ROAD FROM ETHNIC MOBILIZATION TO INTERCOMMUNAL VIOLENCE: A COMPARISON OF KURDISH PROBLEM IN TURKEY AND NORTHERN IRELAND CONFLICT

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED
BY
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Abstract

Although there is an abundance of studies on ethnic civil war, most studies are not able to specify which ethnic dyads are likely to come into conflict with one another and why some countries in transition experience no violence at all. This research contributes to this gap in the literature based on the comparison of Kurdish problem in Turkey and Northern Ireland conflict. It questions more specifically why Kurds and Turks did not turn into communal groups in conflict despite the ethnic insurgency of the PKK whereas the ethnic insurgency of the IRA spoiled over into Protestant and Catholic communities in Northern Ireland by warring republican and loyalist paramilitaries. This research expands the range of instrumental-institutional explanations in line with electoral incentive arguments. The comparison of Northern Ireland conflict and Kurdish problem in Turkey reveals that political competition based on cross-cutting cleavages such as the case of center-periphery cleavage in Turkey serves to circumvent ethnic polarization during ethnic insurgency since political parties and governments are able to appeal to ethnic minority, include ethnic minority leaders in their minimum winning coalition, and restrain themselves from promoting exclusive frames against ethnic minority. Political competition based on overlapping cleavages in closely contested systems such as the case of unionist-nationalist cleavage in Northern Ireland produces political parties and governments supported exclusively by majority ethnic group, de-motivates political parties which hold the support of majority to include ethnic minority leaders into their minimum winning coalition and encourages them to use exclusive frames against minority in order to bond their constituency. This political divide is vulnerable to ethnic polarization which can explode into interethnic conflict under the impact of negative catalysts.

This study directs another puzzle probing into which localities are more riot prone in Turkey and Northern Ireland. Through semi-structured interviews in Northern Ireland and

Turkey, this study demonstrates that in Northern Ireland, communal tensions still boil in "tectonic boundaries", the interfaces which refer to the places where intercommunal violence occurred and where segregated Protestant and Catholic communities meet. Concentrating on "lynching" incidents against Kurds, this study demonstrates the spatial and temporal variation of communal violence against Kurds in Turkey between 1999 and 2012 based an original data collected from a Turkish source (*Cumhuriyet* newspaper) and a Kurdish source (*Özgür Gündem* and *Dicle Haber Ajansı*). This study argues that the change of political opportunity structure provided by democratization and increased pluralism toward Kurdish entailed three consequences influential on the rise and spatial distribution of communal violence against Kurds: boundary activation with regard to Kurdish identity especially in Western Turkey, the opportunity for collective violence due to decreased repression against Kurdish identity and rise of riot networks which are more mobile in statist-nationalist localities of Western Turkey.

Keywords: Ethnic Insurgency, Intercommunal conflict, Kurdish problem, Northern Ireland conflict, lynching against Kurds

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Özet

Etnik sivil savaşlar üzerine birçok araştırma yapılmasına rağmen, araştırmalar hangi etnik grupların birbirleriyle çatışmaya girdiklerini ve geçiş sürecindeki bazı ülkelerin neden etnik şiddet göstermediklerini açıklayamamaktadır. Bu araştırma, literatürdeki bu boşluğa Türkiye'deki Kürt sorunu ve Kuzey İrlanda çatışmasını karşılaştırarak katkı sunmaktadır. Spesifik olarak, IRA etnik ayaklanmasının birlik yanlısı ve cumhuriyetçi paramiliter gruplar aracılığıyla Protestan ve Katolik topluluklarına yayılmasına karşılık, PKK etnik ayaklanmasının neden Kürtleri ve Türkleri çatışma içerisindeki gruplara dönüştürecek şekilde yayılmadığını sorgulamaktadır. Bu araştırma seçim teşviği argümanlarıyla paralel olarak kurumsal-araçsal açıklamalara katkı sunmaktadır. Türkiye'deki Kürt sorunu ve Kuzey İrlanda karşılaştırması göstermektedir ki ortak karşıtlıklar üzerine siyasi rekabet, Türkiye'deki merkez-çevre karşıtlığı gibi, etnik azınlığa hitap edebilen siyasi partiler ve hükümetler üreterek, siyasi partileri minimum kazanç koalisyonuna etnik azınlık liderlerini entegre etmesi için teşvik ederek ve etnik azınlığa karşı dışlayıcı söylemlerin siyasi liderler tarafından desteklemesini engelleyerek etnik savaş sürecinde etnik kutuplaşmayı azaltıcı bir etki göstermektedir. Etnik gruplarla siyasi partilerin örtüştüğü çok yakın bir rekabette ise, Kuzey İrlanda'daki birlik yanlısı ve milliyetçiler arasındaki siyasi rekabet gibi, sadece çoğunluktaki etnik grup tarafından desteklenen siyasi partiler hükümet olur, çoğunluğun desteklediği siyasi partiler azınlıktaki etnik grubun liderlerini kendi minimum kazanç koalisyonlarına dâhil etme ihtiyacı duymazlar ve siyasi partiler kendi tabanlarını birleştirmek için diğer etnik gruba karşı dışlayıcı söylemler üretmekten çekinmezler. Bu tür bir siyasi yarış etnik polarizasyona daha yatkındır ve negatif katalizörler altında etnik gruplar arası çatışmaya dönme olasılığı daha yüksektir.

Bu çalışma ayrıca bir başka soru daha yöneltmektedir ve ülkeler içerisinde hangi bölgelerin daha çok etnik çatışmaya yatkın olup olmadığını sorgulamaktadır. Bu çalışma,

Kuzey İrlanda ve Türkiye'de gerçekleştirilen yarı-yapılandırılmış mülakatlarla, Kuzey İrlanda'da etnik tansiyonların hala "tektonik sınırlarda", Protestan ve Katolik mahalleleri birbirinden ayıran ve etnik çatışmanın yoğunlukta yaşandığı ara bölgelerde daha fazla yaşandığını göstermektedir. Bu araştırma, Kürtlere karşı gerçekleştirilen linç olaylarına yoğunlaşarak, Türkiye'de Kürtlere karşı gerçekleşen toplumsal şiddetin 1999-2012 arasında mekânsal ve zamansal değişimini bir Türk (Cumhuriyet) ve bir Kürt (Özgür Gündem ve Dicle haber Ajansı) kaynak kullanarak göstermektedir. Bu çalışma demokratikleşme ve Kürt kimliğine karşı artan çoğulculukla birlikte siyasi yapıdaki değişimin Kürtlere karşı toplumsal şiddetin yükselmesi ve mekânsal değişiminde etkili üç sonuç yarattığına dikkat çekmektedir: Kürt kimliğinin kamusal alanda tanınmasıyla kimlik sınırlarının aktivasyonu, azalan devlet şiddetiyle birlikte toplumsal şiddetin artması için olanağın artması ve özellikle Batı Türkiye'de ayaklanma çıkartabilecek ağların devletçi-milliyetçi eğilimli mahallelerde artması ve daha hareketli olması.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Etnik ayaklanma, Etnik gruplar arası çatışma, Kürt sorunu, Kuzey İrlanda çatışması, Kürtlere karşı linçler

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Abbreviations

AKP	Justice And Development Party (Adalet Ve Kalkınma Partisi)
ANAP	Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi)
AP	Justice Party (Adalet Partisi)
AP	Alliance Party
BDP	Peace and Democracy Party (Barış Ve Demokrasi Partisi)
BP	Union Party (Birlik Partisi)
CGP	Republican Trust Party (Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi)
CHP	Republican People's Party (Cumhriyet Halk Partisi)
CKMP	The Republican Peasant Nation Party (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi)
DDKD	Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Associations (Devrimci Doğu Kültür Dernekleri)
DDKO	Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths (Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları)
DEHAP	Democratic People's Party (Demokratik Halk Partisi)
DEP	Democracy Party (Demokrasi Partisi)
DIHA	Dicle Haber Ajansı
DP	Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti)
DSP	Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti)
DTP	Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi)
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party
DYP	True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi)
FP	Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi)
GFA	Good Friday Agreement
GP	Trust Party (Güven Partisi)
HADEP	People's Democracy Party (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi)
HDP	Peoples' Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi)
HEP	People's Labour Party (Halkın Emek Partisi)
HP	Freedom Party (Hürriyet Partisi)
IHD	Human Rights Association (İnsan Hakları Derneği)
IMC	Independent Monitoring Commission
INLA	Irish National Liberation Army
IPLO	Irish People`s Liberation Organization
IRA	Irish Republican Army
MAR	Minority At Risk Project
MDP	Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi)
MGK	National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu)
MHP	Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi)
MLA	Member of Legislative Assembly
MNP	National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi)
MP	Nation Party (Millet Partisi)
MP	Member of Parliament
MSP	National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi)
NICRA	Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association
NILP	Northern Ireland Labor Party
NP	Nationalist Party
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdîstan)

PSNI	Police Service of Northern Ireland
RHC	Red Hand Commandos
RP	Welfare Party (Refah Partisi)
RUC	Royal Ulster Constabulary
SDLP	Social Democratic and Labor Party
SHP	Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti
SP	Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi)
TBP	Turkish Union Party (Türkiye Birlik Partisi)
TIP	Workers' Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi)
TKDP	Democratic Party of Kurdistan-Turkey (Türkiye Kurdistan Demokrat Partisi)
UDA	Ulster Defense Association
UDR	Ulster Defense Regiment
UUUC	United Ulster Unionist Council
UUP	Ulster Unionist Party
UVF	Ulster Volunteer Force
YTP	New Turkey Party (Yeni Türkiye Partisi)

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Puzzle

Violence is not the direct corollary of ethnic conflicts even though the abundance of violent ethnic conflicts in the media propels us to think as if ethnic conflicts were often associated with violence. Interethnic cooperation is far more common than violent ethnic conflict but it is overlooked (Fearon and Laitin 1996). Ethnic conflict can manifest itself in non-violent forms such as protests, demonstrations, civil disobedience acts as well as in violent forms such as insurgency, rebellion, intercommunal violence. Through the endogenous and exogenous dynamics of ethnic conflicts, these forms can evolve in time and space metamorphosing into non-violent and/or violent forms. Yugoslavia became the showcase of the transition from interethnic peace to interethnic war illustrating how a country defined by interethnic cooperation and societal peace can fall into interethnic violence, even genocide (Gagnon 2004, Somer 2001). Conversely, countries known to be highly repressive against minorities and endure high numbers of deaths from civil wars such as Latin American countries in the face of indigenous insurgents, Burma against Karen Insurgency, Spain against Basque insurgency, Turkey against Kurdish insurgency did not experience intercommunal violence in which competing ethnic groups confront each other in violent ways. This research will question the evolution of ethnic group behavior addressing why ethnic mobilization leads to intercommunal violence in some instances and not in others (Table I) based on the comparison of Kurdish problem in Turkey and Northern Ireland conflict in Britain.

Kurdish movements in Turkey faced high state repression and exclusion from political representation with many socio-economic discriminative measures until the 1990s. Despite the heavy human, social, economic costs of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party - *Partiya Karkarên Kurdistan*)-led Kurdish insurgency and stigmatization of Kurdish identity with terrorism through 1990s, Turks and Kurds did not turn into clashing ethnic groups who

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mobilize against each other. The Irish in Northern Ireland faced social, political, economic discriminations after the foundation of Northern Irish state in 1921 (see Walker 2012: 44-86) but the level of repression implemented by Northern Irish state against the Irish remains far milder compared to that of Turkish state which engaged in excessive assimilationist and repressive policies against Kurds. The Irish were embedded in a more democratic nation-state like Britain and had a political representation in Northern Ireland Parliament which enjoyed a devolved administration between 1921 and 1972. Nevertheless, the rising civil rights movements in 1960s gave way swiftly to intercommunal attacks in Northern Ireland which reenergized paramilitary organizations and communal divisions. The violence in Northern Ireland - starting at the end of 1960s was not limited to the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)'s war against the British state but took place also between republican and loyalist paramilitary groups that emerged as defenders of nationalist Catholic and unionist Protestant communities respectively and held the monopoly of intercommunal violence. Therefore, this research probes into the evolution of ethnic conflict behavior and mechanisms which drive ethnic mobilization into intercommunal violence based on the comparison of Northern Ireland conflict and Kurdish problem in Turkey. It seeks to answer the following question: Although the Irish enjoyed greater political rights and regional government compared to Kurds in Turkey, why did Northern Ireland conflict turn into intercommunal violence whereas Kurdish problem did not?

This study concentrates on intercommunal conflict not only at macro-level but also at micro-level in parallel with recent studies which look into the spatial variation of intercommunal violence within countries. Thus, this study directs another puzzle looking into the spatial variation of ethnic violence in Northern Ireland and Turkey. In Turkey, there has been a significant increase in communal violence against Kurds after 2005 (Gambetti 2007). In Northern Ireland, although the paramilitary violence significantly dampened down after the

Good Friday Agreement (GFA), there are ongoing communal tensions in "tectonic boundaries", the interfaces which refer to the places where intercommunal violence occurred and where segregated Protestant and Catholic communities meet. Concentrating on "lynching" incidents against Kurds, this study demonstrates the spatial and temporal variation of communal violence against Kurds in Turkey between 1999 and 2012 and discusses the reasons of ongoing communal tensions in Northern Ireland.

1.2. Concepts: Ethnicity, Ethnic Conflict and Intercommunal Violence

Ethnicity is one of the markers which identify individual and collective identity and it has an impact on social relations like other type of identifications such as gender, occupation, religion. Many studies delve into the impact of ethnicity on citizenship policies (Joppke 2005, Brubaker 1992), economic relations (Hechter 1975, Model 1985), language choice (Laitin 1998) or dynamics of conflict (Hale 2008, Hardin 1997, Fearon and Laitin 2003). The news about ethnic violence and civil war which came into public limelight especially in the second half of twentieth century belied the assumption of modernization theory on national identities that predicted that modernization would bring about the assimilation of different ethnic groups and would erode ethnic differences. Even in the most multicultural and cosmopolitan cities such as New York, assimilation did not overshadow ethnic differences; ethnicity maintains its importance regardless of educational attainment, socio-economic level, social mobility and level of assimilation (Nelson 1982). In many European countries, multicultural policies do not find considerable support when it comes to naturalization and citizenship policies toward immigrants (Joppke 2005). Moreover, ethnic conflicts in post-Soviet countries prove that ethnic differentiation does not disappear off the radar despite state-imposed affirmative action policies.

How to explain this resurfacing of ethnicity? Four main theories of ethnicity have discussed so far the waxing and waning of ethnic identities. Primordialists assume that

ethnicity is fixed and locally rooted (Geertz 1963, Van den Berghe 1995, Connor 1994, Grosby 1994). The consanguinity relationship between co-ethnics brings about kinship and affection ties. Not naturally antagonistic, ethnic ties shape the lens through which individuals and collectives pursue their interests. In face of perceived threats against one's ethnic group, the threat to ethnic kin means the threat to your family, thus, ethnic bonds provide solidarity between co-ethnics. Primordialist account succeeds in explaining psychological-emotional ties between co-ethnics, but remains insufficient to explore the construction and evolution of ethnic identities. Many identities that we think as antagonistic today such as "Hutu" -"Tutsi" in Rwanda, "Sinhala", Tamil" in Sri Lanka, "Arab"- "African" in Sudan were just tools of classification imposed by colonial powers to imagine their dominion. Many studies reveal that the content of these ethnic categories changed over time (Prunier 1995, Deng 1995, Kapferer 1988, Anderson 1983). Furthermore, primordialists cannot elucidate why ethnic conflicts flourished especially at the start of 1950s if it was the driving mechanism of group mobilization. While primordialists conceive ethnicity in a continuous relationship between past and present, modernist argument perceives ethnic identity as a relic of pre-modern times which will be assimilated into the core culture. Modernization which was stirred up either by industrialization (Gellner 1983), uneven development of capitalism (Nairn 1977) or print-capitalism (Anderson 1983) was presumed to transform heterogeneous societies bonded either by tribal, clan, religious or ethnic ties into homogenous groups and to create a common communicative space by mass education, ease of transportation and increasing division of labor. Nonetheless, this homogenization did not realize as it was expected to be; modernization process even generated a counter effect clarifying and consolidating ethnic identities by drawing distinct people into local enclaves and increasing interaction among them in urban contexts (Calhoun 1997).

Against the macro-structural approach of modernist argument, instrumentalists concentrate on the individual choice of identification. Conceiving individual as rational interest-maximizer, ethnic identification occurs when individuals perceive advantages in ethnic group membership for the competition of scarce resources such as economic advantages, political power and status gains. Instrumental arguments are mostly used to explain elite behavior. Given the affection and solidarity ties created by ethnic and national identities, ethnic bonds serve to be instruments of maneuver for elites to garner mass support in the pursuit of collective and individual interests. Instrumental accounts covered an extensive area of ethnicity and nationalism studies. They explain mostly the politicization of ethnicity: ethnic mobilization in Africa (Bates 1983), language choices in the post-Soviet world (Laitin 1998), feelings of belonging (Hardin 1997), norm formation (Bhavnani 2006, Bhavnani and Backer 2000). However, instrumentalist accounts fall short to explain why masses follow ethnic leaders if elites pursue their own interests and how ethnic ties invoke psychological-emotional bonds. Constructivists accentuate socially constructed nature of ethnicity because ethnic identities evolve through time and space. "Tutsi" and "Hutu" in Rwanda referred to class position rather than ethnic identity in pre-colonial times (Prunier 1995). While surveys pointed to inter-ethnic peace in Yugoslavia, economic crisis and state dissolution brought about the crystallization of identities (Woodward 1995). Arab identity in Sudan stemmed from the assimilation of Africans into Arab culture but this constructed differentiation between Arabs and African blocked a north-south national integration in Sudan (Deng 1995).

This research adopts a constructivist approach in agreement with Brubaker (2004) who asserts identity as a fluctuating variable open to evolution and reconstruction. Rather than taking identities as fixed and distinct, this research concentrates on the process of ethnicizaiton. Besides, the content of ethnic identities used in this research underwent changes

in time. Kurdish identity is defined not only by political and cultural diversity (Turk, Persian or Arab) but also localized understanding of its relationship to the respective hegemonic national identity (Hirschler 2001: 145). While the boundaries of Protestant and Catholic identities were more blurred in the past, the political controversy over the status of Northern Ireland and the ensuing violence tamed the bridging capital between them while solidifying the binding capital within Protestant and Catholic communities (McGarry and O'Leary 1995). Furthermore, ethnicity is neither relevant nor necessarily conflictual in every context. The existence of ethnic groups does not necessarily lead to ethnicity-loaded claim-making. For example, voting behavior in Mali is shaped more not by ethnic ties but by cousinage ties since people find cousinage ties more trustworthy (Thad and Lauren 2010). Ethnicity even can turn into a guarantee of political stability in some contexts. In Latin America, the fact that many ethnicities with low numbers cohabite precludes the emergence of a dominant ethnicity and contributes to interethnic peace with ethnic parties capable to reach out to the members of other ethnic groups (Madrid 2008). Extreme ethnic fractionalization in Papua New Guinea helps to assure an interethnic cooperation since there is no ethnic group large enough to monopolize political power and dominate other ethnicities (Reilly 2000/2001). Even though activists demand education in indigenous rights in Quechua highlanders in Peru, indigenous people oppose for status advantages to education in the local vernacular (Garcia 2003). Even ethnic regime types based upon membership-expression axis which are shaped in the long run and seldom change, are mutable when counterelites representing ethnic grievances develop a new discourse on ethnicity and nationality policies and rise to power as a hegemonic majority (Aktürk 2011).

The assumption of comparative studies based on the conflictual character of ethnic identities underwent refinement and emanation by recent studies. In 50s and 60s, ethnic diversity was couched as an obstacle to democratization and political stability in comparative

political studies. Almond (1956) posited a positive relationship between ethnic fractionalization and social conflicts. Especially for the new independent states of post-colonial countries, ethnic fragmentation and tribalism were supposed to endanger democratization process. Robert Dahl's *Polyarchy* (1971) argues that pluralism can perversely generate an impediment to the rise of "tolerance and mutual security for public contestation" (Dahl 1971: 109-111). Lijphart purports that more than three, four ethnic groups in democracy will put peaceful management of ethnic conflict in peril since "co-operation among groups becomes more difficult as the number participating in negotiations increases" (Lijphart 1977:56). Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) argue that ethnic fractionalization is likely to undermine democratic prospects since political leaders engage in "ethnic outbidding". They argue that politicians serve from ethnic distinctions in society to mobilize voters which, in turn, lead to politicization of ethnicities and extreme ethno-political positions against moderates. Ethnic conflicts are identified in most cases as intractable conflicts locked in impasse by the incompatible goals of competing parties. Its intractability stems from the fact that ethnic violence can trigger the spiral of counter-violence especially in weak states which is likely to render the conflict self-perpetuating. Many studies trumpet the proliferation of violent ethnic conflicts in the world which replace intrastate wars (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2000, Gurr 1993b). However, large-N studies reveal that ethnic and religious diversity do not, in itself and by itself, provoke civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003, Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Mousseau (2001) demonstrates that ethnic divisions do not constitute a source of conflict unless they do not overlap with other factors. Besides, not any contention which occurs along ethnic distinctions are ethnic conflict, the demands must be integral to the concept of ethnicity (Sambanis 2001:261). This study adopts the definition of ethnic violence defined by Brubaker and Laitin:

violence perpetrated across ethnic lines, in which at least one party is not a state (or a representative of a state), and in which the putative ethnic difference is coded-by perpetrators,

targets, influential third parties, or analysts-as having been integral rather than incidental to the violence, that is, in which the violence is coded as having been meaningfully oriented in some way to the different ethnicity of the target (Brubaker and Laitin 1998: 428).

Many variables have been explored and found significant so far in the studies of civil wars: ethnic and religious diversity (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002), state strength (Gurr 1993; Fenton 2004, 2011), elite interests (Gagnon (1994/1995, 2004; Wilkinson 2004; Brass 1997), external actors (Jenne 2004, Brubaker 1996), psychological emotional factors (Kaufman 2001, Petersen 2002), civil society (Varshney 2003), local actors (Kalyvas 2006, Brass 1997), economic grievances (Gurr 1970, 1994; Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch, 2011), ethnic minority power (Buhaug, Cederman, Rød 2008), national identity (Korostelina 2004), geography (Toft 2005). Many established arguments about ethnic mobilization underwent changes with new data and method improvements. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) find with large-N studies that ethnic fractionalization is not correlated with civil war whilst Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis (2002) argue that they are relevant in the prevalence of civil war. Fearon, Kimulikasara and Laitin (2007) demonstrate that ethnic minority leaders in power do not necessarily lead to civil war but Buhaug, Cederman and Rød (2008) using new index of ethno-nationalist exclusiveness which takes into account ethno-geographic location, demonstrate that when demographical significant ethnic groups are excluded from the center, the likelihood of ethno-nationalist war increases. Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argue that not grievance but greed is important in the onset of civil war but Gurr (1993) and recently Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011) display with new spatial methods that grievances of politically relevant ethnic groups are significant in ethno-nationalist war.

This vibrant debate on ethno-nationalist conflict proves that ethnic conflict and ethnic violence are composite and causally heterogeneous (Brubaker and Laitin 1998). Ethnic conflicts do not consist only of ethnic claims, but they are complex process in which local and

national actors take part as well as public and private interests are interconnected (Brass 1997, Kalyvas 2003). Gilley (2004) even purports that no valid inference has been established so far in ethnic studies because of poor conceptualization and over quantification. This hot debate reveals that ethnic conflicts which cover a wide spectrum of territories from Africa to Europe cannot be explained with uniform methods of data collection and theoretical exploration.

As pointed out earlier, ethnic violence can occur in interspersed forms: insurgency, rebellion, interethnic (intercommunal) violence. Violent intercommunal conflict is harder to detect than a rural insurgency which takes place between armed organizations and established state forces because the boundaries between attackers, perpetrators and victims become blurred during the period of interethnic violence. The Minorities at risk project (MAR) provides data on intercommunal conflict for "at-risk groups" on a yearly basis from 1990 to 2000. Its intercommunal conflict data contains information on "open hostilities between the minority group and other communal groups" that include "conflicts with other minorities and the majority or dominant group, but not conflicts with the state, or with dominant groups exercising state power" (MAR 2009). In recent years, theoretical attention to intercommunal conflict and to the forms of group conflict behavior such as riots (Horowitz 2001, Varshney 2003, Wilkinson 2004), pogroms (Brass 2006) have increased. This research intends to contribute to this line of research delving into the causal mechanisms between ethnic mobilization and intercommunal violence based on the comparison of Kurdish problem in Turkey and Northern Ireland conflict in Britain. The fact that countries challenged by long and harsh ethnic insurgency do not exhibit intercommunal clashes disguises important mechanisms of interethnic cooperation which this study explores (see Table I).

The ethnic groups in this study, Kurds in Turkey and Irish/Catholics in the UK are defined as "ethnonationalist" groups in search of autonomy or independence by Minorities at Risk dataset (2009). These cases are designated as "internal wars" in the Armed Conflict

dataset of Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) "between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states". In the Ethnic Armed Conflict data of Wimmer, Cedermann and Min (2009), these cases are categorized as "ethnic armed conflict". However, the level of group conflict behavior is only coded by Minorities at Risk project. According to Minorities at Risk dataset (2009), Kurds in Turkey do not exhibit intercommunal conflict whereas Catholics in Northern Ireland display intercommunal conflict coded at the level of communal rioting from 1980 to 1998. Even the current level of intercommunal conflict in Northern Irelands is coded as intercommunal conflict at the stage of sporadic intercommunal attacks (see Appendix I).

The minorities at risk project (2009) sets forth six levels to measure intercommunal conflict:

1) Individual acts of harassment, no fatalities
2) Political agitation, campaigns urging authorities to impose restrictions on group
3) Sporadic violent attacks by gangs or other small group: Attacks without weapons (e.g., brawls), knives, or few small arms (e.g., one or two handguns) involving fewer than 20 people.
4) Anti-group demonstrations, rallies, marches
5) Communal rioting, armed attacks: Attacks with multiple firearms, automatic weapons, or heavy weaponry (mortars, shelling, etc.) OR attacks without weapons (e.g., brawls), knives, or few small arms (e.g., one or two handguns) involving more than 20 people
6) Communal warfare: More than six clashes a year between antagonists (Minorities at risk project 2009).

Table I. Ethnonationalist Groups Involved in Separatist Activities * in the World

Country	Ethno-Nationalist Group	Intercommunal conflict since 1990**	Intercommunal Conflict, 1940-1989***
No Intercommunal Cases			
Burma	Karens	0	0
Burma	Hill Tribals	0	0
Papua N.G	Bougavillians	0	0
India	Santals	0	0
Syria	Kurds	0	-99
Turkey	**Kurds**	**0**	**0**
Namibia	Basters	0	0
Ethiopia	Nilo-Saharans	0	0
Ethiopia	Eritreans	0	0

Tanzania	Zanzibaris	0	0
Uganda	Konjo/Amba	0	0
Senegal	Diolos in Casamance	0	0
USRR	Germans	0	0
USRR	Estonians	0	0
USRR/Russia	Tatars	0	0
Italy	Sardinians	0	0
Spain	Basques	0	0
France	Bretons	0	0
France	Basques	0	0
UK	Scots	0	0
Canada	Quebecois	0	0

Violent Intercommunal Cases

Burma	Shan	1	0
Chinese	Tibetan	1	0
Sri Lanka	Sri Lankan Tamils	1	1
Philippines	Moros	1	1
Indonesia	East Timorese	1	0
India	Sikhs	1	1
India	Kashmiris	1	0
China	Tibetans	1	0
Israel	Palestinians	1	1
Iraq	Kurds	1	1
Iran	Kurds	0	1
Sudan	Southeners	1	1
Morocco	Saharawis	1	0
Uganda	Baganda	0	1
Georgia	Ossetians (South)	0	1
Georgia	Azhars	1	0
Georgia	Abkhazians	1	0
Russia	Kumyks	1	0
USRR	Georgians	0	1
USRR	Armenians	0	1
Bosnia	Muslim	1	1
Yugoslavia	Slovenes	0	1
France	Corsicans	0	1
UK	**Catholics in Northern Ireland**	**1**	**1**

* I show ethnonationalist groups involved in active separatist or autonomy movement(s) in the 1980s or 1990s. These groups are compiled combining the data in the category 1 "ethnonational groups" of ethno-political group type (TYPE) and in the category 3 "active separatist or autonomy movement(s) in the 1980s or 1990s" of separatism Index (SEPX) of Minorities at Risk Project.

** INTERCON Intercommunal conflict since 1990

Value Label

0 No intercommunal conflict

1 Yes, some intercommunal conflict

*** NOCOMCON Intercommunal Conflict, 1940-1989

Value Label
0 No intercommunal conflict
1 Yes, some intercommunal conflict
Source: Compiled from the Minorities at Risk Project Dataset using the Minorities at Risk Data Generation and Management Program through 2003 (MARGene).

1.3. Kurdish Problem in Turkey and Northern Ireland Conflict

Kurdish principalities enjoyed significant autonomy under the Ottoman Empire and displayed resistance against the centralization efforts of the Ottoman state in nineteenth century. After Turkey sorted as victorious from the War of Independence (1919-1923), the new Republic engaged in state and nation-building which viewed the Muslim ethnic groups assimilable into Turkish national identity as a historical legacy of Muslim *millet* (Aktürk 2009). Modernization initiatives of young republic especially the abolition of Sultanate (1922) and Caliphate (1924) provoked the resistance of Kurdish leaders since these two statuses were of significant importance that ensured the loyalty of tribal and religious Kurdish leaders. Kurdish rebellions between 1923 and 1936 in Kurdish-inhabited regions which challenged the assimilationist and secularist policies of the Turkish Republic marked the Turkish state discourse which constructed Kurdish identity as a threat to its survival and territorial integrity (Yeğen 1999, 2007). The prohibitions on the expressions of Kurdish identity were implemented in order to de-culturalize them such as the bans on the use of Kurdish language in public and private sphere; the right to broadcasting, the rights of press and the right of expression in Kurdish. Politics based upon negation and assimilation of Kurdish identity reached its peak with 1980 coup d'état. The military rule not only suppressed leftist and Kurdish movements with draconian repression but also designed the 1982 Constitution which stoked assimilation policies against Kurdish identity. The assimilation policies and repressive measures against Kurdish identity pumped new life into the PKK which was considered a marginal Kurdish movement at the end of 1970s in pursuit of a pan-Kurdish state by armed resistance. The armed conflict between the Turkish state and the PKK left its bones all over

the place in Turkey disturbing seriously societal peace: intensified distrust between Turks and Kurds, economic underdevelopment of Kurdish-inhabited areas, increased socio-economic inequality between Turks and Kurds, a highly death toll with more than 30 000 lives in thirty years. While the terrorism of the PKK generated the stigmatization of Kurdish identity with terrorism and separatism, the excessive counterterrorism measures of the Turkish state led at some junctures of the war to "dehumanization of Kurds and the neutralization of crimes committed against their identity" (Bozarslan 2003:108). Yavuz and Ozcan (2006) alert that the mismanagement of Kurdish problem in an era of de-securitization of Kurdish identity in 2000s has the risk to whip up ethnic polarization between Kurds and Turks and the potential of small-scale communal conflicts. Hence, one of the main questions which this research seeks to answer: under what conditions can Kurdish problem turn into intercommunal violence?

The roots of the Northern Irish conflict can be traced back to the fifteen and sixteen century with the colonization of the island of Ireland. However, the boundaries between Catholics and Protestants became more salient during the Irish home rule controversy which reached its peak at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. In 1922, the Irish Free State seceded from Britain with twenty-six countries leaving behind six countries, called as Northern Ireland, alleged to the Crown. The status of Northern Ireland became a major contention between Irish nationalists who wanted to join into the Republic of Ireland and British unionists who were attached to the Britain and strongly appalled by a united-Ireland scenario. Northern Ireland was governed by a devolved government between 1921 and 1972 and enjoyed significant autonomy except the matters of foreign policy and budget. Nationalists who represented Catholic/Irish minority were present in the Stormont Parliament (Parliament of Northern Ireland) but did not have a significant voice in politics due to the monopoly of power established by the majority governments of the Ulster Unionist

Party (the UUP) who represented Protestant/British majority. The civil rights movements which challenged the social, economic, political discrimination of Catholics ended up with strengthening the alienation of Catholic minority from Northern Irish state and reenergizing sectarian attacks. The mismanagement of communal tensions and the growing alienation of Catholic minority gave way to the reformation of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and loyalist paramilitary groups. Unable to control intercommunal tensions, London annulled the Stormont Parliament and instituted the direct rule in 1972. The period known as "Troubles" designates this period of intercommunal violence which erupted in 1969 and terminated officially with the 1998 Belfast Good Friday Agreement. This research tries to investigate that while Irish Catholics enjoyed more political rights and endured less state repression compared to Kurds in Turkey, why did Northern Ireland conflict turn into violent intercommunal violence whereas Kurdish problem did not?

Table II. Minority Population in Northern Ireland and Turkey

	Catholics In Northern Ireland	**Kurds in Turkey**
Population	605,639 (1991) 678,462 (2001) 738,033 (2011)[1]	13 300 000[2] (KONDA 2011: 85-93)
Country Population	1,810,800 (2011 Census)	76 667 864 (2013 Census)[3]
Proportion to the Country Population	38.4% (1991) 40,26% (2001) 40,76% (2011)	17,3% (KONDA 2011)
Number of fatalities	3,532 (Sutton 2014)	35,576 (TBMM 2013, 78).

Kurds in Turkey and Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland display many similarities which are of significant importance for ethnic conflict and civil war studies: they have a

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[1] 1991, 2001, 2011 Censuses, Background Information on Northern Ireland Society - Population and Vital Statistics, available at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ni/popul.htm#3 (15 August 2014).

[2] There are no exact figures on the number of Kurdish population in Turkey but the estimates change from 12 to 15 million (18 to 23 percent of the population). See Gunter (2010: XXVII-XXVIII) KONDA (2011a: 91-92), Mutlu (1996), Bruinessen (2011).

[3] Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu (Turkey Statistics Institute, TÜİK), temel istatistikler, available at: http://www.tuik.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelist (15 August 2014).

tradition of resistance against the central state, they are territorially concentrated, they have a history of autonomy, they are transnational populations (Kurds especially in Syria, Iraq, Iran and the Irish in the Republic of Ireland and especially in the USA). Both minority populations were constructed in state discourses as divisive and disloyal. They both faced political exclusion and state repression at some junctures of history. After the foundation of Northern Irish state, Irish Catholics were represented by nationalists but were excluded from political power due to the plurality rule and the hegemony of unionist governments between 1921 and 1972. They faced social, economic and cultural discrimination in the Northern Irish state. However, Kurds in Turkey suffered from excessive assimilation and counterterrorism measures after the foundation of Turkey as a nation-state: the word "Kurd" was a taboo in public space, the defense of basic rights for Kurds was considered as a treason to the Turkish nation until 1990s, pro-Kurdish movements and activists faced strong state repression and were excluded from political sphere until 2000s. Both the Irish in Northern Ireland and Kurds in Turkey were caught between the Scylla of an omnipresent paramilitary organization, the PKK for Kurds and the PIRA for Irish and the Charybdis of a strong state, Turkey and Britain, which imposed excessive counterterrorism policies. Nevertheless, the Irish case in Northern Ireland was not limited to the war of the PIRA against Britain but spilled into a communal war between republican and loyalist paramilitary organizations. Thus, the central puzzle reveals itself: despite the far less state repression and political exclusion, why did Northern Ireland conflict experience intercommunal violence whereas Kurdish problem conflict did not?

1.4. Time Frame

This research situates the emergence of ethnic challenges in its historical context but gives a particular emphasis on two critical events which sharpened ethnic cleavages within countries: the foundation of the Northern Irish state in 1921 and of the Turkish state in 1923

and the emergence of armed organizations which drove the ethnic insurgencies: the rise of the PIRA in 1969 and of the PKK in 1978. These two events entailed serious repercussions on interethnic relations generating a threshold effect in causal process which induced a major change in the outcome of interest by shifting the options and expectations of social actors (Pierson 2008: 182-187). As Pierson notes, "threshold dynamics are likely to be prevalent in circumstances where actors face binary choices and where the choices they favor depend in part on their perception of what others are likely to do" (Pierson 2008: 193). While the foundation of new states pushed societal actors to redefine their national identities and to recast majority-minority relations; the emergence of armed organizations and the ensuing violence brought about important changes in the dynamics of interethnic relations by generating more homogenous collective identities out of the heterogeneity of individual identities, causing major social, human and economic damages to clashing sides, instilling mistrust and hostilities between ethnic groups. The emergence of armed organizations capable to drag masses behind is "a decisive step in the consolidation of violence…Organization means the systematic recruitment, selection, and training of members…the creation of a tradition" (Waldmann 2004: 101-102). I trace the historical development of cases until today to examine their radicalization, evolution and current situation.

1.5. Methodology

This research relies on a most-similar system design which compares similar cases but differs in the outcome of interest. In searching for the reasons of the absence of intercommunal violence during violent ethnic conflict in Turkey, Northern Irish conflict is selected to reduce the number of disturbing variables to be kept under control, thus, in order to facilitate *ceteris paribus* rule. I included Irish case rather than Basque conflict in Spain since not only the Basque conflict did not display intercommunal conflict (Table I) but also the turning points in Kurdish and Irish cases display convergences which make it easier to

follow path-dependencies in both cases such as the foundation of Northern Ireland in 1921 and of Turkey in 1923, the foundation of the PKK in 1978 and the reemergence of the IRA in 1969. Moreover, this study delves into the communalization of ethnic conflict under democratic governments which was not the case of Basques in Spain as Spain was ruled by a dictatorship between 1939 and 1975. From the perspective of intercommunal conflict, most of the intercommunal conflict cases occurred within countries affected by decolonization or dissolution of the USSR. This was not the case of Northern Ireland as it was situated in an established state. Secondly, the "ethnic practice" referring to "the set of activated identities that individuals employ in any given context" (Chandra and Wilkinson 2008: 523) was similar in both countries. Although both Turkey and Northern Ireland are multi-ethnic states, the ethnic categories at play morphed into broader identities as it was the case of Protestant and Catholic identities in Northern Ireland and Turkish and Kurdish identities in Turkey which crystallized into "ethnic practices" during the violent ethnic conflict.

Kurds in Turkey and the Irish in Northern Ireland display many similarities which are of significant importance for ethnic conflict and civil war studies: they have a tradition of resistance against the central state, they are territorially concentrated, they have a history of autonomy, they are transnational populations (Kurds especially in Syria, Iraq, Iran and the Irish in the Republic of Ireland and especially in the USA). Both minority populations were constructed in state discourses as divisive and disloyal. Both the Irish in Northern Ireland and Kurds in Turkey were caught between the Scylla of an omnipresent paramilitary organization, the PKK for Kurds and the PIRA for the Irish and the Charybdis of a strong state, Turkey and Britain, which imposed excessive counterterrorism policies. Both groups were exposed to social, economic, political discrimination. While Catholics were underrepresented in well-paid jobs and overrepresented in unemployment, Kurds in Turkey suffered from economic marginalization and were impoverished due to forced displacement. Nevertheless, in terms of

state repression and political exclusion, Kurds were at a far more disadvantaged position compared to Catholics in Northern Ireland. While the Irish in Northern Ireland had limitations on their cultural practices and were excluded from political power due to plurality rule in political representation; Kurds suffered from forced assimilation policies, Kurdish identity was a taboo in public sphere until 1990s in Turkey, forced displacement was imposed upon them generating a massive internal immigration within Turkey, pro-Kurdish political parties were recurrently closed and reconstituted under the iron hand of the state until 2000s. Thus, Kurdish case represents a far more "negative case" (no intercommunal violence) for the puzzle I am addressing (Goertz and Mahoney 2004). Negative cases are the cases which are expected to generate the outcome of interest but did not. They lessen the risk of overdetermination which is a default of similar case studies (Przeworski and Teune 1970) "by making it difficult to assume that all of the constituent aspects of the historical trajectory, including events, processes, structures, and patterns actually contributed to the outcome" (Emigh 1997: 667).

Moreover, these two cases have been chosen because they (1) allow for both cross-national and cross-temporal comparisons (2) they offer variation on the dependent variable, that is, intercommunal violence in parallel to ethnic armed conflict in Northern Ireland, non-communal violence in parallel to ethnic armed conflict in Turkey. First, I examine the case of Kurdish problem in Turkey in which intercommunal violence did not take place while its passage was presumed to be likely during the war with the PKK due to the widening identity divides between Turks and Kurds. Second, I examine Northern Ireland conflict in which the onset of intercommunal violence was unexpected while the IRA was weakened in 1950s and civil right movements were in search of transforming the system not by force of arms but by civic activism.

From a methodological perspective, I adopt a structured focused comparison across cases. This method is "structured" because I apply established theories of interethnic violence to each of the case under study in order to guide and standardize data collection (George and Bennett 2005: 67-72). This method is "focused" because it only deals with certain aspects of the historical case studies. Throughout the case studies, within-case process tracing is also applied outlining the "tipping" or "critical" points where political opportunities and ethnic conflict dynamics significantly changed.

As most-similar system designs choose smaller population of cases with sufficient causal and conceptual homogeneity that are required for causal inference in the social sciences (Goertz and Mahoney 2005, Ragin 2000), they are bound by scope conditions that limit their generalization. Firstly, the Republic of Ireland played an important role in Northern Ireland conflict as it was an external national actor able to influence domestic politics in Northern Ireland as Catholics viewed it as a national homeland whereas Protestants considered it as a belligerent country in search of a united Ireland. In Kurdish case, there was no independent Kurdish state but Turkish bureaucratic-military establishment had the fear of disintegration called as Sevres Syndrome which likens in many ways to siege mentality of Protestants. As Protestants were devoted to Britain and fearful of a united Ireland but they were unconnected from Britain, Turks were also fearful of a possible pan-Kurdish state as they are surrounded by Kurds living in adjacent states, Iraq, Iran and Syria. The Kurdistan Regional government emerged as an external actor able to affect internal politics after 2003. In addition, the civil war in Syria also strengthened the transnational appeal of pro-Kurdish causes as it was the case of Kobane battle. Secondly, contrary to Catholics who constituted one third of population and lived side by side with Protestants for centuries (although mostly in segregated areas), Kurds constitute 17,3% of Turkey's population (KONDA 2011a: 91-92) and Kurdish migration to Western Turkey accelerated in 1990s (although there was a small

number of Kurdish locals living in Central Anatolia before). From the perspective of communalization of ethnic conflict in entire Turkey, this study concentrates more specifically on post-1980 period with regard to Kurdish problem in Turkey. Today, 34 % of Kurds in Turkey if we do not include North of East Anatolia region or 44% of Kurds in Turkey if we include North of East Anatolia live in regions in which they constitute a minority (Ibid.). Thirdly, the argument developed in this study delves into the possibility of interethnic conflict during ethnic insurgency, thus, it concedes that antiminority sentiments and mutual mistrust rise due to the dynamics of violent ethnic conflict (see Cairns, Wilson, Gallagher and Trew 1995; Bilali, Çelik and Ok 2014).

Another puzzle this research highlights is the reason(s) of the increase in assaults and attacks against Kurds in the last era. This research conceptualizes the "lynching" incidents against Kurds in Turkey as "communal violence" which facilitates the data collection for the study. While communal attacks have decreased significantly in Northern Ireland parallel to conflict resolution process, they increased in Turkey while Kurdish rights were much more improved compared to the previous eras. I created an original dataset of communal violence against Kurds in Turkey collected from a Turkish source (*Cumhuriyet* newspaper) and a Kurdish source (*Dicle Haber Ajansı* and *Özgür Gündem* newspaper). The study demonstrates the spatial and temporal variation of communal violence against Kurds in Turkey. This quantitative data is complemented by qualitative data based on the fieldwork in provinces which display different levels of communal violence. The qualitative data is collected through semi-structured interviews in Muğla, Balıkesir, Bursa and Istanbul with the representatives, activists of pro-Kurdish party. The fieldwork on communal violence against Kurds changed some of the lenses I carried before the fieldwork. For example, while I associated these provinces with some of the established political orientations in Turkey such as Muğla as republican, Balıkesir as nationalist and Bursa as conservative, I realized that this political

orientations are interlinked in local context as there were republican localities of Balıkesir and Bursa whereas conservative places of Muğla, Balıkesir. Nationalism was very much alive in these provinces which became more visible in the 2015 electoral period during which I conducted the fieldwork, April-May 2015. I chose the HDP (*Halkların Demokratik Partisi*, The Peoples' Democratic Party) representatives and activists as primary interviewees since pro-Kurdish party is the primary victim of communal violence and they are among the first parties who intervene into "lynching" incidents against Kurds. Moreover, while I planned to interview only the HDP municipality offices in order to learn about the city-level dynamics, I realized during my interviews in Istanbul that interviewing district representatives gives further insight into local dynamics. In Balıkesir and Istanbul, I had the opportunity to interview the HDP's representatives in different districts. Furthermore, I had the opportunity to conduct informal interviews with many members of the HDP and to learn about their prior and current experiences in the party. I also planned to interview nationalist actors in these localities and I conducted some preliminary interviews with the CHP (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, Republican People's Party) and the MHP (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, Nationalist Action Party) representatives in Ankara on electoral violence in order to learn about questions which could unsettle them, I restrained myself from interviewing them in Muğla, Balıkesir or Bursa with a questionnaire on communal violence against Kurds finding out a more nationalist atmosphere in these three provinces donated with banal items of nationalism during electoral period. I think that by enlarging the study to interethnic cooperation and societal peace for further investigations, it will be more plausible to interview them in these localities. After all, the fieldwork in Northern Ireland and in Turkey have taught me that interethnic cooperation and societal peace are not the diametrical opposition of communal violence, there are sometimes non-violent coexistences with minor interconnections.

Interviews in Turkey began with questions about the violence directed against the pro-Kurdish party to render the interviewees familiar with the violence going on in local context. The questions focusing on the role of local government, police forces and the situation of Kurds in local context followed the introductory questions. In the fieldwork, I realized that there are far more communal violence against party activists than reported even by *Özgür Gündem* and *Dicle Haber Ajansı* and the supposed antagonism between the MHP and the HDP did not hold true for each locality. While most of the interviews are recorded, I did not record some of them since there were times in which the number of interviewees significantly increased making it impossible to follow and there were moments in which interviewees were eyeballing the voice recorder during the "hot" questions such as questions on the role of police forces.

To provide a comparative perspective on communalization of ethnic conflict, I made a comprehensive analysis of Northern Ireland conflict and interrogated why there is still ongoing, although small-scale, communal violence in Northern Ireland. During the period 2013-2014, I have been in Northern Ireland as a visiting scholar at the Center for the Study of Ethnic Conflict of Queen's University of Belfast by the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey's (*Türkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Araştırma Kurumu*, TUBITAK) research scholarship. I collected data based on semi-structured interviews from various sections of Northern Irish society including local deputies, community workers specialized in conflict resolution, ex-paramilitaries. I also conducted informal interviews with residents in North and West Belfast, the most conflictual areas of Northern Ireland. The interviews in Northern Ireland were easier compared to Turkey as I was a foreign researcher which is not in any way related to Northern Ireland conflict. I realized during my fieldwork in Northern Ireland that searching the origins of interlocutor is not peculiar to the interviewees in Turkey. Moreover, Northern Ireland is a far more open and transparent country concerning its ethnic conflict

compared to Turkey as there is a huge number of academic studies realized by different methodologies on Northern Ireland conflict. To give example, while there is an abundant supply of studies on security forces and their relationship with communities in the best-quality academic journals in Northern Ireland, there is a dearth of studies in this subject in Turkey. While I posed some standard questions about the social, economic, political reasons of Northern Ireland conflict to my interviewees, I also posed open-ended questions according to their specialization.

1.6. Interethnic Cooperation in Turkey and Northern Ireland

This part discusses how ethnic diversity in Turkey and in Northern Ireland were managed in order to show the minorities' socio-political situation in these two countries. The rise of violent ethnic conflicts triggered the discussion over institutional crafting to manage ethnic diversity and to institute interethnic cooperation within nation-states. While Lijphardt, Horowitz and Hechter propose specific institutions designs to prevent ethnic tensions and to promote interethnic cooperation, Roeder and Rothchild offer power-sharing arrangements to manage interethnic relations.

One of the leading scholars of comparative politics, Lijphardt proposes "consociational democracy" approach which hinges on grand coalitions representing ethnic heterogeneity. The main tenets of this coalition entail minority veto power, proportional representation in voting system, public sector recruitment and segmental autonomy in the cultural sector (Lijphart 1977: 25-52). Northern Ireland enjoyed significant autonomy due to the devolved government except for budget and foreign policy. While the unionist governments ruled this devolved government until its suspension in 1972, nationalists did not have a significant voice in the political system since they were constantly remained in opposition due to the plurality rule of Northern Irish parliamentary democracy. None of the

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Turkish Constitutions refer to the existence of ethnic groups in Turkey or design specific institutions to promote interethnic cooperation. Contrary to consociational approach, 1982 Constitution was designed to set up strong and stable governments and instituted ten per cent threshold to prevent the representation of small parties. This threshold works to the consternation of pro-Kurdish political parties which had a voter potential between four and six per cent until 2015. Moreover, 1982 constitution tightened the bans on Kurdish identity such as the right to education, publishing, broadcasting in Kurdish. Furthermore, except for the early periods of the SHP (Social Democratic Populist Party, *Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti*)-DYP (True Path Party, *Doğru Yol Partisi*) coalition government, none of the governments included pro-Kurdish party or changed the ten per cent threshold to allow their existence in Parliament.

Horowitz criticizes consociational democracy approach because grand coalitions are inapplicable in societies marred by severe ethnic divisions and this theory offers no incentives for majority to enter into collaboration with minorities (Horowitz 2003: 15). Horowitz proposes electoral and territorial incentives to promote five main ways of interethnic cooperation:

Prevent the domination of one or more ethnic group by fragmenting their support
Create incentives for ethnic groups notably for majority to engage in interethnic negotiation
Encourage multi-ethnic coalitions
Maintain fluidity and balance between ethnic groups to prevent bifurcation or permanent exclusion of certain ethnic groups
Increase the proportionality between votes and seats so as to prevent minority government (Horowitz 2000: 632).

Turkey is a unitary state marked by "Sevres syndrome", fear of disintegration by secessionist movements. No special electoral or territorial arrangements for Kurds are implemented in Turkey even cultural rights were rejected until 1990s since they were regarded potentially conducive to separatism. Britain is a unitary state with varying

devolution rights to Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland had a devolved administration and was dependent on the UK government for budgeting and foreign policy between 1921 and 1972. Nonetheless, this autonomy did not favor the inclusion of ethnic diversity, to the contrary, brought about a unionist/Protestant rule which maintained its hegemony in society through the social, political, economic discrimination of Catholics.

Hechter (2000) considers nationalism firstly as a political phenomenon which emerges from the disjuncture between "governance unit" and nation. The indirect rule of multicultural empires inhibited nationalist movements because local elites were satisfied with their competences to self-govern. Thus, Hechter offers de-centralization, more in the form of federation as a conflict-resolution mechanism. However, Hechter (2004) alerts that federation in multiethnic states is a "gamble" because federal institution can feed ethnic mobilization while de-mobilizing ethno-nationalist violence. In Turkey, any form of decentralization for Kurdish problem face strident critiques posed by state and political elites under the pretext that it would constitute the first step toward Kurdish independence. The main impetus for Turkish opposition to an autonomous Kurdistan government in Northern Iraq stemmed from the fear that it could motivate Turkey's Kurds for self-government. Different from Turkey, Britain did not consider de-centralization as a matter of existential threat. The consent of majority was always emphasized by the British governments concerning Northern Ireland's constitutional status. But this ostensibly liberal approach could not appeal to Irish nationalists because the majority always insinuated the consent of Protestant majority.

Roeder and Rothchild (2005) propose a comprehensive power-division theory as a mechanism of conflict resolution. The theory offers three fundamental instruments of power-division: civil liberties, multiple majorities, and checks and balances. The first instrument, civil liberties, aims at enforcing individuals against governments' abuse of power. The second

instrument, multiple majorities, allocates power to enhance the participation of cross-cutting majorities to decision-making process. Checks and balances systems intend to hinder the abuse of power in the hands of majorities. Power-division theory supports presidential over parliamentary systems, bicameral over unicameral legislatures and urges impartial and independent judiciaries which monitor executive and legislative power. Turkey is governed by a parliamentary system with a unicameral legislature. Moreover, checks and balances system especially judicial review did not function to the favor of inclusion of ethnic minorities. The Constitutional Court in Turkey entrenched in dominant socio-political alliances was selective in its activism on human rights and was opposed to the expansion of Kurdish rights by the recurrent decisions on banning of pro-Kurdish parties (Belge 2006). Northern Ireland had also a bicameral legislature but the Senate had no political impact. Like Turkey, the justice system could not be considered as "impartial" since these were unionists who composed the dominant staff of courts and they were charged with monitoring and implementing the laws of the unionist governments between 1921 and 1972.

1.7. Theories of Intercommunal Violence

1.7.1. Structural Explanations

Structural explanations give emphasis on macro-structural transformations especially state failures, critical junctures, emerging state of anarchy or the role of external forces on the emergence of ethnic violence. Strong states can control ethnic violence by concession or repression while the weak states cannot (Gurr 1993b). The dissolution of states, notably of multi-ethnic empires after the First World War triggered inter-ethnic violence along with major mass exodus (Fenton 2004, Barkey and Von Hagen 1997, Smith 1986). According to structural explanations, macro-structural transformations enable inter-ethnic security dilemmas. The collapse of multi-ethnic empires created a situation of anarchy which led to ethnicization of conflicts (Banton 2000: 484). Jenne (2004) examining the changing claims of

minorities such as secession, cultural autonomy or affirmative action, finds that the support of external actors for minority demands can backfire ethnic violence by radicalizing minority claims even though the center assures minority rights. Even in the case of repressive states, the absence of external actors' support for minority can contribute to the accommodation of minorities into political system. Brubaker draws attention to triadic relational nexus between nationalizing state, national minorities and external national homeland which can drive the outbreak of interethnic violence (Brubaker 1996).

The countries which host minorities in this study, Britain and Turkey are strong countries capable to implement and to enforce law and order against ethno-nationalist challenges. In the case of Turkish state, Turkish security forces were able to embark upon excessive repressive measures against Kurdish rebellions since the early Republican era with the usage of forced displacement, exile, torture and intimidation against Kurdish insurgent leaders and their would-be supporters. The state established an emergency rule in Kurdish-inhabited provinces of Eastern Turkey which lasted between 1987 and 2002. Special institutions such as village guards (*korucular*) and regional governors were founded capable to implement extraordinary powers in order to undercut the support for ethnic insurgency. Not only security forces but also the bureaucratic apparatus with special powers of emergency rule sought to eradicate pro-Kurdish movements and Kurdish activities. Police, prosecutors and most of political elites in Parliament associated the pro-Kurdish party with the PKK terrorism which served to legitimate their exclusion from the political system and repression on their organization (Watts 1999). In Northern Ireland, unionist governments vested the security forces with additional powers of search, arrest, detention by special powers act in 1922. These powers were designed for one year but lasted until the introduction of direct rule in 1972. When the civil rights movements challenged the Ulster Unionist Party in government for the improvement of social, political, economic status of Catholics, the uneven-handed repression

of security forces against nationalist demonstrators and their favoritism to loyalist counterdemonstrators increased the alienation of Catholics from unionist rule and Northern Irish state. The involvement of British army deteriorated the state-society relations by the heavy-handed tactics of crowd control, house searches, interrogation, and daily street patrols. Like excessive counterterrorism measures of the Turkish state, the excessive British counterinsurgency strategies against the PIRA which viewed Catholics as a suspect population intensified the alienation of Catholics from the British state. The internment policy was introduced in 1971 and endowed security forces with considerable security competences to imprison suspects without criminal charges or judicial proceedings. The inconsistencies in its implementation in favor of unionists and loyalists invigorated the cycle of violence facilitating the militant recruitment of the PIRA (Finn 1991).

Considering the issue of support from external states to minority demands in the host state, the Republic of Ireland was considered as a national homeland by Catholics and as a belligerent country in search of a united Ireland by Protestants in Northern Ireland. The role of the Irish Republic and the Britain in Northern Ireland's future led to the perception of a "double majority" problem for Catholics and Protestants since both view themselves as majority entitled to decide on the island's future (Darby 1983, Ferguson 2005). Kurds did not have an external national homeland comparable to the Irish Republic but the foundation of a possible Kurdish state was the worst nightmare of Turkish state and political elite. The suspected British support to Kurdish leaders for autonomy and independence during the negotiations on Sevres treaty stamped Turkish political memory over a possible conspiracy to disintegrate Turkey by the collaboration of internal and external actors. The establishment of 'autonomous Kurdish Region' in Iraq after the first Gulf War was vehemently opposed by the Turkish state. With the establishment of Iraqi Kurdistan government as a federal state after the

US-led war of 2003, Iraqi Kurds emerged as an external actor capable to affect internal politics in Turkey.

1.7.2. Psychological –Emotional Explanations

While the earlier studies consider collective violence as a societal pathology of mob behavior (e.g Le Bon 1913), many studies explore scientifically psychological-emotional component in intercommunal violence such as demonization, victimhood, ethno-centrism, vengeance (Ryan 2007, Horowitz 2000, Kalyvas 2006). The spirit of social paranoia manifests itself during intercommunal violence (Tishkov 1995). The free-rider problem of Downs (1957) in collective action is undercut by the psychological-emotional process of communal violence. Horowitz (2000) explains that the anxiety over status and self-esteem play an important role in motivating people to join in ethnic violence. Ryan (2007) explains intercommunal violence not only by structural explanations (militarization, residential segregation, economic and political underdevelopment) but also by inter-group attitudes (increased ethno-centrism, the reinforcement of the 'enemy image', demonization/sanctification and individuals' entrapment and trauma/ victimhood). Psychological-emotional explanations are criticized for underestimating the role of macro-structural variables and they are unable to explain the timing of communal violence. Bhavnani and Backer (2000) demonstrate with a rational game theory model that genocide took place in Rwanda and not in Brundi because genocidal norms and interethnic trust within the dominant group spread more swiftly in Rwanda. Bhavnani (2006) explains that mass participation in Rwanda genocide is sustained especially by the threat of punishment which disseminated violence-promoting norms among Hutus in Rwanda. Somer (2001) contends that the unpredictability of interethnic violence in Yugoslavia stems from ethnic preference falsification which ensues from the fact that traumatic events, ideological shifts or the

activities of ethnic entrepreneurs provoke cascades of ethnic polarization. Hadjpavlou (2007) demonstrates with a survey in Cyprus that all-encompassing explanations which impute the responsibility of conflict either to internal or external factors are not well-founded because psychological factors which contribute to the duration of interethnic conflict in Cyprus are as significant as internal and contextual factors.

Turkish state discourse was based on the negation of Kurdish identity and assimilation of Kurds into Turkish nation by a civilizing mission to detach Kurds forcefully from their tribal, pre-modern past (Yeğen 1999, 2007). Especially after the foundation of Turkish Republic in 1923, national discourse was grounded upon social darwinienne theories which "presented the relationship between Kurdish and Turkish world as an eternal combat between on one hand progress and civilization and on the other hand between atavism and reactionary" (Bozarslan 2003). Military interventions into civilian politics consolidated the hard core of Turkish nationalism and "led to the mystification of an official, absolute, and monolithic Turkish identity" (Kadıoğlu 1996: 189). The sense of victimization and the debt of vengeance enmeshed in Kurdish memory were transferred through generations (Bozarslan 2003). Through the de-securitization of Kurdish problem in 2000s, Turks lost their belief in the assimilable character of Kurds into society (Yeğen 2007b). Moreover, the psychological-emotional distance between Turkish majority and Kurdish minority grows during the periods of high intensity conflict which facilitate a propitious social environment for the rise of interethnic tensions in Turkey (Bilali, Çelik and Ok 2014).

While Turkish state and political elite bore the hallmarks of "Sevres syndrome", the unionists in Northern Ireland who represented Protestants were endowed with a "siege mentality". They were attached to Britain and were identified as British but they were separated geographically from Britain. They were the majority in Northern Ireland but anxious about losing their social, political economic hegemony in Northern Ireland to the

favor of nationalists. Nationalists who represented Catholics did not accept the legitimacy of the partition of Ireland and they already had a national homeland in the south as the Republic of Ireland. The memories of the IRA of 1920s and 1930s were still alive for unionist political elite after the foundation of Northern Ireland in 1921 and reinforced their perception of Catholic minority as possible supporters of the IRA and of a united Ireland. Unionists were fearful that they would be reduced to a minority in a united Ireland scenario. In a nutshell, unionists were distrustful of Catholics because of their perceived allegiance to the Republic of Ireland and Catholics were frustrated by unionist governments which imposed social, economic, political discrimination against them.

1.7.3. Constructivist Explanations

Constructivists explain how the acts of representation of ethnic identity and the definition of nationhood alter interethnic relations. The definition and content of identities evolve in time and space. "Tutsi" and "Hutu" in Rwanda denoted class status rather than ethnic identity in pre-colonial times (Prunier 1995). While surveys were showing inter-ethnic peace in Yugoslavia, economic crisis and state dissolution brought about crystallization of identities (Woodward 1995). Dumitru and Johnson (2011) demonstrate that state policies can effectively alter inter group relations by the usage of inclusive or exclusive mechanisms of nation-building. Fenton (2004) argues that religion as well as ethnic hatred should not be treated as fixed since these bonds are mobilized under specific conditions, especially under the traumatic conditions of state destabilization.

The assimilation policies of the Turkish Republic constructed Kurds as "mountain Turks" that descended from ancient Turkish tribes and forgot their Turkish identity in time. Kurdishness symbolized the resistance of religion, periphery and tradition against the Kemalist project of a western, national, central and secular state (Yeğen 1999). The image of Kurds as "mountain Turks" changed in 1990s with more liberal policies toward Kurdish

problem and the intensification of armed conflict between the PKK and the state. Kurdishness became stigmatized with separatism and terrorism through the war between the PKK and the Turkish state. Kurds who suffered from state-induced forced displacement were taunted by urban forms of xenophobia and discrimination in major provinces. The distrust between Kurds and Turks heightened while the number of victims from the fiercest fighting between the PKK and the state increased. Turkish media began to mention Jewish roots of Kurds in 2000s which insinuated the loss of belief in the possibility of assimilation of Kurds into Turkish nation by searching their non-Muslim roots (Yeğen 2007b). While Kurds became more visible in Western Turkey's urban areas in 2000s, negative stigmas against Kurdish migrants proliferated in urban space (Saraçoğlu 2010).

During the colonization of Ireland in the fifteenth and sixteenth century, Britain displayed suspicion toward local Irish leaders due to Spanish and French expeditions into the Ireland and the possibility of collaboration between Catholic powers. The psychological distance between the settler and the native began to enlarge in the eighteenth century as laws based on Catholic exclusion from property ownership, representation in parliament, participation in certain professions were put into effect. Catholics were subversive and disloyal in the eyes of state and the monarchy (Coakley 2011). The discrimination against Catholics brought about more cohesive Catholic/Irish identity which organized into subversive movements in eighteenth and nineteenth century. While the boundaries of Northern Ireland were drawn to the favor of unionists/Protestants in 1921, all cultural symbols and political institutions bore the mark of their dominance. Catholics were construed as "other", subversive, rebellion and lazy. During the period of intercommunal violence which began late 1960s and ended late 1990s, the PIRA was the principal enemy of the British state and the Catholic Irish turned into the suspect community for most of the British people (Hillyard 1993: 257–259).

1.7.4. Instrumental and Institutional explanations

Institutional explanations address the role of elites in exploiting ethnic tensions in pursuit of power (Gagnon 1994/1995, Brass 1997, Wilkinson 2004). Instrumental explanations complement institutional explanations since elites' bid to feed or demobilize ethnic tensions change according to the interests shaped by institutional structures. Thus, agent preferences interact with with institutional factors that shape and constrain behavior. Gagnon (1994/1995) purports that elites in Yugoslavia manipulated ethnic cleavages to de-mobilize reformist challenges against the *status quo*. Marx (1998, 2003) demonstrates that divided elites attempt to consolidate their power and bolster state legitimacy by strategic exclusion of different ethnic, religious or racial groups. The military entrenched in complex interests with bureaucratic-administrative elite fueled interethnic violence in Pakistan (Haleem 2003). Wilkinson (2004) refutes the "weak state, more violence" explanations, if elites wanted to prevent violent interethnic riots in India, even a weak state like India could have stopped them (Wilkinson 2004: 85). According to his electoral incentive argument, town level electoral incentives explain where inter-ethnic riots break out and state-level electoral incentives predetermine where and when political authorities use security forces to intervene in riots. Varshney (2002) puts forward the importance of civic ties and argues that vibrant interethnic associational activism contains interethnic tensions by bridging interethnic differences. For Brass (1997), "institutionalized riot systems", which denote the networks between militant groups, police forces and politicians stir up ethnic violence in order to unite ethnic groups around ethnic political entrepreneurs. Elite alignment on the issue of political violence can alter the direction of intercommunal conflict. Ethnic power holders, local actors and individuals can collaborate to denounce co-ethnic fellows during the spiral of violence to triumph over their co-ethnic rivals (Kalyvas 2006). Hewitt (1994) contends that the

divergence between Francophone elites on the issue of political violence in Quebec prevented the political polarization which was likely to exacerbate interethnic tensions.

This research contributes to institutional and instrumental explanations. This research highlights the critical role of political competition and cleavage structure in appeasing or exacerbating interethnic tensions in line with Horowitz's (1991) and Wilkinson's (2004) electoral incentive arguments. The comparison of Northern Ireland conflict and Kurdish problem in Turkey reveals that political competition based on cross-cutting cleavages serves to appease interethnic tensions by producing political parties able to mobilize different ethnic groups toward common political agendas whilst political competition based on overlapping cleavages in a closely contested system brings about ethnic polarization which fuel interethnic violence under the impact of negative catalysts.

1.8. Political Competition, Cleavage Structure and Interethnic Relations

1.8.1. Cleavages, Political System and Ethnicity

The study of cleavages is explored in many strands of sociology and political science such as studies on political violence, voting behavior, democratization and political organization. These studies explore cleavages either from an institutionalist perspective delving into their capacity to develop formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions or from a sociological perspective examining how divisions in societies are metamorphosed into societal cleavages which shape political parties.

What is the meaning of "cleavage"? While Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argue about their capacity to structure political system in their famous work "Party Systems and Voter Alignments", they do not provide a clear definition. Political parties tackle with many issues but apparently not any issue is institutionalized into political system through political actors. Cleavages are mostly confused with issue divisions, oppositions or social divides but they are

distinguished from the latters by their non-contingent and more durable character. They are translated into politics by the hand of political elites. They are durable but not unfaltering. They remain salient as long as political parties which represent them are able to reproduce themselves electorally and institutionally. When parties representing certain cleavages fade away, those cleavages lose their saliency unless they are reactivated by other political actors. Bartolini and Mair (1990) define three parts of cleavages:

An empirical part that refers to social structure
A normative part that refers to values and beliefs that shape group identities
An organizational part that refers to political parties, institutions and organizations.

In sum, issues divisions turn into cleavages "when a particular social divide becomes associated with a particular set of values or identities made politically relevant by means of an organized party or group" (Mair 2006: 373). Cleavages can be considered as "a form of closure of social relationships" (Bartolini and Mair 1990: 216).

Lipset and Rokkan initiated the discussion on the interaction of cleavages with political system contending that social divisions entrenched in socio-economic history of countries have the ability to shape political system since political parties reflect the "stable system of cleavages and oppositions in national political life" (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 32). In their account, Protestant reformation and industrial revolution were two ground-breaking events which structured social divides in Europe and were institutionalized in Western European political system. Duverger (1951) views electoral institutions as capable to structure political system. This argument is challenged by authors who highlight the role of political actors in articulating and reforming social divisions. Although they cannot automatically restructure cleavages, political elites have also a role to play in the reshaping of social divisions (Przeworski and Sprague 1981). Przeworski qualifies the role of parties in activating certain cleavages:

Class, ethnicity, religion, race or nation do not happen spontaneously, of themselves, as a reflection of the objective conditions in the psyches of individuals ... [I]ndividual voting behaviour is an effect of the activities of political parties (Przeworski 1985: 99-101).

This top-down argument of cleavage formation is summarized by Neto and Cox:

Politicians can take socially defined groups and combine or recombine them in many ways for political purposes - so that a given set of social cleavages does not imply a unique set of politically activated cleavages, and hence does not imply a unique party system (Amorim Neto and Cox 1997: 150).

Cleavages change according to country and social divisions (Evans and Whitfield 1993, Kitschelt et al. 1999). They not only shape the content of political competition, form the agenda of political parties and of their programs but also structure and delimit the response of political parties to new issues. In Rokkan's words, political cleavages and their interaction with society generate a "structure of political alternatives" (Rokkan 1981). New issues can be incorporated into existing cleavage structure or they can form new cleavages in society. The number, saliency and strength of cleavages in society also affect the capacity of parties to penetrate into different groups of society.

Allardt and Pesonen distinguish between structural and non-structural political cleavages. They note:

some political cleavages correspond to ones differentiating social groups within which solidarity and cohesion already exist on other than purely political grounds, while certain other cleavages lack any such correspondence. Because the latter can be perceived only in the sphere of politics, they are here referred to as non-structural (1967: 325).

Structural cleavages are a "division of the body politic into social groups that are characterized by a personal feeling among their members of belonging together in most walks of life" (ibid). Ethnicity is qualified as a 'structural cleavage' by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and Daalder (1966: 66-67). Many studies show that structural cleavages such as religion and ethnicity gained salience in political systems whereas that of class receded (Dalton 2006: Ch. 8, Esmer and Pettersson 2007, Knutsen, 2007, Saggar 2007).

Ethnic ties are a strategic source for politics since they bring about a sense of self-identification among members of ethnic groups, enhance in-group communication, provide social networks and social control among its members dividing in-group from out-group. Lijphart argues that identity-based differences are more significant than other differences in politics (Lijphart 1979). However, ethnicity is not politically institutionalized in every context as the political structure of a given country can be determined by other cleavages shaped by historical transformation and changing socio-economic conditions. Constructed approaches of ethnicity (Chandra 2004, Horowitz 2000, Laitin 1998, Olzak 1992, Posner 2005) which challenged primordial approaches (Geertz 1973, Rabushka and Shepsle 1972) demonstrate that ethnicity is activated strategically and contingently by political actors. Ethnicity can serve politicians in order to build minimum winning coalitions, disseminate information among homogenous populations, give clear messages about who benefit from political power in case of popular support (Fearon 1999, Chandra 2004).

There is not an isomorphic relationship between ethnic parties and voting behavior as members of ethnic groups can vote for different political parties. The saliency of ethnic cleavages hinges not only on the size and configuration of ethnic groups (Madrid 2008, Posner 2004, Reilly 2006) but also on political system, notably on electoral rules and political party system (Ferrara 2011; Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich 2003). The work of Posner on Africa (2005) shows that people are able to scale up or down their ethnic identity categories using their different ethic traits according to changing rules of political game. The number of ethnic groups and their demographic balance can alter political dynamics in a country. In Latin America, the fact that many ethnicities with low numbers cohabite precludes the emergence of a dominant ethnicity and ethnic parties use popular appeals to reach out to other ethnic groups (Madrid 2008). Extreme ethnic fractionalization in Papua New Guinea enables interethnic cooperation since no ethnic group can monopolize power and dominate other

ethnicities (Reilly 2006). The proportional representation increases the number of parties positively with higher ethno-linguistic fractionalization (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994, Amorim-Neto and Cox 1997, Cox 1997, Benoit 2002). Ferrara (2011) shows that electoral concentration plays a significant role on the shaping of party system. He shows that the presence of ethnically concentrated groups has a larger impact on the number of parties than decentralization or proportional electoral systems. In majoritarian systems, they also push small parties into broader coalitions. Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich (2003) display that the additive and interactive combination of ethnic fragmentation, ethnic concentration and electoral institutions explain the largest amount of variance in the number of parties in Africa.

1.8.2. Cross-Cutting Cleavages, Overlapping Cleavages and Interethnic Violence

Politically relevant cross-cutting cleavages decrease the saliency of ethnic cleavages by introducing a variety of political identifications among members of different ethnic groups. When political cross-cutting cleavages are dominant, it will be easier to appeal to multiple ethnic groups and build multi-ethnic coalitions. The roots of this argument lay down on the basic sociological assumption that overlapping cleavages exacerbate social conflicts whereas cleavages which cut across social groups moderate them. The argument on the moderating role of cross-cutting cleavages on social conflicts goes back to the works of Ross (1920), Simmel (1955) and Coser (1956). Simmel speaks of "cocentric circles" which "do not allot any special position to the person who participates in them, because participation in the smallest of these groups already implies participation in the larger groups" (1955: 147). "Concentric circles" increases individualization as "These patterns [of group affiliation] had the peculiarity of treating the individual as a member of a group rather than as an individual, and of incorporating him thereby in other groups as well...." (1955: 139). Membership into several groups increases individuals' freedom of choices as no group is able to dominate their

choices with varying options connected to different group allegiances. Commenting on Simmel's work, Coser (1956) argues:

The interdependence of antagonistic groups and the crisscrossing within such societies of conflicts, which serve to 'sew the social system together' by cancelling each other out, thus, prevent disintegration along one primary line of cleavage (1956: 80).

Dahrendorf supports that superimposed conflicts are much more intense than conflicts which cut across many groups:

different conflicts may be, and often are, superimposed in given historical societies, so that the multitude of possible conflict fronts is reduced to a few dominant conflicts. I suggest that this phenomenon has considerable bearing on the degree of intensity and violence of empirical conflicts (Dahrendorf 1959: 213).

Summarized by Rae and Taylor, cross-cutting cleavages introduce two important implications which change the nature and evolution of social conflicts: they bring about a moderation in individual behavior because individuals who are "cross-pressured" across many groups access to more options and group allegiances. Secondly, these cross-pressures reduce the tendency to partisanship and aggressiveness among groups, thus, it is easier to enhance compromises and to produce collaboration across groups (Rae and Taylor 1969: 534-536).

This moderator role of cross-cutting cleavages is also underlined in democratization studies as cross-cutting groups enhance democratic stability by facilitating the compromise and collaboration across disparate voices (Dahl 1965: 378, Sartori 1969, Schattschneider 1960: 67–68, Almond 1956, Lipset 1963). It is easier to solve conflicts in a society where ethnic, religious or class differences are dispersed vertically across groups than in a society divided horizontally between ethnic, religion, class lines. The congruence between political parties and social cleavages intensifies social conflicts since there is no group to build bridges across divergent forces. As summarized by Lipset:

The available evidence suggests that the chances for stable democracy are enhanced to the extent that groups and individuals have a number of cross-cutting, politically relevant affiliations. To the degree that a significant proportion of the population is pulled among

conflicting forces, its members have an interest in reducing the intensity of political conflicts (1963: 77-78).

Dahl (1965) introduces the nature and strength of cleavages into the Duverger`s equation about electoral institutions and political system. Challenging Duverger`s argument that two party systems are more consensual than multi-party systems, he argues that two party systems characterized by a cross-cutting cleavage with unequal salience is more consensual than a two-party system with equal salience:

when voters` opinions are (and are thought to be) unimodal, both a two-party system and a multiparty system are likely to lead to moderation and compromise among the leading parties. When, on the other hand, opinion is strongly polarized in a bimodal pattern, two parties, each striving to retain the support of the extremists on its flank, will only exacerbate a conflict; and in multiparty systems the centre parties will decline in votes and influence (Dahl 1965:376).

The political exclusion of ethnic cleavages is considered as a catalyst of ethnic grievances. Political exclusion of ethnic groups can take place by many means such as denial of political representation to certain ethnic groups, their exclusion from policy-making, the denial of their right to vote, contest elections, basic citizenship rights. Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010)`s quantitative research on ethnic power relations demonstrates that not the high level of ethnic diversity *per se* but the exclusion of politically relevant groups from power increases the likelihood of civil war. Studies on horizontal inequalities view political exclusion as an integral part of horizontal inequalities (that include as well social and economic dimensions) and consider its impact positive on the likelihood of violent interethnic conflict (Stewart 2008). Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011) demonstrate that horizontal inequalities between politically relevant ethnic groups increase the risk of ethnonationalist conflict. Recently, another work questioned the impact of cross-cutting and overlapping cleavages on violent interethnic conflict. Based on four comparative case studies, Ivory Coast and Yugoslavia (overlap of economic, political and identity-based divisions), Haiti (the lack of major cleavages), and India (the presence of cross-cutting social cleavages across Hindu–Muslim division), Scarcelli (2014) shows that overlapping of identity cleavages

with other cleavages increases the risk of violent intergroup conflict by rendering interethnic tensions explosive in case of negative catalysts such as economic crises or state dissolution whereas interethnic cooperation in a country entangled with cross-cutting cleavages is more resilient against negative catalysts.

The inclusion of ethnic groups into political competition does not solve ethnic problems either even can bolster extreme ethnicization (Gagnon 2004, Horowitz 2000, Snyder 2000). Despite the competitive elections, ethnic groups can be excluded from politics and deprived of possibilities to voice their grievances. In a polarized democracy divided between a majority and a minority, the minority is constantly excluded (O'Leary 2010). The Palestinian minority in Israel does not have a significant voice in the Israel`s parliamentary democracy. Catholics were recurrently marginalized in the Northern Ireland`s parliamentary system. Pro-Kurdish parties have been constantly excluded from the Turkish parliamentary system until 2000s. Elections processes remain vulnerable to ethnic polarization by ethnic outbidding when political entrepreneurs exploit ethnic divisions taking uncompromising positions at the expense of other groups. By appealing to ethnic bonds, politicians not only invoke and redefine collective interests but also invigorate symbolic politics based on self-esteem, worth and potential threats (Horowitz 1985). Horowitz (1985, 1991) and Wilkinson (2004) argue that political parties able to appeal to ethnic diversity contribute to cross-cutting ties between different ethnic groups and enhance interethnic peace since they take up more cooperative and comprising positions on ethnic issues. Wilkinson (2004) contends that political competition and cleavage structure which provide electoral incentives for political parties to appeal to minorities enable interethnic cooperation, thus, contribute to interethnic peace. This argument corresponds to "vote-pooling" argument of Horowitz who advocates engendering electoral incentives to enhance the party competition for minority votes: "only coalitions that rest on intergroup vote-pooling, as well as seat pooling, have reason to be

accommodative" (Horowitz 1991: 177). Wilkinson demonstrates based on rich qualitative and quantitative data that "town-level electoral incentives account for where Hindu-Muslim violence breaks out and that state-level electoral incentives account for where and when state governments use their police forces to prevent riots" (Wilkinson 2004: 4). Ethnic riots serve politicians' interests since they render ethnic boundaries salient and expose the voters to ethnic appeals of political parties. While ethnic violence dampens down the saliency of interethnic ties, ethnic option may swiftly turn into the major determinant of political preferences.

1.9. "Enabling" and "Preventive" Roles of Political Competition and Cleavage Structure on Interethnic Conflict

The comparison between Kurdish problem in Turkey and Northern Ireland conflict provides evidence to corroborate Horowitz's (1991) and Wilkinson's (2004) electoral incentives argument. This research contributes to their argument revealing institutional outcomes generated by political competition and cleavage structure which enhance or harden interethnic cooperation and societal peace. This research explores that political competition and cleavage structure produce three institutional outcomes which produce a feedback on interethnic relations: political parties able/unable to appeal to ethnic diversity, accommodation/exclusion of ethnic leaders and inclusive/exclusive communal frames toward ethnic diversity. The comparison and within-case analysis of Kurdish problem in Turkey and Northern Ireland conflict display that political competition and cross-cutting cleavage structure entail three institutional outcomes which serve to appease interethnic tensions: enhancing institutional opportunities to accommodate ethnic leaders, enabling political parties and governments supported by minorities, encouraging political actors to adopt inclusive communal frames toward ethnic diversity. Conversely, political competition and cleavage structure which overlap with ethno-political divide induce three institutional outcomes which exacerbate interethnic tensions: forestalling the political accommodation of minority leaders,

producing political parties and governments supported exclusively by certain ethnic groups, encouraging political actors to adopt exclusive communal frames against minority. It should be noted that cleavage structure and political competition do not generate these institutional outcomes in a straight line but they emerge in an interactive way as political leaders can develop firstly more inclusive frames toward minority in order to canvass ethnic minority votes and then encourage ethnic leaders to join in their political parties or ethnic leaders can quit a political party which contributes to the decrease of minority votes that motivates, in turn, the party to develop more exclusive frames against minority diverting its strategy to canvass for the votes of the majority. [4]

This research emphasizes that in a system dominated by ethno-political cleavages, electoral rules and political party system play a vital role to generate multi-ethnic alliances vertically along interethnic and intraethnic cleavages. As Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich (2003) highlight,

Democratic stability is typically threatened when ethnopolitical cleavages reflect the configuration of deeply divided societies in which two internally cohesive, sharply polarized, and spatially mixed groups are implacably arrayed against each other, as exemplified most brutally in contemporary Africa by Rwanda and Burundi (Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich 2003: 390).

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[4] For example, although the CHP's (Republican People's Party, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*) ability to canvass for Kurdish votes is limited in Turkey, it developed more inclusive appeals after the presidency of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu in 2010 in order to broaden its constituency in Kurdish regions and accorded to leaders from Alevi and Kurdish origins important positions in the party or with the decreased ability of the AKP (Justice and Development Party*, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) to appeal to Kurds in recent years, its ability to convince Kurdish leaders to join in the party has decreased.

Figure I. The theoretical relationship between cleavage structure, party competition, and interethnic cooperation/conflict

 I will detail below how cleavage structure and political competition produce these institutional outcomes (political parties, ethnic leaders and communal frames) and influence interethnic relations.

1.9.1. Cleavage Structure, Political Competition and Political Parties

Political competition based on cross-cutting cleavages produces political parties which are able to mobilize members of different ethnic groups. Since the electorate of these political parties is composed of various groups, they produce political agendas which aggregate cross-community demands and articulate common problems across diverse groups. Thus, they serve

to de-ethnicize political arena, in other words, depoliticize ethnic cleavages. The political competition based on left-right axis is exemplary of the moderating impact of cross-cutting cleavages on ethnic cleavages. Cross-cutting cleavages tame the power of security dilemmas since people from various groups are integrated into political parties, communicate each other and produce common agendas in cooperation. Conversely, when cleavage structure and political competition overlap with ethnic cleavages, electoral competition spawns ethno-political parties in which political parties represent distinct ethnic groups. Ethnic party competition in closely contested regions can result in ethnic polarization by ethnic outbidding. Many studies demonstrate that ethnic outbidding, through which political parties step up their ethnic tones to defy co-ethnic rivals, has been a catalyst of interethnic violence by accentuating ethnic divides and radicalizing ethno-political positions (DeVotta 2005, Gagnon 2004, Horowitz 1985, Kaufman 2001). The core of ethnic outbidding hinges on outmaneuvering ethno-political rivals which can displace moderates out of the political spectrum in case of crises. When political competition is low between ethno-political cleavages, "politics-as-bargaining" can evolve into "politics-as-war" (Sartori 1987:224). To the contrary, when the competition between ethno-political cleavages is high, ethnic parties use cross-cutting ties in order to mobilize a broader electorate. The political competition in Papua New Guinea is exemplary of this situation. Extreme ethnic fractionalization in that country enhances interethnic cooperation pushing political parties to appeal to a wide range of ethnic groups since the size of ethnic groups is not sufficient to monopolize the power and dominate other ethnicities (Reilly 2006).

Central to the moderating or exacerbating role of cleavage structure and political competition is the capacity of elites to manipulate cleavages in society. Political leaders are also brokers who can gather diverse networks and mobilize them in a single movement (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). Out of the heterogeneity of individual preferences, they

activate certain issues and construct more homogenous groups. Cross-cutting cleavages curtail the possibility of ethnic polarization by producing bridging ties between ethnic groups and constitute a stumbling block against the tribal interests of ethnic elites. Wilkinson's research on India (2004) shows that Hindu-Muslim violence occurs less in regions where political competition based on caste cleavages outweigh ethnic cleavages whereas it occurs more in regions dominated by ethno-political competition. Varshney's research on India (2002) also contributes to this argument showing that Hindu-Muslim violence is less likely in regions where bridging social capital is strong whereas its possibility increases in regions with strong bonding social capital. The core argument of studies on horizontal inequalities is predicated upon the exacerbating impact of overlapping cleavages on ethnic tensions. In counties which display socio-economic horizontal inequalities and possess inclusive electoral systems, Stewart and O`Sullivan (1999) demonstrate that political leaders exploit ethnic divisions to mobilize their co-ethnics.

In Turkey; the major human, social, economic costs of the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state led to the exacerbation of interethnic relations and allowed large room to maneuver for Turkish political parties to raise their nationalistic bid in order to mobilize the constituency. Turkey was beleaguered during this ethnic civil war which witnessed highly deadly pitched battles, terrorist activities of the PKK not only in Eastern but also in Western Turkey, the displacement of millions of people from Kurdish origins by the Turkish security forces, draconian state repression on Kurdish activists and recurrent exclusion of pro-Kurdish parties. But the political competition based on the center -periphery cleavage produced political parties able to appeal to a significant part of Kurdish constituency which undercut the exclusionary nature of political arena against pro-Kurdish movements. While Kurds were increasingly alienated from the centrist politics due to the recurrent political exclusion of pro-Kurdish parties and excessive counterterrorism measures, the ability

of Turkish political parties to appeal to a significant Kurdish constituency stifled the entire shifting of political preferences toward ethnic allegiances and the full disconnection between Kurdish constituency and political system. Center-periphery confrontation introduced a variety of political preferences among Turks and Kurds until the 2000s. The political experience of the 1990s typifies this ironic situation with an intensive political competition for Kurdish votes against the backdrop of darkest times of the war.

In Northern Ireland, the electoral behavior is divided between ethnic lines since the foundation of Northern Ireland and it has not changed significantly after the Good Friday Agreement (GFA). The inability of political parties to appeal to other group rigidifies communal divisions between Catholic nationalism and Protestant unionism. Between 1921 and 1972, rather than appealing to Catholics, unionist governments established by the UUP sought to maintain and preserve their Protestant majority through social, political, economic discrimination of Catholics. This political and socio-economic exclusion fed the ethnic divide instead of demobilizing it. It kept the aspiration for a united Ireland within Catholics alive and maintained the controversy on the constitutional status intact. A slow opening in the political system with rising civil rights movements and the attempt of the leader of the UUP, Terence O'Neill, for minor reforms to include Catholics into the political system resulted in the outbreak of interethnic tensions whose mismanagement led to the exacerbation of interethnic relations and communal war. The peace in Northern Ireland is still described as "no peace, no war" (Mac Ginty 2008), "imperfect peace" (Monaghan 2004), or "in the shadow of the gun" (Sluka 2009). After the GFA, cross-community voting has not still appeared in the political arena with a low degree of electoral competition between ethno-political cleavages. The support for a united Ireland dropped below the 15% among Catholics according to 2013

Northern Ireland Lives and Times survey (NILT) but it is still highly unlikely for a Catholic

to vote for unionist parties and for a Protestant to vote for nationalist parties.[5]

Figure II. The theoretical relationship between cross-cutting cleavage structure, party competition, and interethnic cooperation

Figure III. The theoretical relationship between overcutting cleavage structure, party competition, and interethnic conflict

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
[5] According to 2013 NILT, none of the respondents who categorize themselves as Catholics support the main unionist parties, the DUP and the UUP, and only 1% of the respondents who categorize themselves as Protestants support the nationalist SDLP while this figure is 0 for Sinn Fein. See 2013 NILT Survey, available at: http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2013/Political_Attitudes/POLPART2.html, retrieved September 2, 2014.

1.9.2. Cleavage Structure, Political Competition and Ethnic Leaders

Recent studies on ethnic conflicts and civil war surpassed the debates squeezed between greed-grievances arguments and began to concentrate on the distribution of state power between politically relevant actors. Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009) unleashed a new flood of scholarship revealing that the exclusion of ethnic groups from political power has a positive impact on the likelihood of civil war. This research brought the state back at the center of civil war studies. From this perspective, the inclusion of ethnic groups into political system enhances societal peace by providing ethnic groups with a voice in policy-making and bolstering the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of diverse ethnic groups.

Local ethnic leaders' input into political system entails serious consequences for interethnic relations. The inclusion of ethnic leaders neutralizes two main pillars of internal security dilemma: information failures and commitment problem (Lake and Rothchild 1996). Information problems arise when groups cannot reach to information about the preferences and capabilities of the other side. This lack of knowledge about other groups' intentions and first-strike capabilities intensifies the suspicion and anxiety between contending parties. When state elites cooperate with ethnic elites by their inclusion into political system, they access to private information in the hands of ethnic elites through political bargaining which, in turn, increases the odds of cooperation and compromise. The commitment problem arises when parties have suspicion about each other's motives to uphold the previous formal or informal ethic contract which reflects "the balance of political power between the groups and their beliefs about the intentions and likely behaviors of one another" (Lake and Rothchild 1996: 50). To tame the risk of internal security dilemma, Lake and Rothchild (1996) propose political checks and balances which institutionalize stable relations and ensure reciprocal trust between power holders. The accommodation of ethnic leaders into political system is a mechanism of political checks and balances decreasing the possibility of being exploited by

the other group through ethnic leaders' access to state resources and political privileges, thus, it enhances their input into policy-making according to ethnic group leaders rights and responsibilities in the political system. This elite accommodation boosts also the legitimacy of political system in the eyes of local elites and people. Local leaders play the role of intermediary between citizens and the state. They also enforce the loyalty of citizens to the state.

The inclusion of ethnic group leaders into political system can take place by diverse methods changing from cooptation to formal arrangements by specific institution designs or power-sharing arrangements. The cooptation of leaders can take place by clientelism which assures the arbitrary distribution of state resources in exchange for political support. This method was mainly used in colonial institutions as colonial states distributed state resources at its discretion to local elites in exchange for political support. Power sharing arrangements are used in many multi-ethnic societies such as Switzerland, Belgium, and Lebanon to ensure the voice of ethnic groups in policy-making. Roessler (2011) shows that in personalist authoritarian regions, the incorporation of ethnic leaders into political system can also trigger civil war. Based on Sub-Saharan Africa, he contends that the inclusion of political leaders into political power can drive the militarization of political bargaining as ethnic leaders also access to state's coercive apparatus. Suspicious about the coup plot which poses an imminent danger to political power; rulers exclude ethnic leaders from the political system. This ethnic exclusion backfires internal security dilemma by fueling information failure and commitment problem. A comparative study of Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire also reveals that with the introduction of competitive elections in the 1990s into Côte d'Ivoire, horizontal inequalities and ethnic exclusion were used as electoral instruments by new elites to challenge the established regime whereas in Ghana, elites did not have incentive to mobilize their

constituency along ethnic lines due to the fact that horizontal inequalities and political exclusion of ethnic elites were relatively small (Langer 2008).

Kurdish leaders in Turkey played the role of ethnic brokerage in a centralized system which denied ethnic diversity until the 1990s and opposed stringently to power-sharing arrangements. While there was a widespread Kurdish disaffection from the assimilation and repressive policies of the state, their incorporation into political system, although it did not recognize their ethnic identity, served to tame this disaffection by enabling a sense of inclusiveness into political system and providing local leaders with access to state resources, political privileges and patronage networks. While the PKK was trying to attract more people to its cause and sustain Kurds' loyalty to the armed organization, the position of Kurdish leaders in the political system served to curtail internal security dilemma by providing information about Kurdish regions and assuring their commitment to the political system. Moreover, this political inclusion prevented the entire shifting of the control of terrain to the PKK so that the PKK targeted firstly local Kurdish leaders in collaboration with state and labeled them as "collaborators" (McDowall 1997: 415- 419). This partial incorporation into political system produced an ethnic defection among Kurds, as Kalyvas points out, "a disjunction between ethnic identification and political support for ethno-national goals, without requiring a shift in a person's self-identification" (Kalyvas 2008: 1045). The governments made use of intra-ethnic cleavages to assure a certain control of terrain while fighting with the PKK and introduced the village guards (*korucu)* system recruiting Kurdish villagers charged with assisting security forces. Furthermore, the inclusion of Kurdish leaders into political system cannot be considered as mere "cooptation". These Kurdish leaders took political positions even in the highest echelons of governments. Roessler (2011) states that partaking in highest echelons of government is more than "cooptation" but accommodation into political system. Although partial and exclusionary towards pro-Kurdish movements, this

research argues that this partial inclusion was more than a cooptation if not genuine integration. This research highlights that their presence in the political system contributed to societal peace and served to undercut already preexisting disaffection of Kurds from the state. Posing a counterfactual, this research contends that the entire exclusion of Kurdish leaders from the political system would fuel increased mistrust and suspicion between Turks and Kurds during the PKK-led ethnic insurgency propelling both sides to see the other as a whole within an antagonistic relationship. With no incentive to appeal to other groups, political parties would radicalize their ethno-political positions exploiting Turkish and Kurdish cleavages which were already reenergized and hardened during the war. This would be likely to incite intercommunal violence as this zero-sum game would lead to ethnic polarization and would identify the opponents in war as groups.

Different from Kurds in Turkey, Irish nationalists were not incorporated into political power as the UUP hold the support of Protestant majority and did not include Irish leaders into unionist parties fearful of losing Protestants' votes and suspicious about the allegiance of Irish leaders to a united Ireland. 16 years after the GFA, this is still the case and it is still not imaginable for nationalist and unionist parties to cooperate in a government without power-sharing arrangements which is also confirmed by my interviews.[6] This ethnic exclusion bred the internal security dilemma in Northern Ireland. Civil rights movements which demanded the improvement social, political, economic rights of Catholics were a mass movement which deviated from the militant tactics of republicanism and the IRA. However, this caused an information failure in the eyes of Protestants since these demonstrations were considered as

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[6] Nigel Dodds (Democratic Unionist Member of Parliament for Belfast North), Personal communication, August 28, 2014; Anna Lo (Alliance Member of Legislative Assembly for South Belfast), Personal communication, August 29, 2014; Fra McCann (Sinn Fein Member of Legislative Assembly for West Belfast), Personal communication, September 2, 2014; Alban Maginness (SDLP Member of Legislative Assembly for North Belfast), Personal communication, September 3, 2014; Alex Maskey (Sinn Fein Member of Legislative Assembly for South Belfast), Personal communication, September 9, 2014.

equal to repudiation of political regime for unionist and loyalist communities who were already suspicious about the intentions of Catholic community (Power 1972). The unionists' counterdemonstrations and the inability of government and security forces to control communal attacks backfired the emergence of paramilitary organization which stirred up the full-scale communal war. Furthermore, this ethnic exclusion deepened the commitment problem since nationalist leaders refused to recognize the legitimacy of Northern Irish state and adopted abstentionism in parliament against the political hegemony of the UUP. The boundaries between nationalists and unionists were so clear-cut that unionists were determined not to share power not only with nationalist leaders but also with Catholic voters. Catholics did not have the right to "one man, one vote" even in the 1960s in local elections as local constituency was limited to householders' tax rates in order to privilege the weight of Protestant voters. This ethnic exclusion also contributed to the loss of the control of terrain in favor of the PIRA when it was revived in 1969 since the unionist governments could not penetrate into the social base of militants. Unable to control communal tensions, the British government intervened by the introduction of direct rule in 1972.

1.9.3. Cleavage Structure, Political Competition and Communal Frames

Political competition and cleavage structure alter interethnic relations by producing inclusive or exclusive communal frames toward ethnic diversity. Political leaders can turn into identity entrepreneurs invoking certain attributes which may reify identity categories (Chandra and Boulet 2012). Ethnicity is a strategic tool for political elites since it refers to communitarian associations and has emotional significance for ethnic groups' members. When political competition is based on cross-cutting cleavages, political parties use inclusive communal frames and produce cross-community appeals to reach out to diverse groups. Thus, they employ a more moderate tone toward ethnic diversity and establish a more inclusive political agenda. In a political arena dominated by ethno-political cleavages and closely

contested districts, political parties compete with each other to obtain the leadership of their co-ethnic group so that they increase their exclusive ethnic tone in "defense" of their co-ethnics. This type of competition between ethno-political cleavages is vulnerable to ethnic polarization. This auction-like scenario may crystallize interethnic tensions and motivate ethnic communities to engage in collective actions against each other. Conversely, if electoral competition is high between ethno-political cleavages, this competition produce electoral incentives for political parties to reach out to other groups in order to rise to political power which propel, in turn, more inclusive and moderate appeals toward other groups. Turkish case offers that center-periphery confrontation was in itself a structural disincentive upon political parties of periphery to be ignorant and uncompromising toward Kurdish constituency since they were an integral part of peripheral voices and posed an important electoral potential for political parties. However, in Northern Ireland, unionist governments were intransigent against Catholic minority. The spirit of unionist election slogan of 1925 "not an inch" hovered over the unionist mindset until the introduction direct rule in 1972, as Prof. Adrian Guelke puts, "unionist parties for many years were disinclined even to accept Catholics as ordinary members" (Adrian Guelke, personal communication, 16 July 2015). This intransigent politicking still continues in post-GFA period based on cultural issues which open up a new battlefront for ethnic politics and give leeway to unionist and nationalist political parties to cling onto their ethno-political trenches.

In real life, the boundaries between ethnic groups are not clear cut, but flexible and imprecise. Ethnic labels, attributes and identity categories float around but they become "instrumental" in construction and manipulations of identity boundaries (Chandra 2012). In order to activate them, political elites use certain frames to form the beliefs of voters and change the consciousness of the electorate. These frames are in itself selective since one's own mistakes are overlooked, forgotten, or denied while the rival's contributions are despised,

silenced or rejected. Framing operates as a discursive formation which imagines, communicates and reproduces the in-group and distinguishes the in-group from out-groups. The discourse turns into a boundary maker "By invoking groups, they seek to evoke them, summon them, call them into being" (Brubaker 2004: 37). Framing is central to engender the sense of groupness and to attach emotional significance to it. As Brubaker states:

Framing may be a key mechanism through which groupness is constructed… When ethnic framing is successful, we may "see" conflict and violence not only in ethnic, but in groupist terms (Brubaker 2004: 58).

The nature and intensity of groupness are variable and contingent. Even when the boundaries of group categories are arbitrarily drawn, cleavages follow the suite and in-group/out-group distinctions come to the surface (Horowitz 2000: 141-184). Inter-group comparisons have a tendency to accentuate similarities across members while exaggerating differences from others. In this respect, social identity theory emphasizes that identity is formed by the individuals' membership in an in-group and through comparison or opposition to other group members (Tajfel and Turner 1979, 1986).

Instrumental and institutional explanations stress the role of elites in construction and manipulation of identities but fall short to explain why masses follow leaders if they pursue their own interests. Identities are not just rational categories replete with interests but infused with meanings and emotional significance. Identities are constructed through cultural expressions and enactments which imbue the identity with symbolic capital (Ross 2007). The narrative and interpretation of identities are critical since they structure commonsense reasoning by generating a cognitive map. Cultural expressions and enactments which structure this cognitive map in daily life generate a symbolic landscape through which people understand who they are, perceive the other groups, interpret the "reality". As Ross describes:

Cultural expressions are not just surface phenomena. They are *reflectors* of groups' worldviews and on-going conflict that can help us better comprehend what a group's deepest

hopes and fears are, how it understands an opponent's actions and motives, and what a good enough agreement with an adversary would provide. Cultural expressions play a *causal* role in conflict, when they make certain action possibilities more plausible, and therefore more probable… In addition, cultural expressions serve as *exacerbaters or inhibiters* of conflict. Cultural expressions and the narratives associated with them communicate a worldview that ranges from highly exclusive to highly inclusive., The more that exclusivity and mutual incompatibility are expressed, the harder it is for opponents to alter their relationship; conversely, the more that cultural expressions are, or become inclusive, the more likely it is that parties can deal successfully with differences (Ross 2007:3).

The inclusive and exclusive narratives of identity-building and group boundaries turn into a cognitive lens through which we define ourselves, understand the social world, know each other, interpret our past and predict our future. The studies on social identity show that when the salience of national identity is coupled with ethnocentric views, the possibility to act upon ethno-centrist prejudices increases (Phinney 1991; Peacock, Thornton and Inman 2007). Phinney (1991) shows that strong ethnic identities such as being proud of an ethnic identity do not affect significantly conflict readinesss but when strong ethnic identity couples with ethnocentric views, conflict readiness increases. Korestalina (2007) argues that the effect of ethnic identity on conflict readiness or on compromise is mitigated with the salience of national identity and the boundaries of national identity as ethnic, multicultural and civic. Her research shows that Russians who adopt a salient national identity and believe that they are the most powerful minority group in Ukraine are more inclined into conflict behavior whereas Russians who accept Ukrainian identity without adopting a salient ethnic identity and ethnocentric views, perceive Ukrainian identity as multicultural and they are more inclined towards compromise. Pettigrew (2007)'s research on the European attitudes toward immigrants shows that Germans who have an ethnic conception of German identity are more prejudiced against foreigners and Jews, thus, more favorable toward violence whereas Germans who have a multicultural conception of German identity are less prejudiced against foreigners and Jews and less inclined toward violence. Violence induces a qualitative change in ethnic identity transforming its boundaries, meaning and practices (Tambiah 1992). In effect, identities are never found in their pure form while civic and ethnic identities are

interspersed and interwoven. During ethnic violence, porous boundaries may metamorphose into more purified identities with exclusive discourses of identity entrepreneurs. After all, Chechens were Rossianin and Chechen, Basques were Spanish and Basques, Kurds were Turkish and Kurdish, Protestants in Northern Ireland were Irish vs. Irish were British. These civic aspects of ethnic identities were ignored, despised or consciously eliminated by the language of violent ethnic conflicts.

Cultural expressions and enactments produce "preconstructeds" such as rituals, standardized remarks, formulistic expressions which imply the social distance between in-group and out-group and locate the identity of stranger in relation to in-group. "Papist" in Northern Ireland and "Kurdist" in Turkey were constructed with the intensification of ethnic conflicts as commonsense categories to describe the "extreme" "fanatical" ones in the reference groups who were distinguished from the "ordinary and decent ones" although neither Irish nor Kurds refer to these concepts to describe themselves. These preconstructeds turned into a condition for "others", became enhabited in the patterns of commonsense discourse, imbued the reference group with a moral status and defined the standardized behavior toward the other. In many ethnic-civil wars, it is possible to observe a conceptual struggle over the language of war which takes places as an unofficial war behind the scenes to rationalize the ongoing violence. As Tishkov succinctly puts, "conflicts start with words and words can kill no less than bullets" (Tishkov 2004: 80). While the word "terrorism" is employed by the state actors against the IRA and the PKK in Britain and Turkey, the word "guerilla" which implies resistance to oppression is used by the PKK and the IRA. These armed organizations engaged in creating a tradition for resistance such as ceremonial funerals

of militants or commemoration of symbolic events in Irish and Kurdish history such as Eastern Strike[7] for the Irish and Newroz[8] for Kurds.

While exclusive framing and narratives reify communal divisions, inclusive framing and narratives stress common ties. Narratives and interpretations are critical to understand the dynamics of conflicts since they attribute motives to actions (Pruitt and Rubin 1985: 103). Identification of motives provides information about the other's action, because "once identified, the existence of such motives seemingly makes it easy to "predict" another's future actions and, through one's own behavior, to turn such predictions into self- fulfilling prophecies" (Ross 2009:146). For example, in an internal security dilemma, the information failure, the inability to acquire the private information of the other group, ignites suspicion and anxiety about the other group's intentions which may turn into a self-fulfilling prophesy by igniting the war even through the other parties' intentions were misinterpreted due to disinformation. As conflicts evolve, cultural expressions and enactments of identities and the meanings associated with them change (Weeden 2002). Exclusionary framings can be promoted by political elites during ethnic violence in order to strengthen in-group unity. Besides, ethnic violence creates a propitious atmosphere to spur exclusive identities by the abundance of negative images, stereotypes and stigmas against the other group with the spirit of victimization and demonization.

Political elites use symbols to communicate their inclusive or exclusive frames to the public. They are selective in symbols according to identity categories they want to activate. As Mach points out, "in the political context in particular, symbols are being selected and

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[7] Eastern Strike 1916 was an armed insurrection to overthrow the British rule in Ireland organized by the cooperation between the Irish Citizen Army and Irish Volunteers, predecessor of the IRA.

[8] Newroz is the celebration of traditional Iranian New Year by Kurds. It also symbolizes the mass resistance against tyranny for Kurds which is based on the legend of the blacksmith of Kawa who overthrew the tyrant by a revolutionary uprising.

combined so as to achieve a desired state of people's minds; to appeal to values, to refer to ideas, to stir emotions and stimulate action" (Mach 1993: 37). As Kaufmann (2001) rightly puts, hatreds are not ancient but modern created by political leaders. During ethnic violence, political leaders tap into "ethno-myth complex" invoking mystically-based feelings of hostility and ethnic symbols (ibid.). In India, political elites who have a vested interest in interethnic violence serve from religious symbols in order to activate Hindu-Muslim lines (Wilkinson 2004). The Muslim attachment is used as a symbolic capital especially by conservative elites in Turkey to bind up Turks and Kurds (although the use of Muslim identity did not play such as binding role for Alevi Kurds). Anti-Catholicism in Northern Ireland is used as a justification for social closure and stratification by Protestant elites (Brewer and Higgins 1999). The conflict resolution process requires the emergence of shared narratives, identity categories and shared symbols. In Northern Ireland, peace-building initiatives aim at promoting Northern Irish identity as a cross-cutting identity between Protestants and Catholics. In Turkey, conflict resolution process also brought about the de-securitization of Kurdish identity and there is an ongoing debate on the boundaries of Turkishness and a new identity category as "*Türkiyelilik*" (being from Turkey).

In conclusion, Turkish case offers that political competition and cleavage structure in Turkey whose main fault line was based on the confrontation of center and periphery induced three important institutional outcomes that contributed to interethnic cooperation while societal peace was seriously undercut by the repercussions of ethnic civil war. Firstly, the political competition based on center-periphery confrontation produced political parties and governments supported by a significant share of Kurdish constituency. Secondly, political parties, especially those which canvassed the votes of periphery, competed to attract leaders from Kurdish origins due to their vote potential, thus, incorporated them into Turkish political system as political brokers although their Kurdish origins were not recognized in political

arena. Thirdly, political parties in governments adopted a moderate posture toward Kurds since they were backed by an important share of Kurdish votes while excessive counterterrorism strategies were deepening Kurs' alienation from the state. The electoral competition for Kurdish support pushed political parties to appeal to Kurdish constituency, hence, discouraged political actors to frame the Turkey's war against the PKK in communal terms which risked reifying already heightened ethnic divisions. This research shows that the absence of intercommunal violence in Turkey during the war against the PKK stems neither from political wisdom nor leadership qualities of Turkish political elites as they did not restrain themselves from implementing laws which turned a blind eye to basic human rights or feeding the Turkish nationalism by raising security concerns against the PKK (Bora 2011). The main of the fact is that they were constrained by the political competition and cleavage structure with an important electoral support in Kurdish-inhabited areas.

While in Turkey, the competition between center and periphery is also a political cleavage which cuts across ethnic diversity, the cleavage structure and political competition in Northern Ireland based on the confrontation between unionists and nationalists do not cut across British-Irish and Protestant-Catholic identities. The political competition between unionists and nationalists overlaps with ethnic divide, hence, the majority of Protestants votes for unionist/loyalist parties whereas that of Catholics votes for nationalist/republican parties. Northern Ireland case shows that different from Turkey, the political parties in Northern Ireland were unable to appeal to ethnically diverse society and were only supported by a certain ethnic group. The UUP was supported by a Protestant majority and run the governments by excluding nationalists/Catholics from political power until the introduction of direct rule in 1972. Catholic leaders were doomed to be a minority in parliament whose seats remained low disproportionately to their votes because of the plurality rule. Thus, they were not accommodated into the Northern Irish political system unlike a considerable share of

Kurdish leaders in the Turkish case. The UUP which was the hegemon political party until 1972 adopted an ignorant and exclusionary stance toward Catholic minority since they did not consider Catholics potentially their electorate and they did not want to alienate the Protestant majority afraid of losing their votes. The cleavage structure and political competition which overlapped with ethnic allegiances propelled political actors to use identity-based frames in order to outbid their ethno-political rivals.

1.10.   The role of religion on ethnic conflict in Turkey and Northern Ireland

This study acknowledges the significant role of religion in the process of individual identification and community construction. The process of identification is not only individual but also social as the cognitive process is influenced by the social comparison (Berger and Luckmann 1991, Hogg and Abrams 1988). The perception of differences and similarities is crucial in the identification process and in drawing of social boundaries (Barth 1969). As Brubaker (2013) refines the argument of Barth who pays attention to boundaries not on the "cultural staff" the boundaries enclose, religion and language are important components of "cultural stuff" which inform and reconstruct ethnic boundaries as modes of social organization and media of interaction.

The religion is not a reinforcer of ethno-national differences between Turks and Kurds in Turkey whereas in Northern Ireland, the sectarian division turned into a reinforcer of ethno-national divisions with the exacerbation of home rule controversy and communal tensions in the 19th century in Northern Ireland. However, as case studies and comparison in this research demonstrate, this inclusive or exclusive effect is not constant even within cases but contextually variable. The global comparison on the impact of religion on ethnic civil wars also displays that the same religion can induce different impacts across different contexts which is also the case of Muslim identity and Islamic world (Philpot 2007). Based on the

minority at risk dataset, Fox identifies 105 cases (39%) which involve warring communities of different religion out of 268 cases (Fox 2002: 71). Toft finds that 42 (32%) out of 133 civil wars involved ethno-religious groups (Toft 2007: 97). Both studies reveal that countries of Islamic world are involved in ethno-religious conflicts disproportionate to other religions since 1990s. In Toft's study, in 34 (81%) of 42 religious civil war, one or both parties were Muslim and in 30 (71%) out of them, contestation over Islamic practice was an issue (Philpot 2007: 518).

However, evaluating religion as the only factor that accentuates or mutes ethnic tensions is too narrow to understand its economic, social, political dimensions. This research shows that the use of religion as a supraethnic identity for political purposes can be divisive as in the case of Northern Ireland or inclusive as in the case of Turkey depending on electoral incentives and political competition. In Turkey, neither Turks nor Kurds are a homogenous religious group belonging to mainstream Sunni Islam but heterogeneous in character as there is mainstream Sunni Islam, religious orders, Shia-Caferis, Alevis. The latter is the largest religious minority composed mostly of Turks but also of Kurds and Arabs. Moreover, there is a religious sectarian division among Kurds. While most Turks belong to Hanefi School, Kurds are mostly dominated by Hanefi and the Shafi school but there are also a significant number of Kurdish Alevis concentrated in Dersim/Tunceli (Bruinessen 2000). Muslim identity was a binding social capital between Turks and Kurds during the Ottoman Empire as the social stratification was based on religious criteria, *millet* system rather than on ethnic criteria. This legacy also affected the construction of Turkish nationhood as different ethnic groups belonging to Muslim *millet* were considered as assimilable to Turkish nation different from non-Muslims (Aktürk 2009). Nevertheless, the construction of Turkish nation-state amplified the boundaries between Turks and Kurds as Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms are added into the substantive content of social categorization and comparison among Turks and Kurds.

While Kurdish insurgencies in the early era of republic used Kurdish nationalism interspersed with religious discourses, Kurdish identity turned into the symbol of the resistance of religion, periphery and tradition against the Kemalist project of a western, national, central and secular state (Yeğen 1999). Especially after the foundation of Turkish Republic in 1923, national discourse is grounded upon social darwinienne theories that "presented the relationship between Kurdish and Turkish world as an eternal combat on one side between progress and civilization and on the other hand between barber atavism and reactionary" (Bozarslan 2003: 99). Kurdish and Turkish conservative forces found a voice in political sphere after the passage to multipartism in 1946 in centre-right parties. Pro-Islamic circles were represented with the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*, MSP), Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi),* Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*, FP). Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*, SP), and Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP). These parties emphasized the Muslim identity as a supraethnic identity able to melt ethnic divides (see Yavuz 2009). This political use of religion as a cross-cutting cleavage between Turks and Kurds contributed to interethnic cooperation in Turkey while was undercut by the war with the PKK in this process. These parties received votes of more conservative-Islamic Kurds through their religious appeal and social networks to influential Islamic brotherhoods in Kurdish-inhabited areas. However, this usage of religion was not entirely inclusive as it was alienating for some sections of society, especially for Alevis fearful of Sunni radicalism and for pro-secular Turks who were suspicious about the radical leanings of pro-Islamic movements.

Nonetheless, it is not possible to consider neither centre-right parties nor pro-Islamic parties spared from competing nationalisms in Turkey which they did not hesitate to use in order to mobilize masses against the PKK and to legitimate the excessive use of force against pro-Kurdish parties, intellectuals, activists (see Kadıoğlu and Keyman 2011). Moreover, pan-Turkish nationalism and its representative, the MHP, stoke Turkish nationalism against the

PKK and pro-Kurdish parties and use nationalist discourses interspersed with Islamic discourses. The parties which emerged out of pro-Islamic movements also exploited nationalisms and put the Muslim identity as a central component of Turkish nation (Bora 2011). Moreover, religion can be used exclusively or inclusively by political leaders as an electoral instrument in political competition which is also the case in Turkey especially in the intensified political competition between the AKP and the pro-Kurdish party since 2007. Pro-Kurdish parties steered towards a more inclusive approach toward religion in order to appeal to conservative Kurds in the electoral competition against the AKP and the HUDA-PAR which seek to attract the votes of conservative Kurds. In the last 2015 general elections, while pro-Kurdish party promised to restore the Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*) under the control of the Prime Minister's office, the discourses of the ex-Prime minister and the current President of Republic, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, blaming pro-Kurdish party as being Yezidis and Zarathustra sought to detach conservative Kurds away from pro-Kurdish party. In addition, pro-Kurdish party organized its own religious services as it criticized the Directorate of Religious affairs for implicating a political discourse in service of the state. They organized Friday prayers in Kurdish outside the mosques as an act of civil disobedience (*sivil cuma namazı)* which were rebuked by Erdogan for fomenting unrest in religion (Başer 2011). Furthermore, religiosity does not spare individuals from ethno-nationalist orientations. Sarıgil and Fazlıoğlu (2014) find out that religious Shafi Kurds have a higher degree of ethnic consciousness and ethno-nationalism compared to Hanefi Kurds. Ekmekci (2011) finds out that religiosity and political satisfaction explain better the support for Kurdish ethno-nationalism in Turkey than do socio-economic factors. The conservative vote base of the AKP and the MHP also has strong Turkish nationalist orientations (KONDA 2010:13).

This study shows that communal violence incidents against Kurds typify the racialization of Kurdish identity (see Ergin 2014) which can outpace the binding role of religion as a cross-cutting cleavage in those events. Racism is not just about the attribution of phenotypical markers to an identity but also about cultural assertion of superiority which supports the preservation of identity boundaries based on the perceived incompatibility of life-styles and traditions (Balibar 1991). Communal riots are maybe one of the most significant token of racialization of Kurdish identity and cultural racism floating in the Turkish air. The communal tensions which arise out of the activation of boundaries based on the markers and cues of Kurdishness such as being Kurdish, speaking, listening, singing Kurdish, carrying Kurdish colors offer the manifestations of anti-Kurdish racism. The fact that law officers including police officers and judicial authorities do not prosecute the perpetrators in most cases also reveals the underlying racialization in state's mindset. Moreover, not only through cultural attributes, Kurdish identity is racialized also through phenotypical attributes. The words of the brother of one Kurdish victim who was exposed to communal violence illustrate this stigmatization:

While my brother was going to my big sibling, a group of 15-20 people stopped him in the road. Since my brother is dark-skinned and likens to Kurds, they attacked him with chopper knives, daggers, sticks. They blow his head with chopper knives. All the veins in his left hand are dead. Doctor told `his hand can remain disabled`. There are serious blow in the upper side of his left hand. The bone is squashed. I did not understand what they want from my brother. (see Romenlerin saldırısına uğrayan Kaplan'ın sağlık durumu ciddi [the health conditions of Kaplan who is exposed to attacks of Roma people are serious], *Dicle Haber Ajansı*, 4 April 2006).[9]

Furthermore, the cries of religious slogans such as the use of *tekbir* or praises of God during communal riots stand out as the evidence of intermingling between religion and

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[9] (In Turkish) Kardeşim abimin evine giderken yolda 15-20 kişilik bir grup, yolunu kesiyor. Kardeşimin teni esmer diye, Kürtlere benziyor diye ellerinde satır, hançer, sopalarla saldırıyorlar. Satırla kafasına vuruyorlar. Sol elindeki bütün sinirler ölmüş. Doktor 'eli sakat kalabilir' diyor. Sol üst kolunda da ciddi darp var. Kemik ezilmiş. Kardeşimden ne istediler anlamadım.

Turkish nationalisms. Communal violence can be even directed against religious groups

representing a pro-Kurdish cause by Turkish religious groups. Here is an illustrative incident:

MAZLUMDER (Solidarity Association for Human Rights and Victims, *İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumlar İçin Dayanışma Derneği*) wanted to organize marches with torches in the aftermath of breaking of the fast in Fatih Mosque in order to commemorate Roboski massacres in which 34 citizens were murdered by the planes of the TSK (Turkish Military Forces). To the approximately 150 Mazlumder members who opened the placards "Justice always everywhere" and "the road to *Ummet* passes from Kurdistan", a group of 10-15 people with guns, choppers and knives attacked with *tekbirs* saying "This is Fatih, you cannot use the word Kurdistan here". Three Mazlumder members were pounded. (see MAZLUMDER üyelerine saldırı: 3 yaralı [Attacks on MAZLUMDER Members:3 injured], *Dicle Haber Ajansı*, 9 August 2012).[10]

One of the interviews in *Yedinci Gündem* with Kurdish seasonal workers also sheds light how

the exclusionary stance boosted by the racialization of Kurdish identity can outweigh the

binding role of religion:

Workers are complainant most about the treatment of local people. They speak of the existence of prejudices. Feridun Ertem tells that his niece was beaten high-handedly (*keyfice*) by three people from Arifiye while he was seating in the park. He reports that police forces that came up upon this incident collected all the IDs and they passed the security check (*Genel Bilgi Tarama*, GBT). We ask to Piroz Demir (70) who "live" in the station for one week whether they have any neighborly relations with the houses nearby. The response we receive: "They don't want us to come near to them even to pass in front of their gardens. If we went to their houses to clean up for religious purposes (*abdest almak*[11]), they would not even open the door." 65 year-old Abdullah Gül, whose ears are filled with tears while telling complain about the teasing with his *şalvar*, accent "Miserableness and deplorableness (*Perişanlık ve rezillik*). This is what we live. I laid my eyes on the station to the end, I cried. I pitied for our situation. They ridicule with me when I come out to the bazaar with *şalvar*, they dissed at me saying *kıro*. It is a shame and sin. It is not appropriate to ridicule with how people wear, their tongue"…The owners of nut lands make a division of labor separating Kurds as "foreigner". Besides, "locals" receive 9 million after 10 hour work whereas "foreigners" receive 6,5 million in 12 hours (Yaşam fındık kabuğunda (Life in the nutshell), *Yedinci Gündem*. 4-10 August 2001:6).[12]

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[10] (In Turkish) İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumlar İçin Dayanışma Derneği (MAZLUMDER) İstanbul Şubesi üyeleri, 34 yurttaşın TSK uçakları ile katledildiği Roboski Katliamı'nın aydınlatılması için Fatih Camii'nde iftar açtıktan sonra meşaleli yürüyüş düzenlemek istedi. "Adalet her zaman her yerde" pankartı ve "Ümmetin yolu Kürdistan'dan geçer" dövizleri açan 150 civarındaki MAZLUMDER üyesine, ellerinde silah, satır ve bıçak bulunan 10-15 kişilik bir grup, tekbir getirip, "Burası Fatih burada Kürdistan lafını kullanamazsınız" diyerek, saldırdı. Saldırıda MAZLUMDER üyesi 3 kişi darp edildi.

[11] *Abdest* is a religious obligation in Islam with an aim at cleaning the body before the prayer (*namaz*).

[12] (In Turkish) İşçiler, en çok yöre halkının tutumundan şikayetçi. Önyargının varlığından söz ediyorlar. Feridun Ertem, yeğeninin parkta otururken Arifiyeli 3 kişi tarafından keyfice dövüldüğünü anlatıyor. Olay üzerine

Many studies also refined the arguments based on the role of religion as a catalyst of ethnic conflict in Northern Ireland. First of all, there was not a strong divide between Protestant and Catholic identities until Catholic emancipation of 1830s. Boyd (1969) reveals that the first Catholic Churches in Belfast were aided by subscriptions from Protestants. Tory-dominated English Episcopalians were detached from Scottish Presbyterians who had more liberal leanings until the expansion of voting rights with Catholic emancipation (Patterson 2006). Religion did not play a conflict-mitigating role in Northern Ireland since it overlapped with political, social, economic divisions. Moreover, Protestant-Catholic sectarian division does not exacerbate ethnic conflict in every context. The collaboration between Anglophones and Francophones in political parties helped to solve Quebec conflict in Canada (Hewitt 1994).

There is a nearly academic consensus in the studies on Northern Ireland that religion does not determine the main disagreement (Hayes and McAllister 1999) but it is a marker of ethnic difference (McGarry and O'Leary 1995, Clayton 1998). Moreover, secularization has been at play in Northern Ireland since 1960s as church attendance and conservative attitudes related to sexual relationships, divorce, and abortion have declined whereas communal violence broke out in 1970s. The four main churches in Northern Ireland issued a joint letter in 1974 declaring "the conflict is not primarily religious in character. It is based rather on political and social issues with deep historical roots" (Darby 1976: 114). Besides, studies

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istasyona gelen polislerin de tüm kimlikleri toplayarak Genel Bilgi Tarama'dan (GBT) geçtiğini belirtiyor. Bir haftadır istasyonda "yaşayan" 70 yaşındaki Piroz Demir'e, istasyonun yanındaki evlere bir komşuluklarının olup olmadığını soruyoruz. Aldığımız yanıt: "Yanlarına gelmemizi, bahçelerinin önünden bile geçmemizi istemiyorlar. Abdest almak için kapılarına gitsek kapıyı açmazlar" oluyor. Anlatırken gözleri dolan 65 yaşındaki Abbas Gül ise, şalvarıyla, şivesiyle dalga geçildiğinden yakınıyor. "Perişanlık ve rezillik. Bizim yaşadığımız budur. Az önce boydan boya istasyona baktım, ağladım. Acıdım kendi halimize. Şalvarımla çarşıya çıkıyorum dalga geçiyorlar, 'kıro'diye laf atıyorlar. Ayıptır, günahtır. İnsanların giyinişiyle, diliyle dalga geçilmez"…Fındık bahçesi sahipleri, Kürtleri "yabancı" diye ayırıp, ona göre iş bölümü yapıyor. Üstelik "yerliler" 10 saat çalışmadan sonra 9 milyon, "yabancılar" ise 12 saatte 6,5 milyon alacak.

show that religiosity does not determine the polarization on social, political issues (Rose 1971: 274, McAllister 1982, O'Malley and Walsh 2013).

This research reveals that the political use of religion is tightly interwoven with political incentives. Brewer and Higgins (1999) argue that anti-Catholicism is exploited to defend the privileged socio-economic and political position of Protestants. In Turkey, this kind of religious discourse interspersed with racism against Kurds is not exploited by mainstream political leaders because they needed Kurdish votes in order to challenge the centre. To the contrary of Northern Irish case, political leaders, especially those representative of peripheral forces, used religion in order to produce cross-community appeals and to attract the votes of conservative Turks and Kurds.

1.11. Contribution to the literature

Many researchers call for disaggregation in ethnic and civil war studies because quantification of studies leads to homogenize diverse cases without empirical and theoretical justification (Gilley 2004). Brubaker and Laitin (1998) make "a plea for disaggregation" in ethnic studies because ethnic conflicts are "composite and causally heterogeneous, consisting not of an assemblage of causally identical unit instances of ethnic violence but of a number of different types of actions, processes, occurrences, and events" (Brubaker and Laitin 1998: 446). Ziemke (2007) also insists on micro-level studies of civil war to explore new questions, micro-level data to enlarge our understanding of conflict process and resolution. Moreover, Dumitru and Johson (2011) point to a theoretical gap in the literature: most studies are not able to specify which ethnic dyads are likely to come into conflict with one another and why some countries in transition experience no violence at all. This study intends to contribute to this need of disaggregation in the literature posing the puzzle why some ethnic civil wars do not exhibit intercommunal conflict whereas others do.

From the perspective of Turkey, the last years witness the rising of small-scale "lynching" events especially against Kurds. Scholars, journalists, and various experts begin to speak of rising emotional rupture, polarization, and the danger of intercommunal conflict between Kurds and Turks. Gambetti (2007) reports that only in 2005-2006, there were more than thirty lynching incidents especially against Kurds and leftists. Yavuz and Ozcan (2006) alert the rising polarization between Kurds and Turks and the potential of small-scale communal conflicts. For Northern Ireland case, even after 16 years of the 1998 Belfast Good Friday Agreement, Northern Ireland displays intercommunal conflict at the state of communal sporadic attacks (Minority at Risk project 2009). This research seeks to illuminate causal mechanisms between ethnic mobilization and intercommunal conflict and it tries to demonstrate under which condition(s) Kurdish problem in Turkey can turn into intercommunal conflict and which mechanism(s) reactivate(s) intercommunal conflict in Northern Ireland.

1.12.   Plan of the dissertation

This research proceeds as follows. In order to inquire the first puzzle looking into the possibility of macro-level intercommunal conflict, this study begins by Kurdish problem in Turkey and questions which mechanism(s) forestalled the rise of intercommunal violence between Turks and Kurds while the social, human, economic costs of the war between the PKK and the state deepened Turkish-Kurdish communal divisions and put a heavy stress on cross-cutting ties between Turks and Kurds. Secondly, it proceeds with Northern Ireland conflict and discusses why intercommunal violence erupted in Northern Ireland although Catholics/Irish in Northern Ireland enjoyed a more democratic environment and endured less state repression compared to Kurds in Turkey. Thirdly, in order to address the micro-level intercommunal conflict within countries, it interrogates why communal attacks against Kurds came to the surface despite the ongoing de-securitization of Kurdish problem and

democratization reforms regarding Kurdish identity. Finally, the last chapter discusses the reasons of ongoing small-scale communal tensions in Northern Ireland although the Good Friday Agreement reformed the whole political process in Northern Ireland and dampened significantly violence in the streets.

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Figure IV. Map of Kurdish population in Turkey

Source: KONDA. 2011b. Kürt Meselesi'nde Algı ve Beklentiler Araştırması KONDA BİZ KİMİZ'10 Bulgular Raporu – Mayıs 2011 (The Report on the Findings on the Perceptions and Expectations on Kurdish Problem), available at http://www.konda.com.tr/tr/raporlar/2011_06_KONDA_Kurt_Meselesinde_Algi_ve_Beklentiler.pdf (accessed 2 February 2012).

2. FROM ETHNIC MOBILIZATION TO ETHNIC INSURGENCY: KURDISH PROBLEM IN TURKEY AND THE ABSENCE OF INTERCOMMUNAL VIOLENCE

One of the more remarkable features of the conflict was that after fifteen years of bitter and savage war, the conflict had not descended into an inter-communal one. The danger of this eventuality had been greatly increased by the progressive outflow from the Kurdish region of both economic migrants and dispossessed fugitives from military operations…. A warning sign of increasing polarization came in the April 1999 election, with the greatly increased vote for the extreme right National Action Party by Turks (establishing it as second strongest party), and the capture by HADEP of six Kurdish cities in the concurrent local elections. By its own draconian policy the state had spread the cancer, as it saw it, to other parts of the body of the Republic and fostered the political extremes. Yet it seemed oblivious to the long-term legacy of anger, bitterness and communal danger its daily acts of humiliation were bound to leave….The progressive diminishment of Turkish political life, the weakness of democracy and the widespread acceptance of the necessity for human rights violations by the state in order to maintain order, all make it difficult to be optimistic. Yet the state cannot deny the contradictions lying at the heart of the Republic forever. Social conflict, growing economic frustration and under-performance, and the near certainty of renewed political violence with a thwarted and oppressed minority are likely to lead to a more serious crisis in the future (McDowall 1996: 449-450).

As McDowall's passage displays, the anxiety over the possibility of intercommunal violence due to Kurdish problem loomed large in media, politics and intellectual circles in 1990s and has persisted until today. While this passage was written after 'fifteen years of bitter and savage war', it has now been more than thirty years since the war between the Turkish state and the PKK started and, fortunately, this armed conflict has not still exploded into an intercommunal one which would turn Kurds and Turks into clashing ethnic groups. Turkey was beleaguered during the war against the PKK which witnessed highly deadly pitched battles, the displacement of millions of Kurds, draconian state repression on Kurdish activists and recurrent exclusion of pro-Kurdish parties. Initiated by the PKK to realize a pan-

Kurdish state, the armed conflict claimed more than 35 000 people's lives[13] and instilled distrust between Turks and Kurds. The intensification of armed conflict has led at some points to the identification of Kurds with the PKK and to the consideration of the war as a struggle for survival (Barkey 1993:57-58). Between 1990 and 2000, over 3,000 villages and hamlets were evacuated or burned by Turkish security forces (Jongerden 2007:82). While thousands (or millions) of Kurds were displaced,[14] the social composition of provinces changed due to incoming Kurdish flows. The horizontal inequalities, presumed as provoking interethnic animosities (Stewart 2008), amplified between Turks and Kurds because of the negative momentum of ethnic civil war. The displacement magnified urban ethnic segregation, increased the negative stigmas against Kurds, stratified Turkish and Kurdish society, and produced a Kurdish underclass (Saraçoğlu 2010, Işık and Pınarcıoğlu 2001, Jongerden 2007, Kurban, Çelik and Yükseker 2006). While many Turks faced an insecure future due to the fight of the PKK for Kurdish secession, Kurds were living in an environment of insecurity not only for material reasons but also for non-material reasons such as repression of their language, identity and culture (İçduygu, Romano and Sirkeci 1999). These insecurities could be exploited as electoral tools by Turkish political parties amplifying ethnic divisions and using extremist discourse against Kurdish minority. The anxiety over a possible interethnic conflict was already preexistent in 1990s and 2000s. A survey on Kurdish problem in 2008 shows that 20 per cent of population in Eastern and Southeastern provinces where pro-Kurdish party is strong, 33.3 per cent of population in Eastern and Southeastern provinces where pro-Kurdish party is weak, and 41.4 per cent of population in Western provinces believe that Turkey is heading toward a broader Turkish-Kurdish conflict (Ergil 2010: 327-

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[13] There are no exact figures on the number of deaths ensuing from the armed conflict between the PKK and Turkey. According to the Parliamentary Commission on Human Rights, 35,576 people lost their lives. See TBMM İnsan Haklarını İnceleme Komisyonu (2013: 78).
[14] Nongovernmental organizations' estimates for displaced population range between one and three millions. See HÜNE (2006), Kurban, Çelik and Yükseker (2006), Jongerden (2007).

328). This chapter addresses which mechanism(s) sustained interethnic cooperation in Turkey and prevented the possibility of interethnic violence between Turks and Kurds despite the human, social, economic, political reverberations of the ethnic-civil war.

Drawing upon literature on ethnic conflict, cleavage structure and political competition; this section contributes to Wilkinson (2004)'s and Horowitz's (1985,1991) electoral incentive arguments which stress that political parties able to appeal to minorities appease interethnic tensions by generating cross-cutting ties between different ethnic groups. Turkish case offers that the political competition based on cross-cutting cleavages served to contain interethnic tensions which arose out of ethic war by inducing three institutional outcomes: producing political parties supported by minority, generating institutional opportunities to accommodate minority ethnic leaders, discouraging political actors to use exclusive communal frames against minority. This study argues that the political competition based on center-periphery cleavage in Turkey, which is the major political cleavage that shapes the political arena, served to mitigate the negative impacts of ethnic-civil war and played a moderating role on Turkish-Kurdish relations by enabling three institutional outcomes. Firstly, the center-periphery cleavage and the competition for Kurdish votes produced political parties and governments supported by a significant share of Kurdish voters and prevented the full disconnection between Turkish political system and Kurdish citizenry. Thus, it forestalled the domination of ethnic cleavage and the rise of ethno-political competition in the political arena under the vicious cycle of terrorism and counterterrorism. Secondly, it enabled the incorporation of Kurdish leaders (leaders from Kurdish origins) into political system which curtailed the internal security dilemma ignited by the war with the PKK, although this elite accommodation had a partial and exclusionary character. Thirdly, it discouraged political parties and governments to adopt exclusive communal frames against Kurdish minority which would amplify already hardened Turkish-Kurdish boundaries. This

research demonstrates that the intense political competition for Kurdish votes based on center-periphery cleavage structure played a moderating role on increased interethnic tensions during Turkey's war with the PKK. However, the decreased political competition for Kurdish votes is heightening the ethnic polarization in entire Turkey whose symptoms are communal riots in Eastern and Western Turkey.

In parallel with the study of Denny and Walter (2014: 201), this study defines ethnic civil war as a subset of civil war exceeding the 1,000 battle death threshold (Fearon and Laitin 2003) and involves 'conflicts over ethno-national self-determination, the ethnic balance of power in government, ethno-regional autonomy, ethnic and racial discrimination (whether alleged or real), and language and other cultural rights' (Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010). Turkey`s war with the PKK-led Kurdish insurgency is an illustrating case to study the reshaping of political cleavages during ethnic civil war as it gives a time span (1984-continuning with interruptions) far exceeding the average duration of ethnic civil war, 13.7 years, between 1946 and 2005 (Denny and Walter 2014) and its death toll (more than 30 000 people) is far more serious than aggregate death threshold of civil war.

This chapter proceeds as follows. It begins with explaining the rising interethnic tensions in Turkey due to the ethnic armed conflict from the perspective of structural, psychological-emotional and constructive explanations of interethnic conflict. Secondly, it focuses on the mechanism(s) which sustain interethnic cooperation in Turkey situating its analysis in institutional-instrumental explanations. It gives a brief historical overview on ethnicity, cleavages and Kurdish problem in Turkey. It demonstrates how cleavage structure and political competition shaped the political arena in Turkey with a particular focus on the interaction of center-periphery cleavages with ethnic cleavages during the armed conflict between the Turkish state and the PKK. Thirdly, it discusses the institutional implications of

cleavage structure and political competition on interethnic relations during the ethnic-civil war in Turkey.

2.1. Kurdish Problem in Turkey from the Perspective of the Literature on Interethnic Violence

As mentioned in the introduction part, the literature explaining interethnic violence can be divided into structural, emotional-psychological, constructivist and instrumental-institutionalist explanations. Here I evaluate Kurdish problem from the perspective of this literature. My explanation builds on the fourth explanations and contributes to the burgeoning institutional-instrumentalist literature by demonstrating the malleability of interethnic tensions by the cleavage structure and political competition.

2.1.1. Structural Explanations: Strong State, External Actors, Regional Instability

Major revolts of 1925 Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1927-31 Mount Ararat Revolt, and 1937-38 Revolt of Dersim in early Republican era stamped the memory of bureaucratic-military establishment in Turkey which is called as "Sevres syndrome". Sevres syndrome refers to the attempts to revive or implement Sevres Treaty of 10 August 1920 which stipulated autonomy in Kurdish regions in its articles 62, 63, 64 and the constitution of Armenia in Eastern Turkey. Lausanne Treaty in 24 July 1923 rendered Sevres treaty null. The suspected British support to Kurdish leaders for autonomy and independence during the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire left an existential anxiety on Turkish state elites over a possible conspiracy to disintegrate Turkey by the collaboration of internal and external actors. In Turkish state discourse, Kurdish insurgencies were incited by external actors whose identity change according to the perceived threats of Turkish nationalism involving Western imperial powers, communists or Middle Eastern neighbors (Yeğen 2007a).

The voice of military gained an even more saliency in Turkish politics with the rise of the PKK. More than civilian politics, the military set the parameters of Kurdish politics.

Turkish security forces embarked upon a state terror involving forced displacement, legal and illegal killing of perpetrators and innocents, torture and intimidation in the repression of the PKK. An emergency rule was introduced in 1987 that continued until 2002 in thirteen Kurdish-populated provinces. Laws of Penal code and anti-terrorism laws were mainly used to tame pro-Kurdish movements and to suspend their legal rights. Moreover, special institutions were founded with extraordinary powers. The state instituted the system of village guards (*korucular*) who were selected among Kurdish villagers to combat the PKK insurgency. A regional governor was appointed to implement emergency rule in Kurdish-inhabited areas with extensive competences to restrict basic rights and liberties. A regional military commander was also appointed with additional number of soldiers in the East. In addition, the fight against the PKK resulted also in an all-encompassing environmental destruction especially for animal cropping and agriculture which were two main sources of living in the region (Gürses 2012). Eastern and Southeastern regions were exposed to economic marginalization as a result of unequal distribution of economic benefits (White 1998). Forced displacement of Kurds deteriorated the preexisting economic inequality between Turks and Kurds leading to overcrowding, poverty and unemployment (Kurban, Çelik and Yükseker 2006). While military opposed any reforms for Kurdish rights and regarded them as concessions to terrorism; judiciary, its ideological doppelganger, tamed their rights notably rights of representation and suppressed pro-Kurdish parties identifying them as threat to Turkey's unity (Belge 2006, Koğacıoğlu 2004). Pro-Kurdish parties are recurrently closed and reconstituted.

The instability in the Middle East during 1980s and 1990s contributed to the strengthening of the PKK. It turned into extraterritorial factor that strained the relations between Turkey and neighboring countries. Syria was providing refuge and help for the PKK militants due to the tensions over Hatay city of southern Turkey and the partition of war of

Euphrates River. Greece was another suspected collaborator of the PKK because of conflict on flare-ups over Aegean Sea and the conflict over Cyprus. An ex-ambassador Sukru Elekdag (1996) conceptualized this double threat as "two-and-a-half war strategy". According to Elekdag, in case of an armed conflict, Turkey should have been prepared to deploy its troops on two fronts, on the Aegean and Southern border, and to tackle with a half war instigated inside by the PKK. The EU expressed pressing demands for the recognition of Kurdish rights during Turkey's accession process. This heightened the suspicion over European intentions so as to divide Turkey and to encroach upon national sovereignty (Keyder 2006). Moreover, the presence of Kurdish diaspora in Europe that provided material means and organizational capacity for the PKK kept the scenarios over a potential conspiracy alive (Ayata 2008, Eccarius-Kelly 2002).

The worst nightmare of Turkey was the creation of an autonomous Kurdish region entitled to self-government in Northern Iraq under the pretext that it could spark a contagion effect mobilizing Kurds in Turkey. The establishment of 'Autonomous Kurdish Region' in Iraq after the first Gulf War was vehemently opposed by the Turkish state. Turkey launched multiple large-scale operations into Northern Iraq that was used by the PKK as a place of siege and place of training. With the establishment of Iraqi Kurdistan government as a federal state after the US-led war of 2003, Iraqi Kurds emerged into Turkish political scene as an external actor capable to affect internal politics.

2.1.2. Constructivist Explanations: From compatible to incompatible image of Kurdishness

The boundaries of Turkish modernity are determined by state-centric tradition founded upon four pillars: a strong-state tradition, an organic vision of society (in which individual is submissive to society), national developmentalism and republican model of citizenship (Keyman and İcduygu 2005). Turkish nation-building was premised on the exclusion of non-

Muslims as a continuation of the "Muslim *millet*" under the Ottoman Empire (Aktürk 2009). 1923 Lausanne Treaty recognizes only religious minorities of Turkey as minority excluding Muslim ethnic minorities. Pseudo-scientific theories such as 'The New Turkish History Thesis' (*Yeni Türk Tarih Tezi)* and 'The Sun Language Thesis' (*Güneş Dil Teorisi*) were produced to remind Turkic Central Asian roots and to erase the past based on Islam and ethnic diversity. These theories rewrote the prehistory of Central Asia and demonstrated Kurds as Muslims who descended from ancient Turkish tribes. The goal of assimilation was implanted in the belief that Kurds were eventual Turks that would be assimilated into Turkish society as long as Turkish modernization progresses. Kurdishness which symbolized the resistance of religion, periphery and tradition was an obstacle to ideal Turkish citizen conceived as modern, western and loyal to the Turkish nation-state (Yeğen 1999). Turkish national identity was safeguarded and protected through institutional mechanisms. The official buzzword 'one country, one language and one nation' was instilled in citizens' minds by ideological state apparatus which mainly consisted of compulsory education, mandatory military service, and state-controlled media. "Enligtened" (*aydın*) people of Turkey either judges, teachers, militaries, and intellectuals carried out the mission of civilizing all peoples of Turkey including Kurds. Different levels of state apparatus searched for different levels of Turkishness for their cadres depending on their level of importance for state (Yeğen 2004). None of the constitutions of Turkish republic, 1924, 1961 and 1982 Constitutions, recognize or refer to the existence of other ethnic groups in Turkey. Moreover, these constitutions do not authorize any expressions of ethnic identity such as the use of Kurdish language in public and private sphere, the right to broadcasting, the rights of press and the right of expression in Kurdish.

The image of Kurds as "mountain Turks" changed in 1990s with more liberal policies of Turgut Özal, leader of the ANAP (*Anavatan Partisi*, Motherland Party) government,

toward Kurdish problem. Nonetheless, the defense of Kurdish rights continued to be represented as destructive and divisive in Turkish media (Somer 2005, Sezgin and Wall 2005). Kurdishness was stigmatized with separatism and terrorism with the rise of the PKK. Kurds who suffered from state-induced forced displacement was taunted by urban forms of xenophobia and discrimination in major provinces. The distrust between Kurds and Turks intensified as the victims from the fiercest fighting between the PKK and the state increased. The news and comments about the Jewish roots of Kurds in Turkish media signal the suspicion in public sphere about the assimilable character of Kurds in the Turkish society (Yeğen 2007).

2.1.3. Psychological-Emotional Explanations: Rising Mutual Mistrust between Turks and Kurds

Turkish and Kurdish communities do not share a history of ancient hatred left from Ottoman times (see Bruinessen 2011). However, there was a certain resentment of Kurdish chiefs and emirates against the Ottoman rule by their loss of autonomy with the centralization and modernization reforms of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. While Kurds were divided over Sevres treaty that prescribed the creation of an autonomous and independent Kurdish state (Articles 62, 63, and 64 of Section II), the treaty had also revived new hopes and aspirations for a potential Kurdish state (Kutlay 2012: 387). Mustafa Kemal accentuated Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood and local administration for Kurdish regions during the war of Independence (1919-1922) (Mango 1999). Nevertheless, these promises remained unfulfilled after the end of war. Lausanne treaty, the founding treaty of Turkish Republic was also the starting point of denial and assimilation policies (İçduygu and Kaygusuz 2004). However, Sevres Treaty invigorated the never-ending anxiety over state security and the possibility of disintegration for the founders of new Turkish republic. The abolition of Sultanate (1922) and Caliphate (1924) eroded the loyalty of tribal and religious Kurdish chiefs. Especially the

Caliphate was loaded with sanctity for Kurdish tribal and religious leaders as they drove their symbolic importance from its religious status (Bruinessen 2000, 2011). Kurdish insurgencies in early republican era backlashed the fears and anxiety of state elite over the continuity of state. The state erased any reminiscent of Kurdish identity and culture: the names of villages were replaced; publishing, speaking and writing in Kurdish were banned; Kurdish names were forbidden. Religious schools in Kurdistan, the *madrasas* and *kuttabs,* were eradicated and replaced with Turkish schools charged with instilling assimilation policies. Therefore, Kurdish elite did not only felt *ressentiment* in the face of a real loss of power during the Ottoman Empire but they were also severely alienated from the newly founded Turkish republic by the repressive assimilation policies.

The rise of the PKK in 1984 and its pan-Kurdish dreams of independence invigorated the anxiety over territorial integrity among Turkish bureaucratic-military establishment. Turkey implemented the worst counter-terrorism representational strategy: while it sought to de-legitimize the PKK, it also de-politicized Kurdish grievances (Chowdhury and Krebs 2010). Compared to Turks, Kurds were living in an environment of insecurity not only for material reasons but also for non-material reasons such as repression of their language, identity and culture (İçduygu, Romano and Sirkeci 1999). The PKK was represented as 'killer of babies', 'demon' in the Turkish media but state terror remained invisible due to high state censor. While any expression in favor of Kurdish human rights was charged with sedition, these acts were associated with terrorism in state discourse and they were strictly condemned as treason.

The number of families which were victimized due to the ethnic war increased as the number of death toll from the armed conflict between the PKK and Turkey exceeds 30.000 people. KONDA research displays "approximately one over ten Turks and one over five Kurds affirm the existence of wounded or dead as a result of conflict situation in the last 30

years" (KONDA 2011a: 21). The rising number of victims left different memories for ordinary Turks and Kurds. Contrary to the image of the PKK as "evil" and the Turkish state as "good" for ordinary Turks, these images was blurred for a certain part of Kurds especially for those who suffered from excessive counterterrorism strategies. The support for the PKK and its mobilization capacity increased in 1990s as a side-effect of excessive counterterrorism measures. The recognition of Kurdish identity gives birth to new urban forms of xenophobia that Saraçoğlu describes as "exclusive recognition" (Saraçoğlu 2010). In his research on Izmir, the third great metropolis of Turkey where Kurds migrated, Saraçoğlu finds out that the *İzmirlis* recognize the presence of Kurdish migrants in the city but also exclude them by negative labels constituted by daily interaction in urban life with Kurds. The distinguishing character of this stereotyping is its unique quality that these negative stigmas are used exclusively against Kurds, not towards other ethnic groups that *İzmirlis* cohabitate with. Saraçoğlu finds out five main stigmas used by *Izmirlis* toward Kurdish migrants in the city a) ignorant and cultureless b) benefit scroungers c) disrupters of urban life d) invaders e) separatists. A recent study demonstrates that high level of conflict between the PKK and the state also heightens mutual mistrust between Turks and Kurds (Bilali, Çelik and Ok 2014). The KONDA research of 2011 shows the psychological divide between Turks and Kurds and the alarming intolerance levels towards Kurds among Turks.

Table III. Tolerance toward different ethnic identities in Turkey

The question: Which category would you not accept as bride, colleague or neighborhoods? (Turks for Kurds and Kurds for Turks)		
Position	Turk	Kurds
As husband or wife	57,6	26,4
As collegue	53,5	24,8
As neighbor	47,4	22,1

Source: The report of findings about the research on perceptions and expectations concerning Kurdish question by KONDA (2011a: 106).

2.2. Cleavage Structure and Political Competition in Turkey: A preventive role on Intercommunal Violence

Contrary to many studies' assumption of a straightforward link between ethnicity and political behavior during ethnic-civil war (Kaufman 2001, Posen 1993, Gagnon 2004, Kaplan 1993), ethnic-civil wars generate a dynamic political arena which does not eliminate competition between political cleavages. Many politicians, analysts, international relations scholars fall prey to 'groupism', 'the tendency to take discrete, sharply differentiated, internally homogenous, and externally bounded groups as basic constituents of social life, chief protagonists of social conflicts' (Brubaker 2004: 35). Even under the negative momentum of ethnic-civil wars, cross-cutting cleavages which shape the political arena may be adaptive and resilient preventing the domination of ethnic choice over political preferences. Despite the repercussions of ethno-nationalist violence, members of ethnic groups can display political and organizational behaviors which divert from ethnically-defined organizational and political patterns (Kalyvas 2008). As Kalyvas points out, endogenous dynamics of civil war shaped by the complex interweaving of actors and dimensions can give place to ethnic defection, 'a disjunction between ethnic identification and political support for ethno-national goals, without requiring a shift in a person's self-identification' (Ibid.: 1045). This study contributes to constructivist insights into ethnic-civil war and shows that politically relevant center-periphery cleavage in Turkey undermined the domination of ethnic cleavage in political sphere during its ethnic-civil war and played a moderating role on increased interethnic tensions.

This chapter supports Wilkinson (2004) and Horowitz (1985,1991) who argue that political competition and cleavage structure which provide electoral incentives for political parties to appeal to minorities decrease the likelihood of interethnic conflict in a given country. The within-case analysis of Kurdish problem in Turkey reveals that the political

competition based on center-periphery cleavage structure enabled three institutional outcomes which contributed to the maintenance of interethnic cooperation during the ethnic civil war. Firstly, political parties, especially those which claimed the representation of periphery, competed to attract Kurdish leaders due to their vote potential, thus, incorporated Kurdish leaders into Turkish political system as political brokers. Secondly, political parties in government had to adopt a moderate position toward Kurds since they were backed by an important share of Kurdish votes. Thirdly, this electoral competition for Kurdish support pushed political parties to adopt frames appealing to their Kurdish constituency, hence, discouraged political actors to use exclusive communal frames against Kurdish minority.

2.2.1. Ethnicity, Cleavages and Kurdish problem in Turkey: A Historical Overview

Being Muslim was more important than being Kurdish or Turkish during Ottoman Empire as the official categorization was predicated upon religious criteria used by '*millet*' system which signifies religious communities entitled to self-government by their spiritual leaders. During the war of Independence, Kurdish identity was not a taboo as the brotherhood between Turks and Kurds, including other Muslim ethnic groups in Turkey was stressed many times by Mustafa Kemal in his utterances (Mango 1999, McDowall 1996). In the first Grand Assembly, there were more than seventy Kurdish representatives (Tan 2009: 186). In Lausanne negotiations, in order to defy the demands for self-determination for Kurds, Inonu stated that Turks and Kurds were from the same race and Turkish government was also the legitimate representative of Kurds since many Kurdish representatives were present in parliament and partook in the government of the country (Bayrak 2004:15). However, the tone of government was veering through Turkish nationalism through the end of Independence war. In the new parliament of 1923, the representatives were nominated rather than elected (McDowall 1996:191). After 1925 Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1927-31 Mount Ararat Revolt, and 1937-38 Revolt of Dersim in early republican era, the forced assimilation

policies were implemented to turykify Kurdish populations including forced displacement, prosecution, arbitrary detention and arrest, torture, curfews and wide-ranging bans over the expressions of Kurdish identity. The CHP (Republican People's Party, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*), which was founded by Mustafa Kemal and ruled the country until 1950, closed down its local branches in Kurdish-inhabited areas. They were governed by three general inspectorates under the direct command of Mustafa Kemal (Bozarslan 2008: 342). But even during the one-party rule of the CHP (1923-1946), Kurdish leaders were present in the party (McDowall 1996: 399). Especially Kurdish powerful provincial magnates (*eşraf*) who confiscated non-Muslim properties collaborated with the regime (Tan 2009: 52) and they were the ones who took the position of deputies and mayors in Kurdish-populated areas such as Mardin, Diyarbakır, Bitlis, Siirt (ibid.). Many Kurdish rural leaders from various distinctions such as aghas, chiefs, begs, who were considered to be accomplices of insurgencies, were either deported to the West or executed. The CHP government passed and implemented the Law of Treason and established the Tribunals of Independence charged with extraordinary powers against those who contested Kemalist reforms. These laws were implemented ruthlessly not only against many Kurdish leaders who were suspected accomplices of insurgencies, but also against important leaders of the War of Independence who were opposed to Kemalist policies. The Progressive Republican Party was closed down on 3 March 1925 and important leaders of opposition were executed along with Kurdish leaders in opposition. The Settlement Law (*Iskan Kanunu*) of 1934 was used to deport and disperse Kurdish leaders and population. Therefore, the opposition in entire Turkey was cowed into silence by extraordinary measures of oppression and suppression.

The center-periphery cleavage is a historical cleavage etched in Ottoman social division between the ruling elite and rural peripheral forces (Mardin 1973). The Ottoman ruling elite connected mainly to bureaucracy and military establishment was distinguished

with its cultural, social and economic status from the *reaya* (subjects) and looked down on them with suspicion and contempt. This social division persisted after the foundation of Turkish Republic. The ruling elite now charged with implementing and preserving Republican reforms rejected and repressed the claims of more conservative, rural and lower-educated masses which contested republican reforms such as nation-building, secularism and westernization. Hence, the bureaucratic and military elite at the helm of the *center* had to confront and cohabitate with the *periphery* composed of a heterogeneous set of voices including peasants, artisans, small traders, ethnic and religious groups. One should also note that the boundaries of center and periphery cleavage are not clear-cut as the centrist and peripheral tendencies of the main political parties in Turkey are contingent on changing circumstances. Nonetheless, it is a useful political lens whose impact endures until today and shapes the political arena (see Kalaycıoğlu 1994, 1999; Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2007).

There was no political competition until the foundation of the DP (Democrat Party, *Demokrat Parti*) in 1946 as there was one-party rule. The Free Republican Party (*Serbest Parti*) was founded under the authorization of Mustafa Kemal in 1930 but it was closed by the CHP due to its popularity among people discontent with the regime which could overthrow the CHP government. The center-periphery cleavage is institutionalized into political sphere with the establishment of the Democrat Party. The transition to multi-party regime enhanced the political weight of Kurdish electorate and leaders due to their electoral potential. The size of Kurdish population concentrated mainly in Southeastern provinces of Eastern Turkey, nearly 18-19 per cent of the total population,[15] was not negligible for political actors and could serve as a viable base to build minimum winning coalition. The DP was founded by

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[15] There are no exact figures on the number of Kurdish population in Turkey but the estimates change from 12 to 15 million (18 to 23 percent of the population), See Gunter (2010: XXVII-XXVIII) KONDA (2011a: 91-92), Mutlu (1996), Bruinessen (2011).

four dissidents of the CHP who wrote a memorandum in 1946 for political liberalization. Its founder, Celal Bayar, was a close associate of Mustafa Kemal and the other dissidents, Adnan Menderes was an important landowner from Aydın, Fuat Köprülü was a professor of history and Refik Koraltan was a veteran bureaucrat. Thus, they were a reassuring political formation for the CHP to allow multi-party competition as they would not pose a credible challenge to the main tenets of Kemalist regime. Without challenging the main pillars of Kemalist principles, the Democrat Party stressed religious freedom, private property and liberalization (Demirel 2011). The rise of multi-party competition generated an immediate moderation impact upon the CHP's policies against conservative, rural, religious masses including Kurds. Aware of the alienating impact of forced secularism, the CHP allowed religious instruction in state schools and opening of religious schools alongside state schools. In 1947, the CHP allowed the exiled 2000 aghas to return to their places (McDowall 1996:399). The crisscrossing of grievances between periphery and ethnic and religious diversity was manifest in 1950 elections. Even Tunceli, Kurdish Alevi stronghold which is fearful of Sunni revivalism, voted for the Democrat Party in the 1950 elections. Tribal and religious leaders from Kurdish origins encouraged Kurdish electorate to vote for the DP with calls interspersed with Kurdish nationalism (Bruinessen 2011: 376). The CHP's vote share in provinces with largest Kurdish populations is more than its average votes in entire Turkey despite the ruthless implementation of assimilation policies in 1950 elections. Deniz and Aydın (2012: 94) explain this by two reasons. The DP was founded by people who opposed to the land reform, thus, the CHP gained the support of landless peasants as an advocate of land reform. The other reason was the prominence of bureaucracy during the one-party rule of the CHP which undercut the influence of Kurdish traditional leaders in politics. Moreover, the CHP had not engaged in social-economic restructuring in Kurdish–inhabited provinces such as land reforms, thus, Kurdish traditional elites with class distinctions 'agha', 'beg' or 'sheikh' were

in place to create political allies. Many political parties across center-periphery spectrum made use of local rivalries to collaborate with Kurdish leaders and to make inroads into Kurdish voters. Under the DP, Kurdish-inhabited areas did not see a U-turn in republican policies but underwent a relaxation of forced secularism policies and state oppression. The DP allowed the recitation of call to prayer in Arabic, religious radio broadcasts and supported the construction of more mosques with an emphasis on religious instruction. These policies were directed toward rural, conservative and religious electorate including Kurds. The DP emphasized education and economic development as a solution to disturbances in the East (Aktürk 2012: 138-139).

Leaders from Kurdish origins emerged as potential allies of political parties representative of peripheral forces starting from the DP due to their opposition to the state's secularist and assimilation policies. As Gündoğan describes:

The deputies were mostly from the local Kurdish rulers contrary to the previous period. From the point of Kurdish rulers, the situation was like this. The people who were suppressed no more than five-ten years ago since they were or presumed as 'sheikh,' 'pir,' 'dede,' 'sayyid,' 'seigneur,' 'feodal lord,' 'overlord,' 'chieftain,' etc. were exposed to (political) interest for the same titles, they were rendered more functional in the system. They called Melik Fırat privately[16] and made him deputy. The families of sheikhs and leaders of *tariqas* were added into the system from Said-i Nursi ….to Sheikh of Menzil. A similar process (for chieftains, major tradesmen and landlords) also took place (Gündoğan 2014:104).

This political incorporation created a mutually beneficial relationship. The governments which could not make inroads into Kurdish periphery used these local ties to enforce law and order in the Kurdish regions. Kurdish leaders' political position strengthened patronage networks over local clients through their ability to distribute state funds, manage economic investment and social services in their regions (Bruinessen 2002, 2011). Nevertheless, these deputies were accepted into Turkish politics not as Kurds but as Turks and had to disguise or keep silent about their identity As McDowall highlights:

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[16] Melik Fırat is the grandson of Sheikh Said who initiated a rebellion against the secularization and assimilation policies of the state in 1925.

. . . the aghas ceased to be Kurdish in two vital senses: they quietly disowned their Kurdish origin, and they exploited their relationship with the peasantry not as a means to semi-independence from the center as in the old days, but in order to become more closely integrated members of the ruling Turkish establishment (McDowall 1996:402).

The political careers of the relatives of Kurdish leaders in the Sheikh Said Rebellion are illustrative to reveal how the political incorporation of Kurdish leaders through the political competition based on center-periphery cleavage enabled a political cooperation between Kurdish traditional leaders and Turkish political parties: the nephew and son-in-law of Ali Rıza Efendi (eldest son of Sheikh Said), Abdülmelik Fırat served as a deputy from Erzurum. Fuat Fırat, son of Abdülmelik Fırat also served as a deputy for three parliamentary terms. The grandson of Hanili Salih Bey (another leader of Sheikh Said rebellion who was also executed), Ferit Bora, served as a deputy in the DYP (True Path Party, *Doğru Yol Partisi*) between 1987-1991 and in the FP (Virtue Party, *Fazilet Partisi*) of Necmettin Erbakan between 1995-1999 (Tan 2009: 215-216).

The economic downturn in mid-1950s curtailed the popularity of the DP. The CHP was creeping into the social base of the DP including those in Kurdish regions through the promises on agricultural development, constructions of mosques, electrification. The HP (Liberty Party, *Hürriyet Partisi*) (1955-58) was founded by the deputies who left the DP including deputies from Kurdish origins among whom Yusuf Azizoğlu (Diyarbakır) is one of the most known. The Liberty Party made successful inroads into Kurdish votes and rose as a political challenger of the DP and the CHP in Kurdish-inhabited areas. However, its political impact remained smaller compared to its votes due to the plurality rule. Celal Bayar, the president of Republic, and Adnan Menderes, the prime minister, wanted to hang the 49 Kurds who were considered suspicious in the eyes of the state that were arrested during the protests of Asım Eren, Nigde deputy who called for revenge on Kurds against the massacres of

Turcomans in Kirkuk, but they backtracked fearing the reaction of international system (McDowall 1996: 405).

Ten year rule of the DP ended with the 27 May coup d'état which was an attempt of the center composed of the bureaucratic and military elite to reestablish centrist principles. One of the accusations directed against the DP was favoritism toward Kurds. The leaders of the DP, Adnan Menderes (Prime minister), Fatin Rüştü Zorlu (Minister of foreign affairs), and Hasan Polatkan (Minister of economy) were executed under the military junta. Cemal Gürsel, the head of military junta and the would-be president of Republic, was an advocate of assimilationist and denial policies. He wrote the foreword to the second edition of Mehmet Şerif Fırat's *Dogu Illeri ve Varto Tarihi* [Eastern Provinces and History of Varto] (1961) that argues the Turkic roots of Kurdishness and the non-existence of Kurdish nation in history. The report of State Planning Organization (*Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı)* on Eastern Turkey that was submitted to the military junta recommended to revive assimilation policies by forced displacement, appointment of missionary bureaucracy to the East, dispersion/amalgamation of villages in order to turkify "people who suppose themselves as Kurds" (Yayman 2011: 178-186). The military was anxious about the rising Kurdish activism in Iraq under the head of Mulla Mustafa Barzani and wanted to break his effect in Kurdish-inhabited areas. They sent four hundred eight five people from eastern and southeastern Turkey of whom 55 were from prominent Kurdish families to a camp in Sivas. The composition of exiles in Sivas camp displays that leaders from Kurdish origins were connected to Turkish political parties such as Faik Bucak was a deputy of the DP and would-be president of Turkey's Kurdistan Democrat Party, Tevfik Doğuışıker was a deputy of the CHP, Kinyas Kartal was the would-be deputy of the Justice Party, Ali Rıza Fırat (son of Sheikh Said) and his sons (his son Fuat Fırat became the deputy for three parliamentary terms). Another event which demonstrates this mutual dependence was the fact that the National Unity committee envisaged the distribution of lands

Table IV. General Elections and Party Competition for Kurdish votes between 1950-1960

Elections	Vote Share in Turkey (%)	Vote Share in provinces with largest Kurdish population (%)	Government Formation	Ruling Party (ies)
1950 Elections				
DP	52,68	40,825		
CHP	39,45	48,08		
MP (Nation Party)	3,11	0	Single Rule	DP
Independents	4,76	3,92		
1954 Elections				
DP	57,5	54,45		
CHP	35,29	32,58		
CMP (Republican Nation Party, *Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi*)[17]	4,84	1,33		
TKP (Turkey's Peasant Party, *Türkiye Köylü Partisi*)[18]	0,63	0,46	Single Rule	DP
Independents	1,74	11,24		
1957 Elections				
DP	47,91	44,17		
CHP	41,12	44,19		
CMP	7,08	2,63	Single Rule	DP
HP	3,84	6,19		
Independents	0,05	1,01		

Notes: The election results are compiled using the electoral results of Belgenet.[19] The provinces with largest Kurdish populations are Ağrı, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Tunceli, Van, Şanlıurfa, Şırnak, Adıyaman, Batman, Elazığ according to Mutlu's study (1996). Adıyaman is founded after 1954 elections and is included in the calculations. The vote share of parties in provinces where the parties did not nominate any candidate is calculated as zero.

in Kurdish regions to peasantry but withheld this plan due to political connections of Kurdish leaders (McDowall 1996: 202). However, the repression policies of state elites were straining the relations between Kurdish leaders and the Turkish state. As Said Ensarioğlu, one of the leaders exiled in Sivas camp, explains:

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[17] Nation Party was founded in 1948 by conservative dissidents of the DP and was refounded with the name Republican Nation Party (CMP) when the Nation Party was closed down in 1954.

[18] TKP was founded by a scission of the DP to defend the peasants in 1952.

[19] See http://www.belgenet.net/ (accessed 19.03.2011).

We took ourselves for citizens. I was saying that I was entitled to the same rights but your state says, you are not from me and I elaborate a special law for you and exile you. The states sow the seeds of separatism here (27Mayıs'ın Öteki Yüzü/Sivas Kampı-I 2010).

The 1961 constitution elaborated a more liberal and democratic framework for Turkish politics. The new proportional representation system with national remainder system (*milli bakiye*) was instituted to forestall the majoritarian governments such as the case of the DP but benefited to the emergence of small parties which did not have the chance to voice their grievances in the political system before. Contrary to the preeminence of two mainstream parties due to plurality rule, the post-1960 period witnessed the political fractionalization. The new Turkey Party (*Yeni Türkiye Partisi,* YTP), was led by Yusuf Azizoglu who competed with the AP (Justice Party, *Adalet Partisi*) for the legacy of the DP and made inroads into Kurdish voters. The political space in Kurdish-inhabited areas was divided between the YTP, the CHP and the AP in early 1960s. Like the AP, Azizoğlu insisted for the return of 55 exiled deputies knowing that this would attract electoral support for the party. The YTP was the political partner of the second coalition government composed of the CHP, the Republican Peasant Nation Party (CKMP) and the independents which lasted for 18 months (1961-62). During this period, Azizoğlu partook in the government as minister of health and social aid and contributed to the economic development of Kurdish inhabited areas, especially for the health infrastructure. He had to resign upon allegations against him for 'regionalism'. The political weight of the YTP faded away after 1965 elections. Faik Bucak, an agha from Siverek founded the Democratic Party of Turkish Kurdistan (KDPT) in 1965 but was assassinated in 1966. His successor, Sait Elci, was executed by Dr. Şivan (Sait Kırmızıtoprak), a leftist schismatic, in 1971. Alongside the clientelist ties between Kurdish traditional leaders and mainstream parties; a new generation of Kurdish leaders, urban, educated and weaning toward the left-wing politics, was raising with the ensuing impacts of modernization, education, urban migration, mechanization, increasing literacy among Kurdish

masses. The TIP (Turkish Workers' Party, *Türkiye İşçi Partisi*) was founded in 1961 by twelve syndicalists and was reinforced under his new leader, Mehmet Ali Aybar who took the helm of the TIP in 1962. In the 1965 elections, among 15 deputies of the TIP who entered into parliament, four were from Kurdish origins. The TIP rose as the electoral rival of the CHP and the AP in Kurdish-inhabited areas. The TIP was popular among Kurds and Alevis. There are at least three reasons for Kurdish support of left-wing politics according to Bozarslan (2008: 345-346). The political agenda of the left based on social justice and equality was appealing to Kurds who were living in the most impoverished regions of Turkey. Secondly, the critique of the left against state-centric policies, even though it did not challenge directly Kemalism, was attractive for Kurds. Thirdly, the Marxist-Leninist universal perspective of the left based on the right to self-determination of oppressed people offered a new discourse for Kurds to legitimate their demands. There was a high competition between political parties for Kurdish votes in 1965 between left and right-wing political parties. As Tan describes:

When the year 1965 arrived, leftist, socialist Kurds were in the Turkish Workers' Party; rightist, nationalist Kurds were in the Turkey's Kurdistan Democrat Party, feudal Kurdish aghas and sheikhs who were in the process of integration with the regime and who, in effect, accomplished this integration were gathered in the Justice Party and the New Turkey Party (Tan 2009: 350).

Table V. General Elections and Party Competition for Kurdish votes between 1960-1980

Elections	Vote Share in Turkey	Vote Share in provinces with largest Kurdish population (%)	Government Formation	Ruling Party
1961 Elections				
CHP	36,74	36,48	Coalition Government (20.11.1961-25.06.1962)	CHP-AP
AP	34,8	9,81	Coalition Government (25.06.1962-25.12.1963)	CHP-CKMP-YTP-Independents
YTP	13,73	36,54	Coalition	

Party	%	%	Government	Coalition
CKPM	13,96	1,69	Government (25.12.1963-20.02.1965)	CHP-Independents
Independents	0,81	0,06		

1965 Elections

Party	%	%	Government	Coalition
AP	52,87	29,98	Single Party (20.02.1965-27.10.1965)	AP
CHP	28,75	29,65		
YTP	3,72	20,77		
MP	6,26	1,44		
TIP	2,97	3,04	Single Party (27.10.1965-03.11.1969)	AP
CKMP	2,24	3,01		
Independents	3,19	12,15		

1969 Elections

Party	%	%	Government	Coalition
AP	46,55	28,94	Single Party Government (06.03.1970-26.03.1971)	DP
CHP	27,37	20,7		
GP	6,58	11,7		
YTP	2,18	12,92	I. Erim Hük. (26.03.1971-11.12.1971)	'Above-party' cabinet of Technocrats founded by the support of 1971 military junta
MP	3,22	1,2		
MHP	3,03	1,5		
BP	2,8	0,92	II. Erim Hük. (11.12.1971-22.05.1972)	'Above-party' cabinet of Technocrats founded by the support of 1971 military junta
TIP	2,68	3,29		
Independents	5,62	18,9	Coalition Government (22.05.1972-15.04.1973)	AP, CHP and MGP

1973 Elections

Party	%	%	Government	Coalition
CHP	33,29	26,22	Coalition government (15.04.1973-26.01.1974)	AP- CGP
AP	29,82	23,03	Coalition Government (26.01.1974-17.11.1974)	CHP- MSP
DP	11,89	9,53		
MSP	11,8	14,28	Minority Government (17.11.1974-31.03.1975)	
CGP	5,26	10,65		
MHP	3,38	1,45		
TBP	1,14	0,21	Coalition Government (3l.03.1975-21.06.1977)	AP - MSP - MHP - CGP (First Nationalist Front Government)
MP	0,58	0		
Independents	2,8	14,62		

1977 Elections

Party	%	%	Government	Coalition
CHP	41,39	28,42	Minority Government (21.06.1977-21.07.1977)	

AP	36,89	23,95	Coalition Government (21.07.1977-05.01.1978)	AP-MSP-MHP (Second Nationalist Front Government)
MSP	8,57	17,9	Government supported by CHP and Independents (05.01.1978-12.11.1979)	CHP-Independents-Members from CGP and DP
MHP	6,42	3,65		
CGP	1,87	2,84	Minority Government (12.11.1979-12.09.1980)	
DP	1,85	1,08		
TBP	0,39	0,06		
TIP	0,14	0,14		
Independents	2,49	21,91		

Notes: The election results are compiled using the electoral results of Belgenet.[20] The provinces with largest Kurdish populations are Ağrı, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Tunceli, Van, Şanlıurfa, Şırnak, Adıyaman, Batman, Elazığ according to Mutlu's study (1996). Adıyaman is founded after 1954 elections and is included in the calculations. The vote share of parties in provinces where the parties did not nominate any candidate is calculated as zero.

Alongside its leftist agendas, the TIP privileged ethnic diversity politics, used the word Alevi and Kurd in public campaigning and became the first party to acknowledge publicly the Eastern problem and the presence of Kurdish society in its fourth party congress in 1970.The Justice Party lost its appeal after 1965 elections due to the fact that Süleyman Demirel, its leader, stated in 1967 in a Kurdish-populated area, Mardin, that "Anybody who does not feel Turkish, or who feels unhappy in Turkey, is free to go elsewhere: the frontiers are wide open" (Kendal 1993:83).

The impact of the TIP on Kurdish problem was not confined to the Parliament. With affiliated labor unions and left-wing student movements, the TIP possessed a wide-scale organizational capacity and was able to intimidate the centrist cleavage and right-wing parties in the parliament. Eastern meetings were supported by the TIP, TKDP and Kurdish

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[20] See http://www.belgenet.net/ (accessed 19.03.2011).

intellectuals that organized demonstrations in Kurdish regions and appealed to urban, educated Kurdish citizens. The mass support brought about the foundation of the Revolutionary Cultural Centers of the East (DDKO) in 1969. The political emphasis was diverting from the underdevelopment of the East toward cultural rights with growing Eastern movements. The TIP's public acknowledgement of Kurdish problem became its death knell and it was closed on the grounds of separatist propaganda. The military intervened again on 12 March 1971 sending a written memorandum to preexisting AP government. One of the reasons of intervention was the seperatist question in the east. Many Kurdish activists in DDKO such as Musa Anter, Tarik Ziya Ekinci, Sait Elci and a young Turkish sociologist, Ismail Besikci were put into prison. The military established a martial law including Diyarbakır and Siirt. The leftist and rightist movements were radicalizing due to this repression and began to produce urban militants engaged in guerilla tactics. The CHP began to be popular among Kurds as its new leader, Bülent Ecevit, took the helm of the party in 1972 and was directing the party toward the left. The pro-Islamic MSP (National Salvation Party, *Milli Selamet Partisi*) of Necmettin Erbakan raised its popularity through its religious and pro-Islamic appeals among religiously-minded Kurds and revived Islam as a cross-cutting tie between Turks and Kurds. But these parties did not go beyond the discourse of economic development as a solution to Eastern problem. With the 1974 amnesty of the CHP-MSP coalition government, political prisoners were released and Kurds began to reorganize. Small clandestine Kurdish groups from Turkish-left wing movements were proliferating in Kurdish political space as they turned into underground organizations with diminished hopes from constitutional politics such as Bes Parcacilar (1976), Sivancilar (1972), DDKO – Revolutionary Eastern Culture Clubs (1969), DDKD – Revolutionary Democratic Culture Association (1975), TKSP – Turkish Kurdistan Socialist Party (1975), Kawa (1976), Denge Kawa (1977), Red Kawa (1978), Rizgari (1977), Ala Rizgari (1979), KUK – Kurdistan

National Liberationists (1978), TEKOSIN (1978), YEKBUN (1979), TSK – Kurdistan Socialist Movement (1980), and the PKK – Kurdistan Workers' Party (1978) (see Imset 1993). The KUK and the PKK were Marxist-Leninist organizations which adopted armed struggle against the state in order to put an end to Turkish colonialism and provide the liberation of Kurdistan. They used guerilla tactics to sustain their authority in Kurdish regions and to eliminate 'Kurdish collaborators of the Turkish colonialism'. Bucaks, a prominent family of Siverek were targeted by the PKK in 1978. In late 1970s, the Kurdish political sphere was being autonomized from Turkish political arena as mainstream Turkish parties could not appeal to Kurdish voters and independent deputies surfaced in Turkish political arena in the 1977 local elections. The electoral turnouts were decreasing with increasing public dissatisfaction (Dorronsoro and Watts 2009). Fahri Korutürk, the president of Republic, criticized Ecevit, the leader of the CHP coalition government (1973–1974 and 1978–1979), for closing his eyes against pro-Kurdish movements and an eventual Kurdish state composed of Kirkuk with the aid of the UK and France (Baransel 2006: 72-73). Şerafettin Elçi, minister of public works triggered a cabinet crisis in Ecevit's coalition government in 1979 when he declared 'Kurds exist, and I am a Kurd'. The government was unable to prevent urban clashes between right and left-wing movements. The politicization of Alevi identity associated with left-wing movements attracted the rage of right-wing Turkish nationalists as ethnic pogroms against Alevi community occured in Çorum, Maraş, Malatya.[21] The military intervened once more in politics by 1980 coup d'état.

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[21] The politicization of Kurdish identity and its reinforcement in the political arena are also influential on the rise of communal violence against Kurds. I will detail this point later in the chapter on communal violence against Kurds.

2.2.2. Center-periphery cleavage, political competition and Kurdish constituency[22] in post-1980 period

Bozarslan indicates three camps which prevailed over political space in Kurdish-inhabited areas at the beginning of 1980s:

The majority of politicians were still members of mainstream political parties, such as the JP, the RPP and the Islamist *Milli Selamet Partisi* (National Salvation Party, NSP). Many of these politicians, such as Şerafettin Elçi, Nurettin Yılmaz and Abdülmelik Fırat, presented themselves openly as Kurds, if not as defenders of the Kurdish case and people… The second group was that of the 'newcomers', the followers of the RECA (Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Associations, *Devrimci Doğu Kültür Dernekleri*) and KSP-T(Kurdistan Socialist Party-Turkey, *Partiya Sosyalista Kurdistan-Tirkiye*), who had a much more openly asserted Kurdish identity in places such as Diyarbakır, where they maintained local power. By their very existence, they testified that commitment to the Kurdish cause was becoming the main prerequisite of politics in the Kurdish provinces. The last category was that of the much younger generation, which dominated the street….By becoming affiliated with the NLK (National Liberators of Kurdistan, *Kürdistan Ulusal Kurtuluşçuları*) or the PKK, these militants formed a parallel world of socialization and action through violence, and challenged the domination of the older generations (Bozarslan 2008: 349-350).

1980 coup d'état which suspended the formal politics, implemented heavy repression against leftist and Kurdish movements with an aim to deal a death blow to them and erased the political competition in Kurdish regions in favor of illegal underground organizations. As Bozarslan indicates, Kurdish leaders who no longer disguised their ethnic identity were present at the end of 1980s. However, the excessive repression of 1980 military junta diverted the politics in favor of illegal militant organizations and pumped new life into the PKK which was a marginal Kurdish movement before and expanded its recruitment capacity (Bozarslan 1993, Bruinessen 1988, McDowall 1996).The military reenergized the assimilation policies. The law 2931 banned the use of Kurdish in public and private sphere. Instructions were sent by the minister of education stating that folk songs for ethnic and separatist aims which imply

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[22] Kurdish constituency in Turkey is mainly concentrated in southeastern provinces of Eastern Turkey. A significant number of Kurds also live in Western provinces of Turkey. This paper mainly concentrates on the voting behavior of Kurds in southeastern provinces of Eastern Turkey to illustrate the ability of political parties to appeal to Kurdish population in Turkey. For the distribution of Kurdish population in Turkey, see KONDA (2011a: 91-92).

Kurdish folk songs were prohibited. Under Law 1587, the place names in Kurdish-inhabited areas were renamed to eradicate Kurdish identity.

Like previous 1960 coup d'état, the 1980 coup d'état was an attempt of centrist coalition to reinstitute republican principles which were exposed to erosion, from their viewpoint, by political elites (Demirel 2005). By the same token, it ended up with bolstering the popularity of political parties representative of periphery. Under the raised eyebrow of military, the first general elections in 1983 brought the ANAP (Motherland Party, *Anavatan Partisi*), representative of a vast coalition of peripheral forces including liberals, nationalists, conservatives and Kurds, to political power. In 1983 general elections, a majority of Kurds supported the ANAP which pursued a more reformist and liberal agenda compared to the military-supported MDP (*Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi*, Nationalist Democracy Party). Despite the draconian methods of 1980 military intervention, the overtly military-backed MDP rose as the second strongest party in Kurdish provinces in 1983 elections. Like ANAP, the MDP also established good connections with chiefdoms and notables of Kurdish-inhabited areas such as Bahri Karakeçili and Aziz Bülent Önce from Şanlıurfa, M. Naci Mimaroğlu, Abdulrezzak Ceylan from Siirt (Erkan and Aydın 2012: 180). The left-wing People's Party had also a political ground in Kurdish regions which was a token of the continuing salience of left-wing politics in the region.

Turgut Ozal, leader of the ANAP government, received a large share of votes in Kurdish populated provinces in 1983 and 1987 elections not only due to his reformist character but also his ability to activate religious cleavage to appeal to Kurds through his affiliation with *Nakşibendi* Sufi order, a considerable Islamic brotherhood in Kurdish provinces (Zurcher 2004: 283). His political posture was exemplary of crisscrossing of grievances between periphery and Kurdish cleavage. Despite the military tutelage upon politics, he was able to criticize centrist policies and to advocate reforms on Kurdish rights

and liberties (Ataman 2002, Gunter 1997: 61-79). For the development of the region, Ozal initiated the South East Anatolia Project (GAP) in 1987. Nonetheless, his political openings wavered uncertainly as they went in parallel to increasing securitization of Kurdish problem. The ANAP introduced an emergency rule in 1987 in Kurdish-dominated provinces to fight against the PKK. Laws of Penal code and anti-terrorism laws were implemented harshly to suspend legal rights of activists who advocated basic rights and liberties for Kurds. In 1987, a governor-general was appointed over the eight Kurdish provinces under the state of emergency. The ANAP government continued to make use of intra-ethnic cleavages among Kurds and introduced the village guards (*korucu)* system recruiting Kurdish villagers charged with assisting security forces.

Left-wing SHP (Social Democrat Populist Party, *Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Party*) and conservative-Islamic RP (Welfare Party, *Refah Partisi*) rose as the main rival of the ANAP not only in nation-wide arena but also in Kurdish-populated provinces in 1987 general elections. The SHP took the support of more left-oriented Kurdish voters with important Kurdish and Alevi deputies in the party whereas the RP, successor of the MSP, received votes of more conservative-Islamic Kurds through its religious appeal and social networks to influential Islamic brotherhoods in Kurdish-inhabited areas. In 1984 municipal elections, the RP won important municipalities in Eastern Turkey including Şanlıurfa and Van. The SHP and the RP were able to rebuke centrist policies for harsh policies regarding Kurdish problem. The SHP criticized the excessive repression policies claiming that the south-east turned into 'a sort of concentration camp, where every citizen was treated as a suspect, and oppression, torture and insult the rule' (Cumhuriyet, 12 February1986 cited by Bruinessen 1988:46). However, the SHP also sacked deputies from Kurdish origins who attended an international conference on Kurdish question in 1989.

There was a relative political opening in 1990s with Turgut Özal as the President of Republic. Upon the interview of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader and founder of the PKK, with Ismet Imset in which Öcalan proposed to discuss Kurdish problem within the framework of federal policies, Özal gave positive signals. Özal even declared his half-Kurdish roots. He recognized the multi-ethnic character of Turkey and revoked the ban over Kurdish language. He built informal contacts with Iraqi Kurds. Özal was able to create a positive image in the eyes of Kurds (Cemal 2003: 157). In 1991, Mesut Yılmaz also declared, shortly before his appointment as prime minister that Kurdish could become the second official language in Turkey (McDowall 1996: 430). The SHP's 1990 report included pro-Kurdish demands such as lifting of restrictions on education in Kurdish, authorization of broadcasting in Kurdish, lifting of emergency rule, the need of general armistice. These demands can be deemed as "radical" considering the fraught atmosphere of the war in 1990s (Yayman 2011: 229). Kurdishness was being gradually stigmatized with terrorism and separatism due to the ongoing war with the PKK but it was still possible to build political alignments between Kurdish cleavage and political parties. The SHP achieved an electoral success in Kurdish-inhabited areas in 1991 general elections through its electoral alliance with the HEP (People's Labor Party, *Halkın Emek Partisi*), the first pro-Kurdish party in Turkish political spectrum. The HEP was also a result of the center-periphery confrontation and arose out of left-wing politics. The HEP was founded in 1990 under the presidency of Fehmi Işıklar, the ex-secretary of Revolutionary Workers' Syndicate (*Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları*, DİSK) and many deputies of the HEP such as Feridun Yazar, Ahmet Türk, Mahmut Alınak, Adnan Ekmen, Salih Sümer were coming from the CHP. The HEP was getting stronger in Kurdish-inhabited areas. Faced with a strong political rival, the SHP and the DYP (True Path Party, *Doğru Yol Partisi*), promised more democratization and human rights in their electoral campaigning in the Eastern Turkey and leaders from Kurdish origins took part in powerful positions in the

cabinet of their coalition government. Nonetheless, the collaboration between Kurdish cleavage and political parties representative of center-periphery cleavages ended just aftermath of the 1991 elections. During the oath ceremony of deputies, Leyla Zana, Kurdsih deputy from Diyarbakır finished her oath by stating "I take this oath for the brotherhood between the Turkish people and the Kurdish people" in Kurdish. For a country in which Kurdish language was legalized in 1991, the oath was shocking and the HEP's very existence in Turkish politics was overwhelming. Watts points out the omnipresent pressure of the state upon the pro-Kurdish parties in 1990s:

Police, prosecutors, and a majority of Parliament acted under a paradigm that equated pro-Kurdish leaflets with Kurdish separatist propaganda; portrayed pro-Kurdish party membership as synonymous with PKK membership; and treated demonstrations in support of pro-Kurdish politicians as rebellion against state authority (Watts 1999: 640).

Süleyman Demirel, leader of the DYP and the DYP-SHP coalition government, acknowledged "Kurdish reality" in one of his speeches upon ascending to office in 1991 but after he took the seat of the President of Republic defeating an assimilated leader from Kurdish origins, Kamuran Inan, the promises upon democratization remained in words. The HEP was closed by Constitutional court in 1993 and its successor DEP (*Demokrasi Partisi, Democracy Party*) was closed as well in 1994. The period 1991-1994 witnessed the rising ethnic tensions and fiercest fighting between the PKK and security forces. Tansu Çiller who replaced Demirel in the DYP as president and prime minister of the coalition government adopted a moderate stance toward Kurdish problem at first and organized electoral tours in Kurdish-inhibited areas. She even proposed Basque solution to Kurdish problem (Bask modelinden Faili Meçhullere 2013, Sazak 1993). But Demirel and the military were opposed to political openings in the face of ongoing war (Cemal 2003: 48-55). Demirel triggered the discussion on "constitutional citizenship", citizenship based constitutional rights and not on nationality. But he declared later that Turkey was not ready for this arrangement (Vergin

1996). He was against cultural rights for Kurds and negotiations with the PKK which would be considered, in his view, as concessions to terrorism. The brutal deeds of the war were unfolding across the country between 1991 and 1995 ensuing from highly deadly pitched battles between security forces and the PKK, massacres and counter-massacres from both sides, forced displacement of thousands of people from Kurdish-inhabited areas.

The frustration out of the SHP-DYP coalition government and growing insecurity by the rising clashes between PKK and the state induced an electoral tip in favor of the RP. The RP thrived on the ideological exhaustion of right-wing parties, rampant corruption and unemployment and rose as the first party from 1995 general elections. Politicians could not sustain politics based on ignorance of Kurds especially in local elections because Kurdish presence increased considerably due to forced displacement in big metropolises of Turkey, notably in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir (Bruinessen 2011: 229). Taking the lessons from its decreasing prestige in Kurdish regions due to its electoral alliance with Turkish nationalists in 1991 elections, the RP turned into a more reformist and liberal position with regard to Kurdish problem. The RP appealed to Kurdish voters by challenging nation-state model of Turkish Republic, stressing Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood based on Islamic *ummah* and giving place to Kurds in the party leadership (Çalmuk 2011). The RP had important Kurdish deputies such as Hasim Hasimi and Yakup Hatipoglu. HADEP (*Halkın Demokrasi Partisi*, People's Democracy Party) run for the first time in 1995 general elections. It gained an important share of votes by 4,2 %. Its seats mostly went to the RP since it cannot surpass ten per cent electoral threshold. The significant number of chiefs and notables from Kurdish-inhabited provinces who run as candidates from Eastern and Southeastern Turkey in 1995 elections illustrates how political parties cooperated with local leaders to benefit from their electoral weight. As Erkan and Aydın put it:

1995 elections turned into elections with which, the traditional political actors of the region, in other words, tribal leaders entered into Parliament. Almost all the political parties in the region gave place to important tribal members in their lists. For example, Zülfikar İzol in Şanlıurfa became deputy from the RP, three important leaders of chiefdoms of Şanlıurfa, Sedat Bucak, Necmettin Cevheri and Fevzi Şıhanlıoğlu became deputy from the DYP. Again Eyyüp Cenap Gürpınar and Seyit Eyyüboğlu, the leaders of chiefdoms who have been important in Şanlıurfa traditional politics for many years have been deputies from the ANAP. It can be said that these elections resulted in the victory of chiefdoms in Şanlıurfa. In Diyarbakır, people who are known to have relations with chiefdoms became deputies such as Haşim Haşimi from RP, Abdülkadir Aksu and Seyfetullah Seydaoğlu from ANAP , Selim Ensarioğlu and Salih Sümer from DYP. In Batman, one of the important names from Raman chiefdom, Faris Özdemir became deputy. In Bitlis Kamran İnan from ANAP, Edip Safter Gaydalı from DYP, in Mardin Mahmut Duyan from DYP became deputies (Erkan and Aydın 2012:211).

The RP-DYP coalition was founded on 28 June 1996.The RP's rise to power fueled the fears of centrist coalition against the rise of political Islam. Pro-Islamic movements were also construed as a 'divisive and destructive force against the state' in the eyes of state elites along with pro-Kurdish movements. The first government run by an Islamic Party was forced to dissolve before producing any significant policies with regard to Kurdish problem. The RP-DYP government was dragooned into resignation during the meeting of the National Security Council[23] in 1997 which once more activated center-periphery cleavage in political arena by military tutelage.

On the other side, horizontal inequalities between Turks and Kurds which were already preexistent due to the economic marginalization of Kurdish inhabited-areas (White 1998) heightened since the negative effects of displacement such as squatter house development, overcrowding, poverty and unemployment were shouldered by Kurds (Kurban, Çelik and Yükseker 2006). The social and political composition of Western provinces were changing as the displaced Kurds frustrated with state`s excessive policies voiced Kurdish

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[23] 1982 Constitution instituted the National Security Council (NSC) as the highest advisory board for the state. The NSC is consisted of the Ministers provided by law, the Chief of the General Staff, and representatives of the armed forces and the President, who acts as the chairman. It served in practice as the institution of military tutelage over civilian politics.

grievances in urban areas with social movements and political activism (Watts 2006). As a result, Kurdish question turned into a Turkish problem more than ever in this era. In the political arena, the support of pro-Kurdish parties was being consolidated but the following unstable coalition governments produced no significant policies concerning Kurdish problem. The rift between mainstream political parties and Kurdish constituency was widening at the end of 1990s. Kurdish reality was acknowledged in public by political leaders in 1990s but democratic claims based on Kurdish rights continued to be represented as destructive and divisive in public space (Somer 2005, Sezgin and Wall 2005). 18 April 1999 elections produced the increase of two parties with nationalist credentials, the DSP (*Demokratik Sol Parti*, Democratic Left Party) and the MHP (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi,* Nationalist Action Party) due to frustration over rampant corruption of antecedent parties, the increasing nationalism after the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the PKK. In these elections, HADEP increased its votes from 4.2 to 4.7. The DSP and the MHP instituted the coalition government with the ANAP. These parties which represented more nationalist dimension of center-periphery confrontation did not have a significant support base in Kurdish-inhabited areas (Table I). Both parties did not accept the existence of Kurdish problem. The DSP reduced Kurdish problem to the problem of underdevelopment, the MHP to the problem of terrorism.

Table VI. Turkish General Elections and Party Competition for Kurdish votes in Post-1980 Period

General Elections	Government formation	Ruling party (s)	Effective Number of Parties	Vote share of Governing party (s) (%)	Support for governing party (s) in provinces with largest Kurdish population (%)	Support for Pro-Kurdish Party in provinces with largest Kurdish population (%)
1983	Single-Party	ANAP	2.85	45.14	34.2	-
1987	Single-Party	ANAP	4.11	36.31	30.35	-
1991	Coalition	DYP-SHP	4.67	51.04	55.76	Electoral alliance with the SHP
1995	Coalition (28.06.1996-30.06.1997)	ANAP-DYP minority government*	6.16	38.83	32.13	21,42
	Coalition (28.06.1996-30.06.1997)	RP-DYP		40.56	40.84	
	Coalition (30.06.1997-11.01.1999)	ANAP-DSP-DTP-Independents minority government*		-**	-**	
	Coalition (11.01.1999-28.05.1999)	DSP minority government		14.64	3.71	
1999	Coalition	DSP-MHP-ANAP	6.78	55.58	26.01	24,39
2002	Single-Party	AKP	5.43	34.43	23.43	32,44
2007	Single-Party	AKP	3.48	46.58	46.44	32,5
2011	Single-Party	AKP	2.97	49.95	41.95	39,62

Notes: The election results are compiled using the electoral results of Belgenet. [24] The index on effective number of parties in Turkey is taken from Tezcür (2012) who calculates the effective number of parties according to vote shares. The provinces with largest Kurdish populations are Ağrı, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Tunceli, Van, Şanlıurfa, Şırnak, Adıyaman, Batman, Elazığ according to Mutlu's study (1996). The provinces with large Kurdish populations founded after 1990, Batman and Şırnak from 1991 elections on and Ardahan and Iğdır from 1995

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[24] See http://www.belgenet.net/ (accessed 19.03.2011).

elections on are added into calculations.

* Minority governments do not hold parliamentary majority but they are supported by parties without government portfolios.

**Since the Democratic Society Party (DTP) is founded after 1995 elections by deputies who left the DSP and the ANAP, the vote share of governing parties in ANAP-DSP-DTP-Independents minority government and their support in provinces with largest Kurdish populations cannot be calculated.

The official recognition of 'candidate status' of Turkey to the European Union (EU) in 1999 put pressure on the coalition government to improve Kurdish rights. Mesut Yılmaz, the leader of the ANAP in coalition government even declared 'the road to the EU passes from Diyarbakır' (Demokrasi Kürt'ün de Hakkı 1999). Ismail Cem, the minister of foreign affairs, gave positive signals about right to broadcasting in other languages (Kaya 2010: 110). However, the reluctance of government to pass and implement reforms and the following economic crisis in 2000-2001 rendered the coalition government squeezed between contentious politics stemming from heightened Kurdish activism and the EU's warnings about human rights violations with regard to Kurdish problem.

3 November 2002 elections changed entirely the political spectrum of Turkish politics. Other than the AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, Justice and Development Party), an offshoot of closed RP, and the CHP; other political parties could not pass ten per cent electoral threshold. The AKP sorted as victorious from elections with 34,4 % of votes. The CHP entered into Parliament as the second party. The pro-Kurdish party, DEHAP (*Demokratik Halk Partisi*, Democratic People's Party), increased its votes to 6.14 per cent. The dichotomous structure of Kurdish politics was revived again with the rise of the AKP and the DEHAP. During the AKP's first term in government, it did not make significant progress on Kurdish problem apart from lifting up the emergency rule and elaborating development plans for underdeveloped areas of Eastern Turkey. The speech of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, leader of the AKP government, in 2005 was a turning point for Kurdish problem as he acknowledged

the past mistakes of the state in dealing with Kurdish problem and proposed to solve Kurdish problem with democratization (Kürt Sorunu Benim Sorunum 2005). The votes of the AKP in Kurdish-inhabited areas boosted in 2007 and 2011 general elections. Emboldened by the Turkey's European Union accession process, its significant support in Kurdish-inhabited areas and deputies from Kurdish origins; the AKP government passed and implemented many reform programs which not only tamed bureaucratic-military tutelage over Kurdish problem but also strengthened human rights of Kurds with teaching of Kurdish in private institutions, broadcasting in languages other than Turkish, ratifications of certain parts of the international law with regard to minority rights, 24-hour broadcasting in state-sponsored TV channel TRT 6 in Kurdish language, inauguration of Kurdish language department at Mardin Artuklu University. Although the AKP's reforms concentrate more on individual rights neglecting the collective ones (Tezcür 2010), these reforms were path-breaking compared to the scant progress of previous governments. The AKP could not produce consistent and stable policies for Kurdish problem and fell into a centrist approach in important moments of crises such as Hakkari incidents in 2005[25] and Uludere incidents in 2012.[26] The AKP symbolized the rise of counterelites with a new discourse on ethnicity and nationality and brought about an ethnic regime change in Turkey with their hegemonic majority in Parliament from anti-ethnic regime through multi-ethnic regime (Aktürk 2012). Pro-Kurdish party found also a space in Turkish politics running in local elections and getting their tickets to Parliament as independents since

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[25] A bookshop in Şemdinli, in Hakkari province, was bombed on 9 November 2005, killing one man and injuring others. The suspected bombers and accomplices were apprehended by the crowd gathered nearby. The names of political opponents, information about individuals in Şemdinli were discovered in the car of bombing suspects. Two men out of the suspected bombers were revealed as connected to security forces thereafter. The Commander of the Turkish Armed Land Forces at the time, General Yasar Buyukanit, declared that he knew one of the suspects saying 'he is a good kid'. The prosecutor trying the case linked the incidents to high-ranking military commanders, including Buyukanıt in his indictment file and he was barred from his profession by the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK).

[26] The fighter jets of the Turkish Armed forces launched bombs on Kurdish villagers mistakenly while they were presumed to be targeting the militants of the PKK near Uludere in Şırnak province. This misinformed bombings left 34 civilians dead behind. Its charge of responsibility has been carried neither by Turkish Armed forces nor by government.

2007. Although they were constantly expelled from Turkish politics, their recurring challenge to political sphere produced "representative contention" according to Watts that "provided the movement with a new institutional basis for public gathering, legal protection from prosecution, new access to domestic and international audiences, and new symbolic resources" (Watts 2006: 125). Since 2007 general elections, the pro-Kurdish party entered into parliament being elected as independents in order to bypass ten percent electoral threshold and continues to exist under the surveillance of the police and the judiciary. 2007 elections mark Turkish political history as the first direct representation of Kurdish identity in politics (Çarkoğlu 2007). The political competition in Kurdish-inhibited areas decreased compared to 1990s as the other parties in parliament, the CHP and the MHP, could not produce political agendas attractive to Kurdish voters. With the decrease of political competition, the AKP hardened its political stance to obtain the electoral hegemony in Kurdish-inhabited areas and engaged in outbidding the pro-Kurdish party through its majoritarian reflex. The AKP sought to criminalize the pro-Kurdish party by the hand of prosecutors and security forces during the KCK (Union of Communities in Kurdistan) operations in order to isolate it politically emphasizing its connection to the PKK. The AKP government could not generate a widespread public consensus on reforms for Kurdish problem, including 2009 Kurdish opening project, not only because these reforms drew the ire of parties in opposition, the CHP and the MHP, but also the AKP alienated the electorate of opposition parties by heavy-handed use of state repression against social movements, mismanagement of operations against the military and culturally-loaded political rhetoric polarizing the society along a *Kulturkampf* (Kalaycıoğlu 2012). The polarization in society increased after 2010 as the AKP increased its hegemonic political tones in society after 2010 constitution referendum and accelerated its policies to shape the society according to its Islamic-conservative outlook (Müftüler-Baç and Keyman 2012). The 2011 elections

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witnessed an intense competition in Southeastern provinces with the increasing votes for the BDP (*Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi*, Peace and Democracy Party). Moreover, candidates known for their political appeal rather than their relations to traditional chiefdoms won seats in the Parliament. These elections revealed the limits of traditional chiefdoms in Southeastern provinces. Although the AKP was criticized for not giving place to local leaders, it also achieved significant votes in majority Kurdish provinces. Important chiefs that run as candidate lost in the elections against the candidates from the AKP and the BDP as in Şanlıurfa, in Bitlis and in Diyarbakır (Erkan and Aydın 2012:267). While the AKP and pro-Kurdish party did not enter into meaningful cooperation or negotiations regarding Kurdish problem before 2012, these bedfellows of periphery are in an uneasy cooperation to disarm PKK and solve Kurdish problem since then.

2.3. The impact of center-periphery cleavage on Turkish-Kurdish relations during the war with the PKK

The impact of cleavage structure and political competition on ethnic cleavages should be considered in parallel with the type, size and number of cleavages. The political competition in Turkish political system is explained mainly by two cleavage structures. The first is the center and periphery cleavages which overlap not only with secularist and pro-Islamic positions but also largely with left and right orientations. The second is ethnic cleavages shaped around Turkish and Kurdish identities which are affected by the fight against the PKK and the debate about the Turkey's European Union accession process (see Hale 2002, Çarkoğlu and Hinich 2006). Turkey's war with the PKK brought about more cohesive Turkish and Kurdish identities. From the Kurdish side; the linguistic, tribal, clan, sect or class distinctions among Kurds lost their previous saliency while the activities of the PKK and excessive counterterrorism policies forged a stronger Kurdish identity. From the Turkish side, Turkish cleavage was constantly fed with the increased tone of Turkish nationalism and the securitization policies against the PKK. However, the focal point of

politics remained on the confrontation of center and periphery which was kept acute by the military tutelage. The opposition to centrist policies of peripheral forces generated crisscrossing grievances among people identified with Turkish and Kurdish identities and produced governments able to gather a vast coalition of peripheral voices including an important part of Kurds. As demonstrated above, there was a high political competition in Turkish political arena in 1990s and Turkish governments were supported by a significant share of Kurdish voters which, in turn, constructed multi-ethnic political alignments to the consternation of Turkish and Kurdish cleavage.

Central to the moderating or exacerbating role of cleavage structure and political competition is the capacity of elites to manipulate cleavages in society. Political leaders are also brokers who can gather diverse networks together and mobilize them in a single movement. Out of the heterogeneity of individual preferences, they activate certain issues and construct more homogenous groups. Ethno-political competition and ethnic outbidding occur in the context of electoral politics when political elites compete for the support of their ethnic fellows and have few incentives to appeal to constituencies from other ethnic groups. Wilkinson (2004) and Horowitz (1985,1991) propose to design political competition so as to produce electoral incentives for politicians to appeal to minority votes which will, in turn, enable interethnic cooperation. Cross-cutting cleavages curtail the possibility of ethnic polarization by producing bridging ties between ethnic groups and constitute a stumbling block against the tribal interests of ethnic elites. Turkish case offers that center-periphery confrontation was in itself a structural disincentive upon political elites of periphery to be ignorant and uncompromising toward Kurdish constituency since they were an integral part of peripheral voices and posed an important electoral potential for political parties. While Kurds were increasingly alienated from the centrist politics due to the recurrent exclusion of pro-Kurdish parties and excessive counterterrorism measures, the ability of Turkish political

parties to appeal to a significant Kurdish constituency undercut the entire shifting of political preferences toward ethnic allegiances and the full disconnection between Kurdish representation and political system. Center-periphery confrontation introduced a variety of political preferences among Turks and Kurds until 2000s. The political experience of 1990s typifies this ironic situation with an intensive political competition for Kurdish votes between ANAP, RP, DYP, SHP and pro-Kurdish parties (although constantly expelled from politics) against the backdrop of darkest times of the war.

Moreover, while the exclusionary nature of Turkish politics against pro-Kurdish movements radicalized Kurdish ethno-political cleavage and fed the internal security dilemma ignited by the war against the PKK, the partial incorporation of Kurdish leaders and Kurdish citizenry into the political system helped to dampen the political reverberations of exclusionary stance toward Kurdish identity. Internal security dilemmas stem from two main reasons: information failure and commitment problem (Lake and Rothchild 1996). Information failure arises when groups cannot reach to information about the preferences and capabilities of the other side. This lack of knowledge about the other groups' intentions and first-strike capabilities intensifies the suspicion and anxiety between contending parties. The commitment problem arises when parties have suspicion about each other's motives to uphold the previous formal or informal ethic contract which reflects 'the balance of political power between the groups and their beliefs about the intentions and likely behaviors of one another' (Ibid.: 50). While the PKK was trying to attract more people to its cause and sustain Kurds' loyalty to the armed organization, this partial political accommodation helped to tame the power of internal security dilemma by providing information about Kurdish-inhibited areas and maintaining the commitment of a significant share of Kurdish constituency to the political system. It served to appease partially widespread disaffection from the state by enabling a sense of inclusiveness into political system and providing local leaders with access to state

resources, political privileges and patronage networks. In addition, this political inclusion prevented the entire shifting of the control of terrain to the PKK so that the PKK targeted firstly local Kurdish leaders in collaboration with state and labeled them as 'collaborators' (McDowall 1996: 415-419). Overall, this partial incorporation into political system produced'ethnic defection', in Kalyvas' words (2008), among Kurds by sustaining the loyalty of a significant part of Kurds to the state.

Furthermore, ethnic violence induces a qualitative change in ethnic identity transforming its boundaries, meaning and practices (Tambiah 1992). In effect, identities do not exist in pure forms while civic and ethnic identities are interspersed and interwoven. During ethnic violence, porous boundaries may metamorphose into more purified identities with the exclusive discourses of identity entrepreneurs. The civic aspects of ethnic identities are ignored, despised or consciously eliminated by the language of violent ethnic conflicts. After all, Chechens were Rossianin and Chechen (Tishkov 2004), Basques were Spanish and Basques (Laitin 1998), Kurds were Turkish and Kurdish[27] before and even during the ethnic violence. The language of ethnic conflict produces "preconstructeds" such as rituals, standardized remarks, formulistic expressions which imply the social distance between in-group and out-group and locate the identity of stranger in relation to in-group. "Kurdist" category in Turkey which demonized mostly human rights defenders and Kurdish activists was constructed with the intensification of ethnic violence to describe the "extreme" "fanatical" ones among Kurds who were distinguished from the "ordinary and decent ones" although Kurds do not refer to this concept to describe themselves. Competing nationalist narratives which consist of xenophobic interpretations of Kurdish identity were supplanted

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[27] According to the research of KONDA in 2010, 66.8 per cent of people who categorize themselves as Kurds think that identifying with "being from Turkey (*Türkiyeli*)" is important or very important for them and 68.2 per cent of Kurds think that identifying with "being a Turkish citizen" is important and very important for them. See KONDA (2011a: 101).

into the lexicon of Turkish nationalism parallel to the war against the PKK (Bora 2011, 2014). Sporadic communal attacks against Kurds emerged in Western provinces (Kılıç 1992, Gambetti 2007). The news and comments about the Jewish roots of Kurds in 2000s in Turkish media were emblematic of the loss of belief in the assimilable character of Kurds into the Turkish society (Yeğen 2007b). However, this xenophobia did not grow into a "master narrative", the discourse adopted by elites to frame mass mobilization (Varshney 2002), in Turkish political arena. In Turkish state discourse, Kurdish insurgencies were incited by external actors whose identity changed according to the perceived threats of Turkish nationalism involving Western imperial powers, communists or Middle Eastern neighbors (Yeğen 2007a). Reducing Kurdish problem to a problem of terrorism and underdevelopment, governments did not undertake significant political reforms concerning Kurdish problem until 2000s. Nevertheless, the political parties jockeying for power, especially those representative of periphery, sought to appeal to Kurdish constituency and did not promote exclusive communal frames by reconstructing Kurdish problem as a Turkish-Kurdish confrontation which would reify Turkish-Kurdish divide and had the risk of derailing the ethnic-civil war through an interethnic warfare. As Brubaker states, 'Framing may be a key mechanism through which groupness is constructed… When ethnic framing is successful, we may "see" conflict and violence not only in ethnic, but in groupist terms' (Brubaker 2004: 58). This political pertinence was neither due to their political wisdom nor leadership qualities as Turkish political elites did not restrain themselves from implementing laws which turned a blind eye to the human rights of Kurdish people or feeding the Turkish nationalism by raising security concerns against the PKK (Bora 2011, Özkırımlı 2011). The main of the fact is that they were constrained by the political competition and cleavage structure with an important electoral support in Kurdish-inhabited areas.

A final caveat regarding interethnic peace in Turkey in the 2000s should be noted. Turkish politics produced positive developments regarding Kurdish problem as aforementioned. Nevertheless, the intensive competition for Kurdish votes between ANAP, RP, DYP, SHP and pro-Kurdish parties in 1990s left its place to the bifurcation of Kurdish political arena squeezed between the AKP and the HDP (Peoples' Democracy Party, *Halkların Demokrasi Partisi*). The other parties of opposition, the CHP and the MHP, do not want to collaborate with the AKP and the HDP because they are strongly disturbed by the AKP's authoritarian tendencies and the HDP's pro-PKK posture. Nevertheless, this political opposition locks them many times into political positions which run counter to basic rights and liberties of Kurds and render them unable to appeal to Kurdish voters. The studies on ethnic conflicts reveal that there is a close relationship between competitive elections and ethnic violence since ethnic violence increases in closely contested districts in which ethnic ties are exploited to bind up ethnic constituency (Wilkinson 2004). When the political competition is low, "politics-as-bargaining" can evolve into "politics-as-war" (Sartori 1987: 224). Recently, Turkish politics produced two phenomena which typify these arguments. On one hand, coupled with the unpopularity of the pro-Kurdish party among Turks because of its pro-PKK image and the inability of parties in opposition, the CHP and the MHP, to appeal to Kurdish voters; there has been a rise in attacks and assaults against the supporters of pro-Kurdish parties and Kurdish citizens in recent years. On the other hand, the Kurdish-inhabited areas witnessed increasing clashes between the HUDA PAR (Free Cause Party, *Hür Dava Partisi*) and the PKK. Therefore, despite the de-securitization of Kurdish problem and the positive developments with regard to Kurdish rights, Turkish political arena has been losing in 2000s the moderation impact of center-periphery cleavage. For example, a parliament composed of political parties with an important share of Kurdish votes in their constituency would be much more reluctant not to endorse peace negotiations compared to the MHP, the

CHP and the AKP after 2015 general elections with a very limited support in Kurdish-inhabited areas. The decreasing political competition in Turkish political arena for Kurdish votes is heightening the ethnic polarization in entire Turkey which adds into the polarization along secular-religious camps. Communal riots are a symptom of divided societies and their existence in Western and Eastern Turkey stems from an interrelated phenomenon which points to the danger of ethnic polarization in entire Turkey.

2.4. Conclusion

Ethnic wars challenging the ethnic and political homogeneity of a nation-state heighten interethnic tensions and sow the seeds of mutual distrust between ethnic groups. This section contributes to the puzzle that why some ethnic wars are riven by intercommunal conflict whereas some others are able to maintain interethnic cooperation despite the ensuing interethnic tensions. Turkish case shows that even though Kurdish ethnic warfare ignited the estrangement between Turkish and Kurdish identities, political competition and cleavage structure whose main fault line was grounded upon on the confrontation of center and periphery were capable to produce cross-community politics that cut across Turkish –Kurdish ethnic lines. It served to appease interethnic tensions by generating three institutional outcomes: giving way to the incorporation of ethnic leaders into political system, enabling moderate governments in power supported by an important share of minority votes, discouraging political actors to use exclusive communal frames against ethnic minority.

This chapter demonstrates that politically relevant cross-cutting cleavages may be adaptive and resilient even under the human, social, economic, psychological repercussions of ethnic-civil war. The political competition based on the confrontation of center and periphery produced an "ethnic defection" in political arena, to adopt Kalyvas terms, in which a significant part of Kurdish constituency voted for political parties other than those

representatives of Kurdish cleavage. The center-periphery cleavage and political competition for Kurdish voters enabled the incorporation of Kurdish leaders into political system although Turkish political arena was exclusionary against pro-Kurdish movements and leaders. This partial elite accommodation curtailed the internal security dilemma ignited by the war against the PKK preventing the full disconnection between political system and Kurdish citizenry. The ability of political parties and governments to appeal to a significant part of Kurdish constituency prevented ethnic polarization and the rise of ethnic outbidding politics which had the risk of sliding into extremist ethno-political positions. The governments did not adopt exclusive communal frames and extremist discourse against Kurds even during the darkest times of the war due to their significant support base in Kurdish-inhabited areas. This research alerts that the decreased political competition in Turkey in 2000s renders Turkish political arena vulnerable to ethnic polarization. There has been a rise in attacks and assaults against the supporters of pro-Kurdish parties and Kurdish citizens in the last years. The chapter on communal violence against Kurds concentrates on this puzzle.

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Figure V. Map of Ireland

Source: CRS Graphics.

Source: K. Archick. 2014. Northern Ireland: The Peace Process. Congressional Research Service Report. Congressional Research Service, available at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21333.pdf (January 3, 2015).

3. FROM ETHNIC MOBILIZATION TO INTERCOMMUNAL VIOLENCE: NORTHERN IRELAND CONFLICT AND THE TROUBLES

Figure VI. Catholics and Protestants as a Percentage of the Population, District Council Areas, 1991.

Catholics and Protestants as a Percentage of the Population, District Council Areas, 1991

Source: Information based on the Religion Report of the 1991 Census

Source: CAIN Web Service. (2015). Catholics and Protestants as a Percentage of the Population, District Council Areas, 1991. Visualising the Conflict GIS Maps, available at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/images/maps/map10.htm (January 5, 2015).

While the militant ethnic mobilization in Turkey remained limited to the ethnic insurgency of the PKK against the Turkish state, the militant ethnic mobilization of the IRA and of other republican paramilitary organizations in quest of a united Ireland were not limited to their insurgency against the British state but run into also militant loyalist mobilizations committed to maintain the union with the UK. In Northern Ireland conflict,

republican paramilitaries, most notably the IRA, and loyalist paramilitaries emerged as defenders of Catholic and Protestant communities respectively and fought against each other to triumph their political agenda. The intercommunal violence erupted at the end of 1960s and the ensuing thirty years of conflict, widely known as "Troubles", claimed over 3,700 lives between 1969 and 2001 in Northern Ireland (Smith and Hamilton 2004). The number may sound small for large populations; however, it has a substantial traumatic impact for a population of about 1.6 million. It makes the pro rata equivalent of over 172,000 people in Turkey. In addition, over 30,000 people were injured as a result of the conflict (NISRA 1998, O'Leary and McGarry 1996). This war took place mainly between three actors: republican paramilitaries, loyalist paramilitaries and security forces. Northern Ireland is an example of "complex warfare" in which not only ethnic insurgency took place but also intercommunal violence between republicans and loyalists occurred (Mueller, Rohner and Schoenholzer 2013). O'Leary and McGarry (1996) qualify the intercommunal violence of 1960s stemming from this conflict as a communal war:

The comparisons suggest it is legitimate to classify the Northern Ireland conflict as similar to those who have riven Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and Cyprus. It is an ethnic war, a communal war, or an inter-national war. The Irish euphemism for the conflict, 'the Troubles' is just that: a euphemism (O'Leary and McGarry 1996:18).

Republican and loyalist paramilitary groups were reenergized as "defenders" of Catholic and Protestant communities respectively between 1968 and 1972 (Freenan 2002). They took hold of authority and order in areas where they controlled, secured flows of funds to their organizations and ensured people`s compliance with their rule. Moreover, since the conflict was urban and paramilitary groups were engulfed in local networks and community structures, its impact on society is more direct compared to the armed conflict between the PKK and Turkish state which took place mostly in mountain or rural bases inside or outside of Turkey. The emotional distress of violent conflict was shouldered especially by working

classes as most of the violence took place in working class areas. They were exposed to various kinds of violence like political murders, assassinations, bombings, knee-cappings, tarring-and-feathering, intimidations, tit-for-tat shootings, car-bombings, petrol-bombings. They remained squeezed between paramilitaries and/or security forces, forced out of their homes in mixed areas, felt pervasive insecurity in the middle of violent conflict. The major toll of the violent conflict is concentrated in ten postal code areas; the West and North Belfast mourned for over a third of all deaths. The most deprived populations of Northern Ireland suffered to the utmost from the conflict as the density of deaths from the conflict correlates with the poorest areas (Fay et al. 1998). The Poverty and Social Exclusion Northern Ireland survey shows that half of all household respondents knew someone who had been killed in the conflict (Hillyard et al. 2005).

The roots of the Northern Ireland problem can be traced to the eleventh century with the English colonization of the island of Ireland. The problem became more salient especially in 1921 when the island of Ireland was separated as the Free Irish State and the Northern Ireland alleged to the Crown. The saliency of religious identities may lead to misleading conclusions as if the conflict is about religion but the main building block of disagreement is grounded upon the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. While unionists composed predominantly of Protestants are attached to the maintenance of the union with Britain, nationalists composed predominantly of Catholics viewed the partition of island of Ireland and the British presence on the North illegitimate and defended the unification of Ireland. There is a conceptual struggle even over the naming of Northern Ireland, as many nationalists do not call it as Northern Ireland but as "six countries", "North", "North of Ireland" or "British-occupied six countries" because using "Northern Ireland" would mean recognizing the legitimacy of the partition.

Catholics composed one-third of the population in Northern Ireland when it was constituted in 1921 but their number increased in time constituting 40 per cent of Northern Ireland's population in 2011. Nationalists who represented Irish Catholics were elected to the Stormont Parliament (Northern Ireland Parliament) and had the right to represent their electorate. They were also situated in a more democratic host state, Britain, compared to Kurds in Turkey. Different from Kurds who endured excessive assimilation and repressive measures, Catholics had their own newspapers, sports clubs, social and cultural activities, Catholic-controlled education system. Northern Ireland was governed by a devolved government between 1921 and 1972 and it enjoyed significant autonomy except the matters of foreign policy and budget. The marches and demonstrations of the Civil rights movements which called for the improvement of social, political, economic rights of Catholics triggered counterdemonstrations of unionists and loyalists[28] whose mismanagement led to the revival of paramilitary groups and ensuing intercommunal violence. This chapter interrogates that enjoying far more political rights and regional government compared to Kurds in Turkey, why did Northern Ireland conflict turn into violent intercommunal conflict whereas Kurdish problem did not?

Table VII. Population in Northern Ireland: breakdown by religious denomination (numbers and %), 1991, 2001, and 2011

Year	1991		2001		2011	
Religious Denomination	**Number**	**%**	**Number**	**%**	**Number**	**%**
Catholic	605,639	38.40%	678,462	40.26%	738,033	40.76%
Presbyterian	336,891	21.40%	348,742	20.69%	345,101	19.06%
Church of Ireland	279,280	17.70%	257,788	15.30%	248,821	13.74%
Methodist	59,517	3.80%	59,173	3.51%	54,253	3.00%
Baptist	19,484	1.20%	*	*	*	*
Brethren	12,446	0.80%	*	*	*	*
Congregationist	8,176	0.50%	*	*	*	*
Unitarian	3,213	0.20%	*	.*	*	*

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[28] Loyalists mainly refer to more extreme strand of unionism.

Other	79,129	5.00%	102,211 [1]	6.07%	104,380	5.76%
Other Religions	*	*	5,082 [2]	0.33%	14,859	0.82%
None	59,234	3.70%	*	*	183,164	10.11%
Not Stated	114,827	7.30%	233,853 [3]	13.88%	122,252	6.75%
Total	1,577,836	100.00%	1,685,267	100.00%	1,810,863	100.00%

Notes:

* Figures not available

1. Other Christian (including Christian related)

2. Other religions and philosophies

3. Persons with no religion or religion not stated

Drawing upon literature on ethnic conflict, cleavage structure and political competition; this section contributes to Wilkinson (2004)'s and Horowitz's (1985, 1991) electoral incentive arguments which stress that political parties and governments able to appeal to minorities decrease interethnic tensions by appealing to cross-cutting ties whereas political parties and governments unable to appeal to minorities increase interethnic tensions by reinforcing ethnic cleavages. This chapter argues that overlapping cleavage structure and closely contested political competition increase interethnic tensions by inducing three institutional outcomes: hindering the opportunities to accommodate minority leaders into political system, producing governments supported exclusively by a certain ethnic group, encouraging political actors to use exclusive communal frames. Northern Ireland case offers that the cleavage structure and political competition that overlap with ethnic divide rendered political parties incapable to appeal to ethnic diversity within Northern Irish society and amplified ethnic cleavages by entailing three institutional outcomes. Firstly, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) which held the monopoly of government between 1921 and 1972 due to its electoral support from the Protestant majority applied policies unfavorable to Catholic minority and favorable to Protestant majority in order to maintain its electoral base which

weakened its political legitimacy in the eyes of Catholic minority. Secondly, the UUP with no electoral incentive to appeal to Catholics did not include Catholic leaders into its governing coalition. Political parties that represented Catholics in parliament were doomed to a minority position in Parliament and were excluded from political power in a plurality rule electoral system. Thirdly, unionist parties construed Catholic minority as a threat to Protestant majority and used exclusive communal frames to maintain their support base which fed the mistrust between Catholics and Protestants. The state's failure to enforce rules in an equitable manner between Protestants and Catholics diminished its legitimacy fatally when Catholic protestors led by the civil rights movements challenged the state at the end of 1960s by mass movements. While unionists and loyalists perceived civil rights movements as a betrayal to the state, the inability of the unionist government to respond to Catholics' demands and to manage intergroup tensions spilled over an intercommunal war. The security measures used by the unionist government and the British state deteriorated the situation in parallel to the radicalization of minority and majority groups by the emergence of republican and loyalist paramilitary organizations.

This section proceeds as follows. Firstly, it presents a brief overview of intercommunal tensions which began at the end of 1960s. Secondly, it addresses interethnic violence in Northern Ireland according to structural, constructivist and psychological-emotional explanations. Thirdly, it explains the cleavage structure and political competition in Northern Ireland and situates the reasons of intercommunal violence within institutional-instrumental explanations.

3.1.1. Northern Ireland Conflict and the Troubles

Intercommunal violence between nationalist Catholics and unionist Protestants in Northern Ireland is realized mainly by the hands of paramilitaries. Paramilitary organizations were the major social institutions in which intercommunal hostilities were funnelled through

during the Troubles. They were professionally organized groups which tended to monopolize political violence and subjugate the rival groups.

Nationalist paramilitaries did not accept the legitimacy of partition and aimed to overthrow the presence of Britain by armed resistance (Bishop and Mallie 1987, Coogan 1987). The green book which was given to Irish Republican Army (IRA) recruits says "war is morally justified and the Army is the direct representative of the 1918 *Dail Eireann* parliament and that such they are the legal and lawful government of Irish Republic" (see Coogan 1987). The IRA republicanism was grounded upon six main ideological principles: republicanism, nationalism, militarism, socialism, anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism (ibid). The Provisional IRA was formed in 1969 as a scission of the Official IRA in order to "defend" Catholic community. During 1970 and 1971, the Provisional IRA bypassed the Official IRA in terms of recruitment and militant activities. Moreover, nationalist paramilitaries enjoyed also the communal toleration of Catholic community since the excessive counterterrorism measures of the Britain heightened the preexisting alienation of Catholics from the British state and unionist governments. It is hard to give definite numbers and recruitment of Provisional IRA but according to O'Leary and McGarry (1996), their recruitment base was between 500 and 2000 (O'Leary and McGarry 1996: 24-25). The Provisional IRA turned into the principal actor of violence that inflicted the highest death toll of the conflict. Its armed militancy did not also remain limited to Northern Ireland but extended over the Great Britain and Europe in order to attract public attention to its political cause. Even important members of British elite suffered from the IRA such as the assassination of Lord Louis Mountbatten, a member of British royal family and uncle of Prince Philip, and the attempted explosions that came close to blowing up of Margaret Thatcher, British Prime Minister, and members of her cabinet. The Official IRA took a more defensive stance compared to the Provisional IRA. It was more active in armed struggle

during 1969-1972 period and more left-wing oriented compared to the Provisional IRA. The Official IRA's militant weight remained minor compared to the Provisional IRA. The Official IRA declared ceasefire based on the principle that paramilitary militancy was divisive for the solidarity of working class communities. Another republican militant paramilitary group recruited out of Catholic community is the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), scission of the Official IRA. The INLA`s aim was to realize national liberation and to build up in the next stage social revolution in the united Ireland. The INLA`s forces were limited due to internal feuds from which the Irish People`s Liberation Organization (IPLO) came into existence. The IPLO`s capacity was also limited with minor resources and recruitment capacity. In total, nationalist paramilitaries were the major actors of violent conflict that caused the highest number of causalities. Conventional studies refer to the Provisional IRA as the IRA for the periods of the Troubles. This study follows this convention.

Loyalist paramilitaries were recruited from Protestants, especially from working class Protestants. They emerged as counterrevolutionaries committed to the Union and the Crown. They also positioned themselves as "defenders" of their community. Loyalist paramilitaries were more diversified compared to nationalist paramilitaries due to the fact that the Provisional IRA took the helm of nationalist paramilitaries and recruitment of Catholic community. Some loyalist paramilitary groups were minor organized crime groups. McKittrick contends that up to a dozen of loyalist paramilitaries were real with a certain hierarchy and access to armory (McKittrick 1989: 152). The Ulster Defense Association (UDA) was the legal loyalist paramilitary organization in Northern Ireland. In early 1970s during which its recruitment was highest, its number reached out to 40000 members. It was only declared illegal in 1992. Another loyalist paramilitary organization is the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) which was declared as illegal at the beginning of the Troubles. It is also known as the Red Hand Commandos and targeted mainly Catholic civilians. In early

1990s, the UVF and the UDA organized joint operations and posed a major threat to the IRA especially in early 1990s compared to earlier eras of the war.

The security forces in Northern Ireland were composed of the British army and its various sections that were deployed in Northern Ireland as the Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR) and the police forces, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). Security forces were composed of mainly Protestants and they were viewed as biased toward Protestants by Catholic community. The alienation of Catholic population from security forces increased with rumors of collusion between security forces and loyalist paramilitary organizations (Cadwallader 2013). A common perception among Catholics in this period was that police was more tolerant toward loyalist paramilitaries' killings, harassment and intimidation than toward republican paramilitaries (interview with Feargal Mac Ionnrachtaigh[29], 9 August 2014). The number of death tolls and the concentration of violent conflict in certain areas hide the disseminated dynamic of paramilitary violence as paramilitaries were engaged in multiple attacks to find their targets in early periods of violent conflict. Parallel to increasing levels of residential segregation, it became easier for paramilitaries to find their potential targets in segregated neighborhoods (Mesev, Shirlow and Downs 2009). Many Catholics passed down as "collateral damage" out of clashes between security forces and nationalist paramilitaries in Catholic neighborhoods. O'Leary and McGarry (1996) summarize four main areas of deaths between 1969 and 1989: 44.2% of all deaths stemmed from paramilitary killings of civilians, 34.8% of all deaths from war between nationalist paramilitaries and security forces, 6.7% of all deaths came from internal feuds and self-killings within paramilitary organizations and 5.3% of all deaths from the death of Catholic civilians by security forces (O'Leary and McGarry 1996: 28).

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[29] Dr. Feargal Mac Ionnrachtaigh works on Irish language and is the author of *Language, Resistance and Revival: Republican Prisoners and the Irish Language in the North of Ireland* (Pluto Press, 2013).

Table VIII. The number of deaths inflicted by organizations between 14 July 1969 and 31 December 2001

Organisation Summary	Catholic	Protestant	nfNI	Totals
British Security	303	43	17	363
Republican Paramilitary	445	981	632	2058
Loyalist Paramilitary	734	232	60	1026
not known	38	32	9	79
Irish Security	1		4	5
TOTALS	1521	1288	722	3531

Footnotes: Catholic from Catholic community in NI; Protestant from Protestant community in NI; nfNI not from Northern Ireland killed in Northern Ireland.

Source: The data is taken from the updated and revised version of Malcolm Sutton first published in his 1994 book *Bear in mind these dead: An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland 1969-1993*. It is accessed via CAIN project by cross tabulation of Organization summary and Religious summary, available at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/cgi-bin/tab2.pl (August 17, 2014).

Table IX. Number of deaths per year

Year	Catholic	Protestant	nfNI	Totals
1969	9	7		16
1970	13	10	3	26
1971	77	44	50	171
1972	240	123	117	480
1973	111	73	71	255
1974	115	67	112	294
1975	122	102	36	260
1976	132	139	26	297
1977	39	51	20	110
1978	24	43	15	82
1979	28	46	47	121
1980	27	39	14	80
1981	50	50	14	114
1982	32	45	34	111
1983	29	42	13	84
1984	27	26	16	69
1985	23	27	7	57
1986	25	31	5	61
1987	42	51	5	98
1988	40	36	28	104
1989	24	25	27	76
1990	30	38	13	81
1991	51	36	10	97
1992	54	24	10	88
1993	49	30	9	88
1994	36	25	3	64
1995	7	2		9
1996	10	2	6	18

1997	8	11	3	22
1998	31	18	6	55
1999	6	2		8
2000	4	14	1	19
2001	6	9	1	16
TOTALS	1521	1288	722	3531

Footnotes: Catholic from Catholic community in NI; Protestant from Protestant community in NI; nfNI not from Northern Ireland killed in Northern Ireland

Source: The data is taken from the updated and revised version of Malcolm Sutton first published in his 1994 book *Bear in mind these dead: An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland 1969-1993*. It is accessed via CAIN project by cross tabulation of year and religion summary, available at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/cgi-bin/tab2.pl. (August 17, 2014).

Figure VII. Total Death Rates (per 1000 population) due to the conflict in Northenr Ireland (1969-2001), at ward level

Source: CAIN Web Service. (2015). Total Death Rates (Per 100000 population) due to the conflict in Northern Ireland (1969-2001) at ward level. Visualising the Conflict GIS Maps, available at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/victims/gis/maps/l-jpg/CAIN-Map_NI_Death-rates_Total.jpg (January 5, 2015).

Mueller, Rohner and Schoenholzer's (2013) quantitative study based on religious composition and geo-reference data on deaths shows that sectarian intercommunal violence between loyalists and republicans occurred in "tectonic boundaries" which refer to interfaces

where segregated Protestant and Catholic communities meet. The construction of peace lines, the barriers which separate Catholic and Protestant areas, also corresponds to these tectonic boundaries. But the violence between ethnic insurgent groups, republican paramilitary organizations, and security forces occurred mostly in Catholic strongholds which refer to Catholic wards surrounded by other Catholic wards due to the local support and larger opportunity structure for republican paramilitaries to launch attacks (ibid.).

3.2. Northern Ireland Conflict from the Perspective of the Literature on Interethnic Violence

As mentioned in the introduction part, the literature explaining interethnic violence can be divided into structural, emotional-psychological, constructivist and instrumental-institutionalist explanations. The comparison between Northern Ireland conflict and Kurdish problem in Turkey displays that the first three explanations were also present with similar dimensions with regard to Kurdish problem in Turkey but intercommunal violence did not occur between Turks and Kurds. My explanation builds on the fourth theories and contributes to the burgeoning institutional-instrumentalist literature by demonstrating the malleability of interethnic relations by the cleavage structure and political competition.

3.2.1. Structural Explanations: Strong State and Double National Homeland

Not only British security forces but also security forces of Northern Ireland were viewed as highly sectarian and belligerent by Catholics in Northern Ireland. The reason was that the UUP enforced security measures against Catholics viewing them still attached to the ideal of united Ireland. By the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921, Irish Republicans had to concede to 26 country-Irish Free State and failed to secure an independent united Ireland. Moreover, there was an ongoing civil war in Irish Free State between pro-treaty forces and anti-treaty forces (1922-1924). In the early years of Northern Irish state, the sectarian unrest did not come to an end with more than 400 killed, 2000 injured (Tonge 2002: 19). The UUP composed security forces mainly of Protestants which reinforced the association between

unionist governments and Protestant community in the eyes of Catholics. The UUP vested the security forces with additional powers of search, arrest, detention by special powers act in 1922.The constabulary act of 1922 had set a one-third quota for Catholics in the new police forces called Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) but the Catholic population in the RUC remained around 11 percent in 1969 (Hunt report 1969: 29 cited by Walker 2012: 68). The Ulster Defense Regiments (UDR), the Northern Ireland militia of security forces, and the RUC were conceived as a unionist tool in order to maintain unionist hegemony by Catholics. 95% of both organizations were dominated by Protestants. In addition, the "specials" were armed as an auxiliary force. B specials were openly sectarian by its overwhelming Protestant population. Police forces and specials were viewed as impartial and sectarian by Catholics due to their special relationship with Orange lodges[30] and Protestants population disproportionate to their numbers in overall population (Weitzer 1995). Catholics were also reluctant to join in security forces not only because of the sectarian composition of security forces but also they could face their communities' condemnation frustrated with partition and unionist hegemony. While political parties in opposition which voiced criticisms against the excessive policies of Turkish governments in Kurdish-inhabited areas were able to rose to power as in the case of the SHP (SHP-DYP coalition government) or the RP (RP-DYP coalition government) in Turkey, the UUP did not face such a strong challenge since nationalists who opposed to discriminatory policies of the UUP were tied up to a minority position in the Parliament. These additional powers of security forces were designed for one year but lasted until the introduction of direct rule in 1972. These policies illustrate the brunt

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[30] Orange lodges are connected to Orange order, the largest Protestant civil society organization in Northern Ireland. Its name stems from William of Orange, who defeated the Catholic King James II at the Battle of the Boyne in July 1690. The marches of Orange Order, especially the celebrations of the victory of 17th-century Battle of the Boyne over Catholics inflame sectarian tensions between Protestants and Catholics in summer season.

of insecurity held by unionist governments against Catholic population and nationalist challenges.

The civil rights movements which departed from militant republicanism were a mass movement which challenged the main pillars of unionist regime with their call for the improvement of social, political, economic status of Catholics. The catch-cries of the protestors were "British rights for British citizens" and "one man, one vote" and placed the unionist government in a difficult situation to hold on to its Protestant grip. The uneven-handed repression of security forces against tensions between protestors and loyalist counterdemonstrators heightened the alienation of Catholics against unionist government. The violent tensions between civil right marches, security forces and loyalist counterdemonstrations were simmering in 1968. The British army deployed its troops in 1969 since the heavy-handed tactics of crowd control, house searches, interrogation, and daily street patrols implemented by the RUC and the UDR were seen as part of the problem. Nonetheless, British counterinsurgency strategies could not mitigate interethnic tensions, to the contrary, incited more local tensions. British counterinsurgency operations targeted in its early phases mainly Catholic working class neighborhoods which were also strongholds of republican resistance. Upon the request of unionist government, the British state introduced internment policy in 1971 which endowed security forces with considerable security competences to imprison suspects without criminal charges or judicial proceedings in order to control intercommunal tensions. The Catholic population became the main target of interment as well. The day the internment is introduced, 350 Catholics were arrested as suspects of member of the IRA (Beggan 2006). 95 % of internees were Catholics. One of the reasons of this impartial usage resulted from its sectarian use by the UUP between 1969 and 1972 (Weiter 1985: 43). In January 1972, British soldiers charged with monitoring the civil rights marches in Derry (Londonderry for Protestants) opened fire into demonstrators and killed

fourteen unarmed marchers and wounded eighteenth other. This shocked Catholics who had departed from the militant republican tradition by more peaceful ways of demonstrations. This incident, named as "Bloody Sunday", had repercussions as well in the Republic of Ireland as the British Embassy in Dublin was burned down by demonstrators. The internment policy and the inconsistencies in its implementation in favor of unionists and loyalists increased intercommunal mistrust and the cycle of violence facilitating the militant recruitment of the IRA (Finn 1991).

In 69, whenever the loyalists attacked nationalist areas, the IRA was very very weak. There was only one gang going through the Falls road. Whenever the loyalists came in, then people started to say, people complained about the IRA. They said those things are going through the war and said "I RUN AWAY", "I.R.A.". Where was the IRA when they are and we are getting attacked? That's when the Provisional IRA started, you know, and they became. So, the Provisional IRA at the beginning was stronger and earliest for those who had been attacked by loyalists and then as it turned against the law and against the British, it became stronger in other areas as well. That's how the Provisional IRA started (…). They became very very strong at the beginning in the areas that were close to loyalist areas that had been attacked. (…) Then , it turned more, the British army started to press down on the Catholic community, then it started the war between the Provisional IRA and the British and of course, the British oppressed more, searched the houses, beat up, so people wanted to join. And of course, after Bloody Sunday, they became stronger again (interview with an Irish language teacher grown up in West Belfast, 16 August 2014).

No Protestant paramilitaries were interned until February 1973. After Bloody Sunday, the peaceful civil rights marches left its place to the cycle of violence fuelled by the re-emergence of paramilitary forces such as the Provisional IRA, the UVF, the UDA, all committed to violence to resolve the issue. Upon this explosive situation, the British state introduced the direct rule in March 1972 which suspended the Northern Ireland Parliament. A survey conducted in 1973 on 849 northern Irish Catholic males (between the ages of 17 and 64) showed that 68 per cent considered the internment policy as one of the main causes of ongoing violence (McAllister and Rose 1983: 543). The counterterrorism measures were excessive as 34,919 dwellings were searched by security forces in 1976, some of them were searched more than once (Irish Times, 29 January 1977 cited by Terchek 1977: 57).

Considering that Northern Ireland had 400.000 households at this time and the majority of searched households belonged to Catholics (ibid.), the impartiality and the credibility of British security forces had been seriously torn down in the eyes of Catholics in early phases of violent conflict.

Different from Kurdish population in Turkey which did not have a national homeland; Irish people in Northern Ireland had the Republic of Ireland as their homeland and their aspiration to united Ireland had been heightened upon the outbreak of violent intercommunal conflict. Northern Ireland can be considered as a dual dyad in which not only unionists and nationalists play roles but also the politics of Britain and Ireland entail serious repercussions on intergroup relations (Schmitt 1988). Unionists and loyalists were devoted to British identity and Crown and resisted for a long time against any potential of cooperation between the Republic of Ireland and Britain. The majority of unionists self-identify as British but they do not rely entirely on the Britain skeptical about a possible sell-out of their interests in political maneuvers. The altering dynamics in Irish Free State had also an impact on Northern Irish politics. The declaration of Northern Irish Prime minister in 1934, James Craig that "All I boast is that we are a Protestant Parliament and a Protestant State" was reciprocated in 1935 by the Irish Prime minister declaring Ireland is "a Catholic nation". The Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921 had attributed to the Irish Free State a dominion status like Canada. After the foundation of Irish Free State, the tensions between Ireland and Britain stirred up since Ireland declared the state as "Republic" in 1948 and cut off the formal relations with the British monarchy. Thus, contrary to British expectations, Ireland left definitively the Commonwealth. This strained the relations between Britain and Ireland. Britain responded to that challenge next year highlighting the status of Northern Ireland connected to the United Kingdom by the Ireland act. The politics in Irish Free State evolved in some manners vindicating the unionists' fears about the Catholic domination and their would-be minority position in a united Ireland

scenario. The Article 2 and 3 of 1937 Ireland Constitution defined the nation of Ireland on a 32-country basis claiming the right to sovereignty on the entire Ireland. The political maneuvers of Irish Prime ministers (called as Taoiseach) laying claim on all-Ireland also ignited unionist fears. To give an example, the Irish Taoiseach, De Valera, refused the concessions to northern imports on the grounds that this could "stabilize" the partition (Bowman 1982: 175-182). He proposed in 1939 that those who wanted to remain British could be transferred out of Ireland (IND, 14 December 1939 cited by Walker 2012: 15).

3.2.2. Constructivist Explanations: Clashing and Conflicting Identities

Religious identification is the most salient identity in Northern Ireland although Protestants and Catholics use multiple identifications such as "Irish", "British", "Ulster", "Northern Irish" (Whyte 1990, Trew 1986, Waddell and Cairns 1991, Trew and Benson 1996). The religious identification is a proxy for national and political affiliation. Protestants are associated with British identity, Catholics with Irish.

The history of Northern Ireland is of paramount importance to understand the dynamics and dividing lines of identities. The roots of the debate go for some authors to the Norman invasion of the island in the 12th century; for some others, to the colonization of island in the 16th and 17th century. Until the 17th century, Ireland was governed by a loose British rule as Gaelic chiefs had more responsibility for administration. A more direct English authority was exerted after Henry VIII`s defeat of an Irish army in 1534. Tudor monarchy asserted its dominance on the island and engaged in colonization and plantation by settling the English and Scottish Protestants into Northern provinces of Ireland. Settlers found a different culture and religion in the island and built up their own towns and garrisons protected by local police. The settlers were more intensified in Ulster composed of nine countries: Antrim, Armagh, Derry, Down, Fermanagh, Tyrone, Cavan, Donegal and Monaghan. Parallel to the settlement and colonization, some of the native Irish were displaced toward the West and the

South. The power of British Crown was challenged many times by native Gaelic and Gallicized Norman chiefs and lords. Contrary to Scotland and Wales, Protestantism could not make significant inroads into Catholics during Reformation and Counterreformation because the Anglicization of system of government, confiscation of native Irish lands, stationing of new military forces were detrimental to the interests of Gaelic local leaders. Britain was suspicious about local Irish due to Spanish and French expeditions into Ireland and a potential collaboration between Catholic powers. During this period, it was not the nationality but the contention for power and land interspersed with the conflict on the definition and worship of God determined the dimensions of the conflict (Coakley 2011).

Although the history of Ireland is construed in the 20th century by antagonistic terms between colonizer and colonized, oppressor and oppressed, British and Irish (Buckley 1989), the shifting and flexible alliances in history between the Planter and the Gael challenge this blanket contention. During the Engish civil war, the Anglo-Irish Catholics were royalists against Protestant/Puritan parliamentary forces (O Leary and McGarry 1996: 67). When the Catholic James II was dethroned by the Dutch William of Orange in 1689, the Irish paid the price of allegiance to Catholic James II by penal laws which restricted the activities of Catholic Church and deprived wealthy Catholics of their social and political rights. The Irish parliament was abolished in 1801 and its deputies made up a small proportion of the Parliament of the Great Union. But Protestants' superior political and economic statuses were maintained by their connection to the Westminster. The psychological distance between settler and native began to enlarge in the 18th century as laws based on Catholic exclusion from property ownership, representation in parliament, participation in certain professions were put into effect. Catholics were subversive and disloyal in the eyes of state and the monarchy (Coakley 2011). As English language pervaded into Irish people in time, the Catholic religion became the main instrument of differentiation for Irish nationalism (ibid.).

In the 19th century, the cleavages began to overlap between landlord/tenant, settler/native, and protestant/Catholic. Heterogeneous Catholics groups began to form more cohesive and common loyalties regarding their similar grievances on matters of penal law, religious discrimination and land issues. They organized illegal secret defense organization in the 18th and 19th century. Protestants were dominant in Ulster which was also distinguished from other regions of Ireland by its more modernized and industrialized feature. The repercussions of French revolution, uneven industrial development and potato famine bolstered embryonic resistance movements among Irish as Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood, the forerunner of the IRA, was founded in 1858. Protestant murders by nationalists sapped also the liberal Presbyterians` (composed mostly of Scots) sympathy for republican and non-denominational Irish nationalism.

The Irish home rule controversy which pressed the UK for devolution in domestic matters was led by an Irish Protestant but invoked sectarian hostilities when Catholic emancipation movements evolved into independence aspirations. It was understood that with the extension of franchise, Protestants would be a minority in an all-Ireland parliament. While the home rule bills became prisoner of competition between Conservatives and Liberals and the House of Lords and the House of Commons in Westminster, Protestants and Catholics began to generate their own militias as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) which was formed to resist against Home rule was founded in 1913 and the Irish Volunteers was armed in 1913 to further their political goals. In 1918 elections, Sinn Fein won 73 out of 105 seats (a quarter of those were uncontested). Based on these elections, Irish republicans claim the illegitimacy of the Northern Irish state. In 1919, Sinn Fein established the Irish parliament, *Dail Eireann*, but there was still no agreement on Parliament as it was unattended by unionists and home rule parliamentarians. Irish nationalism could not succeed in uniting Ireland not only due to weakness of guerrilla warfare but also its inability to appeal to Protestants since it is defined

as the antithesis of British Crown, Protestantism and English language (O'Leary and McGarry 1996: 107-108). The intensity of violence in Ireland pushed the British rule to constitute two parliaments that would negotiate the future of Ireland. The Government of Ireland Act created two home rule parliaments in 1920, one in Dublin and one in Belfast. Although unionists wanted the direct rule of the Britain, they conceded to six countries in which they would form a majority and institute their power. But the Irish side was not settled with the treaty as a civil war erupted between pro and anti-treaty forces and sectarian tensions spiraled upward between communities. The constitutional politics could not be restored until 1927 in the Irish Free State. An IRA campaign was developed in the north to complement the earlier guerrilla war of independence in the south.

The boundaries of Northern Ireland were artificially demarcated to ensure a safe majority for unionists and the maximum territory governed by unionist majority (Bardon 1992). The historical region of Ulster contained nine countries with Antrim, Armagh, Derry, Down, Fermanagh, Tyrone, Cavan, Donegal and Monaghan. The three latter countries were taken out of historical Ulster in order to establish a Protestant majority not threatened by the surge of Catholic demography. In the traditional Ulster, Protestant population would form a majority with 56% to 44% ratio (Buckland 1981). Fermanagh and Tyrone were added into Northern Ireland even through Catholics were a slight majority in these regions to guarantee a Protestant majority by two-third of population against one-third Catholics. This drawing of boundaries between Irish Free State and Northern Ireland triggered the ongoing controversy between nationalists and unionists on the constitutional status of the Northern Ireland.

Figure VIII. The Situation in the Six Countries of North-East of Ireland

THE NORTH OF IRELAND
There are nine Counties in the Province of Ulster. Six of these were partitioned in 1920 to form the area now governed by Stormont

ULSTER
DONEGAL   DERRY   ANTRIM
TYRONE
FERMANAGH   ARMAGH   DOWN
MONAGHAN
CAVAN

CONNACHT

LEINSTER

MUNSTER

Source: Adapted from Lynch .(1969). The Situation in the Six Countries of North-East of Ireland, available at: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/docs/lynch/lynch69.htm (13 August 2014).

The surveys show that Protestants are more divided in terms of identity whereas Catholics converge more on Irish identity. However, they converge on what they are not. In 1960s, Protestants were more divided in their self-identification variegated between Ulster, British and Irish identities. Rose's (1971) survey shows that in 1968, the beginning of Troubles, 39 per cent of Protestant population self-identified as British, 32 per cent categorized themselves as Ulster and 20 per cent of Protestants chose Irish identity. Catholics agreed more on Irish identity. Three quarter of Catholics (76 per cent) self-identified as Irish, 15 per cent of Catholics responded to this question as British and only 5 per cent opted for the Ulster identity. One decade later during which the intercommunal violence went on, Moxon-Browne survey (1983) shows that the identity gap between Protestants and Catholics was widened. Two thirds of Protestants chose British identity. One-fifth chose Ulster identity while only eight per cent categorized themselves as Irish. The change in Catholics' self-

identification was more limited. A decade later, those who identified themselves as Irish fell from 76 per cent to 69 per cent, 15 per cent of Catholics opted for British identity.

3.2.3. Emotional Explanations: Mutual Mistrust and Anxiety

Unionists bore the hallmarks of siege mentality due to their insecure position and uncertainties over the status of Northern Ireland when it was founded. First of all, there was an Irish Free State in the South with an Irish majority. Moreover, a civil war was ongoing in the Irish Free State between pro-treaty and anti-treaty forces. Secondly, Northern Ireland had a Catholic minority (one third of Northern Ireland's population) that did not wholeheartedly accept the legitimacy of Northern Irish state and the partition of Ireland. In 1920s and 1930s, the IRA was still active in major strongholds of nationalist areas. Catholic deputies elected to Stormont Parliament in 1920s protested the legitimacy of Northern Irish state calling it as "six countries" and contested the legitimacy of partition and the state. They demanded the connection of Stormont parliament to Dublin. The establishment of Northern Ireland sharpened the rift between unionists and nationalists without generating a potential basis for common loyalty.

The fear of unionists from a united Ireland stemmed from three factors. Firstly, they would be reduced to a minority in a united Ireland scenario. Secondly, they would lose their social, political, economic statuses which were enhanced by the British rule. Thirdly, unionists were distrustful of Catholics because of their allegiance to the Republic of Ireland and Catholics were frustrated by unionist governments which imposed social, economic, political discrimination upon them. Political and cultural symbolism around national identities kept the spirit of these bipolar identities alive. The inability of unionists to rely entirely on the Britain also reinforced the siege mentality of unionists. The UUP viewed Catholic citizens as a threat to its rule and banned the symbols of Irish identity. Unionists considered them as potential supporters of militant Irish republicanism which could give credit to irredentist

behaviors of Irish Free State. Nationalists saw themselves as trapped in an illegitimate state. Moreover, the IRA was not a dead letter as it remained an underground organization capable to induce damage and causalities in Northern Irish state. It launched military strikes between 1938 and 1941 also between 1956 and 1962 (Bell 1979: 73-336, Coogan 1987: 173-241). The appeal of the IRA to Catholic population was limited at the end of 1950s but its existence was sufficient to exacerbate unionists' fears. During the early years of Northern Irish and Irish Free State, minority identities in both states (Protestants for Irish Free State and Catholics for Northern Ireland) endured sectarian attacks, intimidation and rioting (Walker 2012: 44-86).

The memories and national celebrations are also divided in Northern Ireland. One's victory is mostly the other's defeat. They share different stories, speeches, banners, parades which recall and evoke these antagonistically formulated identities. Unionists established symbolic power in early periods of Northern Irish state by more stress on union jack, strong links with the Orange Order, end of grant for the teaching of Irish in 1933 (ibid). In turn, Irish Catholics were still alleged to the symbols of Irish Republic such as tricolor, commemoration of Easter rising. They selectively remember, forget and interpret the same history generating distinct and opposing ethnic memories (Falconer 1988, Wright 1988). The cultural symbols such as parades of unionist organizations provoke communal tensions (Jarman 1997). The Orange order and the Apprentice Boys of Derry celebrate the 1689 victory of William of Orange, the Protestant King of England who won a victory over Catholic king James II. These cultural and religious assertions helped to legitimize the hegemony of the UUP reenergizing Catholic threat and reminding Protestant community of their duties and responsibilities in order to protect and preserve Unionist rule (Mac Laughlin and Agnew 1986: 252).

The social identity approaches discuss extensively the minority-majority conundrum between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. Jackson (1979) argues that unionists are a "minority" in the island because they perceive threats to their political and economic

statuses since they cannot rely on the United Kingdom and they are numerically a minority in the island of Ireland. Douglas and Boal (1982), Poole (1983), and Kennedy (1988) revise this argument and contend that the insecurity of unionists points to a "double minority" mentality between two groups. Cairns (1982, 1987) argues for a "double majority" position because both Protestants and Catholics have positive ratings of their in-group with high self-esteem which demonstrate a majority positioning. Moreover, he details that both groups have a vast array of symbolic and social capital donated with rituals, symbols, music, folklore, sports which protect and preserve these symbolic and social capital. Cassidy and Trew (1998) examine complex identity structures and find "triple minority" within unionists as Protestants' identity definition is contingent upon their minority position in the United Kingdom and the island of Ireland.

The media also bred mutual distrust and anxiety during the Troubles. Although the media in the UK is autonomous from the state, it acted as an ideological doppelganger of the state presenting Northern Ireland conflict as a matter of terrorism (Rolston 2007). The major UK channels such as BBC and ITV were both condemned as anti-republican (Curtis 1984) and anti-loyalist (Parkinson 1998). The IRA was presented as the principal enemy of the British state and the Irish turned into the suspect community for most of the English people (Hillyard 1993: 257–259).

3.3. Cleavage Structure and Political Competition: An Enabling Role on Intercommunal Violence

Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland are also an "ethnonationalist" group in search of autonomy and/or independence like Kurds in Turkey (Minorities at Risk dataset 2009). Both the IRA's resistance against the British rule and the PKK's insurgency against Turkish state are "internal wars" "between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states" (Armed Conflict dataset of Peace Research

Institute of Oslo, PRIO). They are both "ethnic armed conflicts" (Wimmer, Cedermann and Min 2009). Then, why did the ethnic insurgency of the IRA enlarge into interethnic violence whereas the PKK's war remained between the PKK and the Turkish state? This chapter argues that interethnic violence in Northern Ireland arose out of the non-existence of mechanisms which sustained interethnic cooperation like the case of Kurds in Turkey. In Northern Ireland, the cleavage structure and political competition which overlapped with bipolar ethnic divide did not produce any incentive for unionist governments backed the Protestant majority to appeal to Catholic minority. This chapter reveals that the overlapping cleavage structure and political competition divided between majority and minority induce three institutional outcomes which exacerbate interethnic tensions: forestalling the political accommodation of minority leaders, producing political parties and governments supported exclusively by certain ethnic groups, encouraging political actors to adopt exclusive communal frames against minority. Firstly, the UUP did not accommodate Catholic leaders since they had already the electoral support of Protestant majority and did not need the electoral support of Catholics fearful of losing their Protestant support. Secondly, the UUP which held the monopoly of political power was supported exclusively by Protestants and applied favourable policies to Protestants in order to maintain its electoral support. Thirdly, unionists only appealed to Protestant majority and produced antagonistic discourses against Catholic minority in order to bind Protestant majority behind their political agendas. In sum, different from Kurds and Turks in Turkey, governments in Northern Ireland were unable to mediate interethnic tensions channeling ethnic groups towards common political agendas, had no ethnic leaders from minority group which can moderate interethnic tensions and were strictly associated with majority devoid of legitimacy in the eyes of minority.

This chapter contributes to Wilkinson (2004) and Horowitz (1985, 1991) arguments who argue that interethnic cooperation is dependent on the political system which can produce

electoral incentives for political parties to appeal to minority. Wilkinson highlights the role of politicians in a democracy to prevent or incite interethnic violence. Politicians prevent interethnic riots when

minorities are an important part of their party's current support base, or the support base of one of their partners in a coalition government; or when the overall electoral system in a state is so competitive—in terms of the effective number of parties—that there is therefore a high probability that the governing party will have to negotiate or form coalitions with minority supported parties in the future (Wilkinson 2004: 6–7).

Therefore, interethnic peace is dependent on the intensity of political competition and the degree to which governing party or parties enjoy directly or indirectly minority votes. In Northern Ireland, different from center-periphery cleavage in Turkey, ethno-political allegiances do not cut across but overlap with political affiliations. The majority of Protestants voted for the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) until 1970s, Catholics supported the Nationalist Party (NP) and its replacement as the Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP) in the 1970s. The Unionist governments which enjoyed also a majority in the Stormont Parliament (Northern Ireland Parliament) did not have to negotiate or share the power with the Nationalist Party. This political exclusion also kept the political system polarized between overlapping identities: Catholics and Protestants, British and Irish, Unionists and Nationalists.

3.3.1. Ethnicity, cleavages and Northern Ireland Conflict: A Historical Overview

Protestants were not a monolithic category in Ireland until the 19th century and there were some grounds for collaboration between Presbyterians and Catholics. Both were not entitled to some offices open to members of the Church of Ireland and paid tithes to the Church of Ireland. Moreover, the restrictions on Irish commerce and manufacturing had founded the basis for common grievances and coalition potential between Protestants and Catholics. Protestant and Catholic secret organizations were founded in the 18th century undermining the political status of British and Protestant oligarchs in Ireland. Wilkinson (2012) argues that this potential for collaboration was hamstrung by riots used by

Episcopalian politicians which held the political majority in Ireland. Episcopalian elite in collaboration with Tory party was at the top of social hierarchy by economic and political status. The changes in political spectrum by the 1808, 1829 and 1832 reforms in franchise and by the emigrations flows would render Episcopalians a minority in an electoral competition with Catholics and Presbyterians who were inclined to vote for Liberals. Thus, Tory party was pressurized to change its electoral strategy enlarging its popular base either for Presbyterians or Catholics. The issue dimensions of Tory party and interests of Episcopalian voters were closer to Presbyterian voters compared to Catholics due to the fact that Presbyterians would not challenge substantially Episcopalians' privileges compared to Catholics. In addition, a possible coalition with Presbyterian Liberals and Tories would minimize the political costs for Episcopalian Tories in issues of religious equality and redistribution. Wilkinson (2012) shows that in the 19th century, Tory leaders supported Orange lodges and exacerbated religious riots to activate suprareligious Protestant identity and to solidify the bonds between Presbyterians and Episcopalians against the construed "threat" of Catholics. Britain also met the demands of Irish Protestants for commercial interests in the 19th century, thus, eroded the basis of collaboration between Protestants and Catholics.

While the home rule controversy evolved through the Irish aspirations for independence, Ulster Protestants converged upon the allegiance to the Britain by bypassing their differences: working class, capitalist, landlord, farmer, Liberal, Tory, Prebysterian, Episcopalian, and Methodist. Catholics deputies were permitted to take seats in Westminster from 1829 on and Ireland returned a majority of Irish nationalists to the House of Commons while Irish unionists were a majority in the north-east of Ireland. The home rule controversy reinforced the overlapping of political cleavages with ethnic cleavages. While Tories were sympathetic to Irish unionists, Liberals were to Irish nationalists.

3.3.2. Unionist-Nationalist cleavage, political competition and Irish constituency in Northern Ireland

Contrary to the declaration of Mustafa Kemal, leader of the War of Independence in Turkey and of Turkish Republic, "How happy is the one who says I am a Turk!", the dictum of Kemalist assimilationist and civilizing mission; the declaration of the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland in Northern Ireland Parliament "we are a Protestant Parliament and a Protestant State" was not to assimilate Catholics but to bind up Protestants behind the unionist government at the hand of the UUP. While British and Protestant symbols and unionist domination began to mark the state, Irish symbols were being marginalized in Irish enclaves. Fearful of nationalist agendas of Catholic minority and a British sell-out against unionists' interest, the UUP engaged in consolidating its political power. After the foundation of Northern Ireland in 1921, Northern Ireland parliament implemented proportional representation. The UUP which held the government and the support of Protestant majority was anxious about a possible fracture of Protestant majority in favor of Labor party and a possible labor-nationalist alliance especially after 1925 elections in which the UUP lost seven seats in Belfast which were perceived by party stalwarts 'if not as a defeat, at least as a dangerous trend' (Osborne 1982: 140). Northern Ireland Labor Party which in effect appealed to both Catholic and Protestant working classes in Belfast lost its force after the abolition of proportional representation in 1929. The electoral system passed to plurality rule which reinforced the ethnic competition between nationalist and unionist parties. For unionists, the choice of plurality rule was purposeful since it would reinforce the electoral prospect of unionist parties enjoying the Protestant majority votes. In plurality rule electoral systems, the first-past-the post rule supports disproportionately the party with the highest vote which takes seats in the Parliament higher than it would take in a proportional electoral system. After the abolition of proportional representation, the unionist seats never fell below 34 seats until 1952

in the Stormont Parliament composed of 52 seats (Mulholland 2003:34). This system also enabled a fusion between the legislative and the executive so that the unionist governments which had the overwhelming majority in the Stormont parliament did not have to negotiate or search for compromises with nationalists. Northern Ireland enjoyed significant autonomy from Britain except for budgeting and foreign policy but this autonomy only advantaged the unionists who were able to put into place social, political, economic tools to maintain their hegemony. The UUP held the government of Northern Ireland from the institution of parliament in 1920 (established by the Government of Ireland Act of 1920) until the introduction of British direct rule in 1972.

The abolition of proportional representation had three effects reinforcing ethno-religious cleavages: it disproportionately reinforced the UUP to the detriment of the NP, it decreased the effective number of parties, thus, diminished the political competition and it produced a Westminster style two-party system (O'Leary and McGarry 1996: 123–125). The plurality rule reinforced the lining up of Protestants behind the UUP and prevented the division of votes along class lines favoring the religion as the "vital point of importance" (Pringle 1980: 199–201). The Stormont Parliament was not an efficient ground to represent nationalists' interests. The opposition was fragmented between nationalists, socialists, and independent unionists but not coordinated to change the system. After the plurality rule, the NP lost its force and could not reach out to its peak which was 11 deputies in 1929. The NP was the main opposition group in the parliament and refused to accept the title of Her Majesty's Official Opposition. Many of its deputies referred to Northern Ireland as "six countries" not to legitimize the partition. Mulholland notes with regard to unionist and nationalist representation in Parliament until 1972, "there was a regular core of about ten Nationalist and two Labour seats; thus the natural Unionist complement was 40" (Mulholland 2003:34). Catholic deputies often boycotted the Stormont parliament and did not take seats

since they did not want to remain as loyal opposition to unionist governments. Elliot demonstrates that among 10 Stormont elections between 1929 and 1969, 45% of all seats were uncontested due to the single-member district plurality winner system (Elliott 1973: 121). Plurality rule did not only function to the consternation of nationalists but also prevented splintering within parties. But according to Prof. Adrian Guelke[31] (interview with author, 18 August 2014), even the proportional representation would not propel the accommodation of nationalists into the political system due to the exclusionary attitude of unionist governments:

The protestant majority was much more substantial during the Stormont years than it is now. So, even under the proportional representation system, nationalists would have had a minority of the seats. They would have done perhaps a bit better than they did under a plurality system. But, you know, given the determination of unionist parties under Stormont to take no role of the voices of nationalism completely and exclude them. The exclusion of nationalism was not just about the political level, it ran through the whole society. I mean, you know, Catholics play kind of Gaelic games of various kinds, you know, hurling and so on. In the 50s, the BBC of Northern Ireland did not even report the results of these matches. As if there was no interest, anything that was so. They were treated as if they were, you know, kind of, did not count, as invisible.

The plurality rule also tamed the dissenting voices within the UUP which could have eroded its power against Catholics. Unionist politicians were anxious that in the case of the alternation of power, the rules of electoral game would change to their detriment. The speech of Harry West, future leader of the UUP, is illustrative in 1969, "If the Unionist Government ever goes out of power it will never get back in again. The opposition will so manipulate things that it will be impossible for the Unionist Party ever to return to power" (Mulholland 2003:339).

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Table X. Election Results of the House of Commons, 1929-1969

Year	Unionist Party	Other Unionist	Nationalist Party	Other Nationalist	Northern Ireland Labor Party	Other	Total
1929	34	2	11	0	1	0	48
1933	33	2	9	2	1	1	48
1938	35	3	8	0	1	1	48
1945	31	2	10	1	2	2	48
1949	35	2	9	1	0	1	48
1953	35	1	7	4	0	1	48
1958	34	0	7	2	4	1	48
1962	31	1	9	2	4	1	48
1965	34	0	9	3	2	0	48
1969	36	3	6	5	2	0	52

Source: Adapted from Coakley (2009: 259)
Footnote: 48 members were elected the House of Commons since four seats were allocated to the Queen's University of Belfast. The four university seats were abolished in 1969 and redistributed among new territorial constituencies in Antrim and Down. The Northern Ireland Senate was composed of 26 members elected by the House of Commons, the Lord Mayor of Belfast and the Mayor of Londonderry, held Senate seats ex officio.

Table XI. Unopposed seats in general elections (1921-1969)

1921: none	1949: 19 (14 Unionist, 2 Independent Unionist, 2 Nationalist, 1 Socialist Republican)
1925: 11 (9 Unionist, 1 Nationalist, 1 Republican)	1953: 27 (23 Unionist, 3 Nationalist, 1 Anti-Partition)
1929: 22 (16 Unionist, 6 Nationalist)	1958: 26 (24 Unionist, 2 Nationalist)
1933: 33 (27 Unionist, 6 Nationalist)	1962: 24 (20 Unionist, 3 Nationalist, 1 Independent Labor)
1938: 21 (14 Unionist, 6 Nationalist, 1 NILP)	1965: 22 (13 Unionist, 5 Nationalist, 1 NDP, 1 Republican Labor, 1 Liberal, 1 Independent)
1945: 20 (13 Unionist, 1 Independent Unionist, 6 Nationalist)	1969: 4 (4 pro-O'Neill official Unionists)

Source: Whyte, N. (2013) Northern Ireland elections, available at: http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/hnihoc.htm (15 January 2014).

In order to maintain Protestant-unionist hegemony, the UUP practiced sectarian discrimination and biased administration unfavorable to Catholic minority. Not only plurality rule but also gerrymandering, the design of electoral boundaries so as to favor certain parties, was used as a tool by unionists to maintain their hegemony both in Protestant and in Catholic areas. The situation of Derry is emblematic of this manipulation of electoral behavior. Although 60 percent of population was Catholic in Derry, unionists were in power in local councils with a minority of the votes.

Table XII. Electors and elected in Derry 1966

Ward	Voters		Elected councillors
	Catholic	**Non-Catholic**	
Derry North	2,530	3,946	8 Unionists
Waterside	1,852	3,697	4 Unionists
Derry South	10,047	1,138	8 Nationalists

In addition, the local council franchise was dependent on householder's tax-payer rates which were excluding lodgers from the right to vote. This system was designed to undercut the representation of Catholics since they were economically in lower echelons of society and had larger families living under the same roof. This system disenfranchised approximately a quarter of those qualified to vote in local council elections (Jull 1976 cited by Terchek 1977: 53). Other than a minority of local councils governed by the Nationalist party, Catholics did not have a significant voice in the political system. The British government which was indifferent to this political system tacitly supported this exclusionary political system (McKittrick and McVea 2002). Nationalists that were not accommodated into the political system were disillusioned from the hegemony of the UUP. Furthermore, unionists did not attempt to include nationalists into the political system fearing that this inclusion would constitute a slippery slope toward the unification of Ireland, "unionist parties for many years were disinclined even to accept Catholics as ordinary members" (Adrian Guelke, personal communication, 16 July 2015). In the unionists' cognitive map, there was a close relationship between the security of state and Catholic exclusion from political power as illustrated by a prominent unionist MP, Edmund Warnock:

If ever a community had a right to demonstrate against a denial of civil rights, Derry is the example. A Roman Catholic and Nationalist city has for three or four decades been administered (and none too fairly administered) by a Protestant and Unionist majority secured by a manipulation of the Ward boundaries for the sole purpose of retaining Unionist control.
 I was consulted by Sir James Craig [prime minister], Dawson Bates and R. D. Megaw at the time it was done. Craig thought that the fate of our constitution was on a knife-edge at the time and that, in the circumstances, it was defensible on the basis that the safety of the State was the supreme law (Letter to Terence O'Neill included in Cabinet Conclusions cited by Mulholland 2002: 54).

With no incentive to appeal to Catholic minority, the UUP also developed a sectarian patronage system and 'moved towards a much more systematized adoption of anti- Catholic sectarian rhetoric, both on his own part and that of other members of his government' (Bew, Gibbon and Patterson 1996: 77). Spatial segregation was salient for unionists in order to draw electoral constituencies to their favor. Hence, they discriminated Catholics in the allocation of public housing. The major reason was to protect their support base since Catholics would not shift their political allegiances toward unionist parties. Furthermore, unionist governments provided for their support base, working-class Protestants, with job opportunities at the expense of working-class Catholics (O'Dowd 1980). 20000 well-paid jobs connected to security forces were allocated to Protestants (Mulholland 2002:52). Afraid of losing hegemony against Catholics, unionist leaders kept the Protestant fear of losing jobs acute against the rising number of Catholics. For example, the vice-chairman of the Ulster Unionist Council, D. C. Liddle declared in January 1965 that "unless young unionists applied themselves to education 'in another ten or fifteen years' time we will have lost control of all the executive positions – Post Office, Civil Service and local government"(Mulholland 2003: 47). During the hegemony of the UUP (1921-1972), unionist grassroots organizations put pressure upon unionist governments to keep Catholics out of senior public positions (Mulholland 2003: 45). Unionist politicians also incited their fellow Protestant employers to discriminate against Catholics accentuating their disloyalty to the state. For Protestant employers located in higher echelons of commercial and economic life of the country, the unification with the Republic of Ireland sounded like the death knell to their economic dominance (Buckland 1973). Well-paid jobs, such as those in security sector were connected to Protestants. Furthermore, new industries built between 1949 and 1963 were located in Protestant-populated eastern Northern Ireland, remote from Catholic areas (Breen 2000).

Even job advertisements were published underlining the religious affiliation of the possible employee (Barritt and Carter 1962).

The overlapping cleavage structure and political competition not only produced political horizontal inequalities but magnified the pre-existing socio-economic horizontal inequalities. There was a significant income disparity between Catholics and Protestants. Catholics had larger families, lower education attainment, enjoyed less state funding compared to Protestants. Catholics had higher unemployment rates and were overrepresented in low-paid jobs. Private sector was also discriminative against Catholics. The industries able to generate highest profits were at the hands of Protestants such as shipbuilding, marine engineering, linen, textiles. Catholics were concentrated in low-paid position of linen industry and the shirt industry (Mac Laughlin 1978). Protestant workers concentrated in high-paid jobs considered themselves as superior workers of unionist hegemony (Gibbon 1976, Thomas 1956: 189). As Mac Laughlin and Agnew (1986) draw attention, there was a correlation between non-unionists vote and job distribution:

In 1961, the Belfast area, with less than 30 percent of Northern Ireland's land area, accounted for more than 55 percent of the industrial labor force (Northern Ireland Census 1961). Antrim and Down, especially the Protestant sectors of south Antrim and North Down, accounted for over 20 percent of the North's manufacturing jobs. Londonderry City, together with counties Londonderry, Tyrone, and Fermanagh, had more than one-quarter of Northern Ireland's total population and more than one- half of its non-Unionist electorate, but accounted for only 13 percent of Northern Ireland's manufacturing jobs (Mac Laughlin and Agnew 1986: 254).

The unemployment levels in Northern Ireland were correlated with spatial distribution of nationalists and working classes. For example, in December 1976, the unemployment was 10.4 per cent in Northern Ireland, but Protestant provinces and towns were below the average level of unemployment (Belfast, 7.8 percent; Craigavor, 7.9 percent) while Catholic provinces and towns were above the pattern (Strabane, 26.7 percent; and Newry and Dungannon at 20 percent) (Irish Times, 22 December 1976 cited by Terchek 1977: 52).

3.3.3. Sleepwalking into Intercommunal Violence

While ethno-political divides which also cultivated horizontal inequalities were in place, it was not expected that this ethnic divide would explode into an intercommunal violence in 1960s as the IRA campaign that was launched in 1956 disappeared off the radar in 1962 due to insufficient nationalist support. Nonetheless, without significant cross-cutting cleavages among Catholics and Protestants, this system was potentially explosive and broke down with the mismanagement of civil rights movements and interethnic tensions thereof. Surveys in 1960s display also the divide in perceptions regarding discrimination among Catholic and Protestants:

Table XIII. Views on discrimination in Northern Ireland in 1968
Proposition: "…in part of Northern Ireland Catholics are treated unfairly. Do you think this is true or not?"

	Religion	
	Protestant	**Catholic**
Yes	18	74
No	74	13
Don't know	8	13

Source: Adapted from Rose (1971).

A new generation of Catholics more educated by the policies of British welfare state surfaced into political scene in 1950s. They were weary of militant tactics of the IRA and challenged the unionist state from inside with civil rights movements. The votes of Catholic working classes were veering into the Northern Ireland Labor Party (NILP) which returned several of its members to the Stormont Parliament between 1958–1972. This was a serious challenge for the UUP because it could lose Belfast to the NILP. The new leader of the UUP, Terrence O'Neil, was more predisposed for minor reforms to include Catholics into the political system. Inspired by American civil rights movements, the demands of Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) were plausible for any democratic government such as "One man, One vote" "British rights for British people" which challenged in effect the electoral discrimination and sectarian administration of the UUP. Their demands by civic

and democratic means were in fact a direct challenge for unionist hegemony which would not be able to defy this mass movement by its anti-nationalist or anti-IRA rhetoric. Moreover, the NICRA was more than a civil rights movement, it targeted "how local government operated, how local government discriminated against people" (Prof. Adrian Guelke, interview with author, 18 August 2014). The Labor government at Westminster pressurized O'Neill for reforms which were responded by O'Neill with a minor five-point plan: a fairer allocation of housing, foundation of impartial ombudsman to investigate complaints against the government and to canvass votes for council elections, review of the Special Powers Act and a revision of Londonderry Development Corporation to improve gerrymandering. These reforms circumvented the "One man, One Vote" and fell short of expectations.

The NICRA continued its marches but they were reciprocated with unionist and loyalist counterdemonstrators. Conceived as disloyal, Catholic demonstrations were equal to repudiation of political regime in the eyes of unionist and loyalist community (Power 1972). One of the leaders of these counterdemonstrations was Ian Paisley, the would-be founder of a more extreme unionist party, the DUP (Democratic Unionist Party), in the 1970s. As the leader of Free Presbyterian Church, he mobilized the unionists with anti-Catholic bigotry. One of the anecdotes told to me by a West Belfast resident for this era is illustrative:

Ian Paisley in 1968 held a rally on the Shankill road[32] and he said "What is wrong with the Shankill road that they allow papists which means Catholics to live and have shops on the Shankill road? The shops he was referring to were Italian chip shops, so on. These Italians had no stance on all Ireland as well. They were trying to sell chips but that night, their shops were burnt (Interview with a West Belfast resident, 10 August 2014).

The reforms of O'Neill were minor for Catholics and overwhelming for some sections of unionist community. In 1969 elections, unionists were divided between "Official Unionist" and "Unofficial Unionist". The anti-O'Neill faction gained 12 seats out of 39 unionist seats

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[32] Shankill road is the loyalist working-class enclave in West Belfast which is predominantly a nationalist area.

returned in the election. The statement of Tom Lyons, a unionist hard-liner MP in 1968 illustrates the unionist intransigence:

We took over in 1921 under certain conditions. The principles were all laid down and we have abided by them very accurately. Like most parliaments, we like to protect our own authority, and we propose to do so by refusing to touch one man one vote (Mulholland 2003:39).

The clashes between protestors coupled with the arbitrary treatment and misconduct of security forces against Catholic demonstrators intensified interethnic tensions. The Community Relations Commission reported that 8,180 families were forced out of their homes in the Greater Belfast area between August 1969 and February 1973 of whom 80 per cent was Catholic. Unable to control intercommunal tensions, British state deployed its troops in 1969. But the impartial usage of British security forces and the mistreatment of Catholic population as a suspect community deteriorated the situation which peaked with the Bloody Sunday incidents in 1972. With the erosion of credibility of security forces and attacks of loyalist vigilant groups, posters for the IRA were hanging around in nationalist areas. While the official IRA was weak due to the internment policies before, the Provisional IRA began to be recruited. Loyalist paramilitaries were also reforming with the reemergence of the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) in 1971 and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) in 1966. As an ex-UVF militant recalls:

There was a number of bombs that were planted and set off and they (Catholics) set off civil rights marches and breaking away of official IRA as Provisional IRA. And the UVF was reformed (interview with Alistair Little,[33] ex-UVF combatant, 2 September 2014).

With the formation of paramilitaries in place, interethnic violence took a more organized form and sectarian assassinations gained momentum. The intercommunal violence

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[33] Alistair Little is an ex-UVF combatant and works on conflict transformation in various conflict areas such as Northern Ireland, Ireland, the Balkans, the Middle East, and South Africa. He is the author of *Give a Boy a Gun: From Killing to Peacebuilding* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 2009) and *Journey through Conflict Trail Guide* (Trafford, 2013).

was monopolized by paramilitaries who emerged as defenders of their communities. Here it is of particular importance for this study that in Northern Irish case, the state lost its credibility and neutrality during the management of interethnic tensions which could have prevented the explosion of interethnic tensions into intercommunal violence. Different from Kurdish case, ethnic violence spilled over communities for three main reasons. Unionist governments severely misconducted interethnic tensions since they could not control loyalist and republican vigilant groups and alienated the minority population by its mistreatment to Catholic protestors. The unionist governments had no credible political agenda which could mitigate interethnic tensions unlike the Turkish case in which governments such as ANAP, DYP-SHP, AKP governments fostered hope in minority population for the resolution of their grievances and canalized Kurds and Turks into common political agendas. Secondly, unionist governments did not have any ethnic brokerage networks which could have prevented the internal security dilemma spreading over communities. Thirdly, unionist governments had already pointed out the enemy of the majority as they exploited anti-Catholic rhetoric and sectarian discrimination. The next section explains how intercommunal violence proceeded while ethno-political rivals emerged into political sphere.

3.3.4. Introduction of Direct rule and the Peace Process

The introduction of direct rule in 1972 dealt a major blow to political life in Northern Ireland as it prorogued Stormont parliament and transferred all legislative powers to Westminster. The tide of politics in Britain also turned significantly with the direct rule as Westminster now assumed directly the administration and responsibility of Northern Ireland. Prior to the abolition of Stormont, Britain was disinterested in the affairs of Northern Ireland as it was run by a section of an adjunct of Home office which was also responsible for the grant of licensing of London taxi cabs (Tonge 2006: 75). Apart from five-month period of power sharing under the devolved government in 1974, Northern Ireland was ruled by the

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Secretary of State. Northern Ireland constitution act of 1973 stipulated that the Secretary of State would form an executive out of members of new legislature. The legislative assembly was reinstituted in 1975 and lasted until 1986 which was also prorogued by the Secretary of State. The Assembly assumed in this period only "consultative, advisory and scrutiny" roles (Arthur 1984). Direct rule can be described as a "semi-colonial" form of administration (Wichert 1991:179). The secretary of state did not necessarily obtain the consent of local parties for policy-making. Powers invested in the position of the Secretary of State of Northern Ireland were greater than those granted to the Secretaries of State of Scotland and of Wales.

The direct rule consolidated ethnic allegiances as it alienated both unionists and nationalists. From the unionists' side, they had counted on Britain not to disband the parliament without the consent of majority. The UK's Ireland Act in 1949 stipulated that Northern Ireland was part of the United Kingdom unless the Parliament expresses its formal consent to join in a United Ireland. The introduction of direct rule rendered this condition of consent void and displayed that the British Parliament held the ultimate authority on the fate of Northern Ireland (Schmitt 1988: 38). Intimidated by the fact that Britain could sell Northern Ireland government for its interests, this constitutional ambiguity and insecurity stirred even more unionist intransigence against a power-sharing government. From the nationalists' side, nationalists would no more be satisfied with the improvements of civil rights. They forced Britain to recognize Irish dimension and to convince unionists for power-sharing with nationalists. The constitutional proposal in 1973, the White Paper, provided the outline of devolution by power-sharing and inclusion of the Council of Ireland. The council of Ireland implied the recognition of the institutional role of the Republic of Ireland which invigorated fears among unionists.

In June 1973 elections, there was not only interethnic competition but also intraethnic competition by the introduction of proportional representation. Britain introduced single-transferable vote in order to encourage Catholic political participation and strengthen voting across sectorial lines such as voting for the biconfessional Alliance party founded in 1970 (Arthur 1984). Brian Faulkner, the leader of the UUP, was challenged by unionist rivals, the Vanguard Party[34] and the DUP, which were not persuaded about the Irish dimension. They won more seats than Faulkner's official unionists. The SDLP criticized by the Provisional IRA emerged as the major representative of nationalist community. Although both the UUP and the SDLP were pressurized by their ethnopolitical counterparts, they could not withdraw from negotiations to form a power-sharing executive since they did not want to deepen their electoral failure and to hold political advantage against their ethnic rivals. In November 1973, they agreed on Sunningdale Agreement that set the principle of power-sharing and the council of Ireland for the reinstitution of devolved government. This system intensified the political competition as 210 candidates competed for 78 seats within 12 constituencies with an aggregate turnout of 70.1 per cent. The executive was formed out of new legislature with Faulkner as the unionist chief executive and the SDLP's Gerry Fitt as the nationalist deputy minister and other nine minister composed of five unionists, three members of the SDLP and one representative from the Alliance Party. But the unionist opposition was not ready to compromise with nationalists and organized public demonstrations against the new government. Ian Paisley, the charismatic leader of the DUP and founder and Reverend of the Free Presbyterian Church was stealing the public limelight of new government with his appeal to working classes and evangelical rural Protestants (Bruce 1986, 1994). The experience of devolved government tried for a brief period between 1973 and 1974 was doomed to failure

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[34] The Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party (VUPP) which existed in Northern Ireland between 1972 and 1978 is the radical scission of the UUP and was associated with several loyalist paramilitary organizations.

since unionists were unwilling to share power with Catholics. Moreover, the institution of cross-border institution, the "Council of Ireland" rekindled unionists' intransigence considering it as a step toward a united Ireland. In February 1974 general elections, the opposition groups engaged in an electoral alliance under the banner of the United Ulster Unionist Council (UUUC) and won eleven of the twelve Westminster seats allocated to the Northern Ireland. The political ground of this devolution became shaky as the Ulster Workers' Council strike emboldened by the Vanguard Party, the DUP, the Orange Order and loyalist paramilitaries pushed this unwanted political scenario over the edge. The Ulster Workers' Council launched a general strike in May 1974 led by unionist and loyalist working classes that were opposed to the Sunnigdale Agreement. Many services such as food provision, electoral supply and postal services did not function properly because of the strike. During the strike, the UDA killed 33 people, the highest death toll of entire Troubles in one day by no-warning car bombs in Dublin and Monaghan. It caused a political crisis in power-sharing government and Faulkner gave up at the end and resigned from the executive on 28 May 1974. Sunnigdale Agreement was an opportunity for peace to be missed due to unionist intransigence and the paramilitary violence. But the Republicans would never consent to an agreement in which Britain claimed jurisdiction over Northern Ireland as it was in the Sunnigdale Agreement (Interview with Alex Maskey, Sinn Fein MLA (Member of Legislative Assembly) from South Belfast, 9 September 2014). Thus, the violence did not stop.

Another opportunity (for peace) was in 1974 the Sunningdale Agreement and power-sharing executive and that could have created a situation in which if the IRA had stopped their violence at that stage and if loyalists and unionists had cooperated with the SDLP and the Alliance Party, then, we could have made similar rapid progress in terms of new politics in Northern Ireland. That was not to be, but that could have happened even in that stage if the IRA called off their campaign at that stage which they should have done then we could have made a lot of progress. If you fast-forward from 1974 to 1998, 24 years, you get roughly the same package, right, same package. Except those who opposed it in 1974 were supporting it in 1998. So one of my colleagues Seamus Mallon (ex-deputy leader of the SDLP), said that, pointedly, particularly toward the republicans, the GFA was the Sunnigdale Agreement for

slow learners (interview with Alban Maginness,[35] SDLP Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) from North Belfast, 3 September 2014).

The paramilitary violence also forged ethnic bloc voting in parallel to deterioration of intercommunal relations. The nationalist slogan of "Brits out" of 1970s left its place to "Prods out" in 1980s (Dutter 1988). While Republican violence reinforced unionists' fear that the reunification with Ireland should have been avoided by all means, the violence of loyalist paramilitaries bonded nationalists displaying that there was no future for them in a Northern Ireland loyal to the Crown. The unionists were neither politically nor psychologically prepared to give up some of their power in favor of Catholics. The violence was not a condemnatory option in the eyes of Protestants. The 1968 survey shows that 52 per cent of Protestants considered "any measures" acceptable to keep Ulster Protestant while this number was reduced to 13 per cent among Catholics who approved "any measures" to end the partition (Rose 1971: 192-193). In the 1974 elections, about two-thirds of the Protestants voted for unionists or militant unionists (Rose 1976: 97). The 1977 local elections witnessed the inclination of Protestants to vote for more extreme unionist party, Ian Paisley's DUP. The surveys point to an overlap between voting behavior and national identification. The 1978 survey shows that 76 per cent of respondents who voted for nationalist party, SDLP, were self-identified as Irish, while 71 per cent of voters who voted for the UUP and 60 per cent who voted for the DUP considered themselves British (Rose 1971). 1985 survey on political elites also shows that 92 per cent of UUP leaders, 82 per cent of DUP leaders, 12 per cent of Alliance leaders categorized themselves as British while none of the SDLP or Sinn Fein leaders considered themselves as British (Soule 1989:733).

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[35] Alban Maginness is a member of the SDLP since 1972 and he was the Chairperson of the SDLP between 1985-1991. He is the first Nationalist Lord Mayor of Belfast in the history of Belfast. He has been several times a member of Belfast City Council. He was elected to the Inter-Party Talks in 1996 and was also a party delegate to the Brooke Talks in 1992 and to the Forum for Peace and Reconciliation in Dublin. He has been several times elected to Northern Ireland Assembly and he is currently the SDLP MLA from North Belfast.

While Sinn Fein was being criminalized in 1970s due to its connection to the IRA and limited electoral support, the intransigence of the British government against the IRA hunger strikers boosted Sinn Fein's legitimacy. By mid-1970s, British governments pushed forward the criminalization of paramilitaries with accrued emergency powers and special legislation for terrorism. The underlying intention was to break the link between communities and paramilitaries while paramilitaries were spreading the propaganda that they were freedom fighters. However, Margaret Thatcher, the head of Conservative government (1979-1990) stroke the chord of Catholics by maintaining a firm stand against any concession to republican hunger strikers. The republican movement passed to a double strategy from 1981 onwards as republican violence continued but Sinn Fein decided to participate in elections. The ensuing death of hunger strikers provided further impetus for militant republican agenda and ended up with bolstering international sympathy for the IRA and with boosting the electoral votes of Sinn Fein. Sinn Fein was strengthened in 1983 elections with 10.1 per cent of the votes and was reenergized in the political scene as the political wing of the IRA. As one of the ex-IRA combatants illustrates:

It had always been advanced by opponents of the IRA that they did not have any support in nationalist areas. That was one of the criticisms of the Republican movement that they had never support of the people in republican areas, they had no democratic mandate, they represented nobody, they are criminal godfathers, they used all of those terms. But till after the hunger strikes of 1981 which showed that republicanism did have a mandate in nationalist areas and that mandate was increasing all the time (Interview with Sean O'Fiach, ex-IRA combatant, 29 August 2014).

Northern Ireland problem was also no more limited to Ireland but spread over Britain with the IRA attacks with an aim to force the British government to withdraw from Ireland. This widening of the IRA's military targets made Northern Ireland an urgent domestic matter to be solved for British government. On 27 August 1979, eighteen members of the Parachute Regime died in bomb attacks. Lord Mountbatten, a cousin of Queen Elizabeth II blew up by a bomb in his fishing boat on holiday. On 12 October 1984, the IRA came very close to

assassinate Thatcher and leading members of British government. The British government recognized that it would not be able to mitigate Northern Ireland conflict without the cooperation of the Irish government. Both governments concluded the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement which also displayed to Northern Irish parties that British and Irish governments could bypass local parties for conflict resolution. John Major, successor of Thatcher from Conservative party ascended into office in 1990 and was more inclined into consensus-making and cooperation compared to Thatcher. The new British government intended to push for a permanent ceasefire for political talks. Peter Brooke, the Secretary of State declared that Britain had "no selfish strategic or economic interest" in Northern Ireland and would legislate for a united Ireland upon the consent of majority. At the end of political talks between Irish Taoiseach Albert Reynolds and John Major issued the Downing Street declaration in 1993. It was representative of "necessary ambiguities" (McGarry and O`Leary 1995:414) designed to appeal both to nationalists and unionists. It put forward two pillars which also constructed the basis of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. Firstly, Britain had no selfish interest to remain in Northern Ireland against the wishes of the majority. If majority would ever opt for the end of the union, Britain would establish necessary legislation to end its rule. Second, the Irish government recognized the principle of consent as a prerequisite for Irish unity, irrespective of Article 2 and 3 of the constitution of Irish Republic. In August 1994, the IRA declared "complete cessation of military operations" to be included in political negotiations. The IRA had realized that they could not defeat Britain by the use of force and they had to produce new politics to move the process forward. Fra McKann[36], Sinn Fein MLA from West Belfast and ex-IRA voluntary, recalls this era as:

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[36] Fra McKann is a former Republican prisoner involved in the struggle of the IRA. He also organized Sinn Fein party campaigning after 1981 Hunger Strikers. He has been elected several times to Northern Ireland Assembly and he is currently Sinn Fein MLA from West Belfast.

Obviously, the decision to call a ceasefire was a decision made by the IRA themselves. I think that there was a growing realization within republican circles that was the British government and the British military could not defeat the IRA and I think that there was also realization that the IRA could not defeat the British military. There was a belief there that if that was the case, then what you needed to do was to look for a new way forward and to bring the process forward. I know that there were quite a number of senior Irish republicans who went out and spoke to, what would-be called senior opinion makers, whether it is the Catholic churches, Protestant churches, the business. I mean, to find out how you move the process forward. Our leadership was also involved in discussions with the leaders such as John Hume from the SDLP and in privately with the British and with the Irish governments and I think what happened was that then the IRA then believed that there was a new way of uniting the country and that was the peaceful means and methods (Interview with Fra McKann, Sinn Fein MLA from West Belfast, 2 September 2014).

The USA also became more involved in conflict resolution with the presidency of Bill Clinton. Americans for a New Irish Agenda (ANIA), a broad network of Irish community leaders including journalists, lawyers, business owners in favor of constitutional nationalism lobbied for Clinton to encourage him to push forward the conflict resolution. Clinton even sent Senator George Mitchell as a peace broker of negotiations in December 1994. The talks came under the chairmanship of Senator George Mitchell but concluded no substantive progress. Multi-party talks were reestablished under Senator Mitchell on 10 June 1996 excluding Sinn Fein and went on for a year without Sinn Fein. Tony Blair replaced Major in May 1997 and gave further impetus to peace process. He met Gerry Adams, symbolical in terms of recognizing the political voice of Sinn Fein. He tried to convince David Trimble, leader of the UUP to include Sinn Fein into political talks. The multi-party talks chaired by Mitchell was different than before since not only constitutional parties but also paramilitaries and a wide range of community development actors moved to the negotiation table. The Good Friday Agreement in 1998 was considered as the apogee of Northern Ireland peace process and called for political reforms to include Catholic voice into the Northern Ireland political system, the decommissioning of paramilitary forces' weapons, the reduction of British forces (Tannam 2001: 505–506) and a reappraisal of political prisoners' status (Farren and Mulvihill

2000). But the DUP was opposed to the GFA considering it as concessions to terrorism. As

Nigel Dodds[37] (DUP Member of Parliament in Westminister for Belfast North) puts:

We in the DUP recognised inherent flaws in the Good Friday Agreement and believe that the negative consequences of its ratification are still being observed in Northern Ireland politics and general society today. The most potent concern that we as a Party held was an overriding one - the reality that the Agreement would allow front men for Irish Republican terrorists to assume positions in Government without committing to exclusively peaceful and democratic means. We believe this was an anathema to the unionist people of Northern Ireland, in whose communities the IRA had wreaked havoc with the bullet and bomb for many decades. Similarly, we opposed fundamentally the Agreement's release scheme for terrorist prisoners, which to the present day has allowed those convicted of crimes of a terrorist and paramilitary nature pre-1998 to defy justice with a guarantee that they will only serve a maximum of two years of a custodial sentence. So too, the Good Friday Agreement contained provision for a review of policing, which in turn led to the unashamed dismantling of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) through the Patten reform process. This was a hammer blow to the unionist community in Northern Ireland, which was at a loss as to how a so-called resolution to division in our Province could incorporate the abolition of a force that served the law-abiding majority so ably through our country's darkest days. (Nigel Dodds, Personal communication, 28 August 2014).

One of the most important elements of the GFA which differentiated it from the Sunningdale

was the role of Britain for republicans. As Alex Maskey explains:

Sunningdale did not offer the constitutional changes, for example, what the Good Friday Agreement offered. Because you remember that before 1998, the British government claimed jurisdiction over these parts of Ireland. That's bound back to the Government of Ireland back of 1921. Post-Good Friday Agreement, that claim has gone. That means, in legal and jurisdictional terms, the British government no longer claims jurisdiction over these parts of North. We, as Irish Republicans, would never accept a situation where we are legally occupied by a foreign government, this case, Britain. So the constitutional situation over Ireland has changed. We are in a hybrid situation. Yes we are still within the UK jurisdiction but that is now simply based on the will of majority of people here whereas prior to the Good Friday, if one hundred percent of the population in the North had said we want to go with the rest of Ireland to reunify the country, the British government could have said "well thank you very much but no, we are not going to agree that". The Good Friday Agreement, changed the British government if there is a poll in the North, if majority of people opts out of the UK, then British government must legislate that pro-choice. That fundamentally changes the relations between Britain and Ireland and of course, the Good Friday Agreement also ensures that North is no longer just simply an internal model for the UK, it is an all-Ireland

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[37] Nigel Dodds is the leader of the DUP team at Westminster and he is a member of Her Majesty's Privy Council.

model.(Interview with Alex Maskey,[38] Sinn Fein MLA (Member of Legislative Assembly) from South Belfast, 9 September 2014).

3.4. The impact of nationalist-unionist cleavage on Protestant-Catholic relations and intercommunal violence

The type, size and number of cleavages are important to evaluate the impact of competing cleavages on intergroup relations. While in Turkey, the centre-periphery cleavage constituted the focal point of politics and voting behaviour to the consternation of Turkish-Kurdish cleavage, the unionist-nationalist cleavage in Northern Ireland which overlapped with Protestant-Catholic divide and British-Irish divide is the building block of politics which shaped the voting behaviour. Bi-confessional parties such as the Northern Ireland Labour Party before the Troubles or Alliance party after the Troubles could not outmanoeuvre the political competition between nationalist and unionist parties. The force of the Northern Ireland Labour party was eclipsed by the force of fundamental ethno-national division as its vote potential was concentrated in Belfast and it could not organize in rural districts. It let down nationalists in critical identity issues such as its commitment to the partition in 1949 in the wake of the declaration of Irish Republic (Edwards 2009, Feeney 2009). The biconfessional Alliance party remained as a middle class party and could not appeal to Protestant and Catholic working classes that formed the backbone of nationalist and unionist parties. Coulter (1999) argues that class politics could not foster in Northern Ireland as a cross-cutting cleavage among Protestant and Catholic working classes since Ulster unionism that formed the elevated strata of society composed of large landowners and capitalists fuelled ethno-nationalist antagonisms against a possible diversion of Protestant working classes toward left-wing parties. The intercommunal violence of the Troubles reinforced the ethnic

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[38] Alex Maskey was involved in the struggle of the IRA, interned twice in the 1970s. In 1983 elections, he became the first Republican to be elected to the Belfast City Council after the Troubles and the second republican to be elected to the Belfast City Council in Northern Ireland history. He was a member of Sinn **Fein** negotiation team during peace negotiations and he has been elected several times to Northern Ireland Assembly. He is the current Sinn Fein MLA from South Belfast.

cleavages but also intensified mutual mistrust among them. On one side, Protestants viewed the increase of Sinn Fein's votes as a greater assault on their community since it was connected to the IRA. On the other side, the blurred lines between unionist parties and loyalist paramilitaries irritated Catholics who viewed this connection as highly sectarian and alarming for their community.

In Northern Ireland, the political competition between unionist and nationalist parties are closely contested as unionist and nationalist parties do not compete between them but among their ethnic fellows. During the unionist hegemony (1921-1972), it was the UUP which rose to power in each elections and the plurality rule was intentionally introduced to weaken its unionist opponents which also decreased the political competition. Proportional representation system introduced by Britain after the direct rule increased ethnic outbidding since the DUP emerged as the strongest challenger to the UUP whereas Sinn Fein rose as the strongest rival of the SDLP. This closely contested competition encouraged the politics of ethnic outbidding through which political parties increase their ethnic voice in order to attract their ethnic fellows. The unionists' resistance against power-sharing arrangements of the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 caused the collapse of power-sharing arrangements which could not be restored until the GFA. Sinn Fein blamed the SDLP which took its seats in peace negotiations with the unionists. At the end, negotiations seemed like concessions and became swiftly trapped in intergroup and intragroup competition dynamics. Contrary to the experience of Turkey in which many Turkish political parties were competing for Kurdish votes as the competition between ANAP, RP, DYP, SHP and pro-Kurdish parties (although constantly expelled from politics) in 1990s against the backdrop of darkest times of the war, Northern Ireland did not witness such as intense competition for minority votes which could have moderated interethnic tensions by building multi-ethnic political alignments.

Moreover, contrary to the partial accommodation of Kurdish leaders in Turkish political system, Northern Ireland political system did not have ethnic brokerage networks which could have built bridges between the state and minority ethnic group. It is possible to talk about individual Protestants and Catholics who were involved in the other's political cause in Northern Ireland political history rather than group of leaders like the case of Kurdish leaders in Turkey. Besides, the number of these individuals also significantly decreased after the partition. Upon my question about the number of Catholic leaders in unionist parties and Protestant leaders in nationalist parties, Brendan O'leary compared the role of assimilationism on the inclusion of ethnic leaders in Northern Ireland conflict and Kurdish problem in Turkey:

1. There were zero Catholic leaders in the UUP and the DUP before 1972.
And no Catholic leaders of the UUP or DUP since, though there may have been the occasional member.
There have been Catholics in the leadership of the Alliance party from its formation… it's a moot point whether to code it as a unionist party.

2. There were multiple Protestant leaders of Irish nationalism:
Wolfe Tone and others of the United Irishmen in the 1790s
Robert Emmet in 1803
Smith O'Brien and Thomas Davis and others in Young Ireland in the 1840s
The Irish Republican Brotherhood had Protestant leaders from the 1850s to 1923, but small numbers
The Irish Home Rule movement was led by Isaac Butt and then by Charles Stuart Parnell from the 1870s to 1891
but
3. After Northern Ireland is formed there are very few members of the Nationalist Party who are Protestants, no leaders, but there were Protestants who joined Sinn Fein and the IRA.
Two key leaders of the SDLP were Ivan Cooper (a founding member) and John Turnly (assassinated by loyalists).

I think the fact that Turkey is assimilationist (a Kurd who accepts he is a Turk is treated as a Turk) should be distinguished from Northern Ireland unionism (in which the Protestant identity has never been assimilationist in the same way). Irish nationalism is assimilationist in principle, but has been less successful in attracting Ulster Protestants than its 19th precursors (Brendan O'Leary, Personal Communication, 16 July 2015).[39]

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[39] Brendan O'Leary is the Lauder Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. He wrote extensively on Northern Ireland conflict. He is the author, co-author and co-editor of 21 books; and the author or co-author of over 120 articles or chapters in peer-reviewed journals and university presses, as well as numerous other forms of publication

While the NICRA was a civic mass movement which demanded British citizenship rights, certain parts of Protestant community and loyalists viewed these demands as treason to the state and another manoeuvre to promote nationalist goals. However, in 1969 during which intercommunal tensions were simmering, Catholics still favoured a political settlement within Northern Ireland political system and voted for the moderate SDLP. The unionist government lost all its credibility when Catholic population was treated as potential suspects of the IRA by Northern Ireland's security forces, the RUC and the UDR. This lack of ethnic brokers fed the internal security dilemma which arose out of two main reasons: information failure and commitment problem (Lake and Rothchild 1996). The commitment problem was already relevant for unionist governments since Catholics were often presumed as alleged to the Republic of Ireland and potential supporters of the IRA. Information failure was a serious reason of the outbreak of interethnic tensions since the demands of NICRA did not aim at being excluded from Northern Irish political system but to be included into political system. NICRA was a civic mass movement for Catholics who were weary of militant tactics of republicans. There were no ethnic brokers which could appease Catholics' grievances or express their discontent within unionist government. During the interethnic tensions between 1969 and 1972, the biased treatment of Catholic demonstrators by the unionist government and sectarian security forces dampened the government's ability to arbitrate between Protestants and Catholics. This insecurity and anxiety bred the emergence of the paramilitary groups and fuelled the descent into war.

Furthermore, Northern Ireland is an illustrating example of communal mobilization using identity-based frames. Brewer and Higgins (1999) argue that anti-Catholicism is exploited for two main reasons:

as a mobilization resource to defend the socioeconomic and political position of Protestants against opposition that threatens it; and as a rationalization to justify and legitimize both that

privileged position and avoid conflict with those who challenge or weaken it (Brewer and Higgins 1999: 238).

Ian Paisley, leader of the DUP, used virulent sectarian rhetoric raging against the 'Romish whore' and 'anti-christ' (the Pope) to mobilize counterdemonstrators (Mulholland 2002:108). Unionist governments used the discourse of Catholic threat to forge a homogenous Protestant electoral coalition out of the heterogeneity of Protestant voices. Since this was the UUP which swept to power in each election and the parties that represented Catholics were doomed to be a minority in Parliament, Catholics could not develop a sense of belonging to the state. Anti-Protestantism was also present among Catholics in terms of negative stereotypes, pejorative language and was used in sectarian harassments and killings but it was not woven into social structure of Northern Irish state (Higgins and Brewer 2003). These floating discourses based on threats and stereotypes cemented the toxicity in intercommunal relations. In Turkey, while anti-Kurdish language was produced in public sphere in parallel to the war against the PKK, political elites abstained from adopting an exclusive discourse against Kurds since Kurds were an important part of their minimum winning coalition.

3.5. Conclusion

Northern Ireland conflict provides important evidence to develop a focused comparison with Kurdish problem in Turkey. From the perspective of structural explanations, similar to Turkey, the United Kingdom was a strong state able to implement effective security policies against ethno-nationalist challenges. Like Turkey, the United Kingdom put into place excessive counterterrorism measures that alienated Catholic minority. Catholics had a national homeland unlike Kurds with the Republic of Ireland. While this dimension was not so strong in Kurdish case due to the non-existence of a national homeland, this transnational dimension is reinforced in Kurdish case especially after 2003 with the foundation of Iraqi Kurdistan regional government. This dimension has been growing as well with the *de facto*

establishment of autonomous regions in largely Kurdish provinces of Syria. From the perspective of constructivist explanations, Catholics were construed as disloyal, subversive in collaboration with foreign enemies within the established state which is a very similar point in the construction of Kurdish identity in Turkish state discourse. This construction as "other" in the eyes of Protestants also increased the mutual distrust and anxiety between Catholics and Protestants. This mutual distrust, although it is not a historical legacy in the case of Kurds in Turkey, also grew in Turkey since Kurds claiming for basic rights and liberties were treated as traitors and potential separatists by the state.

The cleavage structure and political competition in Northern Ireland could not produce a cross-cutting cleavage across ethnic lines like in Turkey since ethno-national allegiances were overlapping with political affiliations. Northern Ireland case shows that the cleavage structure and political competition divided between unionists/loyalists and republicans/nationalists could not cut across British-Irish, Protestant-Catholic identities. The impermeability of identity boundaries between Protestants and Catholics also maintained the stability in political affiliations (Huddy 2001). This ethnic and political divide hindered interethnic peace generating three institutional outcomes. Firstly, the cleavage structure and political competition that overlap with bipolar ethnic divide did not allow Catholic leaders to be accommodated into the political system unlike the case of Turkey in which a notable share of Kurdish leaders were accommodated into political system by the center-periphery cleavage. Secondly, unionist governments which held the monopoly of power between 1921 and 1972 were not supported by Catholic minority and they officially excluded Catholic minority socially, economically and politically since Catholics were not and would not be their potential supporters. Differently, governments in Turkey were backed by a considerable share of Kurdish votes and attempted to respond to Kurdish demands under the limits of military tutelage. Thirdly, while the center-periphery cleavage and political competition that

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were capable to appeal to a considerable share of Kurds de-motivated political actors to frame the conflict in communal terms in Turkey, the unionist-nationalist cleavage and political competition in Northern Ireland were intertwined and interspersed with Protestant and Catholic communal references. In the words of Prof. Adrian Guelke: "Basically, if you are Protestant, you are likely to support unionist party and if you are a Catholic, you are likely to support nationalist party" (interview with author, 18 August 2014).

Northern Ireland Assembly began to function in 1999, led by moderate unionist and nationalist parties, the UUP and the SDLP. However, hard-line unionists, the DUP led by Ian Paisley posed the decommissioning of weapons by the IRA as a condition for their participation in the government. This brought about a political stalemate and the Assembly was suspended only two months after it started to function. The Assembly functioned on and off again and was again suspended for a long term in 2002. A new agreement was reached in 2006 and the Assembly resumed its function. Hard-liners, the DUP and Sinn Fein, rose as the winners in these elections winning the first and second largest number of seats to the expense of moderates, the UUP and the SDLP. As an irony of history, the staunch unionist DUP leader, Ian Paisley and the former IRA militant, Martin McGuiness, became First Minister and Deputy First Minister, respectively.

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4. COMMUNAL VIOLENCE AGAINST KURDS IN TURKEY

The fire truck which was donated to Çayırbağı village of Trabzon's Düzköy district was exposed to "discrimination". Osman Baydemir, the mayor of Diyarbakır Grand Municipality states: "The vehicle was searched 20 times while it was going to Trabzon, it was stoned in the road and the house in which the conductor stayed was busted". Diyarbakır Grand Municipality donates one of their fire trucks to Çayırbağı village. Some people who saw Diyarbakır license plate (21) called the police for "bomb warning". The police that surrounded the vehicle immediately could not find anything. Hilmi Köroğlu, the Mayor of municipality, falsified the news. But Ahmet Köroğlu, one of the relatives of mayor Köroğlu criticized that "They are not a community in peace with Turkish society. We will extinguish the fire as it has been before. The truck can extinguish the fires but they have humiliated Turks. I don't want this truck to be the vehicle of our pure and clear community. We can buy it by collecting money (Hibe edilen itfaiye aracı tartışma yarattı, *Cumhuriyet*, 5 March 2010: 6).[40]

This study directs another puzzle looking into the spatial variation of ethnic violence in Northern Ireland and Turkey. Although interethnic violence between Turks and Kurds did not occur at a macro-scale before 2000, there has been a significant increase in communal violence against Kurds after 2005 (Gambetti 2007). The "lynching" incidents against Kurds came into limelight as mob attacks against Kurds whose perceived Kurdishness rendered them liable to assault took place especially in Western provinces. While the target of ethnic violence in Turkish political history had been the "other" which was religiously defined before such as the case of Armenian genocide, 6-7 September 1955 riots against non-Muslims and Alevi pogroms in Çorum, Maraş and Malatya at the end of 1970s; the rise of communal violence against Kurds is a new phenomenon in the sense that Turkish nationalism is now being directed not against a religiously-defined target but against an ethnically-defined

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[40] (In Turkish) Trabzon'un Düzköy ilçesine bağlı Çayırbağı beldesine Diyarbakır Büyükşehir Belediyesi'nce hibe edilen itfaiye aracı "ayrımcılığa" maruz kaldı. Diyarbakır Büyükşehir Belediye Başkanı Osman Baydemir, "Araç Trabzon'a giderken 20 kez arandı, yol boyunca taşlandı, şoförün kaldığı ev basıldı" dedi. Diyarbakır Büyükşehir Belediyesi, bir itfaiye aracını Çayırbağı beldesine hibe etti. Ancak araçta Diyarbakır (21) plakasını gören bazı kişiler, polise "bomba ihbarı" yaptı. Hemen aracın çevresini saran polis, inceleme sırasında hiçbir şey bulamadı. AKP'li Belediye Başkanı Hilmi Köroğlu, itfaiye aracının ayrımcılığa uğradığı yönündeki haberleri ise yalanladı. Ancak Başkan Köroğlu'nun akrabası Ahmet Köroğlu, Diyarbakır'dan gönderilen itfaiye aracına karşı olduğunu vurgulayarak şunları söyledi: "Onlar Türk halkı ile barışık bir toplum değil. Eskiden bu yana yangınları nasıl söndürüyorsak yine söndürürüz. Araç yangınları söndürebilir ama onlar da Türkleri aşağılamış. O aracın bizim saf ve temiz köyümüzün aracı olmasını istemiyorum. Biz kendi paramızı toplar alırız."

Muslim "other", ethnic Kurds. This change from vertical state-guerilla violence to horizontal society-society violence demonstrates the social fault lines in Turkey. Moreover, it is a litmus test for potential future frictions because how these violent incidents are handled and which consequences these incidents give birth to have sociological and political impact on societal relations. Regarding Kurdish problem, while the datasets on the armed conflict between Turkish state and the PKK have been broadening (see Tezcür 2010, Ünal 2012, Aydın and Emrence 2015), studies on lynching against Kurds remain limited (see Gambetti 2007, Bora 2014, Baki 2013). This study intends to contribute to this literature with a systematic study on communal violence against Kurds. This chapter demonstrates the spatial and temporal variation of communal violence against Kurds and discusses its reasons based on the data collected from fieldwork, archives of *Cumhuriyet, Özgür Gündem* and *Dicle Haber Ajansı* (Dicle News Agency) and the reports on communal attacks against Kurds collected from civil society organizations.

The spatial variation of communal violence against Kurds demonstrates that the localities dominated by statist-nationalist tendencies in Western Turkey are more prone to communal violence against Kurds. This finding is consistent with Wilkinson's theory of communal riots (2004) that shows that Indian states in which local governments do not need minority support are more riot prone states. Wilkinson's quantitative analysis displays that Indian states in which the political competition is grounded upon caste cleavages which are cross-cutting cleavages among Hindus and Muslims are less prone to ethnic riots compared to Indian states in which political competition is based upon ethnic cleavages. As in the case of Tamil Nadu or Bibar, "…various efforts at religious mobilization attempts have been unsuccessful because the continuing depth of cleavages around castes has lead to highly competitive party politics in which Muslims are a key swing vote" (Wilkinson 2004: 195). Similar to Wilkinson's findings, the provinces which are governed by parties unable to appeal

to Kurdish minority are more prone to communal violence against Kurds in Turkey. In this regard, the construction and reshaping of constituency by political actors and the interaction between social setting and discourse of political parties toward minorities are of significant importance to understand the rise of communal tensions in Turkey.

Wilkinson displays that local governments whose political future relies on minority support use more effectively security forces at their disposal to control local law and order. While the federalism in India attributes considerable powers to the states of the Union on polices forces and on enforcing law and order, Turkey is a centralized state in which police forces operate not under the command of local municipalities elected by people but under the command of governors (*vali*) and district governors (*kaymakam*) appointed by central government. Thus, this close relationship between local municipalities and police forces like in India does not operate in Turkey. Moreover, the accounts of victims and my interviewees also corroborate that police forces are passive or insufficient regardless of the political identity of local governments. Therefore, this study underlines that the administrative structure of a country plays a role as well on the mobilization against an ethnically-defined target.

While the structural, psychological-emotional, constructivist and instrumental-institutionalist explanations help to explain the presence/absence of ethnic violence in a macro-level, there is a growing literature which concentrates on the spatial variation of ethnic violence within countries. This chapter examines the arguments of communal violence under two broad headings: competition theories and network theories and discusses how these arguments apply to communal violence against Kurds in Turkey. This chapter demonstrates that the main impetus which gives rise to communal violence incidents against Kurds since 2007 is the entry of pro-Kurdish party in general elections as it rises as a political actor able to affect political dynamics in Turkey. While electoral competition is the main factor which

explains the temporal distribution since 2007, the changes in political opportunity structure provided by democratization and increased pluralism with regard to Kurdish identity entailed three consequences influential on the spatial distribution of communal violence: boundary activation with regard to Kurdish identity especially in statist-nationalist areas of Western Turkey, decreased repression against Kurdish identity and rise of riot networks which are more mobile in statist-nationalist areas.

In order to detail this argument, this chapter starts firstly presenting the methodology and data used in this research. Secondly, it gives a brief overview of general features of communal violence against Kurds and shows some illustrative examples. Thirdly, it sketches out the theoretical framework about the reasons of communal violence. Then, it displays the findings and discusses the reasons of communal violence against Kurds in Turkey within the framework of collective violence theories.

4.1. Methodology and Data

Decades of suppression and repression of Kurdish identity have been toned down in 2000s as especially the second half of 2000s in Turkey was a "compressed time" for Kurdish problem. Many reforms for Kurdish rights and liberties were put into place by the AKP government at an unprecedented speed compared to earlier governments' foot-dragging. Moreover, the negotiations to disarm the PKK, which were viewed as unacceptable and as concessions to terrorism, are ongoing. These reforms and ongoing peace process recast the preexisting relationship between Kurds and state authorities which were grounded before upon mutual suspicion and anxiety-laden fears of extinction. While Kurdish identity was suppressed before, its repercussions are now expressed with a stronger voice in public sphere. Furthermore, Kurdish identity is not today just about its cultural expressions, it is displayed with its political repercussions and transnational appeal not only in Kurdish-inhabited regions of Eastern Turkey but also in Western Turkey. In today's Turkey, it is possible to see Kurds

protesting for Kobane in Balıkesir, organizing celebrations of the birth of Abdullah Öcalan in Manisa, listening songs about the PKK warriors in public parks in Adana, wedding processions with the HDP and the PKK flags passing through streets in Mersin, the funeral processions of the YPG (Syrian Kurdish forces known as the People's Defense Units) warriors in the fight with the ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) buried in Izmir. This visibility of Kurdishness with its cultural and political repercussions also brings about more possibility for collusion between Turks and Kurds whose relations were overwhelmed by securitization discourse against Kurdish identity and its political expressions.

While the well-known studies on the spatial distribution of ethnic violence concentrate on ethnic riots (Horowitz 2001, Brass 1997, 2006, Varshney 2003, Wilkinson 2004, Berenschot 2011, Bohlken and Sergenti 2010) in which two or more communal groups confront each other in violent ways, the ethnic violence against Kurds is defined more as "lynching" in Turkey which is associated in public discourse with mob attacks. One of the main reasons of the abundance of these types of assaults compared to riots stems from the fact that provinces close to ethnic parity between Turks and Kurds are very rare in Turkey. The "lynching" against Kurds came into public limelight especially since 2005 but it displayed itself also in 1990s while Kurdish migration to Western provinces gained momentum due to the forced displacement of Kurds from Kurdish regions of Eastern Turkey (see Kılıç 1991). The concept "lynching" in Turkey does not refer to its usage in the USA which involves execution of victims by many tactics such as hanging, shooting, burning, lacerating or stabbing, dismembering or mutilation. In public discourse in Turkey, the word "lynching" signifies not only mob attacks but also public humiliation toward special persons or groups as

Ahmet Kaya[41] and Hrant Dink[42] incidents display. I use "communal violence act/incident" as an analytical category for this research which describes the violence in which one of the motives of mobilization is "communal" targeting the communal identity of certain persons or groups. Media coverage complicates the decoding of communal violent acts against Kurds in Turkey due to long-standing media bias against Kurds in Turkish media which hardly uttered the word "Kurd" until 1990s and presented Kurdish grievances as divisive and destructive (Sezgin and Wall 2005, Somer 2005). Frames used by media influence deeply the roots of the problem, as well as the conception of popular justice (Perloff 2000, Messer and Bell 2010, Markovitz 2011). Contrary to many declarations of politicians and state elites that deny the ethnic character of these incidents, there are "communal" violent acts against Kurds in Turkey since the precipitating reasons of mob attacks involve expressions of Kurdish identity such as speaking, listening or singing in Kurdish or participating in demonstrations that reveal the possible attachment of people to a pro-Kurdish cause such as protests of pro-Kurdish party, Newroz celebrations, civil disobedience acts, commemoration of wartime losses.

In Turkey, there is no list of communal violence outside Human Rights Foundation (*İnsan Hakları Derneği*) list which compiles its own list of lynching based on the complaints of victims. Thus, I created an original data of communal violence. In my research, inspired by the studies of Tilly (1966), Tilly and Zambrano (1989), Wilkinson (2004) and Varshney (2003); I define communal violent event as:

 an occasion on which at least more than two persons gathered in a publicly-accessible place and some seize or damage at least one Kurdish person or objects that are associated with a pro-Kurdish cause by the motive of targeting their communal identity.

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[41] Ahmet Kaya is a famous Turkish singer from Kurdish origins who was exposed to public humiliation after he declared his desire to sing in Kurdish. He was put in trial for separatist activities and forced out of Turkey because of death threats. He died in Paris in exile in 2000.

[42] Hrant Dink is a Turkish-Armenian journalist editor of the journal *Agos*. Like Ahmet Kaya, he was also denigrated publicly by media coverage and put into trial according to Article 301 for "insulting Turkishness". Faced with constant death threats, he was murdered in 2007.

Thus, the General Sample (GS) of my data includes all the violent events against the communal identity of Kurds apart from interpersonal violence (see Appendix II: Codebook). This study uses a Turkish source, *Cumhuriyet* newspaper and a Kurdish source, *Dicle Haber Ajansı* and *Özgür Gündem* newspaper to collect data on collective violence against Kurds in Turkey for the period 1999-2012. The selection of Turkish newspaper is made on the comparison of randomly selected mainstream newspapers published in Turkish. I compared *Cumhuriyet, Hurriyet* and *Milliyet* for randomly selected four months. Based on the comparison, I find *Cumuhuriyet* as the newspaper that reports more news on the collective violence against Kurds. This selection was also pertinent since it is a left-wing newspaper attentive to social movements in Turkey compared to other mainstream Turkish newspapers. The selection of Kurdish source was rather obvious. *Dicle Haber Ajansı* gave access to its database so that I used this source beginning from September 2004. I could not reach the news before this date from *Dicle Haber Ajansı* since their news were lost due to a cyber-attack before. Using a news agency provides a greater opportunity to follow the news since it gives the researcher more leeway to access to detailed information. I used *Özgür Gündem* between 1999 and September 2004. I collected data between 1999 and 2012 because the former is one of the most intense periods concerning Kurdish problem in Turkish history with the capture and trial of Abdullah Öcalan and large-scale Kurdish demonstrations for his freedom in Europe and Turkey. The latter gives us the recent situation of communal violence against Kurds in Turkey.

Compiling a data of collective violence is difficult not only due to unreported cases but also due to its complicated narrative as there is no single story that fits all collective violence cases. In Turkey, the motives for collective violence against Kurds are not only directly related to cultural or political expressions of Kurdish identity such as speaking, listening Kurdish, singing Kurdish songs, defending pro-Kurdish party but small incidents of

ordinary life such as money exchange, shoulder strike, bickering over who will be the first to pass the road can trigger communal violence against Kurds when the boundary between Kurdishness and connection to the PKK is activated by networks which spread the rumors such "opening PKK flag" or "shouting slogans for Abdullah Öcalan", "collecting money for the PKK". In order to decode competing motives problem, I develop case categories similar to Varshney-Wilkinson dataset (2006) on Hindu-Muslim violence in India in order to identify whether an event involved communal attack against Kurds or alternatively motivated by other reasons. Wilkinson-Varshney dataset uses public ritual/festivities (Namaz/puja/aarti, religious procession, marriage procession, consecration of religious sit), political events (bandh, demonstration, factional fight), events that are both public and political (speech by political/religious leaders) and criminal events that broke down into riots (gang violence, attack, theft) to determine the definite, strong likelihood and weak likelihood cases (Wilkinson 2004: 257-260). In Turkey, considering "the identity is in the eye of beholder" (Jenkins 1996:2), the mediums through which Kurdishness is manifested in the eyes of beholders are highly wide-ranging: cultural (speaking, listening, singing Kurdish, speaking broken Turkish, participating in Newroz, dancing *halay*), political (supporting pro-Kurdish party, PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, reacting to the assaults, news, arguments directed against Kurds, pro-Kurdish party or the PKK, participating in demonstrations, protests, civil disobedience acts associated with a pro-Kurdish cause), cultural/political items (wearing red, yellow, green clothes or carrying these colored-items, carrying the license plates of Kurdish-dominated provinces, wearing *poşu* which is a traditional type of Kurdish scarf, watching Med Tv/Roj TV which were pro-Kurdish channels).

Table XIV. Definite and Strong Likelihood cases included in the dataset

Definite Cases If the event was reported at the time of the event against the communal identity of Kurds unless there is a plausible reason to believe another competing mobilization may have been responsible for the violence, it is coded as a definite case. The following precipating events are regarded as "definite case":

a) Rumors related to the PKK are the precipating events for the violent acts

b) Speaking, listening or singing in Kurdish, being Kurdish, not wanting Kurds in the neighborhood

c) Organizing a Kurdish wedding, dancing *halay*

d) Participating in Newroz celebrations

e) Wearing pro-Kurdish colors or symbols, participating in PKK funerals are the precipating events for the violent acts

f) Demonstrations for pro-Kurdish parties, for Abdullah Ocalan, for the PKK are the precipating event for the violent acts

g) Attacks against pro-Kurdish parties

h) Kurdish students attacked by *Ülkücü, Alperen* or other nationalist organizations

i) Fights between Kurdish students organized in revolutionary-patriotic student organizations and *Ülkücü* organizations

Strong likelihood Case The following conditions apply: One where an event is reported as "communal" but there is good reason to believe that another competing mobilization may have been responsible for the violence.

The following precipating events are regarded as "strong likelihood case":

a) One where an event is not reported as "communal" but the violent act takes place in an area where the hostilities against *Doğulular* (Easterners) are reported shortly before or after the event.

b) One where an event is not reported as "communal" but the attacks are directed against the demonstrators that speak for grievances associated with a pro-Kurdish cause. The organizations which are associated with a pro-Kurdish cause and attacked with slogans "Kahrolsun PKK" (Damn the PKK) are included in this category:

- Peace demonstrations
- Hunger strikes
- TAYAD (the Solidarity Association of Prisoners' Families) demonstrations
- IHD (Human Rights Association) demonstrations
- Vicdani Red (Conscientious Objection) demonstrations

c) Demonstrators of the trials associated with a pro-Kurdish cause attacked by Turkish nationalists such as trials for Kurds deceased due to the shooting of police forces such as Uğur Kaymaz[43] or Şerzan Kurt[44]

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[43] 12 year-old Uğur Kaymaz and his father Ahmet Kaymaz passed away due to shooting of security forces which presupposed them as terrorist in Mardin Kızıltepe on 21 November 2004. The event stamped the history as "13 bullet incident" as Uğur Kaymaz's body received 13 shots. The police forces which shot them were acquitted for "self-defense". The attacks of nationalist groups against those who came to watch and protest the trial are included in the data.

[44] In the fights between Kurdish students and *ülkücü* students in Muğla Unversity, 21-year-old Şerzan Kurt from Batman passed away due to shooting of police forces during the incidents on 20 May 2010. These fights and the attacks of nationalist groups against those who came to watch and protest the trial are included in the data.

> d) Attacks due to items through which beholders perceive Kurdishness: wearing Ahmet Kaya t-shirt, busses attacked in Western provinces for carrying the license plate of Kurdish regions, making victory sign, wearing red-yellow-green, wearing or carrying items with these colors, wearing *poşu,* watching Med TV/Roj TV

Furthermore, I conducted 25 formal interviews in Istanbul, Balıkesir, Bursa and Muğla with the representatives of pro-Kurdish parties, their activists and local human rights organizations. The focus was on pro-Kurdish party and activists because they are the primary victims of communal violence able to compare the past and present features of communal violence and they are also one of the main organizations which intervene and investigate in the case of communal violence against Kurds. Grasping their experiences and asking in which areas they feel secure or insecure inform the wider question. I also made informal conversations with Kurds and Kurdish activists working in these provinces among whom I met several people exposed to nationalist attacks. Balıkesir, Bursa and Muğla are selected on the basis of variation of communal violence against Kurds as Balıkesir and Muğla are more riot prone compared to Bursa. Istanbul is in effect a laboratory to explore how interethnic cooperation is lived in local context with its varying ethnic demography, different political orientations of local governments and civil society networks whose weight changes per district. Thus, it is a very efficient control case to assess the validity of my findings. The questionnaire of the interviews tested main theories of communal violence studies mainly competition and riot network theories. All interviews are not recorded since some interviewees did not feel comfortable talking about violence while being recorded.

4.2. Some General Features of Communal Violence against Kurds in Turkey

Mob attacks against Kurds which are described in public discourse as "lynching" are not "lynching" in its proper term (fortunately) but can be described as "violent rituals" (Tilly 2003) that describe collective violence with high salience of short-run damage and high-coordination between violent actors. Tilly defines violent rituals as "at least one relatively

well-defined and coordinated group follows a known interaction script entailing the infliction of damage on itself or others" (ibid.:14). Different from mob attacks against leftists that do not adopt certain rituals, rituals play an important role in mobilizing people during communal attacks against Kurds. In many events, Turkish independence rhyme is song, Turkish flags are waved, the slogans of soldier funerals "Şehitler ölmez, vatan bölünmez" (the martyrs will never die, the country will never be divided), "Kahrolsun PKK" (Damn PKK), "PKK def'ol" (PKK Get out) are shouted.

The context of collective violence can be anywhere according to where the alleged offenders are found such as the shops of Kurds, the site of construction where Kurdish workers work, demonstrations of Kurdish parties, funeral of PKK militants, demonstrations against terrorism, courtroom, police station or gendarmerie, a park where Kurdish song is listened, declaration of press, 1 May or the celebrations of Peace and Brotherhood, demonstrations for the day of arrest of Abdullah Ocalan, the hospitals where injured PKK militants are hospitalized or the gendarmeries where they are transported. The means of execution change evidently case by case. Setting fire the alleged offenders' houses, shelters even the fields they grow can be considered as heavy means of execution but beating can be a heavy mean of execution when it ends up with battering to death. Many cases result with displacement of victims with the company of police or gendarmerie. According to the data collected from *Özgür Gündem* and *Dicle Haber Ajansı*, death is reported only in five incidents. Most of the communal violent acts result with injuries.

As Tilly remarks, collective violence is relational and its activation depends on the interplay of actors (Tilly 2003). The "basic triangle of violence" between performer(s), victim(s), and witness(es) (Riches 1986:8) is in effect very dynamic in its performance (Bowman 2001: 27) during which bystanders can turn into victims or perpetrators and vice versa. As demonstrated in one of the examples of communal violence below, the victim does

not have to be from Kurdish origins as one bystander who is dark-skinned can be victim of communal violence since he/she is perceived to resemble to Kurds. The racialization of Kurdish identity is highly at play in communal violence against Kurds (Ergin 2014). Not only cultural or political expressions of Kurdish identity can stir mass anger, symbols which are interpreted as activating a pro-Kurdish cause or Kurdish identity can also flame tensions such as wearing Ahmet Kaya t-shirt, carrying items with yellow, green and red colors, wearing Ardahanspor t-shirt, buses which carry the license plate of Kurdish-inhabited regions such as Diyarbakır, Dersim/Tunceli. The activists, cadres, demonstrators of pro-Kurdish parties are the primary victims of communal violence incidents. In effect, the boundary between political and non-political victims is highly blurred in communal violence incidents as attacks against pro-Kurdish party can spread into shops, houses of Kurds living in the district. There are also organizations such as TAYAD (the Solidarity Association of Prisoners' Families), demonstrators for Conscientious Objection (*Vicdani Red*), IHD (Human Rights Association) which are attacked for their "perceived" connection to the PKK.

Perpetrators are also wide-ranging. While the hot-core supporters of Turkish nationalism such as *Ülkücü* or *Alperen* Institutions are the primary perpetrators,[45] riot networks able to trigger mass riots against Kurds are not restricted to these big boundary-spanning organizations but should be enlarged into locally organized nationalist groups (this point is further detailed below). The scale of communal violence also changes contingently depending on social setting, mobilization capacity of riot networks and people who follow them. While some incidents are limited to small groups, others enlarge into thousands resulting in curfews in those districts. The accounts of perpetrators clearly express how

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[45] *Ülkücüler* (Idealists) are known as Turkish ultra-nationalist youth organization of Nationalist Action Party whereas *Alperen* which is also a Turkish nationalist organization is not connected to this party.

nationalism is at play in people's cognitive lenses in these attacks. The words of Ismail Çelik who assaulted on Ahmet Türk sheds light on this mindset:[46]

I want to listen them, not to hit them. I would have a couple of words and ask for the answer. While I was passing by, I turned blind. The cameras also displayed this psychology. I am not a type of guy who will hit 70 year-old man. He is not to offend. My punch was not directed against Ahmet Türk but the PKK. Nobody is to offend, my interlocutor is not him. Firstly God, then Turkish Republic is great (*İhlas Haber Ajansı*, 18 June 2010).[47]

In the nationalist attacks against the "celebrations of Peace and Brotherhood" organized by the DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, *Democratic Society Party*) Sakarya District Organization in which one people died due to heart attack because of mobs' obstructing of ambulances entering into the scene, ten people who were alleged perpetrators were released. The defense of alleged perpetrators' attorney, Tayfun Zeki, exemplifies how macro-political events stamp public discourse in micro-sphere and give legitimation for the mob attacks:

If it is a crime to protest the actions of one political party, the Prime minister does not shake their hands; the Chief of Staff does not take them into their saloon. If the Prime Minister and the Chief of Staff display such kind of attitude, the reaction of *Sakaryalı* (people from Sakarya) whose martyr has just died is natural. Besides, it was wrong to authorize such an activity at the city center. There are mistakes here. If the crowd which was gathered there was also faulty, we think that the administration and the Prime minister and the Chief of state were also faulty (*Zaman*, 1 May 2008).[48]

4.3. Illustrative Examples

As shown in the examples below, Kurdishness as a form of collective identity is constituted and reconstituted in the context by beholders as the ways in which they speak, act, dress or demonstrate their political views help to activate the boundary between Kurdishness-

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[46] This incident is not included in dataset as it is not collective.

[47] (In Turkish) Ben onları dinlemeye gittim, vurma nedeniyle değil. Bir iki laf söyleyip cevabını isteyecektim. Yanımdan geçerken gözüm karardı. O andaki psikolojiyi kameralar gösterdi zaten. 70 yaşındaki adama kalkıp vuracak değilim. Üzerine alınmasın. Benim yumruğum Ahmet Türk'e değil, PKK'ya attım. Kimse üzerine almasın, muhatabım o değil. Önce Allah, sonra Türkiye Cumhuriyeti büyük.

[48] (In Turkish) Bir siyasi partinin faaliyetini protesto etmek suç ise aynı partinin milletvekillerinin Başbakan elini sıkmıyorken, Genel Kurmay Başkanı salona dahi almıyor. Eğer Başbakan ve Genel Kurmay Başkanı bu şekilde tavır gösteriyorsa, daha yeni şehit vermiş Sakaryalı'nın da bu şekilde tepki göstermesi çok doğaldır. Zaten şehir merkezinde böyle bir etkinliğe müsade etmek yanlıştı. Burda hatalar söz konusudur. Burada toplanan halkın hatası var ise de faaliyete izin veren idare ile Başbakanın ve Genel Kurmay Başkanı'nında hatası vardır diye düşünüyoruz.

pro-Kurdish party and the PKK. The rise of mob attacks reveals that this boundary is to be collectively monitored and disciplined.

4.3.1. Violent Attacks against Kurdish Workers

In a park in Akyazı, Sakarya, a dispute over "shoulder strike" between youth of the district and seasonal workers that came to collect hazelnuts from Southeastern Turkey happened. Turning into a fight and following the dispute that was said to include words over the PKK, four people are taken into custody. More than 1000 people who heard the news gathered in front of Akyazı provincial police center and shouted slogans against the PKK. Security forces prevented hardly the mob trying to enter (the police center). When the tensions continued, the governor of Sakarya, Nuri Okutan came to the scene. The governor talked to the crowd that did not disperse and asked everybody to calm down "You showed reaction by gathering here. Furthering this reaction means reacting against the state. I ask you to disperse complacently. The children against whom you are furious are in the hands of state. The great state will do whatever necessary according to the rule of law. You do not commit the same fault, too" (see Akyazı'da gergin saatler [Tense hours in Akyazı], *Cumhuriyet*, 9 September 2006:15).[49]

4.3.2. Violent Attacks against Kurdish Students

To three students educated in Giresun University Tirebolu Mehmet Bayraktar Vocational School, *ülkücü*s and people from Tirebolu attacked. While students were going to their houses around midnight last night, a group of *ülkücü*s that came closer saying "we will not shelter

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[49] (In Turkish) İlçeye fındık toplamak için gelen bir grup işçiyle bazı gençler arasında, Akyazı belediye parkında, omuz atma tartışması yaşandı. Kavgaya dönüşen ve terör örgütüyle ilgili ifadelerin kullanıldığı belirtilen tartışmanın ardından 4 kişi gözaltına alındı. Olayı haber alan 1000'i aşkın kişi, Akyazı Emniyet Müdürlüğü önünde toplanarak terör örgütü aleyhinde sloganlar attı. İçeri girmek isteyen kalabalığı güvenlik güçleri engelledi. Gerginliğin sürmesi üzerine Sakara Valisi Nuri Okutan olay yerine geldi. Dağılmayan kalabalığa hitaben konuşan Vali Okutan, herkesi sakin olmaya çağırarak şöyle konuştu "Tepkinizi buraya toplanarak gösterdiniz. Bunun daha da ileri gitmesi devlete tepki anlamına gelir. Ben sizden sakin bir şekilde dağılmanızı rica ediyorum. Öfkelendiğiniz çocuklar devletin elinde. Hukuken ne gerekiyorsa büyük devlet onu yerine getirecektir. Siz de aynı hatayı işlemeyin".

PKKs here" began to attack three students, two boys and one girl. While male students took head blows, female student was to be lynched by people from Tirebolu joining to the group of ten people. With blows into her head and body, she shielded into a boy student dormitory as a result of the attacks of *ülkücüs* with knives. It is informed that the security of dormitory calling "PKKs among you go out" took the female student out of dormitory. It is reported that after the attacks, students who are transferred to Tirebolu State Hospital gave their deposition while police did not take any action against perpetrators; they took the statement of students. It is reported that Kurdish students educated in Tirebolu cannot go out of their house due to fear of lynching. Kurdish students did not want to disclose their names since they are to be lynched. (see Tirebolu'da Kürt öğrenciler linç edilmek istendi [Kurdish students in Tirebolu are attempted to be lynched], *Dicle Haber Ajansı*, 28 June 2010).[50]

4.3.3. Violent Attacks against Pro-Kurdish Party

To the BDP building in Muğla Bodrum that initiated hunger strike, 50 people attacked with stones and sticks. The windows of the buildings are broken down and the party signboards are damaged. After the incidents, the group is taken to police stationary (see Diyarbakir`da gergin gün [Tense day in Diyarbakır], *Cumhuriyet*, 18 November 2012: 7).[51]

4.3.4. Violent Attacks against Demonstrators for a Pro-Kurdish Cause

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[50] (In Turkish) Giresun Üniversitesi Tirebolu Mehmet Bayraktar Meslek Yüksekokulu'nda okuyan 3 öğrenci ülkücüler ve Tirebolulular'ın saldırısına uğradı. Dün gece 24 sıralarında evlerine gitmek isteyen öğrencilerin yanına gelen ülkücü bir grup, "PKK'lileri burada barındırmayız" dedikten sonra, biri kadın 2'si 3 öğrenciye saldırdı. Erkek öğrenciler kafalarına darbe alırken, kadın öğrenciyi aralarına alan 10 kişilik gruba Tirebolulular'ın da katılması ile kadın öğrenci linç edilmek istendi. Kafası yarılan, vücuduna darbeler alan kadın öğrenci, ülkücülerin bıçakla saldırması sonucu yakınlarında bulanan erkek öğrenci yurduna sığındı. Yurt güvenliğinin "İçinizde PKK'li olan dışarı çıksın" diyerek, kadın öğrenciyi yurttan çıkardığı öğrenildi. Saldırı sonrası Tirebolu Devlet Hastanesi'ne kaldırılan öğrencilerin, polis tarafından ifadeleri alınırken, saldırıyı gerçekleştirenlere ilişkin polis tarafından herhangi bir işlem yapılmadığı kaydedildi. Tirebolu'da okuyan Kürt öğrencilerin, yeniden linç saldırısına uğrama endişesinin olmasından dolayı evlerinden çıkamadıkları bildirildi. Saldırıya uğrayan Kürt öğrenciler, linç edilmek istendikleri için isimlerini vermek istemedi.

[51] (In Turkish) Muğla'nın Bodrum ilçesinde açlık grevi başlatılan BDP binasına 50 kişilik grup tarafından taşlı sopalı saldırıda bulunuldu. Binanın camları kırılırken parti tabelası da zarar gördü. Olayın ardından grup, emniyete götürüldü.

As a result of police intervention into the public statement in Taksim Square which protests the incidents in Diyarbakır, Roma people who also interfered into demonstrations stroke Fırat Kaplan, one of the demonstrators with chopper knifes and sticks. Biyet Kaplan, brother of Fırat Kaplan who was under the treatment in Taksim Ilkyardım Hospital, told that his brother has nothing to do with the incidents. Telling his brother went for a job interview to Taksim, he was attacked by Romas while he was walking in Okmeydani since he had no money. Biyet Kaplan spoke for Firat Kaplan, who is unable to talk because of incident, "While my brother was going to my big sibling, a group of 15-20 people stopped him in the road. Since my brother is dark-skinned and likens to Kurds, they attacked him with chopper knives, daggers, sticks. They blow his head with chopper knives. All the veins in his left hand are dead. Doctor told `his hand can remain disabled`. There are serious blows in the upper side of his left hand. The bone is squashed. I did not understand what they want from my brother". Telling that police forces come and go back for the statement of his brother who is in serious condition, Kaplain said that they do not let this. Stating that police forces blame his brother for that, Kaplan said "firstly, they should catch those who left my brother in this situation" (see Romenlerin saldırısına uğrayan Kaplan'ın sağlık durumu ciddi [the health condition of Kaplan who is exposed to attacks of Roma people is serious], *Dicle Haber Ajansı*, 4 April 2006).[52]

4.3.5. Violent Attacks against items associated with a pro-Kurdish cause

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[52] (In Turkish) Diyarbakır'da yaşanan olayları protesto etmek amacıyla pazar günü Taksim Gezi Parkı'nda yapılan basın açıklamasına polisin yaptığı müdahale sonucunda gösteriye müdahale eden bir grup Roman, göstericilerden Fırat Kaplan'ı satır ve sopalarla yaraladı. Saldırının ardından Taksim İlkyardım Hastanesi'nde tedavi altına alınan Fırat Kaplan'ın abisi Biyet Kaplan kardeşinin yaşanan olaylarla bir ilgisinin olmadığını söyledi. Kardeşinin iş görüşmesi için Taksim'e gittiğini, parası olmadığı için Okmeydanı'na yürürken Romanların saldırısına uğradığını anlatan Biyet Kaplan, konuşamayacak durumda olan kardeşi Fırat'ın yaşadıklarını şöyle anlattı: "Kardeşim abimin evine giderken yolda 15-20 kişilik bir grup, yolunu kesiyor. Kardeşimin teni esmer diye, Kürtlere benziyor diye ellerinde satır, hançer, sopalarla saldırıyorlar. Satırla kafasına vuruyorlar. Sol elindeki bütün sinirler ölmüş. Doktor 'eli sakat kalabilir' diyor. Sol üst kolunda da ciddi darp var. Kemik ezilmiş. Kardeşimden ne istediler anlamadım." Taksim İlkyardım Hastanesi'nde yatan ve durumu ciddiyetini koruyan kardeşinin ifadesi için polislerin gelip gittiğini belirten Kaplan, buna izin vermediklerini söyledi. Polislerin olaylarla ilgili kardeşini suçladığını belirten Kaplan, "Önce gidip kardeşimi bu duruma getirenleri yakalasınlar" dedi.

Bad things have happened to Topçu family from Ardahan who went to the football field wearing the yellow-red-green coloured uniforms of Ardahanspor in Kavaklı neighbourhood of Sarıyer district. On 14 June, wearing the yellow-red-green coloured uniforms of Ardahanspor which they are funof with his two 6 year-old and 16-year-old sons; the father, Hüseyin Topçu saw a group attacking his 16 year-old son after they got off the car. Upon his intervention, the crowded groups attacked him crying "Hit, kill these Kurds". The father who told that they got out of this lynching incident getting on their car with difficulties also reported that they went to Şeker Aktaş police station in Sarıyer after they drove further away from the scene, however, police sought to put the blame on them telling to them "you provoked people by listening Kurdish". Topçu family called upon the IHD after that, a press conference was organized in the association's office. Abdülbaki Boğa, President of IHD Istanbul office and Hüseyin Topçu participated in the conference with his two sons, Fırat (8), Yılmaz (16). Topçu told that they made a complaint to Sarıyer prosecution to punish the attackers after the events, he displayed the scars of the attacks. The father Topçu wanted the perpetrators who attacked them due to Ardahanspor uniform with yellow-red-green colours to be put on trial. IHD Branch President, Abdülbaki Boğa said that the nationalist discourse used by the leaders during electoral periods turns into lynching directed against some sections of society especially against Kurds "Prime Minister used hate discourse until he got on the balcony.[53] He wanted to write off each other's doings after he got on the balcony. He forgot the words he said. But citizens don't forget. The words which run out of his mount reflected on society as lynching" (3 renkli formaya linç girişimi, *Dicle Haber Ajansı*, 20 June 2011). [54]

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[53] He refers to the balcony speches done by the Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, after the election results came up.

[54] (In Turkish) Sarıyer İlçesi Kavaklı Mahallesi'nde bulunan halı sahaya Ardahanspor'un sarı, kırmızı yeşil renkteki formalarını giyerek giden Ardahanlı Topçu ailesinin başına gelmeyen kalmadı. 14 Haziran'da 8 ve 16 yaşındaki iki oğlu ile birlikte Ardahanlı olmaları nedeniyle gönül verdikleri Ardahanspor'un sarı, kırmızı ve yeşil renklerdeki formalarını giyinip Sarıyer'in Kavaklı Mahallesi'nde bulunan halı sahaya giderken araçlarından indikten sonra, bir grubun birden bire 16 yaşındaki oğlu Yılmaz'a saldırdıklarını gördüğünü aktaran Baba

4.3.6. An example of non-occurrence

After the explosion in Antep, the buildings of the BDP continue to be the target of racist attacks. Lastly, one group who came to the BDP Osmaniye District building attempted to attack…The president of the BDP Osmaniye Branch, Maşallah Çetin, with whom we spoke to about the incident stated that 5-6 people came about 13.00 to the district office which is located at the third floor of Cumhuriyet Meydanı Güntürk Business Center. Telling that police forces took intensive precautions in front of the building, Çetin said "I suppose that they could not attack because we were crowded and police came after them. There were groups down there anyway. Police took the IDs of these persons and brought them to Çarşı police stationary right down here. We also saw a police stick later in front of the entry of building. I called the police and they came to the scene. They said `we are not related to this incident. We are trying to ensure your safety`. Police intervened and dispersed the groups around the BDP building. Police took intensive precautions" (BDP Osmaniye İl binasına gündüz ortası saldırı [Attacks against the BDP Osmaniye City Building in the middle of the day], *Dicle Haber Ajansı*, 26 August 2012).[55]

Hüseyin Topçu, müdahale etmesi üzerine, kalabalık grubun "Vurun, öldürün bu Kürtleri" diyerek kendilerine saldırdığını söyledi. Maruz kaldıkları linç saldırısından zar zor araçlarına binerek kurtulduklarını söyleyen Baba Topçu, hızlıca olay yerinden uzaklaştıktan sonra şikayetçi olmak için Sarıyer'de bulunan Şeker Aktaş Polis Merkezi'ne gittiklerini belirtti. Ancak burada da polislerin kendilerine, "Kürtçe müzik dinleyerek, insanları tahrik ettiniz" diyerek neredeyse kendilerini suçlu duruma düşürmeye çalıştığını söyledi. Bunun üzerine İHD'ye başvuran Topçu Ailesi, konuya ilişkin Dernek binasında basın toplantısı düzenledi. Toplantıya, Fırat (8) ve Yılmaz (16) isimli her iki oğlu ile birlikte saldırıya uğrayan Hüseyin Topçu ve İHD İstanbul Şubesi Başkanı Abdülbaki Boğa katıldı. Olayın ardından kendilerine saldıranların bulunup cezalandırılması için Sarıyer Savcılığı'na başvurduklarını ve Sarıyer Devlet Hastanesi'nden darp raporu aldıklarını anlatan Topçu, linç girişimi sırasında boynuna aldığı darp izlerini gösterdi. Baba Toğçu, giydikleri sarı, kırmızı, yeşil renklerdeki Ardahanspor forması nedeniyle kendilerini linç etmek isteyen saldıranların yargılanmasını istedi. Seçim dönemi boyunca liderlerin kullandığı milliyetçi dilin toplumun bazı kesimlerine özellikle Kürtlere karşı linç olarak geri döndüğünü ifade eden İHD Şube Başkanı Abdulbaki Boğa ise "Başbakan balkona çıkana kadar sürekli olarak nefret dili kullandı, milliyetçi bir dil kullandı. Balkona çıktıktan sonra da helalleşmek istedi. Söylediği bütün sözleri unuttu. Ama yurttaşlar unutmuyor. Başbakan'ın ağzından çıkan sözler topluma linç olarak yansıdı" dedi.

[55] (In Turkish) BDP Osmaniye İl binasına giren bir grubun saldırıyı gerçekleştiremeden olay yerine gelen polis tarafından karakola götürüldüğü öğrenildi. BDP Osmaniye İl Başkanı Maşallah Çetin, binanın altında toplanan ırkçı grupların da polis tarafından dağıtıldığını ifade etti. Antep'te yaşanan patlama sonrası BDP'nin binaları ırkçı saldırıların hedefi olmaya devam ediyor. Son olarak BDP Osmaniye İl binasına gelen bir grup saldırı girişiminde bulunmak istedi... Konuyla ilgili telefonla görüştüğümüz BDP Osmaniye İl Başkanı Maşallah Çetin, Cumhuriyet Meydanı Güntürk İşhanı'nın 3 katında bulunan il binasına saat 13.00 sularında 5-6 kişinin geldiğini aktardı.

4.4.Theoretical Framework

4.4.1. Competition Theories

The power-threat hypothesis is widely discussed in the USA in order to explain lynching events against Blacks (Reed 1972, Corzine, Creech and Corzine 1983, Tolnay, Beck and Massey 1989). Blalock's (1967) power-threat hypothesis argues that the rise in racial tensions stems from the fears of majority about their dominant status that is affected by the participation of a subordinate population to economic and political competition. Soule (1992) argues that lynching rates against blacks increased because interracial political and economic competition intensified with migration to the southern manufacturing areas, black participation in the cotton economy after the enfranchisement of black population, and the rise of black participation in the populist movement. For Carrigan and Webb, the mob violence against Mexicans also aimed at eliminating economic and political competition by sustaining the displacement of the Mexican population from the land, denial of access to natural resources, political disfranchisement, and economic dependency upon an Anglo-controlled capitalist order (Carrigan and Webb 2003: 418). Olzak (1990) demonstrates that economic competition and populist threat simultaneously increased rates of lynching and urban violence at the national level in the USA from 1890 to 1900. Olzak (1992) argues that economic growth encourages competition between ethnic groups since "as fortunes for the disadvantaged rise, they come to compete with those just above them, igniting ethnic conflict and protest on the part of those on the next rung" (Olzak 1992:12). Gurr (1970) and Gurr and Duval (1973) argue that decreased economic wealth increases violence. Couched as relative

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Polisin bina önünde yoğun önlem aldığını söyleyen Çetin, "Biz çok olduğumuz için ve arkalarından polis geldiği için sanırım saldıramadılar. Zaten aşağıda da gruplar vardı. Polis bu kişilerin kimliklerini alıp hemen aşağımızda bulunan Çarşı Karakolu'na götürdü. Daha sonra biz de binanın giriş kapısının önünde bir polis copu gördük. Emniyeti aradım ve kendileri olay yerine geldiler. Kendileri bize 'bu olayla ilgimiz yok. Sizin güvenliğinizi sağlamak için çalışıyoruz' dediler. BDP binasının altındaki grupları ise polis müdahale edip dağıttı. Polis bina çevresinde yoğun önlemler almış durumda" dedi.

deprivation "a perceived discrepancy between men`s value expectations (the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled) and their value capabilities (the goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining" (Gurr, 1970: 13), Gurr argues that deprivation increases human tendency to collective violence. Bolhken and Sergenti (2010) show in their quantitative study on Hindu-Muslim riots that the periods of higher growth are indeed negatively correlated with ethnic riots. McCauley (2013) finds out less communal violence when countries adopt development strategies which override social identities compared to countries which generate competition along identity lines. Countering the effect of economic growth/recession on ethnic riots, Horowitz argues that, economy has no effect on riots since "we have witnessed deadly riots in countries experiencing good times and witnessed quiescence in bad times" (Horowitz 2001: 561).

While psychological-emotional component is conceived as an integral part of ethnic conflict, many researches show that political competition is able to stir ethnic violence when political entrepreneurs sharpen ethnic identities amplifying weakly-held stereotypes and magnifying interethnic hostilities. The studies on Yugoslavia revealed that interethnic animosities are not even necessary for ethnic violence as political entrepreneurs are able to manipulate identities and tear down preexisting interethnic cooperation (Gagnon 2004). Notably, ethnic outbidding strategies, in which political leaders heighten their ethnic tone in political discourse in order to capture the political leadership of their ethnic fellows, are considered to be detrimental to interethnic peace since they backfire the ethnicization of social conflicts (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972, Rothschild 1981, Horowitz 1985, Kaufman 1996).

4.4.2. Riot Networks and Spatial Variation of Ethnic Violence

The recent scholarship on ethnic violence took a new turn delving into the ethnic micro-space within countries and started to ask why some provinces are more riot prone than

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others. Brass (1997) argues that in riot-prone provinces, institutionalized riot systems which denote the networks between militant groups, police forces and politicians stir up ethnic disagreements in order to unite ethnic groups around ethno-political entrepreneurs. Brass (2006) then details three contextual factors that produce a riot: demographic balance between Hindu and Muslim population-if Muslims outweigh Hindus, they can induce an electoral tip in favor of rival party; importance of political opportunity and political will to prevent and control riots. Wilkinson (2004) shows that the capacity of riot networks to trigger communal riot is dependent on the political competition at macro and micro-level. Based on India, he shows that Hindu-Muslim violence occurs less in Indian states run by governments that rely on minority support because politicians mobilize more security forces to halt riot networks in those areas. Hence, he puts emphasis on the role of electoral incentives as a catalyst of intensifying or abating interethnic tensions (Wilkinson 2004).

Varshney contends that 'if ethnic conflict is taken as a dependent variable, trust based on inter-ethnic, not intra-ethnic networks is critical' (Varshney 2003: 452). He shows that communal clashes occur less in provinces where inter-ethnic civil society networks are able to bridge the tensions between different ethnic groups compared to provinces where intra-ethic networks dominate. In his seminal work on India, he finds that associational forms of engagement such as civil society organizations, formal clubs, handle conflict more easily compared to everyday forms of engagement such as families visiting each other, children playing together. Banerjee (2009) also supports Varshney's argument observing in India's Northeast that urban areas in which formal associations and inter-ethnic civil networks are built are more resistant to communal clashes and nationalistic rage than rural areas which are defined more by homogenous, intra-ethnic civil networks. He highlights that it is necessary to take into consideration social settings in which civil society networks operate since urban areas can be more exposed to multi-ethnicity rather than rural areas. Williams (2007) also

shows in her study of communal relations that peace is an active and relational process. After a bomb explosion in Varanasi, communal violence did not erupt due to the pressure of civil society groups especially of religious leaders to prevent the onset of communal violence rather than the activities of state actors such as police and local party politicians. However, civil society networks do not always carry out the element of "civility" which is presumed to be so central for civil society. The social setting in which civil society operates should be taken into account. As Bryant (1995) demonstrates, civil society can be assimilationist and inclusive of pluralism (France) or can be exclusive (Germany) or tolerant (Netherlands) depending on social setting. In Berenschot's (2011) study of communal politics and tensions in Ahmadabad, he finds out that various actors have an interest in generating and maintaining ethnic tensions and intra-ethnic associations have capacity to counter the impact of inter-ethnic networks by fomenting communal tensions. Berenschot's study recalls the concept of Brass (1997) "institutionalized riot systems". Based on the examination of three neighborhoods within Ahmedabad, Berenschot pays attention to the role of political actors and patronage networks who mediate between citizens and state and who are able to mobilize ethnic networks in cases of communal animosity. He argues that Hindu-Muslim violence occurs more in localities where inhabitants access to state through patronage networks that derive electoral gains from communal violence.

4.4.3. Temporal and Spatial Distribution of Communal Violence against Kurds

4.4.3.1.Findings from *Cumhuriyet*

122 communal violence acts are found in *Cumhuriyet* archives. The figure below shows that Abdullah Ocalan's capture in 1999, PKK's resumption of attacks in 2005 and 2011 general elections gave momentum to communal violence acts.

Figure IX. Temporal Distribution of Communal Violence Incidents against Kurds (1999-2012) (Cumhuriyet)

Regional distribution of communal violence acts in *Cumhuriyet* demonstrates that close to half of communal violence acts took place in Marmara region (42.6 %). While Eastern Anatolia is the second region highest in communal violence rate (13.9%); Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean regions show similar rates, 10.7%, 11.5% and 9.8% respectively.

Figure X. Regional Distribution of Communal Violence Incidents (1999-2012) (Cumhuriyet)

The figure below shows that the four biggest provinces of Turkey, Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Bursa are among the provinces which display highest number of communal violence acts against Kurds.

Figure XI. Spatial Distribution of Communal Violence Incidents Per city (1999-2012) (Cumhuriyet)

The figure below shows the distribution of communal violence acts dividing the number of communal violence acts to the population per city. The underlying logic is to find the

intensiveness of communal violence acts per city. For example, between Elazığ and Ankara which display the same number of communal violence acts (6), communal violence acts are more intense in Elazığ with 568.239 populations compared to Ankara with 5.045.083 populations.

Figure XII. Spatial Distribution of Communal Violence Act (Communal Violence Act/Population) (1999-2012) (Cumhuriyet)

Spatial Distribution of Communal Violence Act (Communal Violence Act/Population) (1999-2012)

4.4.3.2.Findings from *Özgür Gündem* and *Dicle Haber Ajansı*

659 communal violence acts are found in *Özgür Gündem* and *Dicle Haber Ajansı* archives. As the numbers show, there is a huge discrepancy in terms of events between *Cumhuriyet* and *Özgür Gündem* and *Dicle Haber Ajansı* archives. This discrepancy stems from several reasons. The most important factor which explains this discrepancy is obviously the use of a pro-Kurdish newspaper which concentrates and narrates the news from a pro-Kurdish perspective. For example, while the attacks against Kurdish students by *ülkücüs* in universities which result with minor injuries can be disregarded by Turkish newspapers, *Özgür Gündem* and *Dicle Haber Ajansı* follow their news and make interviews which provide

the researcher with more information about them. Moreover, these pro-Kurdish sources delve into violence incidents against Kurds and make interviews with victims which greatly help to evaluate the "communal" character of these incidents. Secondly, media bias against Kurdish problem can play an important role in the under-representation of these kinds of events (see Sezgin and Wall 2005, Somer 2005). Thirdly, the framing is crucial to evaluate whether an event is communal or not. For example, while the clashes between Kurdish students and *ülkücüs* can be reported as clashes between leftist students and *ülkücüs* in *Cumhuriyet*; *Özgür Gündem* and *Dicle Haber Ajansı* report them as being between revolutionary-patriotic student organizations which advocate pro-Kurdish causes and *ülkücü* groups and they make interviews with Kurdish students. Fourthly, the use of *Dicle Haber Ajansı* affects significantly the numbers since newspapers prepare their headlines after selecting news from news agency whereas news agencies provide all the news they collect from entire Turkey. It is also necessary to note that due to the bans over *Özgür Gündem*, there are missing days and months in the data: for the year 1999, only *Özgür Bakış* (Free View) was available from 18 April 1999 to 24 April 2000. *2000'de Yeni Gündem* (New Agenda in 2000) was available from 27 April 2000 to 31 May 2001. *Yeniden Özgür Gündem* (New Free Agenda) was available from 2 September 2003 to 28 February 2004. *Ülkede Özgür Gündem* (Free Agenda in the Country) was available after 1 March 2004. I started to use *Dicle Haber Ajansı* after September 2004.

The figure below shows that Abdullah Ocalan capture in 1999, 2005 PKK resume of attacks, 2007 ad 2011 general elections increased the communal violence acts against Kurds. Different from *Cumhuriyet*, 2007 elections show a significant increase of communal violence acts against Kurds. With the 2005 PKK resume of attacks, the number of communal volence against Kurds quadrupled (from 11 in 2004 to 45 in 2005). The number of communal violence acts against Kurds more than doubled in 2007 general elections (from 44 in 2006 to 102 in 2007), it nearly tripled in 2011 general elections (from 55 in 2010 to 146 in 2011).

Figure XIII. Temporal Distribution of Communal Violence Incidents (1999-2012) (Özgür Gündem and Dicle Haber Ajansı)

Temporal Distribution of Communal Violence Incidents (1999-2012)

The figure below shows that while Marmara region is still the first region (36.6%) which displays highest number of communal violence against Kurds, Aegean (19.7%) and Mediterranean (13.4%) regions follow it. Different from the regional distribution of *Cumhuriyet*, the ranking of Eastern Anatolia region drops down from 14 % in *Cumhuriye*t to 10.2 % in *Özgür Gündem* and *Dicle Haber Ajansı* and that of Black Sea Region drops down from 11% in *Cumhuriyet* to 4% in *Özgür Gündem* and *Dicle Haber Ajansı*.

Figure XIV. Regional Distribution of Communal Violence Incidents (1999-2012) (Özgür Gündem and Dicle Haber Ajansı)

The figure below demonstrates that the top ten provinces where communal violence against Kurds is highest.

**Figure XV. Spatial Distribution of Communal Violence Incidents per city (1999-2012) (Özgür Gündem and Dicle Haber Ajansı)**

Communal violence acts occurred in 63 provinces covering 70.245.786 people of population according to 2013 census. Considering the total population of Turkey with 76.667.864, the sample is highly representative. The average number of communal violence acts is ten for the average number of population, 1.115.012. The medium is four which means that 31 provinces display less than four incidents whereas 31 provinces display more than four incidents. The mode of communal violence acts is four which signifies that the number of communal violence acts which appear most in the data is four. The ranking shown below is based on the ranking by communal violence act divided by population.

Table XV. Spatial Distribution of Communal Violence Incidents per city (Communal Violence Act/Population) (1999-2012) (Özgür Gündem and Dicle Haber Ajansı)

City	Communal Violence Act	Population	Communal Violence Act/Population
ÇANAKKALE	23	502.328	4,58
ARDAHAN	4	102.782	3,89
ELAZIĞ	16	568.239	2,82
ESKİŞEHİR	20	799.724	2,50
GİRESUN	10	425.007	2,35
ERZİNCAN	4	219.996	1,82
YALOVA	4	220.122	1,82
DENİZLİ	17	963.464	1,76
BALIKESİR	19	1.162.761	1,63
MERSİN	27	1.705.774	1,58
İZMİR	62	4.061.074	1,53
BİNGÖL	4	265.514	1,51
HAKKARİ	4	273.041	1,46
ERZURUM	11	766.729	1,43
BAYBURT	1	75.620	1,32
MALATYA	10	762.538	1,31
SAKARYA	12	917.373	1,31
AFYON	9	707.123	1,27
MUĞLA	11	866.665	1,27
HATAY	19	1.503.066	1,26
BURSA	29	2.740.970	1,06
MANİSA	14	1.359.463	1,03
EDİRNE	4	398.582	1,00

AYDIN	10	1.020.957	0,98
ANTALYA	21	2.158.265	0,97
ISPARTA	4	417.774	0,96
SİİRT	3	314.153	0,95
İSTANBUL	131	14.160.467	0,93
BİTLİS	3	337.156	0,89
KARABÜK	2	230.251	0,87
UŞAK	3	346.508	0,87
ŞIRNAK	4	475.255	0,84
TOKAT	5	598.708	0,84
GAZİANTEP	15	1.844.438	0,81
KOCAELİ	13	1.676.202	0,78
KÜTAHYA	4	572.059	0,70
KONYA	14	2.079.225	0,67
VAN	7	1.070.113	0,65
SİVAS	4	623.824	0,64
OSMANİYE	3	498.981	0,60
ANKARA	29	5.045.083	0,57
DÜZCE	2	351.509	0,57
TRABZON	4	758.237	0,53
IĞDIR	1	190.424	0,53
MUŞ	2	412.553	0,48
BİLECİK	1	208.888	0,48
TEKİRDAĞ	4	874.475	0,46
ADANA	9	2.149.260	0,42
BURDUR	1	257.267	0,39
KAHRAMANMARAŞ	4	1.075.706	0,37
BOLU	1	283.496	0,35
ADIYAMAN	2	597.184	0,33
ŞANLIURFA	6	1.801.980	0,33
ZONGULDAK	2	601.567	0,33
KARS	1	300.874	0,33
KIRKLARELİ	1	340.559	0,29
NİĞDE	1	343.658	0,29
MARDİN	2	779.738	0,26
YOZGAT	1	444.211	0,23
ÇORUM	1	532.080	0,19
BATMAN	1	547.581	0,18
SAMSUN	2	1.261.810	0,16
KAYSERİ	1	1.295.355	0,08
TOTAL	**659**	**70.245.786**	**0,94**
Mean	10	1.115.012	1,01
Median	4	598.708	0,84

The figure and map below show the provinces which display communal violence acts higher

than average (10):

Figure XVI. Spatial Distribution of Communal Violence Incidents for Provinces Above the Average (Communal Violence Act/Population 1999-2012) (Özgür Gündem and Dicle Haber Ajansı)

The provinces which display communal violence incidents more than average (10) are located

more in Western Turkey.

Figure XVII. Map of provinces which display communal violence against Kurds more than average (10) (Özgür Gündem and Dicle Haber Ajansı)

Note: I also included Adana which displays a similar ethnic diversity with Mersin in order to visualize their comparison. Adana and Afyon display communal violence incidents against Kurds just below the average (10) with nine incidents. The color of provinces is based upon the number of communal violence incidents in these provinces changing from the darkest blue (highest numbers) to lightest (lower numbers).

4.5. Reasons of Communal Violence Against Kurds

4.5.1. Economic Competition

Economic competition hypothesis discusses whether economic growth or economic

contraction intensifies the competition between ethnic groups. The financial crisis of 2001

erupted after the burning issue of Abdullah Öcalan's trial and the ensuing debate on his death sentence. Although economic crisis downsized Turkey's gross national product by 9.5 percent in this period (Akyüz and Boratav 2003), communal violence was not a significant phenomenon until 2005. Communal violence incidents gained an impetus after 2004, while Turkey was able to reach high rates of economic growth, 7.5 per cent per annum during the 2002–06 period (Öniş and Bayram 2008). Moreover, the top provinces where communal violence against Kurds took place are not among the impoverished regions of Turkey similar to Kurdish regions of Eastern Turkey. The developed provinces such as Izmir, Eskişehir, Denizli, Mersin are among the top provinces in which communal attacks against Kurds occurred. Here is the development ratings of the first top ten provinces which displayed communal violence against Kurds above the average (10) according to data from *Özgür Gündem* and *Dicle Haber ajansı*. As can be seen in Table XVI, most of the provinces where communal violence against Kurds is above average, did not decline in their socio-economic development level, but rather improved in their already relatively high socio-economic development level between 2005 and 2010. Therefore, it is difficult to argue that communal violence against Kurds is a result of socio-economic decline of these provinces because in fact, many of these provinces did not decline in terms of their socio-economic development levels.

Table XVI. Social-Economic Development Ratings of Provinces which displayed communal violence against Kurds above the average rate (10)

City	2005	2010
Çanakkale	24	21
Elazığ	15	15
Eskişehir	3	2
Giresun	56	55
Denizli	16	13
Balıkesir	25	32
Mersin	34	29
İzmir	2	4
Erzurum	28	17

Malatya	33	36

Source: Eraydın, K., Gül, E., Çevik., B and Demir., E (2012).

Moreover, the economic inequality between Western Turkey and Eastern Turkey (where Kurdish-inhabited provinces are located) is still continuing. The provinces which are above the average rate of communal violence against Kurds (10 cases per city) are mostly situated in the developed regions of Turkey.

Figure XVIII. Map of the provinces above the average communal violence rate and their socio-economic index

Source: The report of findings about the research on perceptions and expectations concerning Kurdish question by KONDA (2011:18)

There is no data on income inequality between Turks and Kurds per city but as KONDA research of 2011 shows, the socio-economic inequalities are still considerable between Turks and Kurds.

Table XVII. Socio-Economic Inequalities between Turks and Kurds

2010/2011	Turks	Kurds
People whose father are not educated	%20	%53
People who live below 700 TL	% 29	%48
People who are not educated	% 7	% 26
People who live with a population of 9 person in the house	%2	%17
People who got state support	%4	%9

While the macro-picture of economic competition between Turks and Kurds does not explain the rise of communal violence against Kurds, economic competition is a latent factor which can provoke resentment among local population especially in the case of Kurdish shop owners, Kurdish construction workers, Kurdish seasonal workers. While Kurdish shop owners participate in the local market with their assets, Kurdish construction and seasonal workers can attract the resentment of local population since they drag down local wages. The studies on collective violence and victimization show that the lack of close ties to the community has an impact on the choice of victim (Senechal De la Roche 2001, Black 2004). Thus, these three categories, especially in the case of Kurdish construction and seasonal workers, are more prone to victimization in case of communal attacks since these are mobile workers who stay and work only for a short time in the locality. Thus, this mobility reduces their chances to develop close ties to the local community. Senechal de la Roche argues that in communal lynching, the victim is likely to come from people "relationally, culturally distant or functionally independent" (Senechal de la Roche 2001: 127). Kurdish construction and seasonal workers fit into this category as they are "functionally independent" not embedded in local sector. They come from outside to work with very low wages for a short time for landlords or for construction companies. They are literally underclass. They are "relationally and culturally distant" as they are Kurdish and display more signs of Kurdishness as they speak Kurdish or Turkish with accent. Moreover, the fact that they work as a group makes it easier for beholders to assert their Kurdishness and to invoke the floating stereotypes against them. The account of Harun Meydan, Kurdish construction worker who was exposed to communal violence with his co-workers is illustrative of their victimization by their quality of being "relationally, culturally distant or functionally independent":

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When we came to the neighborhood, they started to look at us as if we were enemies. Nobody wanted to talk to us. They were watching us as if we did something to them…We are seasonal workers. When the season of construction opens, we work in constructions coming from our provinces (*memleket*) to big provinces. We hired this house with our seven friends. We were going to the construction, then, coming back to home. We do not have much opportunity to be in the neighborhood. Last Saturday, we came from construction and started cooking at home. In the evening hours, we heard noises from the neighborhood. When we looked at outside, 150 people of locals started shouting "Go away we do not want you" swearing to us. …Polis told us "come on in we will take you" saying that people calmed down outside. We said that we would not come out. But they said that they would force us to come out then and when they took us outside, we saw people waiting there. Polis took us to their doorstep (*ayağına götürmek*) on purpose. Then group started to attack us. Two people kept me and stoke my head with bricks. Four people laid down my friend Nesim and they broke his toe with paving stone. They broke the rib of my fiend Kayhan. They also hit other friends...Then we went to hospital with our means. The ambulance which came there took Kayhan. Kayhan was also attacked there when he went to hospital. When he was taken out of ambulance, those who were there started to attack him shouting "These guys are Kurds, they are from the PKK, those who love God hit him". Nesim whose toe was smashed with paving stone received a health report for four monts for being incapacity to work. He went to Van, his home city. They also sutured my head. When we came this morning to our houses, our door was broken down and they took all our clothes. They messed it up (Ankara'da Kürt işçilere linç girişimi, *Dicle Haber Ajansı*, 18 May 2010).[56]

In the case of Kurdish shop owners, they can be exposed to opportunistic violence and looting in the case of communal violence incidents due to their visible assets and wealth. Mass fervor can be used against them in order to eliminate them from economic competition.

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[56] (In Turkish) "Biz mahallede gezdiğimiz zaman bize düşman gibi bakmaya başladılar. Kimse bizimle konuşmak istemiyordu. Sanki biz onlara bir şey yapmışız gibi sürekli bizi izliyorlardı… Bizler mevsimlik işçileriz. İnşaat sezonu açıldığı zaman memleketlerimizden büyük şehirlere gelerek inşaatlarda çalışırız. Bu evi de 7 arkadaşımızla birlikte tuttuk. Sabahları inşaata gidip oradan da eve geliyorduk. Mahallede fazla bulunma imkânımız olmuyor. Geçen hafta cumartesi günü inşaattan geldik eve yemek hazırlamaya başladık. Akşam saatlerinde mahalleden seslerin geldiğini duyduk. Dışarı baktığımızda yaklaşık 150 kişilik mahalle sakini küfür ederek bize 'Gidin buradan sizi istemiyoruz' diye bağırmaya başladı. Daha sonra evi taş yağmuruna tutular. Bütün camları kırdılar… Polis biz dışarının sakinleştiğini söyleyerek gelin sizi götüreceğiz dedi. Bizde onlara çıkmayacağımızı söyledik. Ancak zorla çıkaracağız dediler ve bizi dışarı çıkardıklarında kalabalığın orda beklediğini gördük. Polis bizi bilerek onların ayağına götürdü. Ardından grup bize saldırmaya başladı. Beni 2 kişi tuttu ve kafama tuğla ile vurdular. Nesim arkadaşı 4 kişi yere yatırdı ve kaldırım taşıyla ayağına vurarak kırdılar. Kayhan arkadaşın ise kaburgaları kırıldı. Diğer arkadaşlarda çeşitli yerlerinden darp edildiler" dedi. 'Bu adam Kürt, PKK'lı bunlar Allah'ını seven vursun' Saldırıların bununla sınırlı kalmadığını kaydeden, Meydan, "Daha sonra biz kendi imkânlarımızla hastaneye gittik. Kayhan'ı ise gelen Ambulans hastaneye götürdü. Kayhan hastaneye gittiğinde orda da grubun saldırısına uğradı. Ambulanstan indirilince orda bulunanlar 'Bu adam Kürt, PKK'lı bunlar Allah'ını seven vursun' diye bağırarak arkadaşımıza saldırdılar. Ayağı kaldırım taşıyla ezilerek kırılan Nesim'e 4 ay iş göremez raporu verildi. Arkadaşımız memleketi Van'a gitti. Benimde kafama 4 dikiş attılar. Biz sabah evimize gittiğimizde ise kapımız kırılmış evde bulunan elbiselerimizin hepsini almışlardı. Evi talan etmişlerdi" şeklinde konuştu.

For example, the recounts of victims in Altınova[57] and Dörtyol[58] incidents are illustrative in this respect:

We did not have any news about the incidents. We learned it from the phone calls. We are being lynched right now, my business was plundered, my five vehicles were ruined, most of my 300 meter care business was looted, the plasma TVs were taken, they are trying to divert a judicial matter into politics and realize their interests. While the incident has nothing to do with us, they imputed it on Kurds and they devastated us. On the first day of this incident, I had no damage but after the funeral in the second day, they attacked our businesses, houses ad vehicles. The mayor of municipality is also in this affair, he did not like us before, he caused many troubles while giving registration for our business, they attacked us after cutting the electricity only in our street. People who are our neighbors for years attack our businesses and houses. None of them came to us to express their sorrow (*geçmiş olsun*). Racism is being directed against us. We are afraid and cannot go outside. We are hungry and thirsty for three days at home. We ask our relatives to send phone credits to us and they bring us secretly food and drink. They (perpetrators) shout slogans about making us leave here putting flags into their houses and workplaces. I have so many damages. I run water station (*su bayisi*), I have lots of waters to sell but I cannot leave home. I do not know what to do. My vehicles were standing in front of my door but soldiers took the ruined vehicles without any investigation. The gendarmerie was already watching them (perpatrators) tearing down (vehicles). As far as I heard, they are now being parked in front of police station. We did not bring compliant to the prosecution. Because we could not leave the home. Besides, they are trying to kill us if we are found. Children are in panic and we are in panic, we are waiting when they will come and kill us (Kasım Yeğin, Human Rights Association Report on Altınova 2008: 4).[59]

We are here for 35 years. There is no field in Çukurova where we did not collect cotton, in Konya where we did not work as farm worker. We invested what we gained from there with our sweated labor (*altın terimizle kazandığımızı*) in this jeweler. They ruined what we worked for, what we saved with our sweated labor. They stole 1 kg 400 gr gold. In the first night of

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[57] In Altınova incidents on 30 September 2008, the fights between two people grew into riots against Kurds and two people died because of hitting by a car driven by one of the clashing sides.

[58] In Dörtyol Incidents on 26 July 2010, after the murder of four police officers by the PKK, the mass rage turned into ethnic riots against Kurds.

[59] (In Turkish) Olaydan hiç haberimiz yoktu. Gelen telefonlardan öğrendik. Şu an linç halindeyiz, mağazam talan edildi, 5 tane aracım tahrip edildi, 300 metrelik mağazamın çoğu yağmalandı, içerideki plazma Tv'ler götürüldü, adli olan bir işi siyasete çekerek kendi emellerini gerçekleştirmeye çalışıyorlar. Olayın bizimle hiçbir ilgisi yokken biz Kürtlere mal ederek bizi perişan ettiler. Olayın birinci günü hiç hasarım yoktu ama ikinci günü cenazende sonra iş yerlerimize, evlerimize ve araçlarımıza saldırdılar. Belediye başkanı da bu işin içinde zaten, daha önceden de bizi pek sevmezdi, birçok kere iş yerimize ruhsat vermekte güçlükler çıkardı, olay gecesi de sadece bizim sokakta elektrikleri kestiler sonra saldırdılar. Yıllardır komşuluk yaptığımız insanlar işyerlerimize ve evlerimize saldırdılar. Hiçbir komşumuz geçmiş olsuna da gelmedi. Bize karşı ırkçılık yapılıyor. Korkuyoruz dışarı çıkamıyoruz. 3 gündür aç susuz evdeyiz. Akrabalarımızdan bize kontör göndermelerini istiyoruz bize gizliden akşam yiyecek ve içecek getiriyorlar. Evlerine ve iş yerlerine bayraklar asarak bizim buradan gitmemiz konusunda sloganlar atıyorlar. Benim birçok zararım var. Su bayisi işletiyorum, satmam gereken bir miktar su var, ama evimden bile çıkamıyorum. Ne yapacağımı bilmiyorum. Araçlarım kapımın önünde duruyordu askerler hiçbir tespit yapmadan zorla tahrip olmuş arabaları alıp götürdüler. Zaten arabalar parçalanırken jandarmalarda seyrediyorlardı. Duyduğuma göre şimdi karakolun kapısında park halinde. Savcılığa suç duyurusunda bulunmadık. Çünkü evimizden çıkamadık. Ayrıca bulunsak ne olacak herkes bizi öldürmeye çalışıyor. Çocuklar panik içinde biz panik içindeyiz, ne zaman gelip bizi öldürecekler diye bekliyoruz.

the incidents, the windows of my jeweler were broken down. I called immediately glassmaker and fixed it. I said to the police officers in front of my jewelry shop that I entrusted here to you. It is said that not to step up the tensions, those from Kurdish origins should be returned to their houses. Thereupon we returned. When we came in the morning, I saw that the windows of my business were broken down again, my goods inside were damaged, 1 kg 400 gr gold was stolen from the top of what we call as "secret part" and which did not fit into lockers (Reşit Kaya, Human Rights Association Report on Dörtyol 2010:2).[60]

While the economic competition argument is helpful to understand the victimization of Kurdish construction, seasonal workers and shop keepers, it remains insufficient to explain the temporal and spatial distribution of violence. Thus, now I turn to political competition argument.

4.5.2. Political Competition

The underlying logic of political competition suggests that when subordinate population deprived of political rights commences to participate in political competition, this also ignites anxiety and insecurity among the dominant population regarding social hierarchy. The spontaneous increase of communal violence against Kurds with the participation of pro-Kurdish parties into parliament by nominating independent candidates and bypassing ten per cent electoral threshold after 2007 lends credibility to this argument since they were the "underdog" of Turkish political system for a long time excluded from the political system by party closures and state repression. Moreover, they have been exposed to long periods of delegitimization by the political system since they were criminalized as the political wing of the PKK. Furthermore, pro-Kurdish parties stirred antipathy and anxiety of Turks for a long

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[60] (In Turkish) Biz 35 yıldır buradayız. Çukurova'nın pamuk toplamadığımız, Konya'nın ırgatlık yapmadığımız tarlası kalmadı. Oradan alın terimizle kazandığımızı burada kuyumcu dükkânı açarak değerlendirdik. Yıllardır emek verdiğimiz alın terimizle biriktirdiklerimiz talan edildi. 1 kg 400 gr altın dükkânımdan çalındı. Olayların yaşandığı ilk gece kuyumcu dükkânımın camları kırılmıştı. İskenderun'dan camcı çağırarak hemen tamirini yaptırdım. Kuyumcu dükkânımın önünde bulunan polis memurlarına burayı size emanet ediyorum dedim. Gerginliğin artmaması için Kürt kökenli olanların evlerine çekilmesi söylendi. Bunun üzerine biz de evlerimize çekildik. Sabah saatlerinde geldiğimizde işyerimin camlarının tekrar kırıldığı, içeride bulunan eşyalarımın tahrip edildiği, gizli bölme dediğimiz ve kasalara sığmayan aparatlar üzerinde bulunan 1 kg 400 gr altınımın çalındığını gördüm.

time with their actions such as provocations using Turkish flag in their congresses such as that of HADEP in 1996[61] and during Newruz Celebrations in 2005[62], discourses loaded with references to the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan, visits of the funerals of PKK militants, references to the taboo word "Kurdistan" in their speeches etc.

If the delegitimization and demonization of pro-Kurdish party were already preexistent in 1990s and early 2000, why did collective violence against Kurds peak during general elections periods? First of all, while there were attacks of nationalist groups against pro-Kurdish party also before 2007, it was comparatively minor since there was no opportunity as there was already state repression against them containing their activities and curtailing their power. It is known that pro-Kurdish party lost its members, activists, cadres in killings and abductions by the hand of "deep state", a buzzword used to describe the criminal networks between state officials, politicians and mafia elements (see Watts 2010). As Watts describes this state repression:

Police, prosecutors, and a majority of Parliament acted under a paradigm that equated pro-Kurdish leaflets with Kurdish separatist propaganda; portrayed pro-Kurdish party membership as synonymous with PKK membership; and treated demonstrations in support of pro-Kurdish politicians as rebellion against state authority (Watts 1999: 640).

Not only security forces, but also judiciary, the ideological doppelganger of military, excluded the pro-Kurdish party constituting it as a threat to the "indivisibility of Turkish state and nation" (Koğacıoğlu 2004). The statement of the prosecutor arguing for the closure of HADEP in 1999 sheds light on this mindset:

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[61] During the HADEP Congress of 1996, Turkish flag was brought down and replaced by the PKK flag. This incident also triggered the criminalization of the party and arrests of many of its members including the party's leader, Murat Bozlak.
[62] In Newroz celebrations of 2005, Turkish flag was burned. While the leaders of pro-Kurdish party considered it as a provocation, this incident also triggered the flag marches and a number of mob attacks against Kurds as a counter-reaction.

If political parties that are established with ties to terrorist organisations are allowed to participate in the elections … we will have in this country thousands of terrorist parliamentarians (Reuters, 9 April 1999 cited by Güney 2002:126).

Secondly, before 2007, its vote base between four and six per cent was not sufficient to challenge political dynamics in Turkey or to take seat in Parliament as its vote was limited to Kurdish-dominated areas and insufficient to bypass ten percent electoral threshold. The pro-Kurdish party was indeed an effective political actor even before 2007 not only in local but also in general elections as it established itself as a viable choice of Kurds in the southeast. It asserted its political power by contentious politics which provided them with "representative contention" "by providing it with an institutional basis for public collective gathering that it had lacked, some legal protection from prosecution, new access to domestic and international audiences, and new symbolic resources" (Watts 2006: 126). However, its voice was incapacitated by the war against the PKK which also justified the state repression upon them in state discourse and legitimized the closures of the party in people's eyes. Hence, it did not pose a credible threat to *status quo* as it was politically marginalized, supported by underdeveloped Kurdish-majority regions, overshadowed by the PKK, devoid of organizational capacity to penetrate into Western Turkey.

After Abdullah Öcalan trial, Kurdish movement gave a greater emphasis on *Tükiyelileşmek* (Turkeyfication) not only by electoral competition but also by contentious politics with a greater visibility of demonstrations (Kapmaz 2004). With 2007 general elections, pro-Kurdish party bypassed ten-percent electoral threshold nominating independent candidates and entered into Parliament as a political group. With this electoral process and their entry into Parliament, Turkish-Kurdish cleavage is *literally* activated in the political arena which was cross-cut and superseded by centre-periphery cleavage as mentioned in previous chapter. Kurdish problem and identity discourses are now part and parcel of Turkish politics which shape and reconstruct the political competition not only between pro-Kurdish

party and other Turkish political parties but also between pro-Kurdish *parties*, especially between the HDP and the HUDA-PAR. It is important here to restate the argument made in the previous chapter, the electoral incentives of Turkish political parties which can propel them to moderate their stance on Kurdish problem decreased. Especially during the CHP under Deniz Baykal period, the CHP and the MHP displayed very similar stances toward Kurdish problem as they viewed the reforms on Kurdish rights as a project to divide the country (Bacik and Coskun 2011: 259). With the change of presidency in the CHP replacing Baykal with Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu in 2010, the CHP sought to moderate its tone on Kurdish problem whereas Turkish nationalist party, the MHP, constantly seeks to bond its constituency emphasizing reforms on Kurdish problem as a "treason project" (*ihanet projesi*) and accusing pro-Kurdish party as being an instrument of terrorism in the parliament. Due to the activation of Turkish-Kurdish cleavage and intra-ethnic competition, ethnic identities are now more salient during election times. For example, the criminalization of pro-Kurdish party as the political wing of the PKK is nurtured in electoral periods by the MHP and the AKP as an electoral wedge to attract Turkish nationalist votes. In addition, intra-ethnic competition gave further impetus to electoral violence in Kurdish-majority regions as political fights between HDP and HUDA-PAR took part in Kurdish regions (see Bozarslan 2015). Therefore, different from the earlier electoral periods, the pro-Kurdish party turned into a political actor, in the words of Przeworski, able to affect uncertainty in the political arena which is a key for democratization (Przeworski 1991). Especially after competing as a political party in 2015 elections and reaching out to 13 per cent of general votes represented by 80 deputies, pro-Kurdish party has now become a political actor able to change the *status quo*, supported as well by more developed parts of Western Turkey, eclipsing the shadow of the PKK, increasing its organizational capacity to penetrate into Western Turkey. Hence, the violence

against pro-Kurdish party, its activists and cadres increase during general elections compared

to local elections in which their electoral weight remains limited:

It increases a little more during general elections… The reason, you know, there is a ten percent ant-democratic threshold in front of us. We are trying to push it. We worked on that for two periods. At this point, the reason is not to be able to pass the threshold, keep us below the threshold. …In local elections, let's say in Üsküdar, we do not have a big stake…I am sure if there was a strong claim at this point, they (attacks) would also occur. I relate it to that, since we do not have a big stake…Insistently, to contain us in some neighborhoods and to block us from organizing in every part of society (Interview *with* Bilal Algunerhan, pro-Kurdish party's Istanbul Üsküdar District Chairman between 1998-2006, current HDP member of electoral coordination in Üsküdar, 12 May 2015).[63]

In local elections, these kinds of attacks were not an issue. The reason is that it does not affect the political power. But these elections will determine the fate of political power, it means, it will determine the future of the AK Party, the future of Turkey, the future of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In this decisive process, it is necessary to marginalize us, criminalize us. I mean, they need to merge us with the backward minds in people's mindset. There is a provocation process like these are old guys, old minded people, they are armed man, they are not as you know, they are in the incidents…General elections are more risky elections since it determines the fate of political power. Since they know that, they can organize at any instant, at any moment, even tomorrow these kinds of provocations (Interview with Şükrü Kaygısız, pro-Kurdish party's Balıkesir Ayvalık District Member, 28 May 2015).[64]

This reinforcement of pro-Kurdish party and boundary activation in political context

occurred in a social setting overshadowed by the ongoing criminalization of pro-Kurdish

party. While the government took positive steps with regard to Kurdish problem, it restored

the state repression against pro-Kurdish party. The excessive use of police force against their

demonstrations continued to portray them as associated with terrorism as security forces made

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[63] (In Turkish) Genel seçimlerde biraz daha fazla artıyor… Nedeni tabi biliyorsun önümüzde yüzde on baraj antidemokratik bir şey var. Biz onu zorlamaya çalışıyoruz. İki dönemde bunu üzerine çalıştık. Bu noktada bizim barajı aşamamamız, barajın altında kalmamız. …Yerel seçimlerde belki Üsküdar' diyelim Üsküdar'da büyük bir iddiamız olmuyor… Eminim bu noktada güçlü bir iddia ortaya çıkarsa, orda da çıkar. Ben ona bağlıyorum, büyük bir iddia olmadığı için… Israrla bizi belli noktalara, belli mahallelere hapsetme. Toplumun her tarafında örgütlenmenin önünü kesme.

[64] (In Turkish) Yerel seçimlerde bu denli yoğun bir saldırı söz konusu değildi. Nedeni de şu merkezi siyasal iktidarı etkileyen bir seçim değil. Ama bu seçim merkezi siyasal iktidarın kaderini belirleyecek, yani AK Parti'nin geleceğini belirleyecek, Türkiye'nin geleceğini belirleyecek, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın geleceğini belirleyecek. Bu belirleyici, süreç içerisinde en önemli faktör biziz. Bu nedenle bizim marjinalize edilmemiz, kriminalize edilmemiz gerekiyor. Yani bizim ısrarla hala halkın kafasındaki geri duygularla yan yana gelip birleştirilmesi Bunlar zaten eski adamlar eski kafada insanlar, işte silahlı, külahlı sizin bildiğiniz gibi değil sürekli olayların içinde gibi bir provokasyon süreci var… Genel seçimler daha riskli seçimlerdir çünkü merkezi siyasal iktidarın kaderini belirleyecek. Bunu bildiği için her an her dakika yarın bile böyle bir provokasyonu örgütleyebilir.

preventive arrests before their mass meetings. Media accorded to this repression recognition presenting the riots in Kurdish regions as extreme and excusing the fury of the police (see Çakır 2014). The KCK operations targeted to weaken not only the urban base of the PKK but also contain pro-Kurdish party through the repression on its cadres and activists (Çiçek 2011). About 1500 Students, intellectuals, activists of pro-Kurdish party were arrested by the government as "accomplices of terrorism" (Ibid.:16). The AKP government also did not enter into negotiations or ask for their input about reforms on Kurdish problem with an aim to marginalize them in the political arena until 2012. The mindset based on the criminalization of pro-Kurdish party was also voiced by the state elites. While the Chief of Staff, Yaşar Büyükanıt, referred to participants in Newroz celebrations as "pseudo-citizens" in 2005 (*GazateVatan*, 22 May 2005), he referred to the DTP parliamentarians as terrorists stating "the PKK is in Parliament", "They exist in Parliament. They even propose constitutional amendments" (*Hürriyet*, 12 December 2007). In the aftermath of 27 April memorandum which expressed the opposition of Turkish general staff to a conservative president of Republic, the military encouraged mass mobilization in the street calling for "display of the mass reactionary reflex against terrorist incidents" (*Milliyet*, 8 June 2007). The attacks against pro-Kurdish party turned into a symbolic moral action as a reaction against terror which was normalized in the discourse of politicians as a "public reaction". To give example, during the attacks against the BDP in the aftermath of bombing attacks in Gaziantep, the Minister of interior affairs, Idris Naim Şahin, expressed:

In the hot hours following Gaziantep incidents, the public reactions came out. Even this reaction turned into rage. These are reactions which we expect as the posture against terrorist

organization, even we approve, they are the expressions of sensibilities (CnnTurk, 25 August 2012).[65]

While the political competition is able to explain the temporal distribution of communal violence after 2007, it does not explain the spatial distribution of communal violence against Kurds as the pro-Kurdish party does not have a strong vote base in top provinces where communal violence against Kurds occur. While Wilkinson (2004) highlights the role of local politicians in triggering ethnic violence which arises out of the relationship between riot networks, politicians and local police forces in states, I could not find such a systematic relationship neither in data nor in my fieldwork although the role of local politicians in communal riots is highlighted in some of the communal violence accounts and in some of my interviews. The absence of such a systematic relationship arises out of two reasons. Firstly, the patronage networks which cultivate the relationship between riot networks, local politicians and police forces in India do not exist in Turkey as local governments' resources remain highly limited compared to the resources of the states of the Union in India. Patronage networks are more dependent on central state administration rather than local governments in Turkey (Mousseau 2012). Secondly, the formation and composition of police forces are determined by central state not by local governments. Moreover, while it may be assumed that the local administrations of the MHP would be hostile to the pro-Kurdish party or Kurds in local context, I did not find such a systematic relationship in local context. To give example, I interviewed the party activists of the pro-Kurdish party in different districts of Balıkesir, all of them were content with the 2009-2014 MHP administration of Balıkesir.

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[65] (In Turkish) Gaziantep'te olay anını müteakip sıcak saatlerde, halkımızın bir tepkisi ortaya çıktı. Hata bu tepki öfkeye dönüştü. Bunlar örgüte, onun eylemlerine duruş açısından beklediğimiz, hatta doğru bulduğumuz tepkilerdir, duyarlılığın ifadesidir.

Table XVIII. Local election results of the top ten provinces with highest ranking of communal violence acts according to Özgür Gündem and Dicle Haber Ajansı

City	Local Elections					
	1999		**2004**		**2009**	
	Local Government	**HADEP**	**Local Government**	**SHP** [66]	**Local Government**	**DTP**
Çanakkale	ANAP	-	CHP	-	CHP	437 (0,2%)
Elazığ	FP	4542 (2,6%)	DYP	4879 (2,8%)	AKP	6472 (2,9%)
Eskişehir	DSP	1069 (0,3%)	DSP	5307 (1,6%)	DSP	0
Giresun	FP	-	AKP	1118 (0,9%)	CHP	0
Denizli	DYP	2713 (0,8%)	AKP	2495 (0,7%)	AKP	5606 (1,2%)
Balıkesir	ANAP	1287 (0,4%)	AKP	8771 (2,3%)	MHP	1892 (0,4%)
Mersin	MHP	52201 (9,5%)	CHP	69568 (11, 9%)	CHP	94805 (12,4%)
Izmir	DSP	53268 (3,3%)	CHP	74857 (%4,6)	CHP	67623 (3,2%)
Erzurum	MHP	1424 (0,7%)	AKP	4115 (2,2%)	AKP	2990 (1,2%)
Malatya	FP	2130 (0,9%)	AKP	2704 (1,1%)	AKP	54 (0%)
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute 2015						

In line with Wilkinson's argument (2004), the provinces which are governed by political parties unable to appeal to minority display more communal violence against Kurds. In 2004 local elections, the AKP won 58, the CHP won nine and the MHP won four provinces at city level. Among the first 23 provinces which demonstrate communal violence against Kurds above the average level (10) including Afyon and Adana with nine communal violence incidents, the AKP governed 17, the CHP governed four and the MHP governed none of them between 2004 and 2009 (the DSP (Eskişehir) and the DYP(Elazığ) governed the other two provinces). In 2009 local elections, the AKP won 46, the CHP won 13 and the MHP won 10

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[66] SHP (*Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti*, Social Democrat Populist Party), DEHAP (*Demokratik Halk Partisi*, Democratic People's Party), *Özgür Parti* (Free Party), SDP (*Sosyalist Demokrasi Partisi*, Socialist Democracy Party), ÖDP (*Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi*, Freedom and Solidarity Party), EMEP (*Emek Partisi*, Labor Party) entered into 2004 local elections building an electoral alliance under the banner of SHP.

provinces at province level. Among the first 23 provinces which demonstrate communal violence against Kurds above the average level (10) including Afyon and Adana with nine communal violence incidents, the AKP governed 10, the CHP governed nine and the MHP governed three of them between 2004 and 2009 (the DSP governed Eskişehir).Thus, compared to the number of local governments governed by these parties, the CHP and the MHP-dominated provinces are overrepresented among provinces which display communal violence against Kurds above the average level (10) including Afyon and Adana between 1999-2012.

Figure XIX. 1999/2004/2009 Local governments of provinces that displayed communal violence against Kurds above the average level (10)

Note: I also included Adana which displays a similar ethnic diversity with Mersin in order to visualize their comparison. Adana and Afyon display communal violence incidents against Kurds just below the average (10) with nine incidents.

4.5.3. Riot Networks and Spatial Distribution of Communal Violence against Kurds

When I hanged the flag of pro-Kurdish party (in the past), I would flee (Party activist of the HDP Istanbul Maltepe District, 14 May 2015)

While I was working for pro-Kurdish party, I was staying in construction sites and not returning home..not to be arrested (Party activist of HDP Balıkesir Edremit, 2 June 2015)

Even in 1990s, the possibility of people attacking me did not come to my mind (Party activist of HDP Istanbul Kartal District, 14 May 2015)

Nobody can attack us in Gülsuyu, they would not even think of it (Party activist of HDP Istanbul Gülsuyu Neigborhood, 14 May 2015)

The municipality does not obstruct us (our activities); does not have any special effort. Besides, there is no need for that since fascists do it constantly (Party activist in HDP Kadıkoy District, 12 May 2015)

As aforementioned, the language of armed conflict between the PKK and Turkish state was in effect conflict generating for the multicultural nature of society. On one hand, the PKK atrocities invigorated mass rage and Turkish people were stoked on patriotism and lust for revenge interspersed with rising racism against Kurdish identity (Bora 2015). On the other hand, democratic claims based on Kurdish rights were delegitimized in Turkish state discourse and represented as deviant and divisive in Turkish media (Yeğen 1999, 2007, Sezgin and Wall 2005, Somer 2005). The use of excessive violence against advocates of Kurdish rights including Kurdish intellectuals and pro-Kurdish party officials was swept under the rug of "terrorist" banner. While these discriminatory legal/illegal arrangements and discourses also fed free-floating racist discourses against Kurds, this racism did not penetrate into each locality with the same impact. For example, when I entered into Istanbul Gülsuyu neighborhood and told people chatting outside of the HDP electoral branch that I was working on communal violence against Kurds, they smiled at me telling that this does not and cannot happen in Gülsuyu since this is a Kurdish and Alevis inhabited neighborhood with leftist leanings. However, this situation was different for Kurds living in Turkish-dominated small

provinces of Western Turkey such as Çanakkale, Yalova, Balıkesir, Muğla, Afyon in which the affimation of Kurdishness was something to be reprimanded. I explain in this part that the change of political opportunity structure with increasing pluralism toward Kurdish identity also expanded opportunities for collusion between Turks and Kurds in micro-sphere by its three aspects: boundary activation in the ethnic microcosm of localities, decreased state repression against Kurdishness, rise of riot networks which are more mobile in localities with statist and nationalist social settings.

With the increasing pluralism with regard to Kurdish identity in Turkey, the ethnic microcosm of urban provinces is more vibrant today. The recognition of multiculturalism not only generated a gradual normalization of Kurdishness in public sphere; it also prompted more possibility for collusion between Turks and Kurds due to the legacy of violent ethnic conflict. While identity boundaries are still porous between Turks and Kurds, identities are not conceived in the same way as they were before the war. Civil wars generate endogenous dynamics transforming the boundaries of ethnic groups (Kalyvas 2008) and end up, in most cases, with hardening them. Throughout the war, Turkish state discourse stirred up Turkish nationalism imposing a vigilant duty to "react against terror" on all citizens. This vigilance was not only directed against the PKK but also against the social, cultural and political practices of Kurdish identity which were constructed in the cognitive schemata as "Kurdist" in search of Kurdish ethno-nationalist goals through state bans and limitations on Kurdishness. Thus, Kurdish ethnic practices turned into something to be reprehended. For example, people learned to react against yellow, red and green which are Kurdish colors used in PKK flags and pro-Kurdish parties' flags or react against people who wear *poşu* which is a traditional Kurdish scarf. This reconstruction of "dangerous" practices was also affected by the mass mobilization of the Kurdish nationalist movement through its capacity of myth-making. Newroz celebrations which are in effect a cultural practice turned into a political

event in this process as state authorities attempted to forestall people from participating in it through the use of prohibitions which, in turn, pumped new life into it by its reconstruction as a myth of resistance by the PKK (Güneş 2012). In sum, in the dialectic of resistance and repression, the boundaries of Kurdishness are reshaped and reconstituted.

Moreover, the politicization of ethnic groups activates identity boundaries as people reconstruct their personal acquaintances as members of a large and threatening community (Appadurai 1998). With the entry of pro-Kurdish party in parliament, the pro-Kurdish party is no more at the margins of Turkish politics but right at its center with its enhanced political weight. The parliament turned into an instrument to realize their collective interests and aspirations. Additionally, Kurdish identity is no more an "underdeveloped" culture to be assimilated but connotes social, political resonances and communitarian associations in public sphere. While the electoral map of Kurdish political space was bifurcated between the AKP and pro-Kurdish party, this blurred the lines as well between pro-Kurdish party, the PKK and Kurds in people's eyes although the state sought to detach Kurdish citizens from the attachment to the pro-Kurdish party and the PKK. As some interviewees reported, asking the support of pro-Kurdish parties to Kurds is sometimes used as a litmus test to identify their "degree" of Kurdishness. In urban life of Western provinces, different from other Muslim ethnic groups, people associate Kurdish identity more easily with "territorial ethnicity" rooted in the social and political space of Kurdish-dominated areas of Eastern and Southeastern Turkey. As interviewees note, people have a tendency to associate more easily and swiftly Kurds from Hakkari or Şırnak with the PKK and the support of pro-Kurdish party compared to those from Malatya or Gaziantep. Therefore, there are also "moments of becoming Kurdish" in public life which can foment "moments of ethnicization" able to generate ethnic tensions in interpersonal relations such as being from Kurdish-dominated places of Eastern Turkey, speaking Kurdish, singing and listening Kurdish songs, organizing weddings in

conformity with Kurdish customs, participating in pro-Kurdish parties' demonstrations or expressing their support, empathy or opposition to the PKK and pro-Kurdish party. In effect, the fact that Kurdishness is now recognizable in public sphere does not denote automatically mullticulturalism but also means that ethnic boundaries can turn into a cognitive lens to assess the dangers and credibility of the "other". The moments of ethnicization can generate stigmas against Kurds during urban interactions as Saraçoğlu (2010) demonstrates. He finds out five main stigma used by *Izmirlis* toward Kurdish migrants in the city a) ignorant and cultureless b) benefit scroungers c) disrupters of urban life d) invaders e) separatists. Thus, the saliency of Kurdish identity is adjusted during interpersonal interactions upward or downward contingent on the social context. Here is an illustrative communal violence incident which shows how identitiy transformation from "*Erzurumlu*" (people from Erzurum) to *Vanlı* (people from Van) activates boundaries and reenergizes cognitive schemata based on the securitization of Kurdish identity:

84 Kurdish workers who work in constructions in Izmit are taken from their workplace forcefully by the gendarmerie and taken to the bus station to make them leave the city. Workers are staying in the bus station for five days….Workers that wait in Izmit Bus Station since five days stated that they have worked for a long time in the municipalities' Ilimtepe cooperative and have worked for the Atlas Construction Company as subcontractor and they have been exposed constantly to pressures. Nevzat Koçak who told that they presented themselves as "*Erzurumlu*" (people from Erzurum) for a long time for the reason that the owners of company and some of the governors of municipality are *ülkücü* said that "when company officers saw a couple of times the cars which carried the license plate "65", they understood that we are *Vanlı* (people from Van)"…In the aftermath of this incident on 29 March's dawn about 03.00, Körfez gendarmerie forces made raids into the construction in which they stayed; Koçak told that "In the raid, constructor, technicians and chefs of construction were also with the gendarmerie. That day, we were taken from our beds with 50 persons and we are brought forcefully to the bus station. 35 people who were dragged from the house of their relatives or of their friends were also taken and brought (to the bus station) in the morning hours (Kürt işçiler kapı dışarı, 3 April 2000, *Özgür Bakış*: 6).[67]

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[67] (In Turkish) İzmit'te inşaatlarda çalışan 84 Kürt işçi, çalıştıkları iş yerinden jandarma baskısıyla alınarak şehri terk etmeleri için otogara götürüldü. İşçiler 5 gündür otogarda kalıyor… Beş günden bu yana İzmit Otogarı'nda bekleyen işçiler, uzun süredir belediyenin İlimtepe Kooperatif inşaatında ve taşeron firma Atlas İnşaat şirketi bünyesindeki inşaatlarda çalıştıklarını ve Kürt oldukları için burada sürekli baskılara maruz kaldıklarını belirttiler. Şirket sahipleri ve belediyenin bazı yöneticilerinin ülkücü olması nedeniyle, uzun süre kendi

Furthermore, identity boundaries are not activated in each locality with the same impact. While provinces such as Istanbul, Izmir, Mersin, Adana were more accustomed to the cultural and political expressions of Kurdishness since they received large flux of Kurdish migrants in 1990s and are nestled with Kurdish enclaves, it is possible to see nowadays the social, cultural, political expressions of Kurdishness in small provinces like in Trabzon, Rize, Afyon, Çanakkale, Küthaya, Tokat which received much less Kurdish population. Besides, the boundary activation does not only bear upon Kurdish migrants. Even for Kurdish locals who live in Central Anatolia for a long time, the assertion of identity is a recent thing. In a series of research series on Kurdish tribes living in Central Anatolia, one of the villagers, Hüseyin Şahmaz (62) who told that they did not even know to go to Kayseri in the past states:

Our fathers used to tell us: don't speak Kurdish. They cut off my uncle's beard saying "hairy Kurds" for a couple of times. We used to go to Adana with saddles. In Kayseri, speaking Kurdish was to be reproached. I can say now that I am Kurdish. My father went to Kayseri for a deposition after three days walking. What a deposition it was. While my father was a shepherd, there was an incident in Binboğalar. The deposition was the deposition of this incident. While soldiers came to the village, everybody was hiding. It was not easy seeing these days (İç Anadolu'nun Botan'ı, *2000'de Yeni Gündem*, 13 July 2000:9). [68]

In localities which have a much more statist and nationalist mindset, revealing Kurdish identity is much more difficult for Kurds due to free-floating prejudices against Kurds. One of my interviewees, a Kurdish Alevi, recounts how these different spaces of localities affect her

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kimliklerini gizleyerek kendilerini "Erzurum'lu" olarak tanıttıklarını söyleyen Nevzat Koçak adlı işçi "Şirket görevlileri birkaç kez oraya gelen 65 plakalı arabaları görünce bizim Van'lı olduğumuzu anladı" diyor… Koçak bu olayın ardından 29 Mart günü sabaha karşı saat 03.00 sıralarında Körfez jandarma birliklerinin bulundukları şantiyeye baskın yaptığını ifade ederek, yaşadıkları olayı şöyle anlattı: "Baskında, jandarmanın yanında müteahhit, teknisyenler ve şantiye şefleri de vardı. O gün şantiyede bulunan 50 kişiyle birlikte yataklarımızdan kaldırılıp zorla otogara getirildik. Akraba veya arkadaşlarının evlerinde kalan 34 işçi de sabah saatlerinde alınıp getirildi"

[68] (In Turkish) Eskiden Kayseri'ye gitmesini bile bilmediklerini belirten Hüseyin Şahbaz (62) şöyle konuşuyor: "Babalarımız korkudan Kürtçe konuşmayın derdi. Amcamın sakallarını kaç kere "Kıllı Kürt" diyerek kestiler. Adana'ya merkeplerle çalışmaya giderdik. Kayseri'de Kürtçe konuşmak ayıplanırdı. Şimdi Kürdüm diyebiliyorum.Babam bir ifade için üç gün yürüyerek Kayseri'ye geldi. İfade de ifade olsa. Babam çobanken Binboğalar'da bir olay olmuş. İfade de bu olayın ifadesi. Köye asker gelince herkes saklanırdı. O günlerden bu günlere kolay gelinmedi.

family's strategies of identity affirmation as they move from a Turkish-dominated district of

Çanakkale to a Kurdish enclave in Izmir:

A:While we were there (Çanakkale), we never told that we were from Tunceli. I was six years-old and my family (*annemler*) warned us when we went there. They told that if they ask you, tell that you are from Elazığ because Elazığ is a more nationalist place. At that time, there were constantly things like Tunceli, terrorism on the news, thus, we said that let's say nothing about our being from Tunceli….She felt anxious because you speak another language. My mother did not know well Turkish when we went to Çanakkale, she knew a little bit. We knew earlier on if go somewhere and if this place is too closed, we should not say. We had this thinking and besides, people of Çanakkale display themselves, our being Alevi was also an issue, we also did not say our being Alevi.

I: Saying "display themselves"?

A:For example, all of them were veiled. Probably there was no person unveiled in the neighborhood. My mother is also veiled but her way of veiling is also different. Then you know that you are different and they are the majority. Then, you say, we should not tell at least. And I am not sure but they can also say in all these discourses very comfortably "terrorists killed this many of people this-and-that". That's why, you just say, for my sake they do not appeal to me as terrorist….When we came to Izmir, Izmir was very different to me. I think that if we had continued to stay in Çanakkale, we could have assimilated more easily to the situation.[69] I can say that we understood our Kurdishness when we came to Izmir…Because you are in the neighborhood (Menemen Asarlık) and everybody speaks Kurdish so that the self-esteem it gives to my father and mother is different. At the end, everybody understands each other's way. Another point was that it was not just about being Kurdish, it was also important to be Kurdish Alevi. For example, my family (*annemle*r) was living in the neighborhood without communicating with those from Muş, Erzurum asserting them as Sunnis. Because there were lots, lots of people from Tunceli and she was only seeing them. Besides, there were attachments of locality (*hemşehrilik*), relative ties. Everybody knows each other from their villages (Interview with Asuman Uğur, 19 August 2014).[70]

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[69] Her sister who settled down in Çanakkale discloses her still as being from Erzincan.

[70] (In Turkish) A: Zaten biz orada kaldığımız sürece Tunceliliyiz demedik hiç. Annemler falan ben altı yaşındaydım biz gittiğimizde bizi bile tembihlemişlerdi. Şey demişlerdi size sorarlarsa Elazığlıyım deyin, çünkü Elazığ daha milliyetçi bir yer. O zaman sürekli haberlerde Tunceli, terörist şu bu şeklinde şeyler vardı o yüzden de hiç söylemeyelim dedik Tunceli'li olduğumuzu… Kendini tedirgin hissetti çünkü başka bir dil konuşuyorsun, Annem biz Çanakkale'ye gittiğimizde Türkçeyi çok bilmiyordu, çok az biliyordu... Öncesinde biz biliyorduk, biz gidersek ve orası çok kapalı bir yerse söylememeliyiz. Bu düşünce vardı hem hem de Çanakkale insanı kendini çok fazla belli ediyor. Bizim Alevi oluşumuzda çok şeydi Alevi oluşumuzu da söylemiyorduk.
I: Belli ediyor derken?
A: Mesela hepsinin başı kapalı. Mahallede açık insan yoktu herhalde. Annemde başını örtüyor ama annemin örtme şekli vesaire de değişik. O yüzden biliyorsun, farklıyız biz ve biliyorsun ki onlar çoğunluk. O yüzden de şey yapıyorsun en azından hiç söylemeyelim. Ve eminim değilim bundan ama bütün o konuşmada çok rahat şey söyleyebiliyorlar işte teröristler şu kadar inşan öldürmüş şu bu. O yüzden de şey diyorsun aman bana terörist demesinler... İzmir' geldiğimizde İzmir benim için çok değişikti. Ben şey diye düşüyorum Çanakkale'de kalmaya devam etseydik çok rahat asimile olabilirdik duruma. İzmir'e gelince hepimiz Kürt olduğumuzu o zaman anladık diyebilirim. Çünkü mahalledesin herkes birbiriyle Kürtçe konuşuyor, onun işte babama anneme

Contrary to many expectations about the reflections of macro-political developments into micro-sphere in a parallel direction, "[T]there is a disjunction, and sometimes a strong one, between personal inter-ethnic relations and political inter-ethnic relations" as Horowitz (2004: 246-247) underlines. The perceptual rigidity produced by the armed conflict over Kurdish identity left its bones all over the mindset. The remark of one participant in the study of Ensarioğlu and Kurban (2011) is illustrative in this regard:

Here only the martyrs are known. Kurds are ignored. In fact, Kurds here are mostly assimilated or they are mostly out of sight. Here Kurd means terrorist, and solving the Kurdish Question means finishing terror. Therefore, the problem needs to be explained well here (Ensarioğlu and Kurban 2011:43).

The activation of boundaries does not propel in itself the rise of communal violence. For collective violence to arise, the role of brokers is of critical importance to link unconnected groups and mobilize them in a single movement (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). Moreover, collective violence is contingent, dependent on context and opportunity. The democratization and increasing pluralism since the beginning of 2000s entailed two consequences which give way to these two phenomena. Firstly, decreased state repression on Kurdish identity provided for nationalist networks the opportunity to display their aggression against Kurdishness. Secondly, there are now an increased level of nationalist civil society organizations and social networks which play the role of connective structures such as the case of the rise of Kemalists and ultra-nationalists civil society networks for whom the expressions of Kurdish identity are hard to digest. For these groups who consider reforms on Kurdish rights as concessions to terrorism and regard Kurdishness as an obstacle to Turkish nation, there was no opportunity to use of transgressive (and at times violent) methods of

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verdiği özgüven farklı. Sonuçta herkes birbirinin dilinden anlıyor. Şeydi bir de sadece Kürt olmak değil Kürt Alevi olmak da önemli. Annemler mesela Muşlu Erzurumlu olanları Sünniler deyip onlarlar hiç iletişim kurmadan mahalle içinde yaşıyorlardı mesela. Çünkü çok, çok fazla Tuncelili vardı onlarla sadece görüşüyordu ediyordu. Ayrıca hemşerilik, akrabalık da vardı. Herkes birbirini köyünden tanıyor.

contention before since there was a high level of state repression against Kurdish identity. With the lessening of this disciplinary tool and the impetus arisen from democratization reforms, there has been a mushrooming of nationalist and statist networks in public sphere. These establishment and nationalist civil society organizations are skeptical about reforms and view them as concessions to terrorism (see Kaliber and Tocci 2010). The perpetrators in communal violence incidents are not restricted to the well-known nationalist organizations such as *Ülkücüs* or *Alperens* because the boundaries of nationalism and nationalist networks are no more limited to them. For example, there are now new nationalist parties such as HEPAR (*Hak ve Eşitlik Partisi*, Right and Justice Party) or Patriot Party (*Vatan Partisi* which is the ex-Worker Party). In addition, there are football networks which display their nationalist stance time to time against pro-Kurdish party such as groups called as *Teksaslılar* of Bursaspor. There are racist networks such as *Buduncular* or *Karakalpaklılar* whose weight change in localities. There are groups which organize military send-off (*asker uğurlaması*) in front of Kurds' houses or pro-Kurdish parties' building. By the same token, Red Apple Coalition (*Kızıl Elma Koalisyonu*) composed of statist-nationalist network of (un)civil associations emerged in 2003 (Jacoby 2011). Among others, new nationalist CSOs are founded such as VKGB (*Vatansever Kuvvetler Güç Birliği*, The Union of Patriotic Forces) and KMD (*Kuvvayi Milliye Derneği*, the National Forces Committee). Called as *Ulusalcılar,* these types of organizations are organized around three common themes: "uncompromising anti-Westernism; externalization of Islam from Turkish nationalism; and ethnic exclusionism" (Uslu 2008: 73). This neo-national resurgence is supported as well by certain media organizations and by popular culture that depict Kurds as internal traitors in collaboration with foreign powers in pursuit of vengeance (Uslu 2008, Dönmez 2008). Moreover, these nationalist networks can arise out of social media such as the campaign of "Terörist yandaşı partiyi Fethiye' den kovma vakti" (it is time to get rid of terrorist partisan from Fethiye)

organized by a group called as "Cennet Fethiye" (Paradise Fethiye) which was involved in the attacks against the HDP Fethiye District Office in 2014. These networks, that are generally local, are able to play the role of riot specialists who are, in Brass' words, "persons who are active at all times in monitoring the daily life of the town or city in the areas in which they reside or which they frequent" (Brass 1997: 285). Here is an illustrative example how these networks can emerge and operate in local context:

While the *ülkücü* attacks are going on against Kurdish students in entire Turkey, Kurdish students from Şemdinli who study in Bayburt have come to the point of quitting the school due to repression and threat upon them…The youth from university D.Ç, E.S, M.G, E.Ç, B.D, İ.D, H.L, H.M, H.N, Z.N and V.Ş, who do not want to disclose themselves due to security issues told that if no solution is found for their problems, they will quit the school. There are 500 students who won Bayburt Education Faculty and *ülkücüs* from Facebook make calls over Facebook "500 terrorists are coming". They told that some of their friends were attacked due to wearing of *puşi* and they were threatened at the corners and they (*ülkücüs*) create provocations…The students express that recurrent scoldings of the instructor named Doruk who gives lectures and who is a computer programmer as "what are you doing here, why did you come, why did not you go to the mountains?" encourage *ülkücü* groups and increase their aggressiveness. In entertainment and morale events, it is not allowed to gather together and play *halay*, the students who stay in dormitories are not allowed to utter a word (*ses çıkarmak*), they are threatened as "you will abide by us, our cultural and rules are in effect, you will keep up with our rules. Otherwise leave here". The students also highlight that the landlords who know that they come from the region (Kurdish regions) to Bayburt do not rent their houses and told that Kurdish students who want to rent a house have difficulties in finding a rented house (Bayburt'ta okuyan Kürt öğrenciler ülkücü saldırılardan kaygılı, *Dicle Haber Ajansı*,15 November 2010).[71]

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[71](In Turkish) Türkiye genelinde üniversitede okuyan Kürt öğrencilere yönelik ülkücü saldırılar devam ederken, Bayburt'ta okuyan Şemdinlili Kürt öğrenciler, gördükleri baskı ve tehditler nedeniyle okulu bırakma aşamasına geldi. ... Bayburt Eğitim Fakültesi'nde okuyan ve güvenlik gerekçesiyle isimlerinin yayınlanmasını istemeyen üniversiteli geçlerden D.Ç, E.S, M.G, E.Ç, B.D, İ.D, H.L, H.M, H.N, Z.N ve V.Ş, artan şiddet ve baskılara çözüm bulunmaması halinde okulu bırakacaklarını söyledi. 'Facebook'tan 500 terörist geliyor mesajı' Bayburt Eğitim Fakültesi'ni kazanan yaklaşık 500 öğrenci olduğunu ve paylaşım sitesi Facebook'ta ülkücülerin birbirlerine mesajla "500 terörist geliyor" duyurusu yaptıklarını kaydeden öğrenciler, bazı arkadaşlarının puşi takmasından kaynaklı saldırılara maruz kaldığını, birkaç kişi tarafından sıkıştırılarak tehdit edildiklerini ve sürekli provokasyon yarattıklarını ifade etti. 'Ne işin var, senin burada niye geldi' Üniversitede öğretim görevlisi olarak ders veren ve bilgisayar programcısı olduğu ileri sürülen Doruk adındaki bir öğretim görevlisinin de kendilerine sürekli "ne işiniz var, siz buraya niye geldiniz, dağa gitseydiniz" gibi sözler söylediğini, bununla ülkücü gruplara cesaret verdiğini ve saldırganlıklarını arttırdığını dile getiren öğrenciler, moral ve eğlence günlerinde de bir araya gelip halay çekmelerine izin verilmediğini, yurtta kalan öğrencilerin de seslerinin dahi çıkmasına izin verilmediğini, "Bize uyacaksınız bizim kültürümüz ve bizim kurallarımız geçerli kurallarımıza ayak uyduracaksınız. Yoksa burayı terk edin gibi" sözlerle tehdit edildiklerini vurguladı. Bölgeden Bayburt'a gittiklerini bilen ev sahiplerinin de kendilerine ev kiralamadığının altını çizen öğrenciler, yurtta sıkıntı çeken Kürt öğrencilerin eve çıkmak istediklerinde de kiralık ev bulma konusunda sıkıntı yaşadıklarını söyledi.

In Afyon Sultandağı, in the aftermath of Şahin who lost his life in the fight between two groups, a group who calls themselves "Afyon Patriotic youth" (*Afyon Vatansever Gençlik*) attacked Kurds' houses. In the aftermath of fights in which knives were used as a result of dispute on opening the way (*yol verme*) between two groups in Afyon Sultandağı, the events which started due the death of Orhan Şahin (18), the student of Antalya Akdeniz University continue. In the afternoon, after the burial of Şahin funeral, a group named "Afyon Patriotic Youth" attacked Kurds' houses and shops. While the houses were damaged, it is reported that tensions are going on (Afyon'da gerginlik devam ediyor, *Dicle Haber Ajansı*, 30 December 2012).[72]

Nevertheless, it is necessary to probe that not every military send-off turns into attacks or not every nationalist group is riot-prone. The capacity to gather people together and make them follow the riot is dependent on people and their interpretation of the situation. As the temporal variation of communal violence against Kurds demonstratse, this capacity is increased in the seaside of Western Turkey where the CHP and the MHP are in a close competition with the AKP for the political dominance:

On the seaside, you know, these are the regions where the vote bases of the CHP and the MHP are found. These two parties used indeed excessive discourses for years, I mean, far-reaching racism. They showed every approach opposed to them, not against I mean, displaying their differences as a threat to Turkism (*Türkçülük*). They applied this for years. In the past, only the MHP used to do that but in the period of Deniz Baykal, there were merely differences in discourse. Let's say, you see the TV channels watched by *ulusalcı*. They also say similar things in their narratives. Therefore, this shapes the social base. While the base should be normally in line with left, social-democracy; the CHP base formed a spirit in these places far-reaching racist attacks. This continued for quite some time. I remember this happened in Torbalı, Serik, Manavgat, for example people were killed because of listening Kurdish folk songs (*türkü*). This conclusion can be inferred from this. For example, if politicians do not have the genuine culture of democracy, democratic values, democratic perspectives rather than rubbing the society against each other, this reality literally materializes (Interview with Ferhat Yeğin, HDP Istanbul 1. Region Coordination Member, 13 May 2015)." [73]

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[72] (In Turkish) Afyon'un Sultandağı ilçesinde iki grup arasında yaşanan kavgada yaşamını yitiren Şahin'in defnedilen cenazesi ardından kendilerine "Afyon vatansever gençlik" adını veren bir grubun Kürt evlerine saldırıldığı belirtildi. Afyon'un Sultandağı ilçesinde iki grup arasında "yol verme" nedeniyle çıkan tartışma sonrasında yaşanan bıçaklı kavgada Antalya Akdeniz Üniversitesi öğrencisi Orhan Şahin (18) adlı kişinin yaşamını yitirmesi ile başlayan olaylar devam ediyor. Bugün öğleden sonra Şahin'in cenazesi defnedildikten sonra kendilerine "Afyon vatansever gençlik" adını veren bir grup, Kürtlerin ev ve iş yerlerine saldırdı. Evlerin hasar gördüğü bildirilirken, gerginliğin sürdüğü kaydedildi.

[73] (In Turkish) Sahilde biliyorsunuz daha çok CHP ve MHP'nin oy tabanı olduğu bölgelerdir. Bunlar gerçekten, bu iki parti yıllarca yani aşırı yani ırkçılığa varan ulusalcı söylemler kullandılar. Ona karşı olan, karşı değil de yani farklılıklarını ortaya koyan her yaklaşımı da Türkçülüğe karşı bir işte tehlike, tehlike olarak gösterdiler. Yıllarca bunu yaptılar. Eskiden bunu sadece MHP yapardı ama Deniz Baykal döneminde nerdeyse hiç söylem

In these places, *ulusalcıs* are more located. They can also act together (with nationalists). For example, I can tell you that. You heard that Ahmet Türk had come to Izmir, it was an electoral period. They threw up for example water taps, toilet closets etc. I know this region very well. It was a region dominated by people from CHP (*CHPliler*). By the same token, the one that brings the flag theme to the fore is the CHP. For example, in Izmir, municipalities distribute the flags to make them hung during 19 May, 29 October. The municipalities developed this flag issue and espoused this spirit (Interview with Necla Şengül, Manager of IHD General Center, 20 May 2015).[74]

It is also imperative to note that we should consider the interactions of party ideologies with social setting. As my interviewees succinctly puts:

It differs from CHP to CHP, MHP to MHP (Interview with Pervin Buduncu, HDP Ankara Executive Board Member, 20 May 2015).[75]

If you go and talk to a person from the CHP in Tunceli/Dersim, you presuppose him to be from the HDP, if you talk to a person from CHP in Izmir, you presuppose him to be from MHP (Interview with Şükrü Kaygısız, HDP Balıkesir Ayvalık District Member, 28 May 2015).[76]

Especially with regard to the CHP, the interviewees put forward the different social bases of the CHP and how this shapes their sense of security. To give an example, while my interviewees in Kadıköy which is governed by the CHP were careful about nationalist networks which are mobile in localities during the electoral period, the interviewees in Kartal which is also governed by the CHP were confident and easy about their activities due to Alevis living in the place with leftist leanings:

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farkı kalmadı. Yani diyelim ki ulusalcı kesimin izlediği kanallara bakıyorsunuz. Orada da neredeyse anlatı itibariyle aynı şeyler söyleniyor. Dolayısıyla bunun biçimlendirdiği bir taban var. Taban hani normalde sol, sosyal demokrat bir çizgi olması gerekirken hani CHP'nin tabanı buralarda çok böyle ırkçı saldırılara varan bir ruh haline girdi. Uzun süre gerçekten devam etti. Torbalı'da olduğunu hatırlıyorum, Serik'de oldu, Manavgat'ta oldu, işte diyelim ki Kürtçe türkü dinlendiği için öldürüldü. Bundan şu sonuç çıkarılabilir. Hani politikacılar özünde toplumu çatıştırmayı değil de demokrasiyi, demokratik değerleri, demokratik yaklaşımı geliştirme kültürü yoksa öyle bir bakışı yoksa, bu gerçekten gerçekleşiyor.

[74] (In Turkish) Ulusalcıların daha fazla olmasından kaynaklanıyor. Ortak hareket edebiliyorlar aslında. Mesela ben size şöyle söyliyeyim. İzmir'de bir dönem belki duymuşsunuzdur Ahmet Türk gelmişti, bir seçim dönemiydi. Mesela balkonlardan şeyler attılar musluk, klozet vs. şeylerini attılar. O bölgeyi mesela ben çok iyi biliyorum, CHP'lilerin ağırlıklı olarak yaşadıkları bir yerdi. Yine aynı şekilde mesela en çok bayrak temasını öne çıkartan CHP'dir. Mesela İzmir'de CHP'li belediyeler dağıtır bayrağı insanlara 19 Mayıs'ta 29 Ekim'de bu tür günler asılması için. Bu bayrak şeyini geliştiren ve bu duyguyu geliştiren belediyelerdir.

[75] (In Turkish) CHP'den CHP'ye değişir, MHP'den MHP'ye değişir.

[76] (In Turkish) Git Tunceli, Dersim'deki bir CHP'liyle konuş, HDP'li sanırsın, git İzmir'deki bir CHP'liyle konuş, MHP'li sanırsın.

It is presumed that there is comfort in Kadıköy in this way. Since Kadıköy is inhabited by a more elite, a more intellectual part (of society), naturally, it is easier for us to express ourselves individually but there are also difficulties, handicaps here. *Ulusalcıs* are more intensely living here. There are periods that they do not welcome us (Gülten Karagöz, HDP Istanbul Kadıköy District Manager, 12 May 2015).[77]

"Even in 1990s, the possibility of people attacking against me did not come to my mind"(Interview with Gülşehri Eniş, Istanbul Kartal District Coordination, 14 May).[78]

I found out the same difference between Balıkesir Ayvalık and Balıkesir Burhaniye.

As interviewees puts:

We can say that the CHP is at a more negative point here compared to several provinces in Turkey. Here is a disease of nationalism which we call "Aegean type nationalism". In addition, the people from CHP (*CHPliler*) here, for example, we organize 1 May in Ankara, Istanbul, Burhaniye, we celebrate together 8 May but we can neither celebrate 1 May nor 8 May together with the people from CHP (*CHPliler*) here. There are classical nationalist prejudices as you know: opening of 1 May with Turkish independency rhyme, opposition to Kurdish slogans, opposition to women's *zılgıt*. Leave aside shouting slogans, we are here facing a CHP mindset opposing to women's *zılgıt*…Just next to us in Burhaniye, we celebrated 1 May together with the same CHP and I will tell you one more interesting thing, people from CHP (*CHPliler)* applauded us while we were entering the arena as the HDP. I mean, while we are living such a tolerance in 35 km away Burhaniye, we cannot live this tolerance in Ayvalık (Interview with Şükrü Kaygısız, HDP Balıkesir Ayvalık District Member, 28 May 2015).[79]

We could not even make public statement in Ayvalık two, three years before. We do these things in Burhaniye for 30 years. 1 May and other things are celebrated here…The reason we are more comfortable here is that Burhaniye is a place intensely inhabited, dominated by social democrats, inhabited by revolutionaries in the past. For example, Labor Party (*Emek Partisi*) is strong here since the old times. The president of Labor Party, Abdullah Varlı, is even from here. In this respect, they cannot dare since we have local thing (base). There is no hatred against one another. Here only Patriot Party (*Vatan Partisi*), the old Worker Party (*İşçi Partisi)* attacks us…They do not even dare. Because they are not even 50 people whereas we

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[77] (In Turkish) Kadıköy'de şöyle bir rahatlık var diye biliniyor. Kadıköy biraz daha elit kesimin yaşadığı daha entelektüel bir kesimin yaşadığı yer olduğu için, doğal olarak, bireysel olarak da kendimizi de ifade etmemiz daha kolay. Ama buranın da bazı sıkıntıları handikapları var. Burada da çok yoğun ulusalcılar yaşıyorlar. Onların da bizi hoş karşılamadıkları dönemler oluyor.

[78] (In Turkish) 90'larda bile saldırı olasılığı aklıma gelmedi.

[79](In Turkish) Burada ki CHP'nin daha olumsuz bir noktada olduğunu söyleyebiliyoruz Türkiye'nin birçok illerine göre. Ege tipi milliyetçilik dediğimiz bir milliyetçilik hastalığı var burada. Bir de buradaki CHP'liler örneğin Ankara'da İstanbul'da 1 Mayıs'ı birlikte yapıyoruz işte Burhaniye'de birlikte yapıyoruz 8 Mart'ı birlikte kutluyoruz ama buradaki CHP'lilerle ne 1 Mayıs'ı ne de 8 Mart'ı birlikte kutlayamıyoruz. Bildiğiniz klasik milliyetçi önyargılar işte. 1 Mayıs'ı İstiklal Marşı ile açmak, Kürtçe slogana karşı olmak, kadınların zılgıt çekmesine, bırakın slogan atmayı, kadınların zılgıt çekmesine karşı çıkan bir CHP zihniyetiyle karşı karşıyayız. …Hemen yanı başımızda Burhaniye'de aynı CHP ile beraber 1 Mayıs kutladık ve üstelik daha ilginç bir şey söyleyeyim, biz HDP olarak alana girerken CHP'liler bizi alkışladılar. Yani böyle bir hoşgörüyü Burhaniye'de 35 km mesafede yaşarken Ayvalık'ta bu hoşgörüyü yaşayamıyoruz.

can gather 500 people in the street when we whistle" (Interview with Hanefi Şahin, President of HDP Balıkesir Burhaniye District, 2 June 2015).[80]

This interplay of party ideologies with social setting should be taken into account also for the areas with the AKP voter bases. To give an example, the conservatism in Elazığ or Afyon which is interwoven with Turkish nationalism and more intolerant toward the social, cultural, political expressions of Kurdish identity can be different from the conservatism in Kayseri or Konya which has more tones of political Islam with an aim at melting Kurdish identity within the banner of Muslim identity. This point should be inquired in further investigations.

Moreover, it is imperative to note that the police interference is a very important factor which affects the mobility of riot networks. While in India, the close relations between politicians, police forces and riot networks influence where and when communal violence erupt (Wilkinson 2004); in Turkey, police forces are rebuked for remaining passive or inactive in communal riots no matter the political identity of local government as they are centrally appointed security forces. As one of my interviewees with a long political carrier in pro-Kurdish party recounts:

The treatment of police does not change according to municipalities. We cannot recognize this at least, we do not feel it within the dimensions of general repression (Hüseyin Gözen, HDP Marmara Regional Coordination, 14 May 2015).[81]

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[80] (In Turkish) Ayvalık'ta biz 2 sene öncesine kadar, 3 sene öncesine kadar basın açıklaması bile zor yapıyorduk, yapamıyorduk bile. Burhaniye'de biz 30 yıldır bu işleri yapıyoruz. 1 Mayıslar hep burada yapılır, bilmemneler yapılır… Burada daha rahat olmamızın nedeni gerçekten burada Burhaniye'de gerek sosyal demokratlar, gerekse eskiden devrimcilerin çok yoğun olduğu, hakim olduğu bir yer. Mesela Emek Partisi burada eskiden beri güçlüdür. Hatta Emek Partisi başkanı Abdullah Varlı buralıdır. Bu anlamda yerli kesimden de şeyimiz olduğu için çok cesaret edemiyorlar. Böyle çok kindar birbirine karşı şeyli yok. Burada sadece geçmişin İşçi Partisi burada Vatan Partisi bize saldırıyor. Onlar da cesaret edemiyorlar çünkü toplasan 50 kişi yoklar biz ıslık çalsan sokağa 500 kişi toplarız.

[81] (In Turkish) Polisin davranışı belediyeye göre değişmez, en azından biz bunun farkında olmayız, genel baskı içerisinde hissetmeyiz.

The words of Mustafa Akdoğan, the Vice-Governor in Afyon who was consulted upon the harassment of Kurdish students in Afyon Kocatepe University by the IHD also display that the main responsible for the treatment of police forces is the central administration that assigns them:

He said that if there is a situation in which police should take side, the determinant of this posture is determined by those who assign these people (IHD Research and Examination report on the violations experienced by students of Afyon Kocatepe University, 25 Janary 2015).[82]

Many incidents of non-occurrence regarding communal violence against Kurds, as one of them is aforementioned, show that police forces have capacity to intervene efficiently to halt the riot networks. Besides, these communal violence incidents grow because they are tolerated (and sometimes applauded) by local governors and law officers. Mob attacks against migrants, minority groups pinpoint the insufficiency of law to protect vulnerable people. While mobs take up the responsibility of state apparatus to judgment and punishment, state monopoly of violence is replaced by private policing and privatization of justice. Therefore, the interaction between institutions which are vested with law enforcement authority and mob attacks should be closely examined. While state repression decreased against pro-Kurdish party and Kurdish identity, the discourse based on criminalization of Kurdish identity is still floating in the mindset of law officers. Regarding communal violence against Kurds, the victims are highly complainant about the late intervention of police forces or their passive posture during the riots. Regarding the mob attacks against pro-Kurdish parties, party cadres complain that although their offices are closely watched and surveyed by MOBESE cameras, the attackers are not found or those who are found are not taken seriously or released for "being drunk". Many interviewees especially people working for pro-Kurdish parties told me

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[82] (In Turkish) "… polisin taraf olması gibi bir durum varsa da bu tavrı belirleyeninin o polisleri atayan kişiler olduğun söylemiştir".

that they do not even report some incidents to the police predicting that their complaint would not produce any result. It is very rare that perpetrators are found in attacks against Kurds. Police forces intervene when incidents begin to exacerbate. For example, in Altınova incidents where two people died and attacks against Kurds' workplaces and houses took place, only the one who ended up with killing two peoples was charged. One of my local interviewee in Ayvalık told that he took 48 years of imprisonment for this but perpatrators were not tried for lynching. Police take provocateurs into custody only in the case of serious injury or death. Even in Bilecik Bozyöyük where demonstrators tried to burn buses filled with crowds that came for demonstration against Abdullah Öcalan's isolation, police did not take any perpetrator into custody. In the case of seventeen year old E.C who was exposed to lynching for singing a Kurdish song, Usküdar Child Bureau sent him to prosecution for "being sympathizer of PKK and exacerbating the population". The prosecution released him afterwards. In most cases, these are the victims who are investigated by the police.

Communal violence reframes the conceptualization of popular justice in local context. Law is not just mere codes that regulate relationships and judge them but it has the "cultural power of law" that shapes and reshapes relationships, defines and produces meaning and identities (Merry 2000). People who will be afraid to break the legal rules in normal times dare to participate into group beating or looting because they feel omnipotent as a mob and probably think that security forces will be empathetic to them or not intervene. Local cleavages are also involved in these violent acts since pro-Kurdish parties find their rivals and/or Kurdish victims find their acquaintances attacking their workplaces or houses. Thus, for those who are disturbed from political and economic competition in local context, ethnic tensions serve them to solve local conflicts without any prosecution since many cases are closed without any liability, result with displacement and/or investigation of victims. Many communal attacks against Kurdish workers ended up with their investigation and

displacement to other provinces. Moreover, courts are affected by the racialization of Kurdish identity. In the case of communal attacks against a Kurdish family in Denizli that also ended up with their displacement, the court showed "regional differences" as a plausible reason for ethnic violence (Çivril Assize Crime Court cited by Bayır 2013: 138).

4.6. Conclusion

In one comprehensive survey, Horowitz (2001) points out three conditions of deadly ethnic riots. Firstly, a hostile relationship between groups that can entice them to killing is preexistent. Secondly, they rely on social support and they are backed by local leaders who justify these incidents. Thirdly, security forces leave the door of communal violence incidents open by implicitly letting them, not interfering directly or being sympathetic to the rioters. In Turkey, although there are worrisome signs of intolerance against Kurds, there is not an entrenched animosity between people identified with Turkish and Kurdish identity. Communal violence against Kurds ends up rarely with death. Thus, it is plausible to assume that the general aim of these kinds of violent events is to intimidate rather than to destroy which is the outcome of lynching in its proper term. In the last decade, not only the state repression over Kurdish identity has significantly dampened down, but also pro-Kurdish party, frustrated at continuing marginalization is mobilized for socio-political change. This assertion has challenged the political dynamics and undermined the basis of the system which has kept Kurdish problem so far in the background under the securitization discourse (Somer 2015). The attacks against Kurds and pro-Kurdish party increase during general elections period because identities are now more salient during election times and their political weight is enhanced by their increased ability to challenge the political center. I observe in my research a variation among provinces in Turkey related to social support for these acts since communal violence against Kurds increases in statist and nationalist-defined areas of Western Turkey. Concerning the support of state authorities, the investigation and prosecution process

of communal violence incidents in Turkey end up with more victimization of the victims. In this regard, I propose to revise Turkey's coding in the Minorities at Risk project database as displaying intercommunal conflict at the third level, which is described as, "sporadic violent attacks by gangs or other small group: attacks without weapons (e.g., brawls), knives, or few small arms (e.g., one or two handguns) involving fewer than 20 people" (Minorities at Risk Project, 2009).

While the myth of homogeneity of Turkish national identity is shattered irreversibly in the last era, the ethnic heterogeneity is now visible, which points not only to a multicultural society but also to the possibility of exploitation and manipulation of boundaries in public sphere. Security forces, community activists and politicians should take a stronger public stand against these incidents and not downplay them as "public reaction". The most visible signs of these incidents are triggering events connected to rumors about the possible relationship of alleged offenders to the PKK. These kinds of rumors provide prior knowledge to the public and to the police to take precaution against potential attempts to collective violence.

The current data and analyses are not without limitations. For example, while I went to fieldwork associating provinces with political tendencies, I found out that the city level is a big scale to associate them with one political tendency whereas neighborhoods within provinces display diverse political tendencies. While in Northern Ireland, the USA, India, studies on communal violence and on how neighborhood characteristics affect communal violence are analyzed with ward-level data compiled with ethnic data; this kind of micro-level data, even the macro-level data does not exist in Turkey. Thus, this study can be considered as a first step for further investigations. Moreover, the interviews can be enlarged to all political actors and civil society networks operating in different neighborhoods of provinces analyzing the problem from an interethnic peace perspective. I do not find it plausible to interview them

with a questionnaire concentrated on communal violence against Kurds considering nationalist environment of these provinces.

Overall, this study adds in important ways to the scarce studies on interethnic violence in Turkey. It suggests alternative ways to conceptualize and measure "lynching" incidents in Turkey and to understand how political parties' interaction with social setting can affect the mass mobilization against Kurdish identity in local context.

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5. ONGOING COMMUNAL TENSIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Petrol bombs thrown at police in Ardoyne

Police have used water cannon on rioters in the Catholic Ardoyne area in north Belfast.

Petrol bombs have been thrown at police. Some of the rioters have also pushed a burning car towards police lines.

Earlier, 24 Orange Order marchers completed a contentious parade past the area.

Some nationalists object to the parade which marks William III's victory at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690.

After the burning car was extinguished, police decided it would be safe for a planned protest parade by The Greater Ardoyne Residents' Collective, to go ahead.

Earlier, police said the Orange Order parade had passed "peacefully" and "in accordance with the Parades Commission determination".

The representatives of three Orange lodges, carrying three banners, were escorted by riot police as they walked past Ardoyne.

The marchers were completing a controversial parade within a deadline set by the Parades Commission.

There was some shouting from nationalist protestors as the small group of marchers went past.

Hundreds of loyalists were waiting to welcome them when they had passed the contentious area.

The marchers had been taken to north Belfast by bus to meet a 16:00BST deadline set by the Parades Commission.

Orangemen say it was a peaceful solution to allow them to complete their return parade from the main celebrations to their Orange halls in north Belfast.

Meanwhile in the mainly nationalist village of Crumlin, in County Antrim, a Twelfth of July Orange parade complied with a Parades Commission ruling and all lodges except the local ones took an alternative route to a dispersal point.

Only the nine local district lodges and five bands are taking the full return route back through the village.

Elsewhere, police in Craigavon advised motorists to avoid the Drumbeg estate area following the hijacking of a bus.

All bus services between Lurgan and Craigavon were diverted past all estates.

Although Turkey is undergoing peace negotiations' process and Northern Ireland ended significantly the war with the GFA, any person who visited both countries can recognize that Turks and Kurds are more at ease with each other with more cross-cutting ties whereas Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland are more on the edge about sectarian tensions with segregated areas, segregated schooling etc. Rather than a post-peace process in a positive sense associated with robust justice, liberty, equity with heightened levels of security and relatively little violence (Galtung 1975), Northern Ireland can be described as a post-war society 16 years after the GFA. Many conflict scholars demonstrate that post-war processes are also replete with problems, bottlenecks and setbacks which can produce a weak and fragile peace unless the absence of violence accompanies fundamental social transformation (Burton 1990, 1996; Galtung 1969, 1975, 1996; Lederach 1995, 1997; Mitchell 1994, 2002). Moreover, the GFA was a beginning of reconciliation of former belligerents and post-war period of Northern Ireland is going on with peace negotiations such as the case of 2014 Stormont House Agreement. From the perspective of peace literature, while the peace between Britain and Ireland can be considered as "warm peace" since the possibility of an interstate state war is unexpected between joint democracies (Bayer 2010), the peace between Catholics and Protestants can be considered as "cold peace" (Goertz 2006) in which contending sides recognize their right to existence but the prospect of a war did not disappear off the radar due to the ongoing activities of militant dissidents although the likelihood of a war decreased significantly. The case of Northern Ireland is no different as many scholars described the post-war context in Northern Ireland as "no peace, no war" (MacGinty 2008), "imperfect peace" (Monaghan 2004), or "in the shadow of the gun" (Sluka 2009). These epithets refer to a post-war environment in which the use of violence is still in the horizon and

feeds into fears about a potential lapse back into collective violence. In today's Northern Ireland, "people do not have to look over their shoulder anymore", the most common phase I have heard from my interviewees about the peace. While the daily political violence is now off the radar, sporadic communal violence still makes the news. The GFA enabled an increased level of safety with the relative absence of violence. However, thirty years of political violence have left its bones all over the place leaving behind an increased level of distrust between communities. The euphoria created by the atmosphere of peace agreement left its place in its first years to anxiety about the durability of peace process after Omagh bombing,[83]increase of internal feuding within paramilitary organizations, Holy Cross dispute.[84]As Mulholland (2002: 151) states: "Many commentators in the summer of 2001 thought that the gulf between the two communities – in their aspirations and social lives – to have been wider than at any time in the previous 30 years".

Despite the dramatic decrease in security-related deaths and sectarian incidents in recent years in Northern Ireland, the perceived vulnerability to communal attacks looms large in people's minds. The tensions between Ulster unionist and Irish nationalist communities which boil every summer through the parade season not only keep the locals on the edge about sectarian attacks but also intimidate immigrants who are afraid that these tensions may veer in the direction of racist attacks. Residents in Northern Ireland still associate safety with their segregated neighborhoods.[85] They are resilient about keeping the peace lines, physical

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[83] Omagh bombing was a car bomb explosion in Omagh, County Tyrone on 15 August 1998 by the Real IRA, militant republican dissident group that opposed to the Good Friday Agreement. 29 people are killed as a result of the incident.

[84] Holy Cross disputes erupted in 2001 in North Belfast, the area most affected by the political violence. North Belfast is a patchwork of Catholic and Protestant communities segregated along peacelines. Holy Cross Girls' Primary School, a Catholic primary school for girls, remains in the predominantly Protestant areas. Upon the rumors about nationalists attacking Protestants' homes, loyalist protesters started picketing schoolchildren and their parents that ran for months.

[85] 2012/2013 Northern Ireland Crime Survey shows that 59 per cent of respondents think that crime in Northern Ireland has increased in the last two years, only 33 per cent perceive a parallel increase in local crimes (Cadogan and. Campbell 2014).

barriers separating the communities which were built up during the Troubles. A recent research shows that although 58 per cent of respondents want to see the destruction of peace walls in the future, the same percentage is also unsure about the police ability to ensure their safety once they are removed and 68 per cent of respondents still think that peace walls are necessary to keep them safe and protect from sectarian attacks (Byrne, Gormley-Heenan and Robinson 2012). Existential anxiety has been a constant feature of Northern Ireland based on "fear of what can happen, rather than what 'is'" (Kay 2012: 243). This chapter analyzes the reasons of ongoing communal tensions based on three forms of communal violence: attacks of dissident paramilitaries, communal tensions around interfaces and rise of racist attacks against immigrants.

In Northern Ireland, riots do not stem from the electoral calculations of politicians in order to maximize their votes as argued by Wilkinson (2004). The main reason for that is the low level electoral competition in Northern Ireland because of the entrenched political preferences of Protestants and Catholics. Other than the Alliance party, nationalist and unionist political parties are unable to appeal to the voters of the other community. While the DUP, the UUP and some minor unionist parties are able to appeal to Protestants; Sinn Fein, the SDLP and other minor nationalist parties are able to appeal to Catholics. Given the very unlikely chances for cross-community voting, intracommunal voting is much more intense than intercommunity voting. 16 years after the GFA, it still highly unlikely for Protestants to vote for nationalist parties and for Catholics to vote for unionist parties. Even the political parties do not make an effort to put their posters up in other's group's areas:

It (rioting) is more to do with parades through the summer, tensions around interfaces. Elections don't really have a big impact on those sorts of tensions because people tend to vote, in unionist areas, they vote for unionist and vice versa. The political parties do not do a

lot, in terms of putting posters up in other group's areas. They will only put their posters up in their own areas (interview with Dr. Neil Jarman,[86] 22 August 2014).

Furthermore, the nature of communal rioting in Northern Ireland is different from India-Muslim riots in India or riots against Kurds in Western Turkey. Residential segregation and peace lines separating Catholic and Protestant neighborhoods are in itself an obstacle to spontaneous and direct Protestant-Catholic confrontations. While the communal riots in India and in Western Turkey undergo the establishment of social networks across unconnected persons in the scene and mob mobilization against an ethically-defined target, communal rioting in Northern Ireland offers that the existence of paramilitaries who hold the control of some neighborhoods provide ready-made social networks and riot specialists capable to inflame communal tensions. The riots which erupt by the youth networks of the PKK in Kurdish-inhabited areas of Eastern Turkey against security forces resemble more to the riots in Northern Ireland due to the legitimacy and status of paramilitary networks in communities. As pointed out in the earlier chapters, paramilitaries arise from a dynamic relationship between state policies, communities and militants. As long as communities turn into defensive communities alienated from security forces and state policies, they produce militants that hold the role of in-group policing instead of police forces. Paramilitaries play the role of "riot specialists" defined by Brass, "persons who are active at all times in monitoring the daily life of the town or city in the areas in which they reside or which they frequent" (Brass 1997: 285). During the Troubles as well, the opportunity for communal rioting and for violence between Protestants and Catholics were undercut by the presence of the British Army, residential segregation and privatization of violence in the hands of paramilitaries (Macginty 2000). Paramilitary organizations were the major social institutions in which personal and

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[86] Neil Jarman is specialized in the political transition of Northern Ireland and he is the director of the Institute for Conflict Research. He has many articles on the role of the civil society in peacebuilding; vigilantism and the control of violence; public order policing; hate crimes and issues related to migration and cultural diversity.

communal revenge were funneled through during the Troubles. Although the peace process sapped their strength and their social base, some of them are still able to maintain their social and economic infrastructure. The continuing residential segregation also prevents us to see the entire picture of hate crime and communal rioting in Northern Irish society since it is in itself a structural barrier to direct Protestant-Catholic confrontations.

This section addresses the developments in Northern Ireland after the GFA and discusses why there is still ongoing small-scale communal violence. Firstly, it displays the scope of ongoing communal violence in Northern Ireland. Secondly, it presents the institutional structure produced by the GFA and questions whether the GFA is able to produce an institutional framework which overcomes communal divisions. Thirdly, it discusses the underlying social infrastructure which provides a proper social framework for communal tensions to flourish on the basis of paramilitaries, defensive communities and residential segregation. This section argues that the institutional structure established by the GFA could not de-activate the polarization of identities in Northern Ireland. Firstly, the cleavage structure and political competition produced by the GFA left the cleavage competition along ethno-nationalist lines unchanged, thus, generated a political arena susceptible to ethnic outbidding. Secondly, the working class areas are still vulnerable to mobilization along communal lines since the social tissue of certain working class neighborhoods based on paramilitary control, defensive communities and residential segregation continues to provide propitious social networks which can be activated during communal tensions. The data for this section is collected in Northern Ireland based on semi-structured interviews with local community workers working for conflict resolution, five interviews with local deputies from different political parties and the fieldwork in North and West Belfast where I conducted informal interviews with residents.

5.1.The scope of Communal Violence

5.1.1. Spoiler paramilitary violence

The termination of war and/or the provisions of peace agreement do not satisfy some groups who use violence to sabotage the agreement, keep the flame of resistance alive and raise their voice in its content and implementation. These groups called as spoilers are the "leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it" (Stedman 1997:5). In Northern Ireland, the main loyalist and republican paramilitary groups became signatories of the GFA and agreed to the provisions related to their decommissioning and demilitarization of their structure. Upon seven years of negotiations and pressures upon the Provisional IRA (PIRA) and its political wing, Sinn Fein, the Independent Commission on Decommissioning announced in 2005 that the PIRA finally completed the decommissioning of its weaponry. However, only the main organization was disbanded leaving behind militant dissident republicans not content with the GFA, notably the Real IRA (RIRA), the Continuity IRA (CIRA), Óglaigh na hÉireann (ONH). The 1998 Omagh bombing that killed 29 people was the largest-scale activity of militant dissidents. They also continue to launch bomb attacks targeting police stations, soldiers, courthouses including Catholic police officers in order to deter them from joining in the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI).[87] The violent dissident republicanism database from 1997 to 2010 shows 711 violent incidents, 187 non-violent incidents and 70 incidents labeled as threat of violence with an overall increase after 2007 (Horgan and Morrison 2011: 646). The militant dissidents also engage in moral policing

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[87] Police officers are exposed to threats and attacks of militant dissidents. A young Catholic policeman was murdered by dissidents in 2011 using a car bomb. According to Police Federation chairman Terry Spence, an estimated 64 PSNI officers had to be re-housed because of the threats of militant dissidents. See Authorities accused of turning back on threatened police officers. *The Legacy*.   February 3, 2014, available at: http://www.thedetail.tv/issues/304/displaced-policing-story-for-legacy-series/authorities-accused-of-turning-back-on-threatened-police-officers (accessed July 25, 2014).

executing punishment attacks and other forms of vigilante justice against suspected drug dealers and sex offenders (Ibid.: 643, Monaghan 2004). However, the militant activities of dissident republicans remain minor and limited compared to the PIRA. As the Independent Monitoring Commission's (IMC) report indicates, their violent campaign "in no way matches the range and tempo of the PIRA campaign of the Troubles" (IMC 2010: 6). On the other side, the primary paramilitary organizations of loyalism, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), Red Hand Commandos (RHC), Ulster Defense Association (UDA) and Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) adopted a conflict transformation role and banned its members who perpetuate sectarian violence and criminality (Monaghan and Shirlow 2011: 650-651). The UDA announced "the war is over" in its statement of Remembrance Day in 2007. In 2009, the UVF and the RHC announced the decommissioning of arms. However, not all factions of these organizations are committed to conflict resolution leaving behind groups that engage in criminal activities. Loyalist paramilitaries are more fractured and composed of loose structures compared to the PIRA, thus, they have more factions that take the lead in criminal business such as drug-dealing, robbery, the sale of counterfeit goods, intimidation and extortion. The IMC's report states that "In contrast to PIRA, loyalist groups are finding it very difficult to contemplate going out of business" (IMC 2011: 14). This year, the veteran members of the UVF who are at loggerheads with the current leadership revealed to the public that the UVF is making a fortune from racketeering and taxing of its own men and continue its recruitment filling its ranks out of drug dealers, unemployed, people inclined to anti-social behavior (Belfast Telegraph.co.uk, 13 October 2014). The IMC also acknowledges that the UDA continues the recruitment of youth which is "inconsistent with an organisation which is going out of business as a paramilitary group" (IMC 2010: 18). Republican and loyalist spoiler groups' time-to-time activities put into suspicion the decommissioning and revive the fears about a potential return to political violence. The figures of British Irish Rights Watch

reported by Sluka display 240 conflict-related deaths during the peace process until July 2007 which "indicates an average of from 16 to 22 deaths per year from political violence since 'peace' replaced 'war' in Northern Ireland" (Sluka 2009: 284). Sluka's study also points to the internal feuding among loyalist paramilitaries as 65 per cent of punishment attacks between 1999 and 2005 were executed by loyalist paramilitaries. The PSNI statistics show a significant decrease in the number of paramilitary shooting and bombings incidents after 2005, particularly in 2006/07 and 2007/08 which increased thereafter (see Table XXI). The causalities due to paramilitary-style assaults and shootings also lowered down after 2005 from three-digit numbers to two-digit numbers which heightened to three digit numbers only in 2009-2010 until 2014. In addition, the security-related deaths dropped substantially to one death per year starting from 2010/2010 which increased to two only in 2012/2013. Nonetheless, these numbers are not sufficient to completely allay the fears about a potential return to political violence since communities have not entirely withdrawn their support from paramilitaries. The results of survey point out a minor but worrisome level of public sympathy for paramilitaries which can be bred if intercommunal relations deteriorate. Based on the 2010 Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Northern Ireland General Election survey, Evans and Tonge (2012) find that 14 per cent of people from nationalist backgrounds sympathize with dissident republicans. This percentage is higher among people who categorize themselves as nationalists. Although this does not mean an unconditional support for violence, this percentage points out the potential of sympathy to opt out of the peace process that can be cultivated. The results of 2007 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey also show that rather than a repugnance of violence, communities demonstrate certain levels of sympathy for loyalist and republican paramilitaries who have used violence during the Troubles.

Table XIX. Sympathy for loyalist groups that have used violence

Finally, thinking about the reasons why some Loyalists groups have used violence during the troubles, would you say that you have any sympathy with the reasons for the violence - even if you don't condone the violence itself? Would you say you have…

	%		
	Catholic	**Protestant**	**No religion**
A lot of sympathy	3	3	1
A little sympathy	24	27	26
Or, no sympathy at all	70	69	73
Don't know	3	1	0

Source: 2007 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, available at
http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2007/Political_Attitudes/ LOYVIOL.html (September 15, 2014).

Table XX. Sympathy for republican groups that have used violence

And thinking about the reasons why some Republican groups have used violence during the troubles, would you say that you have any sympathy with the reasons for the violence - even if you don't condone the violence itself? Would you say you have…

	%		
	Catholic	**Protestant**	**No religion**
A lot of sympathy	11	1	2
A little sympathy	31	19	26
Or, no sympathy at all	55	79	72
Don't know	3	1	0

**Source: 2007 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, available at
http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2007/Political_Attitudes/REPVIOL.html (September 15, 2014).**

Table XXI. PSNI Security Statistics 1998/1999-2013/2014

Period	Deaths due to security situation	Shooting Incidents	Bombing incident	Casualties as a result of paramilitary-style assaults and shootings
1998-1999	44	187	123	245
1999-2000	7	131	66	178
2000-2001	18	331	177	323
2002-2003	17	358	318	302
2002-2003	15	348	178	309
2003-2004	7	207	71	298
2004-2005	4	167	48	209
2005-2006	6	156	81	152
2006-2007	4	58	20	74
2007-2008	1	42	23	52
2008-2009	5	54	46	61
2009-2010	2	79	50	127
2010-2011	1	72	99	83
2011-2012	1	67	56	79
2012-2013	2	64	44	63
2013-2014	1	54	69	70

Source: Police Service of Northern Ireland (2013/2014: 9).

Table XXII. Trends in Racist and Sectarian Incidents

Period	Racist Incidents	Secterian Incidents
1998	106	-
1999	186	-
2000	285	-
2001	222	-
2002-2003	226	-
2004-2005	813	-
2005-2006	936	1.701
2006-2007	1.047	1.695
2007-2008	976	1.584
2008-2009	990	1.595
2009-2010	1.038	1.840
2010-2011	842	1.437
2011-2012	696	1.344
2012-2013	750	1.372

Source: Figures for racist incidents between 1998 and 2004 are taken from Jarman (2012:5). Figures for the period 2004-2005 onwards are taken from the PSNI which began recording hate crimes and incidents in April 2004. See Police Service of Northern Ireland (2013:9).

Table XXIII. Armed groups in Northern Ireland, 2007

All of these groups – including the British security forces – are required to either demilitarize (security forces) or disarm completely (paramilitaries) as part of the peace process agreement:

Republican (Catholic):

Irish National Liberation Army (INLA): On ceasefire, but has not disarmed or disbanded.

Real IRA (RIRA): Small breakaway group, responsible for disastrous premature bomb explosion in Omagh in 1998 which killed 29 and injured hundreds. Nearly inactive, but in 2007 increased their low-level campaign of mostly hoax and incendiary bomb attacks.

Continuity IRA (CIRA): Even smaller breakaway group. Like RIRA, also began to escalate in 2007.

Loyalist (Protestant)

Ulster Defence Association: On ceasefire, but violence against Catholics has continued, and feuds with other loyalist paramilitary groups have increased. Split into two factions following a feud in 2007.

Ulster Volunteer Force: Like UDA. In May 2007 they issued a statement declaring an end to their military activities and that their arms had been 'put beyond use', but this was considered a stunt since they did not engage with the disarmament commission and a new UVF hit-list targeting republicans was discovered the previous month.

Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF): Like UDA, but claimed to have 'stood down' at end of 2005 in response to end of IRA campaign. Their associated 'death squads' – Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), Red Hand Commandos, Red Hand Defenders, Protestant Action Force, etc.: Like UDA. In 2007, the UDA claimed that they stood down the UFF.

Security forces

British Army: At the end of July 2007 the British army officially ended their counterinsurgency campaign in Northern Ireland, although a permanent 'military garrison' of 5000 troops will remain.

Royal Irish Rifles (formerly Ulster Defence Regiment): The locally recruited Ulster Protestant battalions were gradually being disbanded.

Police Service Northern Ireland (PSNI); partly reformed and partly demilitarized.
Source: Sluka (2009: 286)

5.1.2. Violence around interfaces

In Northern Ireland, communal tensions are concentrated in certain areas, especially around interfaces where segregated Catholic and Protestant neighborhoods meet. These neighborhoods are surrounded by peace lines which refer to physical barriers separating Catholic and Protestant neighborhoods. Interface areas are " conjunctions of working class residential zones which identify with opposing ethnic/political communities areas around peacelines (physical barriers separating both communities)" (Jarman 2004:1). For example, the Short Strand, used in the news at the beginning of this chapter, is the Catholic enclave in a loyalist/unionist dominated neighborhood. During my visit to the Short Strand in the aftermath of the attacks against residents' homes, the residents told me that they were used to these types of tensions in the summer and there was a "tacitly accepted level of violence" in neighborhoods under the control of paramilitaries.

Tacitly accepted level of violence exists in many areas. Increasingly in some areas people will work with the police, report to the police, they will try to stop the violence. There are some areas worse than others recently. Say for example, around Short Strand, tensions have been worse. The UVF there are at odds with the UVF, the main commander of the UVF in the West of the city. So the UVF in the East of the city is more criminal in terms of protecting their territory. They do abducting and things like that. In some areas, you find people from republican groups and people from loyalist areas, they work together to reduce tensions in interfaces. In East Belfast, this is not happening at the moment. Because it probably suits the people in the UVF particular to keep the tensions there. It gives them an opportunity, you know, they recruit people to get them to attack, in violence around interfaces. That gets them rolled into the organization and committed to the organization. In some parts of the city, tensions are much lower. It is not the same in all interfaces. You have to look at these specifics of particular interface areas (interview with Dr. Neil Jarman, 22 August 2014).

This situation is no different to some other areas of Belfast. North Belfast is emblematic of the tensions in interface areas as it is a patchwork of nationalist and loyalist communities compared to West and East Belfast composed of more homogenous communities and segregated peace lines. Apart from communal tensions around interfaces,

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unionist-nationalist confrontations also occur in Belfast during the demonstrations or protests such as anti-internment marches, demonstrations for Palestine-Israel conflict.[88] But the number of these confrontations is lower compared to those around interface areas. Balcelli, Daniel and Escribà-Folch (2014)'s quantitative research on sectarian violence in post-conflict period, between 2005 and 2012, demonstrates that low-intensity intergroup violence in Northern Ireland peaks in wards characterized by ethnic parity and in predominantly Catholic (Protestant) wards that border predominantly Protestant (Catholic) wards. The underlying reason is that groups have strategic incentives, either material incentives such as subsidized housing or public schools or non-material incentives such as cultural rights, and opportunities to perpetrate sectarian attacks in these wards. They also find out that the areas which experienced highest fatalities during the Troubles are still the places more vulnerable to sectarian violence. Thus, the legacy of civil war penetrates into intergroup dynamics of post-conflict period.

Figure XX. Sectarian Violence in Northern Ireland (2005-2012)

Source: Balcells, Daniels and Escribà-Folch's (2013:28) elaboration using Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency.

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[88]Demonstrations for Israel-Palestine conflict sometimes turn into nationalist-unionist confrontations in Northern Ireland reviving the tensions between the settler and the native.

Figure XXI. Peace line on Westbourne Street in unionist East Belfast overlooking nationalist Short

Figure XXII. Peace line in Alexander Park, North Belfast dividing nationalist and unionist areas

Figure XXIII. Peace line dividing nationalist Newington Street from the Limestone Road

Note: North Belfast is a patchwork of sectarian enclaves. Here is the peace line dividing nationalist Newington Street from the Limestone Road which is also a flashpoint of sectarian tensions between the predominantly nationalist Parkside and Newington areas and the predominantly unionist Tiger's Bay and Halliday's Road areas.

The tensions around interfaces do not arise out of electoral motivations as noted above but out of political and cultural symbolism reenergized each summer during the times of parades. Cultural expressions donated with political and religious symbolism have a strong role in Northern Ireland carrying out mostly divisive connotations for both communities. They breed ethnicity-inflected identities and perpetuate the communal division within Northern Irish society in post-war process (MacGinty and Darby 2002). Northern Ireland has a vast network of civil society with numerous bands, youth or cultural groups. Thousands of marches are organized in every summer. Especially, the Orange Order marches revive sectarian tensions every summer around the 12th of July, the commemoration of the Battle of Boyne which celebrates the victory of William of Orange in 1690, the Protestant King of England's victory over Catholic king James II. While the routes of these marches passed through the Catholic neighborhoods in the past, nationalists and Catholic residents in some areas oppose to these marches today perceiving them as affirmation of Protestant superiority

and demand their ban or rerouting. While unionist parties view the parades as part of Protestant culture and basic rights and liberties, nationalist parties sensitive to Catholic communities' demands ask for their rerouting based on the parity of esteem principle recognized by the GFA.

Youth of marginalized communities and paramilitaries are the major actors of riots and sectarian tensions during the summer. Some sections of the youth find this experience as exciting and fun called as "recreational rioting" referring to a social rather than political activity which appears by itself and beyond the control of local community or security forces (Jarman 2005, 2008; Jarman and O'Halloran 2001). The flag protests which erupted last year with many communal attacks and rioting illustrate the potent force of cultural symbolism in Northern Ireland. The decision of Belfast City Council to fly the Union Jack (the national flag of the United Kingdom) on designated days provoked sectarian attacks, unionists' protests and riots. The UVF, paramilitary force of loyalists, also held a leading role in the organization of protests with the Ulster Protestant Voice. After this incident, the number of flags hanging in segregated areas increased.

5.1.3. Racist attacks

With the peace process, Northern Ireland became a more stable and prosperous place. The absence of violence and the economic growth in the aftermath of the GFA increased the net in-migrant emigration with more migrants in the region (Jarman 2006). Racist attacks came into public limelight after the GFA (Jarman and Monaghan 2003, Lentin and McVeigh 2006). The BBC marked Belfast as 'Race Hate Capital of Europe' (BBC Online 2004). Jarman (2003) shows 400 per cent increase in the racially motivated crimes from 1996 to 2000 based on the police statistics. Racist attacks are linked to sectarian communal tensions not only because sectarianism is also a form of racism (McVeigh and Rolston 2007) but also

some of the racist incidents are directly or indirectly related to communal rioting. To give an example, in the aftermath of flag protests in 2013, not only communal riots in Protestant and Catholic areas occurred but also attacks against immigrants' properties took place. Locals and immigrants are also exposed to intimidation that drives them out of their homes due to sectarian, racist or paramilitary assaults. The Northern Ireland Housing Executive notes a boost in the number of people driven out of their homes due to the outbursts of flag protests which rose from 288 cases in 2008-2009 to 411 in 2012-2013. Most of the racist attacks occur in poorly developed working class areas but this does not mean that all the residents in these areas are racist (interview with Peter Shirlow, 21 August 2014).

Immigrants settle more in Protestant-populated areas since these areas have more spaces due to decreasing Protestant population and de-industrialization whereas Catholics areas are more crowded due to increased Catholic population. Immigrants are still exposed to racist attacks particularly in East and South Belfast with the involvement of loyalist paramilitaries with different motivations: sectarianism, control of local community, power struggle between the paramilitary gangs. Especially in some loyalist/unionist areas, the immigrants pay protection money to loyalist paramilitaries. In my informal interviews, I met immigrant business owners who pay protection money to paramilitaries. One of them told me that he pays ten pound each week to the UDA and calls them rather than the police in case of troubles in his business believing that paramilitaries provide better protection.

In order to protect. I pay here 10 pound per week, 20 pound per two week. If they come per week, I give ten, if they come per two week, I give twenty. They protect us and they tell others "these are protected" not to touch us. For example, when we first opened up (Doner shop), they tried to frighten us. Pakistanis broke our windows. In that instant we were paying (protection money). We told them that and they were intimidated. They said "please, please don't tell. We will fix it in the morning". Then, they did not do anything to us. When we say that we are working with the UDA, people get intimidated. I made a joke to those who worked for the other UDA asking "why are not you coming?". He said that they (other UDA) came first…The big head is in Shankill (interview with a Turkish Doner shop owner, 13 August 2014).

Some of them told me stories about immigrants who were intimidated or attacked by paramilitaries since they refused to pay protection money. Some of the racist attacks arise out of the reliance of communities on paramilitaries for in-group policing. One local resident told me that she called loyalist paramilitaries due to the heavy noises of drunken immigrants in the street during the night. Immigrants are reticent to go to the police against the disturbances of paramilitaries because they not only fear possible repercussions for their business and families but they are also anxious about their immigrant status or visa applications in the country.

5.2. The Belfast Good Friday Agreement: Regulation and Reproduction of Communal Division

The GFA was an all-inclusive agreement which included not only political parties and civil society organizations but also armed actors such as nationalist and loyalist paramilitaries. Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA was not included in peace negotiations until early 1998 as a punishment for the IRA violence. The moderate actors of unionism and nationalism, the UUP and the SDLP, made significant contributions to the agreement and it was finally concluded on Good Friday,[89] 10 April 1998.

Table XXIV. From Sunningdale to the Framework Documents for the GFA

Introduction of direct rule 1972
Sunningdale Agreement and Executive 1973– 74
Rolling devolution 1982
Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985
Brook–Mayhew talks 1991–2
Downing Street Declaration 1993
Framework Documents 1995

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[89] Since the conclusion of Belfast Agreement coincided with the Good Friday of Easter week, the religious holiday on Friday proceeding Easter Sunday which commemorates the crucifixion of Jesus Christ and his death at Calvary, it is widely called as the Good Friday Agreement.

Table XXV. Negotiations until the Conclusion of the GFA

Brooke–Mayhew Talks 1991–2
Downing Street Declaration 1993
IRA ceasefire 1994
Loyalist ceasefire October 1994
Framework Documents 1995
Mitchell Commission Report January 1996
IRA bomb at Canary Wharf, London 9 February 1996
Northern Ireland Forum election 30 May 1996
Start of multi-party talks at Stormont 10 June 1996
Labour won UK General Election May 1997
IRA reinstated ceasefire July 1997
Sinn Féin admitted to inter-party talks September 1997
British and Irish Governments' 'Heads of Agreement' document January 1998
Good Friday Agreement signed 10 April 1998

The GFA is grounded upon two principles to promote interethnic peace: power-sharing arrangements and cross-community support. The Northern Ireland Assembly is designed to produce a collective executive drawn from four political parties with the highest votes in the Parliament. The Assembly is composed of 108 members elected by the single transferable vote (STV) proportional representation system. The incorporation of STV is designed to transfer votes across nationalist and unionist blocs, thus, to promote cross-cutting electoral behavior. The Members of Legislative Assembly (MLAs) cast vote designating themselves as "nationalist", "unionist" or "other" to ensure that the important decisions are held by cross-community support. The GFA introduces the requirement that all the major decisions that pass the Assembly are based on cross-community support and approved by a majority of representatives of each community. In addition, Northern Ireland communal division is recognized in the position of heads of government as the posts of First Minister and Deputy First Minister are instituted as joint premiers with equal status. They are elected

by the Assembly based on cross-community voting. In the distribution of ministerial positions, the d'Hondt system is implemented to distribute ministerial posts according to party strength. This system ensures that two main communities in Northern Ireland take seats in the government and collaborate to run the country. One of the pitfalls of this system is that the opposition remains weak as the main parties in the Assembly are also participants of the government. It also brings about slow policy-making since mutual agreements take time. Each ministry is endowed with full executive functions and is responsible to the Assembly. Thus, ministers are not required to collaborate in a cabinet or have to be in agreement in executive decisions. This is a considerable break from the collective responsibility of government in a typical parliamentary democracy.

Moreover, the "Irish dimension" is incorporated in the peace agreement as the GFA produced the North-South ministerial Council through which the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland address the issues of common concern. The GFA also institutes a British-Irish Council through which the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom can cooperate. In addition, citizens in Northern Ireland are given the right to choose or keep both British and Irish citizenship. The GFA also instituted Human Rights and Equality Commission in order to implement a comprehensive reform in security sector including the reform of police forces, release of prisoners, demilitarization of paramilitary forces. Northern Ireland is dependent on Britain for non-devolved matters for which the British secretary of state is responsible such as law and order, foreign policy. The agreement sets the principle of consent which highlights that the constitutional status of Northern Ireland can only be changed by the consent of majority.

The Agreement also takes significant steps to promote peace such as release of paramilitary groups on ceasefire and the police reform. Moreover, it includes commitments with regard to equality between Protestants and Catholics such as promotion of Irish

language, fair employment, affirmative action against discrimination. The Agreement highlights the "parity of esteem" for both cultures which recognizes the legitimacy and rights of both communities. The Agreement is at the end a historical turning point not only because it ended the political violence of three decades but also because for the first time in Northern Irish history, republicans recognized the entity of Northern Ireland and unionists and nationalists agreed to share power in a government. Irish government also declared its commitment to change Article 2 and 3 of Irish Constitution which lay territorial claims to all island.

The consociational model designed by the GFA corresponds as well to Lijphart's argument of consociationalism based on grand coalitions representative of diversity within society (Lijphart 1977: 25-52). He also proposes the proportionality in important positions, segmental autonomy and mutual veto. Horowitz (2003) opposes to Lijphart's argument on the basis that this model reifies the cleavages within society and does not produce incentives for interethnic cooperation. Horowitz (2003) like Wilkinson (2004) proposes electoral incentives to push political parties to appeal to other groups' voters in order to decrease the saliency of ethnic cleavages. The consociational model of Northern Ireland is an important laboratory to test these arguments. According to O'Leary (1999), the GFA provides "double protection" which will protect even Ulster unionists if they should ever become a minority in a united Ireland. However, many authors draw attention to that the consociational approach which aimed at incorporating unionists and nationalists in Northern Irish political arena doubled and rigidified the political division between Catholic nationalism and Protestant unionism (McAuley and Tonge 2007) and could not overcome sectarian barriers (McVeigh and Rolston 2007).

The GFA did not bring about cross-cutting cleavages in Northern Irish politics. The constitutional question still defines the political arena and maintains the voting between

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unionist-nationalist camps. The GFA did not address the core disagreement, the conflicting aspirations of unionist and nationalist communities. What the GFA accomplished is to regulate this division by recognizing conflicting aspirations and setting the principle of consent as the condition for the realization of nationalist goals. Unionist and nationalist parties even canvassed popular support for the GFA during the GFA referendum based on these conflicting aspirations (Somerville and Kirby 2012). While nationalists promoted the GFA as a slippery slope toward a united Ireland, unionist parties sought to convince their electorate showing the GFA as a reinforcement of the union with Britain. David Trimble, pro-agreement leader of the UUP, states the Agreement was "as good and as fair as it gets" (News Letter, 12 April 1998 cited by McEvoy 2008). Gerry Adams, leader of Sinn Fein writes in his memories:

Our view was that it was transitional . . . We knew from the parameters of the talks laid down by the two governments that Irish unity would not come out of this phase of the negotiations, but we set ourselves the task of weakening the British link while defending Irish national rights (Adams 2003: 367–368).

The GFA was submitted to referendum to enhance its legitimacy. It was supported by the UUP (with some opposition), the SDLP, Sinn Fein, the Alliance Party, the Women's Coalition and by two other loyalists parties: the Progressive Unionist Party and the Ulster Democratic Party. The DUP under Ian Paisley leadership rejected the Agreement and urged voters to vote no to the referendum with the slogan "IT'S Right to say "NO". The GFA is supported by 71.1 per cent of voters in Northern Ireland and by 95 per cent of voters in the Republic of Ireland. But nearly half of the unionist voters opposed to the GFA as an opinion poll reports that 55 per cent of unionists supported the GFA (McEvoy 2008: 121). The referendum also included constitutional changes to the Irish Constitution annulling article 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution.

The June 1998 elections showed that the ability of single transferable vote was limited to generate cross-community voting since the cross-community vote transfer remained low among nationalist and unionist voters. When the executive was convened in November 1999, it included four main political parties: the UUP; the SDLP; the DUP; and Sinn Féin leaving a small opposition in the Parliament since ninety-two out of 108 MLAs belonged to a governing party. David Trimble (UUP) and Seamus Mallon (SDLP) became First Minister and Deputy First Minister respectively in July 1998. The devolution was delayed because of the disagreement between unionists and Sinn Fein on the issue of the IRA's decommissioning. The early release of prisoners, reform in the police sector, and decommissioning of the IRA became the major issues of disagreement in the government. The politics became the instrument of furthering unionist and nationalist goals. While Sinn Fein intended to promote north-south cooperation on the basis of the GFA, Trimble attempted to hamper Sinn Fein ministers attending the North–South Ministerial Council as a punishment of non-dissolution of the IRA forces. The DUP adopted a 'half in, half out' position taking seats in the Assembly and ministerial posts but boycotting the executive meetings or opposing to decisions which would be agreed in the executive (McEvoy 2008: 148). However, the collective executive agreed also on many issues regarding general services such as free public transport for the elderly, investment in students, the decision to appoint children's commissioners, the publication of a new regional strategy and the launch of the review of public administration.

When Trimble resigned on 1 July 2001 due to the slow progress of the IRA decommissioning; John Reid, Secretary of state, suspended the devolved government on 10 August. It was suspended for a second time on 21 September. When the IRA announced that they put the weaponry beyond use and would open it to independent monitoring, the government was reinstalled. When a scandal erupted on an alleged republican spy-ring at Parliament Buildings, Stormont, the institutions were suspended by the British government

for the final time in October 2002. Elections planned for May 2003 were held in November

2003 which witnessed the rise of extreme parties, the DUP and Sinn Fein. The election results

showed that the DUP and Sinn Fein had to cooperate to institute a new power-sharing

government which would be held by a DUP first minister and Sinn Fein deputy first minister.

One of the main reasons of the rise of the DUP was that the GFA increased Protestant

frustration with the Agreement. Nigel Dodds (DUP Member of Parliament in Westminster for

Belfast North) relates these frustrations to the actions of nationalists and dissident

republicans:

Although, the one-way conveyor belt of concessions to Republicans has been halted by the DUP since 2003, there has been growing frustration and anger at the targeting of unionist culture by republican and nationalist politicians, who promote the ideology of a shared future, whilst acting with consistent intolerance. In 1998, Northern Ireland's nationalist political parties signed up to the principle of consent for our region's place in the UK, yet in 2012 they tore the Union Flag from City Hall, aided and abetted by the Alliance Party. Only last year, Republicans conducted terrorist commemorations for two IRA bombers in Castlederg, an area blighted by terrorism for many decades, despite the concerns of innocent victims and their families. More recently, Sinn Fein's talk of shared space and a shared future was contradicted by their failure to support an Orange Order march for five minutes through a road in North Belfast. These are not issues that will threaten our position within the UK - the DUP has prevented any such developments - however they are events that recaptures the frustration, anger and resentment which flowed from the Good Friday Agreement and its unfair, unequal and unjust treatment the unionist community have received relative to those promoting murderous terrorism (Nigel Dodds, Personal communication, 28 August 2014).

Northern Ireland Lives and Times survey shows a growing confidence of Catholics in social,

political and economic areas with the GFA and a heightening Protestant deception in post-

agreement period. In 1998 while 70 per cent of Protestants believed that nationalists benefited

more from the GFA, 0 per cent believed that Protestants benefited more in 2003. Their

support for the GFA decreased to 28 per cent while 74 per cent of Catholics supported the

GFA. The GFA could not overturn the intergroup dynamics based on zero-sum games in

which one's gain is perceived as other's loss (MacGinty and du Toit 2007). In 2008, 50 per

cent of Protestants stated that Catholics benefited more than Protestants from the GFA while 8

per cent of Catholics thought that Protestants benefited more than Catholics from the GFA.

Table XXVI. The perception of communities toward the GFA, 2008

Have political changes since 1998 benefited Catholics or Protestants more?			
	%		
	Catholic	**Protestant**	**No religion**
Protestants benefited a lot more than Catholics	4	0	1
Protestants benefited a little more than Catholics	4	1	2
Catholics benefited a lot more than Protestants	4	24	4
Catholics benefited a little more than Protestants	13	26	19
Protestants and Catholics benefited equally	64	39	57
Other	0	0	0
(Neither side benefited)	7	7	14
Don't know	5	2	4

Source: 2008 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, available at http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2008/Political_Attitudes/BENFCHNG.html (August 8, 2014).

This deception can be explained by third factors. Firstly, Protestants viewed their primary position in the society undermined by the principle of equality of the GFA. While the Catholic community gained a growing confidence rising in the socio-economic ladder by the affirmative action policies, the de-industrialization and economic recession intensified the anxiety of Protestants, especially of working classes who are affected directly by the decrease of workforce in the North. Secondly, Sinn Fein's resurgence and being the top Catholic political party offended many unionists since they saw Sinn Fein's rise as concessions to terrorism. Thirdly, the GFA recognized the parity of esteem, the legitimacy of both cultures in the island, which necessitated the removal of predominant symbols of Protestantism and Britishness. This intensified unionists' besieged minority mentality since they viewed this as erosion of their Britishness and Britishness of Northern Ireland (Southern 2007).

Parties could not agree on a deal, thus, they were called to Stormont in the beginning of 2004 to bring their proposal for a review of the institutional arrangements as provided for the Agreement. In 2005, the IRA announced its decommissioning verified by the Independent Monitoring Commission on Decommissioning. British and Irish governments intervened in

ongoing stalemate announcing that if parties could not agree on a devolved-power sharing government, they would produce alternative institutional arrangements for a greater cooperation between London and Dublin. The DUP and Sinn Fein cemented their political position in 2007 elections increasing their votes and turning into the leading parties of their communities. After the elections, nobody was certain that the DUP and Sinn Fein would cooperate. The Secretary of state, Peter Hain declared that the parties would choose between 'devolution or dissolution'. Finally, they agreed on the Saint Andrews Agreement in 2006. What is unimaginable in 1970s is imaginable today and the extremes of the period of Troubles, the DUP and Sinn Fein are running the country with two other political parties since 2007.

Table XXVII. Northern Ireland Assembly Elections since 1998

Elections	Nationalist Bloc		Unionist Bloc		Biconfessional
	SDLP	Sinn Féin	UUP	DUP	Alliance
1998 Assembly Elections	**21.97%**	17.63%	**21.25%**	18.14%	6.50%
2003 Assembly Elections	17.0%	**23.5%**	22.7%	**25.6%**	3.7%
2007 Assembly Elections	15.2%	**26.2%**	14.9%	**30.1%**	5.2%
2011 Assembly Elections	14.2%	**26.9%**	13.2%	**30.0%**	**7.7%**

Source: Whyte, N. 2013. Northern Ireland elections, available at: http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections. (15 January 2014). The parties with the highest votes in nationalist and unionist bloc are highlighted in bold.

5.2.1. Cleavage Structure and Political Competition remained intact

The cleavage structure and political competition which have remained intact in the aftermath of the GFA continue to breed identity boundaries between Catholics and Protestants and is one of the greatest obstacles to foment cross-cutting cleavages in Northern Ireland. The electoral competition is based on intraethnic competition and interethnic competition. The GFA could not generate electoral incentives for political parties to appeal to other communities' voters. Tonge writes, 'Ethnic-bloc party competition owed more to preexisting

intra-bloc electoral rivalries than the particular nature of the devolved settlement in Northern Ireland' (Tonge 2005:136). Rather than competing for cross-community votes, political parties compete for the votes of their ethnic fellows in Northern Ireland. This cleavage structure and political competition also motivate political parties to use identity-based frames to outbid their ethnic fellows instead of using frames capable to resonate across communities. The stance of Ian Paisley, leader of the DUP, in 2007 elections is illustrative in this respect as he warned the unionist electorate that if they vote for other parties, they would allow Martin McGuinness, leader of Sinn Fein and a former IRA militant, to become First Minister (McEvoy 2008: 170).

The fundamental tenet of the GFA was to enable equality and parity of esteem between communities. However, in order to assure these goals, it institutionalized and formalized the bipolar political competition instead of creating a favorable electoral structure that would push political parties to appeal to ethnic diversity. The party structure of Northern Ireland divided between nationalists and unionists has not changed significantly in terms of party preferences and electoral behavior after the GFA (see Hayes, McAllister, and Dowds 2005). Institutionalizing the communal divide, the consociationalism also created electoral incentives for political parties to maintain social institutions which contribute to communal divisions such as separated school system, residential segregation. Politics over culture have been a new battlefront for political parties to create a rally-around-the flag effect on communities. Through the crises and keep going to the edge, political parties establish their constituency and mobilize their voters. In this system, the center politics keep squeezed between unionist and nationalist parties. The votes of Alliance party remain around five, six per cent. According to Anno Lo, South Belfast deputy of the Alliance Party, "the constitutional politics are still black or white", "It is still either/or issue" (interview, 29 August 2014).

The conflict has made our society very, very divided. There is really at the moment so far not in the assembly great willingness from the two major parties or shall we say, parties from the two camps except the Alliance the willingness, the commitment to build a shared future, to break down barriers, to break down segregation and to bring people together…The constitutional issues is still so black and white to many people. There seems to be no budge, no softening of it. It is either or issue. I think it is very much to do with loyalist, unionist community that you know, within the UK is what they want. On the other side, nationalists and republicans are yes, they do, they want a united Ireland. The Good Friday Agreement has that principle of consent which is, if majority of people still want to stay in the UK. The politics here become so tribal now that there is still very little leadership from the top to try and to break down these barriers between the two. There are many things the Alliance Party advocates, advocates for like integrated education, shared housing, shared spaces. They are not happening. That's the very frustration of our party. Integrated education has shown to be wanted by parents and young people over 80 per cent from each poll in the last year. Whether from parents or young people, all say that they want to see more integrated education. Even the business sector, over seventy per cent, seventy three per cent or something, says that they see the integrated education as means for prosperity and economic progress in Northern Ireland. But that's not happening. The budget for integrated education still remains under seven per cent of the two education budget. Shared housing is still a pipe dream. Public housing in Northern Ireland, 92 per cent of our public housing is single-identity housing. So if you segregate them from the age of three and four, educate them and you put them in separate areas, there is no hope of people learning about each other and living beside each other, working beside each other, play beside each other, form relationship with each other. The divide continues (interview with Anna Lo, Alliance MLA from South Belfast, 29 August 2014).

The cleavage structure and political competition that divide the political spectrum between unionists and nationalists continue to create a unidimensional political arena in which the majority of Catholics votes for nationalist/republican parties whereas that of Protestants votes for loyalist/unionist parties. Although the designation of votes as "nationalist", "unionist", "other" in Northern Ireland Assembly and in government aim to assure cross-community support for major decisions, it also doubles and rigidifies the ethno-political divisions. The Alliance Party opposes to this designation complaining that the "other" voting has lower comparative advantage compared to "unionist" and "nationalist" voting. This system also puts additional stress on biconfessional parties since they are 'squeezed out' by nationalist and unionists blocs (Wilson and Stapleton 2012). This type of voting institutionalizes communal divisions and makes them salient. According to 2010

Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, close to 60 per cent of Protestant and Catholic respondents view this type of voting as a catalyst of old sectarian politics.

Table XXVIII. Perceptions on Secterianism and Northern Ireland Assembly
When Assembly members in Northern Ireland are elected they have to declare whether they are a 'unionist', a 'nationalist', or 'other'. People have different views about whether this is a good idea. Here are some things that have been said, how much do you agree or disagree with each of these statements?

Because MLAs have to declare whether they are unionist or nationalist it just keeps us stuck in the old sectarian camps.

	%		
	Catholic	**Protestant**	**No religion**
Strongly agree	17	14	24
Agree	48	48	42
Neither agree nor disagree	20	21	24
Disagree	9	11	4
Strongly disagree	0	1	0
Can't choose	6	6	7

Source: 2010 Northern Ireland Life and times Survey, available at http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2010/Political_Attitudes/MLADECL1.html (August 13, 2014)

The consociational arrangements created by the GFA neither change the unionist-nationalist divide nor create electoral incentives for political parties of both sides to appeal to the electorate of other community. The GFA enabled the relative absence of violence on the streets and established a political framework for both communities to deliberate on their problems, reconcile their differences and work towards a shared future. At the end, the DUP and Sinn Fein, two extreme parties of the Troubles, share the government, occupy ministerial posts and also reach agreement on many social and political issues. In 2011, the hard-liners asserted their dominant status once more in Northern Irish politics against the moderates. Although the GFA could not undercut the political dynamics based on intergroup competition, it succeeded in managing and regulating communal divisions. Political discourse is still grounded upon in-group/out-group distinctions (Wilson and Stapleton 2012) but the enemies of the past join in parliamentary meetings, meet the other communities' representatives and civil society organizations, and produce together local decision making. Sinn Fein evolved

from militant republicanism to constitutional republicanism and it achieved as well appealing to middle class nationalists apart from its traditional electoral base of poor, urban working class Catholics.

Politics in Northern Ireland are still vulnerable to polarization by the requirement of cross-community voting for policy making and veto power of both sides. The center politics have not still gained ground in Northern Ireland politics with persistent overlap between self-identification and political affiliation. Although the support for a united Ireland dropped below the 15 per cent among Catholics according to 2013 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, it is still highly unlikely for a Catholic to vote for unionist parties and for a Protestant to vote for nationalist parties.

Table XXIX. Support for United Ireland, 2013

At any time in the next 20 years, do you think it is likely or unlikely that there will be a United Ireland?		
	%	
	Catholic	**Protestant**
Very likely	2	3
Quite likely	10	12
Quite unlikely	33	27
Very unlikely	45	47
(even chance)	2	2
Don't know	7	8

Source: 2013 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, available at http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2013/Political_Attitudes/UNTDIREL.html (3 September 2014).

Table XXX. Political party support for people of different religions

Which of these political parties do you feel closest to? (%)			
	Catholic	**Protestant**	**No religion**
DUP/Democratic Unionist Party	**0**	34	6
Sinn Féin	29	**0**	5
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)	**0**	22	5
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)	31	**1**	9
Alliance Party	7	11	8
W - Other party (specify)	2	1	10
None of these	19	17	41

Other answer (specify)	0	1	2
Don't know	11	12	14

Source: 2013 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, available at http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2013/Political_Attitudes/POLPART2.html (2 September 2014).

This system is vulnerable to ethnic outbidding processes through which political parties increase their ethnic tone in order to attract ethnic fellows. Many studies show that ethnic outbidding processes have potential to slide into extremist positions radicalizing ethnic groups (see Brass 2006, Horowitz 2001, Gagnon 2004). In Northern Ireland, all the issues especially cultural ones such as nationalist symbols, parades or flags become swiftly politicized trapped in intergroup and intragroup competition dynamics. Wilson and Stapleton's (2012) research on Northern Ireland Assembly discourses and proceedings shows the continuing zero-sum politics in Northern Irish political system. They find out three patterns in Northern Ireland politics:

(a) a stark 'zero-sum' approach to power and its distribution; (b) a willingness to use procedural uncertainty to delay and derail proceedings, particularly at the expense of the 'other' side; and (c) a clear and accepted division along the traditional dichotomy of unionism and nationalism, which implicitly underpins the debate and the parliamentary process as a whole (Wilson and Stapleton 2012: 89).

The most obvious example of this argument is the debates on cultural matters, such as marches, parades, flags which have been an instrument of ethnic outbidding by unionist and nationalist parties in order to manufacture a rally around the flag effect on their voters. The flag protests that occurred last year typify the ethnic outbidding on the basis of cultural matters. In the aftermath of Belfast city council to fly the union jack on designated days, unionist parties sent up to 40,000 leaflets to their voters whipping up their feelings in order to outbid the Alliance party which cooperated with nationalist parties on the flag issue (BBC News Northern Ireland, 13 November 2012). Loyalists who are already sensitized about cultural matters and display dissatisfaction with the GFA took on the streets.

Figure XXIV. The leaflets distributed by the DUP and the UUP before the Flag riots

The leaflets are printed in the distinctive yellow color of the Alliance party which sided with the SDLP and Sinn Fein to fly the Union Jack at Belfast City Hall on designated days. The picture is taken from BBC New Northern Ireland, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-20317461 (September 2, 2014).

In effect, there is a certain boundary blurring especially among Protestants whose self-identification oscillates between Ulster, British, Irish and Northern Irish identities (Alba 2005). In the last years, Northern Irish identity seems to grow among Catholics and Protestants. As such, identities are open to multi-dimensionality in Northern Ireland (Muldoon et al. 2007). Political competition remains incapable to mirror this diversity trapped in dichotomous categorizations and ethnic politics. As long as the core issue of conflicting national aspirations is not addressed, the institutional framework of the GFA will contribute to reproducing communal divisions and political preferences that coincide with ethno-national affiliations. Many authors view the power-sharing arrangements of the GFA as a catalyst of single-identity politics (Brown and MacGinty 2003, MacGinty and Darby 2002, Tonge 2004, Wilson and Stapleton 2003). The GFA was the endpoint of political negotiations to which political parties had to sign up under the pressure of third parties. It created a "marriage of force" into which political parties and communities have been dragged into (interview with Prof. Adrian Guelke, 18 August 2014). This marriage enters into crises every couple of years

in which everybody starts to think that institutions are on the verge of collapse. The on and off functioning of Northern Ireland Assembly and interrupted devolution are proof of the incapability and inefficiency of the GFA to generate cross-community politics. The Northern Ireland Assembly was suspended four times; the most lengthy and serious was between October 2002 and May 2007 which was reinstituted after the Saint Andrew's Agreement of 2006. Compared to other peace agreements that failed such as in Mali, Burundi, Somalia; the GFA survives thanks to the UK government's ability and capacity to implement necessary policies and institutions to sustain the peace process (DeRouen, Ferguson, Norton, Park, Lea and Streat-Bartlett 2010).

However, the politics in Northern Ireland are not still ready for cooperation between nationalists and unionists without consociational arrangements. The five deputies I interviewed (Alex Maskey from Sinn Fein, Anna Lo from the Alliance Party, Nigel Dodds from the DUP, Fra McCann from Sinn Fein and Alban Maginness from the SDLP) confirmed that without the consociational arrangements, they would not imagine unionists and nationalists cooperating in a government. The consociational arrangements make possible today the devolved government. The reintroduction of devolved government on 7 May 2007 was also remarkable, the extreme parties of the past, the DUP and Sinn Fein, shared power and continues to share power in the collective government. However, the fact that extreme parties of the past made inroads into middle classes and rose to power pushes both communities to suspect about the intentions of other community and to cling onto their political trenches in favor of their ethnic fellows. Moreover, in the zero-sum politics of Northern Ireland, the cooperation seems like concession. The concession to Irish language act is to be reciprocated by Ulster-Scots by the demand of unionist parties or in exchange of housing and public services for Catholic community; some other investments are to be canalized into Protestant areas. The GFA could not still produce a common sense of loyalty

and agreement on national citizenship (Hays 2010). Unionists and nationalists disagree on many issues especially on cultural matters such as language rights or cultural symbols. The functioning of political institutions based on communal divisions and ethnic outbidding preserves ethno-national trenches between communities. The vetoes and cross-community voting also revive the communal divide and are viewed as sectarianism by some sections of Northern Irish society especially in working class areas which are deeply affected by political violence and vulnerable to sectarian mobilization of political parties.

5.3.Social Environment Vulnerable to Mobilization along Communal Lines

We ask people in interface areas: what has changed from the Good Friday Agreement? Nothing and other, nothing and other. Because there are still behind the peace walls, no job, no investment and they are low education. They don't see any difference. Ok, politicians keep bringing up that people have been killed, it is better than it was and we do agree that it is better than it was. But you know, we were grown up in our age group. We had nobody to speak for us. I am not picking up a political party but the DUP and also unionist parties and the staff like this, they did not come from our particular area and they didn't know our needs and our grave who is crossed up for people who died. People who I speak to daily are saying "there is no change, we have still no job, our children have no future" (Interview with Joe Marley, Project Manager, Belfast Conflict Resolution Consortium, 19 August 2014).

No sooner had the ink dried on the bid of Peter Robinson (First Prime minister of Northern Ireland and leader of the DUP) to drop the siege mentality due to lowering support for a united Ireland and to reach out to Catholic community (Belfast Telegrahp.co.uk, 26 November 2012), the flag protests erupted simmering communal riots. In Northern Ireland, the tensions between communities boil every summer through the parade season. While daily marches occur over the summer period, racist and sectarian attacks also increase. This sub-section demonstrates that working class neighborhoods, the strongholds of resistance during the war, are still vulnerable to mobilization along communal divide. The social tissue of certain working class areas based on defensive communities, paramilitary control and residential segregation still breeds communal tensions. Thus, the political arena which is

susceptible to polarization rests upon a social environment vulnerable to mobilization along sectarian lines.

The social environment of Northern Ireland is shaped around conflicting national aspirations of both communities. The political violence that stemmed from the millennia-old political tensions between unionism and nationalism reinforced the ideological and emotional links among people belonging to the same ethno-religious groups. Both Protestant and Catholic communities are defensive communities with a high degree of solidarity and a besieged minority mentality since Protestants were bonded against the threat of a united Ireland and Catholics were bonded against the sectarian policies of unionist governments. Working class areas of Northern Ireland, notably Belfast and Derry, are the major strongholds of unionism/loyalism and nationalism/republicanism. Northern Ireland is illustrative of urban insurgency in which neighborhoods were rife with identity-based collective action (Staniland 2010). The history of paramilitaries and vigilant culture stretch back to the 18th and 19th century in Northern Ireland as mentioned in the previous chapters. The political violence of the Troubles strengthened even more the bonds among members of communities and between communities and paramilitaries. Paramilitaries are illegal military structures recruited from communities and they emerged as "defender" of their community (Feenan 2002). Communities were not homogenous in their sympathy or support for these extra-military structures but they overtly or covertly gave support to them in certain times of the Troubles which provided, in turn, for them the motivation and the capacity to re-form and engage in the conflict. As Staniland (2010) argues, robust community structure of working class areas was the proper social networks for paramilitaries to flourish whereas the British state could not penetrate into the social base of paramilitaries and could not prevent the mushrooming of paramilitaries on the streets. Normal policing was impossible in these segregated urban areas since police had major difficulty in capturing the militants detaching them from their social

base. There was a complex interplay between state, paramilitaries and communities. Attacked by loyalist groups and alienated by biased police forces of unionist governments, the residents of some nationalist areas began to write on their doors "I RUN AWAY" blaming the IRA for indifference to loyalist attacks and calling for their resurgence (interview with an Irish teacher in West Belfast, 16 August 2014). The Provisional IRA was an urban movement and Belfast and Derry were the major strongholds which provided recruitment (Smith 1995: 94). Against the civil rights movements and the resurgence of the Provisional IRA, the loyalist paramilitaries were also reformed. Belfast was the major front of the war (Kelley 1988: 371).

Communal violence was in the hands of paramilitaries during the Troubles. They were the ones who launched attacks and orchestrated riots. The IRA defended itself as a non-sectarian organization since its main target was the British state and security forces. However, their attacks were also sectarian since they engaged in attacks against Protestants for supporting a state loyal to the Crown. Loyalist paramilitaries defined their role more in "defensive" terms in order to "assist" the British state which was constrained by the formal laws and regulations. Loyalist paramilitaries were less selective in their targeting and adopted the rationale "any Catholic will do" after a certain time which was openly sectarian and racist in its own terms (Cadwallader and Wilson 1991:6). Republican or loyalist, paramilitary organizations sought to spread the armed propaganda by justifying their actions based on the demonization of the victim, even for those who were uninvolved, claiming their complicity with the other side or security forces. The matter of the fact was that they inflicted damage against persons belonging to other ethno-religious community supportive of certain political agendas or national aspirations conflicting with theirs. This was in itself sectarian fusing prejudice-motivated attacks with politically-motivated crimes. Furthermore, they were not defensive in many cases but offensive in their attacks and victim choices. The motivations for joining in paramilitary organizations were complex rather than the simplification of the

phenomenon by the ''terrorist'' psyche or commitment to ideology. The research of McAuley, Tonge and Shirlow (2009) based on the interviews with the UVF and the UDA former prisoners shows that there were three factors which drove them to join in paramilitary groups: "experiential factors (driven by the onset of violence, brutality, community violation), ideological frameworks (strengthened by a strong sense of collective identity), and structural factors (political leadership, social injustice, and socio-economic position)" (McAuley, Tonge and Shirlow 2009).

Paramilitaries enjoyed significant toleration from their communities (Moxon-Browne 1981). These were the communities who provided for the paramilitaries information about the suspected "criminals" in neighborhoods. Communities expected from paramilitaries to execute justice. This attitude was also related to the legacy of policing style during the Troubles. Their existence did not stem from a dyadic relationship between communities and paramilitaries but from a triadic relationship between state, community and paramilitary forces (Brewer, Lockhart and Rodgers 1998). Instead of police, they demanded justice from paramilitaries to fulfill policing vacuum in their neighborhoods. Engulfed in community networks and local structures, paramilitaries assumed the responsibility of informal policing in their neighborhoods. Social processes "such as the survival of community structures, extended family kinship patterns, neighbourliness and legitimate authority accorded to community representatives, which constitute important informal social control" (Brewer, Lockhart and Rodgers 1998: 577) constituted the support base of paramilitaries. The paramilitaries protected their neighborhoods but they were indifferent to crimes executed by their fellows in other communities. They were respected by their communities and considered as mechanism of informal social control in their neighborhoods.

After the GFA, the main structures of paramilitaries assumed conflict resolution activities. Paramilitaries became the signatories of the GFA committed to decommissioning

and demilitarization. Ex-combatants assumed political, military and communal roles in conflict resolution (McEvoy and Shirlow 2009). In some neighborhoods, paramilitaries are committed to conflict resolution and engage in conflict resolution work keeping the youth off the streets orienting them into bands, footballs, cultural issues, while in some areas, paramilitaries engage in criminality. The actors engaged in interface riots are various:

In some cases like East Belfast, it probably is a renegade loyalist group who are against peace process, sometimes there are paramilitaries opposed to peace process. You find it also among dissident republicans. Some cases it is youth, who are basically, you know, highly sectarian and many cases actually youth who are fearing other ways of life such as schooling, social relations, troubles at home etc. so they are using violence, expressing grievances in that way. In terms of scale, it is tiny compared to it was used to be. Years ago many many people were involved; certainly there would be paramilitary involvement. Now sometimes these are just local frustrations. Sometimes it is youth who are also damaging their own community, kids who are involved in anti-social behavior. They express that, one way to express this is sectarian violence. Another way to express is the crime and anti-social behavior in the community...In the past, most riots would be sectarian motivations whereas now it can be that it is an anti-social behavior issue. You understand what I mean; it is not politicized now like it was (interview with Prof. Peter Shirlow,[90] 21 August 2014).

Although relations between communities and police forces have improved in the aftermath of the GFA, paramilitaries driven to illegal business operate in deprived areas and engage in criminal activity with racketeering, dealing in counterfeit goods, robberies and drug trafficking. After the GFA, internal feuding among paramilitary groups increased. While dissident militant republicans broke up from the Provisional IRA which signed the peace agreement, internal feuding among loyalist paramilitaries also increased. The reasons of internal feuding were various such as power struggle, personality clashes, personal gains, ideological reasons (interview with Alistair Little, ex-UVF combatant, 2 September 2014). While the IRA was the major militant institution of republicans, loyalist paramilitaries were more numerous and similar in power. For example, there are three areas of Shankill road

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[90] Professor Peter Shirlow is the Deputy Director of the Institute for Conflict Transformation and Social Justice. He works on the themes of political violence, post-conflict transformation, policing and community and the impact of ethno-sectarian reproduction. This includes a particular emphasis upon former combatants and their inclusion/exclusion within civic society.

controlled by different factions. Lower Shankill is controlled by the UDA and middle and higher mostly by the UVF with different families supporting different organizations. Due to the legacy of Troubles, these neighborhoods are also alienated from the police and prefer to rely on paramilitaries rather than security forces. Paramilitaries are still effective in these areas controlling residents. Communities are not homogenous in their tolerance or support for the paramilitaries. While dissident militant republicans operate more secretively, loyalist paramilitaries operate more freely. In some neighborhoods, the moderate Protestant residents disturbed by paramilitary control began to move away which left the neighborhood to paramilitary control (interview with Dr. Neil Jarman, 22 August 2014). Ellison (2001)'s research after the GFA shows that paramilitary groups were still influential upon young people which experienced paramilitary harassment as part of their life. Half of the sample in Ellison (2001)'s research said that they suffered from sectarian harassment and one third was assaulted for their ethnic or religious affiliations. Young Catholics became the victims of sectarian harassment twice than their Protestant peers. Paramilitaries also have a disciplining role in the community as some young people express that paramilitaries would question them if they saw them entering or leaving the other communities' areas. Thus, they can be a strong deterrent of inter-group contact (Hughes, Campbell, Hewstone and Cairns 2007: 47).

Youth bulge is accepted as an important dimension of urban unrest. Northern Ireland gives alarming signals about the growing youth unemployment. The Labor Force Survey displays a growing unemployment among Protestant youth since 24 per cent of Protestants within the age group 16-24 are unemployed compared to 15 of their Catholic counterparts (Labor Force Survey 2012). In addition, the youth who grew up in post-ceasefire period did not give up the sectarian mental map divided between us and them. They show less support than adults for integrated housing, workplaces and education (Devine and Schubotz 2010). Youth in marginalized neighborhoods is still skeptical about the police due to their entrenched

mistrust against the security forces (Jarman, Quinn, Murphy, Nichol 2002; Jarman and O'halloran 2001; McAlister, Scraton and Haydon 2009; Radford, Hamilton and Jarman 2005). Paramilitaries in some areas try to show leadership to them by peace building activities such as Mark Vinton, a loyalist ex-prisoner:

Yes we have seen peace in a political sense but we have not seen peace on the ground, we have not seen peace being delivered on the ground. You can go back and you can say that there is nobody being killed, left behind. But you will still hear here usually daily attacks by republicans or people offending their own communities, there are still bomb attacks. Peace has not still filtered down to those areas that are most affected. That would be working class areas, either nationalist or loyalist. Within these areas, sectarianism is still rife and peace process has not been built down on the ground. It has politically to a certain extent. Even politically, you will still see that political leadership is still run along sectarian lines whereof you are nationalist, you get something and me as unionist I want the same thing. It is still one for them and one for the other community. Now we have a political framework but it has not filtered down on the ground and communities are not settled…Young ones' mindset says that because they weren't born during the conflict, they missed something. They missed the chance to defend their country; they missed the chance to go to jail. While you still see the Troubles glorified, you will still have young ones who still feel the need to step up and defend their country. You will see on lots of things across loyalist working classes, the slogan to be "we won't be the generation to let these down"….We've got to remember that paramilitaries are people from that community. They were people who protected these areas…Young people will look for leadership and they will look for leadership from those who were connected to paramilitaries. They know who stood up, either in a political sense or in military sense to defend their areas. So young people will always look up to these people. If then people who they are looking up to are charged with different ways forward and say the failures that didn't work in the past and won't work again, that's the best way we can show leadership to young ones (Mark Vinton, Belfast Conflict Resolution Consortium, 19 August 2014).

Knox and Monaghan (2002) state three reasons for the existence of paramilitaries: alienation of republican community from the police, insufficiency of formal justice system to deal with paramilitaries, ongoing need of in-group policing after the peace process by the rise of anti-social behavior and minor crime. Paramilitaries also assume the mission of in-group policing by controlling the "anti-social behavior" of youth groups such as playing music loud, verbal abuse of adults and old, dumping of the rubbish (Monaghan 2008: 87). The youth of marginalized neighborhoods is still skeptical about the police due to their entrenched mistrust against the security forces (Jarman et al. 2002, Jarman and O'Halloran 2001, McAlister et al. 2009, Radford et al. 2005). The PSNI which changed its name and metamorphosed into a

more neutral and equitable organization still has a bad reputation in some communities. The alienation toward police is not completely dissipated. While the 2014 Policing Board Public Perception Survey demonstrates an improved image of police as 68 per cent of respondents think that the PSNI is doing a very/fairly good job in Northern Ireland, the class differences need to be considered (Northern Ireland Policing Board 2014). Northern Ireland Crime Survey 2010/2011 points out that respondents from high anti-social behavior areas have an alarming portrayal of police and justice as they are most likely to perceive an increase in the level of harm caused by organized crime (35 per cent), they are the least likely group to confide in policing (66 per cent), in community engagement (28 per cent), and both in fairness (45 per cent) and effectiveness (28 per cent) of the criminal justice system (Campbell and Freel 2012). After the Patten commission had applied 50/50 recruitment policy from Protestant and Catholic communities, the number of Catholic officers in the PSNI reached out to 30 per cent which is acceptable but still low compared to 45 per cent Catholic population in the overall population. In some nationalist areas, Catholics do not join in the PSNI due to fear of community reprisal. Catholics who join in the PSNI are called as "West Brits" or "Castle Catholics"[91] by some nationalist Catholics who view the Catholics in security forces assimilated into the British army (interview with a West Belfast resident, 17 August 2014). Moreover, the interaction between loyalist paramilitaries and security forces is still questionable for Catholics. For example, a scandal erupted in 2007 that revealed the delivery of a list of over 150 republican murder targets by two members of security forces to the UVF death squads (Sluka 2009: 290). Some loyalist residents also express skepticism about the police due to Sinn Fein endorsing of the PSNI.

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[91] Castle Catholics refer to Dublin Castle which was the center of British domination in Ireland.

Despite the shared future initiatives of governments, there is still no government determination to lead from the front this prospect. The segregation did not change and people are still kept in sectarian jars. The residential segregation still keeps the social infrastructure of communal tensions alive. In Northern Ireland, unionist Protestant and nationalist Catholic areas are segregated by physical barriers, commonly known as "peace lines". These barriers were erected by the British state against rising communal tensions at the beginning of the Troubles. Throughout the Troubles, not only the number of peace lines increased but also residential segregation heightened as the mixed areas became segregated (Boal and Royle 2007). These peace lines were the flashpoints of communal tensions during the Troubles since the majority of deaths took place around them (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006). The research of Shirlow and Murtagh (2006) on segregation and violence in Belfast reveals that 70 per cent of deaths took place within 500 meters of all interfaces and over 80 per cent of the deaths occurred in segregated places which were at least 90 per cent Protestant and Catholic. Moreover, one third of victims were murdered at home or very close to their homes which reified that violence was inextricably interwoven with the assault on the community. Moreover, these interfaces also correspond to deprivation and social inequality. Around 25 interfaces which cover 22 wards, 17 are within the ten percent of most deprived wards. After the GFA, these areas are still the focal point of sectarian tensions. The residents of these areas who are traumatized by the ensuing effects of political violence such as constant surveillance, sectarian prejudice, harassment, stigmatization are still susceptible to sectarian attacks while entering and leaving their areas (Shirlow 2003). Walls reified the sense of security since they are associated with less communal attacks.

There has been very little or unsubstantial work done to reduce community tensions and to improve community relations across divided communities, particularly in Belfast, but you can find the same right across Northern Ireland. So twenty years ago, we had ceasefires followed ultimately by the peace agreement and referendum. People voted and endorsed but that was peace being established at the level of high politics, you know, political administration of government. Elections followed that. While we have peace in terms of the absence of

violence, we have not really created a peaceful society that is at ease with itself. Divisions are frankly just as strong now as there were twenty years ago. We do not have daily violence, currently paramilitaries that we had before; we do not have security forces presence on the street we had before. But we still have interface violence, you know, generally at low level, young people throwing stones and breaking other people's windows or fights between groups picking normally of young people. These tensions traditionally increase generally during summertime where there are tensions associated with it: marching season, bon fires, children off school, we have longer evenings and troubles can erupt. But the underline is that we have not created a united community, communities are just as divided. You know, if you look at Belfast, it is primarily a patchwork of, primarily Catholic and primarily Protestant residential areas that are well-defined. That is often marked out, by so called peace walls so people are living separately by large; people's children are being educated separately and in many other aspects of life divisions persist. It is no surprise that we haven't seen any reduction in the number of peace walls. Despite recent government pledges' to work to ten-year target of reducing, bringing down the peace walls, I have witnessed very little action following these words that would give me any hope that in ten years' time that picture will be any different(Interview with Patrick Corrigan, Amnesty International, 3 September 2014).

The peace lines did not disappear after the GFA, to the contrary, their entire number and the heights of some walls increased (Boal and Royle 2007). The number of peace walls increased from 18 barriers to 88 by 2009 according to Community Relations Council (Community Relations Council 2009: 3). Walls differ in style, height, visibility, style (Jarman and O'Halloran 2001: 4). Peace walls do not only correspond to the need for safety but also to the desire to mark their boundaries and preserve their territorial claim to space (Leonard 2006: 226–227). Their ongoing presence reflects the communities' willingness to remain separated (Ibid.: 227). Walls do not only physically divide communities but also prevent intercommunal communication, face-to-face interaction, the rise of empathy and mutual understanding between communities. North Belfast, the district in which the highest causalities of the war took place, has 25 separate walls which change in style, length and dimension (Jarman and O'Halloran 2001). Their length and style do not only depend on the planning of local authorities and public or private agencies involved in the construction but also on the "the particular nature of conflict and perceived level of threat that existed in each area specific to the time of their construction" (McAtackney 2011: 85). A study on long-term residents in interface areas shows that 81 per cent would desire the demolishment of peace

lines but 60 per cent remarked that they were not still safe enough and 17 per cent thought that their demolishment would cause serious problems if there are removed (Vargo 2008). These segregated areas also developed their separate public and social services with shops, leisure facilities and public services which do not encourage communities to interact either. Residential segregation helps to perpetuate communal divisions and to shape the mental map of the residents (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006). Residents of interface areas prefer to undertake long journeys for shopping, leisure or public facilities instead of using them in adjacent local community (Shirlow and Murtagh 2006).

The segregated neighborhoods and peace lines still enable a sense of security for residents and avow the anxiety about sectarian attacks. These interface areas still bear the brunt of the Troubles as one of local activists recalls:

I grew up in Lenadoon as a young boy and most of Lenadoon where we are sitting now for instance, was all Protestant, unionist area. They had prevented people from moving into houses while there was a big demand for it in Belfast. When Catholics were burnt down, their houses, Ardoyne, Bombay Street, the Falls Road; there was a need for them to have houses. Houses were empty here for years. The British Army and unionists refused people to empty and move in these homes. There is a history there. It is not just a case of recent times (Interview with Pádraic Mac Coitir, Activist of Eirígí, a socialist republican political party in Ireland, 3 September 2014).

In Northern Ireland, still over 90 per cent of populations live in segregated areas. The research on teenagers in Northern Ireland shows that while they feel safe in their neighborhoods, their feeling of insecurity increases in mixed areas (Leonard 2010). The Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE) figures for Belfast shows 100 per cent residential segregation for social housing in which 27 per cent of all population are located (Jarman and O'Halloran 2001: 4). In effect, Belfast has never been an integrated city. It is historically a "polarized city" (Boal 1994: 31) in which highly politicized communities living in segregated areas are situated. Besides, an analysis of 20th century on residential patterns shows that residential segregation does not significantly change during the peace times "segregation

increases more in bad times than it eases in good times" (Hepburn 2001: 93). Some adult residents told me that the interaction between communities was still low before the period of political violence but they were felling safer in the other group's area and would go to the other group's area for shopping or social services.

The segregation is even accepted by local authorities overtly or covertly. Public housing authorities are careful not to settle Catholic population in Protestant areas despite the housing need of Catholics due to growing Catholic population (Murtagh 1995: 220). City planners design public housing estates, parks or public services with a tendency to decrease Protestant-Catholic interaction. Furthermore, the class difference regarding residential segregation should be noted. Middle and higher classes are located more in mixed areas. Moreover, the moderate factions of working class neighborhoods moved away due to many reasons such as control of paramilitaries, low level social services in these areas. These factors contributed to the maintenance of their marginalization and deprivation.

Although working class areas are better-off compared to the times of the Troubles with increasing safety around these areas, the perceived vulnerability of these areas still did not fade away. In interface areas, there is a lack of hope, feeling of left behind with low opportunity of employment and educational attainment and fear of sectarian attacks:

a lack of hope, nothing that sort of tangible that touch in terms of changing their lives, feeling sort of left behind, forgotten, not much opportunity for employment, no educational change so think all of those …A lot of young people who are looking for significance and belonging get that in these organizations (paramilitaries), sense of value…Political parties, when it comes to elections, you will see them all around. But once they get your vote, you hardly see them again. A lot of those areas where there was conflict like interface areas, there is disillusionment with politics and there is disconnection between what is happening in the ground and what is happening in the Stormont. There is a disconnection and a lot of people now feel that it has nothing to do with them (interview with Alistair Little, ex-UVF combatant and community worker, 2 September 2014).

The economic development after the peace has not equally spread among classes leaving the most deprived still the most deprived (Patrick Corrigan, Amnesty International, 3

September 2014). Northern Ireland is the most subsidized part of the Britain with high economic dependency on the Britain. While upper and lower classes benefited from the GFA with cheap housing, secure jobs, grammar school system; working class areas still suffer from unemployment, de-industrialization and dissolution of welfare state. A research on the level of fear in north Belfast in 2003 with 4500 people shows that only one in 12 worked in areas where there was a majority from the 'other' religion, just under half (48 per cent) were afraid to travel for work or leisure through an area dominated by 'the other side', even in daytime, and between one-third and two-thirds believed that their job opportunities were limited by fear (Shirlow 2003). The workplace is one of the most important opportunities for these communities to interact but the global recession also affects them with increasing inequality within society. According to the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, only nine per cent of Catholics and 14 per cent of Protestants stated that they would prefer a workplace comprised of their own religion in 1998. In 2005, these figures went down to seven per cent of Catholics and 11 per cent of Protestants and in 2010, reported attitudes have changed again to four per cent of Catholics and three per cent of Protestants who preferred a workplace comprised of their own religion only. The inequality in Northern Ireland is growing as the gap between poor and rich is widened. Working classes developed a sense of marginalization since they did not benefit from the economic development with limited public services and increasing living costs (Horgan 2006). Protestant households are better-off compared to Catholic households but due to the widening gap between Protestant rich and Protestant poor, the gap between poor Protestant households and poor Catholic households is decreasing (Horgan 2006: 657). This inequality has a ripple effect on working class communities who are affected disproportionately by political violence and poverty (Fay et al. 1998). This relation between poverty and political violence is not addressed by government authorities.

Sectarianism is still rife in interface areas and communities are not at ease with each other. The sectarian prejudices between communities strengthened even more during the Troubles. For years whether it was done directly or indirectly, there was almost dehumanization of other community in sectarian enclaves. Interfaces were the flashpoints of conflict during the Troubles leaving behind memories of loss. Segregated neighborhoods were also safety nets for the communities feeling under threat in which one has to be constantly vigilant under the fear of death. As Rab McCallum, North Belfast Interface Network Project Coordinator, describes this psychology:

people are very aware of where they are walking here, very aware of where the other community is, very worry about what clothes they wore, they're very worry about the names of their children, what they understand from the names of their children cause you give out who they are . That's becoming less and less but in the recent past, this was something very predominant (interview with Rab McCallum, North Belfast Interface Network, 9 September 2014).

The fact that constitutional question is still salient between unionists and nationalists still affects them and keeps them in their ethno-centric trenches. With political debates on cultural issues, people find new reasons to be vigilant and preserve communal hostilities (interview with Prof. Adrian Guelke, 18 August 2014). The parade season historically inflames communal tensions in Northern Ireland, especially the Orange Order parades of 12th of July (Jarman 1997). The parades of Orange Order are closely linked to the unionist tradition and Protestantism and their routes which pass from Catholic neighborhoods invigorate sectarian hostilities (Bryan 2000, Longley 2001, Jarman 2001). Catholics also have parades linked to their culture such as those related to Civil rights movement, Eastern Rising Commemorations or hunger strikes but their routes remain mostly in Catholic-dominated areas. The fierce response of unionists to the civil rights marchers in 1960s generated a backlash of nationalists who opposed more ardently to Orange Order marches (Jarman 2001). While the GFA recognized the legitimacy and equality of both cultures, it opened up a new

battlefront for politics regarding the matters related to culture. After the GFA, republicans wanted to remove symbols related to Brutishness and Protestantism, which were the dominant symbols during the hegemony of unionist governments (1921-1972) based on the parity of esteem principle. The parity of esteem concept fall prey to party politicking and partisan debates on the matters of politico–religious parades (Mac Ginty and du Toit 2007, Ruohomäki 2010). The ethnic outbidding on the basis of cultural matters galvanizes communities into action and reenergizes sectarian tensions each summer.

There is a close relationship between space and identity in Northern Ireland. Segregated neighborhoods are donated with murals, flags, banners which have a significant role in the construction of sectarian identities and spaces (Dowler 2001, Jarman 1997). Some peace lines are also surrounded by murals which are dedicated to conflict and the memorization of war. If you are a foreigner walking around East and West Belfast, you could infer from the visual culture of neighborhoods that intercommunal tensions are still alive and well in Northern Ireland. The murals in East and West Belfast mirror the militant culture of both neighborhoods. While the murals in West Belfast reflect the commemoration of republican militants and history of resistance, the murals in East Belfast commemorate the ex-loyalist combatants and the settlement history with the pictures of William Orange and the Battle of Somme (Rolston 1995, Gallaher and Shirlow 2006). The social environment donated by murals, flags and banners does not reflect a self-reflection about the root causes of violence, repugnance of militarism or interrogation of sectarianism. The murals display clearly that the hero of one side is the other's terrorist and there is a competition between both community for victimization and justification for violence rather than repugnance of terrorism (McAtackney 2011). In West Belfast, 30 forms of memorials exist up to August 2006 (Viggiani 2006). By selective remembering and forgetting, these murals keep alive the memories of intercommunal violence and evoke interethnic hostilities based on singular

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'victim'-related narratives. Even the murals which reflect anti-racist themes are interspersed with sectarian identities and divisions (Geoghegan 2008). Against this reflection of militant culture in the murals, "Re-imaging" program sought to install more positive images negotiating with local communities (CRC, c. 2009). Overall, the residential segregation does not only separate communities but also prevents the communication of one side's narratives through the other side. It generates a place apart keeping each other from the hearts and minds of each other.

While interfaces suffered from the lethal attacks during the Troubles, they now suffer from non-lethal attacks realized by sticks, rocks or bricks. The nature of interface conflict depends on various factors: legacy of the Troubles, the leadership of paramilitaries, internal feuding between paramilitaries or anti-social behavior of the youth which heightened in the post-war process, tit-far-tat attacks, attacks escalating due to interpersonal frictions. These areas suffer also disproportionately from the social breakdown after the Troubles. After the GFA, there has been a dramatic rise in suicide rates, especially in North and West Belfast, areas which are disproportionately affected by the communal violence. People in poor households suffer more from the psychological distress and the legacy of the Troubles (O'Reilly and Browne 2001). These areas are exposed to higher anti-social behavior within the disaffected youth. While the conflicts around interfaces were more paramilitary-fed in the past, now these are remnants of paramilitaries, youth or small gangs who initiate the attacks. Some incidents are the "recreational rioting", the youth groups who riot for the fun (Jarman 2005, 2008; Jarman and O'Halloran 2001). In some areas, internal feudings for territoriality between paramilitaries feed the conflict around interfaces such as in Tiger Bay, a loyalist area of North Belfast in which two factions of UDA and factions that do not belong to the UDA are in power struggles (interview with Dr. Neil Jarman, 22 August 2014). When the tensions escalate between them, they target immigrants or interface residents. Interface troubles

significantly decreased in the last years while in the past, it was possible to hear petrol bombs, nail bombs, rioting every single night in interfaces (Rab McCallum, North Belfast Interface Network Project Coordinator, 9 September 2014). Today, these attacks are more about intimidating the other community and asserting territoriality. In these sectarian enclaves which are traditionally single-identity spaces, immigrants may also become victim of these incidents. In 2004, there was some sort of ethnic cleansing initiated by the rogue elements of loyalist paramilitaries against Chinese residents and shop owners in South Belfast (see The Guardian, 10 January 2004). Immigrants are still exposed to racist attacks particularly in East and South Belfast with the involvement of loyalist paramilitaries with different motivations: sectarianism, control of local community, power struggle between the UVF and other local gangs working in these areas. The respondents of the 2013 Life and Times Survey view the paramilitaries as one of the primary organizations that spark communal strife. In flag protests that occurred in 2013, assistant chief constable declared that members of the UDA and the UVF adopted a leading role sparking intercommunal riots (BBC News Northern Ireland, 8 December 2012).

Table XXXI. Perceptions on reasons of sectarian trouble, 2013

In your opinion, what is the main reason that some people get involved in rioting or sectarian trouble?			
	%		
	Catholic	**Protestant**	**No religion**
A specific incident usually sparks it	26	23	16
It's a response to being provoked	7	11	6
It's a response to having nothing else in your life	23	17	20
People like the excitement	8	9	10
Paramilitaries organise it	21	24	27
It's a last resort to get a point across	2	5	5
Something else - please say what below	5	3	4
Can't choose	8	8	12

Source: 2013 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, available at: http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2013/Community_Relations/WHYRIOT2.html (3 September 2014)

It is difficult to pinpoint leaders of sectarian and racist attacks since there are strong social networks between communities and paramilitaries. By the same token, politicians do not lead from the front the dissolution of paramilitary structures in Northern Ireland. The lines between politicians and paramilitaries are quite blurred. Sinn Fein was the political wing of the IRA and contributed to the IRA's decommissioning and the ex-IRA combatants are transferred into politics after the GFA but the lines between unionists and loyalist paramilitaries are less visible. The boundaries between Orange Order, the UVF bands and unionist politicians are quite blurred (interview with Dr. Neil Jarman, 22 August 2014). Even some of the fundings of the peace process are catalyzed into paramilitaries under the funding of local associations.[92] Moreover, some unionist politicians view paramilitaries as allies or community leaders. Just weeks after the police declared that loyalist paramilitaries were behind the violent actions during the flag protests, Peter Robinson, the First Minister of Northern Ireland and the DUP leader, received senior figures of loyalist paramilitaries in the first Unionist forum at Stormont and offered to collaborate to terminate the flag protests (Irish News, 1 January 2013). The discourse of politicians on sectarianism and racism also plays on communal boundaries and sends message to their electorate. While nationalist parties are more sensible to racist attacks due to their more left-oriented posture and sensibility to majority oppression, unionist parties are ambivalent with their more right-wing discourses. Their responses to racist and sectarian attacks are far from addressing the entrenched sectarian prejudices in the communities. The general reaction is "yes I condemn but" or "tit-for-tat" reaction which does not address the core issue of sectarianism and racism as its primary motivating factor. To give an example, to the banners "local homes 4 local people" "We need

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[92] Hughes, Campbell, Hewstone and Cairns (2007) give the example of £3.5m funding package for the Ulster Political Research Group, the Ulster Defense Association's political ally. They cite one article of The Observer, in which a senior loyalist states that these types of funding have the risk of going to the pockets of disbanded UDA men (The Observer, 16 July 2006 cited by Hughes, Campbell, Hewstone and Cairns 2007:47).

homes" hanged by residents to a Nigerian resident's home in East Belfast; Peter Robinson, the First Minister of Northern Ireland and the president of the DUP, stated that he "wasn't sure" that this can be described as racism (theguardian.com, 19 June 2014). Peter Robinson also came under attacks for his support to a pastor who declared Islam as "satanic" and Muslims as unreliable. Upon the remarks of the pastor, he declared that he would not trust Muslims involved in violence or those devoted to Sharia law but would "trust them to go to the shops" for him (BBC News Northern Ireland, 28 May 2014).

5.4.Conclusion

There decades of intercommunal violence in Northern Ireland left behind zones of friction between Catholic nationalist and Protestant unionist communities which operate beyond the confines of the Troubles. The post-war Northern Ireland typifies that conflict transformation is not a straight line but rather jagged or zigzag in its character. This chapter draws attention to three dynamics which feed the communal riots in post-conflict Northern Ireland. Firstly, the activities of spoiler paramilitary groups and sporadic communal troubles still fuel the anxiety about the possibility of resumed violence as the history of political violence proves how communal attacks and paramilitaries can be a destabilizing factor in intercommunal relations. Moreover, the political arena is still plagued by ethnic outbidding and intransigent party politicking which rub communities against each other, notably on cultural issues. This chapter argues that the GFA and post-war process failed to deactivate identity boundaries between nationalists and unionists. The GFA ended up with reifying the boundaries between Catholics and Protestants and could not produce a political framework capable to generate electoral incentives for political parties to appeal to ethnic diversity. The cleavage structure and political competition based on ethnic cleavages remained intact rendering politics vulnerable to ethnic outbidding politics and polarization between unionists and nationalists. In addition, working classes which were exposed to highest political violence

during the Troubles still have the lowest prospects for a safe environment in which meaningful intercommunity relations can flourish. The social tissue of conflict based on defensive communities, paramilitary control and residential segregation did not significantly change in working class areas after the GFA and they are still vulnerable to communal polarization when political crises arise. The non-dissolution of paramilitary forces provides ready-made violent entrepreneurs for communal tensions. The ongoing segregation in working class areas perpetuates mutual mistrust and anxiety between communities and provides a propitious social space for communal tensions to develop. The social vulnerabilities of working class areas need to be addressed in order to generate a long-term social infrastructure for peace.

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6. CONCLUSION

6.1. Cleavage Structure, Political Competition and Interethnic Relations

Why do some ethnic civil wars display intercommunal violence whereas others not? I delved into this question based on the comparison of Kurdish problem in Turkey and Northern Ireland conflict. In order to highlight the causal mechanisms which lead to intercommunal violence, I asked more specifically why Kurds and Turks did not turn into communal groups in conflict although the increased mutual distrust hung over local community interactions due to the ethnic insurgency of the PKK whereas Northern Ireland conflict spoiled over into Protestant and Catholic communities by the hand of loyalist and republican paramilitaries. This comparison was very pertinent to inquire why some ethnic dyads turn against each other whereas others do not because Kurds in Turkey endured an increased level of state repression and exclusion from political power whereas the Irish in Northern Ireland were able to practice their culture and were represented by the Nationalist party in the Stormont Parliament during the political hegemony of the UUP (1921-1972).

My answer to this puzzle expanded the range of instrumental-institutional explanations which point out the role of institutions in shaping and constraining the range of choices available to actors. While the studies on interethnic violence highlight the role of "manipulative leaders" and "ethnic-outbidding process" as a catalyst of ethnic antagonisms, I show in this research that this manipulation does not always rest upon ethnic cleavages as in the case of Kurdish conflict in Turkey but can be informed by other social cleavages in society that define the main parameters of political competition. While the divides between Turkish and Kurdish identities were amplified and sharpened through the armed conflict between the state and the PKK, Turks and Kurds did not turn into competing communal groups because Turkish political parties, especially those that lay claim on the voice of

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peripheral forces restrained themselves from mobilizing communities against each other since Kurds constituted an important part of their constituency. The Kurdish case revealed that the political competition based on center-periphery cleavage produced three institutional outcomes which affected positively interethnic relations. It produced political parties and governments supported by a significant share of Kurdish voters and prevented the full disconnection between Turkish political system and Kurdish citizenry. Secondly, it enabled the incorporation of Kurdish leaders into political system which curtailed the internal security dilemma ignited by the war with the PKK, although this elite accommodation had a partial and exclusionary character. Thirdly, it discouraged political parties and governments to adopt exclusive communal frames against Kurdish minority which would amplify already hardened Turkish-Kurdish boundaries.

In Northern Ireland, the nationalist-unionist cleavage structure did not give electoral incentives for the unionist parties and governments to appeal to Catholic minority. To the contrary of Turkish case, "unionist parties for many years were disinclined even to accept Catholics as ordinary members" (Adrian Guelke, personal communication, 16 July 2015). In a plurality rule system, the hegemon unionist party in government, the UUP, strove to maintain the support of Protestant majority by applying social, economic, political discrimination against Catholics. Firstly, the UUP which held the monopoly of government between 1921 and 1972 was supported exclusively by Protestants and applied favorable policies to Protestants to maintain its electoral support. Secondly, unionist parties and governments did not accommodate Catholic leaders since they had already the electoral support of Protestant majority and did not need the electoral support of Catholics fearful of losing their Protestant support. Thirdly, unionist parties only appealed to Protestant majority and produced exclusive discourses against Catholic minority in order to bind Protestant majority behind their political agendas. In sum, different from Kurds and Turks in Turkey, governments in Northern Ireland

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were unable to mediate interethnic tensions channeling ethnic groups towards common political agendas, had no ethnic leaders from minority group which could moderate interethnic tensions and were strictly associated with majority devoid of legitimacy in the eyes of minority.

6.2.Riot Networks and Spatial Distribution of Communal Violence

This study directs another puzzle regarding the spatial distribution of communal violence in Northern Ireland and Turkey. In Northern Ireland, communal tensions still boil especially during the parade season in working class neighborhoods which were the strongholds of resistance during the war. The legacy of communal tensions is still felt on "tectonic boundaries", the interfaces which refer to the places where sectarian intercommunal violence occurred and where segregated Protestant and Catholic communities meet.

Are there "tectonic boundaries" in Turkey comparable to Northern Ireland? If there is no polarized city in Turkey comparable to Belfast, there are Kurdish enclaves in Turkish-dominated Western provinces which hint at tectonic struggles. The chapter on communal violence against Kurds is the first step to find out the localities which are more vulnerable to communal violence against Kurds in Turkey. Localities in Turkey are constructed by more porous identity boundaries compared to Northern Ireland and separated by "invisible but felt" boundaries compared to peace walls of Northern Ireland. The chapter on communal violence against Kurds displays that localities defined by statist-nationalist tendencies are more riot prone to communal violence against Kurds. The change of political opportunity structure provided by democratization and increased pluralism toward Kurdish identity entailed three consequences influential on the spatial distribution of communal violence against Kurds: boundary activation with regard to Kurdish identity especially in Western Turkey, the opportunity for collective violence due to decreased repression against Kurdish identity and

rise of riot networks which are more mobile in statist-nationalist localities of Western Turkey.

6.3. Contribution to Theory, Limitations, and Avenues for Future Research

This research contributes to the content of electoral incentive theory developed by Horowitz (1985, 1991) and Wilkinson (2004) that views political competition as key to understand incentives for violence. This comparative case study of Northern Ireland conflict and Kurdish problem in Turkey sets out three institutional outcomes produced by political competition and cleavage structure which feed or de-mobilize the potential for interethnic conflict in times of crises: political parties able/unable to appeal to ethnic diversity, accommodation/exclusion of ethnic leaders and inclusive/exclusive communal frames toward ethnic diversity.

Moreover, this research adds into institutional arguments finding out the role of leadership overrated in the case of societal peace. As Horowitz notes:

If peacemaking in divided societies is a term with any real content, that content must be cast in terms of institutions: structures and recurrent patterns of behavior that work to reduce conflict. The alternatives are much less reliable. Leadership, a quality often emphasized by those who participate in the making of peace, is fragile. Leaders can change their minds or have their minds changed for them by changing conditions or by upstart leaders; they can be replaced, and they can die. Leadership is overrated (Horowitz 2004:245).

The within-case study of Kurdish problem in Turkey shows that the maintenance of societal peace during the war with the PKK resulted neither from the politics of goodwill toward Kurds nor from the leadership qualities of Turkish politicians but from the interests shaped by the cross-cutting cleavage structure and political competition. After all, the abilities of Recep Tayyip Erdogan in reconstituting and maintaining the societal divides (religious vs. secular in Turkey) were no less than unionist leaders' (Catholic vs. Protestant). If the former's role headed toward significant progress on Kurdish rights while the latter's toward the onset of communal violence in Northern Ireland, this is related to the incentives provided by cleavage

structure and political competition. The political competition based on cleavage structure shaped the main divides for these political actors to mobilize in order to forge an unwavering majority. Kurds were part of this majority in Turkey whereas Catholics were not in Northern Ireland.

Another contribution of this research is the study on communal violence against Kurds. This research suggests using the concept "communal violence" in order to code more analytically the mob attacks against Kurds. This study also proposes to revise the intercommunal conflict level coding of Turkey which is no more at zero level. Turkey is vulnerable to communal violence against Kurds at the level of sporadic violent attacks by gangs or other small group: attacks without weapons (e.g., brawls), knives, or few small arms (e.g., one or two handguns) involving fewer than 20 people (Minorities at Risk Project, 2009). While this study is the first research based on a systematical study of communal violence against Kurds, it recognizes its limitations. Firstly, the city-level is too large to investigate how neighborhood characteristics influence communal violence; future research can delve into neighborhood level and inquire how ethnic parity, inter-group inequalities, political-ideological orientations alter readiness for ethnic conflict behavior. Secondly, this research calls for future studies on interethnic cooperation and societal peace in Turkey looking into social, economic, political connections between Turks and Kurds at micro-level. This study highlights that the social, political and economic presence of a minority in a majority-dominated locality do not insinuate interethnic cooperation, the future studies need to penetrate surface appearances and understand the everyday underpinnings of societal peace and collective violence in Turkey.

This research also emphasizes that in a system dominated by ethno-political cleavages, electoral rules and political party system play a vital role to generate multi-ethnic alliances vertically along interethnic and intraethnic cleavages. Nevertheless, this electoral engineering

also has limitations since it is doubtful whether the use of electoral engineering in conflict-ridden societies can be effective to generate electoral preferences across conflictual divides. In the case of Turkey as in the case of Northern Ireland, the roots of cleavages stretch back to the political history of both countries. The cleavages cannot be generated overnight and electoral engineering can fall foul of intra-group, inter-ethnic cleavages when it does not fit into the social tissue of society.

This study recognizes as well its limitations. First of all, while sectarian division also reinforced ethno-political divisions in Northern Ireland, the supra-ethnic Muslim identity played a binding role between Turks and Kurds during ethnic conflict. Secondly, while Irish had a national homeland, this did not exist in Kurdish case. However, this transnational aspect has been growing especially since the foundation of Iraqi Kurdistan regional government and the foundation of de facto autonomous regions in Syria such as the case of Rojava after the outbreak of civil war in Syria. Another challenge of Turkish politics today is to grasp this transnational appeal in order to appeal to Kurds. Thirdly, while vigilant networks have a long history dating back to the 18th and 19th centuries in Ireland, these kinds of vigilant networks between Turks and Kurds started to grow in Turkey with the communalization of Kurdish problem in 1990s. Finally, this study adopts an institutional-instrumental explanation which considers the agent preferences as formed and reshaped by the constraints and incentives provided by institutional structures. Thus, the agencies of militant organizations are left out of the scope of the study.

6.4. Looking forward: On the possibility of interethnic violence in Turkey

This research does not prophesize doom or gloom for societal peace in Turkey but ends up with a few cautionary notes. First of all, this study eschews downplaying "lynching" incidents in Turkey as a bunch of people's anger boiling over against terrorism. Communal

riots are not only related to inter-group fissures but also related to intra-group fissures. Nirenberg (1996) shows that Muslim-Christian riots were also products of intra-Christian struggles in Medieval Spain. Wilkinson (2004) demonstrates that Hindu-Muslim riots are also linked up with intra-Hindu and intra-caste struggles for political power. While the political competition based on Turkish-Kurdish cleavage is now stronger than it had been before, this research alerts that the decreased political competition for Kurdish votes can result in a ratchet effect on interethnic tensions as the number of political parties able to appeal to Kurds decreased. Political parties are not mere reflections of societal cleavages but they are able to construct them through their ability of "political articulation", "through which *party practices naturalize class, ethnic, and racial formations as a basis of social division by integrating disparate interests and identities into coherent sociopolitical blocs"* (De Leon, Desai and Tugal 2009: 194-195). While political parties are able to naturalize mutual distrust between Turks and Kurds with regard to peace process by channeling them toward common political agendas as it was the case of AKP with a multi-ethnic constituency, they can also risk to derail peace negotiations heightening ethnic divides by politics of outbidding as it is the case of the MHP that seeks to outmaneuver the AKP by capitalizing on lingering public resentment against the PKK and peace process. It is important to recall that the default of Northern Irish political parties to appeal to cross-community groups had constructed a stumbling block against the progress on peace process in Northern Ireland. The decreased support of main Turkish political parties in Kurdish regions after 2015 elections gives alarming signals in this respect.

Secondly, the question arises: is there a process of "Northern Irelandization" of Kurdish problem in Turkey? The 2015 elections and the ensuing resumption of the armed conflict between the state and the PKK corroborate this study's thesis as Turkey is vulnerable to ethnic polarization with the ongoing mob assaults against Kurds and mobile pro-PKK riot

networks in Kurdish regions while the gulf between Turkish political parties and Kurdish constituency has been widening. While the HDP's ability to appeal to ethnic Turks breaks its ethnic cage and turns it into a non-ethnic party which sustains rather than endangers interethnic cooperation with a multi-ethnic constituency; the other political parties in parliament, the CHP, the MHP including the AKP after 2015 elections are vulnerable to turn into ethnic parties in search of the votes of Turkish majority unless they can rebuild bridging ties with Kurdish minority. The decreased appeal of Turkish political parties among Kurdish voters also affects their ability to convince Kurdish leaders to run on these political parties' tickets. Moreover, cross-community appeals around the demands of periphery are no more able to convince Kurdish electorate as it was the case of 1990s. Turkish political leaders have another challenge today as they have to respond not only to Kurdish demands but also to the transnational appeal of Kurdish problem as it was the case of Kobane war or the problem of Kurdish refugees. In the same way how Dublin or London affects Belfast, Kobane affects Diyarbakır which echoes through Western Turkey today.

Turkish political history proved that parties unable to appeal to Kurdish minority have been dragged into centrist politics closed to multicultural politics. However, the society in Turkey is no more Turkey of 1980s in which there were little or less extant ethnic tensions between Turks and Kurds, Turks and Kurds were not cohabitating in the same provinces in a scale they are cohabitating today and there was not such a prolonged period of rising expectations of Kurdish minority from the Turkish political system or a long experience of Kurdish activism challenging the center. Not only Yugoslavia but also Northern Ireland "sleepwalked" into violent interethnic conflict while minorities were expecting revisions in the political systems whereas political leaders were in a competitive ethnic polarization in search of votes. The trend of waning Kurdish votes behind Turkish political parties and the

outbidding in search of Turkish majority votes can pave the path of interethnic tensions to which this study pays attention.

Thirdly, the fact that interethnic violence did not occur during the war with the PKK is not a guarantee that it will not occur in the future. To the contrary, social movements arise when "social conflict is transparent and political opportunities are expanding" (Tarrow 1989: 48-49). This study shows that the rise of communal riot is contingent; it is born out of a moment or an opportunity. While the reinforcement of Kurdish rights and of pro-Kurdish party inverted the status ranking of Kurdish identity which was casted as inferior before, this study draws attention to the role of riot networks which are quiescent in normal times but proactive on the rise and spread of communal violence against Kurds during the times of crises. While anti-Kurdish racism seems to be dormant under the light of the peace process, this can be a case of "ethnic preference falsification" (Kuran 1998) in which people restrain themselves from displaying unpopular beliefs in order to avoid social isolation. The leeching away of Kurdish support behind Turkish political parties risks generating incentives for them to provoke Turkish nationalism against the peace process and the pro-Kurdish party. As in the case of 6-7 September riots on Kobane, intransigent party politicking between parties over Kurdish problem can generate cascades in this war-torn society. Cascades are:

self-reinforcing processes that change the behaviour of a group of people through interpersonal dependencies . . . Cascade models explain situations in which the individual's incentives for taking an action, holding a belief, or conforming to a norm depend significantly on the behaviour of others (Somer 2001: 129).

Moreover, it is necessary to highlight that the rise of riot networks is not specific to Western Turkey. Those who are interested in riot networks of Kurdish nationalist groups can look into the archives of *Dicle Haber Ajansı* in which observers can find many riot networks which are not only involved in rioting but also in-group policing such as *"Başkan Apo'nun Talebeleri", "Öz Savunma Birlikleri", "Ege Apocu Gençlik İnisiyatifi", "Fuhuşa Karşı Kürt*

Halk İnisiyatifi", "Apocu Gençlik", "Komeleyên Ciwan". These groups are not only limited to Kurdish regions but they are also mobile in Kurdish enclaves of Western provinces. This research cautions that Turkey has more vigilant networks than it had been before which can diffuse communal riots and shift the scale of ethnic conflict.

This research also demonstrates that it is not possible to rely on the force of religion as a binding social capital between Turks and Kurds since racialization of Kurdish identity is at play in society. The fervor of nationalisms that many Turks and Kurds harbor can outpace the binding force of religion. Crawford and Lipschutz (1998) contend that ''[c]ultural conflict escalates into violence when [domestic political] institutions are weakened, disrupted or transformed''. This research shows that the main responsibility of communal violence against Kurds lies on the central government and security forces. In addition, security forces bear the brunt of racialization of Kurdish identity as they are reticent about investigating and prosecuting the perpetrators. Turkish security forces have a lot to learn from the police reform initiated after the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland which renovated itself through a greater emphasis on police governance and accountability, human rights training, equitable recruitment and community policing through district policing partnerships (see Ellison 2007). The inability of Turkish security forces to control communal riots backfires the spread of riot networks as in the case of Kobane incidents of 6-7 September. This point awaits further detailed research.

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APPENDIX I

MAR Intercommunal Conflict Measures

CCGROUP1 Name of group with highest level of conflict

COMCO Annual Communal Conflict Index, 1990-2000 **421**
Missing Values: -99
0 None manifest
1 Acts of harassment
2 Political agitation
3 Sporadic violent attacks
4 Anti-group demonstrations
5 Communal rioting
6 Communal warfare
99 No basis for judgment

INTERCON Presence of intercommunal conflict
0 No
1 Yes
For each year in which intercommunal conflict reported.
-99 No basis for judgment

NOCOMCON Intercommunal Conflict, 1940-1989?
0 No intercommunal conflict
1 Yes, some intercommunal conflict

GCC1 Level of intergroup conflict, group #1, 1990-2000
Missing Values: -99
0 None manifest
1 Acts of harassment
2 Political agitation
3 Sporadic violent attacks
4 Anti-group demonstrations
5 Communal rioting
6 Communal warfare
99 No basis for judgment

Table XXXII. MAR data on Intercommunal Conflict Measures for Kurds in Turkey and Catholics in Northern Ireland

year_1	year_2	group	ccgroup1	comco	intercon	nocomcon	gcc1
1985	1985	CATHOLICS IN N. IRELAND	Protestants	-99	1	1	-99
1986	1986	CATHOLICS IN N. IRELAND	Protestants	-99	1	1	-99

1987	1987	CATHOLICS IN N. IRELAND	Protestants	-99	1	1	-99
1988	1988	CATHOLICS IN N. IRELAND	Protestants	-99	1	1	-99
1989	1989	CATHOLICS IN N. IRELAND	Protestants	-99	1	1	-99
1990	1990	CATHOLICS IN N. IRELAND	Protestants	5	1	1	5
1991	1991	CATHOLICS IN N. IRELAND	Protestants	5	1	1	5
1992	1992	CATHOLICS IN N. IRELAND	Protestants	5	1	1	5
1993	1993	CATHOLICS IN N. IRELAND	Protestants	5	1	1	5
1994	1994	CATHOLICS IN N. IRELAND	Protestants	5	1	1	5
1995	1995	CATHOLICS IN N. IRELAND	Protestants	5	1	1	5
1996	1996	CATHOLICS IN N. IRELAND	Protestants	5	1	1	5
1997	1997	CATHOLICS IN N. IRELAND	Protestants	5	1	1	5
1998	1998	CATHOLICS IN N. IRELAND	Protestants	3	1	1	3
1999	1999	CATHOLICS IN N. IRELAND	Protestants	3	1	1	3
2000	2000	CATHOLICS IN N. IRELAND	Protestants	3	1	1	3
2001	2001	CATHOLICS IN N. IRELAND	Protestants	-99	1	1	3
2002	2002	CATHOLICS IN N. IRELAND	Protestants	-99	1	1	3
2003	2003	CATHOLICS IN N. IRELAND	Protestants	-99	1	1	3
1940	1940	KURDS	-99	-99	0	0	-99
1941	1941	KURDS	-99	-99	-99	-99	-99
1942	1942	KURDS	-99	-99	-99	-99	-99
1943	1943	KURDS	-99	-99	-99	-99	-99
1944	1944	KURDS	-99	-99	-99	-99	-99
1945	1945	KURDS	-99	-99	0	0	-99
1946	1946	KURDS	-99	-99	-99	-99	-99
1947	1947	KURDS	-99	-99	-99	-99	-99
1948	1948	KURDS	-99	-99	-99	-99	-99
1949	1949	KURDS	-99	-99	-99	-99	-99
1950	1950	KURDS	-99	-99	0	0	-99
1951	1951	KURDS	-99	-99	-99	-99	-99
1952	1952	KURDS	-99	-99	-99	-99	-99
1953	1953	KURDS	-99	-99	-99	-99	-99
1954	1954	KURDS	-99	-99	-99	-99	-99
1955	1955	KURDS	-99	-99	0	0	-99

1956	1956	KURDS	-99	-99	-99	-99	-99
1957	1957	KURDS	-99	-99	-99	-99	-99
1958	1958	KURDS	-99	-99	-99	-99	-99
1959	1959	KURDS	-99	-99	-99	-99	-99
1960	1960	KURDS	-99	-99	0	0	-99
1961	1961	KURDS	-99	-99	-99	-99	-99
1962	1962	KURDS	-99	-99	-99	-99	-99
1963	1963	KURDS	-99	-99	-99	-99	-99
1964	1964	KURDS	-99	-99	-99	-99	-99
1965	1965	KURDS	-99	-99	0	0	-99
1985	1985	KURDS	-99	-99	0	0	-99
1986	1986	KURDS	-99	-99	0	0	-99
1987	1987	KURDS	-99	-99	0	0	-99
1988	1988	KURDS	-99	-99	0	0	-99
1989	1989	KURDS	-99	-99	0	0	-99
1990	1990	KURDS	-99	0	0	0	-99
1991	1991	KURDS	-99	0	0	0	-99
1992	1992	KURDS	-99	0	0	0	-99
1993	1993	KURDS	-99	0	0	0	-99
1994	1994	KURDS	-99	0	0	0	-99
1995	1995	KURDS	-99	0	0	0	-99
1996	1996	KURDS	-99	0	0	0	-99
1997	1997	KURDS	-99	0	0	0	-99
1998	1998	KURDS	-99	0	0	0	-99
1999	1999	KURDS	-99	0	0	0	-99
2000	2000	KURDS	-99	0	0	0	-99
2001	2001	KURDS	-99	-99	1	0	0
2002	2002	KURDS	-99	-99	0	0	0
2003	2003	KURDS	-99	-99	0	0	0

APPENDIX II: CODEBOOK

Please tell me if you spot any problem, have question on the data or comments to improve the data. My e-mail is imren.borsuk@gmailcom. I will try to fix the problem. Any coding procedure has limitations.

The protocol here is inspired by the works of Tilly (1966), Tilly and Zambrano (1989), Varshney (2003) and Wilkinson (2006)

The basic rule is to enter much information as I can get from the newspaper to reflect accurate information of reported facts.

Fields and Entry Protocol

Source This study uses a Turkish source, *Cumhuriyet* newspaper and a Kurdish source, *Dicle Haber Ajansı* (Dicle News Agency) and *Ozgur Gundem* newspaper to collect data on collective violence against Kurds in Turkey for the period 1999-2012. The selection of Turkish newspaper is made on the comparison of randomly selected mainstream newspapers published in Turkish. I compared *Cumhuriyet, Hurriyet* and *Milliyet* for randomly selected 4 months.

Based on the comparison, I find *Cumhuriyet* as the newspaper that reports more news on the collective violence against Kurds. This selection was also pertinent since it is a left-wing newspaper attentive to social movements in Turkey compared to other mainstream Turkish newspapers. The selection of Kurdish source was rather obvious. Dicle New Agency gave access to its database so that I used this source beginning from September 2004. I could not reach the news before this date from Dicle News Agency since their news were lost due to a cyber-attack before. Using a news agency provides a greater opportunity to follow the news since one can access to more detailed information. I used *Ozgur Gundem* between 1999 and September 2004.

The definition of event My definition of violent event is inspired by Tilly (1966), Tilly and Zambrano (1989). For their studies on violent events in France, Tilly and Zambrano (1989) define the violent events in their general sample as "A violent event was an occasion on which at least one group of fifty people or more gathered in a publicly-accessible place, and someone seized or damaged at least one person or object" (Tilly and Zambrano 1989:3). This research concentrates on the communal attacks against Kurds. Communal violent acts describe the violence in which one of the motives of mobilization is "communal" which targets the communal identity of certain persons or groups. In my research, inspired by the studies of Tilly (1966), Tilly and Zambrano (1989), Wilkinson (2004) and Varshney (2002), I define communal violent event as "an occasion on which at least more than two persons gathered in a publicly-accessible place and some seize or damage at least one Kurdish person

or objects that are associated with a pro-Kurdish cause by the motive of targeting their communal identity". Thus, the General Sample (GS) of my data includes all the violent events against the communal identity of Kurds apart from interpersonal violence.

The data does not include the coercion used by security forces including police, military forces, or attacks against the police or military forces. Since *korucus*[93] also work as security personnel in some Eastern and Southeastern provinces, they are not included in the data. Police shooting of Kurds are not also counted if there are no attacks by civilians against Kurds. In line with Tilly and Zambrano`s research on violent events in France (1989), this data excludes violent events undertaken by single individuals.

The data contain actions that include <u>physical seizures or damages to Kurds or objects that belong to Kurds</u>. This fact excludes the violent events that occur among Kurds. While the identification of pro-Kurdish party is easy to identify for Western Turkey, this identification blurs in Eastern and South-eastern provinces where pro-Kurdish parties are in competition with center-right parties. Thus, I exclude the electoral battles that occur in Eastern and South-eastern provinces. I only include those between MHP (Nationalistic Action Party), advocate of Turkish nationalism, and pro-Kurdish parties based on the assumption that the MHP cannot be considered as a pro-Kurdish party due to its opposition to reforms based on Kurdish rights and liberties.

The data include <u>only the violent acts</u> so exclude the gatherings that attempt to violence but do not end in violence or crowds that shout treats of violence but take no action because of police opposition or simply they do not take such action. The data also include damages to symbols that belong to pro-Kurdish organizations such as burning of pro-Kurdish parties' flags.

This data include only violent events <u>in publicly-accessible places</u> thus excludes any violence that occur within closed institutions such as prisons. However, the events that break out of these institutions are included.

The boundaries of violent events During violent events, participants can be composed of a single group or from many formations acting collectively. In line with the works of Tilly (1966), Tilly and Zambrano (1989), participants are those who perform the violent actions, including those interact or others act collectively with the participants (Tilly 1966: 6-8).

Violence has an endogenous dynamic as it can evolve into many forms either decreasing or increasing in size and force. In line with Tilly (1966), Tilly and Zambrano (1989), when violent actions occur on the same days or consecutive days, take place in the same place or in

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[93] *Korucus* are village protectors in Kurdish-inhabited regions who are charged with assisting security forces in order to capture PKK militants.

the neighboring places and there is a plausible indication that there is at least ten percent overlap in personnel (Tilly 1966: 6-8), they are recoded as one single violent event.

Town/City Enter the same as given in the newspaper**.**

Village Enter the same as given in the newspaper**.**

District Enter the same as given in the newspaper**.**

Year Year in which violent event takes place

Month Month in which violent event takes place

Day The day on which the violent event was reported to have begun. As reports are later than event in itself, it is important to count back to the original day.

Turkish-Kurdish The purpose here is to identify whether an event involved communal attack against Kurds or alternatively motivated by other reasons.

1. ***Definite Case*** If the event was reported at the time of the event against the communal identity of Kurds unless there is a plausible reason to believe another competing mobilization may have been responsible for the violence, it is recoded as a definite case.

   The following precipating events are regarded as "definite case":
   a) Rumors related to the PKK are the precipating events for the violent acts
   b) Speaking, listening or singing in Kurdish, being Kurdish, not wanting Kurds in the neighborhood
   c) Organizing a Kurdish wedding, dancing *halay*
   d) Participating in Newroz celebrations
   e) Wearing pro-Kurdish colors or symbols, participating in PKK funerals are the precipating events for the violent acts
   f) Demonstrations for pro-Kurdish parties, for Abdullah Ocalan, for the PKK are the precipating event for the violent acts
   g) Attacks against pro-Kurdish parties
   h) Kurdish students attacked by *Ülkücü, Alperen* or other nationalist organizations
   i) Fights between Kurdish students organized in revolutionary-patriotic student organizations and *Ülkücü* organizations

2. ***Strong likelihood Case*** The following conditions apply: One where an event is not reported as "communal" but there is good reason to believe that another competing mobilization may have been responsible for the violence.

   The following precipating events are regarded as "strong likelihood case":
   j) One where an event is not reported as "communal" but the violent act takes place in an area where the hostilities against *Doğulular* (Easterners) are reported shortly before or after the event.
   k) One where an event is not reported as "communal" but the attacks are directed against the demonstrators that speak for grievances associated with a pro-Kurdish cause. The organizations which are associated with a pro-Kurdish cause and attacked with slogans "Kahrolsun PKK" (Damn the PKK) are included in this category:

- Peace demonstrations
- Hunger strikes
- TAYAD (the Solidarity Association of Prisoners' Families) demonstrations
- IHD (Human Rights Association) demonstrations
- Vicdani Red (Conscientious Objection) demonstrations

l) Demonstrators of the trials associated with a pro-Kurdish cause attacked by Turkish nationalists such as trials for Kurds deceased due to the shooting of police forces such as Uğur Kaymaz[94] or Şerzan Kurt[95].

m) Attacks due to items through which beholders perceive Kurdishness: wearing Ahmet Kaya t-shirt, busses attacked in Western provinces for carrying the license plate of Kurdish regions, making victory sign, wearing red-yellow-green, wearing or carrying items with these colors, wearing *poşu,* watching Med TV/Roj TV

Participants The participants in the violent act are indicated. Note whether the attacked and the perpetrators are identifiable. Note "Yes" if it is identifiable; if not note "No". As defined by Tilly and Zambrano (1989), "The participants in the event included everyone who performed the violent action, everyone who interacted with them directly in the course of that action, and everyone who acted collectively with members of either of the first two categories in the continuous stream of activity containing the violent action" (Tilly and Zambrano 1989: 3).

1.TYPE FORMATION (ATTACKED)	Is it identifiable who is attacked ? YES/NO
TYPE OF FORMATIONS IN THE AREA	- CROWD (INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION) - POLITICAL CADRES OF PRO-KURDISH PARTIES - MEMBERS OF PRO-KURDISH PARTIES - PRO-KURDISH PARTIES' BUILDINGS - KURDISH CITIZENS - CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS THAT CALL FOR KURDISH RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES - KURDISH WORKERS

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[94] 12 year-old Uğur Kaymaz and his father Ahmet Kaymaz passed away due to shooting of security forces which presupposed them as terrorist in Mardin Kızıltepe on 21 November 2004. The event stamped the history as "13 bullet incident" as Uğur Kaymaz's body received 13 shots. The police forces which shot them were acquitted for "self-defense. The attacks of nationalist groups against those who came to watch and protest the trial are included in the data.

[95] In the fights between Kurdish students and *ülkücü* students in Muğla Unversity, 21-year-old Şerzan Kurt from Batman passed away due to shooting of police forces during the incidents on 20 May 2010. These fights and the attacks of nationalist groups against those who came to watch and protest the trial are included in the data.

	- KURDISH STUDENTS CONNECTED TO YURTSEVER-DEVRIMCI (PATRIOTIC-REVOLUTIONARY) STUDENT CLUBS - KURDISH CITIZENS IDENTIFIED DUE TO THEIR CULTURAL ACTS - OUTSIDERS (PEOPLE PRESUMED TO BE KURDISH)
2. TYPE OF FORMATION (PERPATRATORS)	Is it identifiable who is perpetrator? YES/NO
TYPE OF FORMATIONS IN THE AREA	- CROWD (INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION) - MEMBERS OF MHP - NATIONALIST ORGANIZATIONS (INDICATE THE NAME) - ACTIVIST GROUPS - CITIZENS - OUTSIDERS (GROUP REPRESENTING A DIFFERENT LOCALITY)

Duration in Days Count from the beginning of the violent event to the last day on which violence was reported to have taken place. If there is a break in which there is no reported case of violent acts separating incidents of violence in the same area, note as separate incidents.

Forms of interpersonal violence The forms of interpersonal violence reported is indicated. The scale is taken from Tilly (1966), Tilly and Zambrano (1989).

INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION
NON-VIOLENCE
INADVERTENT PROPERTY DAMAGE -LITTERING, TRAMPLING, ETC.
CONVERSION OF PROPERTY -OCCUPATION, TRESPASSING, BUILDING BARRICADES OF PAVING STONES, ETC.
INTENTIONAL DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY
MINOR PERSON COMBAT -PUSHING, SCUFFLING, FISTFIGHTS
THROWING OF PROJECTILES -STICKS,STONES ETC.
COMBAT WITH POTENTIALLY LETHAL ARMS - SHARPENED SCYTHES, KNIVES, POLICE STICKS, CLUBS
COMBAT WITH LETHAL ARMS -FIREARMS, CANNON, TEAR GAS, EXPLOSIVES
OTHER
MISSING DATA

Magnitude   The magnitude of violence is indicated. The scale is taken from Tilly (1966), Tilly and Zambrano (1989).

INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION
SMALL (NO SPECIFIC INFORMATION)
LARGE ENOUGH TO CLOSE A SMALL STREET
LARGE ENOUGH TO CLOSE OFF THE ENTRANCE TO A BUILDING
LARGE ENOUGH TO SURROUND AN OBJECT SUCH AS A TOLL GATE, TRUCK, ETC.
LARGE ENOUGH TO FILL A SMALL MEETING HALL
EXTENDS OVER A HECTARE OF RURAL AREA
OCCUPIES A FIELD
A SINGLE LINE CONTROLLED UNDER A SINGLE ORAL COMMAND
LARGE ENOUGH TO FILL A SMALL BUILDING (E.G., HOTEL FOYER)
MEDIUM (NO SPECIFIC INFORMATION)
LARGE ENOUGH TO FILL A CITY STREET FOR THE LENGTH OF A CITY BLOCK
LARGE ENOUGH TO SURROUND A SMALL BUILDING
LARGE ENOUGH TO FILL A SMALL SQUARE
LARGE ENOUGH TO FILL A LARGE HALL
EXTENDS OVER SEVERAL HECTARES OF RURAL AREA
OCCUPIES SEVERAL FIELDS
GROUP WHICH CAN HEAR AND RESPOND TO A SINGLE ORAL COMMAND
LARGE (NO SPECIFIC INFORMATION)
LARGE ENOUGH TO FILL A CITY STREET FOR SEVERAL STREET CITY BLOCKS
LARGE ENOUGH TO SURROUND A LARGE BUILDING OR SEVERAL SMALL BUILDINGS
LARGE ENOUGH TO FILL A LARGE SQUARE
LARGE ENOUGH TO OCCUPY MOST OF A LARGE BUILDING
EXTENDS OVER MANY HECTARES OF RURAL COUNTRYSIDE
OCCUPIES MOST OF THE FIELDS AROUND A VILLAGE
GROUP WHICH REQUIRES SEVERAL SOURCES OF COMMAND
VERY LARGE (NO SPECIFIC INFORMATION)
LARGE ENOUGH TO FILL KILOMETERS OF CITY STREETS (MOST OF THE STREETS OF A SMALL CITY OR A SECTION OF A LARGE CITY)
LARGE ENOUGH TO SURROUND SEVERAL LARGE BUILDINGS
LARGE ENOUGH TO FILL SEVERAL LARGE SQUARES
LARGE ENOUGH TO OCCUPY MOST OF SEVERAL LARGE BUILDINGS
EXTENDS OVER MOST IF A RURAL COMMUNE
MISSING DATA
TOO BIG *
DESCRIPTION WHICH IS NOT ON THIS LIST

Killed, Injured, Arrested   The objective is to indicate the most accurate numbers from the sources. Bu the number can be ambiguous as there can be changing number of participants. In these cases, the higher numbers are recorded and the lower figures are noted.

Officials The names of all officials are recorded with their ranks as well as information on the role they played in violent acts are entered into the data.

These abbreviations are used:
BB: Belediye başkanı
V: Vali

Type of Policing Indicate all the security forces used such as police, gendarmerie and the arrangements they use.

Link Made to Outside Event If a link is reported to events outside the city where the violent event takes place (e.g. clashes with PKK), then mark "Yes"; if not, then mark "No". Indicate also the nature of outside event.

Police w Perpatrators If there is a report that police collaborate with perpetrators, write "Yes" in this space; if not mark "No". Indicate also the group that police collaborate with.

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