

BEHCET KEMAL YESILBURSA

THE BAGHDAD PACT

**ANGLO-AMERICAN DEFENCE POLICIES
IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1950 – 1959**

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The Baghdad Pact

This book sets out to explore the formation of the Baghdad Pact and Anglo-American defence policies in the Middle East, 1950–1959. It seeks to determine the aims with which the pact was established, the failings of the pact, and the struggle that was undertaken against it by hostile countries. It examines the events surrounding the formation, development and collapse of the pact, and Anglo-American attempts to contain the Soviet Union in the Middle East.

It also deals with British and American post-war defence policies in the Middle East and their collective defence projects in the region, such as the Middle East Command and Northern Tier, which led to the Baghdad Pact. It does not attempt to offer a comprehensive history of British and American policies in the Middle East, but rather aims to explore those policies with particular regard to the problems of Middle East defence.

In addition, it looks at the policies of the local members of the pact and the pact's internal structure. It poses questions of how the members of the pact and the United States perceived the question of Middle East defence, what their basic aims were, and what problems they faced while trying to achieve these aims and implementing their chosen solutions.

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Abbreviations

| | |
|--------|--|
| AIR | Air Ministry |
| AIOC | Anglo-Iranian Oil Company |
| ALCSP | Arab League Collective Security Pact |
| ARAMCO | Arabian–American Oil Company |
| BJSM | British Joint Services Mission |
| BMEO | British Middle East Office |
| BP | Baghdad Pact |
| CAB | Cabinet Office |
| CENTO | Central Treaty Organization |
| CIA | Central Intelligence Agency |
| CIGS | Chief of the Imperial General Staff |
| CO | Colonial Office |
| COS | Chiefs of Staff |
| CRO | Commonwealth Relations Office |
| DEFE | Ministry of Defence |
| ESS | Egypt–Syrian–Saudi Arabian |
| FO | Foreign Office |
| FRUS | Foreign Relations of the United States |
| FY | Fiscal Year |
| HMG | Her/His Majesty’s Government |
| IPC | Iraq Petroleum Company |
| JCS | Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| MEC | Middle East Command |
| MEDO | Middle East Defence Organization |
| NA | National Archives, Washington |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NE | Near East |
| NEA | Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, State Department |
| NIE | National Intelligence Estimate |
| NSC | National Security Council |
| PREM | Prime Minister’s Office |
| PRO | Public Record Office |

| | |
|--------|---|
| RAF | Royal Air Force |
| RCC | Revolutionary Command Council of Egypt |
| RG | Record Group |
| SACEUR | Supreme Allied Commander Europe |
| SACME | Supreme Allied Commander Middle East |
| SEATO | South East Asian Treaty Organization |
| SHAPE | Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe |
| T | Treasury |
| TL | Turkish lire (unit of currency) |
| UAR | United Arab Republic |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| UN | United Nations |
| US | United States |
| USSR | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| WO | War Office |

Preface

This book seeks to explore the formation of the Baghdad Pact and Anglo-American defence policies in the Middle East, 1950–1959. The history of the Baghdad Pact has not so far been extensively researched and, as a result, the formation of the pact and its overall aims are still surrounded by controversy.

There are no comprehensive studies on the subject, though general information is given in a number of scholarly works, articles and memoirs. It is the present author's opinion that archival sources have not been sufficiently examined. There are some studies of the pact based on British and American documents, such as Richard L. Jasse's *The Baghdad Pact: Cold War or Colonialism?*, Ayesha Jalal's *Towards the Baghdad Pact: South Asia and Middle East Defence in the Cold War, 1947–1955*, Brian Holden Reid's *The Northern Tier and the Baghdad Pact*, Nigel John Ashton's *The Hijacking of a Pact: The Formation of the Baghdad Pact and Anglo-American Tensions in the Middle East, 1955–1958*, and Magnus Persson's *Great Britain, the United States, and the Security of the Middle East: The Formation of the Baghdad Pact*, but they look into the origins of the pact either from the British or American perspective, and generally consider the formation of the pact as part of the Western powers' strategy of containment of the Soviet Union.

Although this book is constrained by the limits on the availability of sources to follow a similar approach, it also tries to explore the policies of the local members of the pact, and to examine the pact's internal structure. It seeks to determine the aims with which the pact was established, the failings of the pact and the struggle that was undertaken against it by hostile Middle Eastern states, and what the pact achieved in its three-and-a-half-year lifespan. It does not attempt to offer a comprehensive history of British and American policies in the Middle East, but rather seeks to explore those policies with particular regard to the problems of Middle East defence. It poses the questions of how the members of the pact and the United States perceived the question of Middle East defence, what their basic aims were and what problems they faced while trying to achieve these aims and implementing their chosen solutions.

This book is based upon a range of primary and secondary sources. The primary sources used are found for the most part in the British Public Record

Office, Kew, and the National Archives, Washington. American sources examined also include papers from the Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas; the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University Archives, Princeton, New Jersey; State Department papers in the FRUS series; Joint Chiefs of Staff papers; and National Security Council papers. Various secondary sources have also been used to provide a comprehensive background of the period studied. However, it should be emphasized that archives in the regional members of the pact (Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan) are not available to researchers as yet, and so the study is primarily based upon British and American archives. There can be no doubt, however, that in future new research of a wider scope, based not only on the archive documents of Britain and the United States, but also of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Egypt and Russia should prove more illuminating on the subject.

Apart from the introduction, the book is divided into seven chapters. The introduction contains a brief survey of the political, economic and military position of Britain, the United States and the countries of the Middle East after the Second World War, and seeks to examine Britain's post-war defence policy in the Middle East and the origins of the collective defence idea in that region. Chapter 1 examines American involvement in Middle East defence and the emergence of the Northern Tier Defence Project, leading to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement. Chapter 2 examines the attempts by the United States, Turkey and Pakistan to include Iraq in the Northern Tier Defence Project, and the Iraqi reaction to these attempts. Chapter 3 explores the formation of the Turco-Iraqi pact (the Baghdad Pact) and its subsequent international repercussions. Chapter 4 seeks to explore the extension of the Baghdad Pact, the reasons of the new member states for joining and their efforts to extend the pact further. Chapter 5 focuses on the development of the pact. Chapter 6 examines the impact of the Suez crisis on the pact. Chapter 7 seeks to examine the effects of the 1958 Iraqi coup and the subsequent collapse of the pact.

Introduction

After the Second World War the Soviets had seemingly tried to force their way into the Middle East by direct pressure on the ‘northern tier’ countries. They demanded territory and base rights from Turkey, promoted separatist movements in Iran, and sponsored (so it was believed) the communist side in the Greek civil war. Although these pressures were successfully resisted, they were seen as part of an emerging pattern of Soviet aggression worldwide. The Soviets had taken advantage of their wartime occupation of Eastern Europe and parts of the Far East to establish communist-dominated regimes in Poland, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania and North Korea; in 1948 communists seized power in Czechoslovakia and the Soviets blockaded West Berlin; in 1949 China fell to the communists; and in 1950 North Korea invaded South Korea, precipitating a war which would last until 1953.¹

The emergence of this Soviet threat coincided with signs that Britain was facing increasing difficulties in maintaining her imperial or ‘world’ role. The Second World War had imposed great strains on the British economy, and economic and financial difficulties continued throughout the 1940s. They were aggravated by Britain’s worldwide defence commitments, despite her withdrawal from India in 1947, and from Burma, Ceylon and Palestine in 1948. As early as 1947 Britain faced a major crisis on the northern fringes of the Middle East, where she could no longer sustain the financial and military burden of supporting Greece and Turkey against Soviet pressure. The Labour government turned the problem over to the United States, where President Truman responded in March by enunciating the ‘Truman Doctrine’, which promised American financial and military aid to Greece and Turkey, and to all ‘free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure’. For the British this was a major gain, but it was also a warning that their world role, in the Middle East as elsewhere, would henceforth depend upon American support.²

The Truman Doctrine was but one manifestation of an emerging United States strategy of ‘containing’ communism and Soviet power worldwide. After the war, Western Europe had been slow to recover economically, engendering social and political problems which, it was feared, could offer opportunities for communism. In June 1947 the United States Secretary of

2 *Introduction*

State George Marshall publicly proposed an aid programme for Western Europe, in order to revitalize the economies of the European countries, and strengthen them to resist communism. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan formed the main instruments of political and economic containment against communism. The instrument of military containment was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was formed in April 1949 by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Truman administration, which had been conducting a general review of the situation created by the Cold War in Europe and elsewhere, translated containment into a policy of military alliances and American bases abroad to contain the Soviet Union militarily. In April 1950 a secret National Security Council (NSC) study, the so-called NSC-68, called for a massive projection of American military power abroad in the fight against communist expansionism. The outbreak of war in Korea in June 1950 confirmed the views expressed in NSC-68.³

For present purposes, what matters is what the outbreak of the Cold War, and the United States' assumption of the role of leader of the anti-communist camp, meant for Britain's position in the Middle East. Although Britain's precarious economic position made her commitments in the Middle East difficult to sustain, restricting the amount she could devote to the maintenance of troops and bases and to economic and military aid for Middle Eastern countries, the security of the region remained a paramount British concern, since it was strategically a focal point of communications, a source of oil, a shield to Africa and the Indian Ocean and an irreplaceable offensive base against the Soviet Union. Economically it was, owing to oil and cotton, essential to Britain's recovery.⁴

In June 1946 the Chiefs of Staff concluded that it was of great strategic importance to hold the Middle East in order (a) not to prejudice the security of the United Kingdom, of the other main support of areas of the Commonwealth and of the communications between them; (b) to retain the necessary air bases from which to assume the offensive and attack areas vital to the enemy (the Soviet Union); (c) to secure (Britain's) essential oil supplies; and (d) to deny to Russia the means, first, of securing her most vulnerable flank and, second, of establishing a formidable base from which to extend aggression towards (Britain's) main support areas and their communications.⁵ These views were fully endorsed by the Labour government, which held that the Middle East should be stable, prosperous and friendly, and that Britain should have defence arrangements with some or all Middle East countries, which would afford the best prospect of being able to deny as much as possible of the Middle East to an enemy in time of war.⁶

However, after the Second World War, Britain faced new local threats to her dominance in the Middle East, including pressure for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine and emerging nationalist movements in the Arab countries, which demanded the removal of British forces from their countries

and independence from British influence. Ernest Bevin, the Labour Foreign Secretary, tried to counter these threats with the concept of cooperation through 'equal partnership'. Britain would provide aid and promote economic and social developments, encouraging Middle Eastern states to continue their military and economic alliances with Britain. A regional defence pact was another element of Bevin's Middle East plans. Bevin's idea was 'interlocking pacts' that would allow Britain to defend her interests with the full cooperation of the Middle East states. His ultimate aim was the formation of a strong Arab bloc or federation, pledged to mutual assistance for the defence of the Middle East and looking to Britain for the direction of its strategy and the provision of resources.⁷

Britain already had treaties of alliance with Egypt (expiring in 1956), Iraq (expiring in 1957 with right of review in 1952), and Transjordan (expiring in 1968). These treaties provided for the stationing of certain minimum forces in peacetime, the right of re-entry in an apprehended emergency and the provision of facilities in wartime. However, the treaties, and the colonial status they implied, had become anathema to Arab public opinion after the war, leading several of the Arab governments to demand immediate and complete evacuation of British troops from their countries.⁸

In December 1945, in response to an Egyptian request, the British government agreed to open negotiations for revision of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. In 1946 Britain and Egypt reached an agreement, which would have provided, *inter alia*, for the replacement of the 1936 treaty by a new treaty of alliance, for the evacuation of all British forces from Egypt by September 1949 and for a joint Anglo-Egyptian Defence Board to study the defence of Egypt. However, a dispute over the future status of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan meant that the agreement was never signed. The Egyptians wanted the Sudan united with Egypt, whereas the British insisted on self-determination for the Sudan. After 1946 further negotiations for treaty revision proved unsuccessful. Britain continued to remain in Egypt and to maintain her base in the Suez Canal Zone, justifying this under the 1936 treaty.⁹

For the British government, retention of the Canal Zone base was crucial to all plans for the defence of the Middle East. In March 1949 the Joint Planning Staff concluded that in either the short term or the long term Egypt was the only country in the Middle East where the resources in manpower (skilled and unskilled), industries, communications, port facilities and airfields were adequate for the main British base. The minimum requirements in Egypt were therefore the right to maintain in peacetime the minimum facilities needed for use and expansion on the outbreak of war, and the right of re-entry of Allied forces into Egypt on the threat of war.¹⁰

Britain also had a treaty of alliance with Iraq, signed in 1930, under which Britain enjoyed facilities in Iraq, including the right to maintain air bases at Habbaniya and Shaiba. Either side was entitled to ask for its revision after October 1952. Since the Anglo-Iraqi clash of 1941,¹¹ it had been strongly felt by the Iraqi public and successive Iraqi governments that the 1930 treaty was

4 *Introduction*

'unequal', and its abolition or revision had been a major aim of successive Iraqi governments. An attempt to put this policy into action was made by the Iraqi Prime Minister, Saleh Jabr, in January 1948 when, as a substitute for the 1930 treaty, he signed with Bevin the Portsmouth Treaty, which retained a major British defence presence in Iraq, though it returned the British bases to Iraqi ownership. It gave Britain the right to send troops to Iraq in the event of war or threat of war, and provided for the training and equipping of the Iraqi army by Britain. However, the treaty was repudiated by Iraqi opinion and the government of Saleh Jabr was driven from office.¹²

The only Arab country that concluded a new treaty of alliance with Britain was Transjordan in March 1948. The new agreement replaced the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1946, which gave Transjordan its independence. In return, Britain retained air bases at Amman and Mafraq and undertook to defend Transjordan against external aggression, to train Transjordan's armed forces and to give subsidies to the Arab Legion, which had been established by Britain in 1921 and administered by British officers, especially by John Glubb (Glubb Pasha) since 1938, and which played an active role during the Arab–Israeli war in 1948. Under the new treaty Britain retained the same rights and also agreed to establish a joint defence board responsible for external and strategic planning.¹³

With hindsight, it can be argued that it was not so much the attitude of Arab governments as of Arab public opinion which threatened Britain's position, and that it was above all the Palestine problem which rendered that opinion hostile to Britain. Throughout three decades of British rule, Palestine had been the site of irreconcilable conflict between indigenous Arabs and a growing population of immigrant Jews. By 1947 the British had had enough. They had failed to resolve the Arab–Jewish conflict, and could no longer support the cost of occupation, and turned the whole problem over to the United Nations, which, in November 1947, proposed the partition of Palestine between the Arabs and the Jews. On 14 May 1948 Britain formally terminated her responsibilities in Palestine, the Jews proclaimed the independent state of Israel and the armies of Egypt, Syria and other Arab states invaded the Jewish-held area of Palestine. The new Israeli state defeated the Arab armies, and in 1949 the Arab League states signed armistices with Israel, leaving over 500,000 Arabs displaced from their homes. The war left a legacy of Arab suspicion of the West, since the Arabs blamed the Western powers, notably the United States and Britain, for the creation of Israel. They regarded the creation of Israel against their wishes as a major injustice and an example of Western colonization. The creation of Israel promoted the growth of Arab nationalism, which was kept alive by the absence of any solution to the Palestine problem.¹⁴

One further source of difficulty for the British in the Middle East was their potential rivalry with France. Although, after the First World War, Britain and France had divided the Fertile Crescent between them, with France obtaining League of Nations mandates in Syria and Lebanon, the Second

World War had enabled the British to eject the Vichy authorities from Syria and Lebanon, thereby striking a decisive blow against French influence in the region. The French remained deeply suspicious of British ambitions in the Middle East, fearing that London had hopes of absorbing the Levant states, where France retained economic and cultural interests, into a 'Greater Syria' or a Hashemite-led 'Fertile Crescent Union'. In addition, growing unrest in their North African possessions made the French wary of Arab nationalism.¹⁵

The British had few illusions as to the challenges they faced in the Middle East. They recognized that the political regimes in the Middle Eastern countries, with the exception of Turkey, were weak, inefficient and unstable. The local governments faced repeated outbreaks of violence, strikes and anti-foreign, notably anti-British, demonstrations, and were facing a post-war wave of nationalism. The British did not expect the Arab states to offer effective resistance to communist infiltration in default of adequate Western support, or to produce appreciable resistance in case of Russian aggression. Faced with this local volatility, and conscious of their own military and financial limitations, the British realized that it would be difficult to hold the Middle East in a major war without the assistance of the United States. From the British point of view, it was necessary not merely that the United Kingdom and the United States should not be rivals in the Middle East, but that the two countries should as far as possible have a common policy. Britain therefore perceived a regional defence pact as a way to share the burden of her defence commitments in the Middle East with her allies, primarily the United States. Obtaining United States support for the British position in the Middle East was the main goal of British policy after the Second World War.

After the war, however, much of American policy in the Middle East had been based on the assumption that Britain should be primarily responsible for maintaining Western interests in the region. The United States policy provided for support of whatever British position existed and for utilization of British influence as an important adjunct to its own. The United States wanted to see the British position in the Middle East maintained because (a) it was not considered to conflict with any fundamental American interest but, on the contrary, to be a safeguard for the interests of the whole Western community; (b) it was assumed that British experience and prestige in the area would enable Britain to protect Western interests more easily and more effectively than could be done by any other Western power; and (c) the United States had its own commitments in other parts of the world (in Europe and the Far East).¹⁶

After the war, the first Anglo-American military talks on the Middle East were held in Washington in October 1947. It was agreed that the security of the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East was vital to both powers, that both must support it and that the independence and territorial integrity of Greece, Turkey and Iran must be upheld. Some differences emerged. The Americans refused to be drawn directly into Middle East defence arrangements, arguing that these were a British responsibility, they were lukewarm

towards the notion of a regional defence pact, and they questioned the British preference for a defence based upon the 'inner ring' formed by Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan and Egypt, rather than the 'outer ring' formed by Turkey and Iran. Throughout 1948 the British stood by their view that a collective defence system, based upon greater cooperation among the Arab states and the northern tier countries, was desirable, and by January 1949 they had also reached the conclusion that any regional defence grouping must be backed by the United States as well as Britain. The Americans, however, continued to shy away from anything resembling a NATO model for the Middle East. By October 1949 Bevin was prepared to acknowledge that a collective defence system without United States participation would have little value, and that for the time being, Britain would do better to focus her efforts on strengthening bilateral defence ties with Middle Eastern states, particularly Egypt, Iraq and Jordan.¹⁷

In 1950, however, interest in a collective defence pact began to revive. The British saw it as a means of resolving their differences with Egypt over the Suez base; the Egyptians, it was hoped, would not object to the presence of British military personnel under the umbrella of an allied military organization, analogous to NATO, in which Egypt would be an equal partner. This time, the Americans were more forthcoming. The outbreak of the Korean War in June led them to fear that the Soviets' next move might be in the Middle East, possibly against Iran. They concluded that regional defence must be strengthened, that Britain was too weak to achieve this unaided and that the Suez base must be secured. To this end, they proposed a joint Anglo-American approach to Egypt, to lead eventually to a Middle East defence pact. Nonetheless, differences remained. The United States still refused to extend its own defence commitments, insisting that the Middle East remained a British and Commonwealth responsibility. It continued, too, to express a preference for a strategy based on the 'outer ring'.¹⁸

One fresh difference concerned Greece and Turkey, which were admitted to NATO as 'associate members' in September 1950, but remained anxious for full membership. The British preferred to associate the Turks with their Middle East plans; they suggested that rather than admit Turkey to full membership of NATO, the United States should offer Turkey a direct security guarantee. Washington was reluctant to endorse this suggestion, however, partly because of Congressional opposition, and by early 1951 was inclining to the view that full Greek and Turkish membership in NATO offered the better solution. In May 1951 the British accepted this view, calculating that Turkish entry into NATO would make it easier to draw the United States into the Middle East. However, they proposed that Greece and Turkey should not be placed under Eisenhower's European Command (SACEUR), but under a Supreme Allied Commander Middle East (SACME), who should be a British officer. Washington replied that it would consider the notion of a Middle East Command (MEC), and invited the British to join with the United States, France, Turkey and Commonwealth countries in a 'Middle East Cooperative

Defence Board'; however, it stressed that this board should be a loose, planning arrangement, rather than a fully fledged military command, and rejected a British suggestion that Turkey's membership of NATO should be conditional on her participation in MEC. It also insisted that the MEC should not be a NATO command.¹⁹

Meanwhile all attempts to interest the Egyptians in a regional defence pact had failed. In June 1950 they insisted that Britain must first withdraw her forces from Egypt completely; in April 1951 they demanded a full British withdrawal within one year, and a union with the Sudan under the Egyptian crown; and in June 1951 they refused to consider participation in an MEC until Britain had evacuated the Canal Zone. In August the British warned Washington that Egypt might attempt to abrogate the 1936 treaty unilaterally, and requested support. Washington acknowledged that it was essential to retain the Suez facilities, and that an MEC offered the best way forward. The details of Middle East Command's organizational structure were worked out at Anglo-American discussions in September. It was agreed to establish a SACME, Steering and Chiefs of Staff's committees representing the United States, Britain, France and Turkey, and an advisory Middle East Defence Board representing all Middle Eastern countries interested in regional defence.²⁰

Despite initial reservations, the French and the Turks were willing to cooperate. The Egyptians, however, were not. In October they unilaterally abrogated the 1936 treaty and the 1899 Sudan Condominium Agreement, adding that they would not even consider the MEC proposals while British forces of occupation remained in Egypt and the Sudan. Anti-British riots broke out, and the Egyptian government withdrew all civilian labour from the Canal Zone. The United States, Britain, France and Turkey responded on 10 November 1951 with a quadripartite declaration, announcing their intention of setting up an MEC, and setting forth the principles upon which it would be based. In private, however, the Americans remained cautious. Conscious of Britain's declining capabilities in the Middle East, they proposed to review their policies in the region, and when, in January 1952, the new Conservative government under Winston Churchill proposed early steps to set up an MEC based in Cyprus, they indicated that they would prefer to postpone matters until the details of Greece and Turkey's admission to NATO had been resolved. They also indicated that they would prefer the British to make a fresh approach to Egypt, where a new cabinet had come to office.²¹

The British duly approached the Egyptians in March, offering equal partnership in the MEC in return for an agreement on the Suez base. By June, however, Anglo-Egyptian talks had collapsed, and the Foreign Office proposed that Britain, the United States, France, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa should proceed to set up a Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO), rather than an MEC. The MEDO should be established as a 'planning, coordinating and liaison organisation', which would eventually evolve into a 'fully fledged defence organisation', and Iraq, Jordan, Syria,

Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Egypt should be invited to participate alongside the seven sponsoring powers. Britain and the United States quickly agreed that the organization should be kept flexible and as small as possible, that the seven sponsoring powers should reach agreement before any approach was made to the Arab states, and that the MEDO should be based in Cyprus.²²

Hopes were raised by a revolution in Egypt, where a group of 'Free Officers' under General Naguib seized power on 23 July 1952. Abandoning the idea of an Egyptian–Sudanese Union, the new military regime accepted the principle of Sudanese self-determination. Encouraged, the British gave a memorandum to the other six sponsoring powers – the United States, France, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa – proposing the establishment of a MEDO. All agreed, though the United States indicated that it would wish to assess the reaction of the Arab states before proceeding further. In fact, the new Egyptian government had secretly informed Washington that it would be willing to join the MEDO if granted economic and military aid. The State Department, convinced that Egypt's assent was the key to participation by other Arab states, dismissed an Anglo-Turkish suggestion that initial soundings be taken of Iraq, and urged the Foreign Office to give priority to negotiations with Egypt over the Canal Zone. For the first time it indicated its willingness to take an active part in the negotiations. The British welcomed the offer, but added that any programme of military and economic aid to Egypt should be linked to Egypt's acceptance of the principle of joint defence worked out through the MEDO.²³

Superficially, it might seem that Britain's patient diplomacy had paid off. The Americans had been persuaded to cooperate in a MEDO, to acknowledge the importance of the base in the Canal Zone, and to assist in talks with the Egyptians. In reality, divergences between London and Washington continued. For the British, the MEC and the MEDO were primarily devices for preserving their leading role in the Middle East, while sharing some of its burdens; the United States, in contrast, was interested in a broader political approach to the Middle East. Washington was also insistent that it could assume no substantial defence burdens in the region. Further, the United States' increasing willingness to cooperate reflected a perception of growing British weakness in the region. It was the Assistant Secretary of State for Near East, South Asian and African Affairs, McGhee, and the Secretary of State, Acheson, who were largely responsible for convincing the United States administration to support the MEC and the MEDO, but in retrospect both men claimed to have been sceptical. Acheson said in 1954, 'I don't believe any of us really thought that the MEDO was ever going to be a defense organization, that it had any defensive capacity'. McGhee was more forthright: 'the defence of the Middle East was just a bunch of mush. There was no way it could have been defended.'²⁴ With the arrival in office of a Republican administration in January 1953, American support for the concept of a MEDO was gradually to be withdrawn, and abandoned entirely in June 1953.

1 The Northern Tier Defence Project (1953–4)

The emergence of the Northern Tier Defence Project

In early 1953 the idea of setting up a MEDO still remained the joint Anglo-American objective in the Middle East. However, the State Department and the Foreign Office had different approaches to the issue. At the end of December 1952 Henry Byroade, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, was sent to London to try to work out Anglo-American differences over the Suez negotiations. Byroade's meetings with Foreign Office officials highlighted the basic differences between the American and British approaches. From 31 December 1952 to 7 January 1953 seven meetings were held between the American and the British delegations and the participants kept minutes of the meetings, calling them an 'agreed record', which was later called 'United Kingdom Memorandum on Defence Negotiations with Egypt'. According to the 'agreed record' of the US–UK talks on Egypt, the British position was broken down into three cases, called A, B and C. Case A called for the Canal Zone to be handed over to Egypt and the base area placed under Egyptian control. 'The depots and installations would act as a working maintenance base for a proportion of the Middle East Land Forces in peace. The Army would retain not more than 5,000 personnel to run these installations and the RAF not more than 2,000 for the same purposes.' The implication was that 'the allies would be assured of having a working maintenance base in peace to which they could return and operate immediately in war'.¹

The lesser position, from the British point of view, was Case B. It would allow the base to remain under Egyptian control. The Egyptians would take over the depots and installations and assume full responsibility for keeping all communications in working order and for maintaining Allied war reserves and heavy workshops in a state to be reactivated at short notice. To assist the Egyptians in this task, a rather smaller number of allied supervisory and technical personnel would be required than in Case A. The implication was that during peacetime there would not be a fully working base in Egypt, but it would be possible to reactivate the base within sixty days. The ultimate fallback position was Case C: the base would remain under Egyptian control,

and the Egyptians would assume the same responsibilities as in Case B. The United Kingdom would retain the right of periodic inspections of reserves and installations. The military personnel who would carry out these inspections would be stationed in Egypt, but if the Egyptians were adamant on this point, civilians stationed outside Egypt could be used. In these circumstances, it was estimated that it would take at least ninety days to reactivate the base. The difference between Cases A and B was that under Case A there was British control of the operation of depots and other installations, whereas under Case B control would be Egyptian. In other words Case A would give a working base in peace which could be used effectively and promptly in war, whereas Case B would produce a less satisfactory base which would not be immediately available in war.²

Byroade expressed general agreement with most of the British points, but doubted whether Case A could be achieved. He also opposed the new British 'package proposal', which included

- a a phased withdrawal of the British armed forces from Egyptian territory,
- b the maintenance of the Canal Zone base in peace with a view to its immediate reactivation in the event of war,
- c an arrangement for the air defence of Egypt,
- d the participation of Egypt in a Middle East Defence Organization and
- e a programme of (US and UK) military and economic assistance to Egypt.³

The first three of these five points were included in Case A. The last two were not included in Case A, but were nevertheless regarded by the British side as essential elements in a settlement.

The State Department believed that it would be a great mistake to insist upon discussion of a MEDO simultaneously with discussion of the other four points of the 'package proposal'. It was the State Department's view that evacuation of the Canal Zone and its maintenance must be agreed upon first; then, if Egypt desired, discussions for a MEDO should take place. The State Department believed that evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal Zone should start prior to negotiations with Egypt on the form of the MEDO itself, and that as soon as negotiations with Egypt on the MEDO had reached a suitable point, approaches should be made to other Arab states. However, the Foreign Office persisted in its view that Egyptian participation in a MEDO was essential for a Suez Canal base settlement, and that this formed the essence of the new British 'package proposal'. The British argued that unless they had adequate assurances about Egyptian participation in the MEDO, it was not possible to agree to evacuation since if Egypt refused common defence planning, a vacuum would be created. They agreed that the MEDO could not be established until negotiations with Egypt and other Arab states on the form of the MEDO had been undertaken. The Foreign Office insisted that the five separate parts of the proposed settlement must be put forward as five interdependent elements in a single settlement. In the end,

Byroade agreed to the British 'package proposal' and its joint presentation to the Egyptian government.⁴

American military aid to Egypt also became a source of friction between the United States and the United Kingdom. The United States was planning to give military aid (approximately \$10 million) to Egypt to maintain the Naguib regime in power and to set the stage for Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. Although Britain was in agreement with the United States that it was in their best interests to maintain the Naguib regime in power, she objected to the timing of the proposed aid package to Egypt. The British government wished to maintain a 'phased release of arms' to Cairo 'as an effective bargaining weapon in extracting from Egypt some sort of package deal on evacuation and Egyptian participation in a MEDO'.⁵ They were concerned that American military aid would damage London's bargaining position, have a negative effect in Parliament, stimulate the supply of arms to Egypt from other countries, have a bad psychological effect on British troops in the Canal Zone, and cause difficulties with Israel. Eden argued that the United States should concentrate on economic aid and leave military aid to the British. In this way, the United Kingdom could use military aid as leverage in its negotiations with Cairo. If the United States accepted the British arms embargo policy towards Egypt, Britain would be able to use a 'phased' release of arms as an effective bargaining weapon in extracting from Egypt some sort of 'package' deal on evacuation and Egypt's participation in the MEDO. Byroade expressed concern at this procedure as a philosophy of 'little steps for little people'. He said that the stakes in Egypt were such that Britain and the United States must take risks and give concrete evidence of their good faith to the present Egyptian regime. He emphasized that the risks involved could be offset by the fact that deliveries would be slow and, if the Egyptians proved uncooperative, the supply of arms could be cut off at any time.⁶

On 14 January 1953 Eden reported to the Cabinet that Washington had agreed that Case A should form the basis of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. The only divergence between the United States and Britain, he said, was over the supply of arms before the start of negotiations, but both powers had agreed to withhold delivery of any military equipment if Anglo-Egyptian relations became critical. He stated that the United Kingdom would not agree to troop withdrawals 'until the Egyptians have indicated their willingness to cooperate in a regional defence organization'.⁷

Eden completely misjudged the American position. The United States was against providing London with veto power over any type of aid to Egypt. After encouraging Naguib on military aid, Washington felt that if it were to withdraw its proposals, the Egyptian government would lose whatever faith it had in the United States. The State Department feared that if it allowed the British veto power over aid, there would never be a MEDO, and that the Egyptians would ultimately expel the British from the Canal Zone.⁸

The State Department was convinced that an immediate interim response to Naguib's request for aid was essential not only to maintain the Naguib

regime in power, and sustain its confidence in the West, but also to set the stage for the forthcoming negotiations between Egypt and Britain over the Suez Canal base. The United States therefore proposed to provide Egypt with \$10 million in arms and equipment, reassuring Britain that the equipment would not be conducive to guerrilla attacks against British forces in the Canal Zone. The United States would also encourage Egypt to pursue her 'habitual arms sources', namely the British. Despite further British objections, the State Department informed the Egyptian government on 19 February 1953 that it qualified to receive military aid, specifically limited to training.⁹

Meanwhile, a new Republican administration had come into office in the United States under President Eisenhower. Shortly after his inauguration on 20 January 1953, Eisenhower began to frame a new strategy towards the Middle East. The new administration believed that Egypt was still the key to the Middle East defence question, but that Cairo would not consider participation in a MEDO until the Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the Suez Canal base was settled. The United States concluded, therefore, that a settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute was an urgent matter. The new Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, was noticeably less enchanted with the MEDO and the British position generally than his predecessor. He took up a more independent approach to the Middle East, one that was already developing within the State Department. Although the State Department continued to support the MEDO concept, it began to promote its own policies in the Middle East.

Upon the Eisenhower administration's taking office, the British Prime Minister, Churchill, had written a series of letters to the new president, calling for a clarification of the new administration's role in the Anglo-Egyptian talks. What Churchill really wanted was confirmation that the new administration would stand by the commitments made by its predecessor at the end of its term of office. Churchill also wanted the new administration to provide a high-ranking military man to participate in the Anglo-Egyptian defence discussions. However, Eisenhower and Dulles retreated from the understanding reached in January 1953 between Byroade and British Foreign Office officials, and informed the British government that they supported the Truman administration's position that the United States should not take part in direct talks between the British and Egyptian governments with respect to the withdrawal of British forces from the Suez Canal Zone. Washington would become involved once negotiations began on the defence structure in the Middle East, and on a programme for supplying military and economic aid to Egypt.¹⁰

Churchill responded by sending Eden to Washington to smooth over Anglo-American disagreements. Eden arrived in Washington in early March, hoping to convince the United States to participate in the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, since an American presence would induce the Egyptians to accept the 'package proposal' upon which the British and American governments had finally agreed during Byroade's visit to London in January 1953.

At a meeting with Dulles on 6 March, Eden indicated that the British gov-

ernment would not go beyond Case A except for minor modifications. Britain would rather remain in the Canal Zone than relinquish treaty rights in exchange for an arrangement which provided no base, or an inoperative base, in time of war. Cases B and C had never received Cabinet approval. Case C was politically impossible for the Churchill government, because it would mean the abandonment of the Canal Zone base. Eden was even sceptical that the Cabinet would accept Case B. During the talks, Eden received a very strong telegram from Churchill objecting to any compromise over Case A. Another factor was increasing opposition from Conservative backbenchers in Parliament, who were highly critical of the recent Sudan agreement.¹¹ Churchill was deeply concerned that the Sudan agreement might be seen as a 'scuttle'. He believed that Case B would also be seen as a 'scuttle', therefore Eden had to push for Case A. Despite Eden's insistence on Case A and a package deal with Egypt, Eisenhower and Dulles maintained their negative attitude on the point. Dulles argued that Egypt would certainly reject Case A. He suggested that Case B should be substituted. He proposed that Eden should put to London for approval the following formula:

Negotiations with the Egyptian Government will be undertaken in Cairo by representatives of the two governments, including military officers of high rank. The objective will be to secure an agreement on the basis of Case A. Should this prove impossible, the US Government wish to make it clear that in their view, it may be necessary to fall back on an arrangement lying between Case A and Case B and in the last resort on Case B. If the Egyptians prove completely intransigent, a new situation will be created which the two governments will discuss.¹²

However, he told Eden that American participation in the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations would be contingent upon an Egyptian invitation. Eisenhower agreed to send Lieutenant General R. A. Hull to Cairo to assist Jefferson Caffery, the American Ambassador in Cairo, and British negotiators, if the Egyptians accepted American participation in negotiations. Eden was confident the Egyptian government would welcome American participation.

Eden realized that his visit had not been very successful. He had been unable to win American support for the MEDO, for control of aid to Egypt, and for Washington's participation in the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations without Egyptian approval. Upon his return to London, Eden reported to the Cabinet that he had reached full agreement in Washington on the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. He presented to the Cabinet the formula upon which he agreed in Washington, but the Cabinet refused it. However, in his memoirs Eden later confessed, 'we were not prepared to discuss our exodus in isolation. There was, in consequence, no basis on which to begin negotiation.' He complained,

it was unfortunate that the United States government were not prepared to put any pressure upon the Egyptians to bring [about their participation]

. . . The Egyptians were left to act as they wished and they preferred to divide both the discussions and the allies.¹³

The failure of Eden's visit increased Churchill's frustration with Washington. Eisenhower and Dulles were annoyed by Churchill's letter of 18 March, which rebuked the United States for its lack of support, and seemed to suggest that the United States' failure to help the British in the Middle East would bring a loss of British support in Korea.¹⁴ Eisenhower claimed to be puzzled by Churchill's attitude. He wrote to Churchill that the United States did not disagree with British plans for the Canal Zone. Rather, Washington was concerned not to give 'the appearance of ganging up on the Egyptians'.¹⁵ Dulles told Eisenhower that Churchill 'seems to think we are trying to run out on him whereas the facts are just the contrary'.¹⁶

After more than two months of persuasion by Jefferson Caffery, the American Ambassador in Cairo, the Egyptian government moderated its position, and indicated its readiness to start talks with the British government, although adding that it was not hopeful of a successful outcome. The Egyptians rejected American participation in the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. Nasser told Caffery that the RCC (the Revolutionary Command Council) 'wishes to avoid having the United States placed in a position to share public hostility now directed against the British'. However, Naguib tried to exploit the Egyptian rejection to enhance the nationalist image of the regime in Egypt by publicly attacking the American offer, declaring that 'we have enough with one . . . I will not accept any interference whatever with the independence of this country'. In spite of this, Naguib secretly told Caffery that 'you can accomplish more in your behind-the-scene role than you could have accomplished as an active negotiator'.¹⁷

When the RCC rejected the initial approach by the British and American ambassadors, Stevenson and Caffery, Eisenhower refused further American participation in the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. On 19 March he wrote to Churchill,

If the United States walks into a conference with [Britain], against the wishes of the Egyptian government, then the only obvious interpretation would be that our two governments, together, are there to announce an ultimatum. An uninvited guest cannot possibly come into your house, be asked to leave, and then expect cordial and courteous treatment if he insists upon staying.¹⁸

The United States encouraged the British government to begin negotiations with the Egyptian government as soon as possible. Churchill agreed to resume the talks, but instructed his negotiators to proceed on the basis that 'it was the Egyptians who desired to resume negotiations' and that discussions should be based on Case A.¹⁹

Despite the differences, the American efforts enabled the Anglo-Egyptian

negotiations over the Suez Canal base to resume on 26 April, but the negotiations soon collapsed as both sides hardened their position. British insistences on Case A and Egyptian participation in a MEDO before evacuation were major obstacles. The British required an Egyptian commitment to a MEDO, at least in principle, but the Egyptians refused to discuss a MEDO until the British evacuation from the Suez Canal base was fully completed. London blamed Washington for failing to join in the negotiations, arguing that had the United States allied with Britain, the Egyptians would have been compelled to accept British terms. In May 1953 Dulles, already impatient with the British failure to reach an amicable agreement with Egypt, decided that a new approach must be taken to the Middle East defence question. As far as Dulles was concerned, the MEDO idea with Egypt as the key country was now obsolete. He embarked on an extensive tour of the Middle East and South Asia to take a first-hand look at the situation, and to determine an alternative solution. Between 9 and 29 May he visited Israel, India, Pakistan, Greece and Turkey as well as seven Arab countries. Upon departing from Washington, he announced that he would listen intently to what he was told and consider the problems brought to him with the utmost interest and sympathy. He would gather facts rather than make specific proposals. However, three major issues already occupied the attention of Dulles prior to his departure: (a) the Anglo-Egyptian dispute, (b) the Arab–Israeli conflict and (c) Middle East defence.²⁰

Two days before his departure, Dulles received a personal message from Churchill, requesting the United States to delay providing Egypt with any military aid. Dulles considered this British request to be part of a policy intended to handicap American plans for the Middle East, and to weaken his position at the bargaining table with the Egyptians.²¹ On 11 May Dulles arrived in Cairo, where he first met Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi, who told him that the MEDO was now ‘definitely out of focus’. Fawzi said, ‘There is sometimes a profound difference between signed papers and the nature of things’ and added that ‘perhaps we are not communist now and we do not want to be, but this situation might change’. On the same day Dulles held a meeting with Prime Minister Naguib, who told Dulles, ‘The (Egyptian) people have such a lack of confidence’, that ‘they will not listen now to the idea of a defence arrangement’. He said that ‘no government in any Arab country can now go against the will of the people, who hate the British and feel bitter against the United States’. He told Dulles, ‘Free us from the British occupation and we can then negotiate in good faith’. He thought that the Arab League Collective Security Pact might be developed into ‘something good’. He added, ‘No country can stand alone’, and expressed the view that ‘Russia is not our friend’. By implication, Naguib did not exclude the possibility of Egyptian participation in a Middle East defence organization once the British had evacuated the Suez Canal base. Concerning Anglo-Egyptian relations, Dulles took a pro-British line with Naguib and told him that ‘the United States cannot equip Egyptians to fight the British’, but on the other

hand, he conceded that the original MEDO proposal no longer met the situation and was outdated. Dulles suggested that something else could be found. Dulles accepted that the British 'package proposal' was unobtainable; it was obvious that Egypt would accept only a little more than Case C. At his meeting with Dulles on 12 May Nasser repeated what Naguib and Mahmoud Fawzi had said the day before. Furthermore, Nasser told Dulles that 'the Egyptian people think of the MEDO as a perpetuation of occupation'.²² When Dulles stressed the importance of the MEDO and Egyptian participation in it against the Soviets, Nasser asked why they should join the MEDO. He then explained,

The Soviets are five thousand miles away and we have never had any trouble with them. They have never attacked us. They have never occupied our territory and they have never had a base here, but the British have been here for 70 years.²³

Nasser then asked Dulles,

How can I go to my people and tell them I am disregarding a killer with a pistol 60 miles from me at the Suez Canal to worry about somebody who is holding a knife five thousand miles away? They would tell me, [he replied], 'first things first'.²⁴

He told Dulles,

People must first own their independence before they are really interested in defending it. We are not ready to discuss pacts or any security measures unless we do it of our own free will.²⁵

In short, the Egyptian leaders told Dulles clearly that Egypt would not participate in a MEDO until British troops evacuated the Canal Zone. Dulles was impressed. He had arrived in Cairo expecting that Egypt 'would be the key to development of strength' in the Middle East, but his talks with the Egyptians convinced him otherwise. However, despite his failure to secure Egyptian participation in a MEDO, Dulles did not lose his hope that Egypt might become the first Arab country to make peace with Israel, since Naguib had told him that after the British evacuation he could reach an agreement with Israel.

Dulles got a more favourable impression in Syria, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey, and this encouraged him to look to the 'northern tier'. In Syria, Dulles had a long conversation with General Shishakli, Chief of State, who was in favour of a collective defence system in the Middle East. However, on 16 May he told Dulles that it was first essential to assure security within the Middle East area before trying to set up a defence system against attack from outside. He said that the Middle Eastern people themselves would be best defenders of their own territory, and that before any regional defence system

could be established the Arab countries must discuss the problem first. He concluded by saying that if efforts were made to set up a Middle East defence organization without prior settlement of the Arab–Israeli and Anglo–Egyptian questions, the Arab people would not understand and would consider that their leaders had betrayed them. In Iraq, on 18 May, Nuri Said, Minister of Defence, told Dulles that since 1934 Iraq had been aware of communism as a dangerous doctrine, and that he was pleased to see that the United States had recognized the danger of communism and was now trying to stop its expansion. Nuri said that Turkey was strong and ran less risk than Iran, which was weak, of being attacked by the Soviets. The Iran–Iraq frontier was therefore in great danger. Nuri stated that plans should be worked out for the protection of this area and the Middle East. Dulles replied that a new look would be taken with regard to Middle East defence and a fresh start would be made. On 24 May at a meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammed Ali, Dulles expressed his views with regard to the desirability of establishing some form of regional defence system in the Middle East. Dulles said that he had no preconceived or frozen ideas as to the form such a regional defence set-up might take. However, in his view, such an organization must have its roots in the area itself. No outside countries could present a blueprint and expect the countries of the region to accept it automatically. To succeed it must have the solid support of countries in the area and they must believe that their interests were best served by getting together and creating greater strength through collective action than they could have by acting independently of each other. To demonstrate his point, Dulles said that Europe had recognized the importance of collective action and created NATO, which greatly increased the scope and strength of European defence. He concluded by saying that what was needed in the Middle East was someone to take the initiative with other countries of the area. Mohammed Ali agreed and said that Pakistan would welcome anything which assured the security of the Middle East. He felt that Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and Syria could develop some kind of a grouping to create a barrier against Soviet aggression in the Middle East.²⁶

On 26 May Dulles discussed the question of Middle East defence with Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, who told him that the MEDO should be set up without the Arabs, and Turkey (with US aid) should become the backbone of Middle East defence. Menderes said that in view of Turkey's social and political stability and the determined attitude of Turkey vis-à-vis the Soviet threat, it was only natural that she would have a primary role in the defence of the area. He said that Turkey would continue to exert every effort to accomplish an organization of countries in the area, including eventually Pakistan, for Middle East defence. Dulles said that he would fully accept Menderes's view that Turkey would have to be the backbone of any such organization or of plans for the defence of the Middle East. However, while a backbone was important, Dulles said, it was equally important that there be flesh around it. He opposed Menderes's idea that the Arab countries should

be ignored with respect to Middle East defence, adding that from his own observations, in the northern Arab countries, such as Iraq, there was a sense of Russian danger. He thought that it might be desirable, without activating a formal MEDO, to give some encouragement to selected Arab countries which seemed to have the will and disposition to equip themselves to meet the Russian threat. On the same day, at a meeting with the Turkish President, Celal Bayar, Dulles said that the Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO), which was a plan for Middle East defence invented some two years ago, had not proven to be any good. Too many states not part of the area, and too many states in the area who were more interested in quarrelling over Israel and the Suez base than in the defence of the area, were included in the original plan. Bayar agreed with Dulles. In his view, there were several knotty problems which the Arabs put forward in justification of their position: that of Israel, Suez and the independence of several Arab countries. Bayar did not believe that the Arabs would be on the Western side even if their problems were solved. However, Bayar said that Iraq was, in his judgement, more reliable than the rest.²⁷

Upon his return to Washington, Dulles attempted to resolve the problems which prevented the formation of a Middle East defence system. His approach was twofold: to facilitate an agreement that would end the Anglo-Egyptian dispute, which seemed to be the main obstacle to establishing a Middle East defence organization, and to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict, or at least reach a *modus vivendi*. The idea of setting up a MEDO based on Egypt was therefore temporarily shelved, pending a solution of these other problems.

Dulles now perceived the success of the MEDO as a remote possibility. In a televised speech on 1 June he announced:

A Middle East Defense Organization is a future rather than an immediate possibility. Many of the Arab League countries are so engrossed with their quarrels with Israel or with Great Britain or France that they pay little heed to the menace of Soviet communism. However, there is more concern where the Soviet Union is near. In general, the northern tier of nations shows awareness of the danger. There is a vague desire to have a collective security system. But no such system can be imposed from without. It should be designed and grow from within out of a sense of common destiny and common danger.²⁸

On the same day he reported to the National Security Council:

The general concept [is] that . . . Pakistan could be made a strong loyal point. So, obviously, could Turkey. Syria and Iraq realized their danger, and could probably be induced to join with us. As for the countries further south, they were too lacking in the realization of the international situation to offer any prospect of becoming dependable allies. Iran . . . was the

obvious weak spot in what could become a strong defensive arrangement of the northern tier of states: Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Pakistan.²⁹

He told the National Security Council that Naguib was merely a front, and that the RCC, which was under Nasser's influence, was the real power in Egypt. Even if the administration solved Anglo-Egyptian difficulties, he said, the larger problem of political and economic stability in Egypt would remain for years to come. He believed that the United States must abandon its hope 'of making Egypt the key country in building the foundations for a military defense of the Middle East'.³⁰

Dulles concluded that the concept of a Middle East defence organization, with Egypt as the key, was not a realistic basis for present planning, and that the United States should concentrate henceforth upon building a defence in the area based on the northern tier, including Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria and Iran. He continued,

The old MEDO concept was certainly finished. For one thing, Turkey was still greatly feared by the Arab countries which she had once controlled. A fresh start was needed on the problem of defense arrangements, and the only concept which would work was one which was based on the contribution of the indigenous peoples.³¹

On 9 July the National Security Council discussed Dulles's report, which advocated greater independence and greater responsibility in the Middle East for the United States vis-à-vis Britain, and included the following points:

- a the MEDO was no longer played up as a likely defence arrangement in the future;
- b Egypt was no longer considered to be the nucleus of a Middle East defence organization, and the so-called northern tier states had been substituted for Egypt; and
- c a new look had been taken at the Suez base problem.³²

As to (a), Dulles said that the MEDO was impracticable. It was too complicated, and too much like NATO. Something less formal was needed as a substitute. As to (b), Dulles said that Egypt must be discounted as a strong point for the foreseeable future, because she was so engrossed in her own problems that the free world could not depend upon her as the cornerstone of a Middle East defence organization. On the other hand, the so-called northern tier countries, namely Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, were feeling 'the hot breath of the Soviet Union on their neck', and were accordingly less preoccupied with strictly internal problems or with British and French imperialism. Dulles also expressed the hope that the missing link in the northern tier, namely Iran, would some day join to eliminate the gap in the northern tier. Dulles summed up by expressing his view that separate bilateral arrangements

with the northern tier states were much preferable to arrangements modelled on NATO. The National Security Council confirmed Dulles's recommendations and adopted NSC-155, 'The US Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East'. Subsequently, NSC-155 was amended before approval by the President and circulated on 14 July as NSC-155/1, which became the basis for Washington's new Middle East policy for the next four years.³³

The most important recommendation of NSC-155/1 was to 'assist in finding solutions to local problems in the area which involves its relations with the United Kingdom' and to help settle 'the outstanding issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict'. These two problems, if they remained unresolved, were seen as openings for the Soviet Union to extend its 'control and influence by means short of war'. NSC-155/1 concluded that unless these issues were resolved, 'the Near East may well be lost to the West within the next few years'. With the removal of these obstacles, the United States could develop secret plans for the defence of the Middle East. The United States assessed the primary threat in the Middle East as political as well as military.³⁴

Dulles's Middle East tour of May 1953 was the turning point in the Anglo-American relationship over the Middle East. The United States would henceforth pursue a more independent policy and take the lead in encouraging the formation of a regional defence organization based on the northern tier. It would not necessarily oppose London, but would no longer give unconditional support to British policy in the Middle East. Although the MEDO still remained the platform of British policy in the Middle East, it was, in Dulles's view, outdated and ineffective, and pursuing it further would be counter-productive.³⁵ On 17 June, in a memorandum to Dulles, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, John Jernegan, stated,

To tie ourselves to the tail of the British kite in the Middle East . . . would be to abandon all hope of a peaceful alignment of that area with the West. Unless there is marked change in British policy . . . the British and ourselves would be driven out completely or we would have to maintain ourselves in the area by force at heavy material cost and even greater cost in terms of moral standing throughout the non-European world.³⁶

On the same day, Jernegan had a meeting with Harold Beeley, Counsellor at the British Embassy in Washington. Jernegan told him that the State Department had decided that the MEDO concept had to be put on the shelf, since the political atmosphere in the Arab countries made it useless. He indicated that the best plan for the moment would be to work individually with those states which seemed most disposed to cooperate with the West for defence. These were the northern tier countries: Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and Iran. Beeley replied that the Foreign Office was still determined to set up a MEDO along the lines of the Turkish suggestion, though it agreed with the State Department's view that the Arab states were unlikely to participate in it.³⁷

The Foreign Office's willingness to go ahead without the Arab states was not, however, shared by the British Chiefs of Staff, who reported on 8 June that without the Arab states, a MEDO was not a deterrent and was useful only in involving the United States in Middle East defence.³⁸ Sir John Harding, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, said that there was little point in forming a military pact, since only Britain and Turkey had forces in the Middle East, and Britain's were being reduced. There was 'nothing to plan with, and nothing to plan for'. In his view, any approach to Middle East defence should be entirely political, to convince the United States and Middle East states of the need for Middle East defence, and to lay a foundation for a MEDO.³⁹ Sir John Troutbeck, the British Ambassador to Iraq, told the Foreign Office in mid-June that there was no hope of Arab participation in the plan as it existed, and if established without Arab participation as the Foreign Office suggested, Britain would only lose further goodwill. In his opinion, Britain should break off planning with France and Turkey, and work solely with the United States.⁴⁰

Meanwhile, the United States had renewed its behind-the-scenes efforts to bring the United Kingdom and Egypt back to the negotiating table to resolve the Suez Canal base dispute. The United States hoped that once the base dispute was settled, the Egyptian government would prove more receptive to American suggestions on other key issues, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and Middle East defence. On 10 June Eisenhower sent a telegram to Churchill, emphasizing that it was not possible to conclude a settlement of the Suez base issue on the basis of Case A, despite its desirability from a military point of view. Eisenhower urged that a new approach be made to reconcile Britain's minimum defence needs with the nationalist sentiments of the Egyptian government, and that Britain should promptly resume negotiations with Egypt. In the American view, Britain should move towards Case B in order to secure an agreement with Egypt.⁴¹

The British government was not ready to give ground on the issue of the Suez base. On 15 June, in reply to Eisenhower's telegram, Churchill said that he still believed that Britain could get an agreement which retained the essential features of Case A. In a note to Churchill on 6 June, General Robertson, Commander-in-Chief of the British Middle East Land Forces, had explained reasons as to why Britain should insist on Case A and refuse to accept Case B. He said that

Case B will quickly degenerate into Case C. We shall then find ourselves with no British personnel in the Base. Apart from the bad effect on the maintenance of our stock, this will mean also that we shall no longer have a 'foot in the door'.⁴²

Meanwhile, in order to secure early resumption of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations on the Suez base, the State Department prepared a formula and sent it to Egypt for use in forming her own proposals. The State Department's

formula endeavoured to establish a framework for each of the main points of disagreement between Britain and Egypt, i.e. the number of British technicians, the duration of the agreement, and the availability of the base. The State Department suggested that Egypt should agree to an arbitrary number of British technicians for a fixed period of years. In the State Department's view, the number of technicians should be limited to 4,000 and the duration of the agreement should be five years. As to the availability of the base, the State Department suggested that it should be available to Egypt's allies and allies of Egypt's allies in the event of attack or threat of attack against any of the Arab states.⁴³

On 10 July the Egyptian government responded by proposing a new formula to the State Department. It accepted all the State Department's suggestions except in respect of the duration of an agreement. It proposed three years rather than five. The following day, President Naguib sent a letter to Eisenhower. He wrote,

I can assure you that if a satisfactory settlement can be reached, Egypt will cooperate loyally with her friend and allies to this end and, with their assistance, will be prepared to do her full part in building the military strength and economic and social stability which is indispensable to the achievement of security in the Middle East. [However], it is essential . . . that simultaneously with the signing of agreements on evacuation and the future of the base, there be firm undertakings and specific commitments to forthwith furnish Egypt with military equipment and other assistance as may concomitantly be agreed.⁴⁴

Meanwhile, the signs of divergence between American and British policies in the Middle East which had emerged since Dulles's trip convinced London to hold detailed talks with Washington. A previously scheduled summit meeting between Churchill and Eisenhower in Bermuda was postponed, due to the illness of both Churchill and Eden. The subsequent visit of the Acting Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, to Washington in July only produced a series of sharp exchanges with Dulles. Egypt was still a source of friction. The American position remained that Case A could not be obtained, and that the British government should move towards Case B in order to secure a settlement. In the British view, this would offer something which was very little more than Case C. They still believed that Case A could be obtained with some slight modifications in form. During meetings with Dulles on 11 and 14 July Salisbury proposed a slightly different version of the old British 'package proposal'. He proposed a minimum five-year agreement subject to the creation of a Middle East defence organization and Egypt's participation in it. He stated that Britain would not accept an agreement which did not retain essential features of Case A, namely that technical control of main installations in the base should remain in British hands. In the event of war, the British wished to get back quickly to a base which would be in working

condition. This could only be obtained under Case A. Salisbury found the Egyptian proposals with regard to the availability and duration of the base unacceptable. In the British view, three years was too short for adequate military planning for the Middle East. With regard to the availability of the base, Salisbury proposed that the base should also be available in the event of an attack on Turkey or Iran in addition to any of the Arab League states. As to the MEDO, however, Salisbury agreed with Dulles that there was no hope of getting Egypt into the MEDO or any variation thereof. He accepted Dulles's idea for shelving the MEDO, and this ended further serious British consideration of the MEDO.⁴⁵

The idea of a collective defence organization in the Middle East had started out as something that both the Foreign Office and the State Department saw as a long-term goal. By 1950 the British saw it as a good way to involve the United States in Middle East defence, although from the summer of 1951 it was also seen as a solution to the Anglo-Egyptian dispute. However, the British never saw an MEC and a MEDO as an organization of equal partnership with the Middle East countries. Egyptian membership was desired only because of the base facilities there, and the British would allow the other Arab countries at best second-class status. The real power would lie with the four sponsoring states, but this meant primarily the United States and United Kingdom. Both Turkey and France were discouraged from taking leadership roles. The MEC and the MEDO were attempts to share the burden of Middle East defence, but the British insisted on retaining the leadership position.⁴⁶

In the United States McGhee and Acheson were largely responsible for convincing the Defense Department and the administration to support the MEC in the spring of 1951, as a way of showing a more active American role in the Middle East. When the MEC failed, they continued to support it in principle because of Britain. In later years, however, both claimed that the MEC stood little chance of success.⁴⁷

The United States was also concerned with bringing in the Arabs as participants, but this was not possible because of the Arab–Israeli and Anglo-Egyptian disputes. Above all, the United States was interested in a broader political approach to the Middle East, whereas the British were interested in preserving their strategic position. This basic difference in approach led to the eventual foundering of the whole idea.⁴⁸

After the Washington talks, the British view on the Suez base question began to shift towards Case B, since they realized that they would not persuade Egypt to accept Case A. At the end of July a series of informal talks in Cairo began between representatives of Britain and Egypt, with Case B at the centre of the discussions. However, the two main subjects still in disagreement were first the number of British technicians who might be allowed to remain under a modified Case B, and second the details of the rights of re-entry to the base in the event of war. The British wanted to retain broad rights of re-entry in the event of an attack on a member of the Arab League or on Turkey or Iran. Finally, by the end of 1953, Egypt agreed to Britain's re-entry to the

Canal Zone in the event of an attack on an Arab League state or Turkey. But Egypt and Britain could agree no further. There were still many questions to be solved, such as whether the British technicians in the Canal Zone should wear military uniforms and carry arms.⁴⁹

The Turco-Pakistani Agreement (2 April 1954)

Meanwhile, from the summer of 1953 onwards, while the British were still distracted by the Egyptian problem, the United States unilaterally proceeded with its new defence policy based on the northern tier. The State Department decided that it would be best to work individually with those states which seemed most disposed to cooperate with the West, such as Pakistan and Iraq. The goal was a separate bilateral arrangement with each of these countries. Dulles believed the policy was modest but realistic, and more apt to produce results than a MEDO based on a NATO model. With more favourable political conditions, any successful American bilateral arrangements could be turned into a larger multilateral grouping for the region. This would allow an American-supported area defence arrangement to 'rise from within', and Washington would assume the role of a weapons supplier.⁵⁰ However, the State Department realized that the political base for such an organization did not exist, and must first be brought into being. The United States sought the support of such 'Asian and African states, particularly Pakistan, as might contribute to the security and stability of the Near East'.⁵¹

On 30 July Dulles informed American diplomatic missions in the Middle East that the MEDO was now 'on the shelf', and that in the absence of a regional defence organization it was the intention of the State Department to promote increasingly close cooperation with those states of the Middle East which were most conscious of the Soviet threat and most disposed to cooperate with the Western powers, mainly Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and Iran (the so-called northern tier countries). Dulles also indicated that \$50 million for military aid was available as a lever for the cooperation of the northern tier. In his view, if economic and military aid were given to those Middle East countries which were most disposed to cooperate with the Western powers, they all could come together, and a bulwark of strength could be built along the northern tier of the Middle East. The United States would therefore bolster Turkey and Pakistan, and between these two cornerstones would develop stability and further elements of strength wherever conditions made it possible.⁵²

On 11 August the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their comments and recommendations with respect to the northern tier defence concept and American military aid for the Middle East to the Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson. The Joint Chiefs of Staff found the new defence concept acceptable, achievable and suitable for the immediate future, though they, from a military point of view, recognized the need for a MEDO in which all of the Arab states would willingly participate. With regard to American military aid

to the Middle East, they recommended two phases, the first of which would be intended primarily to establish a politico-military climate favourable for obtaining the participation of the individual states in planning for the defence of the Middle East, and the second would be designed to meet the estimates of requirements for Middle East defence made by some form of Allied military planning organization in collaboration with the Arab states. These views were approved by the Defense Department, which on 17 August informed the State Department of them.⁵³ On 28 and 29 August the chiefs of American diplomatic missions in the Middle East met in Cairo together with representatives of the Department of Defense and Department of State to discuss military aid to Middle Eastern countries. They suggested that the \$30 million appropriated by the Congress in July 1953 specifically for military aid to the Middle East should be given as soon as possible to Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon and Israel. They also suggested that additional military aid should be given to Egypt, Pakistan and Iran.⁵⁴

Meanwhile, in Iran, a military coup took place. On 14 August the Prime Minister, Mossadegh, called upon the Shah to dissolve the *Majlis* (Parliament) whose support he had gradually lost since he came to power in March 1951. The following day, the Shah refused Mossadegh's demand and dismissed him, and appointed General Zahedi in his place. Mossadegh defied the order and issued a proclamation under his own authority dissolving the *Majlis*, and riots broke out in Tehran against the monarchy and the Shah. As a result, the Shah, alerted in advance of a coup against him, fled Iran. However, four days later, Mossadegh was overthrown by a counter-coup planned and supported by the CIA and MI6, and the Shah was restored to power. Soon after that, the United States, which only two months earlier had refused to give aid to the Mossadegh government, decided to give Iran \$45 million emergency aid in addition to \$23.4 million earmarked under the United States technical assistance programme. However, the United States made it clear that further American aid would depend upon developments in the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute. The new Iranian regime wished to settle the oil dispute, and in mid-October resumed negotiations with Britain, the United States and the AIOC. In November the British government announced that it was ready to recognize nationalization within the framework of an arrangement which satisfied the interests of the parties concerned. On 5 December a joint communiqué was issued announcing the resumption of diplomatic relations between Iran and Britain. As a result of exploratory talks in the winter of 1953–4 in Washington and London, an international consortium was formed in April 1954 to resume Iranian oil operations and, finally, on 5 August the consortium signed an agreement with Iran.⁵⁵ The solution of the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute, which the United States had considered an obstacle to the northern tier project, removed one issue, which like the Anglo-Egyptian and Arab–Israeli disputes, had served as an obstacle to the development of a defence pact in the Middle East.

American interest in a northern tier scheme was well advanced by 1953.

Turkey and Iran were already receiving considerable American assistance. It seemed natural to include Pakistan in a Middle East defence arrangement. The British had been aware of Pakistan's potential for Middle East defence ever since 1947. However, the Chiefs of Staff argued that an approach to Pakistan for her assistance should be a long-term goal. Pakistan's concern with Kashmir and Pashtunistan, the territories disputed with India and Afghanistan respectively, and Indian opposition to any Pakistani military involvement in the Middle East, convinced the British government that an approach to Pakistan was inopportune in the short run. The Americans held similar views at first, but after 1951, as a result of the communist victories in China and the Korean War, they decided to pursue a more active policy in South Asia. Due to India's neutralist attitude, the State Department increasingly favoured Pakistan as a dependable ally in the region. In American planning, Pakistan occupied a strategic position which rendered her active assistance for the defence of the Middle East of the greatest importance. She had military facilities, such as airfields from which the Persian Gulf could be dominated, as could important areas along the southern border of the Soviet Union. The United States was also interested in Pakistan's army, which could be used for the defence of the Middle East.⁵⁶

By September 1953 Pakistan had announced her support for a northern tier defence arrangement, but in return she expected economic and military aid from the United States. In September 1953 General Ayub Khan, the commander of Pakistani field forces, visited Turkey. During his visit he was impressed generally with the Turkish military posture, but he found no disposition on the part of the Turkish government to talk about substantive matters of regional defence. The only Cabinet member he met was the Minister of Defence, who did not impress him. He did not meet the President, Prime Minister or Foreign Minister, all of whom were not available. On 16 September in an interview with the *New York Times* correspondent Welles Hangen, General Ayub stated that Pakistan favoured a northern tier defence pact based on Turkey and Pakistan and probably including Iraq, but not Iran, which, in his view, was too weak. He said that they could take no action without a go-ahead signal from the United States, and that no word on this subject had yet been received. However, he made it clear that American military and economic aid would be a prerequisite for Pakistani participation in this new defence concept. He added that the United States wasted too much time on the Arab states, and should encourage the new northern tier defence concept. In a subsequent conversation with Hangen, Nuri Birgi, Under-Secretary-General of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expressed a favourable personal reaction to the idea of close Turco-Pakistani defence collaboration, but added that the 'groundwork would have to be very carefully laid'. He said that the Turkish government wanted to be sure that Pakistan's objective was not to use Turkey against India.⁵⁷

After his visit to Turkey, General Ayub Khan went to the United States. During this so-called 'medical' visit, he made a strong plea for American mil-

itary aid to Pakistan. The United States did not consider this a formal request from the Pakistani government, but the State Department, which had a strong desire to comply with it, suggested that there should be a limited amount (about \$25 million) of military aid to Pakistan in 1953. The State and Defense Departments therefore agreed in principle to \$30 million in military grants for Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Jordan and Lebanon, with \$50 million to be set aside for Egypt and Pakistan. However, the United States put off making a definite decision, because of strong Indian opposition to the provision of military aid to Pakistan.⁵⁸ On 19 October the American Embassy in New Delhi warned the State Department that the Indian response to direct military aid to Pakistan would be bitter and vigorous. For this reason, the embassy urged the Department to find an indirect way to give military aid to Pakistan. Meanwhile, the Shah of Iran had asked Henderson, the American Ambassador to Tehran, what role the Iranian army could play in Middle East defence. On 30 September Henderson reported to the State Department that if the Western powers undertook to modernize the Iranian army, the Shah would show more interest in the establishment of a defence association among Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and Iraq. The State Department was sceptical. On 9 November it asked Henderson whether the Shah and the Iranian government would be strong enough to risk the domestic and foreign repercussions of a public alignment with a Western-oriented defence group.⁵⁹

However, in light of recent developments in the Middle East, such as the Shah's interest in increasing the defence capability of the Iranian army, the views of Ayub Khan with respect to defence of the Middle East as expressed to the Turkish and American officials during his recent visits to Turkey and the United States, and reports from the American Embassy in Baghdad regarding the recognition by the Iraqi government of the Soviet threat, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded on 14 November that the time might be propitious for encouraging Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq, or a combination thereof, to form a defence association. In the Chiefs' view, this concept would visualize an association of indigenous forces under an indigenous command advantageously located with relation to the Soviet threat. It would also provide for the evolutionary growth of a defence organization which would logically develop over time to include other Middle Eastern countries. Moreover, it would not depend upon a satisfactory resolution of the Anglo-Egyptian and Arab-Israeli disputes. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also suggested that some alternative way should be found to provide military aid to Pakistan in order to avoid adverse repercussions in India and Afghanistan.⁶⁰

On 27 November the State Department asked Avra Warren, the American Ambassador to Ankara, to inform Ghulam Mohammed, Governor General of Pakistan, who was in Turkey, that the United States government had not yet decided on military aid to Pakistan, but hoped to reach a decision in a few days. During his visit to Turkey between 27 and 30 November, Ghulam Mohammed had extensive conversations with Turkish leaders about Middle East defence. He endorsed the Turkish government's views on the necessity of

a defence organization against possible Soviet aggression, and was much more specific than Ayub Khan about the desirability of cooperation with Turkey. The Turkish government, which had long been anxious to see some concrete progress made as regards Middle East defence, confirmed its willingness to enter into a defence system with Pakistan. Also, it showed further willingness to include Iran in a tripartite defence instrument, if and when conditions in Iran indicated sufficient stability for Turkey to support a defence build-up there. The Turks told Ghulam Mohammed that they would expect the United States to give a signal when Iran was in a suitable condition to be included in the proposed arrangement. However, they were reluctant to include any of the Arab states. They pointed out that if Iraq were to be considered, the result would be to involve the whole Arab League, one by one, and interject their problems of interrelations and the Palestine problem into the defence concept from which, in the Turkish government's view, they should be excluded. However, it was agreed that the two governments should proceed with a defence system based on Turkey and Pakistan.⁶¹

On 3 December in reply to the State Department's enquiry of 9 November, Henderson wrote that the Shah's attitude with regard to Middle East defence was that until Iran had an army which was capable of putting up some kind of defence, it would be useless to discuss multilateral defence arrangements. In the Shah's view, first, Iran should be more on a basis of equality in military capabilities before seriously considering mutual defence arrangements and, second, the combined strength of participating countries should be enough to discourage a Russian threat. However, Henderson believed it possible Iran would, in one or two years, be willing to move in the direction of joint arrangements, assuming (a) an early oil settlement, (b) the continuation in power of a government friendly towards the West which cooperated fully with the Shah and which had widespread public support and (c) steady though not necessarily spectacular increase in the capacity of the Iranian army. Henderson also believed that the British must be brought into the picture before any definitive discussions with Iran, Iraq or Pakistan, in all of which they had a particular interest.⁶²

This emerging northern tier defence concept, which excluded direct or overt Western participation, proved a major source of friction between the State Department and the Foreign Office. Britain wished to participate in a Middle East defence arrangement and to encourage other Arab states to join, as a vehicle to maintain her presence in the region. On the other hand, the United States sought to keep the Western role covert and not pressure the Arabs to accede. Moreover, the Foreign Office did not believe that Iran was militarily strong enough to make any contribution to Middle East defence, or that Iran was economically strong enough to support a large army. The Foreign Office saw Iran more as a buffer state between the Soviet Union and the Arab world, and thought that the Iranian army should be used only for internal security.⁶³ As to American military aid to Pakistan, the Foreign Office had agreed that if the United States decided to give military aid to

Pakistan, Britain would not stand in the way. The Foreign Office had no objection in principle provided the aid was given as a simple transaction between the United States and Pakistan, uncomplicated by links with Middle East defence. However, in December the Foreign Office had second thoughts. On 4 December the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, said,

We are not at all clear what it is the Americans are proposing, and I think our main objective should be to find out what they have in mind. If it is a question of American bases in Pakistan, then I think we should warn them that this might seem provocative to the Russians . . . There would also be no harm in telling them about the message we have had from Nehru [objecting to the American plan].⁶⁴

On 7 December at a meeting with Dulles in Bermuda, Eden tried to find out what the American position was regarding military aid to Pakistan. Dulles explained to Eden that the United States was still undecided as to what kind of aid it would give. It might be that anything it did for Pakistan should be a part of a general plan for defence of the Middle East. He assured Eden that there was no question of asking for American base facilities in Pakistan. As regards India's opposition, Dulles said he was well aware that the Indian government would complain if any military aid were given to Pakistan. The Indian Ambassador in Washington had already made a strong protest. India was opposed to any military aid programme to Pakistan or to any other arrangement which would swing Pakistan more into the Western orbit. The Indian government argued that once Pakistan accepted such aid she would be drawn into a Western defence system and no longer be able to maintain her neutral position between East and West. This was unacceptable to Dulles. This, he said, was equivalent to India claiming the right not only to remain neutral herself, but to prevent other countries from lining up with the West.⁶⁵

At an NSC meeting on 16 December 1953 Richard Nixon, the Vice-President, said that when he talked to Nehru the latter had expressed himself as very strongly opposed to the provision of United States military aid to Pakistan.⁶⁶ Nixon said that Nehru professed to fear American aid to Pakistan because the latter might use its added strength in the Kashmir dispute, or even resort to measures against India itself. However, Nixon did not believe that this was the real explanation of Nehru's dislike of American military aid to Pakistan. In his view Nehru was against this aid because, by building up Pakistan, Nehru's leadership in Asia and in the Middle East would be challenged. Above all, Nixon said, Nehru did not wish to lose this position of leadership. He therefore thought that it would be a fatal mistake to back down on American military aid to Pakistan solely because of Nehru's objections. Such a retreat would cost the United States its hold on Pakistan and on many other areas in the Near East and Africa.⁶⁷ These views were supported by Hildreth, the American Ambassador in Karachi. He told the State Department at the end of December that the United States could gain a great deal by

going ahead, and that failure to do so at this juncture would be disastrous both for the United States' relations with Pakistan and for the position of the present pro-American Pakistani government. It would also be disastrous for America's standing with the other countries of Asia, who would assume the United States had backed down in the face of Indian threats.⁶⁸

Although there were certain obvious difficulties such as Indian opposition in the way of a military aid programme to Pakistan, the United States was determined to go ahead with its project in the hope of associating Pakistan in Middle East defence. In order to mitigate Indian opposition, and to maximize Pakistan's contribution to Middle East defence, the new American plan, on which they acted without prior consultation with the British government, attempted to link their military aid programme to Pakistan with the initiation of some kind of military collaboration between Pakistan and Turkey. The State Department believed that an agreement between Turkey and Pakistan, providing for consultation and mutual defence planning, would not only be of military value, but would also provide a framework of collective security which would help to justify the extension of aid to Pakistan and minimize adverse repercussions in India and elsewhere.⁶⁹

By the end of 1953 Dulles realized that Turkey and Pakistan presented the best chance for a defence pact in the Middle East. On 24 December Dulles instructed the American Ambassador in Ankara to tell the Turkish government of the proposed military aid for Pakistan, and to suggest that the Turkish government should take the lead in approaching the Pakistani government to start military talks concerning a mutual defence arrangement. What the Americans were suggesting was not a treaty of alliance, but some form of joint defence planning in which other Middle Eastern states, particularly Iraq and eventually Iran, might later take part, but from which the United States and other Western powers would be excluded. The State Department hoped that the governments of Turkey and Pakistan might announce their decision to start military talks, since such an announcement would provide the United States with a suitable occasion for announcing its own decision to grant military aid to Pakistan. The United States, while hoping an agreement between Turkey and Pakistan would contribute to the formation of an organization for Middle East defence, considered the immediate aim of an agreement to be the possibility of providing military aid to Pakistan without arousing adverse reaction from India. The United States intended to show that American military aid to Pakistan was intended to strengthen Middle East defence against outside aggression rather than to take sides in disputes within the area, such as those that existed between Pakistan and her neighbours.⁷⁰ The essence of Dulles's proposals was that American military aid to Pakistan should be linked with the initiation of some kind of military collaboration between Pakistan and Turkey, which might develop into some system of collective defence in the Middle East.

In response to this secret approach, the Turkish government expressed itself as in favour of a Turco-Pakistani agreement on the understanding that

the United States would provide military aid to Pakistan. On 28 December the Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, said his thinking coincided with the American plan. The following day the State Department informed the Pakistani government of the new plan, and a week later, on 5 January 1954, Eisenhower agreed in principle to proceed with military aid to Pakistan.⁷¹

On 11 January the Turkish government delivered a memorandum, which was an answer to an American memorandum of 28 December 1953, and contained a full statement of Turkish views on the American proposals. The Turkish government stated that it was willing to do its best to help the United States provide military aid to Pakistan because of its feeling of friendship for Pakistan, and also because such aid would increase effective resistance to Soviet aggression. It hoped that an agreement with Pakistan might create the core of a future organization for Middle East defence, and considered that the fact that an agreement with Pakistan would be followed by American aid to Pakistan might be a principal factor in the ultimate attraction of such an organization to the Arab states. The Turkish government was prepared to take the initiative as soon as it might hear that the United States approved of its plan of action. It suggested that the governments of Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and India should be informed before the public announcement of the talks between Turkey and Pakistan. The French government should also be told in advance, since France was a joint sponsor of the MEDO concept which would be superseded by the new proposal. NATO would be informed on the day on which the joint communiqué was issued. The Turkish government emphasized the importance of secrecy until the time came for these various approaches to be made.⁷²

The Turkish government considered the association of Iran and Iraq with its defence talks with Pakistan to be premature. As regards Iran, it believed that the Iranian government would not be opposed to the scheme, but there would be no question of suggesting Iranian participation in any way. It thought that the time had not yet arrived to ask the Iranian government to join Turkey and Pakistan, because of the unsettled Anglo-Iranian oil dispute. The United States considered that the Iraqi government might be receptive to an invitation to join Turkey and Pakistan eventually. However, the Turkish government did not see Iraq's accession to the Turco-Pakistan arrangement as an immediate possibility. For the past two years Iraqi leaders had spoken realistically in private, but their unwillingness or inability to speak the same way in public made the Turkish government uneasy about the Iraqi attitude. The Iraqi Prime Minister, Dr Fadhil Jamali, had several times made some vague suggestions to the Turkish Ambassador in Baghdad, stating that it was desirable that Turkey, Iraq and other Middle East countries should cooperate to meet the Soviet threat, of which the Iraqi government was very conscious. When the time came to inform the Iraqi government, Jamali would be reminded of his previous enquiries to the Turks about the possibility of a Middle East defence association similar in character to that which was now being contemplated between Turkey and Pakistan. He would be told that

Turkey and Pakistan were about to make the first move towards such an association, and their proposals would be explained to him in a form 'somewhere between a notification and an invitation'. If he did not show an immediate readiness to participate, he would be told that the door was always open for Iraq. On 14 January 1954 a telegram from the American Ambassador in Baghdad endorsed the Turkish view of Iraq. The Ambassador indicated that the participation of Iraq in a regional defence organization was unlikely until the United States had established a military aid programme; the Middle East atmosphere had improved, especially in respect to the Suez Canal base problem and provided the Palestine problem was not stirred up.⁷³

As to informing India, the Turkish government indicated that it would give what assurances it could; for instance, Turkey would not take sides between Pakistan and India as regards the Kashmir dispute. It would be for the United States and Pakistan, at the same time, to do all they could to remove Indian objections, particularly on the subject of American military aid to Pakistan.⁷⁴ The Turkish government was particularly worried about the reaction of the Afghan government, which had recently made some enquiries of the Turkish Ambassador as regards press rumours of the American scheme, but had made no protest. The Turkish government was particularly anxious, since Turkey had very close relations with Afghanistan, which, in the Turkish view, also occupied an important geographical position from the point of view of the security of the Middle East. Therefore the Turkish government wanted to assure Afghanistan that it would make it clear to Pakistan that it was not taking sides in the dispute over Pashtunistan and suggested that it might be necessary to provide a written guarantee or even a treaty of friendship to Afghanistan, in order to keep it friendly to Turkey and stop it from impulsive action which might allow expansion of Russian authority there. The State Department agreed with most of the Turkish proposals, though it had some reservations over the suggested handling of the approach to Afghanistan. The United States considered Afghan inclusion in any defence arrangement as a remote prospect because of Afghanistan's weakness and possible Soviet reaction.⁷⁵

The first reaction of the British government to the American plan was that it would not be a useful contribution to Middle East defence. At a Cabinet meeting on 5 January 1954 Eden expressed his concern about the speed with which the United States was going ahead towards a military pact between Turkey and Pakistan, later bringing in Iraq and Iran. Eden said that this would look rather aggressively anti-Russian, unless it was clearly shown to be defensive in character. The Foreign Office considered the American project harmful, and pointed out that, from the point of view of regional defence in the Middle East, the American initiative seemed unlikely to lead to any useful and practical results. In the view of the Foreign Office, the system envisaged by the Americans would lack the advantage of a British contribution to regional defence, whereas the basic idea of the MEDO had been that the Middle Eastern states should be associated with the Western powers in

ensuring the defence of the area. Turkey and Pakistan were too far apart for effective military cooperation, and the only significant forces they could dispose of were land forces. In the event of Soviet aggression, they would be manning very different sectors of the global front, and therefore there was no basis for joint planning between Turkey and Pakistan. The Foreign Office considered that planning alone, without an alliance or commitments, would not by itself strengthen the anti-communist front, and would be ostentatiously provocative. If Iran were later to be included in such a planning organization, she would only be a liability, and this would also increase the provocation in an area regarding which the Soviet Union was traditionally very sensitive. The Foreign Office feared that it would frustrate their aim of furthering closer and stronger links between Turkey and Iraq, to which the Iraqis seemed at last to be in a receptive mood, and probably prevent them from following up the Turkish suggestion that the British should have some base facilities in Mardin, enabling their forces to act as a hinge between Turkey and Iraq. In sum, the American manoeuvre seemed to have dangerous repercussions for the Middle East as a region. A façade of planning, set up under obvious Western persuasion, would be regarded as highly provocative by the Soviet Union, but there would be no compensating creation of strength in the area if the participation of Western powers was excluded. As a result, the Foreign Office recommended that the United States should, if possible, be discouraged from pursuing the project in its present form.⁷⁶ However, Churchill was much more favourable to the American plan. A military arrangement might be useful, he said, especially since Britain was redefining her defence policy, namely developing nuclear weapons instead of conventional ones. The Cabinet agreed that the United States should be dissuaded from making a premature announcement, but did not reject the American proposals.⁷⁷

The Foreign Office then asked the State Department about the utility of a Turco-Pakistani pact. On 5 January Sir Roger Makins, the British Ambassador in Washington, was instructed to find out the views of the State Department on certain aspects of their project. The Foreign Office wished to know, would joint military planning between Turkey and Pakistan provide an effective basis for Middle East defence, given the wide separation of the two countries? What would be the effects on other Middle Eastern states? What would be the consequences for NATO of the assumption by Turkey of these added responsibilities? What would the other NATO countries say?⁷⁸

The following day Harold Beeley, Counsellor at the British Embassy in Washington, put the above questions to John Jernegan of the State Department. Jernegan told Beeley that arrangements for combined planning between Turkey and Pakistan would be of value even if no other country agreed to participate. He pointed out that arrangements of this kind would enable concerted action to be taken on both flanks in the event of an invasion of Iran. Moreover, Pakistan could give valuable assistance in the defence of the Persian Gulf. Also, the present plan should prove more attractive to Iraq than the MEDO, since it would not require her to disregard Arab opinion

by associating in measures of collective defence with the Western powers directly. The MEDO had not worked because of Western predominance. The absence of Western membership in this new pact would encourage other Middle Eastern countries to join. As the pact developed, Western advisers could become involved. The State Department did not think there would be any serious adverse reaction in the Arab countries. As regards Turkish commitments to NATO, Jernegan pointed out that Turkey would not be undertaking any commitment to defend the territory of other Middle Eastern countries, and whatever pact was created between Turkey and Pakistan would not conflict with Turkey's NATO obligations but would go no further than the MEDO proposals. There would be no binding commitments of any kind. It would be merely a planning arrangement.⁷⁹

On 11 January the Foreign Office asked for the views of the Chiefs of Staff on the strategic aspects of the American plan. The Chiefs of Staff seemed to be in favour of the plan. They said that it had long been British policy to seek American participation in, and backing for, some form of Middle East defence organization. For this reason alone, they said, they should not discourage the United States from any interest that they might take in the area, though it might be necessary to channel their initiative so that it did not conflict with British plans. Although the American proposals, they said, as they now stood, had no immediate military value, they might pave the way for the formation of some effective organization for the defence of the Middle East, an objective that had hitherto eluded the British. Therefore, they said, on general strategic grounds they would welcome American interest in the Middle East. However, they added that it was essential that American policy for the area should be coordinated with British policy, since no plan for the defence of the Middle East could be effective without British participation. They thought that the American proposal for military collaboration on a planning basis between Turkey and Pakistan was in itself no solution to the problem of Middle East defence. Militarily, such collaboration would be ineffective unless the United Kingdom was a full partner. If, however, the American proposal could be made the initial step towards the forging of a joint central organization for the defence of the Middle East as a whole, it could be an important step forward. Moreover, by collaborating with Turkey, Pakistan, as a Moslem country, might also influence Iraq and Jordan to collaborate, which might even lead eventually to shifting the focus of the Arab League away from Egypt. Neither Turkey nor Pakistan could by themselves form an effective defence against Soviet aggression. Pakistan would be unlikely ever to station large land forces in the Middle East, because of the threat to her north-west frontier. However, there would be great advantages if she accepted even a small commitment. Also, it was not desirable that collaboration between Turkey and Pakistan should lead to Turkey accepting commitments additional to NATO. For the above reasons, the Chiefs of Staff concluded that the United States project should not be considered in isolation. It should be related to and coordinated with the defence of the Middle East as a whole.⁸⁰

The Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff supported the United States' moves towards Turkey and Pakistan in principle, but the Foreign Office continued to oppose the new American proposal. The Foreign Office believed that it was losing the diplomatic advantage to the United States in Turkey, Pakistan and Iraq. It also resented being informed about events in the region. It wished to be consulted, not informed, and was also angered by the extension of American aid to Iraq. It considered the new American initiative as signalling Washington's intention to get out of step with the British in its Middle East policy. In the Foreign Office's view, the United States in many ways seemed to disregard the British position and to neglect Britain's views and interests in the Middle East. It feared that the United States was out to take Britain's place in the Middle East.⁸¹

In February Sir Roger Makins, the British Ambassador in Washington, wrote to the Foreign Office that since the end of the Second World War American influence had greatly expanded in the Middle East and the United States had firmly established itself as the paramount foreign influence in Turkey and Saudi Arabia. It was gaining a similar ascendancy in Iran and it now seemed that Pakistan could to some extent be drawn into the American orbit. Makins did not believe that the United States was consciously trying to substitute its influence for Britain's in the Middle East, since the United States knew that such a policy would involve the extension of its own military commitments, and would also be inconsistent with its general attitude towards the United Kingdom as its major ally. Yet even if this was not the United States' conscious policy now, Makins asked, was it nevertheless the inevitable conclusion of the present trend of events? The answer to this question, he said, would depend largely on British efforts, and in particular on the way in which the British would adjust themselves to this new American factor in Middle Eastern politics. On the other hand, Makins warned, the Americans also had their suspicions about British policy in the Middle East. They felt that the British regarded them as playing a supporting role in their Middle East policy, which was to consist of switching on or off the powerful current of their diplomatic and financial influence, and were asking the US to accept limitations on their activity which the British did not accept for themselves. It seemed to them that the British wanted the US to cooperate in the Middle East on Britain's terms and did not fully recognize the Americans' own interests there and what they were doing towards building up barriers against Soviet penetration into the Middle East.⁸²

The American project soon became public knowledge and created great resentment in India, where it was represented as involving the Indian subcontinent in the Cold War. In a speech on 3 January Nehru said that the proposal was 'a step not only towards war, even world war, but a step which will bring war right to our doors'. The Indian government had already been conducting a major diplomatic campaign against the American project and had made representations to the United States, and to the British and other Commonwealth governments. India objected to the American military aid to Pakistan

because Nehru feared that a Pakistani alliance with the United States 'would bring the Cold War to India's borders'. However, in the Foreign Office's view, the basic reason for Nehru's opposition seemed to be that a stronger Pakistan would threaten the dominance of India in Asia, the Near East and Africa.⁸³

Indian resentment was also heightened by rumours that Pakistan would give the United States military bases on her territory in return for American military aid. Russia, too, was disturbed by the rumours. The Soviet newspapers reported that the Soviet Union would not be indifferent to the talks between the United States and Pakistan about setting up American air bases in Pakistan, from which even such a remote region as 'the Soviet industrial centre beyond the Urals' would become accessible to the American airforce. Pakistan's accession to plans for the formation of the military bloc in the Middle East had also a direct bearing on the Soviet Union's security.⁸⁴ On 1 January 1954 the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali, said in Karachi on the radio, 'we never offered and do not intend to offer any bases in our country to any foreign power'. On the same day, in Dacca, he repeated that no decisions had yet been adopted on the question of American military aid, and that such aid 'will not be connected with any condition' and 'will not depend on the granting by Pakistan to the United States of military bases'.⁸⁵

The *New York Times* reported that although there was no question of the United States receiving base rights in Pakistan, there already existed a major air base in Karachi and in the event of war Pakistan could be expected to make such a base available without any prior commitment. The granting of American aid would transform Pakistan in case of war into a convenient base for American bombers, which could land there after bombing Soviet industrial centres in Central Asia, since Karachi was within easy striking distance of the most remote Soviet industrial centres.⁸⁶

After a full exchange of views, at the end of January the United States and Turkey agreed on the steps which they would follow. The Turkish government would approach the Pakistani government with a proposal that the two should undertake prompt negotiations for an agreement providing for consultation on political, economic and security matters of mutual interest. The United States would offer secret assurances that they were prepared to furnish military aid to Pakistan within the framework of the Turco-Pakistani agreement. Prior to a public announcement, the Turkish government would inform Iraq, Iran, India and Afghanistan and make an explanatory statement in the North Atlantic Council (NATO). They would make a special effort to reassure Afghanistan and sound the Iraqi government as to their interest in joining the proposed agreement. The Turkish Ambassador to Tehran would inform the Iranian government of the Turco-Pakistani talks, without making any reference to possible Iranian participation in the proposed agreement. The Turkish Chargé d'Affaires in New Delhi would merely inform the Indian government, leaving it to the United States and Pakistan to offer further explanations and assurances. After the announcement of the Turco-Pakistani joint communiqué, Pakistan would publicly request American military aid.

Prior to an American reply to Pakistan, India would be informed of the decision, and a personal letter from President Eisenhower would be sent to Nehru.⁸⁷

The British Foreign Office did not press its argument against the Americans further. Selwyn Lloyd, minister of state at the Foreign Office, minuted on 16 February that the Turco-Pakistani arrangement had progressed faster than the Foreign Office thought possible, and the United States was placing great hopes in it. The extent of American aid to Pakistan was not yet clear, but it would follow the announcement of Turco-Pakistani cooperation.⁸⁸ The Foreign Office concluded that it might have been better if they had firmly discouraged the United States at the outset. It was now clearly too late for them to intervene, since too much publicity had been given to the project and it had generated too much feeling. They could only await events, keeping in close touch with the United States meanwhile and, if United States aid was finally granted, endeavour to ensure that as much as possible was spent on the off-shore purchase of British equipment.⁸⁹ The practical arguments in favour of this were, on the Pakistani side, the desirability of avoiding a multiplicity of equipment types and, on the British side, the desirability of maintaining their market in Pakistan and of selling equipment they had available. However, they had been warned by India that if they participated in the United States–Pakistani deal in this way they would be severely criticized and Anglo-Indian relations would be severely damaged. Therefore it was decided that it would be premature at this stage to come to any definite conclusion on the offshore purchase of British equipment.⁹⁰

The Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, said that he just wanted to convey to the United States that without necessarily being opposed to the plan for Turco-Pakistani talks, he had misgivings about the manner of the launching of it and the apparent withdrawal of the Western powers from defence planning in the Middle East. He had been disturbed by the Americans' initiative to launch their plan without prior consultation with the British government, which was the originator of the MEDO and the only Western power with forces in the area. Eden said that the Americans seemed to be working on the assumption that aid to Pakistan under cover of a Turco-Pakistani arrangement would be less unpalatable to Nehru than straight aid to Pakistan. He believed the contrary to be the case. In his view, the new American project would not be helpful. The direct linking of American aid with a Middle East defence arrangement would arouse India's worst suspicions and exacerbate her reactions. While some Indians might see aid primarily as strengthening Pakistan against India, Nehru's own anxiety had concentrated on the possible linking of Pakistan with Western defence arrangements.⁹¹ Eden said that without wishing to oppose the American plan on its merits, and while he had no objection to straight American aid to Pakistan, he had misgivings, particularly regarding the more unfavourable impact of the present plan upon India, and also regarding its timing. Eden said that this plan bore on Soviet interests at extremely sensitive points. It was therefore surely not wise to advocate it

publicly just before the forthcoming Berlin Conference between the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union.⁹² As a result, the Foreign Office impressed on both the United States and Turkey the importance of avoiding any public announcement that might adversely affect the progress of the Berlin Conference. The Foreign Office gave various reasons in favour of delaying the conclusion of any Turco-Pakistani agreement: the unfortunate effect on the Berlin talks with the Soviets, the violent Indian reaction, which placed the British government in a difficult position from the Commonwealth point of view, and the desirability of including the Western powers in any agreement.⁹³

In Berlin, on 4 February 1954, Eden took the opportunity to tell Dulles that it would be just as well if the talks between Turkey and Pakistan could be kept as quiet as possible while the Berlin Conference was on. He said to Dulles that the timing of any announcement should be carefully related to the Berlin Conference, as this could easily be used by the Russians as an excuse for a breakdown. The Soviet Union had already protested against American military aid to Pakistan. It would therefore regard the announcement of talks between Turkey and Pakistan, at the instigation of the United States, as a further irritant. Dulles promised this would be borne in mind. As regards India, he said that the Indian attitude had made it impossible for the United States to go back on its decision. India, said Dulles, was entitled to her policy of neutralism in Asia, and the United States had no complaint to make about that, but it was not American policy to give way to neutralism. Meanwhile, the British Ambassador in Ankara had been asked to urge the Turkish government to defer any announcement until after the Berlin talks.⁹⁴

In early February the Turkish government sent to Karachi a draft of a treaty providing for cooperation between Turkey and Pakistan in the economic, political and cultural spheres as well as for methods of strengthening peace and security. The only reference to military matters would be an article reading as follows:

consultation and cooperation between contracting parties in the field of defence to cover following points: (a) exchange of information with the purpose of duly availing themselves of technical progress and jointly drawing benefits from their experience; (b) in production of arms and ammunition, endeavours to meet so far as possible requirements of contracting parties; (c) studies on, and determination of, ways and extent of cooperation which might be effected in accordance with Article 51 of Charter of United Nations, should an unprovoked aggression occur from outside.⁹⁵

According to Scott Fox, Counsellor at the British Embassy in Ankara, the Turkish government was anxious to play down the military aspect of its talks with Pakistan, and would be likely to emphasize the political nature of the talks in the joint communiqué. The Turks realized that there could be no

question of proposing to Pakistan any sort of defence pact, and wished to avoid any commitments which might get them into difficulties in the North Atlantic Council. They also realized that their Balkan pact arrangements with Greece and Yugoslavia afforded no sort of parallel for any arrangement with Pakistan. Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia constituted a cohesive geographic unit, whereas Pakistan did not constitute a geographic entity or strategic unit with Turkey. Therefore only some quite loose arrangement would be possible with Pakistan, and the emphasis should initially be put on political rather than military cooperation. The door would of course be left open for other countries to join in later.⁹⁶

Selahattin Refet Arbel, the Turkish Ambassador to Karachi, was instructed to propose to the Pakistani government that if they agreed to the Turkish text, it should be published not less than six days after the Turkish Ambassador had telegraphed Pakistani agreement. During this interval the Turkish government would confidentially inform India, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and NATO. The initial Pakistani reaction to the Turkish draft was favourable, although they had some suggestions on form and language. They were also in agreement with the Turkish government on the text of a joint communiqué.⁹⁷

Turkey and Pakistan, who had adopted the American scheme with enthusiasm, soon reached agreement on the desirability of a treaty providing for consultation in the political and economic fields and also for a joint examination of the possibilities of collaboration in questions affecting the security of the two countries.⁹⁸ The Turkish government was in more of a hurry than before to finish the job because of leakage in the press, which also disturbed the United States and Pakistan. Hildreth, the American Ambassador in Karachi, reported that the press leakage increased excitement in Pakistan and would make the position of the Pakistani Prime Minister more difficult until it was possible to announce some decision. He reported that the Pakistani Prime Minister was eager for an announcement prior to the elections in East Pakistan on 15 February, and requested him to advise the State Department of the earliest possible date a joint Turco-Pakistani communiqué could be issued.⁹⁹

The Turkish government therefore asked the British government not to press its request for postponement of any announcement until after the Berlin talks, as the Pakistani government was anxious that this should be made as soon as possible because of speculation in the press. The Turkish government also added that the terms of the announcement would be studiously mild and would not cause much offence to the Russians, unless they were already determined to seize on any pretext to cause a breakdown in the Berlin talks. The Foreign Office realized that they could no longer press the governments of Turkey, Pakistan and the United States to postpone their announcement, and that further cautionary advice would not deter these governments, but would only embroil them with the British government.¹⁰⁰

On 19 February Turkey and Pakistan, prompted by the United States,

announced their intention to form a pact. Two days before the joint Turco-Pakistani communiqué was announced, the Turkish Ambassador in Baghdad informed the Iraqi government. This was interpreted by the Iraqi Prime Minister as an invitation to join.¹⁰¹ On 24 February the American Ambassador to India, George Allen, delivered a personal letter from President Eisenhower to Indian Prime Minister Nehru concerning American military aid to Pakistan. The following day, the United States announced its decision to give military aid to Pakistan.¹⁰²

Once the public announcements had been made, and Pakistan had been assured of American military aid, Pakistan seemed to be less in a hurry over the pact with Turkey, and asked for a month in which to study the Turkish draft, whereas during the exchanges of views with Turkey she, anxious for a military aid agreement with the United States, had continually pressed for an early announcement of the negotiations with Turkey.¹⁰³ In March Bowker, the British Ambassador to Ankara, commented that Pakistan was interested only in strengthening herself for the struggle with India over Kashmir, and that, having now got her assurance of American arms, she would be slow to follow up the defence talks with Turkey. On the other hand, Bowker noted, the Turks themselves were unlikely to be in a great hurry to push ahead with military talks with the Pakistanis under the agreement, since they felt that so long as their understanding with Pakistan remained on a general basis, it would stand more chance of attracting the participation of Iraq. At the same time they did not expect any spectacular or immediate results as regards the possibility of cooperation from Turkey's and Pakistan's neighbours. However, Bowker stressed, the important factor in all this was the support which the new conception had received, and would continue to receive, from the United States. Accession to the new pact would, Bowker added, bring certain material benefits and such a bait was bound to attract. Already there were definite signs of interest on the part of Iraq. This new development, therefore, seemed bound to be of considerable importance for the future of the Middle East and for the position of Britain in the area.¹⁰⁴

Finally, on 2 April 1954, Turkey and Pakistan concluded an 'Agreement of Friendly Cooperation'. The agreement provided for consultation on international matters of mutual interest; continuing cultural, economic and technical cooperation; consultation and cooperation on certain defence matters; and accession of 'any state, whose participation is considered by the contracting parties useful for achieving the purposes of the present agreement'. The agreement was to last for five years and be automatically renewable for additional five-year periods unless denounced a year before each such period ended.¹⁰⁵

The key security provisions of the agreement were:

Article 2 The contracting parties will consult on international matters of mutual interest and, taking into account international requirements and conditions, cooperate between themselves to the maximum extent.

Article 4 The consultation and cooperation between the contracting parties in the field of defence shall cover the following points:

- (a) Exchange of information for the purpose of deriving benefit jointly from technical experience and progress.
- (b) Endeavours to meet, as far as possible, the requirements of the parties in the production of arms and ammunition.
- (c) Studies and determination of the ways and extent of cooperation which might be effected between them in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, should an unprovoked attack occur against them from outside.¹⁰⁶

From the British point of view, the Turco-Pakistani Agreement offered a possible means of organizing collective defence in the Middle East. However, its value for this purpose would depend on whether Iraq and Iran, and at a later stage other Arab states, joined it and whether it could somehow be linked to the West. According to the Foreign Office, the weakness of the agreement was that it provided only for consultation on defence matters and that the parties undertook no obligation for mutual assistance in the event of attack on one signatory by a third country.¹⁰⁷

At the time of the signature of the agreement Zafrullah Khan, the Pakistani Foreign Minister, stated that talks between the two chiefs of staff could be expected to begin soon. The Turkish government was surprised since they knew nothing of any Pakistan proposal in this sense. The Turkish government, although quite ready to consider any suggestions which the Pakistanis might make in this connection, had no intention of making any themselves, since the treaty was not an alliance, and if one of the parties was attacked, the other party was not obliged to go to its help. Even if the other party were to decide to try to help the other in case of war, it was clear that neither of them was in a position to send troops to the other to help. Any staff exercises which might take place under Article 4(a) of the agreement, in order to discuss, for instance, how troops, if and when they became available, could be sent (e.g. via the Persian Gulf), would therefore be academic. Sub-paragraph (b) of Article 4 had been drafted with a view to Turkey supplying Pakistan rather than vice versa, since Turkey had a few small arms factories.¹⁰⁸

Bowker asked Nuri Birgi to what extent the Turkish government regarded the value of the agreement with Pakistan as dependent on eventual military assistance and strategic cooperation from the United States and Britain. Birgi replied that such assistance and cooperation would certainly be necessary eventually if the agreement was to be an effective basis for Middle East defence. The Turkish idea was that as the agreement itself developed and as neighbouring countries became associated with it, it would become apparent how American and British assistance could best be given. However, even without such an eventual broader development, they thought the agreement would be of value if only for its effect of weaning Pakistan from her

pan-Islamic inclinations and linking her with Turkey and the West. As regards the possibility of neighbouring countries acceding to the Turco-Pakistani agreement, the Turkish government had no extravagant or immediate hopes, though they thought that as time went on the agreement would exert an attractive force. As far as Iraq was concerned, in the Turkish view, two things were essential: first, that Iraq should learn to treat the Israeli question as a separate issue and, second, that she should learn that her obligations to the Arab League did not preclude her from assuming associations and obligations in other quarters. According to Bowker, the Turkish government regarded the project as due to their own and Pakistani initiative and the fruit of their positive approach to the problem of international security. Their main defence position was firmly established in NATO, and having provided for further local defensive cooperation to the West through the Balkan Pact, the Turks were now laying the basis of a defensive system on their eastern flank. No doubt this new development owed much to positive Turkish and Pakistani approaches, Bowker commented, but the original idea had come from Dulles after his trip to the Middle East. The State Department saw it as a heaven-sent means of justifying to Congress the military aid which they were anxious to give to Pakistan. Moreover, it fitted neatly into the pattern of United States policy towards Turkey, which the United States had selected as the future bastion of Western defence at the eastern end of NATO and as the recipient of lavish economic and military assistance.¹⁰⁹

At the invitation of the Turkish government, Mohammed Ali, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, paid an official visit to Ankara from 10 to 12 June 1954. He was given a cordial welcome and in the course of his visit the Turco-Pakistani Agreement was ratified by the Turkish Assembly. On 12 June the instruments of ratification were formally exchanged between the Pakistani and Turkish prime ministers. The Turkish government was very impressed by Mohammed Ali's positive attitude, his enthusiasm over the agreement and anxiety to see the implementation of all its clauses. The talks held during Mohammed Ali's visit were mainly concerned with the future of the Turco-Pakistani Agreement. It was decided to hold military talks between the general staffs of the two countries in order to establish a plan of mutual defence as envisaged under Article 4 of the Turco-Pakistani Agreement. It was also agreed that there should be close consultation between the representatives of the two countries abroad as well as between their statesmen at home, and that occasion should be taken to set up the joint consultative machinery for which provision was made in the Cultural Agreement signed between the two countries in 1951 in order to increase cooperation in this sphere.¹¹⁰

As regards the possibility of accession to the agreement, Menderes told Mohammed Ali that the first and most obvious possibility was Iraq. Alone among the Arab countries, Iraq had reacted positively to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement. On 5 April Nuri Said had told Burton Berry, the American Ambassador in Baghdad, 'The Regent and I are 100 percent for it, and of course, the King'. When he was asked if Iraq would join, he replied, 'You

planned that from the beginning, for how else could Pakistan assist Turkey except through Iraq?' He continued, 'of course we will join but first we have to meet the problem of neutralizing Middle Eastern public opinion on the Palestinian issue'.¹¹¹ The Turkish and Pakistani prime ministers had agreed that Iraq should be asked to say definitely what her intention was as regards joining the agreement. As regards Iran, they agreed that soundings should also soon be taken of her intentions. Menderes said that the Turkish government had already made a tentative approach which had been quite favourably received by the Iranian government. When Mohammed Ali raised the question of the admission of Israel to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement, Menderes said that Turkey was not prepared to alter her policy towards Israel and that the most she would do was to refrain from encouraging Israel to join the agreement. He stressed the importance of preventing the Turco-Pakistani Agreement from being considered hostile to the West or to Israel, as a result of Pakistan's associations with the Arab League. He pointed out that Turkey had no intention of identifying herself with pan-Islamism. Mohammed Ali was very understanding and did not challenge the Turkish view. On 12 June at his press conference, he said that no distinction should be made between Islamic and non-Islamic states as regards membership of the agreement.¹¹²

2 The extension of the Northern Tier Defence Project (1954–5)

Iraq's reaction to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement

On 16 February 1954, as promised, the Turkish Ambassador to Baghdad informed the Iraqi Prime Minister, Dr Fadhil Jamali, of the proposed Turco-Pakistani Agreement, indicating that Iraq's accession would be welcome. However, within Iraq there was already much opposition to the idea of accession to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement. Official and public opinion was divided. The King, the Crown Prince and Nuri Said, the ex-prime minister, were in favour of accession, but the government was cautious. The Prime Minister was questioned in the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies on 21 February 1954. He denied that there was any joint defence scheme involving Iraq, apart from the Saadabad Pact and the Arab League Collective Security Pact.¹ There was, he said, no fresh commitment of any sort on defence matters. When he was asked whether Iraq might in future participate in the Turco-Pakistani Agreement, he replied that this might or might not occur; in any event parliament would be consulted.²

At a press conference in Baghdad on 24 February, regarding rumours that Iraq intended to join the Turco-Pakistani Agreement, Dr Jamali stated that Iraq had not yet received an invitation, but if she did the Iraqi government would examine it in the light of Iraq's national interests. According to Troutbeck, the British Ambassador to Baghdad, Jamali was gravely concerned at the possibility of violent popular opposition such as had destroyed the Portsmouth Treaty in 1948, of which he had been a signatory. He thought that the communists, together with neutralist and nationalist elements, would do all they could to prevent Iraq's accession and that there would be a danger of serious riots if accession took place.³ Although Jamali made repeated denials to the press and the Iraqi Parliament, his assurances did not prevent the continuance of criticism and the existence of suspicions that the government intended to accede to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement.⁴

However, Jamali was anxious to improve Iraq's relations with the West, on which Iraq depended for arms and equipment to strengthen her armed forces. Jamali was also anxious to improve relations between Iraq and Turkey, which had been cool since the break-up of the Ottoman Empire. The Iraqis

had been for long afraid that Turkey wished to recover the province of Mosul. This fear had diminished but there was still a certain amount of suspicion against Turkey. The British government encouraged Jamali's idea of a rapprochement between Turkey and Iraq, but did not want Iraq to join the Turco-Pakistani Agreement. In Britain's view, Turkey needed the active support of Iraq to defend her eastern and southern flanks against a possible Soviet attack. The British wanted Iraq to give Turkey this support, and to give themselves the facilities for making their own contribution in that area, since the south-eastern flank of Turkey formed the exposed end of the NATO front. They thought that the Turkish government could help them to convince the Iraqi government of the role which Britain should play, and of the importance of Britain's continuing to keep her base facilities in Iraq. On the other hand, they opposed Jamali's idea of sending a mission to Turkey to find out how the Turkish government had overcome the problem of relations with American military service personnel in Turkey; the Foreign Office feared that if Iraq were to regard the relations which existed between Turkey and the United States in the sphere of defence as a pattern for revising the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, this might well mean that the British would be asked to relinquish their air bases in Iraq, as well as their right to station operational units there.⁵

The Foreign Office therefore tried to guide the Iraqi government towards seeking closer relations with Turkey on the diplomatic and political level rather than on the military level. It hoped that the Turkish government would convince the Iraqi government to accept a close military alliance with the West. Whatever method the Iraqi government might choose to strengthen its relations with Turkey, the British government hoped that the Turkish government would welcome an Iraqi approach, and do its best to persuade the Iraqis of the necessity of close collaboration not only with Turkey, but also with the West, in their common defence problems. The British wished the Turkish government to go further, and to try to dissuade the Iraqi government from seeking to secure Iraqi ownership of the air bases, which were indispensable to Britain if she was to make her own contribution to Iraq's defence and thus to the defence of Turkey's eastern flank.⁶ However, the real British motive was different. At the Berlin Conference in January 1954, when Dulles told Eden that the United States had decided to go ahead with the northern tier defence concept despite Indian objections, Eden had merely expressed his hope for a British role in the northern tier through Iraqi participation. This reflected a significant change in British policy towards the Middle East. Britain would no longer base her Middle East policy upon Cairo, but upon Baghdad and Amman. On 12 January 1954 Eden defined the new British policy as follows:

[We] should make it plain that our positions in Iraq and Jordan were clearly related . . . if we are to have any position in the Middle East, our authority must be based on close relations with Jordan and Iraq . . . The

chances of Egyptians becoming our friends are slight. Israel cannot fulfil our purpose. Iraq and Jordan are friendly and could be made more so.⁷

The United States also encouraged Iraq to improve her relations with Turkey, but for a different reason. The United States was trying to get Iraq into the Northern Tier Defence Project, and had used American military aid as bait. Approximately a year earlier, in March 1953, the Iraqi government had requested military aid from the United States in order to strengthen its armed forces for the defence of its territory against possible Soviet aggression. The Iraqi request was given final approval in January 1954, though negotiations with the Iraqi government had been held up pending the decisions reached by Turkey and Pakistan. During this period the United States had talks with the United Kingdom with regard to American military aid to Iraq, which resulted in a secret 'Memorandum of Understanding' signed in Washington on 26 February 1954, under which the United States undertook that American aid to Iraq would be complementary to the British plans in Iraq, and that the British would be consulted on its application. Moreover, as large a proportion as possible of the military aid made available to Iraq by the United States would be spent on offshore purchases from the United Kingdom.⁸

Meanwhile, although the Iraqi leaders were in favour of joining the Turco-Pakistani Agreement, they wanted to be sure the Americans would be forthcoming with their military aid. On 9 March the crown prince told Troutbeck that while he was not greatly exercised by Egyptian opposition, he was exercised about the attitude that Syria might adopt. He attached great importance to keeping in line with Syria over foreign policy, since the new Syrian government, which came into office on 1 March 1954, was favourably disposed towards Iraqi-Syrian union. He asked Troutbeck if the British government could put in a word at Damascus to the effect that the Syrian government should refrain from criticizing Iraq if the latter were to accede to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement. He added that it would be better for Iraq to defer consideration of acceding to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement until the question of American military aid to Iraq was settled.⁹

Also on 9 March Nuri Said had a conversation with Troutbeck, and told him of his projected activities in the realm of Middle East defence. Nuri Said was due to go to Pakistan and India as a delegate of the Iraqi government, and after his return he was planning to visit Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey and Iran. In all these countries he would discuss the question of security in the Middle East. Troutbeck commented that 'I hesitate to say' what Nuri's real purpose was in all this. However, he noted that Nuri had for long harboured the idea of getting together with Iraq's neighbours, and he might feel that the proposed Turco-Pakistani Agreement offered an opportunity to realize these ambitions. He was conscious of the opposition to such a policy both in Iraq and elsewhere, and might hope that even if he could not overcome all opposition abroad, he might at least be able to moderate it. Troutbeck warned that it was always difficult to see precisely what Nuri's real

purpose was. It had never been easy to know how far he was serious and how far he was 'trying it on'. He was restless by nature and he might be chagrined by being left out of the government and so anxious to keep out of the country for a time.¹⁰ Troutbeck commented that the new American initiative in the Middle East, whose significant features were the Turco-Pakistani Agreement and the offer of military aid to Pakistan, was likely to have considerable repercussions on Nuri Said and the Iraqi leaders, and Nuri's visit to Pakistan and India seemed intended to prepare the way for Iraq's association with the United States and the Turco-Pakistani Agreement.¹¹

In mid-March Nuri Said went with King Faisal to Pakistan, where he had several talks with Pakistani officials concerning Middle East defence. The Pakistani government was in favour of Iraqi accession to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement, but its response to Nuri's proposal for an exclusive combination of Pakistan and the Arab states directed against Israel was discouraging. Nuri's next stop was India. His ostensible objects were to investigate the relation to Iraq's interests of the Turco-Pakistani Agreement and to seek Nehru's views on this alliance and on the possible formation of a neutral bloc including Iraq and India. However, as he told Troutbeck on 9 March, his real object was rather to avert Indian criticism in the event of Iraqi acceptance of American military aid and of Iraqi accession to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement. Troutbeck reported that Nuri did not have any serious hope of converting Nehru, and had for long been eager to challenge the Indian Prime Minister about the whole conception of neutrality. On 21 March Nuri had a meeting with Nehru. In response to Nuri's exposition of the Zionist and communist threats to Iraq and the Arab countries generally, Nehru said that India could not undertake any military commitments outside her own frontiers, in the context either of the Turco-Pakistani Agreement or of a neutral bloc. Nuri replied that if India could not give military assistance to her neighbours if they were attacked, she could not expect them to participate in a neutral bloc under Indian leadership.¹²

On 15 March in a report to the Foreign Office, Troutbeck drew attention to the possible repercussions in Iraq of the United States' initiative in instigating the Turco-Pakistani Agreement and offering military aid to Iraq. Troutbeck expressed concern at the possible effect of these developments on the British position in Iraq, and urged the need for closer coordination between British and American policy if British interests were not to suffer. Troutbeck envisaged two dangers. First, if Iraq associated herself with an American-sponsored agreement between Turkey and Pakistan and also accepted American military aid, Britain's position in Iraq would be weakened vis-à-vis the United States. Second, if the whole plan fell through as a result of local and foreign opposition, Iraq might turn away from association with the West and towards an Arab and neutralist policy. With regard to Iraqi accession to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement, Troutbeck warned that it would meet with strong opposition, not only from neutralist opinion in Iraq itself, but also abroad. Among the Arab states opposition would come from Egypt,

who saw her position as leader of the Arab world threatened, and from Saudi Arabia, who had refused American military aid and did not wish to see any strengthening of Iraq. Hence the Iraqi government's keen interest in the action of Syria, for if Syria also joined the opposition, Iraq would have the whole of the Arab League against her. Elsewhere there would be opposition from India, Israel and possibly France, since the French government feared that any strengthening of Iraq by American aid might enable the Iraqi government to bring stronger pressure upon Syria in the direction of union with Iraq.¹³

At the same time, the British Ambassador to Ankara, Bowker, pointed out that the United States' object in creating the Turco-Pakistani Agreement was, using military aid as a bait, to build on it a defensive association of what Dulles called 'the northern tier of nations', i.e. by the addition in the first place of Iraq and later of Iran and perhaps Syria. According to Bowker, this policy contrasted with Britain's own assumptions hitherto, namely that Middle East defence must hinge on Egypt, and that until Britain's negotiations with Egypt were settled little progress could be made towards securing the cooperation of the Middle East states in collective measures. There was a danger, however, that British influence in Iraq and elsewhere might suffer if Britain did not now take up a definite attitude towards the United States' initiative and show readiness to help in putting it into effect.¹⁴

Meanwhile, the British Ambassador in Cairo, Stevenson, reported that Egyptian concern about the possibility of Iraqi accession to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement stemmed from an anxiety that Arab solidarity should not be broken as long as the Canal Zone problem remained unsolved. Stevenson suggested that if Iraq did not join the Turco-Pakistani Agreement until an Anglo-Egyptian settlement was reached, it might have the effect of neutralizing Egypt, and avoiding a repetition of the sort of intrigues that had destroyed the Portsmouth Treaty in 1948.¹⁵

In the light of these reports, in April 1954, the British Foreign Office examined the possibility of Iraqi adherence to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement. The Foreign Office considered that there would be advantages in it, although the Turco-Pakistani Agreement provided only for mutual consultation. Iraq's adherence would strengthen her alignment with the Western powers and signify her rejection of Arab League neutralism as advocated by Egypt. Iraq's accession would also provide a basis for discussions with Turkey and Pakistan on joint defence, which would be unlikely to take place otherwise. In addition, it might eventually, if the British became associated with them, lead to some real improvement in the security of the Middle East. However, the immediate danger of Iraq's accession would be that a violent reaction of Iraqi and Arab opinion might overthrow the Iraqi government and lead to a reaction towards a pro-Egyptian neutralist policy. Moreover, if Iraq associated herself with an American-sponsored agreement between Turkey and Pakistan and also accepted American military aid, there would be a danger that, as the Turco-Pakistani Agreement was recognized to be an American initiative and was

closely linked with American military aid, Iraq would become less dependent on the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 for her security and arms supplies. British influence would be correspondingly reduced and Britain's chances of retaining the military facilities which she needed would diminish. Her position in Iraq would be weakened vis-à-vis the United States.¹⁶

As a result, the Foreign Office concluded that it would be premature to adopt too definite an attitude as regards Iraqi accession to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement until Britain saw how the pact itself developed and until Britain had reached a decision on her own policy as regards the replacement of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. In the meantime, the British government would remain non-committal but vaguely benevolent towards Iraqi accession. The Iraqi government had to judge for itself how far it could carry its parliamentary and public opinion.¹⁷

With regard to American military aid to Iraq, the Foreign Office argued that the British position on United States military aid was defined in the 'Memorandum of Understanding' of 26 February 1954, which was to minimize the detriment such aid might cause to Britain's own position and try to make of it a useful contribution to Iraqi military capacity. Offshore purchase from Britain was the best method, and the British government was urging this on the Americans. The government was also endeavouring to secure better coordination of policy with the United States. The government would try to bring the United States to take account of Britain's long-standing military relationship with Iraq, and consequently should take the United States into Britain's confidence as soon as a decision had been taken to embark on military talks with Iraq with a view to treaty revision.¹⁸

Meanwhile, the United States was laying the foundations for a military aid agreement with Iraq as bait to get Iraq into the Turco-Pakistani Agreement. The State Department at first had resisted extending military aid to Iraq on the grounds that Iraq should first join the Turco-Pakistani Agreement but, under pressure from the Baghdad Embassy, agreed to extend military aid to Iraq with no strings attached. In April Burton Berry, the American Ambassador in Baghdad, informed the Iraqi government that the United States was prepared to give Iraq military aid. However, he made it clear that though a certain amount would be available unconditionally in 1954, the full amount that Iraq could expect to receive in the long run was likely to depend on the extent of her cooperation in Middle East defence arrangements.¹⁹

On 21 April 1954 the United States duly signed a military aid agreement with Iraq, who pledged to employ the American military aid 'solely to maintain its internal security and its legitimate self-defense' and solemnly declared 'that it will not undertake any act of aggression against any other state'.²⁰ However, there was no stipulation that Iraq should join the Turco-Pakistani Agreement. It was just hoped that Iraq might find it expedient in the near future to do so. The State Department anticipated that an agreement of this kind with no strings attached might do much to strengthen the position of those leaders in Iraq who basically favoured a regional defence system, and

that American military and economic aid would incline the Iraqi government towards participation in the Turco-Pakistani Agreement.²¹

However, not all were so optimistic. Kohler, the American Counsellor in Ankara, told the British Counsellor in Ankara, Scott Fox, that the Turkish government was increasingly pessimistic about bringing Iraq in, particularly now that the United States had gone ahead and given Iraq military aid without any strings attached.²²

The United States heads of mission in the Middle East, at their annual meeting in Istanbul in May 1954, suggested that Washington should not press Iraq or any other Arab country to accede to the Turco-Pakistani agreement. In their view, Iraq should be allowed to work out her own terms with Turkey and Pakistan, and if other countries wished to join they should also be considered sympathetically. They thought that Egypt would resent any arrangement for the Middle East in which Cairo did not play the central role, since Egypt regarded herself as indispensable to the defence of the Arab world. They thought that the United States should convince Cairo that the northern tier defence concept did not detract from the importance of Egypt, and advised the State Department to work out any differences with the Foreign Office in order to secure British support for the northern tier defence concept. They concluded that expansion of the Turco-Pakistani Agreement offered a feasible method of setting up a regional defence organization, 'that progress might be slow, but that none of the obstacles now discernible by their nature preclude achievement of the project'.²³

In June 1954 a national intelligence estimate concluded that the Turco-Pakistani Agreement did not carry the stigma of the old MEC and the MEDO, but its immediate effects were psychological and political rather than military. It did not reduce the vulnerability of the Middle East. However, together with American military and economic aid programmes, it could create an opportunity to form a regional defence pact eventually. The intelligence estimate also concluded that the United States should proceed slowly to avoid arousing strong Israeli opposition, and a resulting escalation in Arab-Israeli and inter-Arab hostilities.²⁴

In July the National Security Council reviewed United States Middle East policy, and concluded that the northern tier was the best prospect for creating an indigenous regional defence arrangement for the Middle East. The council noted that the northern tier concept must be developed as 'an indigenous movement, not linked formally . . . with the Western powers or with Western defence organizations except through the participation of Turkey'. They warned that until the problems of the region were settled it was unlikely there would be further accession to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement. They concluded that the northern tier concept could not be developed without a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and strongly recommended greater United States involvement in promoting proposals for peace between Israel and the Arab states.²⁵

The council recognized the importance of the United Kingdom in the

Middle East and the need for cooperation with it. They acknowledged that, as British support for the northern tier was an important factor in determining its success, efforts should be made to overcome the doubts held by the United Kingdom, and the initiative for an Arab–Israeli settlement should be defined in collaboration with the United Kingdom. While unilateral action had brought results, especially in the northern tier, the United States could not advance towards an Arab–Israeli settlement without the help of the United Kingdom, which still retained the diplomatic lead in Iraq, and political and military dominance in Jordan.²⁶

While the United States was reassessing its Middle East policy, the United Kingdom was finishing its negotiations with Egypt and proceeding with similar discussions with Iraq. Pressed by the United States, Nasser, who had ousted Naguib as prime minister in March 1954, accepted British re-entry into the Suez Canal base in the event of war or the threat of war against an Arab state or Turkey, and the United States promised aid to Egypt after a settlement was reached. As a result, heads of agreement for an Anglo-Egyptian treaty were initialled on 27 July 1954 and the treaty was signed on 19 October 1954.²⁷

The Anglo-Egyptian heads of agreement were regarded as a major breakthrough by both Britain and the United States. The latter saw it as the removal of an important obstacle to its northern tier project. With the Anglo-Egyptian dispute resolved, the United States linked the progress of a northern tier pact to an Arab–Israeli settlement, which became its next objective. Believing that the Truman administration's favouritism towards Israel had prevented successful American mediation, the Eisenhower administration had accepted a policy of impartiality.²⁸

However, on the other hand, Britain's objective now was to regain political leadership of the area through revision of the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. Although by June 1954 the Foreign Office accepted that the Turco-Pakistani Agreement was a useful contribution to Middle East defence, they remained suspicious of United States policy. The Foreign Office continued to oppose any United States attempt to 'go it alone' in the Middle East, and still believed that British garrisons and treaties with Iraq and Jordan were the best guarantees of Middle East security.²⁹

In view of American interest in the Middle East, as shown in the Turco-Pakistani Agreement and American military aid to Iraq, Eden told the Cabinet in May 1954 that the Iraqi government might believe that Britain was leaving it to the United States to 'make the running in that part of the world unless Britain take steps to put her military relations with Iraq on a durable footing acceptable to both sides'.³⁰ Eden recommended that the British government should approach the Iraqi government for a revision of the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty on the lines of a revised concept of a forward strategy for the defence of the Middle East, and the British Ambassador in Baghdad should be authorized to give the Crown Prince a hint of Britain's intention before the Iraqi elections in June 1954, so that he was aware of the desirability of choosing a prime minister strong enough to get the resulting arrangements

through the Iraqi parliament. With regard to the method of approach to the Iraqi government, Eden suggested that, after the British Ambassador had cleared the way with the King and Crown Prince, the British government should propose to the Iraqi government that military representatives of the two sides should hold secret talks with a view to working out arrangements for mutual defence. When agreement had been reached on the military level, the British government should consult with the Iraqi government as to the form in which the agreement should be embodied.³¹

In view of the revised concept of a forward strategy for the defence of the Middle East, the British government hoped to convince the Iraqi government that effective mutual defence arrangements could be worked out provided that there was adequate cooperation between the British and Iraqi forces and, in particular, that the Iraqi air bases were capable of being immediately and effectively used by the RAF in the event of war. Meanwhile, during the Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammed Ali's visit to Turkey in June 1954, the Turkish and Pakistani prime ministers had agreed that strong pressure should be brought upon Iraq to join the Turco-Pakistani Agreement. Iraq should be asked to say definitely what her intention was concerning the agreement, since the Iraqi government had long toyed with the idea of acceding to it. The Iraqis would now be told that a definite decision was required of them one way or the other.³² However, the Iraqi government had not yet made up its mind about accession, and was, the British Embassy in Baghdad noted, unlikely to do so for some time to come. The political situation in Iraq was confused and unstable. Jamali's government had not enjoyed a strong position since its formation in September 1953. It depended on the support of the palace and of the Constitutional Union Party, which controlled a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Neither's support proved lasting, and as a result Jamali's government had resigned on 19 April.³³

On 29 April a new government was formed under Arshad al Umari; Jamali became Minister of Foreign Affairs. Yet on the same day as the new government was formed, a decree was issued by the palace dissolving Parliament and initiating the election of a new chamber. It was announced that new elections would be held on 9 June. However, the elections, which were duly held on 9 June, did not seem really to have solved the political problem in Iraq. The Constitutional Union Party of Nuri Said, though losing twenty-four seats, remained numerically by far the strongest party. It won fifty-six seats out of a total 135 seats in Parliament. The United Popular Front, which was mainly composed of Nuri Said's opponents, secured two seats, and the Popular Socialist (Umma) Party of Saleh Jabr, formed by him in 1951 mainly to oppose Nuri Said, won fourteen seats. The National Front won twelve seats, all representing radical socialist or nationalist tendencies. The independents won fifty-one seats. No majority was possible without their support. Whereas, however, in the previous parliament there were only some dozen vocal critics of the Constitutional Union Party or palace governments, now there would be at least twenty-six from the National Front and the Popular Socialist Party.³⁴

Hooper, the British Chargé d'Affaires in Baghdad, reported on 9 July that the political situation in Iraq remained confused and unstable. The government of Arshad al Umari was just a caretaker and very weak. Although the government itself favoured Iraqi accession to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement, it was not strong enough to deal with the strong opposition which would be raised not only by other Arab states, but also by nationalist and left-wing elements in Iraq itself. The left-wing elements had just scored a considerable propaganda victory in the elections, largely on opposition to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement. The present moment was therefore most inopportune for any approach to the Iraqi government. If it was forced into a decision now, it might well decide not to accede.³⁵ The British government therefore urged the Turkish government not to approach the Iraqi government on the basis 'take it or leave it'. The effect of such a *démarche* would likely be that the chances of Iraq's accession, even at some later date, would be considerably reduced.³⁶ Meanwhile, the British government urged upon the Crown Prince the desirability of appointing a prime minister strong enough to negotiate a revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930.

Nuri Said's search for an alternative defence project

The unsettled political situation made the Crown Prince realize that a strong prime minister and government were needed. He wanted a government headed by Nuri Said in which all political elements in Iraq would be united in opposing communism. For some time the Crown Prince had tried to carry on without Nuri Said and relations between the two had deteriorated. However, as Troutbeck, the British Ambassador to Iraq, noted, 'the [Crown Prince] had to eat humble pie and recall [Nuri Said] to power from a sick bed'.³⁷ In July the Crown Prince went to Paris, where he met Nuri Said and put strong pressure upon him to return to Iraq and form a government. The Crown Prince gave him more or less a free hand as to what he should do in the political sense on his return. Despite the advice of his doctors that he should stay another two months in England because of his illness, Nuri Said agreed to return to Iraq at the end of July and form a government subject to the condition that when he took office he should either be allowed to dissolve the present chamber and hold new elections, or at least that he should be given a blank-cheque authority to dissolve Parliament when and if he thought fit.³⁸

According to Patrick Seale, Dulles's northern tier defence concept was not entirely satisfactory for Nuri Said, because Britain was opposed to it and because the forward strategy of the northern tier did not provide for extensive Arab participation. Iraq wished to lead the Arab world, not be cut off from it. Iraq's accession to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement could result in Iraqi isolation from the Arab world. Therefore Nuri Said sought to develop a formula whereby Iraq would serve as the link between the Arab world, its northern neighbours and the Western powers. Nuri Said did not want to accede to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement. Instead he wished to arrange a treaty with

Pakistan, which would provide Iraq with security against Israel. This showed that Nuri Said still remained preoccupied with Israel rather than Russia as the main threat to Iraq's security.³⁹

Nuri had to go searching round for a camouflage so that any defence arrangement with Britain could be represented as merely an incidental part of an agreement with other Middle Eastern states. In London, on 16 July, at a meeting with Selwyn Lloyd, minister of state, Nuri Said explained his plan concerning Middle East defence. His idea was not to join the Turco-Pakistani Agreement, but rather to form a separate grouping with Pakistan in which he hoped the British government would play a part. His intention was to negotiate a pact with Pakistan which would bear a close relationship with the two parties' obligations under the United Nations Charter and in particular with Article 51, i.e. collective self-defence. Iraq would not undertake any obligation to go to the aid of Pakistan, but if Israel were to attack Iraq or her neighbours Pakistan would come to their aid. However, he made it clear that it would not be necessary for Pakistan to support the Arab states in an aggression against Israel. He said that this idea had already been discussed with the Pakistanis, who were ready to conclude such a pact provided that the United States saw no objection. Nuri was misleading Lloyd. In fact, when Nuri visited Karachi in March 1954, the Pakistani government made it known that they were not well disposed towards the idea of a defence combination with Iraq or any other Arab states outside the Turco-Pakistani Agreement. The British Foreign Office reacted sceptically, noting that it was hard to see what attractions Nuri's scheme could have for Pakistan: Nuri's plan would commit Iraq to nothing, but would commit Pakistan to coming to the assistance of the Arabs if they were attacked by Israel. Nuri emphasized that the pact would be open to accession by any country interested in the peace of the Middle East, which would enable Britain to join at a later stage. In Nuri Said's view this would provide a means by which they could broach the question of revising the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930.⁴⁰

The Foreign Office preferred Iraqi accession to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement to a separate arrangement between Iraq and Pakistan, since it would be neater and simpler, though it saw no obvious objection to an Iraqi-Pakistani treaty, which would have the advantage that it might provide the means for securing some commitment by Pakistan towards Middle East defence. There was, however, little attraction for the Foreign Office in Nuri Said's suggestion that the revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty should be dealt with in this context. Otherwise, the Foreign Office preferred to leave Nuri to make the running with other Middle East states, and did not wish to put pressure on him to join the Turco-Pakistani Agreement if he thought some other solution preferable. The main British concern was that Nuri should find some acceptable political 'umbrella' of Middle East defence under which they could secure revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty on satisfactory terms.⁴¹

Meanwhile, in Iraq, with the announcement of the Anglo-Egyptian heads of agreement in July, public pressure on the Iraqi government increased,

calling for a new Anglo-Iraqi treaty similar to the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement. On 28 July Foreign Minister Jamali informed the Foreign Office that Britain should return the military bases at Habbaniya and Shaiba to Iraq, with arrangements for British access to them whenever they desired. Jamali stressed the Iraqi government's desire to cooperate, but warned that it had to be careful 'not to create the appearance of a *fait accompli* to the Iraqi people'.⁴²

At the end of July Nuri Said returned to Iraq and took office as prime minister, and on 3 August he formed a new government. On the same day, a royal decree was issued dissolving Parliament, and announcing fresh elections to be held on 12 September. Within a fortnight, Nuri completely transformed the political situation in Iraq, though not by democratic methods. The political parties were abolished, the opposition newspapers suppressed and stringent decrees issued to curb communists. Nuri took particularly firm measures against the communists, who, under the banners of the National Front and the Popular Socialist Party, had made considerable gains at the previous elections.

In a letter to the King on 3 August Nuri Said had outlined his foreign policy as

(a) the termination of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 and cooperation between Iraq and other foreign states in conformity with the provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter; (b) the strengthening of relations between the Arab countries and the removal of friction and tension between them; (c) the strengthening of relations with neighbouring states and improvement of cooperation between them and the Arab states to repel the Zionist danger.⁴³

The section which dealt with the termination of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty led to some speculation in Britain as to whether Nuri Said intended to abrogate the treaty by unilateral action. However, Nuri Said assured the British government that he contemplated no such step, and told them privately that he envisaged an arrangement for the air bases at Habbaniya and Shaiba roughly similar to that agreed at the time of the Portsmouth Treaty in 1948; that was, mainly British maintenance staff, RAF squadrons to use the bases when invited by the Iraqi government to do so, and transit facilities.⁴⁴

In mid-August Nuri Said approached the Egyptians regarding Middle East defence. His latest thinking on Middle East defence was a revised version of the Arab League Collective Security Pact, to which Turkey, Iran and Pakistan as well as Britain and, if it was willing, the United States, could accede. This was the proposal worked out by Nuri Said and the Egyptian Minister of National Guidance, Major Salah Salim, at the northern Iraqi summer resort of Sarsank in mid-August. By this Nuri Said was reverting to his old idea which he had put to Troutbeck, the British Ambassador in Baghdad, in 1951.⁴⁵

On 15 August Major Salah Salim arrived at Sarsank, where the two sides

discussed a wide range of issues including the communist threat, the Palestinian problem, Middle East defence and the British role in the region.⁴⁶ At Sarsank Salah Salim opposed the Turco-Pakistani Agreement as well as the multilateral arrangements with Pakistan which Nuri Said had in mind. He argued in particular that Pakistan was neither militarily nor geographically analogous to any Arab state. When he asked for an alternative proposal as basis for cooperation with the West, Nuri Said brought forward the Arab League Collective Security Pact, to be modified in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and expanded to permit membership of non-Arab countries such as Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Britain and even the United States.⁴⁷

By the end of the talks on 18 August Nuri Said and Salah Salim had agreed on the desirability of a comprehensive regional defence pact based on the Arab League Collective Security Pact and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. They also agreed to work secretly for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, as regards defence arrangements, no draft was drawn up. It was merely agreed in principle that the Iraqi and Egyptian governments should each approach the United States and Britain and seek their views on what modifications would be required in the Arab League Collective Security Pact in order to expand it into a regional pact under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, to which Turkey, Iran and Pakistan as well as Britain and, if it was willing, the United States could become party.⁴⁸

After the Sarsank talks, Salah Salim held a press conference in Baghdad on 19 August. He stated that it was important that the Arab League Collective Security Pact should be made a reality and should not remain 'just ink on paper'. When he was asked about the Turco-Pakistani Agreement, he replied that neither it nor any other agreement outside the Arab world had any place in current Arab affairs.⁴⁹ On the same day, Nuri Said told Hooper, the British Chargé d'Affaires in Baghdad, that when the British and the Americans gave their view, and after the Iraqi elections on 12 September, there would be a further meeting in Cairo to review progress and decide whether an approach should be made to other Arab states. Nuri Said therefore hoped to get a reaction from London and Washington by the middle of September. Nuri Said also told Hooper that he was greatly impressed by Egyptian jealousy and distrust of Pakistan, which, Nuri felt, the Egyptians saw as a threat to their position as a leading power in the Middle East. Nuri Said claimed that the initiative for a defence pact based on the Arab League Collective Security Pact had come entirely from the Egyptians.⁵⁰

On 22 August Nuri Said told Gallman, the American Ambassador in Baghdad, that this new plan would bring the Arab countries into the Middle East defence system more quickly than the Turco-Pakistani Agreement; would accomplish the objectives which the proposed the MEDO had failed to accomplish; and would be difficult for other Arab states to reject because it was an indigenous plan, whereas the Turco-Pakistani Agreement would be hard to sell to the Arabs; would concentrate the attention of the Arab states

on the Soviet threat and divert it from Israel; and would obviate the necessity of extending the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, since all the participants in the enlarged Arab League Pact, including the British, would have available to them the two Iraqi air bases which the British now controlled.⁵¹

On 23 August the American Embassy in Baghdad reported to the State Department that the plan possessed valuable psychological advantages in the Arab states because of its indigenous origin; that Egypt and Iraq had taken the United States and the United Kingdom into their confidence from the beginning; that outright rejection by the United States could cause deep resentment, particularly if the United Kingdom considered participation; that the United States would have the opportunity to shape the Arab League Collective Security Pact and to prevent it at least from having unacceptable features whether or not the United States acceded; that American presence as a member or associate in the new grouping would enable the United States to restrain and guide the Arab states regarding Israel more effectively and thereby allay Israeli fears; that if the new pact really provided a basis for peace with Israel, the attention of the Arabs could then be turned towards the Soviet threat; that if the new scheme was delayed for a period of time, the United States would still be in a strong position to argue forcefully that, in view of unsuccessful Egyptian and Iraqi efforts to create a regional defence group including the Arab as well as the northern tier states, accession to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement was the only realistic solution to Middle East defence problems. However, the State Department was not pleased with the result of the Sarsank talks, as it appeared Iraq was moving away from the idea of joining up with Turkey and Pakistan. Dulles was 'greatly disturbed' by Nuri Said's proposal, and suggested reviewing American military aid to Iraq. He said that he had bought the idea of military aid to Iraq on the theory that it was going to tie up with the northern tier countries, and not merely build up the Arab League against Israel. Dulles suspected that Iraq was being used by the British as a means to enlarge the Arab League Collective Security Pact as a basis for Middle East defence and as a replacement for the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty.⁵²

The British government welcomed the Iraqi approach to Egypt, as they saw it as an opportunity to regain the initiative from the United States. With the Suez agreement completed, Britain was more optimistic about building on the Arab League and less favourable to the northern tier defence concept. The Foreign Office considered Nuri's plan encouraging, in that non-Western powers were suggesting a regional defence organization that would invite Western participation. Evelyn Shuckburgh, Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, minuted that the plan had obvious advantages, provided that Britain's participation could be obtained in a form which would give her an effective voice in the policy of the pact, and suggested that Britain should seize on the proposal and shape it according to her needs. On 31 August the Foreign Office instructed Troutbeck to tell Nuri Said that the British government was inclined to favour his idea of associating the Western

powers with the Arab League Collective Security Pact.⁵³ On 1 September Troutbeck reported to the Foreign Office that, with this new proposal, Nuri seemed to have reverted to his old idea, which he had put to Troutbeck in 1951. Troutbeck pointed out that Nuri was getting old and this might well be his last innings as prime minister. He seemed, for the time being, to have dispersed his opponents and was almost certain to have a parliament submissive to his will. Troutbeck added that 'with all his faults he is the only Iraqi Prime Minister I have known with any pretensions to statesmanship. There is no one else of his calibre in this country.' This might, Troutbeck said, prove Britain's last chance of agreeing with Iraq on some reasonable arrangement for defence. With regard to the proposed defence pact, Troutbeck said that it would be better to tie them up in an arrangement based on their own ideas, rather than force them into a Western-made plan. British efforts hitherto to do this had failed lamentably.⁵⁴

Soon after the Sarsank talks, differences emerged between the Egyptian and Iraqi interpretations of the nature and extent of agreement reached at Sarsank between Nuri Said and Salah Salim. While Nuri Said claimed that he expected Britain and the United States to be associated with the pact from the beginning, the Egyptians thought that time would be needed to erase Egyptian suspicions of Britain. In the event, however, it turned out that at Sarsank Salah Salim had gone beyond his instructions in committing his government to a regional defence pact with the Western powers. Nasser was not prepared to go along with Iraq in cooperating with the West. When he learned for the first time of the full extent to which Salah Salim had gone beyond his brief at Sarsank and committed Egypt to making an approach to Britain, Nasser took the line that no declarations of policy, or gestures, linking Egypt with the West could be made in advance of the signature of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the Suez Canal base.⁵⁵

Three days after the Iraqi elections, which took place on 12 September and resulted in an overwhelming victory for Nuri Said, Nuri visited Cairo in an attempt to talk Nasser round. However, Nasser told him that the internal situation in Egypt was not ripe for any advance towards a Middle East defence arrangement. He said that he first wished to conclude the Suez base agreement with the British and then wait two years until the situation crystallized. Nasser said that 'we want to enjoy independence and exercise our minds at a time when we are independent'. Nuri Said replied that he could not wait for so long and that he would work for some form of regional grouping which would allow Egypt to join later if she so desired. Nasser responded that 'you are, of course, free to do whatever you wish. We shall continue with our policy and the future will judge between us.'⁵⁶

Having learned in Cairo that the Egyptians were unwilling for the next two years or so to consider his ideas for a regional defence pact, Nuri Said appeared to be in considerable doubt about his next move. Stevenson said that Nuri seemed unable to decide between the relative disadvantages of an arrangement with Turkey or an arrangement with Pakistan. The aversion

which he had consistently displayed since his conversation with Selwyn Lloyd on 15 July to joining the Turco-Pakistani Agreement did not appear to have diminished, but whereas he had hitherto shown some hostility to the idea of a link with Turkey and considerable preference for Pakistan, he now seemed to have been affected by Egyptian hostility to the idea of an association with Pakistan, and to be seeking some arrangement which would not involve Iraq in an immediate or direct link with her.⁵⁷

On 16 September Nuri told the American Ambassador in Cairo, Caffery, that he could not wait. Iraq was in an exposed position. He said that he felt he must do something. Caffery then asked what he had in mind; Nuri replied, 'Nothing very definite'. He said that he would suggest a pact with Pakistan, and then later Turkey, or perhaps a pact with Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, and eventually Syria and Lebanon. Caffery commented that obviously Nuri Said was disappointed with the Egyptians, and his thoughts were not yet well defined.⁵⁸ Nuri Said, it appears, was toying with various possible groupings with regard to Iraq's defence and the replacement of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty.

On 17 September Troutbeck wrote to Shuckburgh that he had considerable doubt if either of Nuri's plans would come to anything. Troutbeck suggested that the British government should leave Nuri to run his ideas until he saw that they were non-starters. Then the British government might persuade him to get down seriously to considering the future of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and perhaps to join the Turco-Pakistani Agreement. However, in the meantime, any pressure would do more harm than good, particularly if it came from the Turks.⁵⁹

After his visit to Cairo, Nuri Said went to London on 18 September, and remained there until 3 October. During that time he had a series of conversations with members of the Foreign Office on the subject of Middle East defence. On 20 September he told Selwyn Lloyd that he was now thinking of the following possible solutions: first, a five-power pact including Iraq, Syria, Turkey, Iran and Britain; if Syria was unwilling to join, then, a four- or five-power pact including Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Britain and possibly Pakistan; if Iran was unwilling to join, then, a three-power pact including Iraq, Pakistan and Britain. But Nuri was in favour of a pact with Pakistan, and he had got so far as writing down the text of a draft agreement with Pakistan. When Lloyd asked whether the agreement was intended to replace the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty or not, Nuri replied, 'yes'. He said that he was thinking of an agreement in the spirit of the 1948 Portsmouth Treaty, which he wanted to put through the Iraqi Parliament in February or March 1955 at the latest. Nuri said that the agreement would be open to accession by other states, and hoped that Britain would join at an early stage. However, Nuri did not make clear whether he would wish Turkey to join at first or not. In fact, Nuri regarded his new plan as an alternative to joining the Turco-Pakistani Agreement.⁶⁰

According to Jamali, the ex-prime minister of Iraq, Nuri Said's opposition to joining the Turco-Pakistani Agreement was on account of Turkey's unpopularity in Iraq and the other Arab countries. Troutbeck, in his report to Eden,

said that Nuri Said was distrustful of bringing the Turks into any closer relationship on defence with Iraq. On the other hand, Troutbeck said, he would be happy to see Iran accede to the proposed pact with Pakistan. The American Chargé d'Affaires in Baghdad told Troutbeck that Nuri had brought up again his distrust of the Turks. It was probably for this reason that while he would not object to Turkey being part of some large regional organization, he did not like the idea of associating with Turkey in a smaller organization.⁶¹

From the Foreign Office's point of view, Nuri's idea of an Iraqi-Pakistani pact had certain drawbacks. The Suez Canal Zone would not come within the scope of the agreement. The gap between the northern and southern sections of the Arab League would remain open, and Egypt would be highly critical of any association between the northern tier of Middle East states and Britain. Moreover, this would to some extent discount the benefit which the British had hoped to derive from an Anglo-Egyptian agreement.⁶² However, from the point of view of the Chiefs of Staff, the advantage seemed to lie in discreetly encouraging the northern tier grouping, while the Foreign Office was not sure. In the view of the Chiefs of Staff, the relative merits of the northern tier group were that, for the British, it would be easier to revise their defence arrangements with Iraq, and in particular to obtain concrete military facilities. The participation of Turkey would be useful and would fit in with the ideas of the United States. Also, a tie-up between Britain and the Arab League would be obnoxious to Israel, and this would increase that country's sense of frustration and encirclement.⁶³

In sum, the Foreign Office became once more favourable to the northern tier idea, since it realized that it would not be possible for any regional defence organization to develop out of the Arab League because of Egyptian opposition. The Foreign Office also realized that the northern tier proposal was an opportunity to retain facilities in Iraq, and also a device to recapture control of regional defence planning from the United States and block American attempts to supersede Britain's position in the Middle East. On 6 October Eden wrote to the British Ambassador in Baghdad:

Generally speaking, I agree that we should leave Nuri to make the running with the other Middle East governments. I do not wish to put pressure on him to join the Turkish-Pakistan Pact if he thinks some other solution preferable. My main concern is that he should find some acceptable political 'umbrella' of Middle East defence under which we can secure revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty on satisfactory terms.⁶⁴

The State Department was pleased with Nuri's intention to approach Pakistan, Turkey and possibly Iran, and Britain's intention to support the northern tier concept. Dulles was in favour of closer cooperation between Iraq and Turkey within the framework of the Turco-Pakistani Agreement.⁶⁵

Turkish attempts to bring Iraq into the Turco-Pakistani Agreement

Meanwhile, the Turkish government, too, was taking stock of its position. Since the Democrat Party came into office in 1950, all the indications were that Turkey was becoming more and more determined to play a leading role in developing Western policies in the Middle East and in guiding the Arabs towards closer relations with the West in general and herself in particular. Obvious examples of this trend were her desire to become party to the Tripartite Declaration, her willingness to join the MEDO and her anxiety to bring the Arab states into the Turco-Pakistani Agreement. Turkey regarded herself not as belonging to the Middle East but as a Western country adjacent to it, with an important interest there in connection with the security of her own southern frontier.⁶⁶ Moreover, when the Democrat Party came to office in 1950 it focused its attention on economic development, in which it, largely due to American assistance, had made impressive progress in four years. Yet this spectacular development was not without its drawbacks, the principal of which was high inflation, which gravely affected Turkey's economic stability in 1954. Consequently, by the end of the year, the Democrat government found itself in need of new funds to meet its foreign and domestic commitments. It turned towards the United States for help, asking for a \$300 million loan, in addition to all the regular economic aid received from Washington under the programme of mutual security or technical assistance. However, for the first time since 1947, Washington refused to give Turkey further economic assistance. Washington was critical of the overextension of the Turkish economy and resented Turkey's disregard of the recommendations made by American experts assisting in Turkish development plans.⁶⁷

Bowker argued that Turkey was determined to pursue a forward policy in the Middle East, though this might well bring her into conflict with the policies of Egypt and the Arab League. He went on to say that once the Balkan pact with Greece and Yugoslavia was completed, Turkey would probably turn her attention increasingly to Middle East problems. The successful conclusion of the Balkan pact would give Turkey's western frontiers as much security as she could expect, but still a lot remained to be done for her eastern flank, and her pact with Pakistan was only a beginning. Bowker pointed out that Turkey had always conceived of herself, particularly since she joined NATO, as the Western power most directly interested in the Middle East, and therefore she felt that it should naturally fall to her to take the lead in developing Western policies in the area. According to the Foreign Office, as the Turks realized, their general interests and policies in the Middle East were at odds with those of Egypt and of the Arab League, which was dominated by Egypt. In their attempts to improve relations with other Arab countries, the Turks would have to overcome not only Egyptian influence, but also the continuing suspicion and distrust of Turkey throughout the Arab world, which had increased as Turkey became more Western.⁶⁸

Between 12 and 17 July 1954 Turkish diplomatic representatives in Arab capitals held a conference in Istanbul on Turkey's Middle East policy, the first ever regional conference of Turkish diplomatic representatives.⁶⁹ On 31 July Orhan Eralp, Director-General of the Second Department of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, gave Scott Fox, the Counsellor at the British Embassy in Ankara, the following account of the conference. According to Eralp, the general view of the conference was that the Arab League was a 'nefarious body' whose principal aim was destructive and negative. As regards the Arab states individually, however, there were some hopeful signs. The hostility to Turkey which was found in the Arab countries did not appear to represent the sentiments of the people, but only those of the governments who, for internal political reasons, were often obliged to pursue short-sighted foreign policies. As regards the attitude of the Arab states to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement, Eralp said, the conference noted that Egypt and Saudi Arabia were definitely hostile, and that Syria and Jordan would continue to 'wait and see'. Turkey would continue to work gently on Syria and Jordan, but she would not make any immediate approaches to ask them to join. While her policy towards Egypt would remain the same, Turkey would leave it to Egypt to take the initiative in adopting a friendlier attitude. Eralp commented that once the Anglo-Egyptian agreement was completed, the Egyptian government would have to look round for some other 'scapegoat' in order to deflect the attention of the Egyptian public from internal affairs. With regard to Iraq's accession to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement, Eralp said that the Turkish government would not be prepared to wait for ever and would therefore take the first suitable opportunity in the next few months to get a definite answer, 'affirmative or negative', from Iraq.⁷⁰

According to Eralp's account, the conference concluded that the time was now ripe for Turkey to pursue a more active policy in the Middle East. She would increase her friendly gestures, including cultural contacts and exchanges of visits with Arab statesmen. Turkey's proper policy was to maintain an attitude of benevolent understanding towards the Arab states. However, this would not involve any change in Turkey's policy of friendship with Israel. The conference also concluded that the government should make a formal request to the United States, Britain and France to join the Tripartite Declaration. Eralp told Fox that this was not merely a question of prestige for Turkey. The Turkish government considered that Turkey and the three Western powers (the United States, Britain and France) should act together in all questions concerning the Middle East.⁷¹

Already, in May 1954, when Henry Byroade, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, was giving an account to the Turkish Foreign Minister Fuad Köprülü of what had passed at the Istanbul meeting of United States Middle East heads of mission, he had said that one of the recommendations of the conference was that the 1950 Tripartite Declaration should be reaffirmed and possibly 'given teeth'. At this point Köprülü had intervened to say that Turkey would probably also wish to join

the declaration. Byroade replied that it would be for the State Department to decide whether to proceed on the lines recommended at the conference. Subsequently, he asked for the views of United States Middle East heads of mission. Most of them objected to Turkish accession to the Tripartite Declaration on the grounds that Turkey was looked upon by the Arab states as a puppet of the 'imperialist' powers and therefore the accession of Turkey to the Tripartite Declaration would not give it greater weight in their eyes. Also, Turkey was the only Moslem country with close commercial relations with Israel to be on friendly terms with her. As a result, in view of the reactions from the heads of mission, the State Department was reluctant to bring Turkey in.⁷²

The British government welcomed the Turkish initiative in principle. In their view, the extension of Turkish influence and responsibility in the Middle East did not represent any threat to British interests. Turkey's accession to the Tripartite Declaration would strengthen its effect. In practice, however, the British government felt that despite its superficial attraction, there was little to be gained by Turkish participation in the Tripartite Declaration. Turkey could hardly add to any armed action taken by the three powers. She could not afford economic sanctions for long. Any effort on her part therefore would be a dispersion of effort.⁷³

Moreover, according to Sir Sterndale-Bennett, of the British Middle East Office (BMEO) in Egypt, there was a possible danger in the timing of the Turkish request. A revival by Turkey of special interest in this part of her empire, coupled with suspicion of her on the grounds of benevolence towards Israel, might well raise controversy in the Arab world. The Arabs would not like the prospect of active Turkish intervention in the Middle East. The value of the declaration would in Arab eyes be diminished by Turkish participation in it. It would probably be represented as an attempt by the Western powers to promote the reassertion of Turkish influence in the former Ottoman Empire. Sir Sterndale Bennett pointed out that it was also undesirable, particularly at a time when the British had just secured the inclusion of Turkey in the reactivation clause of the heads of agreement with Egypt. A Turkish move at that particular moment might conceivably complicate the finalization of the agreement, and the British government would be the last to want to take any risk over the final conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement. He concluded that, in these circumstances, the Turkish request should be deferred until after conclusion of the Suez Canal base agreement.⁷⁴

The Foreign Office realized that it was to some extent a matter of prestige with the Turkish government, and appearing to stand out against it might do a lot of harm. It decided not to encourage the Turkish government to make a request, but to accept a request once it was made. The Foreign Office would at all costs avoid getting into the same position as they did over Turkey's entry into NATO. They had then burnt their fingers badly by trying to prevent Turkey from joining NATO. The British government decided to take no action until the United States and France took action, but to approach the United

States in the first instance, and see whether it was prepared to urge the Turkish government to refrain from making the request. If in the event the United States said it saw no objection, the British government would then give way, too.⁷⁵

Meanwhile, the State Department instructed the United States Ambassador in Ankara to ask the Turkish government to defer, pending further American study, any formal request to participate in the Tripartite Declaration. Moreover, the United States National Security Board had turned down the proposal of reiterating in reinforced form the Tripartite Declaration. The Turkish government agreed to hold its fire, at any rate for the time being, as regards requesting participation in the declaration. However, the Turks hoped that the United States would consult them should there be any future question of reissuing the declaration or of taking any alternative action to reinforce the status quo. In these circumstances, the American action made it less urgent for the British government to make similar representations to the Turkish government.⁷⁶

Meanwhile, contacts between Turkey and Iraq had been intensified since Nuri Said had accepted the premiership in August 1954. In early September 1954 the Crown Prince of Iraq, Abdul Ilah, made a visit to Turkey and had several talks with the Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes. According to what Menderes told Bowker, the Crown Prince, with regard to Middle East defence, suggested that Iraq should cooperate with Egypt on the basis of the Arab League Collective Security Pact, which was, however, not regarded as a suitable basis for Middle East defence by the Turkish government. Menderes pointed out to the Crown Prince the absurdity of the Arab states aspiring to constitute between themselves the basis of a Middle East defence system. To illustrate his point Menderes quoted a Turkish proverb to the effect that 'two naked men can only associate in a public bath' and added that no Middle East defence system could be of any effect which did not include Turkey and Britain. He took the opportunity to lay particular stress on the importance of the role which Britain must play in Middle East defence and hence the importance of Iraq maintaining a close association with Britain.⁷⁷

Menderes suggested that if Iraq found difficulty in contemplating accession to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement, she should, as a first step, initiate a bilateral association with Turkey. Such a move, in Menderes's view, could be convincingly justified to the Arab League as a natural defence precaution by Iraq in her exposed geographical position. According to Menderes, this idea seemed to find some favour with the Crown Prince. When he was leaving Turkey, the Crown Prince had told Zorlu, Deputy Prime Minister and Acting Foreign Minister, that it would be desirable for Nuri Said and Menderes to explore the possibilities of reaching an agreement on a Turco-Iraqi bilateral defence pact, rather than to attempt to move Iraq into the Turco-Pakistani Agreement. When Zorlu reported this conversation to Menderes, he agreed that the idea was worth exploring during the forthcoming talks with Nuri Said. Zorlu thought that if this idea worked out, Iraq could propose a similar

bilateral pact with Pakistan. Later, the two pacts could be combined within the framework of the Turco-Pakistani Agreement.⁷⁸

Menderes hoped that the British government would encourage the Iraqi government in this sense because, in his view, such a move would help to associate Iraq with the West and fit in with Turkish aspirations to play a part in Middle East matters, including the Arab–Israeli question. However, from the British point of view, Menderes’s suggestion of a separate Turco-Iraqi pact did not at first sight seem any more valuable than Nuri’s suggestion for a separate Iraqi–Pakistani pact. In the British view, there was no point in multiplying bilateral defence arrangements in the area. What was needed was a comprehensive organization covering either the whole Middle East or the northern tier states only. Nor was there any reason to suppose that a Turco-Iraqi pact would be more acceptable to Iraqi public opinion or to the other Arab states than would Iraq’s accession to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement. Both would mean that Iraq was aligning herself with the Western powers. The British government was therefore reluctant to encourage the Iraqis to conclude a bilateral defence agreement with Turkey, but, on the other hand, they would say nothing to discourage it, and would only stress to Nuri Said that the Turkish armed forces were essential for the effective defence of the Middle East against Russia.⁷⁹

In October 1954 Nuri Said visited Istanbul on his way from London to Iraq and stayed there from 9 to 19 October as guest of the Turkish government. On 22 October Menderes told Warren, the American Ambassador in Ankara, that Nuri’s visit had afforded a valuable opportunity for exchanges of views on Middle East defence and for reviewing existing relations between the two countries. Menderes gave Warren an account of his talks with Nuri Said. He said that Nuri had started by expressing his intention of working for a bilateral pact with Pakistan rather than Turkey. He said that the Arab states faced two dangers: first, the danger of an attack from Israel and, second, the danger of an attack from Soviet Russia. Of these, the first was the greater since the Arab states alone were threatened by Israel whereas other states were concerned with preparing against the danger of aggression by Soviet Russia.⁸⁰ Nuri added that Turkey was less preoccupied with the problem of Israel than the Arab states because her territories were not contiguous to Israel, and that Pakistan in his view would be more willing to identify herself with the Arab concept of Middle East defence, which included primarily the containment of Israel. That was why he wished to conclude a defence agreement with Pakistan. In other words, he did not want a defence agreement with Turkey since the latter had no common frontier with Israel and could not help Iraq in the event of trouble from that quarter.⁸¹

According to Bowker, who was also given an account of the Menderes–Nuri talks, Menderes’s reply to this exposition of Nuri’s views was friendly but very plain. He said that first of all it was no use Iraq thinking that she could leave it to others to deal with the possibility of Soviet aggression. If Turkey were attacked and defeated on Friday, Iraq would be involved on

Saturday and it was vain to imagine that Iraq could make any effective provision for her security without Turkey. As regards Israel, Menderes doubted that Iraq could really be so apprehensive of a danger from Israel, but added that if Iraq really wanted security from such a threat, he failed to see how the fact that Turkey had no common frontier with Israel would make Iraq turn for assistance to Pakistan, since Pakistan had no common frontier either. Menderes said to Bowker that the real motive of Nuri's project of a pact with Pakistan was to form a Moslem group between Pakistan and the Arab states in rivalry to Turkey, and that Nuri had wished, as a result of his talks in Istanbul, to be able to tell the Pakistanis that his idea of a bilateral pact between Pakistan and Iraq had Turkey's blessing. Menderes went on to say that he then told Nuri Said that his arguments were clearly a pretext for avoiding an association with Turkey as a result of prejudice and misapprehension of Turkey's true sentiments towards the Arab states. The Turkish government's sole object as far as Iraq was concerned was to ensure that in the event of war Iraq's northern frontier should be defended. They would not mind whether this was done through Iraq joining the Turco-Pakistani Agreement, or by concluding a separate arrangement with Turkey, or by any other grouping.⁸²

In the course of lengthy discussions, stretching over ten days, Menderes refrained, according to Bowker, from trying to impose any precise line on Nuri to join the Turco-Pakistani Agreement and made it plain that if for any reason the agreement was not regarded as a suitable basis for a wider Middle East grouping, Turkey was quite ready to modify it or incorporate it into something else. Menderes finally succeeded in getting Nuri to give up his idea of a pact with Pakistan, and to agree to aim at a grouping of all the Arab states in association with Turkey, Pakistan and Iran. If this were not possible, they should try for a northern grouping comprising Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan and Iran. Any of these groupings would include close association with Britain and the United States. In Menderes's view, there was no doubt whatever about the necessity of the eventual association of the United States and Britain in any Middle East grouping that might emerge. His argument was that it was up to the countries on the spot to organize themselves in the first place, and give convincing evidence of the will to plan for their own defence.⁸³

Menderes told Bowker that although there was little direct reference to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, he had made a point of telling Nuri that the Turkish government was most concerned that Britain should not withdraw from Iraq. In accordance with the British government's advice, he told Nuri Said that Iraq should maintain the closest relations with the United States and Britain. He pointed out that while the support of the United States was essential for the security of any country in the free world, Britain, as the only outside power with forces in the Middle East, was an essential element in any defence system for the area, because apart from Turkish, Iraqi and possibly Pakistani forces the only others which would be immediately available in the area would be British.⁸⁴

Bowker commented that it was a cardinal principle of Turkish Middle East policy to proceed at every step in complete accord with Britain, because during the London talks on Middle East defence in 1952 it had been agreed that Turkey and Britain should proceed as occasion offered to work on the individual Arab states with the object of getting them to take a more realistic attitude towards Middle East defence. The occasions had not until recently been numerous, but the Turkish government was continuing on the same line. It was most anxious in doing so to avoid giving the impression of any divergence of aims or policy between Turkey and Britain.⁸⁵

Menderes told Bowker that Egypt had figured predominantly in the talks and it was agreed that the next step would be for the Turkish government to approach Egypt in order to see if it would be possible to bring all the Arab states into some Middle East defence arrangement. The Turks would also be responsible for approaching Syria and Lebanon. If the Turks got nowhere with the Egyptians, an attempt would be made to get some defence arrangement between Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan and Iran during Menderes's visit to Iraq in January 1955. Troutbeck said that Nuri obviously intended to leave it to the Turks to make the running over this, because he had already carried out his own part of this operation when he visited Cairo on his way to London the previous September. Troutbeck pointed out that 'from all this it appears that the ball now rested with the Turks', who, in particular Menderes, were the driving force behind a Turco-Iraqi defence pact.⁸⁶

At the end of the Istanbul talks the Turkish government believed that Nuri's suspicions and misapprehensions of Turkey and her aims in the Middle East had been successfully dissipated and that a basis had now been established of a common approach to the problem of Middle East defence. However, Nuri Said did not seem to be convinced. On 27 October when he gave an account of his talks with Menderes to Troutbeck, he said that two things had particularly impressed him in his talks with the Turks. In the first place he sensed a certain jealousy of Pakistan. Nuri said that the Turkish government did not like the idea of Iraq first making some arrangement with Pakistan and Turkey joining in afterwards. Second, he had been disturbed by the emphasis with which Menderes had protested that they had no territorial claims or ambitions beyond those stated in the Turkish National Pact.⁸⁷ Nuri went on to say that the Turks had suggested to him that Turkey and Iraq should sign a pact engaging each country to come to the assistance of the other in the event of attack. He said that he had objected to the idea since Iraq had no troops to send into Turkey and the Turks too had no troops to send into Iraq.⁸⁸

According to Bowker, Nuri's suspicions of Turkish irredentism with regard to Iraq were characteristic of the Arabs' attitude towards Turkey. Bowker said that there was nothing serious in the way of irredentism in the mind of the Turkish government and it seemed unlikely that Turkish public opinion had any irredentist aspirations. Nuri Said had just brought up again his distrust of the Turks. It was indeed noticeable that in his talks with Selwyn Lloyd in

July 1954 Nuri had never mentioned Turkey in connection with his idea of some defence arrangement between Iraq and Pakistan. On 16 November 1954 Nuri Birgi, the Secretary-General of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, confirmed to Bowker that Menderes had mentioned the National Pact, but said that he had done so with the sole and genuine intention of confirming that Turkey had no irredentist aspirations, and of dissipating any qualms which Nuri Said might have on the subject. Bowker commented that Nuri Said's anxiety on this score was a striking illustration both of the deep Arab suspicions about Turkish designs and of the failure of the Turks to realize how deep these suspicions were. Bowker said that although the Turkish government knew that its general interests and policies in the Middle East were at odds with those of Egypt and of the Arab League, it had indicated that it would now tackle the Egyptians about joining some new defence organization. The British Foreign Office pointed out that in its attempts to improve relations with the other Arab countries, the Turkish government would have to overcome not only Egyptian influence, but the continuing suspicion and distrust of Turkey throughout the Arab world. However, the Turkish government would take every opportunity of making the Arab states aware of her friendly sentiments. It invited a group of Egyptian journalists to attend the National Day celebrations in Ankara on 29 October, and in return Turkish journalists were to visit Egypt in November. Moreover, Menderes expected to visit Cairo in November and to receive a return visit by the Egyptian Prime Minister in December. On the other hand, the Egyptians had based their policy on making the Arab League effective in the economic as well as military fields and they had made it plain to the Iraqis that they were opposed to the conclusion of any 'piece of paper' connected with Turkey or Pakistan. They had taken the line that it would be straining Arab opinion too far to make them join pacts with the West. In a letter to Hooper, the British Chargé d'Affaires in Baghdad, Shuckburgh said that the Egyptians were not only not ready to make a move forward themselves, but also disapproved of Iraq doing so.⁸⁹

Meanwhile, Nuri Said was trying to use Iraq's proposed association with the northern tier countries in a defence pact as bait to get more military aid from the West. On 5 November he told Troutbeck that Iraq had no money to pay for the expansion of the Iraqi Army; if Iraq was to carry out the expansion programme as planned by British advisers, the British government must therefore either provide free equipment or persuade the United States to supply British equipment by offshore purchase, unless the British government wished Iraq to relinquish the British connection and join Turkey and Pakistan in the 'American sphere'. On 6 November Troutbeck, with regard to Nuri's demands for military aid, wrote to the Foreign Office that 'Nuri is the most brilliant beggar I have ever met, and it is never easy to know how far he is serious and how far he is "trying it on"'. He warned the Foreign Office that Nuri was trying to play the Americans and the British off against each other.⁹⁰

On 21 December Nuri told Gallman that he was not prepared to sign any kind of defence agreement during Menderes's visit to Baghdad. He said that he needed clarification on certain points before he could sign any agreement. He said that before he could make a move towards any kind of regional pact he would have to know how far the United States and the United Kingdom were prepared to go beyond their NATO commitments. He added that it was hard for him, in the face of Egyptian opposition, to sign an agreement with Turkey now unless joined by the United States and the United Kingdom. On 31 December the State Department instructed Gallman to use every suitable opportunity to discreetly encourage and foster the earliest Iraqi association with the Turco-Pakistani Agreement or the conclusion of bilateral arrangements with either party. The State Department also asked Gallman to remind the Iraqis that, as already indicated, the extent of American military aid would depend largely upon progress in Iraqi accession to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement.⁹¹

Meanwhile, the Arab League foreign ministers held a meeting in Cairo. They concluded that no alliance should be concluded outside the fold of the Arab League Collective Security Pact, and that cooperation with the West was possible, provided a just solution was found for Arab problems and provided the Arabs were allowed to build up their strength with gifts of arms. Although the Arab states were opposed to defence arrangements with the West, they still looked to the West as a source of arms. On 27 December Menderes stated that 'those living in a certain region must not fall prey to the illusion that by uniting only among themselves they can live in security'.⁹²

Among historians, there is a significant degree of controversy about the question of who, in late 1954, was promoting the northern tier concept. Ayesha Jalal argues that the impetus towards the formation of a Turco-Iraqi pact came from Washington. In her view, the Turco-Iraqi pact (the Baghdad Pact) was the conclusion of an American attempt to sideline the British in the Middle East. She argues that the 'British could see that the pact was yet another US move to drive them out of an established sphere of influence'. She argues further that 'the British now reconciled themselves to accepting the US lead in the Middle East', and that the need for military bases in Iraq forced Britain to join the pact in April 1955. On the basis of this consideration, she poses the question as to whether the Turco-Iraqi pact marked 'the United States' final victory over Great Britain during the Cold War, a victory which the Suez Crisis of 1956 served to confirm'.⁹³

Jalal's analysis of the origins and nature of the pact contradicts the analysis of Brian Holden Reid. Reid argues that in considering 'the various motives why the British government sought to organize a defensive pact in this region, the attitude of Turkey was crucial'. He argues that the Turkish Prime Minister, Menderes, who was anxious to promote the role of his country in the Middle East, and to prove himself a loyal ally of Britain and the United States, set out to form a defence pact with Iraq, with Britain as the driving force in the background. Further, Reid argues,

The Turks held that if the Middle Eastern states themselves showed a willingness to organize in their own defence, then the United States could be more easily persuaded to support them. Turkish initiatives were part of wider diplomatic aspirations to enlarge its role within Western spheres of influences, including memberships of NATO and participation in the Korean War. An active foreign policy also helped divert attention from economic problems at home.⁹⁴

In his view, the Turks were agents of a kind, but of Britain rather than the United States. The British supported the Turks to form an agreement which would make provision for the renewal of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, but which, as will be seen, was not guaranteed until a very late stage of the Turco-Iraqi negotiations. The original draft of a Turco-Iraqi pact put forward by Nuri Said did not allow Britain to continue enjoying defence facilities in Iraq, which 'was one major British reason for acceding to the Baghdad Pact which was to complicate relations with the United States'.⁹⁵

Nigel John Ashton argues against the analysis of Jalal and Reid:

Whilst all these views have elements of truth in them, they fail to recognize the significance of the crucial *volte face* in American and British policy under the impact of events in the Middle East during the months of January to April 1955. Both [Jalal and Reid] appear to misinterpret certain critical events in the period from July 1954 to April 1955, and in particular, neglect the crucial shift in emphasis in American and British policy during the period January to April 1955. During this period the British and American Governments exchanged the roles of piqued neutrality and enthusiastic advocacy towards the [Turco-Iraqi] pact.⁹⁶

Nevertheless, it appears to the present author that in late 1954 and early 1955 the driving force behind a Turco-Iraqi defence pact was Turkish Prime Minister Menderes. The creation of the Turco-Iraqi pact owed much to Menderes's persuasive initiative. As Brian Holden Reid acknowledges, the impetus towards the formation of a Turco-Iraqi pact came from Ankara, with Britain and the United States as the driving force in the background. Although Reid's analysis of the origin of the pact seems feasible, the analyses of Jalal and Ashton cannot be dismissed. There are elements of truth in their analyses, but they appear to neglect the role of the regional states, particularly Turkey, who played the role of champion of the pact right up until the end. Besides the Soviet threat, there were some other reasons behind Turkey's wish to promote a Middle East defence pact.

3 The formation of the Baghdad Pact (1954–5)

The Baghdad talks and the Turco-Iraqi consensus on Middle East defence

In September 1954, when Menderes asked Nasser for a meeting, the reply was that public opinion was not ripe for an immediate contact. Menderes then suggested that he should visit Cairo in November, and the following month Nasser should visit Ankara, but the Egyptian government again asked for postponements. In view of Nasser's refusal to meet Menderes and of the unlikelihood of any rapid progress being made in persuading the Arab states to join a defence arrangement, the Turkish government made a Turco-Iraqi defence agreement its immediate objective, and Menderes decided to visit Baghdad in January 1955.¹ However, according to Bowker, Menderes's motives were mixed. In the first place, there was genuine concern for Turkey's right flank in any war with Russia, and the urgent desire to continue the work begun with the Turco-Pakistani Agreement of filling in the gaps in the line from the Turkish frontier eastwards. Second, however, the deterioration in Turkey's internal and external economic position made it necessary that Menderes's government should establish itself in American eyes as the most effective instrument for bringing about the realization of the northern tier concept and, as the corollary to this, establish the impossibility of the United States allowing the economic collapse of so valuable an ally. Third, the Turkish government was most concerned to see Britain maintain her military position in the Middle East and in Iraq particularly. Menderes was therefore willing that a Turco-Iraqi agreement should provide the means for revising the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. His aim was to conclude an arrangement in line with the northern tier project, and to bring the Iraqis to sign a bilateral Turco-Iraqi pact on lines similar to the Turco-Pakistani Agreement, since Nuri Said had mentioned rather casually at the end of his Istanbul visit in October 1954 that if the Turks wanted to sign a bilateral agreement, he would be prepared to consider it.²

However, since then, the matter had not been carried substantially further and no draft of any such agreement had so far been prepared. According to Hooper, the British Chargé d'Affaires in Baghdad, there would in any case

have to be considerable further Turco-Iraqi consultations before any such agreement could be signed, and it seemed to Hooper unlikely that Nuri Said would be prepared to sign any agreement without further consultations. Nuri, it appears, did not expect any spectacular results from the visit of the Turkish Prime Minister. On 5 January 1955 he told Hooper that he would certainly not be ready to sign any agreement with Turkey when Menderes visited Baghdad. His intention, he said, was to make the talks with the Turkish Prime Minister purely exploratory, and thereafter to have talks with the British and the Americans on the general outline of a regional defence arrangement under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.³

The Turkish Foreign Ministry, similarly, did not expect an agreement to be signed during Menderes's visit to Baghdad. On 3 January 1955 Nuri Birgi, the Secretary-General of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said to Bowker that while it would be a mistake to expect an agreement between Turkey and Iraq during the Prime Minister's visit to Iraq in January, it was expected that considerable progress would be made towards that end. He thought that it was essential that the project, which had been so much discussed, should be brought a definite stage further towards fulfilment since otherwise, if left much longer in suspense, it might 'turn inadequate' and simply become another of the many obsolete projects for Middle East defence.⁴

By the end of 1954 the British government, which had hitherto been opposed to a tie-up between Turkey and Iraq, had come to consider the Turkish initiative as a step in the right direction. From the Foreign Office's point of view, a wider defence arrangement in the Middle East seemed to be impossible, owing to Egyptian opposition, and the important point for the British was to provide without delay a political 'umbrella' under which they could secure a satisfactory revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. Any delay in the emergence of a defence arrangement in the Middle East would mean that Britain would be obliged to tackle the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty before there was an 'umbrella' to stand under.⁵

The Foreign Office therefore did not object to Menderes's visit to Baghdad, but was in doubt whether Nuri Said would continue his idea of a grouping with Turkey in view of the fact that during the Arab League meeting in December 1954 the Egyptians had definitely come out against any Iraqi defence association with Turkey or Pakistan. The Foreign Office did not expect much from Menderes's visit to Baghdad, but suggested to the Turkish Foreign Ministry that the Turkish Prime Minister should bear in mind during his visit the importance of the United Kingdom continuing to enjoy defence facilities in Iraq, particularly the stationing of RAF units, after the termination of the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. In return, the Turkish government asked the British government to encourage Nuri Said to join a defence group with Turkey, and to be firm with the Egyptians.⁶

On 6 January the Turkish Deputy Prime Minister, Zorlu, assured Bowker that during their visit to Baghdad he and Menderes would do their utmost to bring Nuri Said to the point that Britain should continue after the termina-

tion of the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty to enjoy facilities to station RAF units in Iraq. Zorlu went on to say that the Turkish government's idea of a regional defence arrangement with Iraq was an arrangement which would be open to the accession of the United Kingdom and the United States. From the Turkish point of view, Zorlu said, a regional defence arrangement which in the first place aimed at including other Arab countries would take too long to conclude. He added that the Turkish government regarded Iraq, because of her geographical position, as the most important element among the Arab states from the point of view of regional defence. At the same time, however, the Turkish government considered Egypt the decisive influence in the Arab League, and it was necessary to convince her that any defence arrangement with Iraq would not affect Egypt's position as leader of the Arab world.⁷

On 6 January 1955 Menderes arrived in Baghdad, apparently confident that he could persuade the Iraqis to agree in principle to a pact between Turkey and Iraq as the basis for a Middle East defence organization. Three days later, Nuri Birgi told Hooper that Menderes regarded the Iraqi suspension of relations with Russia, just a few days before his arrival, as a good sign, publicly committing Iraq to the Western camp. However, Birgi added, Menderes was already greatly impressed by the strength of what he described as 'negative' elements in Iraq; that is, the neutralists and those who were pre-occupied with Israel to the exclusion of every other problem. Hooper told Birgi that Britain feared that after long negotiations all that might emerge would be a paper agreement which would not provide for the one thing which would give the defence of the region real 'teeth', i.e. base facilities for Britain in Iraq. Birgi replied that the Turkish government was fully alive to this.⁸

However, the first formal discussions between the Iraqi and Turkish delegates, which began that day, were not very encouraging, since the Iraqi Prime Minister was adamant that Iraq could not undertake any commitments outside her own frontiers. It was clear, Hooper commented, that Nuri still had a suspicion of Turkish irredentism, and would strongly oppose any arrangement involving Turkish troops entering northern Iraq. On the following day Nuri told Hooper that he intended to conclude a protocol with Turkey on the basis of the Turco-Iraqi Treaty of 1946 but open to accession by other states, whereby the two countries would initiate staff talks, and each would grant freedom of transit through its territory to military *matériel* destined for the other. Hooper told him that he considered this a very small step in the right direction and encouraged him to go further than his intention of concluding a paper agreement.⁹

Hooper was able to give the gist of this conversation to the Turks, who were disappointed at the meagreness of Nuri's proposals. As a result, Menderes, who had at first intended not to force the pace, decided to press the Iraqis more strongly, and during a talk with Nuri Said on 12 January he persuaded Nuri to go further and agree with him to issue a communiqué. He refused to fulfil his engagement to address the Iraqi Parliament that day until Nuri

Said had agreed to the communiqué, and the assembled deputies were kept waiting.¹⁰

On 12 January, following a week of talks, the Iraqi and Turkish governments jointly issued a communiqué announcing that they had decided to conclude a treaty against any aggression committed against them from any quarter in conformity with the right of self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The communiqué also referred specifically to the two countries' readiness to sign a bilateral agreement, even if other countries to be approached did not sign with them.¹¹ According to Hooper, this indicated that Nuri Said was prepared to go forward despite Egyptian opposition. Noting the reference to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, Hooper commented that Nuri Said probably felt that if he clung firmly enough to this article he would expose himself less to attacks by the Egyptians, inasmuch as it would be difficult for the Egyptian government, as a member of the United Nations, to criticize too violently an agreement based on the United Nations Charter, even though it meant that Iraq was departing to some extent from the idea of the Arab League Collective Security Pact.¹²

With regard to the references in the communiqué to 'aggression . . . coming from within or without the region', and to an undertaking to act 'in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter and with decisions based on these principles', Hooper said that they were directed at Israel, and inserted at Nuri Said's request, to conciliate public opinion in Iraq and in the Arab world generally. This interpretation was subsequently confirmed by Menderes to Bowker, though he added that the references in question entailed no change whatever in Turkish policy towards Israel or in its support for the full implementation of the United Nations resolutions on Palestine, relating to partition, the internationalization of Jerusalem and the return of refugees. Turkey had as a matter of principle always supported the United Nations, including by implication the United Nations resolutions on Palestine, but recognized the impossibility of the literal application of the resolutions.¹³

Apart from pressure by Menderes, it remains unclear what finally induced Nuri Said to accept such a binding commitment to a defence agreement with Turkey, and what price, if any, the Turks had paid. However, according to the British Foreign Office, Nuri Said was probably influenced by pressure from the Americans, since he had earlier asked Hooper to restrain the Americans from hustling him, but it does not appear that the State Department pressurized Iraq to conclude an agreement with Turkey, though it encouraged her to do so. The Foreign Office itself had encouraged Nuri Said to go further than a paper agreement. However, it seems that the outcome of the Baghdad talks was largely the work of Menderes. The fact was that the United States and Britain were both surprised by the Turco-Iraqi decision to conclude a defence agreement, which they had not expected. Hooper commented that perhaps Nuri Said felt that his original intention, if set forth unadorned, would not catch the imagination of the West sufficiently to encourage further military aid, for which Nuri was most anxious, or perhaps he felt that by making a

maximum bid at the outset he would have room for subsequent manoeuvre, and might appear to give way to attacks by other Arab states without having to give up his basic idea of concluding a defence agreement with the West. However, Hooper concluded that it was not certain that Nuri had changed his mind on this subject.¹⁴ According to Bowker, the price the Turkish government had paid was probably a measure of Turkish support for the Arab cause against Israel, since the Turkish government regarded the references to the United Nations resolutions on Palestine in the Turco-Iraqi communiqué as concessions to the Iraqis. On 15 January the Israeli Minister in Ankara told Bowker that Menderes had gone off to Baghdad determined at all costs to get something spectacular in the field of foreign affairs which would help to divert attention from Turkey's critical economic situation, and that the price he had paid was a measure of Turkish support for the Arab cause against Israel.¹⁵

Britain was quick to welcome the proposed agreement between Iraq and Turkey. She regarded it as a first step towards the establishment of an effective organization for the defence of the Middle East and hoped that it would provide a political 'umbrella' under which she could secure defence facilities in Iraq after the termination of the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. The British government had hitherto refrained from giving Nuri Said more than cautious encouragement, as it considered that it must be left to Nuri Said himself to judge how far he could go in ignoring Egyptian objections, but it now decided to press the two governments to bring their initiative to reality as soon as possible, before neutralist opinion had had time to stir up opposition.¹⁶ The United States also welcomed the Turco-Iraqi agreement. In congratulatory telegrams to Menderes and Nuri Said, Dulles praised the results achieved. At a press conference in Washington on 18 January Dulles said that the United States considered the Turco-Iraqi intention to sign a treaty as a constructive move towards building up the so-called 'northern tier', of which Turkey and Pakistan were already the pioneers.¹⁷

There was, however, a difference between the American and British reasons for welcoming the agreement. Although, for Dulles, it was a development of the 'northern tier' defence system, which would be completed with the participation of Iran, in the British view the Turco-Iraqi agreement could only mean something if Britain herself secured defence facilities in Iraq after the termination of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, and if the other Arab states participated.¹⁸ Hooper commented that British and American views on Middle East defence seemed to envisage two different things. The British looked on a regional defence pact as a screen or umbrella for the security of the defence facilities in Iraq, which they enjoyed under the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, while the Americans appeared to look on a regional grouping as an end in itself. Hooper suspected that the Americans would probably be much more content than the British with a paper agreement between Turkey, Pakistan and Iraq, which would give them a good excuse for asking Congress for more aid for the countries concerned, but this would do nothing to put real 'teeth'

into the defence of the area. In the British view, to sit back and rely on the efficiency of a paper agreement between Iraq and her neighbours would be to court disaster in the event of a real war. Hooper urged the Foreign Office to make it clear to the Americans that such an agreement, though a useful first step, was nowhere near enough, and that the object of encouraging such an agreement, which must never be lost sight of, was to make a step towards obtaining facilities for British forces in Iraq. One major difficulty about relying on the Turks to defend Iraq was, Hooper argued, that the Iraqis were deeply suspicious of Turkish irredentism. They would probably drag their feet over any proposal involving inviting Turkish forces into Iraq, since once in they might never go away again.¹⁹

On 11 January Evan Wilson of the United States Embassy in London passed a communication from the State Department to Evelyn Shuckburgh, Under-Secretary for Middle Eastern Affairs, which expressed the American view that British thinking on the 'northern tier' concept (i.e. Iraq joining the Turco-Pakistani Agreement) was not as positive as it had been. The State Department still thought that the northern tier was the most realistic basis for Middle East defence, but feared that the Foreign Office, while still keen on the 'indigenous approach' towards a Middle East defence pact, had been impressed by Egyptian opposition to any early pact and thought it unwise to press Iraq too hard in the matter. Wilson pointed out that the United States had no desire to see a worsening of relations between Egypt and Iraq, or between Egypt and the West, but they did not think that either of these things was likely to occur as a result of Iraq joining the northern tier. From the State Department's point of view, Iraq's relations with Egypt were already bad and there was no prospect of an improvement. Moreover, even if such action by Iraq should result in a break-up of the Arab League, the northern tier would provide an alternative centre of attraction around which the Arab states might group themselves and this, in the State Department's view, would not be a bad thing.²⁰

Commenting on this conversation in a minute, Shuckburgh insisted that the American view that the British government had been positively discouraging the Iraqis from going ahead with the northern tier was the reverse of the case. He emphasized that although Britain's approach was more cautious than that of the United States, and Britain did not wish to put pressure on Iraq, Britain would nevertheless encourage any move Iraq might make. Shuckburgh continued,

The fact remains, however, that there is a difference of emphasis between the United States and ourselves in this. They are vigorously pressing forward the Northern tier idea whereas we are not entirely convinced that this is wise having regard to Egyptian objections and the extreme instability of Arab opinion generally. It is not unnatural that our attitude should have slightly changed in the last year since during that time we have made our Treaty with Egypt and the Nasser Government has moved in the

direction of co-operation with the West. No Middle East defence arrangement is likely to have much value unless it enjoys Egyptian support or participation, and we must therefore take account of Egyptian views as to how it should be organized . . . On the other hand, if Nuri does join the Northern tier, it may well be that the Egyptians will change their attitude in order not to be left behind in the queue for Western defence aid. In other words, if the American policy succeeds, it may be a great success but I think it is risky and may well fail. We must avoid being blamed for its failure.²¹

A further problem was the reaction of Israel, whose government was disturbed by the Turco-Iraqi communiqué's references to 'aggression . . . coming from within or without the region', and to an undertaking to act 'in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter and with decisions based on these principles'. On 28 January Fischer, the Israeli Minister in Ankara, met Menderes and expressed his government's anxiety with regard to the communiqué. According to what Menderes told Bowker, he had told Fischer that he regarded the references as concessions to the Iraqis, but of form rather than of principle and substance, and that the Baghdad communiqué entailed no change whatever in Turkey's policy towards Israel. Turkey had repeatedly declared her support in principle of the United Nations resolutions on Palestine, and the references in question implied no more than this, and did not imply support for a literal implementation of the resolutions. With regard to internal aggression, Menderes had said that it was the only possible way to get over the Iraqi and general Arab position that they were unable to make preparations against possible outside aggression because they feared aggression from Israel. Fischer had then asked Menderes whether he could promise that, in the event of the Iraqis asking that the references should be incorporated in the pact, he would refuse the request. Menderes assured him that the Turkish government would make every effort to avoid the use of the same or similar language which might imply Turkish commitments with respect to implementation of the United Nations resolutions on Palestine. Menderes gave him a 90 per cent assurance on this point. He could not give him 100 per cent assurance because, if it became clear that the pact could only be concluded by Turkey agreeing to the inclusion of the references in question, then he would not feel justified in withholding his assent, since in that event he would regard this formal concession to Arab sentiment as a justifiable price to pay for achieving a vitally important step forward towards establishing Middle East defence.²²

On 14 January, after his visit to Baghdad, Menderes went to Lebanon and Syria in order to explain the Turco-Iraqi initiative and seek their support in advocating it to the other Arab states. However, his visit was not very successful, since Damascus and Beirut intended to keep in line with the Arab League. According to the account given to the British Ambassador in Damascus, John Gardener, by the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires, Ismail Soysal, Menderes

had been surprised at the unrealism displayed by the Syrians as regards world affairs, and notably the danger of communism as both a political and a military force. The completely negative way in which the Syrian government received the arguments put forward by Menderes was, according to Gardener, typical of their real attitude. He said that the expressions of opinion called forth by Menderes's visit had shown once again that Syrian policy was paralysed by a deep division of view. The right-wing elements wanted agreement on certain conditions with the West. On the other hand, the left-wing elements would have nothing to do with cooperation with the West. Gardener concluded that the only policy which commanded widespread support was to follow at the present negative Egyptian lead.²³

According to the British Ambassador to Beirut, Chapman Andrews, Menderes had explained the Turco-Iraqi initiative to the Lebanese government and sought its help in advocating it to the other Arab states. The Lebanese government had offered to mediate between Turkey and the Arab states, notably Egypt, a role which, Menderes considered, the Lebanese government was not suitable to play. Menderes was very doubtful of Lebanese support. He was particularly distrustful of the Lebanese President, Camille Chamoun, who was, Menderes thought, under Egyptian and French pressure not to play ball with the Turks. On the other hand, the Prime Minister, Sami al-Sulh, was, Menderes thought, more forthcoming but not able to do anything effective because he was on bad terms with the President. Moreover, Menderes was suspicious of the Lebanese proposal to incorporate a phrase in the joint Turco-Lebanese communiqué to the effect that Turkish policy fitted in with that of the Arab League. This, Menderes argued, was a partial truth which might be dangerous, and he refused to even consider its inclusion. Andrews commented that it was too much to hope that the Lebanese government would at once boldly follow Iraq's lead. Much would eventually depend on how Iraq stood up to the battering she would receive from Egypt.²⁴

As anticipated, Egypt's reaction was negative. She called an emergency meeting of the Arab League prime ministers in Cairo on 22 January, to discuss the situation created by Iraq's decision to conclude a treaty with Turkey. Nuri Said's first reaction was not to attend, and he requested postponement of the meeting, claiming poor health. He also sent Fadhil Jamali, Acting Foreign Minister, to Damascus and Beirut with the twin objects of explaining his point of view to the Syrian and Lebanese governments and of postponing the Cairo meeting.²⁵ His offer that the Iraqi Ambassador to Cairo should attend in his place was refused, however, and the conference of the Arab League prime ministers opened on 22 January without an Iraqi representative. The conference informed Nuri Said that they were prepared to wait a few days, in the hope that he would recover from his illness and come to Cairo. Nuri stuck to his decision not to go, but agreed to send Jamali to attend the conference on his behalf.²⁶

Jamali arrived at the conference on 26 January, but was unable to convince his colleagues that the proposed Turco-Iraqi pact was consonant with the

Arab League Collective Security Pact. The Egyptians sought to persuade the other Arab League States that Iraq was pursuing the wrong policy, but they were taken by surprise by the independent spirit shown by the Syrian, Jordanian and Lebanese prime ministers, who, despite strong pressure from Egypt and Saudi Arabia, adopted an independent line during the conference. Nasser then announced that if Iraq persisted in her intention to go ahead and sign a defence agreement with Turkey, Egypt would withdraw from the Arab League Collective Security Pact and would thereafter consider her position in the Arab League.²⁷ This, according to Stevenson, had a profound effect on the other Arab prime ministers. They were prepared to refrain from following the Iraqi lead and even to urge the Iraqi government to take into account Egyptian objections as regards timing, but not to censure Iraq or expel her from the Arab League. In fact, Stevenson commented, they were not prepared to sacrifice their own interest in Western aid to Egypt's egotism.²⁸

On 30 January a subcommittee of the conference, which had been set up to prepare a draft of a joint communiqué, announced that they could not reach agreement, since the Levant states would not join Egypt in a condemnation of the Iraqi initiative. The conference thereupon decided to send a delegation, consisting of the Lebanese Prime Minister, the Syrian and Jordanian foreign ministers and the Egyptian Minister of National Guidance to Baghdad. Its task was to try and reach agreement with Nuri Said on cooperation between all Arab states and the West in a way that would take into account Iraq's special needs, and thus make the Turco-Iraqi pact unnecessary. The delegation arrived in Baghdad on 31 January, and meanwhile the conference adjourned until 3 February.²⁹

In the meantime, the Iraqi Cabinet, the elder statesmen, the Crown Prince and the King had given unanimous support to Nuri, had reaffirmed Iraq's right to make such treaties as she considered necessary for protection of her interests and integrity, and had endorsed his policy of maintaining a firm and resolute attitude in the face of Egyptian pressure. This policy had the full support of the United Kingdom and the United States governments, who considered that nothing should be done to endanger the proposed Turco-Iraqi pact, and advised Nuri Said to stand firm in the face of Egyptian pressure.³⁰

During the meetings in Baghdad it was proposed to Nuri Said that Iraq should postpone her decision for six months to enable a joint Arab policy to be worked out; meanwhile the Iraqi and Egyptian prime ministers should meet in Beirut to try to reconcile their views. Nuri Said declined all suggestions. He made it plain that Iraq would proceed with the proposed treaty with Turkey. On 3 February he told Wright that the Egyptians had been extremely difficult; 'they gave me hell', he said, 'but I gave them double hell'.³¹

On 4 February the Turkish government informed Nuri Said that a six-month delay in carrying out the treaty would be unacceptable, and urged him to be firm with the Egyptians. They also urged the Lebanese President, who had proposed the delay, to keep quiet if he could not support the Turco-Iraqi

initiative.³² The British took a similar line. From their point of view, the Egyptian-inspired suggestion of a six-month delay might lose them what seemed to be possibly the last initiative of the ageing Nuri, offer them no real prospect of a satisfactory defence arrangement through the Arab League, and discourage the Turks. J. G. Ward, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, said,

I am sure that we ought to make sure of the bird in hand, in the form of the unexpected bonus of the Turco-Iraqi Agreement; and that we should aim at exploiting this quickly to get a favourable revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty.

But Ward warned that Britain should realize that she would have to pay a price in the form of a setback to her relations with Egypt. This could, at least for the time being, seriously hamper the Anglo-American endeavour to promote an Arab–Israeli settlement, since at the end of his tour to the Middle East in November 1954 Shuckburgh had concluded that the key to an Arab–Israeli settlement lay through Egypt. The Foreign Office concluded that the longer Nuri Said delayed before concluding an agreement, the more public opinion in Iraq would be influenced by repercussions in the Arab League. Moreover, Egypt might provoke Arab nationalist feeling, leading to internal trouble in Iraq and the overthrow of Nuri Said's government. Britain, therefore, encouraged Nuri Said to go ahead with his plan.³³

On 2 February the meetings in Baghdad between the Arab League delegation and Nuri Said resulted in deadlock, and the delegation returned to Cairo. On 6 February after hearing the delegation's report, the conference of the Arab League prime ministers in Cairo broke up without a resolution being passed or a communiqué issued, as the Levant states refused to join Egypt in a condemnation of the Iraqi initiative.³⁴

The signing of the Turco-Iraqi treaty: the Baghdad Pact (24 February 1955)

Soon after the Arab League prime ministers' meeting ended, discussions began between Turkey and Iraq on the draft of the Turco-Iraqi pact. Meanwhile, the Iraqi and Turkish governments urged Britain and the United States to join the Turco-Iraqi agreement at or soon after signature. Britain was in favour of Turkey and Iraq going ahead with the treaty and of herself acceding at a later date. However, she attached great importance to the inclusion in the treaty of some general provision to cover future defence arrangements between herself and Iraq and thus to enable the existing Anglo-Iraqi treaty to be terminated. Although the United States agreed that speed was essential, it was in favour of the signatories in the first place being Turkey, Iraq and Britain. If this happened, the State Department hoped that the United States could accede later.³⁵ At a meeting with State Department officials in Wash-

ington on 28 January, Shuckburgh was told that what Dulles favoured was 'eventual US association with the pact provided it was on the same lines as US associations with the Manila Pact, i.e. the US would only be involved in the event of aggression from outside the area'.³⁶

With regard to the question of United States accession to the Turco-Iraqi pact, on 9 February Jernagan of the State Department told Harold Beeley of the British Embassy in Washington that for domestic reasons it would be very difficult for the United States to accede to the Turco-Iraqi pact unless they were prepared at the same time to give some kind of security guarantee to Israel. This in turn, Jernagan said, would mean that the United States' strongest card in the effort to induce the Israeli government to make its contribution to the settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute would be played prematurely.³⁷

On the same day, the State Department instructed the United States' ambassadors in Ankara and Baghdad to inform the Iraqi and Turkish governments that the United States reiterated its strong support of the Turco-Iraqi pact, but questioned the possibility of the United States being an original signatory or joining at an early date. In the view of the Middle East Command (MEC) and the Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO) experiences, the United States was reluctant to take any action which might be interpreted as suggesting that the pact was imposed from outside the area. While it was true that the United States had encouraged the proposed pact, the impetus had come from indigenous realization of the outside threat to the Middle East. Moreover, the problem was not urgent in view of United States arrangements with Pakistan and Turkey, taken in combination with the aid agreements with Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan.³⁸

It remained for the Turkish and Iraqi governments to arrange the detailed terms of the pact. At the end of Menderes's visit to Baghdad, Nuri Said had given him a draft, but warned that it was only tentative, and that he would be very ready to consider any amendments. The original Iraqi draft consisted of five articles altogether, but only Articles 1 and 2 were relevant to defence matters:

Article 1 Consultations and discussions shall be held between the respective competent military authorities of the two high contracting parties for the purpose of obtaining reciprocal information regarding security measures and defence plans in countries of the high contracting parties. Exchange of views and information shall also be carried out for the sake of benefiting from the technical experience and progress achieved by any of the two high contracting parties in the field of defensive armament.

Article 2 The high contracting parties undertake to furnish all facilities and assistance for the passage of arms, military equipment, supplies and other materials used for defensive purposes pertaining to their respective armies, through the territory of the other party without being subject to customs or any other duties.³⁹

It was clear that Nuri Said's idea of a defence pact with Turkey was one limited to an exchange of military information, consultation about defence plans and free transit of military *matériel* through the territories of the two countries. This was quite unacceptable to the Turkish government, since it contained no 'umbrella' clause and made no provision for cooperation in defence. To sign it, the Turkish government argued, would mean a retreat from the clear sense of the joint communiqué issued at the end of the Baghdad talks in January. The Iraqi draft was therefore amended and strengthened by the Turkish government. The main amendments were to Articles 1 and 2, which were changed by the Turks to provide the 'umbrella', with special regard to revision of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty, and to make joint military plans subject to special agreements which might be proposed by Turkey.⁴⁰

The Turkish draft consisted of eight articles, of which the first two articles were as follows:

Article 1 The contracting parties undertake to co-operate, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, in meeting any armed aggression that might be committed against one of them from within or from outside the area of the Middle East.

Article 2 With a view to ensuring the effective realization and application of the co-operation provided for in Article 1 above, the competent authorities of the contracting parties shall draw up military plans and decide upon the necessary measures as soon as the present treaty enters into force. These plans and measures shall become operative upon approval by the governments of the contracting parties and may, furthermore, be the subject of special agreements.⁴¹

The principal difference between the two drafts was that the Turkish text made provision for cooperation in 'confronting any armed aggression' (Article 1) and, in pursuit of this cooperation, for the establishment of joint military plans and measures (Article 2); whereas the Iraqi draft provided only for military consultation on defence plans (Article 1) and for facilities for the passage of arms through each other's territories (Article 2). In short, the Iraqi draft did not meet the British requirement – an 'umbrella' for a defence arrangement between the United Kingdom and Iraq to replace the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty – whereas the Turkish draft, on the other hand, seemed to be what the British wanted. They therefore welcomed the Turkish draft.⁴²

Nuri Said received the Turkish draft amendments in the first week of February, but did not consider them suitable for a bilateral agreement. In particular, he would not accept the last half of Article 1 (from the words 'in confronting' to the end). In his view this referred to Israel, which was not a matter of bilateral concern between Iraq and Turkey. Nor would he accept Article 2, since it might imply that Turkish forces might operate in Iraq in time of war. He warned the Turkish government that if the Turks wanted an agreement at once it would have to be the original Iraqi draft.⁴³

On 8 February Nuri told Wright that he now wished to go ahead and sign a bilateral agreement with Turkey based on the Iraqi draft, and thereafter to convert this bilateral agreement, within as few weeks as possible, into a tripartite pact between Iraq, Turkey and the United Kingdom, or else into a four-power pact, to include the United States if they were willing. This three- or four-power pact would contain the umbrella provision which the British government wanted.⁴⁴ However, according to Bowker, the Turkish government considered Nuri's attitude illogical. They mistrusted Nuri's idea of signing an anodyne agreement first and expanding it later when others acceded. Menderes told Bowker that the Turkish government had no wish to insist on full acceptance of their proposed amendments, but if they were to sign an agreement with Iraq it must be a text agreed between the two parties. Menderes added that the Turkish government was quite ready to drop the references to internal and external aggression, which had been inserted as a concession to Arab feeling.⁴⁵

On 9 February Nuri Said proposed to the Turks an amended new draft, which attempted to compromise between the original Iraqi draft and the Turkish re-draft. The principal change was a new Article 1, providing for cooperation between the high contracting parties 'for their defence and security in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter' and for 'special agreements' to give effect to agreed measures for this cooperation.⁴⁶ This new Article 1 was satisfactory from the British point of view. It seemed to meet the British requirement for an umbrella provision to cover future defence arrangements between Iraq and the United Kingdom. The only slight change the British suggested was the reversal of the order of the words 'defence and security' in the first sentence of Article 1. The word 'security' would be the treaty cover for their preparatory defence arrangements. It was therefore desirable for them to separate it from the reference to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which provided only for self-defence against armed attack. This would give them better cover for the detailed preparatory defence arrangements which they wished to make with Iraq, and they stated that they would be prepared to accede at a later date to a treaty between Turkey and Iraq containing such a clause. This would give time for them to hold technical talks with the Iraqis and reach preliminary agreement in principle on the facilities which they required.⁴⁷

However, Nuri Said's new draft was unacceptable to the Turkish government, even though its previous objection 'that it contained no umbrella clause and made no provision for cooperation in defence' was met. The Turkish government was upset by Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Nuri's new draft,⁴⁸ which, it complained, discriminated against Turkey inasmuch as they restricted cooperation for defence between Iraq and Turkey, though not between Iraq and any other powers that might accede, to exchanges of military information and facilities for the passage of arms. The Turkish Prime Minister said that it was entirely contrary to the whole spirit of his long negotiations with Nuri, and he would not sign an agreement on the lines of Nuri's new text, since to

do so would render Turkey ridiculous. According to what Nuri Birgi told Bowker, Menderes thought that Nuri Said's reason for inserting Article 2 was his morbid suspicions of Turkish designs on northern Iraq. Birgi said that in order to dissipate these, the Prime Minister was ready to give Iraq a categorical guarantee of respect for her territorial integrity, though this would really be a repetition of Article 1 of the Turco-Iraqi Agreement of 1946. Menderes attributed Nuri Said's attitude to his natural tendency to temporize, and his fear for his personal safety as a result of Egyptian-inspired threats. Menderes said once again that the Turks had no wish to insist on full acceptance of their proposed amendments, but if they were to sign an agreement with Iraq it must be a text agreed between the two parties.⁴⁹ According to Bowker, Menderes, who had sent Nuri Said an average of two messages a day since he left Baghdad, thought that maintenance of constant pressure on Nuri, and insistence on the necessity of the utmost speed, as well as British and American support, would enable him to bring Nuri over the last hurdle.⁵⁰

The Foreign Office and the State Department conceded that whereas the Iraqi draft was quite inadequate, the Turkish draft provided a satisfactory basis for the pact, but warned that it would be a mistake to sacrifice the chance of a workable defence arrangement to the admitted desirability of a quick conclusion. They did not want to put too much pressure on Nuri. On 10 February the Foreign Office instructed Bowker to inform the Turkish government that Nuri's new Article 1 was satisfactory from the British point of view and met their requirement for an 'umbrella' provision to cover future defence arrangements, and that Britain would be prepared to accede to an agreement between Turkey and Iraq containing such a clause. Moreover, the Foreign Office had concluded that Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Nuri Said's new draft did not directly concern the British government, and must be settled between the Iraqi and Turkish governments. The Foreign Office thought that it would be unwise for the British government to intervene, since Nuri Said was suspicious of Turkey, and was determined to avoid commitments which would involve the possibility of Turkish forces operating in Iraq. The Foreign Office added a warning that the Turkish government would be wise to take account of Nuri Said's fears and of the danger of losing the whole agreement by trying to get too much.⁵¹

On 13 February Nuri Birgi told Bowker that Menderes was most anxious to take account of Nuri Said's fears. He was ready to accept as much as possible of Nuri Said's new draft, with all its imperfections, and to give all appropriate assurances, but he could not sign a defence agreement in which preparatory defence arrangements between Turkey and Iraq were specifically limited to matters which could be settled without any such agreement, as was the case with Nuri Said's new draft with its Articles 2, 3 and 4. Birgi repeated that such an agreement would bear no relation to the objective which Menderes had in mind and would make him look ridiculous.⁵²

From Baghdad, on the other hand, Wright reported that Nuri Said was nervous and suspicious of the Turks who, he thought, were trying to man-

oeuvre him into some wording which could subsequently be interpreted as permitting entry of Turkish forces into Iraq in wartime, to which, he told Wright, he could never agree. On 16 February Nuri Said appealed to Wright to help him. Wright tried to persuade him that the main preoccupation of the Turkish government was to avoid the pact being so worded as to appear discriminatory against and derogatory to Turkey. He had great difficulty in getting this point over, but in the end Nuri Said accepted it, and said that if the Turkish government preferred, he would be willing to omit not only Article 2 of his revised draft but Articles 3 and 4 as well. Iraq and Turkey could subsequently conclude a 'special agreement' between themselves, deriving from Article 1 of the pact in the same way as any future agreement between the United Kingdom and Iraq.⁵³

At the same time Nuri Said wished to include a number of new proposals in the pact which appeared to the British and Turkish governments to be unsuitable and undesirable. These included a new article about non-interference in internal affairs and peaceful settlement of disputes between the signatories, and references in the preamble to the Arab Collective Security Pact and to the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement. On 16 February Nuri Said told Wright that if the Turkish government could not accept these new proposals, he would give up the idea of a pact with Turkey altogether, and seek instead a pact with the United Kingdom and Pakistan. Wright commented that the idea of establishing a defence pact between Iraq and Turkey now seemed to be in sight of a breakdown unless the Turks were prepared to accept Nuri Said's new proposals, and that although Nuri Said's new draft was far from ideal, it seemed to provide the 'umbrella' clause which Britain wanted and to remove any possible appearance of discrimination against Turkey, and to be in a form to which other countries could accede without much amendment. Wright added that Nuri Said's original draft had done none of these things, and indeed Nuri Said had virtually dropped it.⁵⁴

On 16 February the Turkish Foreign Minister told Bowker that Nuri Said's latest draft was acceptable to the Turkish government, subject to certain minor points which could be settled when the Prime Minister went to Baghdad to sign the agreement. However, the Turkish government considered Nuri Said's additional new proposals inappropriate. It thought that an agreement between Turkey and Iraq should not refer to agreements to which Turkey was not a party, and pointed out that Iraq's obligations under the Arab League Collective Security Pact were fully safeguarded under Article 4 of Nuri Said's draft.⁵⁵

The British government saw no harm in referring to Article 11 of the Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation between the Arab League states, but considered the final clause of the preamble referring to the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement to be a serious misrepresentation of the meaning of Article 4 of that agreement, since Article 4 of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement did not provide for 'defensive measures to preserve peace and security in this region', but merely stated that in the event of an armed attack, Egypt

should afford to the United Kingdom such facilities as might be necessary in order to place the Suez Canal base on a sure footing and to operate it effectively. It did not oblige the Egyptian government to take defensive measures. The Foreign Office commented that Nuri Said's motive in including this reference in the preamble was, probably, to demonstrate to Arab opinion that his agreement with Turkey was comparable to the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, and did not represent any radical innovation in relations between Arab and Western countries.⁵⁶

While progress towards the drawing up of the final draft was continuing with great difficulty, the Turkish government faced a new demand from Nuri Said, who now wanted to include in the pact, by an exchange of letters, a promise that Turkey should commit herself to working in cooperation with Iraq to secure the implementation of the United Nations resolution of 1947 on Palestine. His aim in including this in the pact was to convince the Arab world that he was not neglecting the Israeli menace.⁵⁷ Washington and London wanted no reference to the Palestine question in the pact itself, nor close association between the pact and any accompanying documents mentioning Palestine. Britain strongly opposed Nuri Said's new proposal, since it would make things more difficult for Britain, and complicate the question of her accession to the pact. She felt that if the Turkish government were to agree to this proposal, the effect would be unfortunate; not only would Israel react strongly, but the prospect of Anglo-American efforts to secure an Arab-Israeli settlement would be prejudiced. Moreover, the suggested exchange of letters might commit Turkey to working in cooperation with Iraq to secure implementation of the United Nations resolutions of 1947 on Palestine. The Foreign Office assumed that such an exchange of letters might impose a strain on Turkey's relations with Israel and that adverse Israeli reaction to the Turco-Iraqi pact as a whole would be likely to follow. The Foreign Office also believed that the withdrawal of Israel to the 1947 United Nations frontiers was quite impracticable. Moreover, the proposed exchange of letters would give the pact the wrong twist by colouring its public interpretation, since it was hoped that the main value of the pact, from the point of view of building up defence arrangements, would be that it would turn Arab eyes away from the Palestine question towards the outside danger. The British government therefore decided to act to prevent the new suggestion going further, and advised the Turkish government against it.⁵⁸

On 20 February the Acting Secretary-General of the Turkish Foreign Office told Bowker that the letters were not part of the pact, that they went no further than the Baghdad communiqué and merely repeated previous statements by the Turkish government of general support for the United Nations resolutions on Palestine. Bowker objected that the letters, by referring specifically to the United Nations resolutions on Palestine, went considerably further than the Baghdad communiqué, and that they might well later be cited by Iraq and the other Arab states as committing Turkey to supporting a more literal application of the resolutions than she had hitherto contemplated, and

that by specifically referring to the Turco-Iraqi pact they might inevitably colour its interpretation.⁵⁹

On 22 February however, the Turkish Prime Minister told Bowker that he was committed to an exchange of letters with Nuri Said because of Nuri Said's insistence, but could not agree to include them in the pact, because of the effect which this would have on Turkey's relations with Israel and on the eventual accession of the United Kingdom and the United States. Bowker suggested that if an exchange of letters was thought to be absolutely unavoidable, then its terms should go no further than the Baghdad communiqué.⁶⁰ Meanwhile, Wright, on instructions from his government, had managed to persuade Nuri Said to drop his proposed reference to the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement in the preamble, and to agree that if there had to be an exchange of letters, they should be separate from the pact.⁶¹

The only apparent point of difference remaining between the Turks and the Iraqis was on Article 5, dealing with accession. The Turkish proposal on this article was designed to preclude any Russian attempt at accession by adding the word 'actively' concerned with security and peace in the Middle East. The Iraqi proposal, on the other hand, was designed to exclude Israel by adding 'and which is fully recognized by both of the High Contracting Parties'. They agreed to put both phrases in Article 5. Finally, they agreed on the amended Turkish-Iraqi text of a mutual cooperation pact between Turkey and Iraq, and on 20 February the Iraqi government formally invited Menderes to come to Baghdad on 23 February with the object of signing the pact the day after.⁶²

In the meantime, Britain had made a last effort to lessen Egyptian hostility to the forthcoming pact. On 20 February Eden visited Cairo on his way to a SEATO⁶³ meeting in Bangkok, and held long discussions with Nasser. The atmosphere between the two men was friendly, especially where Anglo-Egyptian relations were concerned, but they were in disagreement on the Turco-Iraqi pact. Nasser declared his desire for good relations with the West, but argued against the Turco-Iraqi pact, which was, he thought, ill-timed and inopportune, and had seriously set back the development of effective collaboration with the West by the Arab states. He explained that what Egypt desired to see, instead of a Turco-Iraqi pact, was an Anglo-Iraqi agreement on the lines of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, whereby the air bases in Iraq would be reactivated in the event of an attack on Turkey or even Iran. As Eden wrote in his memoirs, Nasser was 'not open to conviction on the Turco-Iraqi enterprise . . . No doubt jealousy plays a part in this and a frustrated desire to lead the Arab world.' However, Eden's failure in Cairo did not prevent Menderes from going to Baghdad.⁶⁴

Meantime, at a meeting with Iraqi ministers and elder statesmen, Nuri Said had received unanimous support for the text of the pact and for a separate but simultaneous exchange of letters with Turkey. He warned Wright that if he consented to a substantial alteration of the pact, or to postponement of the exchange of letters, he would risk losing his backing in Parliament.⁶⁵ Menderes arrived in Baghdad on 23 February and the following

day, just before the signing of the pact, he suggested the inclusion in the pact of a new article reading,

A permanent Council at ministerial level will be set up to function within the framework of the purpose of this pact when at least four powers become party to the pact. The statute of the council will be drawn up by this same body.

Menderes wanted to have a functional organization, not a planning organization. Nuri Said told Wright that he was inclined to accept, unless Her Majesty's Government advised to the contrary. The Foreign Office accepted the Turkish proposal subject to an understanding that, if necessary, ministers could be represented on the council by deputies, as in NATO. The Foreign Office also suggested that the last sentence of the proposed new article should be omitted since the Foreign Office doubted the need for the council to have a formal statute.⁶⁶

On his arrival, Menderes told Wright that he had pledged himself to the Iraqis on an exchange of letters mentioning the United Nations resolutions on Palestine, but promised that he would resist any attempt to turn them into an annex to the pact. Wright secured a similar promise from Nuri Said. However, Nuri Said refused to sign the pact without the exchange of letters, and Menderes gave way, explaining to Wright that to postpone the exchange of letters would have meant postponing, and perhaps losing altogether, the pact. Wright commented that Menderes could not have obtained better in the circumstances.⁶⁷ The Turco-Iraqi Treaty of Mutual Cooperation, the so-called Baghdad Pact, was signed at 11.45 p.m. on 23 February 1955 by the prime ministers of Turkey and Iraq, and formally announced on the following day. It was ratified on 26 February by the Iraqi Parliament and the Turkish Grand National Assembly. In the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies voting was 112 to 4 in favour, and in the Senate 25 to 1; in the Turkish Assembly the vote was unanimous.⁶⁸

The stated aim of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation between Iraq and Turkey was the further improvement of good relations between the two countries in order to contribute to world peace and security, particularly in the Middle East. Specifically, the parties pledged themselves to 'cooperate for their security and defence consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter' (Article 1). In order to ensure the realization and effective application of the cooperation provided for in Article 1, the parties would determine the measures to be taken as soon as the pact entered into force (Article 2). A permanent council at the ministerial level was to be set up to implement the pact when at least four powers had become parties to it (Article 6). The pact was open for accession to any member of the Arab League or any other state actively concerned with security and peace in the Middle East. Acceding states could conclude special agreements, in accordance with Article 1, with other states parties to the pact (Article 5).⁶⁹

The pact would remain in force for five years and was renewable for five-year periods. Any signatory could withdraw, after giving notice, at the end of a five-year period, in which case the agreement would remain in force for the other members (Article 7). The document contained such standard phraseology as an undertaking not to interfere in each other's internal affairs, and a pledge to settle any disputes between themselves in accordance with the United Nations Charter (Article 3). The parties also declared that the dispositions of the pact were not in contradiction with any of the international obligations contracted by either of them with any third state or states. They undertook not to enter into any international obligation incompatible with the pact (Article 4). In addition, an exchange of letters between the Iraqi and Turkish prime ministers at the time of signing recorded their understanding that the pact would enable their countries 'to co-operate in resisting any aggression directed against either of them' and 'to work in close co-operation for effecting the carrying out of the United Nations resolutions concerning Palestine'.⁷⁰

United States reaction was broadly positive. According to the State Department, although the opening sentence of Article 1, taken out of context, might be construed as a binding commitment for one party to come to the assistance of others in case of aggression, the remainder of Article 1 along with Article 2, containing the real essence of the agreement, indicated that there was no commitment of an absolute character. Rather, the agreement provided that the parties might approve or disapprove any measure which might be considered, but with no obligation actually to reach agreement on such measures. However, the agreement had potential as a basis for a security arrangement in that, in addition to showing intent to meet aggression, it established a moral obligation and provided a psychological impetus to take measures as extensive as the parties might agree to take. To this extent, the Turco-Pakistani Agreement, which it had been thought might serve as a framework for the northern tier defence concept, was superseded by the Turco-Iraqi pact. The Turco-Pakistani Agreement represented little more than expressions of willingness to cooperate but, on the other hand, the Turco-Iraqi pact provided at least a basis on which Turkey and Iraq could begin to coordinate policies for defence of their eastern flank in cooperation with the United Kingdom. The Turco-Iraqi pact was, as such, a more suitable vehicle as a basis for Middle East defence, since it provided wide latitude for taking defensive measures jointly or among certain of the parties, and reflected a more immediate intent to undertake these measures. It also provided for the eventual establishment of a ministerial council as another means of implementing its provisions. Therefore, from the State Department's point of view, it would be desirable for Pakistan to accede to the Turco-Iraqi pact.⁷¹

According to a national intelligence estimate, a high-level interdepartmental report by the State Department, although Iraq's signature of a defence agreement with Turkey reflected some appreciation of the Soviet threat, it was largely motivated by such collateral factors as:

- a the desire to replace the old Anglo-Iraqi Treaty with a new agreement more acceptable to nationalist sentiment,
- b the wish to promote Iraqi–Syrian union (by bringing Syria into the Turco-Iraqi pact),
- c the recognition that some positive step towards area defence was necessary to obtain further American military aid,
- d the wish to increase Iraq’s prestige in the Arab world,
- e a desire to strengthen her position vis-à-vis Israel and
- f the weight of Turkish insistence.⁷²

On the other hand, according to the same national intelligence estimate, Turkey’s primary concern was the defence of her frontiers with the Soviets. To this end, she was interested in strengthening her NATO ties, but she also showed increasing interest in protecting her exposed southern flank from Soviet aggression through Iran and the Arab states, and so sought participation of Iran, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan in the Baghdad Pact. Nevertheless, the further development of Arab ties would also strain Turkey’s relations with Israel.⁷³

The international repercussions of the Turco-Iraqi treaty (the Baghdad Pact)

With the signature of the Turco-Iraqi pact, a basis for establishing a regional defence organization in the Middle East existed. However, both the Foreign Office and the State Department were uncertain as to how effective it would be in attracting the cooperation of other Middle Eastern countries and in generally furthering American and British political, economic and military aims in the area. Nevertheless, the Turco-Iraqi pact caused instability in the Middle East by disturbing the precarious balance of interrelationships within the region. In particular, the pact, in the eyes of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, France, Israel and Russia, posed challenges to their prestige and interests in the region.⁷⁴

Although Iraq’s signature of a Western-supported defence pact with Turkey broke down the wall of solid Arab opposition to defence cooperation with the West, it aggravated a sharp cleavage within the Arab world. Egypt saw the move as a challenge both to her leadership in the Arab world and to the concept of Arab unity. The announcement of the Turco-Iraqi pact was taken by Egypt as a direct challenge to her dominant position in the Arab League and as an indication that the United States and the United Kingdom no longer regarded Egypt as the key Arab country. Nasser believed that Western-inspired pacts like the Baghdad Pact were a threat to the security of the Arab states. In his view, they were mainly to serve Western interests in the Middle East. Anthony Eden’s remark that ‘jealousy plays a part in this [Egyptian opposition to the Baghdad Pact] and a frustrated desire to lead the Arab world’ has, it appears, some truth in it. Nasser feared that the pact

might attract Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, and that Iraq, by thus achieving her Fertile Crescent plan, could take the leadership of the Arab world. Nasser thought that the pact would strengthen his arch-rival Nuri Said and isolate Egypt from the rest of the Arab world. He believed that the pact would weaken and divide the Arab League in which Egypt was the dominant power. In sum, it seems that the real reason behind Nasser's opposition was his drive for leadership of the Arab world and domination of the Arab League to serve Egypt's interests.⁷⁵

Together with King Saud, who reacted at least equally strongly because of his bitter rivalry with the Hashemite dynasty in Iraq, Nasser made vigorous efforts, first to prevent and later to offset the Iraqi move. Nasser launched a vigorous propaganda campaign against Iraq and her leader Nuri Said. He, by using 'the Voice of the Arabs' radio, directly appealed to the Arab people to oppose the Baghdad Pact and to reject any inclination by their governments to join the pact. Cairo radio, in its broadcasts of 26 and 27 January, had called upon the Iraqi people to repeat the Portsmouth Treaty riots and cause the rejection of the proposed Turco-Iraqi pact and the downfall of Nuri Said. However, Nasser was unsuccessful in his initial efforts to deploy the rest of the Arab League in condemnation of Iraq and to attract effective internal opposition to the Iraqi government.⁷⁶

Thereafter Nasser attempted to promote a new Arab alignment, based initially on Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria, which aimed at isolating Iraq and reaffirming, under Egyptian leadership, a unified Arab position against defence agreements with the Western powers except on Arab terms. The result was a struggle for influence over the governments and important political elements in the uncommitted countries, with Egypt and Saudi pressures and inducements ranged against those of Iraq and Turkey. On 26 February Major Salah Salim, Egyptian Minister for National Guidance, visited Damascus to discuss an Egyptian proposal for a new defence pact among those Arab states opposed to alliances with non-Arab powers. The plan provided for a unified army under a joint command, a unified foreign policy based on a prohibition of alliances outside of the proposed pact, and a unified economic policy enabling member states to finance the unified army from their own resources. On 2 March the Syrian government accepted Salah Salim's proposals. On the same day, a joint communiqué was issued, which indicated that the two countries had agreed not to join the Turco-Iraqi pact or any similar pact, but to establish a joint Arab defence and economic cooperation pact.⁷⁷ Following his visit to Damascus, Salah Salim visited Saudi Arabia, which subscribed to the Egyptian-Syrian communiqué of 2 March. On the other hand, Lebanon and Jordan refused to accept Egyptian proposals as put forward by Salah Salim. On 6 March the governments of Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia jointly announced that their armed forces would be placed under a unified command. The arrangements reached through these agreements were subsequently known as the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi, or ESS, pact, and were obviously an Egyptian reaction to the Turco-Iraqi pact.⁷⁸

On 5 March the Turkish government issued a statement expressing its concern over the trend of events in Syria and Syria's agreement with Egypt. On 7 March the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires in Damascus, Ismail Soysal, acting on instructions from his government, delivered an oral statement to the Syrian Prime Minister, protesting against what Turkey believed to be the anti-Turkish nature of the Syrian–Egyptian agreement. Six days later, Soysal gave the Syrian Foreign Minister an aide-memoire, which described the proposed Egyptian–Syrian pact as an act hostile to Turkey, and threatened a revision of Turkish policy towards Syria if the latter should persist. The Syrian reply to the Turkish note said that the Syrian government received it with 'little satisfaction' and that its spirit and tone were 'incompatible with the rules in usage in correspondence with independent states'. According to Bowker, on 20 March Menderes told the Syrian Minister in Ankara that Syria and Egypt, by their statements, had begun a war against Turkey and Iraq. He said, 'we are at the end of our patience. If you speak of Alexandretta, we will speak of Aleppo. If you wish to break off relations we are ready to do so.'⁷⁹

Meanwhile, Nasser informed the British government that he would not object to British or Pakistani membership of the Turco-Iraqi pact, if the pact were not extended to other Arab states. Nasser feared that if Jordan and Lebanon joined the Turco-Iraqi pact and Syria soon followed, Egypt would be left to face Israel alone. The Foreign Office assured Nasser that the British government would not seek to extend the pact to other Arab states.⁸⁰ In April 1955 Nasser attended the first non-aligned conference at Bandung in Indonesia. At the conference Nasser made contacts with Indian and communist Chinese leaders, who suggested and then arranged for the subsequent arms deal with the Soviet Union. At Bandung Nasser emerged as a new and prestigious world leader who spoke for the Afro-Asian bloc.⁸¹

On 28 April the Turkish government gave the British and the United States governments a memorandum setting out its views on how to prevent the conclusion of the proposed defence agreement between Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia and urged a dual line of action: to strengthen the Baghdad Pact as soon as possible through bringing Jordan and Lebanon into the pact, and to give support to Syrian opposition elements and impose economic and commercial sanctions against Syria. However, the Foreign Office and the State Department found the Turkish suggestions unacceptable and impracticable.⁸²

Saudi Arabia also opposed the Baghdad Pact because of her dynastic rivalry with Iraq and her suspicions of Anglo-American intentions in the Middle East. According to the national intelligence estimate of the State Department, Saudi Arabia's extreme preoccupation with parochial concerns, particularly her desire to prevent any strengthening of the Hashemite House in Iraq, outweighed broader considerations of strengthening the area as a whole. Saudi Arabia would subsidize elements in Lebanon and Jordan, and especially in Syria, in an effort to prevent defence ties with Iraq. She would try to check the spread of Iraqi influence and to undermine the Baghdad Pact.⁸³

Lebanon and Jordan sought to prevent an open break between Iraq and

Egypt. These countries found themselves in the middle of the Egyptian–Iraqi controversy. According to the national intelligence estimate, both were weak states, whose independence in foreign policy was extremely limited. Jordan’s preoccupation with Israel and the sentiments of the Palestinian refugees in Jordan would make an open stand against Egypt politically hazardous. Both states were also heavily dependent on the West, Jordan through her treaty ties and subsidies with Britain, Lebanon because of her trade patterns and the conviction of her Christian elements. Friendly relations with the West were necessary to these two states’ continued independence and economic survival. Both had accordingly temporized in the Egyptian–Iraqi controversy in the hope that a solution would be found which would preserve some degree of Arab unity while permitting beneficial relations between Arab states and the West.⁸⁴

The national intelligence estimate concluded that Lebanon’s economic needs and the influence of her Moslem population made her fearful of alienating Egypt and she would attempt to stay neutral between Iraq and Egypt. Lebanon had a heavily adverse balance of trade and she had to find markets for her agricultural products. It so happened that Egypt took large quantities of Lebanese agricultural products and that the trade balance with Egypt was heavily in favour of Lebanon. The British Ambassador in Beirut, Andrew Chapman, similarly advised his government that if Lebanon could find sterling markets for her products, and if Britain could help her economy in other ways, it would be easier for Lebanon to align her foreign policy more closely with the West.⁸⁵

The Baghdad Pact also intensified Israeli alarm at the developing pattern of defence arrangements. Israel was concerned that Turkey, the only Middle Eastern state with which she enjoyed friendly relations, had now entered an agreement with one of her Arab enemies which provided for mutual assistance against aggression from any source and which, by the terms of an accompanying exchange of letters, pledged Turkish cooperation in carrying out the United Nations resolutions on Palestine, many of which were quite unacceptable to Israel. From the Israeli point of view, the Baghdad Pact, instead of drawing Iraq into the anti-communist front as the British government said, had drawn Turkey into the anti-Israeli front. Israel was further alarmed when Turkey and Iraq tried to extend the Baghdad Pact to Israel’s neighbours, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan.⁸⁶

On 6 March 1955, at a meeting with the British Ambassador in Tel Aviv, the Israeli Prime Minister, Moshe Sharett, said that the Turkish government, by undertaking to cooperate with Iraq for the implementation of the United Nations resolutions on Palestine, had reinforced Arab determination never to make peace with Israel. He went on to say that the Turkish government had put itself in a position where it was forced to pay the Iraqi price. This price was bound to be at Israel’s expense, and it had taken the form of a gesture which undermined Israel’s position and decreased the faint prospect of peace in the Middle East.⁸⁷

According to the State Department, the Baghdad Pact had intensified a feeling of isolation in Israel and a fear that time was working against her. Since David Ben-Gurion's return to the cabinet as defence minister on 17 February 1955, Israel had adopted a tougher border policy, particularly in the Gaza area. On 28 February Israeli troops attacked an Egyptian army camp in Gaza and killed thirty-eight Egyptians. The Gaza raid was a turning point in Arab-Israeli relations. Nasser abandoned his policy of restraint on the Egyptian-Israeli border and agreed to the organization of fedayeen (commando units) to carry out raids into Israel. He renewed his demand for arms from the United States and the United Kingdom, but they refused. Nasser, under pressure from the discontented Egyptian army, turned to other sources, particularly the Soviet bloc.⁸⁸

Israel would make every effort to dissuade the United States, the United Kingdom and Turkey from strengthening the Arab states. She would also seek Western arms aid and security guarantees in order to counter any increases in Arab strength. While she recognized that the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 provided some deterrent to Arab aggression, she argued increasingly that the declaration offered inadequate guarantees to herself. Israel sought to exploit the apprehensions of the French, who were anxious for a greater voice in the formulation of Western policy in the Middle East, since she had been excluded by Britain and the United States from discussions on Middle East defence after the MEDO proposals. Failing satisfaction of her desire for arms aid and firm security guarantees from the United States and the United Kingdom, Israel looked increasingly to France for military aid. The Gaza raid stimulated the development of a Franco-Israeli rapprochement. Expelled from Syria and Lebanon during the Second World War, and excluded from Anglo-American discussions on Middle East defence between 1950 and 1955, France sought an outlet for a Middle Eastern role. Israel, anxious for arms and refused by London and Washington, provided the opportunity.⁸⁹

For some considerable time, the French were violently opposed to the Baghdad Pact and used all their influence against it. Bowker, in a report to the Foreign Office in February 1955, said that French opposition to the pact had never been a mere expression of opinion. In fact, it was an act of policy. In Syria and Lebanon the French had been conspiring against the pact. French opposition was originally based on the alleged threat to the independence of Syria and Lebanon and on the fear that the two Levant states might be increasingly withdrawn from French influence, as well as on the argument that the pact would create conflict in the Arab world. On 5 February the Turkish Prime Minister had summoned the French Ambassador to express indignation at the French activities in Syria and Lebanon against the proposed Turco-Iraqi pact, and had warned him that if these French activities continued, Turkey would be obliged to reconsider her benevolent attitude towards French policy in North Africa.⁹⁰

Although France insisted that she approved of strengthening the Middle

East against Soviet aggression, her attitude towards the Baghdad Pact in practice was negative. In June 1955 the State Department concluded that the French were offended at being left out of the preparations for the arrangement. They were even more concerned that a British plot was being hatched to establish Iraqi hegemony over Syria and Lebanon, where France maintained special interest. Concern for the maintenance of French influence and interests in Syria and Lebanon was reflected in continuing French covert activity designed to hold Iraqi, Turkish, British and American influence in check.⁹¹ Writing in December 1955, after months of demonstrated French hostility, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the British Ambassador to Paris, noted that the pact was regarded by the French government as having divided, rather than strengthened, the Middle East. It was accused of indirectly opening the way to Soviet influence in Egypt, Syria and Afghanistan. It was also held responsible for increased Arab–Israeli tension, on the grounds that Israeli fears had been provoked by the Egyptian–Syrian–Saudi alliance, which was an indirect consequence of the Baghdad Pact.⁹²

In December 1955 Shuckburgh, in a minute, admitted that the pact seemed momentarily to have divided the Arab world, but, from the Foreign Office point of view, what the pact had done was to distinguish those Arabs who were prepared to cooperate with the West and those who were not. Once they had joined, it would be considerably easier to get them, as a result of their partnership, to scale down their anti-colonial and pro-nationalist propaganda and activities. From Shuckburgh's point of view, the French attitude to the Baghdad Pact was dominated by the following factors:

- a anxiety about Arab support for the nationalists in French North Africa,
- b jealousy of the United Kingdom position in the Middle East and
- c an idea that France had a 'special position' as the ex-mandatory power in Syria and Lebanon.

A combination of (b) and (c) above probably accounted for the French attitude to the pact. They feared that Iraq would take over Syria and Lebanon, and unite the Fertile Crescent. If this happened, French influence in these countries would be replaced by British. Therefore the French government took the line that the Baghdad Pact was a bad thing because, first, it was provocative to the Soviets, and they were inclined to blame it for the recent ills of the Middle East, e.g. the Egyptian–Czechoslovakian arms deal; and, second, it divided the Arab world, i.e. Britain had gone too quickly in trying to associate the Arabs with the West and therefore stood the risk of losing all.⁹³

Yet in a report to the Foreign Office in March 1956, Gladwyn Jebb said that although France was not happy about the Baghdad Pact, as time went by she had accepted it as an accomplished fact and would refrain from criticism. The French government agreed with the British government that France would stop critiquing the Baghdad Pact. In return, the British government would help the French government in its difficulties in North Africa. However,

the French government would continue to invoke their dislike of the Baghdad Pact as an argument to curry favour with Nasser.⁹⁴

The Soviet Union was also opposed to the Baghdad Pact, seeing it as a threat to its security. The Soviets at first tried to prevent the Baghdad Pact and later on discouraged the accession of additional Arab states. They encouraged Egypt to prevent other Arab states from joining the pact and to form an anti-Iraqi pact with them. They also tried to prevent Iran's accession to the pact. When the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement was signed, Nasser had been criticized by the Soviet Union. However, as Nasser came increasingly into conflict with Britain and came out in opposition to the Baghdad Pact, the Soviets began to support him. This also brought about a change in the Soviet attitude to Israel. They now began to give Israel's Arab neighbours full support and encouragement in their hostility to Israel.⁹⁵

As to Indian opposition, in June 1955 the State Department concluded that as long as Nehru believed that 'power blocs' constituted a threat to peace, India's opposition to regional defence groupings would continue. The State Department already knew that Pakistan's ties with the northern tier grouping and accompanying American military aid to Pakistan were especially distasteful to India. However, the State Department noted that India was also opposed to the accession of the Arab states and Iran to the Baghdad Pact, and in particular encouraged Egypt to take a neutralist position.⁹⁶

4 The extension of the Baghdad Pact (1955–6)

The accession of Britain and the signing of the Anglo-Iraqi Special Agreement (5 April 1955)

Ever since the abortive Portsmouth Treaty of 1948 the time had never been propitious to conclude a new Anglo-Iraqi treaty because of Britain's engagement with the Anglo-Egyptian dispute. Also, Iraqi governments had never been sufficiently strong or durable to make further attempts, except in July 1953, when the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Taufiq Suwaidi, informed the British government that the Iraqi government was wondering whether it would be feasible to terminate the 1930 treaty by resorting to a regional defence agreement under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. However, later Iraqi governments had been too beset by parliamentary difficulties to consider the question of treaty revision. The return of Nuri Said to power in August 1954 had marked a decisive step. The termination of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 and cooperation between Iraq and foreign states in conformity with the provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter were one of the main planks of the policy that he had outlined in his letter of 3 August to the King. He considered that it was time for a change, and that the agreements between Turkey and Pakistan, and between Egypt and Britain, had paved the way. However, he had assured the British government that he had no intention to abrogate the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty by unilateral action, and had indicated that he had in mind an arrangement for revision of the treaty similar to the abortive Portsmouth Treaty of 1948.¹

Nuri's ideas with regard to alternative defence arrangements were compatible with the proposals that he had mentioned to Selwyn Lloyd, the minister of state, in London in July 1954, which envisaged a regional defence pact that would provide a framework for future defence cooperation between Iraq and Britain, allowing the 1930 treaty to be terminated. On 15 December 1954, in the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies, Nuri had announced that his government would terminate the treaty with Britain prior to its expiration in 1957, and promised to inform Parliament in February or at the latest in March 1955 about the way in which the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty would be terminated. He added that he had no intention of denouncing the treaty, but would replace it

by something better that would strengthen and not weaken the defence of Iraq and of the Middle East in general.²

Ever since the hint thrown out by Taufiq Suwaidi in July 1953, the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff had been studying the question of revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, and the initiation of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement in July 1954, and the return of Nuri Said to power in August seemed to provide Britain with an opportunity. The British took a positive view of Nuri Said's announcements of 3 August and 15 December regarding the revision of the 1930 treaty, and regarded the internal political situation in Iraq as sufficiently stable. The politicians, who had hitherto remained silent and aloof, in particular Salih Jabr, were now openly speaking in Nuri's favour. Moreover, the Turco-Iraqi pact of 24 February had provided an 'umbrella clause' under which the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty could be replaced, on a new footing, and British military requirements in Iraq secured. Britain accepted it as the best available means of providing for the defence of the Middle East and as a framework for the revision of the 1930 treaty. From the British point of view, these developments presented an opportunity too good to be missed. Wright informed the Foreign Office that there had not for a long time been a political situation in Iraq so favourable to an agreement. Nuri Said was friendly and cooperative. He was in a strong position internally with the Parliament under his thumb. He was ready to give Britain her essential defence requirements in Iraq and anxious to conclude a new treaty as quickly as possible. If Britain missed this occasion, she could not expect it to recur.³

During his numerous conversations with Nuri during the negotiations for the Turco-Iraqi pact, Wright had taken the opportunity of preparing the way for a new agreement informally. By this means a considerable amount of ground had been cleared, and it was decided by the British and Iraqi governments to initiate military talks at Habbaniya on 22 February with the object of exploring the possibilities in detail.⁴ On 22 February Air Marshal Sir Claude Pelly, Commander-in-Chief Middle East Air Force, met Nuri Said at Habbaniya and presented Britain's defence requirements in Iraq, which were: pre-stocking in Iraq of equipment for the use of British land and air forces in war; joint planning, joint training and interlocking of air forces of Iraq and Britain; maintenance in Iraq of British ground staff for the Royal Air Force (RAF) and of British technicians for workshops and so forth; prolonged and virtually continuous training and visits to all airfields in Iraq; staging and overflying facilities; mine prevention in the Shatt al-Arab; and a modern air warning system jointly operated.⁵ Nuri Said accepted all the British requirements, but at the same time he asserted three main principles:

- a Iraq should take command of the RAF bases at Habbaniya and Shaiba, though British ground elements would remain there under subsidiary British command;

- b no RAF squadron should be permanently stationed in Iraq, though frequent visits by squadrons would be welcome; and
- c Iraq should take over responsibility for all guard duties.⁶

The success of these talks opened the way for further discussions on the political side, and on 28 February, after discussions with Wright, Nuri produced a draft agreement which he proposed should be annexed to the Turco-Iraqi pact. The draft was short and enunciated three principles: (a) that the 1930 treaty be terminated by mutual consent, (b) that the bases be handed over to Iraqi command and (c) that cooperation between the two countries in the defence of Iraq should continue on the lines of the military talks. At the same time, in order to avoid the appearance of giving way to British demands to make military preparations in Iraq in advance of any possible war, Nuri suggested that in connection with the installation of radar, air defence and technical help, the Iraqi government should appear to ask for British assistance, which Britain would then agree to give. This was the position when Eden stopped in Baghdad on 4–5 March 1955 on his return from a SEATO meeting in Bangkok. During this visit Eden put the finishing touches to the new agreement with Iraq. Nuri confirmed his agreement with Britain's military appreciations, while Eden drew attention to various points omitted from the Iraqi draft, on which agreement would be necessary before signature could take place. These included the arrangements to be made in case of war, the timing of the withdrawal of RAF squadrons from the bases, and a financial settlement. Detailed arrangements on these matters, as well as on such subjects as pre-stocking and joint training, would have to be set out clearly and precisely in subsidiary documents. To this the Iraqis agreed. The last point in Eden's talks with Nuri concerned the exchange of letters concerning Palestine which had been included in the Turco-Iraqi pact. Eden told Nuri that if Britain acceded to the pact it would be necessary for him to make it clear by a statement that Britain was in no way committed to, or concerned with, paragraph 1 of the letter between Iraq and Turkey mentioning the resolution of the United Nations about Palestine. Nuri made an attempt to convince Eden to show more understanding on this issue, but he failed.⁷

On 14 March Eden put to the British Cabinet the questions of Middle East defence, the Turco-Iraqi pact and the revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. He told the Cabinet that it was in Britain's best interest to accede as soon as possible to the Turco-Iraqi pact, since the pact seemed to offer Britain the best chance of securing a satisfactory defence agreement with Iraq to replace the 1930 treaty. He reviewed the need for a defensive position on the Iraqi frontier to defend the Gulf, and dwelt on the importance of co-operative agreements. He said that there was no immediate prospect of other states joining the Turco-Iraqi pact. The United States was unlikely to accede in the immediate future. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria were strongly opposed to the pact and were trying to organize an opposition camp. Lebanon

and Jordan were more favourably disposed but, owing to Egyptian pressure, were unlikely to accede for some time. Pakistan and Iran were also favourably disposed but had no immediate intention of acceding. Britain's accession to the Turco-Iraqi pact would improve cooperation between Iraq and Turkey, though the pact was a less far-reaching agreement than either NATO or the 1930 treaty with Iraq. Eden reviewed the results of the preliminary talks in February and recommended settling on the favourable terms that Iraq had offered. He said that the termination of the 1930 treaty and its replacement with a new special agreement would satisfy Iraqi nationalist opinion, while preserving British requirements. He added that exchanges of notes would outline the details of Anglo-Iraqi military cooperation, though the special agreement itself would be very general. He asked his colleagues to give him the authority to open negotiations to the following ends:

- a Britain's accession to the Turco-Iraqi pact,
- b the conclusion of a bilateral agreement with Iraq along the lines of the draft that had been reached between the two sides to terminate the 1930 treaty,
- c the conclusion of subsidiary agreements in the form of exchanges of notes or of departmental arrangements to provide for the detailed operation of the agreement at (b) and
- d an arrangement with Iraq whereby the sums paid for the British installations in Iraq should be used to establish a fund for the supply of arms to Iraq.⁸

On the following day the Cabinet approved Eden's recommendations.

On 20 March Wright, in accordance with the decision of the Cabinet, presented Nuri Said with a Foreign Office re-draft, based on Nuri's original draft. The preamble of the Foreign Office counter-draft made the point that the new agreement should not be annexed to the Turco-Iraqi pact as Nuri had suggested, since this might imply that Turkish approval was necessary, but should be a bilateral special agreement as authorized by Articles 1 and 5 of the Turco-Iraqi pact. Nuri accepted the re-draft with very little change.⁹ The discussions between the two sides then turned to the subsidiary exchanges of notes that would clarify the matters that the agreement left vague. A memorandum to accompany the special agreement would spell out in detail the way in which every aspect of the Anglo-Iraqi requirements would be met. With the negotiations on the text of the memorandum spinning out during the last two weeks of March, time was running out for Nuri's promised statement to the Iraqi Parliament, a fact the British used as a trump card. According to Wright, Nuri was in a mood of deep dejection, and did not believe that the text of the memorandum would be completed in time. He was the prisoner of his own timetable. Throughout the negotiations he had tried to persuade the British to leave the points covered by the memorandum for inclusion in subsequent exchanges of letters at departmental level, but the

British refused to accept this, warning that without the memorandum there could be no announcement of a new Anglo-Iraqi agreement.¹⁰

Pressed for time, Nuri finally agreed on the text of the memorandum on the evening of 29 March. The following day the texts of the Special Agreement and the two exchanges of letters and attached memorandum were initialled by Wright and Nuri Said, with Britain retaining all the rights agreed upon on 22 February. On 30 March the Iraqi Parliament approved the Special Agreement with Britain. In order to forestall any criticism, the Members of Parliament were given copies of the Special Agreement only, but not of the memorandum listing the military facilities which Iraq would give to Britain. In a speech to the Parliament, Nuri said that his government had invited the United Kingdom to accede to the Turco-Iraqi pact and to terminate the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. A brief debate then took place, though not enough opportunity was given to those who wished to speak. At the end of the meeting, a unanimous vote was taken approving the government's policy. Half a dozen opponents had left the Chamber before the vote.¹¹

On the same day, Eden informed the House of Commons that his government had decided to accede to the Turco-Iraqi pact and to sign a special agreement with Iraq for mutual defence cooperation under Article 1 of the Turco-Iraqi pact. He added that his government's intention was to deposit its instrument of accession on 5 April, thus bringing the agreement and its subsidiary exchanges of notes into force on that date. He also made it clear that in acceding to the Turco-Iraqi pact, his government was not associating itself with the letters exchanged at the time of its signature between the Turkish and Iraqi prime ministers on the subject of Palestine. He told the House of Commons that the Turco-Iraqi pact would be in the interest of all the states in the Middle East, including Israel, and that Britain's purpose in acceding to the pact was to strengthen her own influence and voice in the Middle East.¹²

The Anglo-Iraqi Special Agreement was finally signed by Nuri Said and Michael Wright on 4 April, and on the following day the agreement came into effect with Britain's accession to the Turco-Iraqi pact, which was now termed the Baghdad Pact. Also on 5 April Churchill resigned, and was succeeded by Eden as Prime Minister; Harold Macmillan assumed Eden's former position as Foreign Secretary. The exchange of notes that accompanied the agreement specified in detail the obligations of each party. Although Britain agreed to return her military bases at Habbaniya and Shaiba to Iraq, she retained military facilities in Iraq no less than those in the 1930 Treaty.¹³ On 4 April in the House of Commons, Eden said,

The goal which we seek from the Baghdad Pact is very simple. By our adherence, we have consolidated our influence and raised our voice in the Middle East. Britain's adherence to the Baghdad Pact provides her with continued interference in the affairs of the Middle East.

Eden added that 'the object of the Baghdad Pact is to direct the attention of both sides to something other than Israel. And this pact would leave [Israel] in security and stability.' At the same meeting, Anthony Nutting, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, said that 'we are working to have other countries in the Middle East join this agreement' (i.e. the Turco-Iraqi pact). He also said that the Baghdad Pact would achieve security for the Middle Eastern countries including Israel, and that the Baghdad Pact did not conflict with the interests of Israel.¹⁴

On 12 April however, the Israeli Prime Minister, Moshe Sharett, told the British Ambassador in Tel Aviv that the Turco-Iraqi pact, by excluding Israel, had 'an unbalancing effect on Israel's status within the region . . . [and with] Britain's accession . . . has aggravated that disequilibrium'.¹⁵ On 20 April the Foreign Office informed the Israeli government that under the new treaty Iraq's strategic planning, training and equipment would be closely bound up with general defence plans of the northern tier countries as a whole, including Britain, and that this would make it more difficult for Iraq to use her armed forces against Israel.¹⁶

The Special Agreement came into force on the date on which Britain became a party to the Baghdad Pact, and it would remain in force so long as both Iraq and Britain were parties to that pact. The Turco-Iraqi pact came into force on 15 April and would therefore, in accordance with its Article 7, remain in force in the first place until 15 April 1960. The Special Agreement would remain in force for the same period, provided both Iraq and Britain remained parties to the Baghdad Pact.¹⁷ The duration of the Special Agreement accordingly depended upon the duration of the Baghdad Pact. If the Baghdad Pact became unpopular or a dead letter the Special Agreement could perish with it. Wright therefore proposed to lay emphasis on the Baghdad Pact rather than on the Special Agreement, since the durability of the Special Agreement depended on the durability, the growth and the enlargement of the Baghdad Pact. For Britain, advocating and expanding the Baghdad Pact was therefore an essential factor in maintaining her own Special Agreement with Iraq.¹⁸

According to Wright, the Special Agreement was of value to the British Commonwealth and to NATO as well as to Turkey in particular. In his view, as expressed to the new Foreign Secretary, Macmillan, the agreement embodied the best terms Britain could expect to obtain, especially in view of the less favourable Anglo-Egyptian settlement of 1954. That it did so was largely due to the foresight and breadth of vision of Nuri. He had in the course of the last eight months so shaped the internal situation of Iraq, though by not democratic methods, as to make his views and policy acceptable. He had sought the means to exploit the realities of the situation as he saw it, in the manner most beneficial to Iraq. According to Wright, Nuri Said realized that in the event of a general war Iraq would inevitably be involved in hostilities. He knew that a Russian occupation would be a disaster for Iraq or, as Wright expressed it in the most cynical terms, for the class and way of life which he

represented. By aligning Iraq with the West, Nuri had, in his view, obtained the best possible chance of defence against Soviet aggression, while demanding as the price of his cooperation the maximum possible help from Britain (and also, he hoped, from the United States) in strengthening and preparing the Iraqi armed forces. Wright warned London, however, that although the new agreements were beneficial to Iraq and Britain, Britain could have no certainty that they would prove to be durable. The future of the agreements would depend on Nuri, and a future disappearance of Nuri from the political scene would certainly lessen the impetus to cooperation between the two sides. Wright warned that Nuri might be succeeded by weaker men, who might either allow the Special Agreement to run its five years and then denounce it, together with the Turco-Iraqi pact, or under pressure from the left and nationalist opinion at home, in Syria and in Egypt, seek to denounce the Special Agreement in its mid-term or frustrate its purposes. The future of the Special Agreement, as of the Turco-Iraqi pact, was therefore far from automatically assured. Much, in Wright's view, would depend on the continuing cordiality of Britain's day-to-day relations with succeeding Iraqi governments, and in turn this would depend on the ability of the Iraqi leaders to find public acceptance of their policies. The Iraqi leaders and the Iraqi people should be convinced that their general interest lay in observing and prolonging the pact and the Special Agreement, and Britain must bend her efforts to make it appear that both were worthwhile. Britain must not let the Turco-Iraqi pact lose momentum and must also ensure that Iraq was receiving the benefits of association with Britain, in particular aid in building up her armed forces. Furthermore, Britain must aim at the gradual absorption into the pact of other Arab states. Wright ended his comments by saying that 'Iraq has now become a stone in the wall of defence against Soviet aggression, but she is still a loose stone, needing both cementing into position and the support of other stones before the wall can be sound'.¹⁹

The accession of Pakistan (23 September 1955)

The only non-Arab country to immediately consider joining the Turco-Iraqi pact was Pakistan. In his memoirs, General Mohammad Ayub Khan, former Commander in Chief of the Pakistani Army, explained Pakistan's reasons for wishing to join the Baghdad Pact as follows:

The crux of the problem from the very beginning was the Indian attitude of hostility towards [Pakistan]. We had to look for allies to secure our position. Then there was the strong desire which has always existed in Pakistan that we should forge closer relations with our neighbours in the Middle East and particularly with other Muslim countries, not only because of the existence of common bonds of faith but because we have an identity of attitudes and values and we share the same historical experience and face similar problems. The American interest in the pact

was well known; they wanted to establish a counterpoise to communism in the Middle East. It was this fear of communism that had impelled [the Western powers] to help the Muslim World, [which] occupied an area which was vital strategically and economically and that was the reason why the United States and other Western countries thought it worth their while to befriend the Muslims. The Muslim World itself was at that time emerging from the domination of Western powers. It needed material assistance and also time and the technical know-how to develop its human and material resources. There was no reason why we should not have taken advantage of the opportunity. For us, our own needs for development were paramount and that was the reason we [wanted] to join [the Baghdad Pact].²⁰

According to Ayub Khan, another reason for Pakistan joining the Baghdad Pact was the appreciation that the Middle East was a vulnerable area, containing vast natural resources which could become a source of conflict between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. Once such a conflict started, argued Ayub Khan, it would spread to Pakistan's borders and seriously endanger her security. Therefore it was natural for Pakistan to be interested in associating with any arrangement for the defence and security of the Middle East. Through the Baghdad Pact, Pakistan hoped that she would get a certain measure of protection against Indian designs in the Middle East, and that the countries in the region would get to know her problems and understand more closely the threat from India to which she was exposed. Through this process, Ayub Khan added, Pakistan would be able to get sympathy and support against the Indian threat.²¹

In reality, Pakistan was somewhat hesitant about joining the Baghdad Pact. She first wished to see other Arab states accede to the pact, and she was also concerned at the effect which accession would have on her relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria. This attitude, however, did not last long, since the United States and the United Kingdom pressed her to accede to the pact. The United States exerted as much pressure as it was able on the Pakistani government, for it wished to stress the northern tier aspect of the pact.²² From the American point of view, first, Pakistan's accession to the Baghdad Pact would maintain the momentum of the movement for strengthening Middle East defence. Second, after Pakistan's accession, the pact would include four members, and under the terms of the pact, this would make possible the establishment of a council, which would implement the pact's provisions. Third, with Pakistan's membership, participation would seem more attractive to Iran.²³

The British view, as recorded in an aide-memoire handed to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali, by the UK High Commissioner in Karachi on 22 March, was that through the accession of Pakistan the Turco-Iraqi pact could be developed into an effective organization for the defence of the Middle East. Pakistan's accession could also encourage other Middle East

states in the same direction. Moreover, Pakistan's accession would bring into being, under Article 6 of the pact, the permanent council, which would provide a useful instrument for the coordination of the defence efforts of the parties to the pact. Also, the Foreign Office believed that if more countries of the area joined the Baghdad Pact and gave it a more Asian and less Western composition, the United States would be more likely to accede.²⁴

Meanwhile, Turkey and Iraq were working hard to bring Pakistan into the pact, though they had nothing to offer to Pakistan apart from a warm welcome. In March 1955 the Turkish government suggested to the Iraqi government that they should together tell the Pakistani government that whenever Pakistan felt inclined to accede to the Baghdad Pact she would be warmly welcomed. The Iraqi government accepted the Turkish suggestion. Meanwhile, the Foreign Office informed the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Pakistan that the British government would warmly welcome the accession of Pakistan to the Baghdad Pact.²⁵

On 30 March the Turkish Ambassador and the Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires in Karachi presented a joint invitation from their governments to the Pakistani government to accede to the Turco-Iraqi pact. The Pakistani Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali, replied that he was personally in favour of Pakistan joining the pact, but it was a question for the Cabinet, which had been hesitant due to fear that the Baghdad Pact without the United States would be ineffective and British-dominated. He added that he would consider the question of timing very carefully, and suggested that Pakistan might decide not to join until another Middle East country had done so. In particular, he suggested that Iran should accede before Pakistan, or perhaps Iran and Pakistan might accede at the same time.²⁶

In May when Hildreth, the American Ambassador in Karachi, asked Mohammed Ali whether the reason for delay in joining the Baghdad Pact was a desire not annoy Egypt and Saudi Arabia at a time when those countries might be effective in mediating the Pakistani-Afghan dispute, the latter replied that this was no concern, and that the reason for delay in the first instance had been pressure of internal business. He added that it was also necessary to consult General Ayub, who had advised the Cabinet against Pakistan's accession to the Baghdad Pact unless the United States joined. According to Mohammed Ali, General Ayub had told the cabinet that unless the United States came into the Baghdad Pact and made materials available, the protection of Pakistan started by the Turco-Pakistani Agreement would not be effective. Until the United States joined the Baghdad Pact, it would be shadow and not substance. The Pakistani government should make clear that it was in favour of joining the Baghdad Pact and in sympathy with its principles and objectives, but it should use its refusal to join the pact as a means of putting pressure on the United States to make up its mind about what it was going to do in the Middle East.²⁷

This analysis of Pakistan's stance was confirmed by the UK High Commissioner, who suspected that the main motive underlying the stiffening of

Pakistan's attitude was her desire to speed up and, if possible, increase deliveries of American military aid. Before joining the Baghdad Pact, Pakistan hoped to secure firm military commitments from the United States. In a press interview on 11 June the Pakistani Prime Minister said that the rate of flow of American military aid to Pakistan 'could and should have been faster'. In London, the Foreign Office concluded that the Pakistani government had at last come into the open and there was now no prospect of Britain's pressing them to join the pact. From the Foreign Office point of view, the Pakistani attitude justified their view that the Baghdad Pact was losing momentum because of the negative attitude adopted by the United States. The Foreign Office thought that the Pakistani attitude, while disappointing, gave them further ammunition to try and get the United States to take a more positive attitude towards the Baghdad Pact.²⁸

Meanwhile, however, the State Department had informed the Pakistani government that American aid to Middle East countries would in future be based on the development of plans for regional defence, rather than on separate country-by-country estimates of individual defence needs. This would be the same whether or not the United States became a member of the Baghdad Pact, and the Pakistani government should not be influenced in its decision regarding accession to the pact by the expectation that United States membership or non-membership in the pact would influence the amount of aid provided to Pakistan. Although Pakistan's accession to the Baghdad Pact was desirable from a political point of view, the United States did not want to pay or promise a high price for such accession. It did not want to exert pressure or to hold forth special inducements. It was a matter which Pakistan must decide entirely for herself. As regards United States accession, the State Department added that they were not contemplating it at the moment, due partly to the uncertain relations among Arab states and the United States' desire to effect an improvement in general Middle Eastern stability. However, the State Department did not exclude the possibility of American accession at a later stage, and the United States would continue to encourage Pakistan to accede to the Turco-Iraqi pact.²⁹

In Pakistan, differences over Pakistan's accession to the Baghdad Pact continued, and the cabinet decided to send General Ayub to Turkey to find out what Pakistan's position would be if she acceded to the Turco-Iraqi pact. On 22 June General Ayub arrived in Ankara. His talks with the Turkish authorities immediately became tripartite, with the participation of Nuri Said, who was in Ankara at that time for an official visit. According to Bowker's information, General Ayub had come to Ankara convinced that the pact could never be an effective instrument for Middle East defence until the United States acceded, and that it was useless for Pakistan to accede first. He was also apprehensive about taking on new commitments, in view of Pakistan's limited military resources and her internal and external preoccupations, and he was suspicious of designs which Iraq, in particular, was thought to have on the use of Pakistani forces in the event of war. However, Menderes and

Nuri had spoken to Ayub in their most convincing form and given him clear and convincing answers to his questions. They had said that the pact in itself contained no new commitments, and amounted to little more than a reaffirmation of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. It was a framework, and it was up to the contracting parties, under Articles 1 and 2, to decide what to put into it. They had argued that when Pakistan acceded, it would be possible to set up the permanent council anticipated under Article 6, which would provide the appropriate means of discussing the problems which were worrying General Ayub. Nuri Said had pointed out that he had himself made it clear at the time of the conclusion of the Turco-Iraqi pact that he did not contemplate a situation in which Iraqi armed forces would be called upon to fight outside Iraq's borders. In reply to a specific enquiry by General Ayub about what Pakistan's position would be under the pact if Turkey became involved in war as a member of NATO, Menderes had said that Pakistan's position would not be any different from what it was, but there should be an understanding among all parties to the pact to confer and see what help they could bring to each other in the event of war. Menderes had also reassured General Ayub about the American attitude to the northern tier concept and the Baghdad Pact, pointing out that continued American support was assured, as was manifested by the military aid which the United States was already giving to Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan, though for various reasons its own accession to the pact could not take place at once. In the end, Bowker reported, General Ayub had accepted the arguments put to him by Menderes and Nuri Said in favour of Pakistan's accession without further delay, and had admitted that Pakistan's hesitation in acceding had been due not to the politicians but to himself, who, as a soldier, had wished to know clearly beforehand what commitments Pakistan would be taking on.³⁰

As a result of his talks, General Ayub, on 28 June sent a telegram to Karachi recommending prompt Pakistani accession to the Turco-Iraqi pact. Two days later, on 30 June, the Pakistani Cabinet decided to accede to the pact, subject to the following reservations:

- a Pakistan's obligations under the pact would be limited to the case of direct aggression against Turkey or Iraq, i.e. if Turkey as a member of NATO was drawn into a war there would be no obligation on Pakistan to come to Turkey's assistance;
- b Pakistan would not be able to give greater assistance than her military potential allowed and would not be able to accept any military commitment which would have the effect of weakening her capacity for defending her own territory.³¹

On 1 July 1955 the Pakistani Prime Minister announced in a radio broadcast Pakistan's decision to accede to the pact, without making any reference to the reservations. Before making his announcement, he informed the representatives of Turkey, Iraq, the US and the UK that he would not refer to the

reservations in his broadcast, but emphasized that there was to be no misunderstanding in the minds of the four governments.³²

The governments of Turkey, Iraq and Britain did not object to the Pakistani reservations which, although in their view unnecessary, were understandable, but they did object to the Pakistani proposal to embody them in a formal document attached to Pakistan's instrument of accession, because this document might be held to constitute an amendment to the pact and thus detract from it.³³ Nuri Birgi, the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Turkish Foreign Affairs, told the British Ambassador in Ankara that the Turkish government considered that a formal reaffirmation of the reservations at the time of Pakistan's accession would lead to serious difficulties. Instructions had therefore been sent on 22 July to the Turkish Ambassador in Karachi to see the Pakistani Prime Minister and restate the Turkish government's view that the reservations were unnecessary, since it was clearly understood that Pakistan, under the pact, would only be committed in the event of an attack on Iraq or Turkey. The Ambassador was also instructed to point out that as regards the first reservation, the Turco-Iraqi pact contained no commitment whatever as regards NATO, and that as regards the second, accession would put no obligation whatever on Pakistan as regards deployment of her military forces, and that any commitment in that respect could only result from a subsequent agreement between Pakistan and the other signatories. According to the Turkish government, such reservations were implicit, but to make them explicit could create serious difficulties in developing the pact in the future. The Ambassador was instructed to point out that no such written reservations had been sought by Turkey or Iraq in concluding the pact, though certain mutually understood limitations affected each of them.³⁴

The British government had also sent instructions to its High Commissioner in Karachi, to urge the Pakistani government to refrain from putting forward reservations formally at the time of accession. Britain argued that the reservations were not necessary in view of the wide drafting of the Turco-Iraqi pact, adherence to which would not entail the commitment which Pakistan seemed to fear. A commitment with regard to actual troop dispositions would only come about as a result of the signing of special agreements with the parties, as Britain herself had done with Iraq. Britain pointed out that if, on the other hand, the Pakistani Prime Minister felt that he must calm public or parliamentary opinion in Pakistan, there would be no objection to his pointing out publicly that accession would not entail a commitment to NATO or specific commitments about the positioning of troops, which would come about only as a result of signing special agreements.³⁵

Pakistan also intended to associate herself with the exchange of letters between Turkey and Iraq on the United Nations resolutions regarding Palestine. The Turkish government accepted the Pakistani proposal for an exchange of letters with Iraq regarding Palestine as necessary from the Pakistani point of view for same reasons as the Turco-Iraqi exchange. The British government, understandably, did not like the idea, and tried to persuade the

Pakistani government to dissociate itself from the exchange of letters and to remain silent on this point when they acceded to the pact. The British tried to secure American support, since the Americans, too, did not like the idea of Pakistan associating herself with the exchange of letters.³⁶

However, when the High Commissioner reiterated to Rahim, the Secretary-General of the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the reasons why the British government would prefer Pakistan not to subscribe to the exchange of letters on Palestine, Rahim replied that while he understood the British position, it was virtually impossible for Pakistan to refrain from subscribing to the exchange of letters, since it would be interpreted as a pointed and deliberate abstention from Moslem solidarity. Neither the Pakistani public nor the governments and peoples of Turkey and Iraq would understand this. Nor, despite the strong pressure from the British, Turkish and Iraqi representatives, would the Pakistani government drop its two reservations to the pact. At the end of July the UK High Commissioner in Pakistan warned his government that it would be a mistake to press the Pakistanis further on this point, because the Pakistani Cabinet had decided to accede to the Turco-Iraqi pact only after a fairly stiff tussle among its members, and the two reservations had been introduced for the sake of unity among its members. There were thus probably some ministers who still had residual doubts, and further pressure would almost certainly lead to further dissension in the Cabinet, and very likely provide an opening for those who wished to hold up Pakistan's actual accession.³⁷

By 22 August the Foreign Office had agreed that further attempts to persuade the Pakistanis to drop the idea of recording reservations in writing would be dangerous, as had the Turkish government. In September, the governments of the United Kingdom, Turkey and Iraq finally agreed that they would accept, subsequent to the deposit of the instrument of Pakistan's accession to the Baghdad Pact, a letter from the Pakistani government, which would set forth certain observations by Pakistan on her obligations under the pact. At Turkey's suggestion, it was agreed that the Pakistani government should hand a copy of its letter of reservations to the representatives of the three members of the Baghdad Pact in Karachi, whose governments would in turn merely acknowledge receipt. On these terms, Pakistan formally acceded to the Turco-Iraqi pact on 23 September. With this, the number of states of the Turco-Iraqi pact amounted to four, the number required for the establishment of the ministerial council provided for in Article 6 of the pact.³⁸

In the view of the State Department, Pakistan's accession to the Baghdad Pact was primarily motivated by hopes of ensuring continued and, if possible, increased American military aid, and strengthening her military position vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan. Soon after acceding to the Baghdad Pact, Pakistan's attention was diverted from Middle East defence questions to her immediate and pressing political and economic problems and to her strained relations with India and Afghanistan. In sum, Pakistan saw the Baghdad Pact as a means to receive more American military aid and strengthen her position

against India. However, the State Department considered that Pakistan's accession to the pact served to give renewed momentum to the northern tier concept. The State Department also considered that Iranian accession, which would complete the northern tier, would give further impetus, and it hoped that this could take place within the next six to twelve months. The United States would take such steps as it could, including a modest increase in military assistance, to encourage Iran to join but it would not use pressure to induce Iran to join the pact.³⁹

The accession of Iran (3 November 1955)

Ever since the Turco-Iraqi pact had been signed, the Shah of Iran had been saying that he was in favour of joining the pact, though neither he nor his government thought that the time was ripe. They had taken the line that they would like to join 'on a basis of equality', i.e. when the Iranian armed forces were stronger and they had something to contribute. The Shah felt that Iran must have armed forces which were not inferior in equipment or training to those of Turkey and Pakistan, and were capable of taking their place in the line as equals with other participants. He also had to take account of internal stability and of possible Soviet reactions. To the Shah, Iran's national security was inseparable from domestic security, and domestic security was in turn intertwined with the security of his regime. Before acceding to the pact, he insisted on knowing what Iran would get out of the pact. To the British, it seemed clear that the Shah would not take Iran into the pact unless he was first assured of substantial military and economic benefits, and the Iranians' apparent hesitations about the Baghdad Pact were obviously an attempt to drive up the price of their accession. In Iranian eyes, the Foreign Office believed, a defence association with the West meant a gift of arms, the strengthening of the Iranian armed forces and an undertaking to defend Iran if she was attacked, but it did not mean that Iran would give any of her associates bases or other facilities.⁴⁰

In March 1955 the Shah had told Sir Roger Stevens, the British Ambassador to Tehran, that he was in no hurry to accede to the Turco-Iraqi pact. He was anxious, first of all, to have public opinion fully behind his government, and to set up social, economic and administrative reforms. He wished to find out what help would be forthcoming from Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan, and then to obtain commitments from the United States and the United Kingdom regarding the defence of Iran, which would enable him to feel strong enough to join the Turco-Iraqi pact.⁴¹ In the same month, the Iranian Foreign Minister told Stevens that he was worried about the timing of Iran's accession, particularly in relation to the pending financial and frontier agreement with Russia. He wished to see this agreement ratified by the Russians first. He was also nervous about the possibility of the effects on public opinion if the Russians resorted to sabotage in Iran, since, he claimed, neutralist feeling in Iran was strong. In Iran, he claimed, there was very little

enthusiasm, and considerable potential opposition, to Iran's accession to the Turco-Iraqi pact at a time when there was much talk of an easing of tension abroad and the need for economic and social development at home.⁴²

The Foreign Office suspected that the Shah would welcome pressure on him to join the Baghdad Pact. This might be because of his natural indecision, or he might think that pressure from Britain could later be pointed to either as a reason for more military and economic aid or as an excuse, if reaction, internal or external, to Iran's accession to the pact were sharper than he had expected. He could then put all blame on the Western advice which had led to premature accession to the Baghdad Pact. For these reasons, the Foreign Office decided that the Shah must be given no reason to suppose that Britain was pressing him to take a decision for which the responsibility must lie with Iran herself.⁴³ The Foreign Office saw other good reasons for delay. Immediate Iranian accession to the pact, Shuckburgh noted, would have little if any military advantage. The Iranian armed forces were quite incapable of putting up any resistance to a Russian attack; even if they were, he thought, the civil administration would collapse as a result of such an attack and the Shah would possibly flee the country. Moreover, Iran might not give her Allies military bases or facilities for pre-stocking. Iranian signature of the pact would therefore do little or nothing to close the gap between Iraq and Pakistan. Nor did Shuckburgh expect any political gain in Iran itself. Although the Shah could probably keep opposition within bounds, most Iranians were neutrals at heart, who would be seriously frightened by Russian threats and would blame the West. The only advantage would be to maintain the political momentum of the pact, but this was already being done by Pakistan. Iranian accession might enhance the prestige of the pact and make it look less like a Western organization, and thus more attractive to those countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and Syria whose participation would be of genuine political value. However, it was doubtful if Iran's accession would turn the scale in any of those countries. In sum, British policy was, while continuing to favour Iranian accession, not to press for it, not to pay any high price for it and, in particular, not to offer Iran direct military and economic commitments. The Americans were broadly of the same mind, though they were keen to see Iran join the Baghdad Pact on the principle that this would underline the northern tier aspect of the pact.⁴⁴

In March 1955 the Shah proposed high-level military staff talks between Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, the US and the UK. On instructions from the Shah, the Iranian Chief of Staff, on 15 March, informed the British Military Attaché in Tehran that the Iranian government wished to propose immediate staff talks with the northern tier countries (i.e. Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan), the US and the UK. Similar approaches were made to the other military attachés concerned. The object of the talks, the Iranians explained, would be to tie up the defence of Iran and her neighbours, as a preliminary to reaching a decision on whether or not it was desirable for Iran to accede to the Turco-Iraqi pact.⁴⁵ The British and the Turkish governments were agreed that the

Shah's proposal for high-level staff talks must be considered in relation to the question of Iranian accession to the Turco-Iraqi pact. To have staff talks before Iran acceded to the pact would be to put the cart before the horse, and might considerably delay Iran's accession. The Foreign Office suspected that the Shah regarded the talks as an alternative to accession to the pact; his idea was to get problems of area defence discussed before he committed himself politically. This seemed to be dangerous, for if staff talks were held in advance of political defence arrangements, the officers participating might well come under pressure to discuss commitments for which there was no political authority. More concretely, it seemed clear that if the US and the UK were to participate they would be faced with requests for commitments to defend Iran and for military and economic aid as prior conditions to Iranian entry into the pact. The Foreign Office concluded that it would not be desirable for the UK to participate in such talks.⁴⁶

The State Department shared the British view that it would be undesirable for British or American representatives to participate in the proposed staff talks. It was agreed that neither the UK nor the US should participate in the proposed talks since, if they did, they would be faced with requests for commitments to defend Iran and for military and economic aid as prior conditions to Iranian accession to the Turco-Iraqi pact.⁴⁷

Meanwhile, in their efforts to prevent Iran from joining the Baghdad Pact, the Russians were using a combination of the carrot and the stick, as yet with the emphasis more on the former. They had proceeded rapidly to the ratification of the Soviet–Iranian Frontier and Financial Agreement in May 1955, and were making the most of their 'generosity' in that context. At the same time they were making frequent references to their 1921 and 1927 treaties with Iran since, under the 1921 treaty, Russian troops were entitled to enter Iran if a foreign power threatened the frontiers of Russia. From the British point of view, all these were threatening references, but they had been no more than hints and there had been no specific threats. All in all, it seemed to the British government a very mild reaction to increasing talk of Iranian accession to the Baghdad Pact. Therefore, in the British view, it seemed unlikely that Iran's accession would provoke a Russian attack or serious disturbances.⁴⁸

At the end of May the Iranian, Iraqi and Turkish governments agreed to hold the staff talks in Baghdad. Nuri Said, who wished to see Iran join the pact as soon as possible, persuaded the British government to send an observer, but not until mid-June did the State Department agree to follow suit. The State Department was led to this change of intention by rumours circulating in the Middle East, to the effect that the US was becoming less enthusiastic about the northern tier concept and the Turco-Iraqi pact, and its decision to send an observer was made in order to show willingness, at least as far as the governments of the four northern tier countries were concerned. This American decision had also encouraged Pakistan to declare on 1 July her decision to accede to the Turco-Iraqi pact.⁴⁹

Meanwhile, at the Anglo-American politico-military discussions in Washington on 23–4 June, Sir Roger Makins, the British Ambassador to the United States, said that although Iranian accession to the Baghdad Pact was desirable, its timing should be left entirely to the Iranians. Makins said that political advantages would flow from Iranian accession, particularly in giving the pact greater area coloration and in influencing the Arabs, but militarily the pact would not gain much from Iranian accession. He stated that Britain wanted to see Iran's armed forces considerably strengthened before she got involved in extensive military commitments in Iran. Moreover, although the prospect of Iranian accession would not cause Soviet military action, the Soviets might try to frighten Iran and might cause the Shah to back away from the pact. On 11 August with regard to Iranian accession, Herbert Hoover, the Under-Secretary of State, told Makins that the United States attached considerable importance, 'perhaps more than [Britain]', to Iran's role in the northern tier and in the Middle East generally. The United States' estimates of Iran's importance rested largely on four considerations. First, Iran was the only country in the Middle East besides Turkey and Afghanistan that had a common frontier with the Soviet Union. Second, the northern tier concept could not materialize until Iran became a participant in the Baghdad Pact. Third, the most suitable defence line in the Middle East lay in Iran. Fourth, the availability of Iranian oil for the free world was very important for the United States. The United States hoped that Iran would join the Baghdad Pact within the next six to twelve months. However, the United States did not intend to use pressure to induce Iran to join the pact. Makins replied that Britain did not rate Iran any less important than did the United States. Britain fully recognized the importance of Iran's geographical position and her oil. The difference between the American and British views on Iran regarded what Iran was capable of doing administratively and militarily. Britain appraised Iran's ability to take on tasks and to carry them through at a somewhat lower level than did the United States. Makins said that from a military point of view Iran's participation in the pact would, in effect, add considerable liabilities to the pact without compensating assets. Makins added that Iran could not contribute effective forces to area defences at this time and that Britain was unable to increase her own military forces. On the other hand, there were considerable political benefits to be obtained by Iranian membership in the pact. Therefore, while welcoming Iranian membership, Britain had not pressed the point and did not foresee giving a special commitment at this time.⁵⁰

The northern tier staff talks between Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan, with British and American observers, were held in Baghdad and Habbaniya between 9 and 14 August 1955. The talks, the British observer Brigadier T. E. Williams reported, achieved at least a step in the right direction, although the Iranian delegation had made a very bad impression on all other participants by their most elementary and unconvincing presentation of their case. However, although the Iranian concept of national defence was originally to meet the

Russian attack in the north along the Elburz mountains line, as a result of the talks, Iran finally accepted the Zagros mountains defence line, which meant falling back almost to the Iraqi frontier in the west and defending only the oilfields and a strip of Iranian territory up to 150 miles wide in the south-west.⁵¹

For Iran, the northern tier staff talks were satisfactory in that all participants recognized Iran's vital strategic position. The Shah wanted to know what concrete military and economic aid could be made available to Iran, arguing that without it there would be no point in Iran's accession to the Turco-Iraqi pact, especially in view of the difficulties it might cause with Russia. In September the Shah presented to Britain and the US his demands for military and economic aid, and requested a guarantee from both countries to come to Iran's support if she was attacked by Russia. He also wanted recognition of Iranian sovereignty over Bahrain.⁵²

The British government rejected the Shah's demands and advised him to avoid any kind of blackmailing tactics. The British position was still that they would welcome Iran's accession to the Turco-Iraqi pact, but were not prepared to press for it nor to pay any high price in the way of military or economic aid or of specific undertakings to defend Iran against Russian attack. They would not even discuss Bahrain in this connection. They would leave the timing of accession to Iran herself, and would not urge her to change her mind if she wished to delay. From the British point of view, the only advantage of Iran's accession to the Baghdad Pact would be the psychological effect in the Middle East of so traditional a neutral as Iran throwing in her lot with the West. Militarily, Iran had no contribution to make, and indeed might be a liability. However, Britain did not want to discourage Iran if she genuinely wished to play her part in the Middle East defence organization. The US also rejected the specific requests which the Iranian government had made as their price for joining the pact, and informed the Iranian government that it would not make any specific commitments beyond those already made. The State Department warned that if Iran attempted to link the Bahrain question with Middle East defence, it might well provide Iran's internal enemies with a new vehicle for launching a move to unseat the Iranian government and start a chain reaction of dubious claims involving other Iranian frontiers. Such action would not only make a Middle East defence pact impossible, but also might well impede continuation of American aid programmes in Iran.⁵³

Meanwhile, Turkey and Iraq were doing all they could to bring Iran into the pact. In September 1955 Turkish President Bayar and Foreign Minister Zorlu visited Iran. According to Stevens, the British Ambassador to Iran, they exerted pressure on the Shah to join the pact, arguing that Iran should do as Turkey had done, i.e. take the leap of joining a Western defence arrangement without preliminary conditions about military and economic assistance, and then wait for the assistance to follow. Zorlu, as an inducement to the Iranians, made the 'audacious' suggestion that the first meeting of the

pact council might be held in Tehran if the Iranian government joined immediately.⁵⁴ The Turkish visit to Tehran was successful in persuading the Iranian government to join the Baghdad Pact without first bargaining for a high price. The Shah indicated that he would be prepared to announce Iranian accession if he could be told in advance that both Britain and the US, immediately after such accession, would make statements welcoming Iran's accession and guaranteeing (or at least expressing a vital interest in) Iranian territorial integrity. In the case of any American declaration he also wanted some phrase to the effect that the US would try their best to provide economic and financial support.⁵⁵

The Turkish government was convinced that it had brought the Iranian government to the sticking point, and that one more push was needed, though only Britain and the US could give it. However, it wished to avoid giving an impression that Iran's accession had come about under the pressure of the Turkish visit to Iran and, together with Iraq, pressed Britain and the US to make some declaration which the Iranian government could use with its Parliament and public opinion to show that it had taken the right step. In the Turkish government's view, it was unnecessary that this declaration should contain even general commitments or promises. It thought that a repetition of the Bevin declaration of 1950 in rather different terms would be adequate.⁵⁶

By the first week of October the British policy, of not putting pressure on Iran to accede to the Turco-Iraqi pact immediately, had changed sharply for two reasons. First, the British knew from secret sources that the Russians had made representations to the Iranian government against their accession to the pact, and that the Iranian government had replied in forceful terms. Second, there was the Soviet action in Egypt, represented by the Egyptian arms deal with Czechoslovakia, which was announced on 27 September 1955.⁵⁷ According to Trevelyan, the British Ambassador to Cairo, fear of an Israeli attack following the Gaza incident of 28 February had caused Nasser to redouble his efforts to increase the armament of the Egyptian forces. By the middle of the year he had been convinced that he would not get substantial quantities of arms from the United States and the United Kingdom. Meanwhile, the Soviets had been tempting him with attractive offers of substantial quantities of arms, and by the end of August the Egyptian government had decided to accept the Soviet offers. A contract was signed in the middle of September with the Czechoslovak government, deputed by the Soviet government, which assured the Egyptians of a plentiful supply of fighter and bomber aircraft, medium and heavy tanks and artillery, with some light naval craft and submarines. According to Trevelyan, this transaction had helped Nasser to regain the prestige in the Arab world which he had lost by his impotence to halt Nuri Said's plans earlier in the year. It was also a sign of Egyptian independence, it strengthened the Arabs against Israel and it scored off the West, which had been assuming rather too blandly that it had a monopoly of advice and supplies.⁵⁸

However, Nasser's arms deal with Czechoslovakia aroused apprehension in Britain and the United States at the possibility of Soviet penetration of Egypt and the Middle East by means of economic and military assistance. It threatened to seriously alter the balance of power in the Middle East, to internationalize the power struggle in the region and to bring both America and Russia to play a more active role in an area where hitherto the dominant great powers had been Britain and France. In short, it would bring the Cold War into the Middle East. As Robert Stephens notes, however, the Soviet arms deal did not bring the Cold War into the Middle East. It was already there and had been intensified by the moves to set up Western-backed regional defence systems, culminating in the Baghdad Pact. But the arms deal ensured that henceforward the Middle East could no longer be regarded as a purely Western sphere of influence. The West could no longer hope simply to seal off the Arab world from Soviet penetration. Russia had re-established herself as a Middle East power. She had secured at a cheap price a valuable political foothold in the most important Arab country, whose influence also extended into Africa. The Soviets had succeeded in 'leaping' over the northern tier.⁵⁹ The Western powers had failed in their basic objective of preventing expansion of Soviet influence in the Middle East, and in their objective of erecting a regional defence organization in the area. Although the Baghdad Pact still formed a part of the political landscape, its significance as the shield of the Middle East against Soviet aggression had now been diminished by the success of the Soviets' 'leapfrog' tactics in Egypt.⁶⁰

The Egyptian-Czechoslovak arms deal forced the British government to take immediate steps to strengthen the northern tier and to offset the damage which had been done to the Western position in the area. The Foreign Office thought it was essential, if the West's reputation in the Middle East was to be maintained, that something should be done to strengthen the Baghdad Pact and to show that Western policy was still positive in the area. Britain's counter-moves were to get Iran into the Baghdad Pact, to give all she could to Iraq and get the United States to do the same, to declare the immediate independence of the Sudan, and to get the United States to reduce economic aid to Egypt and transfer it to Iraq.⁶¹

At a meeting with Dulles on 26 September the British Foreign Secretary, Harold Macmillan, had suggested that one of the cards they could play in offsetting the Egyptian arms deal with Czechoslovakia would be a strengthening of the Baghdad Pact, including the accession of Iran. He added that his government was thinking of issuing a statement which, while giving no new guarantees and making no promises, might be helpful to the Iranian government in making a decision to accede. The statement he had in mind would repeat the 1950 Bevin declaration.⁶²

On 5 October the Shah informed Chapin, the American Ambassador in Tehran, that he was prepared to join the Baghdad Pact if the United States so desired and if the United States would agree to issue a post-accession statement, which, in addition to welcoming Iran's accession and restating United

States interest in Iran's territorial integrity and stability, would contain a phrase to the effect that the United States would continue to entertain sympathetically Iran's request for military and economic assistance. He wanted an answer to this question prior to 8 October, when he was to inaugurate the Iranian Senate's new session, whereas he could declare Iran's intention to join the Baghdad Pact in a few days. He added that if he did not receive any answer prior to 8 October, he would reconsider the timing of Iran's accession to the Baghdad Pact.⁶³ On 6 October the British government decided to authorize its Ambassador in Tehran to inform the Shah that as soon as Iran acceded to the pact they would issue a statement welcoming the decision and repeating the 1950 Bevin declaration. It also asked the State Department to give the Shah a similar encouraging message and to speed up its arms supplies to Iraq.⁶⁴

However, British and American policies concerning the Baghdad Pact were again at odds. Up to the announcement of the Egyptian–Czechoslovak arms deal, Britain had been reluctant to endorse Iran's accession to the Baghdad Pact. On the other hand, the United States had been keen to see Iran join the pact on the principle that it would underline the pact's northern tier aspect. However, after the arms deal, they exchanged roles. Britain now wanted to retaliate by securing Iran's membership in the pact. The United States was more reserved. At a National Security Council meeting on 6 October, Dulles argued that 'we still have great hopes that the new relationship between the USSR and Egypt can be held to a minimum of significance. Such hopes would be abruptly ended if we should urge Iran to join the Baghdad Pact.' Therefore, he intended to give a negative reply to the request of Iran that the United States approve Iran's announcement of entry into the Baghdad Pact.⁶⁵

Referring to Dulles's proposed answer to Iran's request, the Vice-President asked Dulles whether the primary reason for his answer was a lack of financial resources to support Iran. Dulles replied,

Financing was not the primary factor. The primary factor was the overall political question; namely, whether United States policy in the Middle East should be directed toward an attempt to insulate the new Soviet–Egyptian relationship or whether United States objectives would be served by seeming to enhance the significance of the Soviet–Egyptian deal by a major counter-move in Iran.⁶⁶

Dulles's shift against Iran's accession to the Baghdad Pact marked the beginning of a State–Defense split between Defense Secretary Charles Wilson and Dulles. Wilson professed himself to be 'much bewildered'. At the National Security Council meeting on 6 October, he asked Dulles, 'Why had we been for so long so eager to get Iran into the Baghdad Pact and now that she was prepared to join, we are opposing the move?' In response, Dulles said that it was not wise for the United States to urge Iran to take a move which would amount to casting the die – at least until the United States could ascertain

whether present American pressures on the Soviet Union might not cause the Soviet Union to slow up its campaign to acquire additional influence in the Middle East. However, Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pointed out that Iran was on the point of joining the Baghdad Pact whether or not it got further American assurances for military assistance. Dulles replied that 'It was Okay' if the Iranians elected to join the pact on their own, but he very much doubted that they would do so in the absence of a further quid pro quo from the United States. Later that day Admiral Radford told Dulles that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were strongly in favour of Iran's adherence to the Baghdad Pact.⁶⁷

On 6 October in a telephone conversation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Allen Dulles, John Foster Dulles said that he was not happy regarding the United States' giving assurances to Iran now. He thought that Russia might regard it as a reprisal against Egypt and any hopes of quieting the situation would disappear and it would lead to a step against the United States and things would be worse. On the same day, John Foster Dulles called the Secretary of Defense, and told him that he was still dubious about urging the Iranians into the Baghdad Pact. Also, on 6 October, John Foster Dulles sent a cable to Chapin in Tehran, in which he explained his apprehension over Iran's acceding to the Baghdad Pact at this precise time, in view of the probable Soviet reaction. It could be interpreted as a move brought about by the United States and the United Kingdom in retaliation for the Soviet–Egyptian arms deal. Announcement under these circumstances might lead to strong Soviet counter-moves, and if the Iranians felt that they could defer joining the pact without a serious loss of momentum, this would be the desirable course. However, John Foster Dulles added that if in Chapin's judgement action was necessary now in order to prevent loss, he might inform the Shah that following Iran's accession to the Baghdad Pact the United States would be prepared to issue a welcoming statement which would also re-emphasize the United States' policy of support for Iran's independence.⁶⁸

On 7 October at a meeting with the Iranian Prime Minister, Chapin said that Iran's accession to the Baghdad Pact at this moment might be viewed as retaliation, brought about by the United States and the United Kingdom, for the Soviet–Egyptian arms deal and that strong Soviet counter-moves might result. The Iranian Prime Minister replied that accession had gone so far that a change of direction would have a serious effect on Iran and the other pact members. Chapin then exercised his discretion, and said that when Iran joined the Baghdad Pact the United States would issue a welcoming statement, including reference to assistance and United States interest in the territorial integrity of Iran. After due consideration, the Shah decided not to alter his plan to accede to the Baghdad Pact within the next few days. On 8 October in a speech inaugurating the Iranian Senate's new session, he spoke of the disadvantages resulting from Iranian neutrality in the past, and stressed the need for building up Iran's defensive strength within the framework of the United Nations. Although no mention was made of the Baghdad

Pact in the speech, its intention had already been made clear privately, and it was immediately interpreted as indicating a decision to join the pact. On 12 October after informing the parties to the Baghdad Pact of its decision to join, the Iranian government informed the Senate and the *Majlis* of its decision to join the Baghdad Pact and formally presented the ratification bill to the Senate, which approved it on 19 October.⁶⁹

Also, on 12 October the United States issued a statement, emphasizing that the United States had a long-standing interest in the territorial integrity and independence of Iran, which would remain a cardinal feature of United States policy, and giving an assurance that the United States would not waver in its demonstrated purpose to assist Iran and other free nations which were making their own determined efforts to achieve defensive strength and economic and social progress. On the following day, the British Foreign Office hailed Iran's decision as a step that would increase security and help the cause of peace in the Middle East.⁷⁰ However, on 12 October the Soviet government gave Iran a sharp note warning that accession to the Baghdad Pact was incompatible with the maintenance of peace and contrary to the good-neighbourly relations and treaty obligations between Iran and the USSR. On 16 October the Iranian government replied in forceful terms. It described the Soviet interpretation as incorrect and inadmissible, and pointed out that the pact was consonant with the United Nations principles and did not in any way conflict with the treaty relations between the two countries.⁷¹ At a National Security Council meeting on 13 October, referring to the Soviet note to Iran, John Foster Dulles said that he still retained his anxiety that Iran's accession to the Baghdad Pact would have grave repercussions and face the United States with new dangers but, in any case, it was clear that the United States had not put pressure on Iran to join the Baghdad Pact at this time and, accordingly, the United States could not be blamed for the consequences.⁷²

According to the British Ambassador in Tehran, Geoffrey Harrison, Iran's accession to the Baghdad Pact was largely the personal initiative of the Shah. For Iran, it was also a departure from her traditional policy of neutrality. However, according to Ramazani, it could not be considered a departure from Iran's traditional policy of neutrality because, in his view, Iran never had a tradition of neutralism or neutrality except during the Mossadegh period between 1951 and 1953. According to Ramazani, Iran's accession to the Baghdad Pact signified that Iran refused to experiment with a neutralist foreign policy like that of the Mossadegh period, and instead chose to ally herself with the West.⁷³

Be that as it may, Iran's accession to the Baghdad Pact stemmed in good part from her expectations of military and economic aid from the United States. Iran also hoped for a United States–United Kingdom security commitment against Russian aggression. According to the State Department, the Shah also expected to gain additional external support for maintaining himself in power. As John Campbell observes, Iran, like the other Moslem members of the Baghdad Pact, had joined the pact primarily in order to get

more economic and military aid from the West, rather than out of faith in the concept of regional security. For Iran, the Baghdad Pact was more than just a military pact. It provided a framework for development plans. It was, as the Iranian Prime Minister, Hussein Ala, said, a 'new form of association', an instrument of regional, social and economic cooperation in harmony with what the Iranian Prime Minister described as the 'basic characteristic of our time', the tendency of states towards interdependence.⁷⁴

With Iran's accession to the Baghdad Pact, Dulles's northern tier scheme now became a reality, at least on paper. The Western powers held the whole frontier from eastern Turkey to Baluchistan against a possible Soviet attack, and had closed the gap between NATO and SEATO. This covered the Middle East and its rich oilfields from outside aggression, but not from internal challenges. On 20 October Egypt and Syria signed a mutual defence pact. Under the terms of the pact, armed aggression against either signatory was to be considered as directed against both, and each signatory was to come to the aid of the other in case of attack. On 27 October Egypt also signed a mutual defence pact with Saudi Arabia, which contained language almost identical to the Egyptian–Syrian pact. These pacts were viewed by the United States and the United Kingdom as directed against Israel, Iraq and the Baghdad Pact.⁷⁵

5 The development of the Baghdad Pact (1955–6)

The attempts to bring more Arab states into the pact, and the Alpha Project

In the immediate future, Britain was determined to make the Baghdad Pact an effective instrument for cooperation with Middle Eastern states, and to get the United States' commitment to consolidating it. The British view on developing the Baghdad Pact, as well as British policy towards associating other states in regional defence arrangements, reflected Britain's overall political and economic interests in the area, as well as military concern over the Soviet threat. She was concerned with protecting as much as possible of her political and economic interests and influence in the area. In order to ease negative reactions in the Arab world to Britain's accession to the Turco-Iraqi pact, and make it more attractive to other Arab states, Wright informed the Foreign Office on 16 March that it would be desirable if one or more of these states could be induced to accede to the Turco-Iraqi pact at the same time as Britain, or soon after her. This would emphasize the indigenous character of the pact and increase its value as the 'umbrella' for the Britain's defence arrangements with Iraq.¹

However, there was no immediate prospect of any Arab state acceding except Jordan. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria were out of the question and were trying to organize an opposition camp. On 2 March 1955 Egypt and Syria had announced that they agreed not to join the Turco-Iraqi pact or any similar pact, but to establish a joint Arab defence and economic cooperation pact. On 6 March Saudi Arabia joined Egypt and Syria. The best to be expected from Lebanon was that she could remain neutral between the two Arab blocs.

On 16 March Charles Duke, the British Ambassador in Amman, indicated that Jordan might be brought into the Turco-Iraqi pact if it could be made attractive for her by a revision of the 1948 treaty and increased supplies of arms. On 17 March the Foreign Office instructed Duke to inform the Jordanian government that if Jordan and Britain were to become partners in the Turco-Iraqi pact, the British government would be willing to consider sympathetically the replacement of the 1948 Anglo-Jordanian Treaty by a new

special defence agreement under Article 1 of the pact. However, the United States remained opposed to the accession of the Arab states bordering Israel and pressed Britain to accept a moratorium on any further Arab membership of the pact, since it would jeopardize the 'Alpha Project', a secret Anglo-American plan for the settlement of the Arab–Israeli dispute.²

The origins of the Alpha Project may be briefly explained. Following the conclusion of the Suez base agreement with Egypt, Eden had felt that it was time to improve Arab–Israeli relations. He hoped that an Arab–Israeli settlement would promote Western goals in the Middle East. In November 1954 Evelyn Shuckburgh, Under-Secretary for Middle Eastern Affairs, was sent on a fact-finding mission in the Middle East, with instructions from Eden to look out for any possibilities of an Arab–Israeli settlement. Eden hoped that when Shuckburgh returned to London, Dulles would send someone to discuss the result of Shuckburgh's trip. Upon his return from the Middle East, Shuckburgh drafted a plan for an Arab–Israeli settlement. The main principles of the plan were close cooperation with the United States; 'visible concessions' by Israel, such as territory; 'guarantees of security' by the major powers; an understanding worked out mainly with Egypt; and the definition of the objectives as 'an overall settlement', not 'peace'. In his draft, Shuckburgh also made it clear that the purpose of an Arab–Israeli settlement would be to strengthen Britain's influence and position in the Middle East and check Soviet penetration in the region. Moreover, it would seize the initiative for Britain in the Middle East from the United States. Shuckburgh hoped that the plan would win Egyptian cooperation and place Anglo–Egyptian relations in harmony with the rest of Britain's connections in the Middle East, and with the Western defence system in the region. In December 1954 Eden and Dulles met in Paris, and agreed on a secret Anglo-American plan, based on Shuckburgh's proposals, for an Arab–Israeli settlement, codenamed 'Alpha Project'. Dulles appointed Francis Russell of the State Department to work with Shuckburgh. In January 1955 Shuckburgh and Russell began work on the details in Washington; the talks continued in London, which Russell visited in March and in April 1955.³

However, by April there had been a crucial change in British priorities. After the conclusion of the Turco–Iraqi pact, and particularly after British accession to it in April, Britain began to show greater concern for the Baghdad Pact, while the United States remained chiefly anxious to create a favourable atmosphere for launching the Alpha Project. Further, Britain now saw the Alpha Project as a means for the expansion of the Baghdad Pact and for obtaining American support for the pact, since settlement of the Arab–Israeli dispute might encourage the Arab states and the United States to join the pact. Britain began to encourage the Arab states, particularly Jordan, to join the pact. In contrast, the United States feared that further Arab membership of the Baghdad Pact would jeopardize the Alpha Project.

On 24 March 1955 Dulles argued against the early accession of Jordan, Lebanon and Syria:

Jordan, Lebanon and Syria are not important from a military viewpoint. Their adherence to the Turco-Iraqi pact, on the contrary, would have two adverse effects: It would further isolate and embitter Nasser, and it would give the IG [Israeli government] the occasion for claiming that the United States had put its political and diplomatic weight behind Israel's Arab neighbours and therefore against Israel. It looks as though the United Kingdom had grabbed the ball on the northern tier policy and was running away with it in a direction which would have . . . unfortunate consequences.⁴

Dulles was convinced that there was no hope for the accomplishment of the Alpha Project except through the cooperation of Nasser, who strongly objected to further Arab membership of the Baghdad Pact. Dulles considered that early accession to the Baghdad Pact by Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, or for that matter by Jordan alone, would seriously diminish the chances of obtaining Nasser's cooperation. He was also concerned about the effect in Israel if any of her immediate Arab neighbours were to become linked with Iraq and Turkey, and instructed the State Department that nothing was to be done to encourage any of Israel's immediate neighbours to enter the Baghdad Pact. On 24 March George Allen, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, told Harold Beeley, Counsellor at the British Embassy in Washington, that the accession of Israel's immediate neighbours, particularly Jordan, to the Baghdad Pact would greatly complicate the Alpha Project by tending to isolate Egypt and thereby weaken Nasser, and would intensify Israel's agitation. Allen added that the State Department was considering discouraging Jordan from acceding to the Baghdad Pact. On the same day, Beeley informed the Foreign Office of the State Department's attitude, and advised that 'we should encourage as many Arab states to join the Baghdad Pact no matter if it makes it more difficult for Nasser to proceed with ALPHA'.⁵

The State Department's attitude angered the Foreign Office. Shuckburgh argued,

Our declared object is to make the pact the foundation for an effective defence system for the Middle East. If this is to be achieved, Syrian, Lebanese, and Jordanian accession will eventually be necessary. We cannot afford to risk giving the impression in the Middle East that we are wavering and that our policy has changed. I fear that if we or the United States were to discourage Jordan from joining the pact at the present moment, the pact would certainly become immediately known throughout the Middle East and would do much damage not only in Syria and Lebanon, but also Iraq and Turkey. It would, moreover, be counted by Nasser himself as a triumph for his policy of opposition to the pact, and might make him less rather than more anxious to cooperate in ALPHA.⁶

On 31 March Eden instructed Beeley to tell the State Department,

It would be most unwise to try to help Nasser at the cost of weakening our support for the Turco-Iraqi Pact. Our declared object is to make the pact the foundation for an effective defence system for the Middle East. If this is to be achieved, Syrian, Lebanese and Jordanian accession will eventually be necessary. They cannot expect to command respect in the Middle East unless they pursue a consistent policy based on their convictions. Their enthusiastic support of the Turco-Iraqi pact is too recent in men's minds to enable them to execute a volte-face with safety or dignity.⁷

In the event, however, the British were prepared to bend, at least to the extent of not actively pressing Jordan or other Arab states to join the pact for the time being. Ralph Stevenson, the British Ambassador in Cairo, wrote to Shuckburgh that 'I personally very much doubt whether there can be much stability in this area until this Egyptian-Iraqi conflict is resolved', and Stevenson added that 'the net advantage to the West is small if Iraqi realism and cooperation are matched by neutralism and irresponsibility in Egypt and the other Arab states'. Stevenson suggested that having served the purpose of 'umbrella' for the revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, the Turco-Iraqi pact, as it was, be allowed to fade into the background, and that this 'might enable Iraq eventually to gravitate back towards her natural orbit, i.e. the Arab one'. He warned that the accession of other Arab states to the pact would stir up the Egyptians. With regard to the Alpha Project, Stevenson advised that 'it would be unwise and useless to make any such approach [to Nasser] until the dust raised by the Turkish-Iraqi Pact began to settle'.⁸

The Foreign Office agreed with Stevenson that Egypt was of more than nuisance value. The Foreign Office believed that 'not only shall we not succeed ultimately in our aim of stabilizing the Arab world; and developing in it a satisfactory system of defence, if Egypt undermines our efforts: any attempt to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute will be very difficult without Egyptian cooperation'. However, the Foreign Office argued that Britain had staked her credit on the Turco-Iraqi pact, and that she could not afford to let Turkey and Iraq down. Britain could not allow the Turco-Iraqi pact to die for want of attention; 'It was not only a question of defending Britain's Special Agreement against Iraqi nationalism, Britain's credit generally was deeply involved'. In the Foreign Office's view, Britain had to nurse the pact through its tender years. 'Britain must, therefore, continue to support the pact, hope that other Arab states would join it, and do nothing that could be construed as discouraging them from doing so.' Meanwhile, Britain would work for the accession of Pakistan and Iran. Yet the Foreign Office thought that it would 'be better not to bring these states in together, or too soon; for, to continue the nursery metaphor, Britain should do better not to use all her water on the plant in one dose'. In the Foreign Office's view, Iran was of doubtful value militarily and politically, but the accession of Pakistan would be of consider-

able value and Britain should be prepared to face the difficulties and join with the Turks and Iraqis in encouraging it. In short, the Foreign Office concluded that Britain should:

- a do everything she could to prevent Egypt concluding a rival pact with Syria and Saudi Arabia;
- b for the present continue her policy of not pressing other Arab states to join the Turco-Iraqi pact; and
- c work for the accession to the Turco-Iraqi pact of Pakistan and later Iran.

If Britain was unable to stop Nasser's efforts to conclude his rival agreement, Britain should reverse her policy on (b); but if she did, she would reduce her chances on the Alpha Project.⁹

On 1 April, in a memorandum to Dulles, George Allen, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, presented his views on the matter of Jordan's or other Arab states' accession to the Baghdad Pact. He pointed out that a policy of neither encouraging nor discouraging accession to the pact was consistent with NSC-5428, which stated that the United States should: 'neither encourage nor discourage other Arab states from asking to participate in regional security arrangements'. On the same day, Shuckburgh stated to the American Embassy in London that Britain was not pressing Jordan or any Arab state to join the Baghdad Pact. The British government had made it clear, Shuckburgh said, that if Jordan decided to join the Baghdad Pact, Britain would consider revising the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1948. Shuckburgh added that it would be 'extremely dangerous' for either the United States or the United Kingdom to discourage Jordanian accession. On 4 April, in a conversation with Aldrich, the American Ambassador in London, Eden stated that the British government had supported the Baghdad Pact as 'the foundation for an effective defence system for the Middle East'. At the same time he indicated that the British government had not been pressing other Arab states to join the pact, but urged that neither the United States nor the United Kingdom should advise Jordan against joining. Britain agreed not to put pressure on Jordan to accede to the Turco-Iraqi pact. In return, the United States agreed not to seek to dissuade Jordan from joining the pact. They hoped that the next accessions to the pact would be Pakistan and Iran.¹⁰

On 28 April, in his reply to Stevenson's letter of 28 March, Shuckburgh argued that, as things were,

the Turco-Iraqi pact represents our best hope of building an effective defence system and we cannot afford to let it wither entirely after producing a single bloom in the shape of the Anglo-Iraqi Special Agreement. Our own credit as an acceding state and our relations with Turkey are deeply engaged. We recognise equally the need to help Nasser save himself from his rash opposition without concluding a rival agreement which

would deepen the division in the Arab World. To this end we have been careful not to press the other Arab states to join the Turco-Iraqi Pact, and do not for the present intend to do so.¹¹

Shuckburgh continued that with an eye to Nasser, Britain would avoid brandishing the Turco-Iraqi pact too much in the immediate future and try to play down its Arab and build up its northern tier aspect. He hoped that the next candidates for admission to the pact would be Pakistan and then Iran. Meanwhile, Shuckburgh and Russell had completed their work on the Alpha Project, and on 5 April Henry Byroade, the American Ambassador in Cairo, submitted the project to Nasser, whose response to the project was deemed promising.¹² In view of Nasser's interest in the Alpha Project, Shuckburgh and Russell met in London at the end of April and worked out the final details. According to the project, Israel would abandon 5 per cent of its territory to facilitate the resettlement of about 75,000 refugees; those who chose not to return would receive monetary compensation from the Israeli government. Jerusalem would be divided between Israel and Jordan, and both sides would have equal access to the holy places. Israel would also abandon a small section of the Negev to allow the construction of a road to meet the Arab demand for a land link. The economic blockade against Israel would be lifted, and a series of treaties of guarantee would be provided by the United States and Britain.¹³

Meanwhile, Wright urged the Foreign Office again that both in terms of Britain's relations with Iraq, and on wider grounds, her interest lay in fortifying and expanding the Baghdad Pact and in laying emphasis on the pact rather than the Special Agreement. He warned that Britain's failure to urge accession to the Baghdad Pact might give the impression that Britain was losing interest in the pact and that Jordan, Lebanon and Syria might conclude that Britain did not wish them to join. Wright concluded by saying that Britain should make it clear that her policy was to support the pact.¹⁴

By June 1955 it seemed to the Foreign Office that the pact was in danger of losing momentum, since Pakistan and Iran were reluctant to join the pact unless they were assured of handsome benefits. The Foreign Office believed that the United States should be persuaded of the need to give the pact some fresh life, and that Britain, with the United States, should take a more positive line about Jordan's accession to the pact. The Foreign Office wanted to use King Hussein's impending visit to London to convince him of the advantages of Jordan's accession to the Baghdad Pact, though it would leave it to the King to decide when and how he would like to join the pact. With regard to revision of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1948, King Hussein would be told, as he had been already once in March 1955, that if Jordan and Britain were to become partners in the Baghdad Pact, Britain would be willing to consider sympathetically a Jordanian proposal for the replacement of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty by a new special defence agreement under Article 1 of the Baghdad Pact.¹⁵

On 18 June Anthony Nutting, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, had a conversation with King Hussein, and said to him that Jordan's accession to the Turco-Iraqi pact was a matter for her own judgement, but he wished to make it clear to King Hussein that the British government looked forward to her early accession. It regarded the pact as a necessary and urgent first step for the defence of the Middle East and thus the sooner it was joined by other Arab states the better. It was not, however, attempting to put any pressure on the Jordanian government. The King replied that it was Jordan's policy not to be committed to either of the rival groups in the Arab world.¹⁶

At Anglo-American politico-military discussions in Washington on 23–4 June Sir Roger Makins, the British Ambassador to the United States, expressed the latest British views on the problem of Middle East defence. Makins said that defence arrangements in the Middle East should be based on the Baghdad Pact, since it provided a much better foundation for effective Middle East defence. It was linked to the West through Turkey and Britain, its terms provided for special agreements among the members, it covered the Russian front and it had in Iraq airfields and bases available to Britain including provision for pre-stocking. Britain wished to build up the pact by securing the accession of other area states, but feared that the momentum behind the northern tier concept and the pact was slowing down. In the British view, the initial enthusiasm in the area was waning, and the impression was growing in the Middle East that the United States was not as strong in its support of the pact as it had been at the outset. Makins noted that since Britain's accession to the pact in April, there had been no further accessions, and because of sharp adverse reactions to its creation from Egypt and Israel, Britain and the United States had not encouraged Lebanon and Jordan to join. Lebanon was originally favourable to the Turco-Iraqi pact but had since cooled off owing to pressure from Egypt and Syria. However, if the United States and Britain were to urge Lebanon to join the pact, she would probably do so. As there would, however, be little military advantage in Lebanese accession, Britain was not disposed to put pressure on Lebanon to join the pact. As regards Jordan, Makins said that Britain had not pressed Jordan to accede but indicated that if she did so Britain would be prepared to replace the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1948 with a new agreement under the pact. However, Makins argued that pressure should be applied on Lebanon and Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact if the momentum behind the pact failed. As to US accession, Makins said that Britain wished the United States to become a fully fledged member, but if US accession was delayed, as a minimum Britain hoped for US association with military planning in the Middle East. Makins referred to the importance of obtaining the accession of a fourth state to the pact in order that the ministerial council provided for by the pact might be established. He suggested that Pakistan should be induced to accede promptly to the pact. In the British view, there would be some help from Pakistan in the Middle East in time of war, and there were important

political values involved, particularly in influencing the Arabs. As regards the ministerial council, Britain assumed that there would be no objection by the participants to deputies at the ambassadorial level sitting for the ministers. Ministerial meetings might be held occasionally, and the permanent council might have its seat in Baghdad, though ministerial meetings might rotate among the area capitals. Subordinate to the council would be a military planning organization located in Baghdad with representation from each pact participant. The main function of the planning organization would be to draw up war plans. Makins added that a small international secretariat to service the council and the military planning organization would also be required. Since there were no economic clauses in the pact, said Makins, economic and infrastructure matters would be handled by the council. He stated that although there were no references in the pact to the problem of subversion and despite the existence in the pact of a clause against 'any interference whatsoever' in internal affairs, subordinate special agreements concerning the control of subversion could be negotiated. However, Makins warned that it would be necessary to move slowly and softly in this direction. Britain saw no need for a formal connection between the Baghdad Pact and NATO. The British believed that the overlapping of membership (Turkey and Britain) should be sufficient to provide liaison between the two organizations. Makins added that Britain also saw no need to create a command structure under the pact. In the British view, the area members of the pact were not yet disposed to put their forces under international command. Also, there was no immediate prospect of stationing troops of one area member in territory of another area member.¹⁷

Meanwhile, Dulles was anxious to make a public statement on the Alpha Project. He was concerned with the 1956 presidential election in the United States. He believed that American policy towards the Arabs would become less sympathetic as the 1956 election approached because of Jewish electors.¹⁸ The British government, however, was apprehensive about the effect on governments and publics in the Middle East of a public statement, particularly in Iraq and Jordan. Macmillan objected that the announcement of the Alpha Project could cause a 'blow up', since neither the Arabs nor the Israelis would like it at first, and to make a public statement would carry serious risks which would fall largely upon Britain, by reason of her responsibilities and commitments in the Arab world. There might be a violent reaction in Iraq against the Baghdad Pact and the new Anglo-Iraqi Agreement, which might lead to the weakening or even the fall of Nuri Said. In that event, the whole concept of a Middle East defence organization would be swept away. However, after initial opposition, the Foreign Office agreed to an American statement, but explicitly linked the Alpha Project to the Baghdad Pact, arguing that in return for British support of Dulles's statement, the United States should promise to join the pact as soon as an Arab-Israeli settlement was completed.¹⁹

On 14 July Macmillan and Dulles met in Paris and discussed the Alpha Project. Macmillan asked Dulles whether the United States would consider

ways in which it could help to mitigate hostile reactions by the Arabs, and particularly any dangerous effects on the position of Nuri Said, the Baghdad Pact and the Anglo-Iraqi Special Agreement. He suggested that the United States should consider accession to the Baghdad Pact, and assure Nuri Said that he would receive arms (Centurion tanks) by offshore purchase from Britain. Dulles replied that the United States might indicate to Iraq that it was impossible for the United States to join the Baghdad Pact until the Palestine question was settled, but that if a settlement could be achieved, the United States would be prepared to join. In the meantime, the United States would maintain contact with the defence discussions of the northern tier through observers, and would give its support. Macmillan accepted the American position, promising that the Foreign Office would issue its own statement of support after Dulles had delivered his speech. Doubtless it would be an exaggeration to claim that the real motivation for Britain's support of the Alpha Project was the expansion of the Baghdad Pact, but the British were clearly exploiting the one issue for sake of the other.²⁰

On 17 July Eden met President Eisenhower in Geneva and brought up the matter of United States accession to the Baghdad Pact and the subject of United States aid to Iraq, with particular reference to Centurion tanks. As regards United States accession to the Baghdad Pact, Eisenhower replied that no such action was deemed practicable until the Arab–Israeli problem could be clarified. Both Eden and Macmillan insisted that before the Alpha Project was announced, the United States should show some concrete evidence of an intention to join the Baghdad Pact and to provide further military aid to Iraq.²¹ Throughout July and August they pushed for American assurances about ultimate accession to the Baghdad Pact and about American readiness to make a substantial contribution towards the supply of British tanks to Iraq.

In reality, Britain had little choice but to support Dulles's proposed public statement. Macmillan believed that if the statement were not made, American policy would surrender to Israeli demands for a security guarantee. On 3 August Makins was instructed to inform the State Department that the Cabinet agreed that the British government would issue a supporting statement, subject to assurances by the United States on (a) their ultimate accession to the Baghdad Pact and (b) their readiness to make a substantial financial contribution towards the supply of British Centurion tanks to Iraq. On 11 August Herbert Hoover, Under-Secretary of State, gave Sir Roger Makins the US comments on the British views that Makins had given the State Department in June. Hoover told Makins that the United States supported the development of a northern tier defence organization within the framework of the Baghdad Pact, and intended to continue to support the pact as the best basis for regional defence arrangements in the Middle East. However, the State Department did not consider the accession of additional Arab states to the pact desirable until the Arab–Israeli situation improved. The State Department believed that the United States and Britain should

concentrate on the completion and strengthening of the northern tier. To this extent, Hoover said, the United States was encouraging Pakistan and Iran to accede to the pact. Hoover told Makins that the State Department appreciated that there were reasons making an early Jordanian accession to the Baghdad Pact desirable; nevertheless, the State Department believed that the disadvantages in Jordanian accession arising from Jordanian contiguity to Israel were overriding, and hoped that Britain would not encourage Jordan to join the pact until the Arab–Israeli situation improved. Makins replied that only after Pakistan and Iran had joined the pact should the possibility of Jordanian accession be considered, and that only if the momentum of the pact lagged and it was necessary to bolster it up again would Britain consider the possibility of Jordanian accession at an earlier date. As to organizational arrangements under the pact, Hoover urged that they be kept as loose and simple as possible. He assumed that after the accession of Pakistan as a fourth member the permanent ministerial council provided for in the pact would be established, and that it would meet periodically to coordinate plans and exchange views. He also assumed that since the ministerial council would meet occasionally, the requirement of permanency would be met by the designation of deputies, who might be the chiefs of diplomatic missions in Baghdad. Baghdad would be the logical seat of the permanent council as the pact had been signed there, but the United States considered this a question that should be left to the Middle Eastern members of the pact to determine. Hoover added that there should be a small secretariat but no command organization. Rather than establishing a permanent military planning organization, there should be periodic meetings of military representatives. Liaison between the Baghdad Pact and NATO should be informal. As to the question of US accession, Hoover said that it would not be wise for the United States to accede to the pact because such a step would adversely affect its influence in bringing about a peace settlement between Israel and the Arabs. The State Department did not consider that it was a matter requiring immediate action because the United States already had security arrangements with two of the pact members, in addition to Britain, through NATO (Turkey) and SEATO (Pakistan), though it did not rule out the possibility that the United States might join the pact eventually. As an interim measure the United States would establish close liaison arrangements with the pact so that the United States might coordinate its plans and aid programmes for the development of defensive strength in the Middle East with the plans and efforts of the other states concerned.²²

On 19 August in a message to Macmillan, Dulles confirmed the United States' attitude of contemplated accession to the Baghdad Pact if a settlement could be achieved between the Arab states and Israel. As regards United States military aid to Iraq, Dulles said that the United States would pay for ten Centurion tanks, if Britain paid for two, with more to be shipped in 1956. On the same day, in a memorandum to Eisenhower, Dulles explained his rationale for his speech on the Alpha Project. He said that 'if ALPHA is to be

done at all, it should be done while we can speak as the friend of both [the Israelis and the Arabs] . . . We need to make such an effort before the situation gets involved in 1956 politics.' With regard to the Alpha Project, Dulles finally delivered a speech to the Council of Foreign Relations in New York on 26 August 1955. He presented the project in very broad terms, concentrating on three points: the problems of Arab–Israeli borders, Palestine refugees, and mistrust between the Arabs and Israelis, without mentioning the Alpha Project as such or the Anglo-American consultations. On the following day, the British government issued a statement, calling Dulles's statement 'an important contribution towards the solution of the most critical and outstanding problem in the Middle East'.²³

Dulles's statement received no response in the Arab world, but a speech by Eden at the Guildhall on 9 November was welcomed by the Arabs, particularly for its reference to the United Nations resolutions on Palestine, and its suggestion that Israel should make territorial concessions to the Arabs. Israel, however, was upset, and on 15 November Ben-Gurion, the Israeli Defence Minister, stated in the Knesset that 'the essence of Sir Anthony Eden's proposal is the crushing of the state of Israel'. When Dulles presented the Alpha Project to the Israeli Prime Minister, Sharett, later that month, Sharett rejected it as long as it was based on territorial concessions.²⁴

In the spring of 1955 the British government had told Nasser that Britain would not seek to extend the Baghdad Pact to other Arab countries, and Nasser had informed the British government in return that he had no objection to British or Pakistani membership of the pact. Moreover, the Foreign Office and the State Department had reached an understanding not to encourage Israel's Arab neighbours to join the Baghdad Pact. However, the situation was totally changed by Britain's efforts to bring Jordan into the Baghdad Pact towards the end of the year, during General Templer's visit to Jordan in December 1955.

The Baghdad meeting of the Ministerial Council of the pact (21–2 November 1955)

The accession of Pakistan as the fourth member of the Baghdad Pact in September 1955 had led to the setting up of a ministerial council in accordance with Article 6 of the pact. However, in regard to the place of the inaugural meeting of the pact's council, there had been disagreement between Britain and Turkey. The Turkish government had been strongly in favour of choosing Tehran, and the Turkish Foreign Minister, Zorlu, during Bayar's visit to Iran in September 1955, had told the Shah that they would advocate Tehran as the site of the first meeting of the Baghdad Pact. The Turks had used this as a bait for Iran's accession since, according to Zorlu, to hold the first meeting in Tehran would do much to prove to Iranian opinion that their country was on a basis of equality, and help the Iranian government to obtain public support and approval for their decision to accede to the Baghdad Pact. As

to the timing, the Turkish government was in favour of a meeting in early November 1955, which would give the Iranians a little more, but not too much, time to make up their minds, while avoiding the possibility of the impression being caused that Iranian accession had come about under Turkish pressure during Bayar's visit to Tehran. The British government objected to holding the first meeting of the pact in Tehran, arguing that this might seem unduly provocative to the Russians. The British believed Baghdad would be a more convenient place for the meeting, since the original treaty had been negotiated there and the instruments were deposited there. They were also anxious, in view of Egyptian opposition to the pact, to strengthen the position of Iraq as an Arab country linked with the West. On 12 October however, Iran announced her decision to join the Baghdad Pact, thus rendering the Turks' talk of need for bait superfluous. Moreover, Pakistan and Iraq had also objected to holding the meeting in Tehran. Turkey gave way.²⁵

The inaugural meeting of the Baghdad Pact opened in Baghdad on 21 November under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri Said. All member countries were represented by their Prime Ministers, except Britain, which was represented by the Foreign Secretary, Harold Macmillan. The opening session was attended by the press, and also by United States observers: the United States Ambassador to Iraq, W. J. Gallman; Admiral Cassidy, the Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces in the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, and other American service and diplomatic representatives. Gallman, recalling his government's immediate endorsement of the Baghdad Pact, thanked the meeting for its invitation to cooperate. The Iranian and Pakistani prime ministers replied that they looked forward to American accession to the Baghdad Pact.²⁶

In the review of the international situation made in restricted session on 22 November, Macmillan stressed the importance of the economic aspect of the pact. He undertook to increase the scope and scale of Britain's technical assistance to other members, and said that Britain was prepared to use her experience in the field of atomic energy to help those members with their own projects for the peaceful application of atomic energy. However, he made no offer of economic or financial aid. Hussein Ala, for Iran, spoke of his country's desire to settle border problems with Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan. Mohammed Ali discussed Afghanistan's hostility to Pakistan. Menderes urged that a solution be sought to the Palestine problem. Nuri Said spoke of the disruptive effects of communist propaganda in the Middle East. Although all emphasized the communist threat and the resultant need to strengthen the Baghdad Pact as quickly as possible, each also spoke of what troubled and interested his own country. It was clear from the start that there were underlying divergences among the members and that defence against Soviet aggression was not their sole concern.²⁷

The meeting then turned to matters of procedure and organization and agreed to set up a permanent council at ministerial level in accordance with Article 6 of the pact, in order to provide for continuous consultation on politi-

cal and economic questions, as well as on military matters affecting the mutual interests of the member states. This council would be the supreme organ of the pact, to which would come all questions necessitating a governmental decision, and which would give the necessary directives to all other organizations of the pact. Ministerial sessions would be held once a year. Otherwise, meetings would be attended by deputies. The permanent headquarters of the pact and its subsidiary bodies would be situated in Baghdad. Each government would appoint a deputy representative to the council with ambassadorial rank. The Council, through their permanent deputies in Baghdad, would meet at any time to discuss any matters of political, economic and military interest to the five governments. It was also agreed that the Prime Minister of Iraq should serve as chairman of the council throughout the year 1956, although, if the council met elsewhere during the period, the chief delegate of the host country would, as a matter of courtesy, be invited to take the chair. The chairmanship would rotate thereafter by alphabetical order of countries. 'The Baghdad Pact' was, at Macmillan's proposal, chosen as the official name of the pact, and the Iraqi government was entrusted with the task of registering it with the United Nations on behalf of all the signatories.²⁸

The Council also agreed to set up a permanent secretariat in Baghdad. However, there was disagreement between Britain and Turkey on the form and functions of the secretariat. Britain was in favour of going slowly and of not building up the whole structure of the pact right at the beginning and also wished to keep the structure as simple and economical as possible. The British favoured a small secretariat, which could be provided by the Iraqis; liaison with the other parties could be maintained through specially appointed officers at their embassies in Baghdad. On the other hand, Turkey was in favour of setting up a much larger permanent secretariat. The Turks wanted the permanent secretariat to be a coordinating body within the Baghdad Pact organization and, where it was so authorized, to function as an executive organ and make suggestions to the ministerial council. In the Turkish view, the secretariat should be headed by a secretary-general with a suitable staff, and should include an administration section, an economic section, a political section and a propaganda and press section whose work would consist, *inter alia*, in collecting and collating information on political currents in the Middle East, particularly concerning the Baghdad Pact, and in counter-propaganda and publicity for the pact and its member countries. In the end, the Council decided to refer the question of the permanent secretariat to the permanent deputies of the Council for details of its composition and organization.²⁹

At Macmillan's proposal, it was agreed to set up an economic committee, which would examine measures to develop and strengthen the economic and financial resources of the region, and would be open to non-member countries. It was hoped that other countries would in time associate themselves at least with the economic committee, if not with the pact itself. The emphasis on economic cooperation reflected the appreciation that military planning and security vigilance would be ineffective in building up resistance

to communism if poverty was not eliminated. The United States undertook to establish permanent military and political liaison with the Baghdad Pact, and to send an observer to the meetings of the economic committee. The meeting welcomed the American decision, and noted with appreciation the generous assistance given by the United States to all pact countries by supplying them with free arms and military equipment. However, at the end of the meeting, the United States observer made it clear that the United States, although intending to support the pact and its organizations, believed that at present they could contribute more to the purposes of the pact from outside.³⁰

The meeting also agreed to establish a military committee, responsible and subordinate to the Council, which would consist of the Chiefs of Staff of member states or their deputies, and meet either at its own discretion or at the request of the Council. Once again, however, there was disagreement between Britain and Turkey about the terms of reference and functions of the committee. Turkey was in favour of a far larger permanent organization whose principal function would be to give directives to a permanent military group, and to study and approve its decisions before transmitting them to the Council. The permanent military group would be attached to the military committee and its duties would be, in particular,

- a preparation of defence plans;
- b preparation and assignment of forces, determination of their objectives, control of these forces in peace-time and permanent contact with the authorities of each country for this purpose;
- c preparation of plans for simultaneous and automatic action of the allied forces in case of war and for effective application of defence plans;
- d collaboration in such fields as the coordination of armaments, exchange of personnel, etc.; and
- e study and comparison of information about hostile forces and their plans and determination of the zones of defence.³¹

However, in the British view, the military committee should be on quite a small scale and there should be no command organization, at any rate in the first instance. The British considered the Turkish proposals for the military committee much too far-reaching for the first stage, seeming to envisage a complete NATO-type organization which, the British thought, might not be acceptable to the other members of the pact. In particular, the British felt that there should be the very minimum of expenditure in men and money consistent with maintaining the impetus of planning. Although the British wanted the Baghdad Pact to be a functioning military organization, they knew that their defence expenses, forces and base facilities in the Middle East were being rapidly reduced and, rather, looked to the Baghdad Pact to improve their diplomatic and economic position in the Middle East. The meeting instructed the military advisers to examine the terms of reference for the military committee, and in the event the British proposal for simpler terms of reference

prevailed. It was agreed to establish a joint secretariat to coordinate staff planning, and to set up a security organization in Baghdad. It was emphasized, however, that there was no intention of setting up any command organization for the pact. However, the British sensed that planning would progress more quickly than they had expected, and that they would be pressed to state their military capabilities and intentions in the Middle East.³²

During the meetings the Pakistani delegation supported the British case. The Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali, more than once took the lead in expressing points of view close to the British, as when he opposed the Turkish proposal for a standing military group and the Iraqi suggestion for an anti-subversive machine with wide powers. According to Wright, the Turkish delegation was very tough and inclined to press for a pact 'with teeth in it'. The Turkish delegation, whose sixteen-man team was twice as large as that of any other delegation, took a consistently dynamic line. This was shown in their eagerness to establish a big permanent secretariat for the pact and their anxiety to seek new accessions to the pact as forcefully as possible.³³

If the Turks were anxious to give the pact real military teeth, the Iraqis were more concerned to give it a concrete role in combating communist subversion. The Iraqi delegation was particularly worried about Egyptian, Saudi and communist activities in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. This preoccupation of the Iraqi delegation with the problem of subversion was confirmed by the Council when they tabled a draft resolution calling for joint anti-subversion machinery. As a result, the Council accepted that there was a threat of subversion in the pact area, and agreed that it could be met most effectively by cooperation among members of the pact. To this end, the Council instructed deputies to consider what permanent secretariat was required and to make arrangements for combating subversive activities in the pact area. Macmillan's proposals to make available technical advice on communist subversion were warmly welcomed. According to Wright, the Iranian delegation was interested in little else but getting the chairmanship next time and having the next meeting in Tehran. In this aim they were successful. The Council decided to meet again in special session in Tehran during the first half of April 1956. The Iranian Prime Minister was able to concentrate on staking Iran's claims to extensive economic aid as a recompense for the increased responsibilities she had accepted under the pact. The other major preoccupation of the Iranian government was to see some of the pact's permanent machinery established in Tehran, not only for reasons of prestige, but also because of the reassuring effect on public opinion. The common point which was repeatedly stressed during the conference by the Turkish, Iranian and Pakistani prime ministers was the need for keeping up the momentum of the pact by securing new members. The Pakistani and Iranian prime ministers repeatedly appealed to the United States to join the pact as a full member, but the United States Ambassador restated his government's position that it had no intention of joining the Baghdad Pact, believing 'that it could do more outside it than in'.³⁴

At the same time the Turkish and Iraqi prime ministers paid particular attention to the question of accession by Jordan and Lebanon, and urged that pressure be put on Jordan to join, and abandon its precarious neutrality between the pact and Egypt. They urged Britain to assist. Menderes told Macmillan privately that in dealing with the Jordanian government they should use the carrot as well as the stick. On 23 November Menderes and Nuri Said discussed the possibility of Jordan's accession with the Jordanian Minister to Iraq, who was furnished by them with a message for King Hussein to the effect that if Jordan were to join the pact, Turkey and Iraq would provide her with military and economic aid. Macmillan added that the Minister might say that Britain, too, was prepared to extend some military aid and to revise the 1948 Anglo-Jordanian Treaty. It was anticipated by Menderes and Nuri Said that the United States, too, would extend some military aid. On 24 November 1955 Menderes and Nuri Said told Gallman that if Lebanon was offered some assurances of arms and economic aid, she would join the pact, and that if both Jordan and Lebanon joined, this might encourage Syria to follow suit. They asked Gallman whether the United States could give an assurance of extending to Lebanon some military and economic aid.³⁵

Meanwhile, on 22 November 1955, a final communiqué had been released to the press setting out the decisions taken and announcing that the Council would meet again in Tehran early in April 1956. Special mention was made of Iraq's relations to the pact, with a declaration that Iraq's responsibilities under the pact did not conflict with her defence obligations as a member of the Arab League, nor with her obligation to cooperate economically with other members of the League. Note was also taken of the 'generous and valuable' military and economic aid that had been extended to each member of the pact by the United States, and of the offer by the United Kingdom to share its experience in the application of atomic energy to peaceful purposes. This first meeting of the Baghdad Pact seemed to justify optimism that a workable organization had been formed. Macmillan spoke of a real success. On 25 November in his report to Eden, he stated, 'If we follow it up, we have the means of creating solid links, both in the military and in the economic field, between Muslim countries and the West', and emphasized that

our prestige is now irrevocably involved in the success of the Baghdad Pact, and that . . . it is essential we make it succeed. As an immediate step we must get some other Arab states to join. This is most important for Nuri who feels isolated as the only Arab present. The first must be Jordan.

Macmillan also suggested that a real effort should be made to get the United States fully into the pact.³⁶

Echoing these views, on 30 November 1955 Wright, the British Ambassador to Iraq, wrote that Britain should stimulate, guide and advise the Moslem members of the pact in order to keep up the momentum given by the

inaugural meeting. Wright pointed out that while the pact would be able to consolidate itself during the next few months on its own momentum, it was important to obtain further accessions, and that it would certainly be helpful if Jordan and Lebanon were to join. He added, however, that if anything could really establish the pact as a force to be reckoned with, it was the early accession of the United States. The first meeting of the deputies was held within a week of the establishment of the Permanent Council and a Permanent Secretariat was established. Three further meetings of the deputies followed in quick succession, at the last of which, on 23 December, the Secretary-General of the pact, Sayed Awni Khalidi, a former Iraqi representative at the United Nations, was present for the first time.³⁷

The Economic Committee held its first meeting in Baghdad in January 1956. This was a preliminary meeting, concerned to initiate studies of measures which would help the development of the regional members of the pact, and devoted itself to those which would make great impact on the daily life of the peoples concerned. It appointed subcommittees to deal with communications and public works, trade, agriculture and health. While broadly welcoming the committee's work, and anxious that the regional members should understand the value which Britain placed upon the pact as a whole, the Foreign Office in London was concerned that the Economic Committee should not regard itself as an instrument for distributing aid to the regional members, and that emphasis should be given to the importance of self-help and regional cooperation as a means of producing practical benefits.³⁸

The attempts to bring Jordan into the pact and the Templer Mission

In view of the conclusion of the Egyptian–Soviet arms deal in September 1955, and of the Egyptian–Syrian–Saudi mutual defence pacts in October, the Foreign Office feared that the Baghdad Pact was losing momentum. However, it was Turkish determination which was to push the Foreign Office onto a new track. The occasion was the state visit by the Turkish President, Celal Bayar, to Amman in November 1955. In October the Turkish government had urged the British government that the time had come to bring Jordan into the Baghdad Pact. In the Turkish government's view, the Western powers should promptly take all possible actions to diminish the prestige Nasser had obtained by his recent arms deal with Czechoslovakia, and Jordan's accession to the Baghdad Pact would be most effective in this sense. On 14 October Zorlu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, had a discussion with Michael Stewart, Counsellor at the British Embassy in Ankara, on the possibility of Jordan's early accession to the Baghdad Pact, in connection with the Turkish President's visit to Amman in November. In his view, Egypt's arms deal with Czechoslovakia had created a new and dangerous situation in the Middle East; there was now a possibility of Russian influence there. Zorlu argued that Nasser was fully responsible for his policy and was not in any way

to be trusted, and suggested that the most effective way to deal with the situation would be to isolate Egypt by grouping the remaining Arab states firmly round the Baghdad Pact. In this connection, he wanted to know the British view on the desirability of pressing Jordan to accede to the Baghdad Pact, and whether the British government had ever contemplated offering a revision of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty, which, in his view, would be a powerful inducement. Zorlu added that the Jordanian government would act soon if they were quite convinced that the British government wanted them to do so, and that Lebanon would follow Jordan's lead quickly. Stewart replied that he had heard nothing of the Jordanian attitude since King Hussein's visit to London in June 1955.³⁹

Stewart's reply was supported by a report from Amman. On 15 October Duke, the British Ambassador to Amman, reported that there was no sign of any inclination by the Jordanian government to depart from their neutral attitude towards the Baghdad Pact. Their line, Duke said, still was that they should keep in step with other Arab states, as they would get nothing additional out of joining the Baghdad Pact except abuse from Egyptian propaganda. Their position was adequately secured by their existing treaties with Britain and Iraq, which had the same practical effects as would accession to the Baghdad Pact, without the disadvantages. Duke warned that when the Turco-Iraqi pact was first announced, Jordan had come dangerously near to toppling into the Egyptian camp. After recovering some degree of balance, however, the Jordanian government had adopted a policy of neutrality between Iraq and Egypt, and claimed to be attempting to reconcile the two groups in the name of 'Arab unity'. On 17 October the British Ambassador in Beirut also reported that the Turkish government was wrong in its estimate that Lebanon would join the Baghdad Pact if Jordan did. He argued that Lebanon could not and would not risk arousing hostility from Syria and Egypt unless some major new factor arose, such as accession by the United States to the Baghdad Pact.⁴⁰

Meanwhile, Eden had minuted to Macmillan on 14 October that the Turkish idea of bringing Jordan into the Baghdad Pact was 'worth considering', as Britain 'must tie to [her] Treaty all Arab States we now can', but Macmillan was hesitant. There was also a divergence of views between Zorlu and Macmillan as to how to deal with Nasser, and with Jordan's accession to the Baghdad Pact. On both issues, Macmillan was unwilling to exert pressure on Jordan and Egypt. On 20 October in a telegram to the British Ambassador in Ankara, Macmillan argued that the time had not yet come for a deliberate attempt to isolate Egypt, because Nasser had not yet committed himself very far politically with the Soviet bloc, and there was still a good hope of stopping Nasser's drift towards Russia. In his view, an attempt to intimidate Nasser by isolating Egypt would be likely to have a reverse effect and merely throw him into the arms of the Soviets. For these reasons, he proposed, they should be cautious now about trying to extend the northern tier southwards as a move against Egypt. Moreover, Macmillan argued that

Jordan's accession to the Baghdad Pact would also increase pressure for a guarantee to Israel, at a time when, as a result of Nasser's arms deal with Czechoslovakia, it was particularly difficult to resist. He claimed that the Jordanian government was already aware of his views. When King Hussein was in London in June 1955 he had been told that the British government would welcome Jordan's accession to the Baghdad Pact, and that if Jordan joined the pact the British government would be willing to consider sympathetically a proposal for the replacement of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1948 by a new special defence agreement under Article 1 of the pact. However, Macmillan thought that it would do well if the Turkish President, when at Amman, spoke in favour of Jordan's accession.⁴¹

The Turkish government also asked the United States to support Turkey's attempts to bring Jordan into the pact. On 26 October, at a NATO meeting in Paris, Turkish Foreign Minister Zorlu told Dulles that President Bayar planned to seek Jordanian accession to the Baghdad Pact during his visit to Jordan in the first week of November, and asked for Dulles's views. Dulles replied that up to the present time the United States had opposed a southward extension of the Baghdad Pact for two reasons: first, it would antagonize Egypt and, second, accession by countries bordering on Israel would be viewed as giving an anti-Israeli character to the pact and inhibit United States support for the pact. On the other hand, Dulles remarked, if the pact did not assume an anti-Israeli character but took the form of promoting a settlement of the Jordanian border, it might make a difference. Zorlu then advanced the idea of a United States security guarantee to Israel and simultaneous accession to the pact. Dulles told Zorlu that he would give him an answer when he had consulted his advisers. On 2 November the State Department informed the Turkish government that, although it would be difficult to convince the Jordanian government to accede to the Baghdad Pact immediately, the United States would not advise Jordan against accession to the pact. If Jordan asked for advice, the State Department would say that the United States considered the pact a useful instrument for the development of collective security in the Middle East and continued to give full support to it. However, the State Department pointed out that if Jordan joined the pact before a border settlement between herself and Israel, it would constitute a further obstacle to the United States' accession to the pact and its efforts to seek agreement on boundaries between Israel and the Arab states, which was the prime objective of the United States. The State Department added that US accession was not immediately foreseeable in any event and that the United States saw no reason why the Turkish President should not sound out the situation in Amman.⁴²

On 3 November the Turkish President began his five-day official visit to Jordan. During the visit, he and Foreign Minister Zorlu made a determined effort, with British support, to persuade King Hussein and his government to join the Baghdad Pact, principally on the strength of assurances that Jordan would derive considerable additional advantages, military, financial and political, to which the British government would be the main contributor. On

4 November Zorlu told the British Ambassador in Amman that they should play the hand together as they had in Tehran. Zorlu said he and the President had spoken to the King and found him inclined to agree to Jordan's accession to the Baghdad Pact. He urged that now was the time to make every effort to convince Jordan to join the pact, in order to counteract the activities of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which were increasing daily and having a disastrous effect in the Middle East. Egypt was even trying to undermine the Arab Legion. Zorlu stated that it was a matter of urgency to counteract their manoeuvres, and it would be no bad thing if relations could be broken off between Jordan on the one hand and Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the other. If Turkey and Britain did not act vigorously together, he pointed out, the army which Britain had built up in Jordan would within a year be of little military value, while the political effect might well involve the collapse of the throne in Jordan. Zorlu asked for Duke's support in representations to the Jordanian government, and suggested that the British government should use all inducements at its disposal, including an offer of a new Anglo-Jordanian Treaty and a supply of arms, to convince the Jordanian government to join the Baghdad Pact. Duke replied that he would take an early opportunity to speak to the Jordanian Prime Minister. On 6 November Duke had a meeting with the Jordanian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the British position regarding Jordan's accession to the Baghdad Pact. He reminded him of the request put forward by Tawfiq Abul Huda in March 1955, when he was Prime Minister, for the revision of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty, and of the reply that he had been given, namely that if Jordan acceded to the Baghdad Pact, Britain would be willing to consider sympathetically Jordan's wishes, and to replace the treaty by a special agreement under the Baghdad Pact. As for the provision of arms and military equipment, Duke said that as a member of the Baghdad Pact, Jordan would be entitled to more sympathetic consideration of her military needs.⁴³

According to Duke, Zorlu, at a meeting with the Jordanian Prime Minister and Court Minister on the same day, outlined the advantages which Jordan would gain by accession to the Baghdad Pact. Jordan would, he said, secure Turkey as an ally on the spot against any Israeli aggression, and the support of Turkey for the adoption of United Nations resolutions as a basis of negotiations for any settlement of the Palestine problem, since the Turkish government would be prepared to make an exchange of letters with the Jordanian government similar to those exchanged with the Iraqi government. Zorlu also emphasized that now was the time for Jordan to accede to the Baghdad Pact; the Jordanian government was already upset by the effects of Egyptian and Saudi propaganda, and tomorrow the target might be the throne itself. As to the Syrian threat, to which the Jordanian ministers referred, Zorlu replied that Turkey could, if necessary, take action that would be crippling to Syria. As for the chances of Jordan obtaining more financial and military assistance as a member of the Baghdad Pact, Zorlu said that while he was not in a position to give any firm undertakings on behalf of the

Western powers, he considered that Jordan's chances would be much better as a member of the pact than outside it. At a meeting on 8 November Zorlu told the British Ambassador that as a result of a further meeting the previous day, at which General Glubb, the British Commander of the Jordanian Arab Legion, was present, in addition to King Hussein and the Jordanian Prime Minister and the Minister of Court, he was convinced that the Jordanian government would join the Baghdad Pact, but was trying to obtain the maximum benefit from doing so. Fawzi al Mulki, the Court Minister, was, however, opposed to the accession of Jordan to the Baghdad Pact, and therefore encouraged extravagant demands in the hope that they would be refused, thus providing a good excuse for Jordan to disappoint the hope raised in the Turkish delegation of early accession. Fawzi al Mulki had apparently taken the line that Jordan could get all she wanted without joining the pact and should therefore drive a hard bargain before doing so. Answering Fawzi al Mulki's argument, Zorlu had said that it was not a matter of straight bargaining, and advised him not to attempt to drive a direct bargain with the United Kingdom. He drew a parallel with the case of Pakistan and American aid, which it had not been possible for the United States to give, owing to Indian objections, until Pakistan joined the pact. Zorlu told Duke that the demands which Jordan was making were dictated by considerations more of prestige than of practical needs, and suggested that it would turn the balance if the British government could make an immediate offer of some substantial amount of military aid.⁴⁴

While instructing Duke to support Turkish efforts, and underwriting the hints that a treaty revision and military aid would follow Jordan's accession to the Baghdad Pact, the Foreign Office was still hesitant. Shuckburgh's instruction to Duke was still that 'it would be wiser . . . not to initiate further pressure on the Jordanians until we had time to assess the impact on them of action already taken'.⁴⁵ Shuckburgh was more explicit in a memorandum to Deputy Under-Secretary of State Harold Caccia, and Minister of State, Anthony Nutting:

I fear it [i.e. Jordan's accession] may retard what I believe to be the incipient awakening of a desire on Abdel Nasser's part to mend his fences with the West . . . if the Jordanians resist the Turkish pressures; I hope we will not blame them publicly, or even privately . . . I see no reason why we should invite for ourselves a share in Turkish unpopularity . . . the Turkish visitors have been sullenly received in Amman by the populace.⁴⁶

Nutting, in his marginal note, agreed with every word of this.

However, according to Duke, the Turkish delegation did their best to allay the Jordanians' fears about the possible consequences of their accession to the Baghdad Pact. They argued most convincingly the general advantages to Jordan of joining the Baghdad Pact. Bayar made a good impression by his gift of eighty-five tons of wheat to the Palestinian refugees and of 2,000

Jordanian dinars to the poor and needy of Jordan. Yet, during the talks, the attitude of the Jordanian government was that they must have some tangible and concrete advantages to convince Parliament and public of the justification for Jordan's accession, since the Baghdad Pact was not popular in Jordan. Finally, on 9 November King Hussein told Duke that the Jordanian government was ready to join the Baghdad Pact, provided that it received the necessary backing from Britain. The King urged that the hands of the Jordanian government needed to be strengthened to resist Egyptian and Saudi influence in Jordan. He appealed for early delivery of the Vampire aircraft that had been promised by Britain as a preliminary gift in June 1955, which he believed would greatly strengthen his own and the government's hands concerning the Baghdad Pact. On 10 November Duke reported to the Foreign Office that the position which had been reached was that the King and the Jordanian ministers appeared to be on the brink of joining the pact, though they still had some anxiety about internal reactions. They had been swayed by the Egyptian and Saudi propaganda, particularly against the Arab Legion and the throne itself, which the Turks did not shrink from playing up. Their fears of Syrian and Lebanese action against their communications had been largely relieved by an undertaking that Turkey would not allow any nonsense there. The Turks had tried to reassure the Jordanians that their relations with Israel were a legacy from the former government, and that Turkey would henceforth support the Arab cause at the United Nations. They had explained that they had voted against the Arabs on the question of French North Africa because the Arabs had voted with Greece against Turkey over Cyprus. However, the main point of substance upon which Jordan really needed reassurance was military aid, and this the Turks were unable to give. The most they could do was to urge that Jordan would stand much better chances as a member of the Baghdad Pact than outside it, and therefore they had to talk to the British about it. Zorlu, on his return to Ankara, tried to persuade the British Ambassador there that it was essential to buy the accession of Jordan to the Baghdad Pact by increased military aid, as well as by a treaty revision.⁴⁷

Meanwhile, General Glubb, the British Commander of the Jordanian Arab Legion, had reported to the War Office that the Jordanian government was ready to enter the Baghdad Pact, though it was nervous of internal reactions stimulated by Egyptian propaganda and Saudi money, and needed to have some very definite and tangible gains to justify joining the pact. He believed that Jordanian accession to the pact might be the key to the preservation and extension of Britain's influence in the Middle East, and by this means Britain might be able to shut out Russia, at least from the Levant. The entry of Russia into the Middle East, he warned, was undeniable, and made the safety of Britain's interests extremely precarious. The Arab Legion was an insurance policy for the protection of British interests, and if the Legion went, the area would fall into chaos, and Britain's influence would disappear. Jordan's accession might also be the first step towards checking the spread of Egyptian influence, and swinging the balance of power against Egypt and her arms deal

with Czechoslovakia. The Egyptians and the Saudis were offering to supply Jordan with all the Russian arms and money that they wanted from Russia. Glubb was convinced that the ultimate Egyptian aim was to oust British influence and to tie Jordan to Egypt.⁴⁸

Duke agreed with Glubb that Britain faced a moment of crisis and opportunity. A push from Britain, in the shape of a firm commitment to treat Jordan generously, particularly concerning armaments, might well give Jordan the necessary courage to enter the Baghdad Pact. The atmosphere in Amman was rather tense. Events regarding Jordan's accession to the Baghdad Pact, he reported, were rapidly moving to a climax, and the government was on the verge of collapse. 'I am convinced', he said, 'that we [the British government] must act very soon if we are to do any good. Even a few days might make all the difference.' He added that this was not a matter of blackmail. It was a fact that any Jordanian government which came into the Baghdad Pact on no more than indefinite assurances would find its action repudiated by Parliament, would face violence, and would certainly be thrown out of office, making it all the more difficult, if not impossible, for any successor government to bring Jordan into the Baghdad Pact. He suggested that Britain should supply the ten Vampire aircraft, in order to hold the position.⁴⁹

The Foreign Office concluded that the need to strengthen the Baghdad Pact and support King Hussein outweighed the risk of upsetting Nasser, especially after the completion of the Egyptian–Syrian and Egyptian–Saudi Arabian mutual defence pacts in late October. On 19 November Macmillan instructed Duke to tell King Hussein that Britain would welcome Jordanian accession to the Baghdad Pact, and would provide ten Vampire aircraft as a 'gift' to show her continued intention to help Jordan build up her armed forces. She would consider further supplies of equipment when Jordan had joined the Baghdad Pact. At the Baghdad Pact Council meeting in Baghdad on 21–2 November Macmillan was also urged by the pact members to bring Jordan into the pact. They all believed that Jordan was sympathetic, but maintaining precarious neutrality between the pact and Egypt. They suggested that pressure should be put on Jordan to join. Menderes proposed that in dealing with the Jordanian government, they should use the carrot as well as the stick. He argued that Jordanian and Lebanese accession would give a positive example to all the countries of the Middle East.⁵⁰ After the Baghdad Pact meeting, hesitation by the Foreign Office concerning Jordan's accession to the pact vanished abruptly. Upon his return from the Baghdad Pact Council meeting, Macmillan wrote to Eden,

I very much fear that, if we do not get Jordan into the Baghdad Pact now, she will drift out of our control. The King and the Prime Minister are said to be ready to come in, but they want a price . . . I think we can work out a package offer, including a revision of the present Treaty [the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1948], which should suffice. We should then present this to them [the Jordanians] and more or less compel them to come in. In

the final result, we may have to say that we cannot continue our financial and military support for a country which will not stay on our side in grave issues; and then the Israelis will get them. The situation in the Middle East is being rapidly undermined and corrupted by Saudi money. The agents of King Saud, their pockets bulging with gold, are co-operating everywhere with the Communists against Western interest. What is in fact happening is that the United States Government treats the operation of Aramco as a purely commercial transaction and unlike ourselves does not feel any responsibility for ensuring that oil revenues should be wisely invested. In consequence the Saudis have no other outlet for their wealth than subversion; and it is no exaggeration to say that American (Aramco) money is being spent on a vast scale (about £100 million a year) to promote Communism in the Middle East. Nuri made a special plea to the conference [the Baghdad Pact Council meeting on 21–2 November] (directed particularly at the American observer) that means should be found of stopping, even for six months, the payments of Aramco to the Saudis. I think we have got to take this most seriously. It may be that the United States Government can do nothing to interfere with the activities of Aramco, who operate under a privately-negotiated concession. In that case we may have to see what the oil world can do. Alternatively, it may be a question of Anglo/US action to upset King Saud and remove this canker.⁵¹

The Foreign Office concluded that bringing Jordan into the Baghdad Pact would help to reinforce Iraq's position in the Arab world, and that it would also prevent Jordan from falling into Egypt's net. It also believed that the time had come for the United States to join the pact. Bringing the United States into the pact would be the biggest contribution to stability in the Middle East. Macmillan therefore sent a message to Dulles on 25 November, in which, after explaining the importance of the Baghdad Pact for Western interests in the Middle East, he told Dulles that Britain had decided that she 'must go all out in support of the pact and make it a reality and do her utmost to get new Arab entrants since Nuri's position could not be comfortable while he was alone'. He added that Britain was going to do everything she could to induce Jordan to come in. He also asked Dulles to encourage his government to join the Baghdad Pact, and to help stop King Saud's support for those who were acting against the Baghdad Pact and Western interests in the Middle East. On the same day, Winthrop Aldrich, the United States Ambassador to London, impressed upon the State Department that 'I believe we should do everything possible to act favourably on suggestions made in Macmillan's message including joining the Baghdad Pact as soon as possible'.⁵²

However, Dulles had already decided against Jordan's accession to the Baghdad Pact, since at the beginning of November Nasser had told the American Ambassador in Cairo that he was ready to discuss Palestine on a confidential basis if nothing new happened, i.e. if neither the United States nor any further Arab states should join the Baghdad Pact. Already, on 9 November,

Dulles had told Macmillan that the introduction into the pact of Israel's neighbours would present a new problem and make it more difficult for the United States to support the pact. Unless Lebanon, Syria and Jordan were ready to make peace with Israel, which he doubted, he rather wondered whether it was wise to bring them in.⁵³ Moreover, at a National Security Council meeting on 21 November, Dulles had said,

The concept of the so-called 'northern tier' of the Middle Eastern states had originally been his own concept. At the time that this concept had been accepted there was a general feeling that we could not hope to induce the Arab states south of this tier to join it. This view had in fact been borne out by events. The United Kingdom, which had been initially sceptical of the northern tier concept, had now switched to strong support of it; indeed, they were supporting it now more strongly than perhaps was wise. The British were now putting all their money on Iraq. In any event, the situation needed most careful reappraisal, because the British are tending to run away with it . . . We could not let the British make our policy for us in this area, or follow the British line blindly. [However], we should . . . cooperate with the British.⁵⁴

The American reply to Macmillan's message of 25 November turned up on 6 December, by which time the British government had already sent General Templer, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to Jordan with the aim of bringing Jordan into the Baghdad Pact. The American reply was unsatisfactory and very disappointing to the British government. Regarding the Baghdad Pact Dulles said,

An immediate move to expand the Baghdad Pact would probably deny us Nasser's cooperation. Therefore, I think we should wait a little before trying to bring in Jordan and Lebanon. If we are not successful in Egypt, we should endeavour to secure the adherence of those two states as soon as possible.⁵⁵

As regards the United States' accession to the pact, Dulles linked this question with the Arab–Israeli settlement, and said that

US adherence to the pact would probably have to be coupled with a security guarantee for Israel. My thought is that such a guarantee should not be extended prior to agreement on Israel's permanent frontiers at least on the northern Arab states. Otherwise, we would be giving up our strongest lever for use with Israel in obtaining a settlement.⁵⁶

Dulles was also unhelpful on the Saudi bribery problem in Jordan; Saudi Arabia had allegedly bribed some members of the Jordanian government to oppose Jordan's entry into the Baghdad Pact. Dulles said that it would be

difficult for the United States to reduce or control Saudi Arabia's injudicious use of its oil revenues, but it would be useful to exchange information regarding Saudi activities in the Middle East.⁵⁷

One day previously, on 5 December, Sir Gerald Templer, Chief of the British Imperial Staff, had left for Amman with instructions to negotiate the details of accession to the Baghdad Pact with the Jordanian government. His aim was to get the Jordanian government to commit itself to accession in a public statement. Alternatively he was to get a signed private agreement to that effect or, failing that, a 'letter of intent' signed by the Jordanian Prime Minister, declaring the intention of the Jordanian government to accede to the Baghdad Pact. In order to bring the Jordanian government to that point, Templer was to offer substantial economic and military aid to Jordan and the replacement of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1948 by a special agreement under Article 1 of the Baghdad Pact.⁵⁸

At his first meeting with the Jordanian Prime Minister and Minister of Defence on 7 December, Templer, unlike Bayar, adopted a somewhat aggressive posture. Reading virtually verbatim from a brief drafted by Shuckburgh, he outlined the political, economic and military advantages which Jordan would gain by joining the Baghdad Pact. This was then the choice before Jordan, he said: to join with the other pact powers in an alliance against Soviet expansion and communism, and thereby gain strong new allies and added security all around, or to follow a misconceived policy of neutralism which would open the whole of the Middle East to Soviet penetration and to the eventual overthrow of existing regimes.⁵⁹

Together with the stick, however, Templer also extended a carrot. He offered substantial economic and military aid. This included

- a an infantry brigade headquarters with its brigade transport company and two new infantry battalions which, together with an existing battalion, would form a new infantry brigade;
- b a medium artillery regiment;
- c funds and equipment for the conversion of an armoured car regiment to an armoured regiment – the capital cost of these items was about £4,490,000 with annual maintenance cost of £1,220,000;
- d an undertaking to start negotiations at once for the replacement of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty by a special agreement under the Baghdad Pact;
- e An undertaking temporarily to reinforce British forces in Jordan by additional RAF ground forces and to pre-position additional stores and equipment in Jordan for British forces which would be dispatched there in the event of Israeli aggression. This would be explained as a measure to increase Jordan's security in view of increased tension on Israel's borders.
- f As a further inducement, which was personal to the King, the British government proposed to appoint him an honorary air vice marshal in the Royal Air Force once Jordan joined the Baghdad Pact.⁶⁰

Although the first meeting proved satisfactory for both sides, the Jordanian Prime Minister, Said al Mufti, was not convinced, and seemed more preoccupied with Israel. Templer, however, noted that the Prime Minister was 'weak as water', and might be vulnerable to outside pressures, though it would be difficult to bring him to the sticking point. The first meeting with King Hussein, on the other hand, was more successful; the King was impressed and pleased with the amount of Britain's military and economic offer.⁶¹

However, it took Templer a long time to size up the situation in the Jordanian Cabinet. It was not until 10 December that it emerged clearly that there was a deep split on the issue between the East and West Bank ministers. The latter seemed 'captivated' by the Palestine problem and argued that accession to the Baghdad Pact would divert attention from what they considered to be Jordan's primary problem. Before long, it was evident that there was no longer any chance of securing a public commitment from the Jordanian government, and on 10 December, after two days of demonstrations against the Baghdad Pact and the government in Amman and the West Bank cities, Templer reported that he could not obtain Jordanian accession. The Prime Minister, Templer said, 'is a jelly who is frightened of his own shadow'. In addition, the Jordanian Cabinet now increased its demands: the supply of military aid and negotiations on revising the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty must begin before accession. An Israeli attack on Syrian positions in the Golan Heights on 12 December further agitated the West Bank opposition, and the following day the four Palestinian ministers (Na'im Abd al-Hadi, Azmi Nashashibi, Sam'an Da'ud, and Ali Hasna) resigned. On 14 December the Prime Minister, Said al-Mufti, resigned, too. 'I am afraid', Templer then wrote to London, 'I have shot my bolt.'⁶²

Templer's visit had exposed a deep split in Jordan, particularly between East and West Bank Jordanians. King Hussein attempted to preserve Jordan's ability to join the Baghdad Pact by instructing Hazza al-Majali, a former interior minister known as a supporter of the pact, to form a new government. The Palestinian ministers, however, refused to participate in such a government, and threatened a full-scale revolt. On 16 December extensive rioting erupted in various part of Jordan on both banks. By 18 December much of the country was in turmoil. On 19 December the King dissolved the Jordanian Parliament, and on the following day Majali submitted his resignation. The King's subsequent effort to set up a caretaker government under Ibrahim Hashim met with similar results. By the second week of 1956 a new government had emerged under Samir al-Rifa'i and promptly declared its opposition to accession. On 29 December Eden, in a marginal note on a report by Duke to the Foreign Office, wrote, 'we cannot bully them'. However, for a further two months a hope was expressed that Jordan might eventually join the Baghdad Pact.⁶³

Templer had achieved none of his aims. He listed the Jordanians' fear of Egypt, their preoccupation with the Palestinian problem, Israel's attack on the Syrian border on 12 December and the 'spinelessness' of the Prime

Minister, Said al-Mufti, as the reasons for the failure of his mission.⁶⁴ It was believed that Egypt had played a large part in the failure of Templer's mission. R. H. Mason, the First Secretary at Amman and Duke's deputy, reported that Anwar Sadat, a member of the Egyptian Revolutionary Command Council, had personally bribed the West Bank ministers to offer their resignations, thereby becoming 'one of the direct causes of the breakdown of the negotiations with the Jordan government'.⁶⁵ Anwar Sadat, in his memoirs, admits that 'it is no exaggeration to say that I played an important part in the frustration of the Baghdad Pact. In Jordan, for instance, although the King belonged to the same ruling family as that in Iraq, I was able to persuade him not to join the pact.'⁶⁶

Nasser, who had no objection to a northern tier defence concept without the Arabs, strongly objected to the policy of including Jordan in the Baghdad Pact. He saw the British attempt to bring Jordan into the Baghdad Pact as a breach of the assurance given to him by Eden in February 1955 that the Baghdad Pact would not be extended to other Arab countries. In return, Nasser had agreed to cease his attacks on the pact. He feared that if Jordan joined the pact, other Arab states would follow, and Egypt would lose her leadership and be isolated in the Arab world. He therefore intensified his propaganda campaign against Britain and the Baghdad Pact, and decided, together with the Saudis and the Syrians, to offer Jordan a subvention in place of the one she received from Britain.⁶⁷

The failures of the Templer Mission and the Alpha Project, and the dismissal of General Glubb

By the end of 1955 Nasser had succeeded in establishing a dominant position in the Arab world. Syria and Saudi Arabia were allies. In spite of strong Iraqi, Turkish and British pressure, Jordan and Lebanon stayed out of the Baghdad Pact. Iraq was isolated from the mainstream of Arab politics. As a result, Britain's position in the Middle East and the Baghdad Pact had suffered a setback. The Baghdad Pact had become increasingly the object of hostile attacks by Egypt and the neutralists. Dulles observed that the failure of the Templer mission constituted a most serious blow to British prestige in the Middle East. In the view of the United States State Department officials, the British had 'suffered their most humiliating diplomatic defeat in modern history'.⁶⁸ On 16 December Eisenhower had concluded that the 'British never had any sense in the Middle East . . . [I am] a little afraid of the results of the Baghdad Pact'. On 10 January 1956 he noted in his diary,

We tried to make the British see the danger of . . . pressuring Jordan to join the Northern Tier Pact [the Baghdad Pact]. They went blindly ahead and only recently have been suffering one of the most severe diplomatic defeats Britain has taken in many years.⁶⁹

On 12 January 1956 Macmillan, who became the Chancellor of the Exchequer on 21 December 1955, noted in his diary: 'we have lost the first round [to Egypt]. However, the game is not over yet; and we have got to win . . . for if we lose in the Middle East . . . we cannot live.'⁷⁰ On the other hand, from the time of the Templer mission onwards, Nasser apparently began to believe that the British government was trying to isolate Egypt. On 19 January he said to the American Ambassador in Cairo that the Baghdad Pact was 'a political ideology designed to isolate Egypt. One by one, nations in the Arab world would be brought into the Baghdad Pact until finally Egypt would be left alone to confront the Israelis.'⁷¹

To patch up the differences with Washington and get its support for the Baghdad Pact, Shuckburgh visited Washington from 13 to 19 January 1956, in order to prepare the ground for the coming summit between Eden and Eisenhower. However, discussion of the Baghdad Pact with State Department officials did not produce any solid results. The Americans thought that the Baghdad Pact was well supported as it was, and there was no need for further members. They gave three reasons why the United States could not accede to the pact: it would arouse the Soviets, exacerbate inter-Arab rivalries and reduce the United States' ability to influence developments in the area, particularly the Arab–Israeli situation. Shuckburgh suggested that the United States should increase its financial support for Iran and Iraq. The two sides, however, agreed that no more attempts would be made to introduce Arab members to the pact, in order to avoid another situation as in Jordan.⁷²

In late January Eden and the new Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, who replaced Macmillan on 21 December 1955, visited Washington to discuss the Middle East situation with Eisenhower and Dulles. Eden again sought a formal commitment by Eisenhower and Dulles to the United States' accession to the Baghdad Pact. Despite Eden's attempts to pursue a closer alignment of United States and British policies, the talks did not produce any results beyond those obtained at the preliminary meetings between Shuckburgh and the State Department. The United States leaders would not offer more than verbal support for the Baghdad Pact, although they agreed to participate on some of its committees. Dulles said that it was politically impossible for the United States to join formally until a security guarantee was given to Israel. Eden told Dulles that he understood the United States' difficulties about joining the pact, but he hoped that the communiqué after the meetings would contain some sympathetic reference to the Baghdad Pact, and that the United States would provide some more arms for Iraq. Dulles saw no difficulty about a sympathetic reference, and confirmed that the United States was considering providing more Centurion tanks for Iraq by offshore purchases and would be able to give some economic aid to Iran. The final communiqué accordingly noted that the Baghdad Pact had 'an important part to play in the economic and political development of member countries' and served 'the interests of the area as a whole'.⁷³

The Washington talks showed that there was a considerable gap between

Washington and London in their attitudes regarding the situation in the Middle East. Selwyn Lloyd, Macmillan's successor as Foreign Secretary, considered the talks to be 'rather disappointing'.⁷⁴ Subsequently, Eden bitterly recalled in his memoirs,

Having played a leading part to inspire the project, the United States held back while Britain joined it . . . The repeated hesitation perplexed and harassed our friends in Turkey and Iraq, Iran and Pakistan. They strengthened Russian and Egyptian will to destroy the pact and overthrow the governments which supported it.⁷⁵

However, Eden had then accepted that American accession was not forthcoming and therefore asked Dulles to increase American aid to the Baghdad Pact countries.

While Jordan's refusal to join the Baghdad Pact was the turning point, the most spectacular episode so far as Anglo-Jordanian relations were concerned was the dismissal of General Glubb, the Commander of the Arab Legion, in March 1956. In the aftermath of Templer's mission in December 1955, General Glubb became a target of the opposition, which demanded his removal together with the other British officers in the Arab Legion. Moreover, there was a growing tension between Glubb and King Hussein, who accused the former of turning the Arab Legion into a 'disorganized rabble'. Glubb termed King Hussein's leadership 'erratic and irresponsible'. King Hussein also criticized Glubb's administrative, strategic and fiscal policies, implying that he had deliberately blocked the promotion of Arab officers and neglected the Legion's stores. Glubb was also accused of using the Arab Legion as a vehicle for spreading pro-pact literature in the West Bank.⁷⁶

On 1 March King Hussein ordered the dismissal of General Glubb with two other British officers. The dismissal of Glubb, without prior warning, came as a great shock to the British government. Eden's urgent appeal to King Hussein to reconsider his precipitate action was refused, but the deadline for Glubb's expulsion from Jordan was extended to twenty-four hours. According to Johnston, the British Ambassador in Amman, there were two immediate causes. The first was King Hussein's fear that if he did not place himself at the head of the nationalist movement he would be overwhelmed by it. During the troubled period which followed General Templer's visit the King, and indeed the monarchy itself, had become targets of criticism on the ground that they were obstacles to the attainment of nationalist goals. The second was the pressure inside the Arab Legion for a more rapid transfer of command and responsibility to Arab officers. King Hussein had calculated that a dramatic anti-British gesture would place him in eminence. Within days, the Foreign Office concluded that they had no evidence of Egyptian or Saudi intervention in the dismissal of Glubb. The Foreign Secretary, Lloyd, said that the King's action had been taken on the advice of a group of young officers. He later confirmed that the principal reason for Glubb's dismissal

was the King's resentment at taking guidance and advice from a man who was so many years his senior. Even Eden, in his memoirs, admitted that the problem was the King's 'personal dislike which had grown to something of a phobia' about Glubb's control of Jordanian defence.⁷⁷

However, Eden was also convinced that Nasser had prompted King Hussein to remove Glubb. Since January Eden and the Foreign Office had collected reports of an Egyptian propaganda campaign against Glubb. Anthony Nutting, in his book *No End of a Lesson*, claims that

[Eden] put all the blame on Nasser, and brushed aside every argument that more personal considerations had in fact influenced King Hussein's arbitrary decision . . . He decided that the world was not big enough to hold both him and Nasser.⁷⁸

For Eden, Glubb's dismissal was the last straw. Such a blow to Britain's waning prestige as an imperial power could not be allowed to go unpunished. Nasser had prevented Jordan joining the pact and now he had got rid of Glubb. Nutting claims that for Eden, if Nasser succeeded, it would be the end of him. Nasser must therefore be himself destroyed.⁷⁹ On 3 March Shuckburgh wrote in his diary that '[Eden] is now violently anti-Nasser, whom he compares with Mussolini'.⁸⁰

Unlike the Foreign Office, Eden was in favour of a tough line, calling for withdrawal of the British subsidy and denunciation of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1948. On 5 March General Glubb warned Eden, 'It would not be right to come down on Jordan like a ton of bricks . . . Do not pull out, do not cut the subsidy, stop sending telegrams and let the dust settle down.'⁸¹ Also, Charles Duke, the British Ambassador in Amman, opposed withdrawal of the subsidy and denunciation of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1948, since 'action against General Glubb might have been directed only against him personally and . . . the manner of his dismissal might have been due to the awe in which he had come to be held in Jordan'.⁸²

The Foreign Office was trying to form a long-term policy. Shuckburgh argued that Jordan would repair her relations with Britain 'if we [the British] could find a way of letting them back through the Iraqis'. He suggested that Britain should ask for Iraqi assistance, through military forces and partial takeover of the British subsidy, to Jordan. On 5 March at a ministerial meeting, Macmillan, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, supported Shuckburgh and obtained agreement to the policy of an Iraqi-Jordanian axis. On the following day, the Cabinet approved the decisions of the ministerial meeting, though Eden still considered Egypt 'the main threat to [British] interests' in Iraq and the Persian Gulf. The choice lay between Eden's wish for quick, decisive and tough action and the Foreign Office's long-term policy of isolating Nasser.⁸³

On 10 March, at a meeting with Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Shuckburgh considered, 'If we have despaired of

Nasser, ought we to seek to overthrow him and if so, how? We must have full American cooperation in any such effort.' Also, Britain had to decide how Nuri Said and the Baghdad Pact could be sustained, how King Saud could be detached from Nasser, and whether the United Nations, and thus the Soviet Union, should become more involved in the area. On 12 March Nutting, regarding Shuckburgh's questions, suggested that in order to isolate Nasser, Britain should bring the United States into the Baghdad Pact, forge the Iraqi-Jordanian axis, detach Saudi Arabia from Egypt and install a pro-Western government in Syria. Nutting also suggested that military and economic aid, including funding for the Aswan High Dam, should be withheld from Egypt.⁸⁴ Eden strongly opposed the Foreign Office's proposals. He called Nutting and said,

What's all this poppycock you've sent me? I don't agree with a single word of it . . . What's all this nonsense about isolating Nasser or 'neutralising' him, as you call it? I want him removed, and if you and the Foreign Office don't agree, then you'd better come to the Cabinet and explain why. I don't want an alternative and I don't give a damn if there's anarchy and chaos in Egypt.⁸⁵

On 12 March Eden also told Shuckburgh that 'Nasser must be got rid of. It is either him or us, don't forget that'.⁸⁶

Meanwhile, Sir Alec Kirkbride, who had served as an adviser for more than thirty years to King Hussein's grandfather, King Abdullah, reported to the Cabinet after a visit to Amman,

The King's dismissal of General Glubb . . . was essentially an act directed against General Glubb personally; it was not designed to disrupt Jordan's relations with the UK; and both the King and the Prime Minister of Jordan were now most seriously disturbed at the possibility that a lasting breach might thereby be created in the relations between the two countries. What was immediately required was an assurance that the UK Government were not proposing to withdraw their support from Jordan and an offer to discuss the terms on which British officers might serve with the Arab Legion in the future.⁸⁷

On 13 March the Foreign Office concluded,

It is most important that we should bring the Iraqis and Jordanians much closer together . . . It would be better to proceed through closer bilateral arrangements between Jordan and Iraq in the first place, leading possibly to some trilateral arrangements to include us.⁸⁸

On 21 March Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd warned the Cabinet,

It was evident that [Nasser] was aiming at leadership of the Arab world; that, in order to secure it, he was willing to accept the help of the Russians; and that he was not prepared to work for a settlement of the Arab dispute with Israel . . . It was now clear that we could not establish a basis for friendly relations with Egypt.⁸⁹

However, instead of a direct confrontation with Egypt, Lloyd suggested, as Nutting did, a long-term policy of 'isolation':

We should seek increased support for the Baghdad Pact and its members. We should make a further effort to persuade the US to join the pact. We should seek to draw Iraq and Jordan more closely together. We should try to detach Saudi Arabia from Egypt by making plain to King Saud the nature of Nasser's ambitions. We should seek further support for Libya, in order to prevent the extension of Egyptian or Communist influence there. We should seek to establish in Syria a Government more friendly to the West. We should counter Egyptian subversion in the Sudan and the Persian Gulf. There were also possibilities of action aimed more directly at Egypt – e.g., the withholding of military supplies, the withdrawal of financial support for the Aswan Dam, the reduction of US economic aid, and the blocking of sterling balances. In all this we should need the support of the US Government. The first task would be to seek Anglo-American agreement on a general realignment of policy towards Egypt.⁹⁰

Finally, Eden accepted the Foreign Office's long-term policy of 'isolation', and authorized Lloyd to present the policy to the United States.

A further aspect of the British reaction to the dismissal of Glubb was to press for immediate American accession to the Baghdad Pact. On 5 March Eden wrote to Eisenhower,

There is no doubt the Russians are resolved to liquidate the Baghdad Pact. In this undertaking Nasser is supporting them and I suspect that his relations with the Soviets are much closer than he admits to us. Recent events in Jordan are part of this pattern.⁹¹

Asking for American accession to the Baghdad Pact and more Centurion tanks for Iraq by offshore purchase from Britain, Eden concluded that certainly 'we should accept, I think, that a policy of appeasement will bring us nothing in Egypt. Our best chance is to show that it pays to be our friends.'⁹²

By coincidence, Selwyn Lloyd was dining with Nasser in Cairo when the news of Glubb's dismissal came out. At dinner, Nasser proposed a truce in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the Baghdad Pact. If Britain froze the membership of the pact with no more recruitment of Arab states, Nasser would cease anti-British and anti-pact propaganda. Lloyd did not reject Nasser's proposal, but stated that he must consult other pact members and his

government first. For Britain, it would not be so difficult to accept Nasser's proposal, since she had already agreed with the United States the previous month that there would be no further Arab accessions to the Baghdad Pact. However, on 6 March 1956 Eden cabled Lloyd, who was in Karachi for a SEATO meeting, that Nasser's hopes of an Anglo-Egyptian truce over the Baghdad Pact were misplaced: 'I am absolutely sure', he wrote, 'We must do nothing to lead the members of the Baghdad Pact to think that we are considering limiting the membership. It could be fatal even to explore this with them at the present time.'⁹³

On the same day, Lloyd conferred with Dulles, but the request for American accession to the Baghdad Pact was once more refused. Dulles told Lloyd that he could not conceive of the Senate approving accession to the Baghdad Pact without a security guarantee to Israel. He also told Lloyd that there was still some hope that Nasser might take a more constructive attitude towards an Arab–Israeli settlement if there was a provisional standstill on Arab membership in the Baghdad Pact, since Nasser had given this indication during a conversation with Eisenhower's special representative, Robert Anderson, in Cairo on 5 March. Anderson, then on a secret mission to the Middle East in an effort to bring about an Arab–Israeli peace, had asked the State Department whether he could give such assurances to Nasser. Dulles informed Anderson on 6 March that he agreed with Hoover, the Acting Secretary of State, that there would be 'no further accession' to the Baghdad Pact.⁹⁴

On 6 March commenting on the talks between Lloyd and Dulles, Nutting told Eden, 'It does not seem that the Americans have yet hoisted in that appeasement of Nasser simply does not pay and that whatever "bargain" you make with him he will break.'⁹⁵

However, on 8 March, Dulles told Lloyd that unless

Nasser did something definite soon, we would have to 'ditch' him. By something definite, he meant an immediate cessation of propaganda against the Baghdad Pact and the West, acceptance of the Johnston plan, and definite steps towards a settlement of the Arab–Israeli dispute.⁹⁶

Also, on the same day, Dulles sent Eisenhower a memorandum in which, in case of Egypt's rejection of the Alpha Project, Dulles suggested US adherence to the Baghdad Pact; a settlement of the dispute between Britain and Saudi Arabia over Buraimi; a Congressional resolution authorizing Eisenhower to act with the United Nations to ensure Arab and Israeli compliance with armistice lines; substantial military support to Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan; and defensive arms to Israel.⁹⁷ Eisenhower endorsed Dulles's position and wrote in his diary,

We have reached the point where it looks as if Egypt, under Nasser, is going to make no move whatsoever to meet the Israelis in an effort to settle outstanding differences. Moreover, the Arabs, absorbing major consign-

ments of arms from the Soviets, are daily growing more arrogant and disregarding the interests of Western Europe and the US in the Middle Eastern region. It would begin to appear that our efforts should be directed towards separating the Saudi Arabians from the Egyptians and concentrating, for the moment at least, in making the former see that their best interests lie with us, and not with the Egyptians and with the Russians.⁹⁸

On 9 March in response to Eden's letter of 5 March, Eisenhower wrote, 'It may be that we shall be driven to conclude that it is impossible to do business with Nasser. However, I do not think that we should close the door yet on the possibility of working with him.'⁹⁹

In regard to the Baghdad Pact, Eisenhower wrote,

I question whether adherence by the United States to the Baghdad Pact now is the right answer. Measures apart from actual accession to the pact such as our recent decision to increase aid to Pakistan and Iran may be more effective support for our friends. This is particularly true when drawbacks to adherence are considered, such as the effect on the other Arab states and probable demands for arms and a security guarantee to Israel.¹⁰⁰

However, Eisenhower agreed to more Centurion tanks for Iraq and increased aid to Iran and Pakistan.

Meanwhile, President Eisenhower's special representative, Robert Anderson, who was on his secret mission to Cairo, had failed to obtain Nasser's agreement to an Arab-Israeli peace settlement (the Alpha Project). Nasser would only accept a settlement that provided a common Egyptian-Jordanian border, rather than transit rights or a 'corridor' across the Negev desert. However, the Israeli government would not consider cession of the Negev. On 12 March Anderson briefed Eisenhower and the Acting Secretary of State, Hoover, who agreed with Anderson that 'we should make every attempt to try to affect a split between Saudi Arabia and Egypt'.¹⁰¹ The next day Eisenhower wrote in his diary,

Nasser proved to be a complete stumbling block. He is apparently seeking to be acknowledged as the political leader of the Arab world. [In contrast, Israel was] a tiny nation, surrounded by enemies . . . [It had] a very strong position in the heart and emotions of the Western world because of the tragic suffering of the Jews throughout 2,500 years of history. I think we can hold Libya to our side through a reasonable amount of help to that impoverished nation, and we have an excellent chance of winning Saudi Arabia to our side if we can get Britain to go along with us. Britain would, of course, have to make certain territorial concessions [Buraimi], and this she might object to violently. If Saudi Arabia and Libya were our staunch friends, Egypt could scarcely continue

to intimate associations with the Soviets, and a certain Egyptian would no longer be regarded as a leader of the Arab world.¹⁰²

Washington was convinced that something must be done, and such was the concern that some officials now began to press for early United States accession to the Baghdad Pact. At a meeting with Eisenhower on 15 March, Admiral Radford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned that 'if the United States does not join the Baghdad Pact, there are signs the pact may disintegrate'. He added that if the United States joined the pact, current suspicions and criticisms could be lessened. At the same meeting, Admiral Burke, the Chief of Naval Operations, said, 'what is needed at such a time is someone else in a country who can become the leader'. He added, 'By dumping cotton, great pressure could be exerted [on Egypt]. Similarly, by curtailing oil output in some areas, the flow of money might be curtailed.' Eisenhower replied that 'perhaps [King] Saud could be the leader. [Saudi] Arabia is the religious centre. It could then take a leading role.'¹⁰³ The next day, Hoover, the Acting Secretary of State, told Eisenhower that 'Nasser appeared to be becoming a progressively increasing menace. We were therefore giving added attention to methods of splitting the Saudis away from the Egyptians and to obtain [*sic*] close relations with the Libyans.'¹⁰⁴ On 23 March in a letter to Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally recommended US accession to the Baghdad Pact without delay.¹⁰⁵ Meanwhile, the British Foreign Office informed the State Department of the Cabinet's adoption of a long-term policy against Nasser.

Finally, on 28 March, Dulles sent Eisenhower a memorandum, in which he set out new American policy as follows:

In view of the negative outcome of our efforts to bring Colonel Nasser to adopt a policy of conciliation toward Israel, we should, I believe, now adjust certain of our Near Eastern policies, as indicated below. The primary purpose would be to let Colonel Nasser realize that he cannot cooperate as he is doing with the Soviet Union and at the same time enjoy most-favoured-nation treatment from the United States. We would want for the time being to avoid any open break which would throw Nasser irrevocably into a Soviet satellite status and we would want to leave Nasser a bridge back to good relations with the West if he so desires. The policies indicated below would in the main be coordinated with the United Kingdom.¹⁰⁶

The first policy was with regard to Egypt. First, export licences covering arms shipments to that country would continue to be denied by the US and the UK, both of whom would also continue to delay the conclusion of negotiations on the High Aswan Dam being carried out at that time. The US would also continue to delay action on Egyptian requests for grain and oil, and would defer any decision on a CARE program for that country. Finally,

expanded radio facilities would be provided for Iraq to counter Egyptian broadcasts. Regarding other countries, the US and the UK were to begin negotiations with the Sudan with the aim of increasing their influence in that country, thereby minimizing Egyptian influence and control of the headwaters of the Nile. Efforts to stabilize the situation in Libya were to be intensified, and the UK was to be encouraged to maintain treaty relationships with Jordan and to help it to prevent a situation in which a pro-Egyptian *coup d'état* would be successful. Increased support was to be given to the Baghdad Pact; however, accession to it was not in question. Aid to pact countries would be accelerated, and support would be in the form of amending the nature of US participation in the Military Committee of the pact by assigning high-level officers who would be more active in military discussions than previous observers had been. The US was also to display more interest in the economic aspects of the pact by attempting to coordinate its aid programmes with the pact organization, and by sending high-level officers to represent the US in economic meetings related to the treaty organization. An intensified programme was to be carried out in Ethiopia with the aim of enhancing Western influence in that country, and steps would be taken to counter Egyptian and Soviet influence in Yemen and other Arab countries with the help of King Saud. The US would attempt to dissuade Israel from proceeding with work at Banat Ya'qub to divert the waters of the River Jordan or from taking other actions which might cause hostilities and thereby endanger the whole Western position in the region to Soviet advantage. Export licences for military items would continue to be denied indefinitely to Israel and adjoining Arab states, other than Saudi Arabia and Iraq. However, Western countries wanting to sell limited quantities of defensive arms to Israel would be regarded sympathetically. Pro-Western elements in the Lebanon would be strengthened by offering economic aid in the form of grants and loans for projects aimed at creating favourable public opinion. Finally, the strengthening of the American position in Saudi Arabia was considered to be of vital importance. The US wanted to assure King Saud that some of his military needs would be met, and others provided for subsequently. In addition to this, it was stated as necessary that planning for more drastic action be made should the above course of action not yield the desired effects.¹⁰⁷

On the same day President Eisenhower approved the new policy, under the code name 'Omega', and wrote in his diary,

I have authorized the State Department to start work on all of the attached points [in the Omega memorandum]. A fundamental factor in the problem is the growing ambition of Nasser, the sense of power he has gained out of his associations with the Soviets, his belief that he can emerge as a true leader of the entire Arab world, and because of these beliefs, his rejection of every proposition advanced as a measure of conciliation between the Arabs and Israel . . . [I hope] that we begin to build up some other individual as a prospective leader of the Arab world . . .

My own choice of such a rival is King Saud . . . [Saudi] Arabia is a country that contains the holy places of the Moslem world, and the Saudi Arabians are considered to be the most deeply religious of all the Arab groups. Consequently, the King could be built up, possibly, as a spiritual leader. Once this was accomplished, we might begin to urge his right to political leadership.¹⁰⁸

As a result, the United States abandoned the idea of working with Nasser to bring about an Arab–Israeli peace settlement. However, although the United States’ policy of working with Nasser was abandoned in parallel with a similar shift in British policy, the United States now opted to promote the regional role of Saudi Arabia rather than that of Iraq. The United States directed its efforts towards separating the Saudi Arabians from the Egyptians, and concentrating on making the former see that their best interests lay with the United States, not with the Egyptians and with the Russians.

As to US accession to the Baghdad Pact, on 28 March Dulles told Eisenhower that the United States could not join the pact without giving some security guarantee to Israel, and that if the United States was to do so, this would quickly knock out Iraq. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff remained in favour of United States accession to the Baghdad Pact. They felt that if the United States did not join the pact soon, it might disintegrate. The Department of Defense supported the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On 5 April, in a letter to Dulles, Charles Wilson, the Secretary of Defense, said that early United States accession to the Baghdad Pact, or an indication of the United States’ intention of acceding some time in the future, would do much to bolster the pact and would give substantial encouragement to its members. On 7 April Dulles told Eisenhower that the Senate would never ratify a treaty like the Baghdad Pact, though the United States had encouraged its formation. Dulles also said that ‘the British had taken it over and run it as an instrument of British policy’, which had caused the pact a tremendous amount of criticism. On 9 April Dulles had an extensive conversation with Admiral Radford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during which he set forth a number of considerations which in his view made it inadvisable at that time for the United States to join the Baghdad Pact. Dulles said that he had spoken to some Congressional leaders who had expressed the belief that the injection into the Congress of the question of joining the Baghdad Pact would create a major explosion and the Senate would not agree. To propose joining the pact and then to have it rejected by the Senate would be a death blow to the pact. Another reason, Dulles explained, was that while the original northern tier concept had been a regional grouping to resist Soviet penetration into the Middle East, it had become in reality a forum for Arab politics and intrigue. Also it had become a means for Britain to preserve her position in Iraq and in the Middle East. Britain also saw it as an instrument for supporting Nuri Said in his rivalry with Nasser and King Saud, as well as for supporting Iraq against Syria. In other words, Dulles argued, the

Baghdad Pact was dealing about ninety per cent with Arab politics. Until this situation was changed, he said, American accession would be widely interpreted in the Arab world as a move against Arab unity, and would thus seriously undermine the United States' position in the Middle East. Even if the United States joined the pact, Dulles said, the effect on Iraq would be extremely bad. The other Arab states would take the position that Iraq had sold out her solidarity with them against Israel for United States membership in the pact, and this might well result in toppling the Iraqi government. For Dulles, another consideration was that if the United States joined the pact there would be almost irresistible pressure to give Israel a security guarantee, which would permanently alienate the Arab states and cause them to join solidly with the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁹

On 23 April 1956, in reply to Wilson's letter of 5 April, Dulles wrote,

While the original Northern Tier concept envisaged a regional grouping to resist Soviet penetration, and the pact in fact serves this purpose to some extent, it has become deeply involved in Arab politics and intrigue. Until this situation is changed, American adherence would be widely interpreted in the Arab world as a move against Arab unity and the action would thus seriously undermine our position in several states where we are endeavouring to exert useful influence in solving the area's basic problems. Our signature to the pact would give rise to almost irresistible pressures to extend to Israel a security guarantee; I doubt that Senate ratification could be obtained for protecting Iraq without also protecting Israel. If this should happen, the net result would not benefit Iraq or the Pact.¹¹⁰

The American decision not to accede to the Baghdad Pact was taken on political grounds, in spite of the continuing enthusiasm of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Department for the pact on military grounds. However, as will be seen, pressures on the United States as to its accession to the Baghdad Pact continued both from the pact members and from some of the departments of the United States government itself.

The Tehran meeting of the Ministerial Council of the pact (16–19 April 1956)

As the Tehran meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council approached, pressure on the United States to join the pact was intensified. The four Moslem members of the pact pressed Britain and the United States to strengthen the pact, expressing their great disquiet about the deteriorating situation in the Middle East, and complaining that Britain and the United States had failed to respond with sufficient force in the face of the communist threat. They also expressed disappointment at the lack of aid, especially from the United States, for both economic and defence purposes.

On 24 March 1956 the prime ministers and foreign ministers of Turkey

and Pakistan and the foreign ministers of Iran and Iraq met in Karachi to discuss how the Baghdad Pact could be made more effective and, in particular, how more support could be obtained from the United States and Britain. They concluded that separate but similar *démarches* should be made by the four powers to the United States and Britain, warning that important and vital decisions would have to be taken at the Tehran meeting. Specifically, the United States should openly accede to the Baghdad Pact and give more military and economic aid to the pact countries, and positive steps should be taken to frustrate subversive activities against the pact. On 30 March 1956 the Turkish government gave the United States and Britain a memorandum, which proposed that the council meeting at Tehran should be used to study and reach decisions on the questions, in particular, of the United States' accession to the pact, the attitude to be adopted towards Egypt, and aid to pact members. Similar *démarches* were made by Pakistan, Iraq and Iran to the United States. In response, the United States assured Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq on 6 April that its firm support for the Baghdad Pact would continue, and that it would send to the Tehran Council meeting a special delegation, consisting of high-level officials in the political, military and economic fields, would participate in the Counter-Subversion and Liaison Committees, and would consider increasing military aid to the pact members and paying a contribution to the expenses of the pact's secretariat. Once again, however, the United States emphasized that it had no intention of joining the Baghdad Pact. Britain, too, urged the United States to take more active steps to support the pact. On 30 March Dulles received a message from Selwyn Lloyd emphasizing the importance of convincing the Moslem members that the pact was worthwhile. Lloyd proposed that the work of the Economic Committee should be emphasized at the Tehran meeting, and added that Britain was prepared to contribute to a Baghdad atomic training centre, to training nuclear scientists, to a regional centre for instruction in the use of agriculture machinery and to expert surveys of pest problems. However, Lloyd argued that something bigger was needed to impress the Moslem members, and suggested a technical assistance board to aid member countries with development projects. The Board would need a working fund totalling \$1–2 million for use over a period of years; the British government was prepared to make some contribution, and expected the United States to assist. On 7 April Dulles replied, agreeing that it was necessary to demonstrate to the pact's Middle Eastern members and other states in the area that the Baghdad Pact was worthwhile, and that particular attention should be given at the Tehran meeting to economic matters. He particularly emphasized the importance of joint projects which would involve more than one country, such as communications, transport, trade and development of water resources. He added that the United States was prepared to send to Tehran high-level political, military and economic observers who would participate actively in discussion of area problems to the extent the Council wished.¹¹¹

Britain's concern to promote economic aspects of the pact reflected aware-

ness that Britain could do little to strengthen the pact militarily. The truth was, as Anthony Head, the War Minister, had noted in February 1956, that Britain had neither the men nor the money to make the Baghdad Pact effective militarily. He had also noted that 'no matter how successful we may be in evading at this stage the issue of how far we are prepared to back the pact with forces and money, it seems inevitable that we will be forced into the open before long'. He suggested that military planning should be restricted to what was realistic and practical, although measures would have to be taken to keep the pact's momentum going. According to Head, it was politically and militarily unacceptable for Britain to allocate forces for the defence of the pact area, since the forces and base facilities in the Middle East were being rapidly reduced in late 1955 and early 1956. Moreover, an effective and rapid movement of mobile forces into the north-east of Iraq was no longer seriously contemplated as a practical proposition by the Ministry of Defence, since deployment was expensive in manpower and resources. The Ministry of Defence felt that Britain should only risk war in the Middle East if a NATO or Baghdad Pact ally was attacked by the Soviets, to secure oil supplies, to ensure the use of the Suez Canal, or in cooperation with a United Nations resolution. Britain, as Devereux notes, would avoid more than token commitments to the pact; though she was prepared to set up the pact machinery and turn it into a functioning organization, she would not admit that she was no longer capable of defending the Middle East, and much of her commitment to the pact was based upon bluff.¹¹²

The Tehran meeting of the Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact took place from 16 to 19 April 1956, under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister of Iran, Hussein Ala, and was attended by the prime ministers and foreign ministers of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey, and by the Minister of Defence of the United Kingdom, Sir Walter Monckton. The United States was represented by a delegation of observers headed by Loy Henderson, Deputy Under-Secretary of State. Following the opening session, Henderson noted great concern on the part of the Moslem members about the situation in the Middle East and the prospects for the pact's future. They all revealed feelings of frustration, worry, fear and puzzlement. They were particularly puzzled over the attitude of the United States, and stressed that the United States' accession to the Baghdad Pact was essential. The Iranian Prime Minister, Hussein Ala, expressed his gratification at progress made in organizing the Baghdad Pact since the Council meeting in Baghdad, but urged that the pact must achieve two interrelated objectives: (a) to increase the defensive capability of member states in order to be able to deter aggression, and (b) to take effective steps to improve the conditions of the people and raise their standard of living. As at Baghdad, Nuri Said referred to the danger of communist subversion in the Middle East. Communists, he said, were exploiting the Syrian, Egyptian, Arab-Israeli and Palestinian refugee problems for their own ends. He stressed the need for immediate measures to combat subversion, but urged that these measures should take into account the grievances of

the Middle East, which communists were now exploiting. In particular, he emphasized the need for an early settlement of the Palestine and Kashmir disputes. Nuri also expressed the hope that equipment and technical assistance from the United States and Britain would be forthcoming to meet member states' deficiencies. The Pakistani Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali, spoke of the need for increased defensive and productive capacities and for outside assistance to accomplish pact objectives. He pressed for action on Kashmir, adding that existing Pakistani–Indian tension made heavy demands on the defensive capacity of Pakistan and precluded her from making a full contribution to the objectives of the Baghdad Pact. He concluded that the United Nations' resolution calling for a plebiscite should be implemented if the Kashmir dispute was to be resolved. Menderes, for his part, analysed the international situation and emphasized the subversive activities by Egypt and the Soviet Union against the Baghdad Pact.¹¹³

Monckton, the British Defence Minister, gave a brief review of the United Kingdom's position, and announced the aid earmarked for the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Centre, with an offer of £250,000 for technical assistance by British experts and training fellowships in Britain. Henderson reaffirmed United States support for the Baghdad Pact and accepted full membership of the Economic, the Counter-Subversion and the Liaison Committees, whose terms of reference provided for the extension of membership to non-signatory governments at the discretion of the Council. He stated that his government was prepared to pay a one-sixth share of the pact's annual budget, and to provide eight officers for the Secretariat. He also announced his government's intention to establish a small military liaison group with the Baghdad Pact on a permanent basis. Henderson added that the United States would give sympathetic consideration to methods of assisting in implementing economic development activities involving more than one country, but made it clear that United States' membership in the Economic Committee did not imply any additional commitment with respect to economic aid, either through the Economic Committee or bilaterally. The meeting proceeded to set up the Liaison and Counter-Subversion Committees, whose establishment had been agreed at the Baghdad meeting. The Liaison Committee proposed to gather information and to exchange it among the member countries. Its main task was to produce a detailed 'assessment of communist subversion in the Baghdad Pact area', for use by the Counter-Subversion Committee. The Counter-Subversion Committee would deal with the subversive threat to the member countries. It would study the information gathered by the Liaison Committee and advise on methods for promoting activities in the Middle East favourable to the pact and its members, would counter any harmful activities that might originate in neighbouring and other countries opposing the pact, and would make recommendations to the council on these matters.¹¹⁴

The Council, having considered the reports and recommendations of various committees and reviewed the international political situation, decided, following the Economic Committee's recommendations, that the Secretariat

should coordinate technical assistance offers and the exchange of technical personnel and information between member states. The Council stressed the desirability of joint projects between two or more members in such fields as communications and industry, and it was agreed that a special committee should study the possibility of joint development of the water resources of the Tigris and Euphrates basin. In addition, the Economic Committee would undertake a detailed study of the pattern of agricultural and industrial production and trade, with a view to promoting trade among the pact members. Also, in Tehran, the Military Committee continued its planning meetings. Discussions centred on the forces that each country would assign to the pact, a point which the British had hoped to avoid since they were not sure themselves as to what they had available. The British representatives therefore stressed their imminent nuclear capability, which would be based on Cyprus and operate from bases in Iraq. As Devereux notes, the British tried to make the regional members of the pact think that Britain would help them in a global war. The British tried to hide their weakness in the Middle East from their pact allies, 'and actually made up paper promises of reinforcement in wartime'.¹¹⁵

The meeting's final communiqué, released to the press on 20 April, drew special attention to the importance of joint projects, long-term economic needs and the work of the Economic Committee. Plans were approved for the establishment of training centres in the agricultural and health fields, coordination of technical assistance, study of joint regional development projects and examination of possibilities for trade expansion within the pact area. Also, considerable stress was laid on the need to promote a wider understanding of the purposes of the pact in order to counter subversive attacks from neutralist and communist sources. The communiqué indicated that it was necessary to implement the resolutions without delay, particularly those relating to projects which were likely to yield early and visible results and to promote the well-being of the people in the pact area. No doubt, these objectives could contribute to the defensive strength of the pact and promote cooperation between the members in the long term, but the communiqué did not indicate a sense of urgency in building defences. At the end of the Council meeting in Tehran, according to Henderson, the four Moslem members of the pact were somewhat more relaxed, particularly when it was announced that the United States was willing to participate further in pact activities. They welcomed United States participation in the Economic, the Liaison and the Counter-Subversion Committees as a concrete example of the United States' interest in the pact's aims, though there remained a consensus that the Baghdad Pact could be put on a firm foundation only if the United States joined it fully. Therefore, after the Tehran meeting, pressures on the United States regarding its accession to the Baghdad Pact continued, both from the pact members and, as will be seen, from some of the departments of the United States government itself.¹¹⁶

6 The decline of the Baghdad Pact (1956–8)

The effects of the Suez crisis on the pact

It is not the object of this chapter to give a full account of the events that led to the Suez war. The aim is rather to examine the effect of the war on the Baghdad Pact.¹ For many years Egypt had aimed to build a high dam at Aswan, since this project was of the utmost important to her economy. However, a project on this scale required foreign finance. In December 1955 the United States and the United Kingdom had agreed to finance the project, but on condition that Egypt's budget and her balance of payments were placed under their supervision. Nasser refused the proposed conditions, and this stance, coupled with his anti-British propaganda, his attacks on the Baghdad Pact, his arms deal with the Czechs in September 1955 and his recognition of communist China in April 1956, gradually undermined British and American support. The four Moslem powers of the Baghdad Pact had also pressed the United States and the United Kingdom not to finance the project, since they feared that they would get less economic aid than they were already receiving. As a result, on 19 July 1956 Dulles publicly announced that he had decided to withdraw the loan offer for the Aswan dam project. Two days later the British government followed the American example. Nasser retaliated quickly and on 26 July he declared the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. This decision opened the way for the Suez war.

On 27 July 1956, at a Cabinet meeting, Eden said that if the Western powers did not 'take the necessary steps to regain control over the canal [it] would have disastrous consequences for the economic life of the Western powers and for their standing and influence in the Middle East'.² On the same day, Eden wrote to Eisenhower to inform him of Britain's position. Eden wrote, 'we cannot afford to allow Nasser to seize control of the canal in this way'. He warned that if a firm stand were not taken, 'our influence and yours throughout the Middle East will, we are convinced, be finally destroyed. We must be ready in the last resort, to use force to bring Nasser to his senses'.³ The next day Eisenhower informed Eden that he was adamantly against the use of force, sending Under-Secretary of State Robert Murphy to London for consultations and calling an international meeting of the 'maximum number

of maritime nations affected by the Nasser action'. On 28 July Murphy arrived in London and had a series of conversations with Eden, Macmillan and Lloyd. After his talks, he became convinced that the British were prepared to use force. The following day he informed Eisenhower of British intentions. Eisenhower was alarmed and immediately sent Dulles to London.⁴

Dulles arrived in London on 1 August. He would try to 'dissuade [the British], perhaps a bit at a time, gradually deflecting their course of action'. He told Eden that he was in favour of an international conference to pressure the Egyptian government to assure the 'efficient operation of the canal'. Eden agreed to call an international conference in London on 16 August. At the conference, Dulles called for 'the creation of international agreements under which all parties would participate in a Suez Canal board responsible for operating the canal'. Dulles's plan also recognized the sovereign rights of Egypt and the safety of the canal as an international waterway. The conference accepted Dulles's proposals and appointed Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies to head a delegation to present the proposals to Nasser. However, on 4 September Nasser rejected the proposals.⁵

As a result of the failure of the Menzies mission, Dulles proposed a new plan, the so-called Suez Canal Users' Association (SCUA), which was formed on 12 September. Its main purpose would be to operate the canal, including the coordination of ship traffic and the collection of tolls. However, SCUA failed to solve the canal problem. Dulles himself did not believe in SCUA. He saw it primarily as a dues-collecting agency on behalf of Egypt, thus disappointing Britain. On 8 September he told Eisenhower that he had no other alternative to prevent the British from resorting to force. On 2 October, in a press conference, Dulles stated in regard to SCUA, 'There is talk about "teeth" being pulled out of it. There was never "teeth" in it, if that means the use of force.'⁶

As a result, the British government decided to use force against Egypt and were looking for ways and means to attack. Coincidentally, France and Israel were considering a common military action against Egypt. France disliked Nasser because of his involvement in the Algerian war, and also had shares in the Canal Company. On 14 October the French informed the British of Franco-Israeli plans to gain control of the Suez Canal. On 24 October representatives of France, Britain and Israel met in Sèvres outside Paris and signed a secret protocol which worked out the full details of a proposal for the military occupation of the Suez Canal.⁷

On 29 October in accordance with the 'protocol of Sèvres', Israeli forces launched an attack against Egypt. On the following day Britain and France summoned both Egypt and Israel to withdraw their forces from the Canal Zone and voted against a ceasefire in the United Nations. On 31 October Egypt rejected the summons, and France and Britain launched an air attack on Egyptian military targets. On 2 November, the United Nations adopted a resolution calling for a ceasefire, withdrawal of Israeli, French and British forces and the reopening of the canal, but Britain and France ignored the

resolution and continued their attack against Egypt. On 5 November their parachute regiments began occupying the Canal Zone, particularly at Port Fuad and Port Said.⁸

However, the Soviet threat to attack Britain and France, the lack of support from the United States and the lack of support for the British government at home together with an actual lack of solidarity within the British government itself, and combined with very strong hostility throughout the world, forced the British government to accept the United Nations call for a ceasefire on 6 November. As a result, Britain not only lost the war, but also lost much prestige in the Arab world. Of all the Arab states, Iraq's position was the most difficult. Her special ties with Britain as well as her membership of the Baghdad Pact made Iraq and her leaders the target of Arab attacks. The grave situation in Iraq led the Foreign Office to fear that Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact was imminent. Although the pact had played no part in the momentous events that led to the Suez war, it had been a contributing factor in the quarrel because of Egyptian criticism of it. The Suez war posed serious problems for the pact, which came close to overthrowing the government of its only Arab member, Iraq.⁹

Iraq's role in the Suez crisis requires some comment. When Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal on 26 July Nuri Said was in London accompanying King Faisal on a state visit to Britain. Eden was fearful of a new crisis in Iraq, since all Iraqi leaders were abroad at the same time. On 29 July Eden wrote to Lloyd saying,

Once again here the key is Iraq. I am not happy about Nuri and the King and the Crown Prince all being away at the same time. The next fortnight is likely to be critical. Do you think that Nuri should return, or that the possibility should at least be mentioned to him? I suppose he knows that we intend to be firm, but I remember the coup in 1941, when he and Abdullilah were thrown out. I would rather that the King and Nuri were both on the spot.¹⁰

On Eden's instructions, Sir Michael Wright, who was in London with the Iraqi visitors, met Nuri Said and the Crown Prince on 30 July 1956. Nuri was ready to go back to Baghdad if this proved necessary, but he assured Wright that he was not worried about the internal situation in Iraq because most of the Iraqi politicians were on holiday outside the country and the students were not in the schools. He was also satisfied about the army. The Crown Prince supported Nuri and saw no reason to go back to Baghdad before the end of the visit. The discussions then turned to Nasser. Nuri was concerned at Nasser's increasing influence in the Middle East, and wanted Britain to stand up to Nasser and cause him to fall. Wright asked him for his thoughts about the possible use of force; Nuri fully supported the idea. However, Nuri warned that if any action were to be taken against Nasser it must not be in conjunction with or to the benefit of Israel. He was from the beginning to the

end against bringing Israel in. He was also against French participation in any action against Nasser, at least initially, because of France's hostile attitude to the Baghdad Pact and her policies in Algeria, but he changed his mind in the course of the talks in London. However, he still insisted that Israel should be kept out of any military action, warning that bringing Israel in would mean a full-scale disaster not just for Iraq, but for everybody concerned with the Middle East. He was assured by the British government that his warning would be considered. In the middle of August the Iraqi leaders returned to Baghdad, apparently confident that Britain would keep Israel out of the crisis.¹¹

Nuri also claimed that Britain was not giving enough support to the Baghdad Pact against Nasser. On 25 July he had urged Lloyd to bring Sudan and Kuwait into the Economic Committee of the pact. Lloyd was against such a proposal because he feared a similar situation might arise in these countries as had already happened in Jordan in December 1955. Further, there was a general understanding between Britain and the United States that no more Arab states would be brought into the pact. The Foreign Office believed that the effect of the accession of new members like Sudan, Kuwait, Tunisia and Morocco would be to weaken rather than strengthen the Baghdad Pact unless Britain was prepared to put more money into the Economic Committee. In fact, Britain was not ready to do so.¹²

The Israeli attack on Egypt on 29 October was a great shock for Nuri. He had confidently expected that Britain would consult her partners in the Baghdad Pact before taking any military action. The Anglo-French ultimatum to both sides on 30 October was another shock for him, but he still thought that the Anglo-French action would be a police action against both sides. However, the fact was that Britain and France took armed action against Egypt alone. This action, Wright warned, placed Nuri, as well as the King and Crown Prince and all those in Iraq who had actively pursued a policy of friendship with Britain, not only in serious political difficulty but in danger of their lives, and threatened the continued existence of the regime and the monarchy in Iraq.¹³

Political stability in the other Moslem countries of the Baghdad Pact was not endangered, but the blocking of the canal, the Israeli attack and the Anglo-French intervention, and the sympathy of all Moslems for their brothers, demanded action by their governments. Therefore President Mirza of Pakistan called a meeting of the Moslem members of the pact in Tehran on 3 November.

The Tehran meeting of the Moslem members of the pact (7–8 November 1956)

In order to consider the situation created by the Israeli aggression against Egypt and the Anglo-French intervention, the four Moslem members of the Baghdad Pact met in Tehran during the first week of November 1956. Before

leaving Karachi for an official visit to Tehran on the morning of 31 October, some hours after the Anglo-French warning of their intended intervention in Egypt, President Mirza of Pakistan decided, without prior consultation with the other three powers, to propose by telegram to Ankara and Baghdad that the prime ministers of Turkey and Iraq should join him and the Iranian government in Tehran for urgent consultations. Menderes reported that on his doctor's orders he could not go to Tehran until 5 November. This, however, did not prevent the Iranians and Pakistanis from pressing Menderes to accelerate his arrival because they had told Nuri Said that Menderes would arrive on 3 November, with the result that Nuri arrived on that day much irritated to find that the conference would not begin for at least two days. In spite of the tense situation in his country, Nuri's arrival clearly indicated the importance that he attached to the Tehran meeting – he hoped to play an active role in ending the war. The first thought of the Pakistani and Iranian representatives was that the four Moslem powers might engage in an attempt at mediation. This notion was at first encouraged by the Americans, since they felt that any pressure which could be brought to bear on the British and the French might be useful. With the passage of the United Nations resolution calling upon Britain and France to accept a ceasefire, however, American pressure relaxed, and the prospective participants in the meeting began to think rather more in terms of advice which they could offer regarding the shape of a future settlement.¹⁴

Nuri had arrived with a proposal for which he had received Cabinet approval before leaving Baghdad. The proposal was to the effect that the four powers should recommend

- a the early restoration of the independence and territorial integrity of Egypt,
- b the immediate release of Egyptian prisoners held by Israeli or Anglo-French forces,
- c early withdrawal of Israeli forces to behind the 1948 armistice line and
- d agreement to work for a definitive solution of the problem of Palestine.¹⁵

In Tehran the representatives of Iraq, Iran and Pakistan indicated that if their policy, as enunciated in Nuri's proposals, could not be accepted by the British government, it might be necessary for them to effect a temporary separation from Britain. This did not prevent them from toying with the idea of a formal council meeting which Britain should join. On 3 November the Shah told Stevens that if it came to the worst he was quite sure that later on arrangements could be made without too much difficulty for Britain to associate herself once again with the pact. These remarks appear to have been based on ideas brought by Nuri Said which reflected the very difficult position in which the Iraqi government found itself. Nuri thought that in order to withstand public opinion, the Iraqi government should act together with other Moslem powers of the pact to temporarily separate Britain from the pact. All this led

to the plea that Britain should accept their proposals immediately. With some reluctance, since the Turkish government had not yet had an opportunity of commenting on them, they produced a copy of the proposals and gave it to Stevens informally. Stevens commented that one of the main objectives of the three governments (Pakistan, Iran and Iraq) in Tehran was to show solidarity among the pact members and strengthen the pact. They meant to prevent it from floundering as a result either of differences with the British or of internal pressure upon Pakistan and Iraq, particularly the latter, to leave it. Yet despite this, Stevens commented, their main aim seemed to be to save their own futures rather than the future of the Baghdad Pact.¹⁶

In the light of Nuri's proposals, the representatives of Iraq, Pakistan and Iran prepared a draft communiqué calling for an immediate ceasefire, withdrawal of all Israeli troops behind the Israeli border and the withdrawal of British and French forces, a guarantee of Egyptian territorial integrity, and a definitive settlement of the Israeli border along lines projected in 1947. Final acceptance of the communiqué would await the arrival of Pakistani Prime Minister Suhrawardy on 6 November, and the Turkish Prime Minister Menderes on 7 November.¹⁷

On 5 November the Shah and the Pakistani President, Mirza, told Chapin, the American Ambassador to Tehran, that the United States should join the Baghdad Pact at an early date, and urged the United States to exert every possible pressure on the United Kingdom to accept Nuri's proposals. Mirza stated that if the British refused to accept, not only would the Baghdad Pact break up, but he would seriously advocate Pakistani withdrawal from the Commonwealth.¹⁸

In the end, Menderes turned up on 7 November. Although the official reason for the delay was his health, Menderes was in fact hoping that the course of events in Egypt would cool the excitement of his colleagues and facilitate agreement on a declaration of policy that would not be offensive to Britain. By the time he arrived, tension had relaxed considerably as a result of the news of the allied ceasefire in Egypt on 6 November. It is probable that a communiqué incorporating the proposals shown to Stevens would have been issued earlier had it not been that the Turks arrived with their own draft and angered the others by insisting on setting up a special drafting committee for the purpose of having their draft considered and incorporated. Menderes strongly opposed the idea of freezing Britain's participation in pact activities. By the evening of 7 November it was obvious that if the four powers' communiqué was to have the effect that its authors intended, namely to show that they had influenced and were influencing the British action, and to use that fact to steady their own public opinion, they would have to give up the idea of freezing Britain's participation in the meetings of the pact. They did so. Finally, on 7 November, the final communiqué was issued by the prime ministers of four Moslem powers. Before it was issued, in accordance with the British government's request, some modifications were made to meet Britain's general requirements. Britain succeeded in eliminating the word 'unwarranted'

and replacing it with 'regrettable' as a characterization of the Anglo-French attack. Otherwise the wording was not little changed, nor did the British make more than a perfunctory attempt to do so.¹⁹

The four powers condemned the aggression committed by Israel in launching an attack on Egypt with the intention of occupying Egyptian territory, and considered that Israeli troops must be withdrawn immediately to the armistice line and that all Egyptian prisoners taken by Israel must be released. They laid stress on their intense loyalty to the United Nations and their demand for the governments of Britain and France to stop hostilities, withdraw their forces from Egypt and fully observe and respect the sovereignty and independence of Egypt. They emphasized the urgent necessity of solving once and for all the Palestine dispute and proposed the United Nations resolution of 1947 as a basis for negotiating a settlement. They expressed their considered view that the Suez Canal dispute should be settled through negotiations with Egypt under the auspices of the United Nations. It was significant that these proposals all related to the position which it was hoped would prevail at the termination of brief hostilities in Egypt. There was no suggestion of mediation and no request for a ceasefire. The latter, in fact, was reinserted in the final communiqué, but only at a time when a ceasefire was clearly in the wind and with the object of getting credit for the four powers for something which was almost certainly going to happen soon in any case. According to Stevens, the British Ambassador to Tehran, the Shah was quite determined to see that if any credit was going to the Baghdad Pact powers he should get it. He would naturally use the opportunity to build himself up in his country. The British government replied publicly that it was 'most appreciative' of the initiative of Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey: 'the views offered both individually and collectively by these governments have weighed heavily in the decision to bring an end to military action in Egypt'. The four Moslem powers expressed themselves as pleased by the British statement that the joint action of the four had affected the decision for a ceasefire order on 6 November. In fact, this was a lie as no joint approach had been made by the four powers to the British government.²⁰

On 10 November Ardalan, the Prime Minister of Iran, told the Iranian Senate,

Our efforts [to bring about a ceasefire] . . . were an achievement which brings prestige to the four governments. We declare to the world that, though we may be weak little governments, we are nonetheless firmly attached to certain principles and we do not want them to be sacrificed. The [British] government, which is also a member of our pact, should observe these principles, and it has done so.²¹

From the British point of view, the Tehran meeting had served a useful purpose. It saved the Baghdad Pact. It gave an opportunity for a pooling of ideas between the four Moslem members of the pact at a time when every-

thing was in the melting pot. If they had not gathered together they might have acted unilaterally and contradictorily, and if Nuri had been in Baghdad rather than in Tehran during the period in question, it might have been much more difficult for him to resist demands that Iraq should leave the Baghdad Pact altogether. Turkish support and Britain's own constructive attitude, in conjunction with the ceasefire in Egypt, helped her to preserve her relations with the other members of the pact. The Tehran meeting also served another purpose, that of keeping Pakistan in the Commonwealth. Suhrawardy, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, was under pressure from his own party, and on 3 November he had made a statement, in which he threatened to leave the Commonwealth. President Mirza's attitude was robust. He regarded his prime minister's threat as a bluff, the strongest card to play in talking to the British government. Many constitutional processes would have to be gone through before leaving the Commonwealth. The best thing to do, he said to Stevens, was to get Suhrawardy out of Pakistan and away from the influence of his own party as soon as possible. Mirza then sent the presidential plane to pick up Suhrawardy and remove him from the overheated political atmosphere of Karachi. Suhrawardy arrived in Tehran on the morning of 6 November. By the time they both returned to Pakistan the agitation there was dying down.²²

Stevens commented that the other impressive feature of the meeting was the continued faith in the pact displayed by all four powers. For them the pact was both symbol of solidarity and absolute reality. It was the keystone of their foreign policy and a prophylactic against their constant obsession – Soviet aggression.²³ At the Tehran meeting the four Moslem powers of the pact also decided, however, to postpone the forthcoming council meeting at Karachi, due in January 1957, because of mounting anti-British sentiment throughout the Middle East. In particular, the Iraqi government and public opinion were not fully satisfied with the results of the Tehran meeting. No condemnation had been made of the Anglo-French aggression against Egypt and Iraq's demand to suspend Britain's membership in the Baghdad Pact had been refused. Even so, on 9 November Gallman, the American Ambassador in Baghdad, reported to the State Department that Iraqi Foreign Minister Burhan al-Din Bashayan had told him that anti-British and anti-government feelings were rapidly mounting in Iraq.²⁴

At the conclusion of their meeting in Tehran all four Moslem prime ministers had posed the question of the next step and had agreed that United States accession to the Baghdad Pact was most important in view of the Soviet menace. On 9 November they had a meeting with Chapin, the American Ambassador in Tehran, and individually and collectively bluntly stated that now that the United States elections, which had taken place on 6 November, were over and President Eisenhower had been triumphantly re-elected, there appeared to them to be no reason why the United States should not join the Baghdad Pact immediately. Menderes explained in detail his understanding of the United States' reasons for not joining hitherto, which he felt were now invalid:

(1) [The] US [was] no longer under obligation guarantee Israeli territorial integrity because of (a) Israel's attack on Egypt and (b) her pretensions as announced by Ben-Gurion to territorial expansion; (2) Heretofore US public opinion has not been prepared for US adherence Baghdad Pact but now clear BP is instrument of peace in Middle East area; (3) No necessity trying appease Egypt or Syria which had aligned themselves with Communist camp; (4) Conversely every reason encourage non-Communist Arab nations join pact since they would find it in their own best interests once they realized pact, as exemplified by action taken here today, was instrument for peace and stability; (5) Menderes could not understand why when US had been guiding genius for NATO and SEATO and foster father BP [Baghdad Pact] US had thus far deferred formal adherence although BP was essential link between those two pacts.²⁵

At the same meeting, the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Malik Firoz Khan Noon, said to Chapin, 'you will realize that all of us in Middle East are afraid of Russians and US cannot let us down. It must join Baghdad Pact.' In conclusion, all participants again stressed their belief that the most important step which could be taken for the security of the Middle East was United States accession to the Baghdad Pact immediately.²⁶ On 14 November Chapin informed the State Department, 'In my judgment great danger disintegration BP exists with consequent grave decline US prestige unless US gives satisfactory assurances BP members immediately'.²⁷

The Baghdad meeting of the Moslem members of the pact (17–23 November 1956)

When Nuri Said returned from Tehran he found the situation in Baghdad extremely tense. Many members of his Cabinet were gloomy and wavering. On 9 November to ease the strain, the Iraqi government decided to break off diplomatic relations with France and not to participate in any Baghdad Pact meetings at which Britain was represented.²⁸ These decisions had been taken in response to public pressures and without prior consultation with Britain and the other three Moslem powers of the Baghdad Pact. The Iraqi government assumed that these measures would satisfy public opinion. They also informed the British government that, constitutionally, future meetings of the Baghdad Pact could not be regarded as meetings of the Council of the pact, though they added that this would only be for a temporary period.

The first move was primarily symbolic as Iraq's ties with France were negligible, while the second move was rather surprising to the British and revealed the political implications of the Suez crisis for Iraq. By trying to suspend Britain from the pact, even temporarily, Iraq wanted first to avert public criticism and, second, to present the pact as a genuine regional defence organization made up of Moslem states, aimed against Israel (not only against the Soviets) and open to other Moslem Arab states.²⁹

This posed a new threat to Egypt. The pact as a seemingly Islamic organization could theoretically induce other Arab states to join the pact. This fear was clearly shown in Nasser's letter of 19 November to King Saud, who was at that time considered by many as a potential candidate for joining the pact. Although 'the pact is now frozen', Nasser wrote, 'Britain and her allies are thinking of trying to convert it into an Islamic pact which will attract all Islamic countries not already members of the pact'.³⁰ Nasser's fear was that this policy was intended to isolate Egypt from Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan. Actually, his fear was justified by the visits of the Pakistani President to Riyadh in November 1956 and of the Pakistani Prime Minister to Beirut in order to advance cooperation with these countries, mainly against communism, but also to find out their position concerning accession to the Baghdad Pact.³¹

The Iraqi decision of 9 November did not surprise Britain and Turkey. They realized how much pressure the Iraqi government was under. However, from the British point of view, the danger was that once the Iraqi government started yielding to public opinion, it was uncertain where it would end. Iraq might go further and break off diplomatic relations with Britain. However, the Iraqi decision shocked the other members of the pact. Pakistan and Iran strongly protested against Iraq's unilateral decision, but were unable to change it.³²

In Iraqi foreign policy there was another drastic change at that time. On 13 November the Iraqi government issued an extravagant communiqué which called, in effect, for the dissolution of Israel. This marked a radical shift in Iraq's policy towards the Palestine question, from a fairly moderate position to an extreme attitude. In fact, Iraq exploited the fact that the Palestine problem had not been discussed at the Arab League meeting in Lebanon in the first week of November to demonstrate that she was the genuine representative of the Palestinians, who had been neglected by the Arab states. Iraq actually used the Palestine problem as a lever in order to achieve internal and external gains. However, these measures were not enough to cool the internal situation in Iraq. Iraqi opinion was still very agitated because of the government's failure to give enough support to Egypt and to break off relations with Britain. Various political figures (former prime ministers and ministers) and extreme nationalist leaders such as Kamil Chadirchi tried to exploit the situation and bring Nuri down. Many politicians visited the Palace and urged a change in government. The British government feared that the Palace might be persuaded that change was necessary. They believed that any new government would find itself confronted with a deteriorating internal position and be subject to great pressure, both to break off relations with Britain and to abandon the Baghdad Pact.³³

The British government, therefore, decided to encourage a new meeting of the Moslem powers of the Baghdad Pact in Iraq. The Foreign Office considered that Turkey, Iran and Pakistan could press the King and the Crown Prince to keep Nuri in power and make them realize the danger of a change

of government at such a critical time. In Ankara Bowker pressed the Turkish government to do what it could to this end, and encouraged Menderes to go to Baghdad. Meanwhile, Wright spoke to President Mirza of Pakistan, who was on an informal visit in Baghdad, along similar lines.³⁴

Nuri Said was determined to maintain law and order and to preserve the connection with Britain and the Baghdad Pact and in this he received every possible help from the prime ministers of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. They all visited Baghdad between 17 and 23 November to bolster the morale of Nuri and to shore up the position of the Iraqi government. Immediately after his arrival in Baghdad on 18 November, Menderes had a meeting with Nuri Said and the Pakistani Prime Minister. On the following day Menderes told Gallman that he was now especially disturbed by the 'negative attitude' of the Pakistanis, and, although to lesser extent, of the Iraqis too. According to Gallman, by 'negative attitude' Menderes meant the rigid attitude towards Britain. Menderes told Gallman that what he wanted particularly to achieve during the talks in Baghdad was to get the British actively back in the pact so that all pact members could concentrate together on the number one problem: the Soviet threat. He insisted that cooperation between Britain and other pact members must be restored and the pact revived and strengthened.³⁵

Menderes worked hard to change Iraq's decision. He pressed the Iraqi politicians to be calm and to understand that it was not in the interest of the Moslem members of the pact to dissolve their partnership in the pact since they would become separated and helpless. Instead, they should work together at strengthening the pact and building on it. In this connection, he urged that Britain should remain in the pact, and that the members should act together to bring in the United States. He believed that American accession to the pact would be the most important stabilizing factor, and that the United States should, without delay, join the pact and give increased support to those countries in the Middle East who were still prepared to stand with the West against communism.³⁶

On 21 November Menderes met Gallman again and told him that the representatives of the four Moslem members of the pact had not yet reached agreement on a joint communiqué, since Nuri Said wanted no reference to the Baghdad Pact unless the United States could follow up the communiqué with an announcement of early accession to the pact. One of Menderes's objectives, according to Gallman, was to word the communiqué in such terms that it might contribute towards easing popular pressure on Nuri Said and bolster his government. Menderes also said that the Turkish government would, as a gesture of solidarity with Iraq, withdraw its ambassador in Tel Aviv. Moreover, Menderes suggested that the Iraqi Crown Prince should visit Washington as their spokesman to give a first-hand account of the Baghdad talks to the American government. In his view, such a mission would be received favourably by the Iraqi public and would diminish some of the present pressure on Nuri Said and gain some time for his government. Menderes hoped that when the communiqué had been issued the United

States would be able to make some kind of supporting statement publicly. Gallman told Menderes that any degree of support that the United States could publicly give the Baghdad Pact depended on the wording of the communiqué. He also warned that early accession by the United States to the Baghdad Pact was unlikely, and that any mention of the efforts in Baghdad of the representatives of the four Moslem members to effect early accession of the United States should be avoided.³⁷

Finally, on 23 November, a joint communiqué was issued. It did not mention early accession by the United States to the Baghdad Pact, but stated that, in the view of their particular interest in the security and stability of the Middle East, the four Moslem powers' cooperation and concerted endeavours were essential. At the same time, however, the four powers agreed to send the Iraqi Crown Prince to the United States to present a plea for early American accession to the Baghdad Pact.³⁸

Although the representatives of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan succeeded in calming down the Iraqi politicians and were able to convince the King and the Crown Prince that Nuri should stay in office, they were not successful in changing the Iraqi government's decision not to participate in Baghdad Pact meetings at which Britain was represented. Meanwhile, the internal situation in Iraq had deteriorated. On 21 November demonstrations broke out in Baghdad, Mosul and Najaf against the government. Nuri Said, strongly backed by the Palace, took a firm line. He closed the schools and prorogued Parliament for a month from 1 December. The government introduced a state of emergency and the army was called out to support the police. Wright commented that the year 1956 had ended with Nuri still in power, but with the ground heaving under his feet.³⁹

On 26 November Turkey, as a result of pressure from her pact allies, particularly Iraq, withdrew her ambassador in Tel Aviv. This was regarded by the Iraqi government as evidence of Turkey's cooperation with the Arabs to solve the Palestine question.

The question of the United States' accession to the pact

The Suez crisis forced the United States to review its Middle East policy. Washington feared that the Soviets would seize the opportunity to fill the vacuum that had been left by the decline of British influence in the Middle East as a result of the Suez crisis, and concluded that something should be done to express the determination of the United States to support the Baghdad Pact and the independence of the Middle Eastern countries. There had been increasing pressure on the part of the members of the Baghdad Pact for United States accession to the pact. Moreover, American representatives in the countries of the Baghdad Pact and some of the Departments of the United States government in Washington were also in favour of American accession to the pact. However, the State Department continued to doubt that the United States should accede.

The American ambassadors to the Middle Eastern members of the Baghdad Pact had been most emphatic in their recommendations of United States accession to the pact. For example, on 10 November, the United States Ambassador to Turkey stated,

convinced . . . that prompt and full United States adherence to the Baghdad Pact will have tonic effect on the Middle East situation . . . considerations (1) United States no longer beholden to Israel; (2) United States adherence would (A) fortify Anglo-American alliance, (B) strengthen United Kingdom position in the Middle East, (C) stiffen backs of Arab countries in firmer posture *vis-à-vis* Soviets, and (D) make clear United States serious support of security of area against Soviet encroachment.⁴⁰

On 14 November the United States Ambassador to Iran reported,

now is golden opportunity while situation is still fluid to consolidate United States position by early adherence to Baghdad Pact . . . if United States remains unwilling to join the pact when previously-stated reasons appear no longer valid, members likely to conclude real reason for United States refusal is unreadiness commit itself in defence Middle East. This interpretation would have shattering effect on morale Baghdad Pact countries.⁴¹

On 15 November the United States Ambassador to Iraq reported,

As I informed Department prior to Council formation [15 March 1955] and prior to April pact meeting at Tehran [17 April 1956], I believed half measures not enough and that formal adherence by United States to pact needed more than anything else to transform pact into going concern. Today [15 November 1956] the reasons for this view exist in even greater force.⁴²

On 14 November in a letter to the Acting Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson said that recent developments in the Middle East had created a most favourable opportunity for Congressional approval of United States accession to the Baghdad Pact.⁴³ At a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting on 16 November, Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that the United States should join the Baghdad Pact immediately. From the Joint Chiefs of Staff's point of view, it was the only way to stabilize the situation in the Middle East. Admiral Radford emphasized that the pact was otherwise likely to fall apart and, if it did, it could not be put together again. If the United States joined, it would have further control over activities under the pact and the situation in the Middle East. The United States could also support Iraq, where the danger of collapse was great. In Iraq, the United States might establish military bases, which

could be operated rapidly in the event of difficulties in Syria. Also, if the United States joined, the British and French would be much more willing to withdraw from Suez. Even Saudi Arabia might join the pact if the United States joined. Admiral Radford did not believe Israel would oppose United States accession to the Baghdad Pact. He thought that Israel could be persuaded that US accession was in Israel's interest. Admiral Radford asked Murphy, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, why Dulles opposed United States accession. Murphy replied that the Secretary felt that the reasons for opposition to the United States' joining as were applicable earlier still persisted, which were the position of Israel and the Soviet reaction. Murphy added that the United States would have less freedom of action if it joined than it had at present. Fraser Wilkins of the State Department commented that 'two serious objections to our joining the pact had always been the danger of a serious adverse Soviet reaction and the likelihood that we would thereby be more associated in Arab minds with the UK and the French'. Wilkins also noted that Turkey and Pakistan, two members of the Baghdad Pact, were allied with the United States in NATO and SEATO, and that possibly by separate arrangements with Iraq and Iran the United States could accomplish its purposes without formal accession to the pact. Gordon Gray, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, commented that the question of military assistance would probably be more difficult if the United States joined the pact. Admiral Radford replied that 'we are getting a large volume of requests for equipment now and that in any case we recognize the need to do more for countries in the Baghdad Pact'. On 16 November commenting on the Joint Chiefs of Staff's views, Dulles said that he still had grave reservations. He felt that the Baghdad Pact was largely an instrument of Anglo-Arab politics, and that under the pact the British were trying to use Iraq to advance their interests in the Middle East. The pact was also undermined by Iraq's violently anti-Israel attitude and her ambitions vis-à-vis Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the status of the pact seemed peculiarly obscure at that time, when Iraq was reluctant to meet with the United Kingdom at the pact meetings because of her resentment at the British attack on Egypt in collusion with Israel. Dulles also believed that for the United States to enter a pact which guaranteed the frontiers of Iraq would lead to irresistible pressure for a similar guarantee for Israel.⁴⁴

On 21 November at a meeting with key government officials, including the members of the NSC, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence, Eisenhower said that 'if the British get us into the Baghdad Pact – as the matter would appear to the Arabs – we would lose our influence with the Arabs. The British could then take a very intransigent stand.' He suggested that the United States should work towards building up King Saud as a major figure in the Middle East. The State Department was still against United States accession to the Baghdad Pact, believing that it would not serve the United States' national interests. There were a large number of reasons for this. The State

Department believed that United States accession to the pact would: endanger the United Nations efforts to stabilize the situation in Egypt; provide an excuse for the Soviets, who had made clear its strong opposition to the pact, to make further moves against the West in the Middle East; provide an excuse for Israel to renew demands for a security guarantee from the United States, without which it would be difficult to obtain Senate ratification; cause strong opposition from the Saudis, in whom the United States had many interests; bring the United States more directly into Hashemite–Saudi–Iraqi–Egyptian disputes, considering that uncommitted Arab nations were hostile to the pact; and finally, increase demands for further United States aid to member states.⁴⁵

Other reasons include the fact that the State Department considered the effectiveness of the Baghdad Pact in preventing Soviet penetration in the Middle East to be dubious, since the Soviets appeared to be using the existing tensions in the area to their advantage. Rather than making direct threats of armed force, they seemed to be relying on psychological, economic and covert military measures. Furthermore, although public support for the pact was strong in Turkey and Iran, the same could not be said for Iraq and Pakistan following British and French military action in Egypt. Thus it was not considered advisable for the United States to accede to a pact which had lost a good deal of support in two of its important members. Finally, while the ‘northern tier’ concept was essentially one of an indigenous organization, the Baghdad Pact was considered by non-member states to be largely Western-inspired and, in particular, British-dominated. The State Department considered it doubtful whether United States accession would alter this predominant view. Instead of becoming a full member of the pact, the State Department thought that the United States might strengthen the security of the member countries by joining the Economic Committee of the pact and by setting up bilateral military and economic programmes, thus avoiding the disadvantages entailed by accession to the pact itself. It stated that the United States should not be compelled to adhere to the pact, a long-term commitment, in order to meet what it saw as a short-term crisis among the four regional members as a result of military action by Israel, Britain and France against Egypt. The State Department was looking for alternative ways in which it could best express the United States’ support for the Baghdad Pact. The alternatives that the State Department was considering were as follows: first, to arrange for Iran to join SEATO. This, the State Department thought, would have the advantage of affording Iran some assurance of US armed support in the event of Russian aggression. On the other hand, it might have a deleterious effect on the Baghdad Pact and would isolate Iraq from any collective security arrangement with the United States. Second, to join the pact’s Military Committee. This would have the advantage of enabling the United States Military Liaison Group to exert leadership, but would not satisfy the pact members, who would still push for full US accession. Third, to announce its willingness to assume major financial responsibility for some pact projects such as the

projected motorway from Istanbul to Karachi, and to provide the pact countries with military equipment such as a radar network. The State Department was also planning to issue a public statement to reaffirm the United States' support for collective security through the Baghdad Pact.⁴⁶

On 29 November the State Department issued a statement which paid tribute to the Baghdad Pact countries for their determination to uphold the United Nations Charter to further a peaceful and lasting settlement of Middle Eastern problems, and to bring to bear both their influence and wisdom in the interest of the nations of the free world. The United States reaffirmed its support for the Baghdad Pact and for the collective efforts of the Middle Eastern members of the pact to maintain their independence. The United States would view any threat to the 'territorial integrity or political independence' of Middle Eastern members of the pact with the 'utmost gravity'.⁴⁷

On 30 November in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, with regard to the State Department's statement, Admiral Radford said that this might be considered a definite step in the direction of bolstering the morale of the pact members against Soviet aggression, but it did not go far enough to assure ultimate United States accession to the Baghdad Pact. It would probably provide the pact members with some added sense of security and give them some assistance in replying to domestic criticism, but would not satisfy their demands for United States accession to the Baghdad Pact. Admiral Radford once again expressed the Joint Chiefs' views on the desirability of United States accession to the Baghdad Pact. He said that United States accession to the pact now would offer the greatest opportunity to exert the United States' influence on the political and military situations in the Middle East, with resultant advantage to Israel. The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered that continuation of the Baghdad Pact as a regional defence organization against Soviet aggression in the Middle East was vital to the security of the Middle East and to the attainment of United States military objectives in the area. The collapse of the Baghdad Pact would be an irreversible loss to the interests of the United States in the Middle East.⁴⁸

From the Joint Chiefs of Staff's point of view, accession to the Baghdad pact would not increase the responsibilities that the United States had already assumed in the Middle East or materially increase the cost thereof. In fact, lack of accession to the pact might prove to be more costly in that Turkey, Iran and Pakistan might demand more aid. United States accession to the pact, on the other hand, would provide the United States with an opportunity not only to establish a military position in the area but also to influence political and military developments to the advantage of the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that the military and political advantages which would accrue to the United States by acceding to the pact far outweighed any disadvantages which might result. An important result of prompt United States accession to the pact would be the checking and downgrading of Nasser's gains. In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if the United States failed to accede to the pact immediately, the opportunity to do

so might be lost. Without tangible evidence of United States strength in the Middle East, it was a fact that Nasser would end up with greater prestige than before, and that Soviet penetration in the area would become an accomplished fact.⁴⁹

On 4 December the Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson, sent a letter to the President expressing the Defense Department's views on accession to the Baghdad Pact, in contrast to those of the State Department. The opinions of the Defense Department were that accession to the pact would allow the US to fill the political and military space left by the UK after its decline in prestige and position, the only other power able to do so being the Soviets; reinforce US support of the concept of collective security, promoted to counter the Soviet communist threat; demonstrate US determination to support the 'sovereignty and territorial integrity of the free nations of the Middle East'; make a constructive contribution to helping the flow of Middle Eastern oil to Western European markets and ensuring the availability of bases and resources to the US and its allies; increase the prestige of the pact and its member nations; help coax Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Lebanon, away from Nasser's domination, reorienting them to a more Western-friendly association of Middle East states; facilitate military panning according to US interests in the area; and strengthen the south-eastern flank of NATO, thus facilitating coordination of planning between NATO, the Baghdad Pact and SEATO. Unlike the State Department, it believed that accession would not necessarily increase the amount of military assistance to the region because of US leadership in the strategic planning of the pact.⁵⁰

In the opinion of the Defense Department, failure of the US to participate in the pact would result in a lack of confidence in US determination to support its friends and allies in the face of Soviet threat; the likely deterioration of other collective security arrangements of which the US was a member; greater Soviet success in consolidating, strengthening and expanding its position in the Middle East, Africa and Asia; the collapse of the protection of NATO's south-eastern flank; and the ultimate collapse of the Baghdad Pact, in which case the US would have to undertake military operations in an unfriendly environment should it be drawn into hostilities in the Middle East. On 4 December Dulles told the ambassadors of the four Moslem members of the Baghdad Pact that the United States was determined to support the Baghdad Pact. The creation of the pact was an outgrowth of a suggestion which he had made regarding the northern tier but, he said, it had unfortunately become involved in area politics and was not universally viewed as an instrument solely to oppose communism and Soviet aggression. The question of Israel also presented a problem for the United States in regard to its accession to the pact. Dulles concluded by saying that it was the United States' firm intention to do something about the Baghdad Pact, but he could not tell them now what the United States would do.⁵¹

On 8 December, at a meeting with William F. Knowland, a Republican

senator from California and member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dulles said that the United States must make its presence more strongly felt in the Middle East. In his view, there were three choices: first, to join the Baghdad Pact, second to try to organize a new grouping and third, to deal on a bilateral basis with some manoeuvrability. The latter, Dulles said, should be on the basis of a Congressional resolution authorizing the President to use the armed forces and to spend certain sums to bolster the military defence abilities and economies of countries whose governments showed a determination to combat communist infiltration. Dulles said that he had come to the conclusion that the third choice was the best, since there were grave liabilities which attached to the Baghdad Pact, and the process of creating a new organization would be full of delays and pitfalls. Senator Knowland indicated general concurrence without any commitment as to details. On the same day Dulles presented these three alternatives to President Eisenhower and said that he preferred the course of action calling for a Congressional resolution authorizing the President to make arrangements for military cooperation and appropriations for expenditure. According to Dulles, this would show the United States' determination to make its presence known in the Middle East. It would also give the United States manoeuvrability in the area, which would not exist through the Baghdad Pact or a new pact. Eisenhower commented that if the United States proceeded, it could carry two strings in the bow, both the first and the third proposals. He said that if the United States brought Saudi Arabia and Lebanon into the pact, it could go with them and that would be wonderful. Dulles said that evidence the State Department had at the moment was that Saudi Arabia would not join the pact. Dulles mentioned the problem of Jewish and non-Jewish elements, both of which, Dulles said, would get something from the resolution proposal. Dulles added that he was under great pressure from a group of senators to give assurances of security to Israel because of the United States' statement of 29 November about determination to help the Baghdad Pact. Eisenhower argued that as a member of the Baghdad Pact the United States would guarantee that nothing would be done as a pact to harm Israel, to which, he said, the pact had never indicated hostility. It was only a defence against communism. Dulles replied that the latter was not actually in the charter of the pact and that whereas it should, of course, be a defence against communism, it had been perverted into an instrument of Arab politics. Eisenhower conceded that part of the price of US accession to the Baghdad Pact would be a bilateral agreement with Israel, and that he agreed with Dulles to go ahead with the third alternative.⁵²

After Eisenhower's decision, Dulles told Herbert Hoover, the Acting Secretary of State, that after full consideration he had decided that United States policy in the Middle East should be maintained on a bilateral basis, and that the United States should not engage in a multilateral approach such as that which was implicit in the Baghdad Pact. Hoover agreed with Dulles's views. The British were quickly informed. During the NATO meeting in Paris on

10 December Dulles told Selwyn Lloyd that, with regard to United States accession to the Baghdad Pact, he was considering a Congressional resolution which would authorize the President to take stronger action in the Middle East and make it possible to use that authority to support the Baghdad Pact and other activities in the area. Lloyd, in commenting on the proposed resolution, said he gathered that as a result of this resolution the United States would be likely to put observers on the Military Committee as well as the Economic Committee of the Baghdad Pact and 'that sort of thing'. The debate within the United States administration, however, was not yet concluded. On 14 December in a paper entitled 'Probable Consequences of US Adherence or Non-Adherence to the Baghdad Pact', the intelligence organizations of the United States government concluded that US accession to the pact would be widely regarded as a strong indication of US intention to oppose more actively and directly the extension of Soviet influence in the Middle East and to take a firmer stand against the efforts of Nasser and others to undermine the Western position in the region. Such a decision would have a considerable effect in dissipating the impression of US indecision which, over the last two years, had discouraged the Baghdad Pact members, weakened the will of friendly or uncommitted elements in other Arab states to stand up against Egyptian- or Soviet-inspired anti-Western pressures, and encouraged greater boldness on the part of those seeking to undermine the Western position. At least initially, the self-confidence and prestige of the Baghdad Pact members and of Western-oriented elements in the other Arab states would be considerably enhanced, and that of their opponents reduced.⁵³

The intelligence paper stated that United States accession would enable the United States to assume leadership of coordinated military planning and training, thus remedying a weakness which had become especially apparent with the decline of United Kingdom strength in the Middle East. It would also facilitate United States access to bases in the pact countries. However, it would involve particular responsibilities and hazards. The Baghdad Pact countries would almost certainly regard United States accession to the pact as acknowledgement of their claims to preferential economic, military and especially political support. They would probably regard the United States as committed to supporting them against their rivals in the arms race in the Middle East. United States accession to the pact would arouse bitter opposition in Egypt, Syria and Jordan. Nasser and his supporters would regard such a move as a threat to their interests in the area and would probably react with efforts to strengthen their hold on Syria and Jordan and to undermine and intimidate pro-Western elements in Iraq and Lebanon. According to the intelligence paper, United States accession would probably increase Soviet fears about the extension of United States military power in the Middle East. Although it would almost certainly provide additional deterrents to direct Soviet military intervention in the area covered by the Baghdad Pact, the Soviets would probably intensify their activities in other Middle Eastern

countries. The Soviets would almost certainly encourage Egypt and Syria in their efforts to counteract the United States' move and would probably furnish increased amounts of military equipment and technical personnel. It would almost certainly be strongly condemned by India and probably by other neutralist states. It would also cause some concern and probably some protests in Israel. However, the Israeli leaders would probably consider United States accession to the pact as a move in the direction of a harder policy towards Nasser and would therefore at least privately see some merit in it. On balance, the Israelis would probably view the United States' commitment as an indirect contribution to their security. However, they would probably take advantage of the situation to bring new diplomatic pressure on the United States for a security commitment to Israel.⁵⁴

The intelligence paper pointed out that by staying out of the pact the United States would avoid various disadvantages inevitably entailed in joining. It would refrain from giving the neutralists a new ground for accusing it of preoccupation with military alliances. It would remain free of a new association with the United Kingdom in a colonial area context. It would not be aligning itself with certain Middle Eastern countries against their local rivals and it would avoid a new source of friction with the Soviets. Thus the United States, staying outside the pact, would probably have a better chance of retaining the credit it had won in the Arab-Asian world by its stand on Israeli, British and French military intervention in Egypt. Moreover, by refusing to make a firm treaty commitment, it would retain some extra room for manoeuvre in dealing with the Arab-Asian neutralists and with the Soviets, and it might be in a better position to seek a comprehensive accommodation with the forces of nationalism and anti-colonialism in the Arab-Asian world. The intelligence paper concluded that, in the view of the decline of the British position in the Middle East, and without full United States participation and support, the Baghdad Pact would almost certainly lose its potential as a military component integrated with Western defence arrangements. As a political association, it would probably be kept alive by its Moslem members, but only for a short time, even if they were given United States support. In the absence of United States accession or some effective alternative United States policy, the member governments, especially Iraq, would be in an exposed position in the face of Egyptian and Soviet pressures.⁵⁵

On 20 December in a conversation with Eisenhower, Dulles said that the State Department was opposed to United States accession to the Baghdad Pact because it had become so mixed up in Arab politics. Nasser opposed it, and more importantly King Saud did also. Dulles commented that King Saud was the only figure in the Middle East with sufficient present and potential assets to serve as a counterpoise to Nasser. Moreover, it would be extremely difficult to obtain Senate approval without giving a security guarantee to Israel. In the light of these facts, Dulles said he was in favour of a resolution authorizing three forms of presidential action as means of building the United States' position in the Middle East.⁵⁶

These were:

- a To cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence.
- b To undertake programmes of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East upon request of their governments, in support of the inherent right of self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.
- c To employ the armed forces of the United States in taking measures, consonant with the Charter of the United Nations and other treaty obligations of the United States, to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nation or group of nations against communist armed aggression.⁵⁷

A fourth element in the proposal would be a Congressional authorization of a sum such as \$400 million for use in the fiscal years 1957 and 1958 with full flexibility. Meanwhile, the Operations Coordinating Board of the National Security Council concluded that the Western control of strategic points in the Middle East had been seriously threatened by the wave of anti-British and anti-French feeling following the military action of Britain and France against Egypt. There was unrest in the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms, and the British position in Jordan and Iraq was particularly threatened. The Jordanian Parliament, on 21 November, had called for abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1948 and for acceptance of a subsidy from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria. According to the Board, the possibility of Jordan's retaining her ties with Britain was slight, though the Jordanian government was seeking a formula to retain British subsidy. Although the Iraqi government remained pro-Western, its position was seriously shaken by popular resentment over the Anglo-Iraqi tie, and the Iraqi government had announced that Iraq would no longer participate in meetings of the Baghdad Pact Council at which Britain was present. According to the Board, the Soviet Union, by outright propaganda support of the Arabs and by supplying aid, primarily military armaments, had made psychological capital of the situation and greatly strengthened its position, particularly in Egypt and Syria. The United States was able to retain its economic position and a measure of political influence, particularly in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In some respects, by its emphasis on a peaceful solution of the Suez Canal controversy, and strong stand in support of the United Nations' efforts to restore peace, the United States' psychological position in the Arab states was enhanced. However, the position of its principal Western allies (Britain and France) had declined sharply, which raised serious questions about the ability of Britain to reassume her previous position in the Middle East. The weakened position of the British made the denial of resources and strategic positions to the Soviets increasingly difficult.

For the United States, the problem was the power vacuum created by British and French collapse and preventing the Soviets from filling it.⁵⁸

The Suez war, the Board concluded, placed the United States in a difficult position in the Middle East. The United States' sympathy with those genuinely desirous of becoming free and completely sovereign nations had run into sharp conflict with actions required to maintain the strength of the Western alliance and to support its Western allies. Differences of assessment, both as to the character of the threat to the West and as to the means to meet it, had arisen between the United States and Britain. While the United States saw Arab nationalism as an inevitable development which should be channelled, not opposed, Britain had seen Arab nationalism, backed by the Soviets, as a threat to her entire position in the Middle East. On 29 December Dulles called in the British and French ambassadors in Washington and outlined to them in general terms the administration's plan to present to Congress a programme for military and economic cooperation in the Middle East. Dulles emphasized the power vacuum which existed in the Middle East as a result of the Suez war, and said that if the area was lost, NATO would be undermined. He said that it was not practicable at present to handle the situation through US accession to the Baghdad Pact because, first, Saudi Arabia was strongly opposed to the pact and the United States did not wish to alienate that country and, second, on the domestic side US accession to the pact would raise demand for similar measures with respect to Israel.⁵⁹

On 1 January 1957, at a meeting with some members of Congress, Eisenhower explained the proposed Middle East resolution to them and said that the existing power vacuum created by Britain's collapse must be filled by the United States before it was filled by the Soviet Union. Five days later Eisenhower presented to the Congress his proposal, which came to be known as 'the Eisenhower Doctrine', for United States military and economic cooperation with those Middle Eastern nations desiring such assistance. He proposed

- a cooperation with and assistance to any nation or group of nations in the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence,
- b programmes of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations in the region that desired such aid,
- c employment of United States armed forces to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of nations requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism and
- d employment, for economic and military purposes, of sums available under the Mutual Security Act of 1954 as amended, without regard to existing limitations.⁶⁰

In regard to the last point, Eisenhower indicated his intention to seek in subsequent legislation the authorization of \$200 million to be available during each

of the fiscal years 1958 and 1959 for discretionary use in the area, in addition to the other mutual security programmes. The Eisenhower Doctrine, which was accepted in March 1957 by Congress, authorized the President to use the armed forces of the United States to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of any nation or group of nations in the Middle East requesting such assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism. It also authorized the President to extend military and economic aid to those nations to further the maintenance of their independence. On 7 January 1957, Eisenhower appointed James P. Richards, former chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, as special assistant with the personal rank of ambassador to advise and assist him and the Secretary of State on problems of the Middle East region.

The Ankara meeting of the Moslem members of the pact (19–20 January 1957)

The prime ministers of the four Moslem powers of the Baghdad Pact met once more in Ankara on 19–20 January 1957 to review the situation in the Middle East, and above all to discuss the Eisenhower Doctrine, which they warmly welcomed, particularly as it gave them the impression that the United States might join the pact. The four Moslem members of the pact noted in a communiqué that the doctrine recognized the threat posed by communist aggression and subversion to the countries of the Middle East. They fully supported the measures outlined in the doctrine as best designed to maintain peace in the Middle East, and expressed the view that the Eisenhower Doctrine would prevent further Russian infiltration in the Middle East, reduce Russian influence in the Arab countries where it was now established and give them a chance to break away. They also urged that every effort should be made to detach Saudi Arabia from Egypt, whose position owed much to Saudi Arabian support.⁶¹

The Crown Prince of Iraq, who stopped in Ankara on his way to the United States, was requested to make the following points at Washington. The points were that

- a The Eisenhower Doctrine was not a substitute for American accession to the Baghdad Pact,
- b the doctrine should as far as possible be canalized through the Baghdad Pact,
- c no American aid should be given to Egypt and Syria and
- d the United States should give substantial material and technical aid to the full scale and collective counter-propaganda efforts.⁶²

Apart from this, no attempt was made to draw up an agreed brief for the Crown Prince's guidance, nor was he given any formal mandate to speak on

behalf of all the Moslem members of the pact. However, they were not, it seems, very confident of United States accession. The Ankara meeting confirmed the determination of the four powers to continue to work towards building up the Baghdad Pact politically, economically and militarily, and in particular towards strengthening and developing their collaboration with the United States and the United Kingdom. The four powers in Ankara agreed on the urgent necessity to establish immediately a coordinated and powerful machinery to resist the intensive and effective hostile propaganda against the Baghdad Pact coming constantly from Moscow, Cairo and Damascus. The Ankara meeting did valuable work towards bringing the Baghdad Pact back to normal and in preparing the ground for its further development.⁶³

As far as Britain was concerned, one of the most satisfactory aspects of the meeting was that it confirmed once more the common determination to work for the strengthening of the pact. It also seemed to have done much to exorcise the ghost of Britain's unpopularity which had haunted the collective thinking of the four Middle Eastern members of the pact since the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt. However, despite considerable pressure by the other three prime ministers, Nuri Said adamantly refused to fix a date for the next meeting of the Ministerial Council of the pact until the Crown Prince returned from the United States, though he accepted the fact that the meeting would take place. During his visit to Washington in February 1957 the Crown Prince was given to understand that in the context of the President's Middle East proposals the United States hoped to be able to go much further in its participation in the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact as well as in all pact activities directed against communism, but not to accede.⁶⁴

As far as Iraq was concerned the tide had in fact started to turn in early 1957, and by the end of February Nuri Said felt strong enough to agree to the resumption of work in the pact committees with British participation. This trend was reinforced by the opening of the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Centre on 31 March, in the presence of King Faisal, which was a turning point in the public resumption of pact activities. Shortly afterwards, the Baghdad Pact Council began to meet again at deputy level and it was not long before the full range of committees met. This was closely followed by the meeting of the pact Council at ministerial level in Karachi in June 1957. Within the Middle East, too, circumstances appeared to be improving. At the end of 1956 Iraq had been almost completely isolated in the Arab world, but by the spring of 1957 the tide had started flowing in Nuri's direction. In this context, the visit of King Saud to Iraq on 11–14 May marked an important step in the detaching of Saudi Arabia from Egypt, and meant that Iraq no longer felt isolated in the Arab world. This visit was a remarkable success for the Iraqi government and indirectly for the British. Wright commented that the Iraqi government had succeeded in making King Saud fully alive to the danger of Nasser's policies and to his hostile intentions towards the regimes in Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The Iraqis and the British were pleased at having brought King Saud to recognize that the Baghdad Pact was in no way harmful to Arab interests

and to the point of being prepared to accept Iraqi membership of it. American advice during King Saud's visit to Washington in February had no doubt also played a helpful part.⁶⁵

The Karachi meeting of the Ministerial Council of the pact (3–6 June 1957)

The Karachi meeting of the Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact was postponed from January to June because of the Suez crisis. As the time for the meeting approached, Washington and London studied, as usual, how they could strengthen the pact without, in the case of the United States, having to join it. However, there was no common ground between the two. The United States was a member of the Economic Committee and the Counter-Subversion Committee. It was the largest contributor to the pact's budget and supported the regional members of the pact with significant military and economic aid. Its representatives attended all meetings of the pact as observers. However, it still refused to join the pact.

On 9 March 1957 Congress endorsed President Eisenhower's proposals which he had submitted to Congress on 5 January. On the same day Eisenhower announced that Ambassador James P. Richards would leave for the Middle East on 12 March as the head of a special mission to explain his Middle East proposals to the region's leaders. Before Richards began his tour, the State Department instructed him to inform the Baghdad Pact members that the United States was prepared to join the Military Committee of the pact if invited to do so by the Ministerial Council at its meeting in Karachi in June. In the State Department's view, the Military Committee of the pact provided a vehicle which could be used for planning with the area states, while avoiding to a considerable extent the political liabilities of full membership of the pact. The State Department thought that the United States would act most effectively by continuing to strengthen the pact while not joining it formally. Moreover, the State Department did not want to link the Eisenhower Doctrine directly to the pact and thus jeopardize acceptance of the doctrine by the area countries.⁶⁶

Richards' instructions therefore implicitly confirmed that although the Eisenhower Doctrine was originally designed to deal with communist aggression in the Middle East, it was actually adopted as an alternative to deflect the pressure for United States accession to the Baghdad Pact. However, the State Department tried to avoid giving the impression that the Eisenhower Doctrine was intended as a substitute for United States accession to the Baghdad Pact.

Between 21 and 24 March 1957 Macmillan, who had replaced Eden as Prime Minister on 8 January, and Selwyn Lloyd met President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles in Bermuda to discuss the problems concerning the Middle East. In Bermuda, the British soon realized that there was no prospect of getting the United States to join the Baghdad Pact in the foreseeable future, and concluded that high priority should therefore be given to the

pact members' demand from the United States, which was a substantial sum of money for the work of the Economic Committee.⁶⁷ On 21 March the State Department told the British that the United States was prepared to join the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact, if invited to do so by the members at the Karachi meeting of the pact. On the following day, the State Department publicly announced that the United States through the Richards mission had informed the members of the Baghdad Pact of its decision to join the Military Committee of the pact.⁶⁸ At the Bermuda conference, although its *de facto* participation was further extended through the decision to join the Military Committee of the pact, the United States still refused to join the pact as a full member. By joining the Military Committee and refusing to accede to the pact itself, the United States was prepared to associate itself only with the military goals of the pact.⁶⁹

This was a further defeat for continuing British efforts to secure full American membership. At the end of January 1957 Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, in a telegram to Harold Caccia, the British Ambassador in Washington, had stressed that American membership of the Military Committee was 'very much a second best and no substitute for full accession to the pact'.⁷⁰ Indeed, Gallman, the United States Ambassador to Baghdad, had been opposed to assuming more responsibilities unless the United States had a vote in the council, which only full membership could give it. In his memoirs Gallman says, 'we were getting involved without having a voice. Joining the committees, but not members of the pact, we had a voice in the committee meetings but still did not have a vote in the council where final decisions were made.'⁷¹

On 12 March Ambassador James Richards began his two-month tour to the Middle East. He visited fifteen countries as part of an effort to explain the Eisenhower Doctrine on economic and military assistance to countries in the Middle East, and also to demonstrate American interest in the Middle East. It was not a give-away mission. Richards had authority to discuss certain priority projects.⁷² During his visits to the four Baghdad Pact countries, Richards informed the governments of the United States' decision to join the Military Committee of the pact if invited to do so. Richards also gave assurances that the United States was prepared to finance joint projects recommended by the Economic Committee of the pact. It had been considered at the Tehran meeting in April 1956 that joint projects, though likely to be expensive, would represent one of the best ways of demonstrating the advantages of membership of the Baghdad Pact. So far as the United States and the United Kingdom were concerned, the most immediately promising projects had been roads, railways and telecommunications.⁷³

On 9 April in Baghdad, Richards told the Secretary-General of the Baghdad Pact, Sayed Awni Khalidi, that American aid would be given to the joint projects (telecommunications, railways and motorways) and stated publicly that \$1 million would be devoted to surveys in the fields of telecommunications, railways and motorways and a further \$11.5 million to the projects themselves. The commitments which Richards made for regional pact projects

were favourably received in the pact countries, and the Secretary-General stated that the undertakings would be most effective in strengthening the Baghdad Pact. However, the United States did not intend to channel any of the aid through the Baghdad Pact, though it indicated willingness to take account of economic projects of a multilateral character.⁷⁴

The American gesture of offering \$12.5 million for the Baghdad Pact prompted the British government to consider following suit. To regain the confidence of the Moslem members of the pact, particularly Iraq, the Foreign Office wanted to offer a substantial contribution to the Baghdad Pact at its forthcoming Council meeting at Karachi in June. There was, however, a difference between the Foreign Office and the Treasury about how much help Britain should give to the economic side of the Baghdad Pact. The Foreign Office proposed, first, to offer an increase in technical assistance from £50,000 to £200,000 a year and, second, to contribute £2 million a year for three years to economic development of the Middle Eastern members of the pact. The Foreign Office's justification for the proposals was the view that, since the proposed Karachi meeting of the pact council and its committees was the first since the Suez crisis, Britain must make some contribution to demonstrate her interest in the pact and her right to remain a member of it. The Treasury agreed to the first proposal but not to the second. The Treasury's view was that an increase in Britain's contribution to technical assistance was the most Britain could afford in relation to the other forms of help Britain was giving to the pact countries and to Britain's economic position. The Treasury thought that an additional £2 million a year would amount to a considerable increase in expenditure which was already too high. In the Treasury's view, Britain should first set her own house in order before getting down to further and more far-reaching commitments to the Baghdad Pact.⁷⁵

In a letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer on 29 April the Foreign Secretary proposed that Britain should offer the following financial assistance to promote Britain's aims in the Baghdad Pact: (a) the raising of Britain's technical assistance contribution from £50,000 to £200,000 a year over the next five years; (b) instead of £2 million, £1 million to be spent over a period on economic aid towards approved development projects in the field of communication; (c) £30,000 a year for military training; and (d) £500,000 a year for defence infrastructure. The Foreign Secretary said that the Baghdad Pact, from its inception, was intended to be the cornerstone of British policy in the Middle East. Experience in the Suez crisis had proved that it was. The fact that, against expectation, it had held together, and that Britain retained membership of it, had saved Britain's position in the Middle East and therefore safeguarded the oil supplies, which constituted Britain's most vital interest in the Middle East. The Foreign Secretary pointed out that major policy goals could not be attained at no cost, and while it was obviously the duty of the Treasury to get the best policy at the lowest price, no policy could be had for nothing. Finally, in the first week of May, the Treasury accepted the Foreign Office's proposals.⁷⁶

The third meeting of the Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact was held in Karachi from 3 to 6 June 1957 under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy. The British delegation to the Council was led by Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd. The prime ministers of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey led their delegations. Loy Henderson, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, was the principal United States observer. The press were admitted to the opening session on 3 June, at which introductory statements were made by the chief delegates and the reports of the committees were considered. The press were also admitted to the final session on 6 June, at which the final communiqué was formally approved and closing statements were made. At the opening session the Council formally invited the United States to join the Military Committee. The United States delegate, whose statement concentrated on United States aid and support for the Baghdad Pact, accepted the invitation. The accession of the United States to the Military Committee was considered by the members of the pact as a further indication of the United States' continuing support of the pact and of its determination to assist the pact members to meet any threat of communist aggression.⁷⁷

Selwyn Lloyd, in his introductory statement, announced that his government was prepared to provide £1 million for joint economic projects. Britain also increased her technical assistance from £250,000 to £1 million. Moreover, Britain offered half a million pounds a year for the provision of a defence infrastructure. In their introductory statements, the Iranian Prime Minister made a special plea for better publicity in support of the Baghdad Pact, while the Iraqi Prime Minister made several frank statements of the Iraqi points of view on Palestine, Kashmir and Cyprus. Nuri made a sharp attack on Israel, describing her as 'the most serious source of danger to the peace and stability of the area'. On Kashmir, he said that Iraq stood for a solution of the problem compatible with the rights of the people of Kashmir for self-determination. On Cyprus, Nuri said that Iraq would support a settlement which would safeguard the rights of the Turkish population both constitutionally and internationally. For Turkey, Menderes analysed the history of the pact since its foundation and stressed the importance of developing the pact's activities in every field. Apart from these two sessions, the entire business of the Council took place in restricted session, in which full and frank exchanges of views took place over a wide range of international problems affecting the members of the pact. The particular preoccupations of individual member states, such as Pakistan's fear of India and Iraq's fear of Israel, disturbed the discussions on the collective problems of the pact. Menderes, whose influence was most effective throughout, advised the council not to allow the individual preoccupations of member governments to affect the collective problems of the pact as a whole, and explicitly said that he did not wish to burden the Council with his preoccupation with Cyprus.⁷⁸

There were some wordy exchanges between the United Kingdom and United States delegations, on the one hand, and the Pakistani delegation, on

the other, as a result of the latter's determined attempt to secure an amendment to the terms of reference of the Liaison Committee to widen the scope of its activities to include subversion from all (and not merely communist) sources. In this issue, Pakistan was supported by Iraq and Turkey, and opposed by Iran as well as by the United Kingdom and the United States. The Liaison Committee's main task was to produce a detailed 'assessment of communist subversion in the Baghdad Pact area' for submission to the Council and for use by the Counter-Subversion Committee. Suhrawardy, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, argued that member countries were threatened by subversion from 'neutralist countries' as well as from the communist countries. He made it clear that the amendment desired by Pakistan had Indian 'subversion' in mind, and stated explicitly that Pakistan's membership of the pact was designed to secure United States and United Kingdom support for her against the Indian menace. It was on this basis, Suhrawardy said, that he had persuaded the people of Pakistan to give their support to the government and to the Baghdad Pact. If Pakistan's assumptions in this regard were shown to be false, he threatened, she would reconsider her membership.⁷⁹

Selwyn Lloyd opposed any change in the terms of reference of the Liaison Committee, and was strongly supported by Loy Henderson. The latter saw the proposed change as a first step to military planning against India and Israel. However, in the end Henderson accepted the proposal to widen the terms of reference, subject to the understanding that this change was not to be considered as indicative of any shift in the direction which the Baghdad Pact had been following; that is, the Liaison Committee would continue to concentrate its work on communist and communist-inspired activities; also, the change had been made merely to enable the Liaison Committee to furnish all the information regarding the subversive activities in the pact area which the Counter-Subversion Committee needed in order to carry on its work. Lloyd accepted the amendment, subject to the same reservations as Henderson. In spite of the emphasis on the need to treat this as 'top secret', information about it was leaked to the press before the end of meeting. In all this, Suhrawardy won a notable victory.⁸⁰

The Council welcomed the accession of the United States to full membership of the Military Committee and expressed its deep gratification with the purposes and principles of the 'Eisenhower Doctrine' on the Middle East and with the assistance extended thereunder. The principal development of the Karachi meeting was the approval of plans to set up a more comprehensive military planning structure – a joint planning staff, rather than the joint military command which the regional members of the pact preferred. On the economic side, major emphasis was placed on the joint projects. In considering the report of the Economic Committee the council approved a number of projects designed to improve communications and to accelerate the development of the region. These included the linking of the Baghdad Pact capitals by telecommunications and the construction of roads and railways. For these projects the United States through the Richards mission had made available

the sum of \$12.5 million. Of the United States' contribution, \$8,370,000 was allocated for a telecommunication survey and for equipment linking Baghdad Pact capitals by ultra high frequency radio. Some \$2 million was authorized for the initial construction costs of roads connecting Turkey with Iran (Shivelan–Bajirge–Rezayeh linking with the Tehran–Tabriz main road) and Iraq (Cizre–Silopi–Zakho), and \$1 million for a survey of a line linking the Turkish and Iranian rail systems (Muş–Tatvan–Tabriz). With these offers, the British government thought, the United States had scooped the best communications projects and put a foot in the door on the Iran–Turkey railway project which was next best to the communications projects from the British commercial point of view. For its part, Britain made available £1 million for these projects and undertook to improve radio links and telegraph facilities between London and the capitals of the regional pact members and between the four regional capitals themselves. Britain also agreed to give aid for a survey of the Pakistani section of a road between Karachi and Basra, along the eastern shores of the Persian Gulf. Pakistan also offered 500,000 rupees (\$105,000) annually over five years for these projects.⁸¹

As far as the United Kingdom was concerned, the striking feature of the Karachi meeting was the absence of any reference to the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt, which seemed to be a dead issue so far as the Muslim members of the pact were concerned. The main emphasis was on the possibilities of future progress, especially in the economic field, and on closer co-operation in political affairs. The Baghdad Pact would continue to be a cornerstone of Britain's Middle East policy. Two days after the Karachi meeting closed, on 8 June Nuri Said resigned. He had been in office since 4 August 1954. The Palace felt that it was time for a change of government, if not of strategy, and that the appointment of a more non-committal elder statesman was desirable in order to give some outlet to the normal pressures of Iraqi political life and practice. The Palace wanted to show that Nuri had not been a dictator imposing a personal policy, particularly in foreign affairs, but a constitutional prime minister carrying out a national policy. The new government was formed on 18 June by Ali Jawdat, a former prime minister and one-time Iraqi ambassador in Washington. He made an attempt to moderate Nuri's foreign policy. He maintained the basic pro-Western, anti-communist stand of Nuri, but with a definite shift in favour of Arab nationalism. Jawdat's first foreign policy statement pointedly avoided mention of the Baghdad Pact and spoke of achieving better relations with the Arab countries. He proved to be too indecisive and too anxious to please everyone.⁸²

The Turkish government was extremely dissatisfied with the weakness of Ali Jawdat and was angered by the vote of the Iraqi representative at the United Nations on the Cyprus issue in opposition to Turkey on 13 December 1957. As regards the Iraqi action, the facts were that the Iraqi representative at the political committee of the United Nations had voted for the Greek resolution over Cyprus in disregard of specific instructions. The Iraqi representative at the Assembly changed the vote to one of abstention but in doing

so disregarded further specific instructions to vote with the Turkish government sent to him by telegram, whose receipt in time was confirmed by a telephone conversation. The permanent Iraqi representative at the United Nations, who represented Iraq on the political committee, had been recalled to Baghdad and the Iraqi Ambassador in Washington, who voted in the Assembly, was warned by the Iraqi government of the consequence of his action. As a result, on 14 December 1957, Ali Jawdat was succeeded by Abdul Wahhab Murjan, who was a Shia aged forty-eight and a supporter of Nuri. In his first statement Murjan supported the Baghdad Pact. This indicated that Nuri was back in office by proxy. If the government of Ali Jawdat had a more Arab nationalist tendency, that of Murjan represented a more Iraqi nationalist point of view. The latter was anti-Nasser, the former more inclined towards an accommodation with Nasser without wishing to see Iraq dominated by Egypt.⁸³

Meanwhile, Turkey had for some time been calling attention to the dangerous situation arising from the steady Russian penetration of Syria. The situation in Syria was brought to a head by the replacement in August 1957 of General Nazimuddin by General Bizri as Chief of the Syrian General Staff, followed by changes in the security forces and the dismissal and arrest of army officers. At this point, the Turkish government appealed to the United States for more active help to redress the situation which they saw as threatening a hostile encirclement of the eastern flank of NATO. As a result, between 24 and 28 August, Loy Henderson, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Administration, visited Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. Henderson's visit produced a confused agreement on the necessity of a firm Arab response to the Syrian danger, but realization of this objective was frustrated by the complete reluctance of Arabs to adopt publicly an attitude of firmness against Syria, a reluctance which in this case was strengthened by the fear felt by friendly Arab governments of their own public opinion resulting from the blaze of publicity and public speculation which had surrounded Henderson's visit. Sceptical of the likelihood of effective action by friendly Arab states, Turkey considered the possibility of 'going it alone' against Syria, and massed major land forces along the Syrian border. This troop concentration was denounced by Syria and Egypt as evidence of Turkey's aggressive intention. In the event the Russians gained considerable advantage from adroit propaganda designed to present Russia as the friend of a nationalist Syrian regime threatened by 'warmongering imperialists and their tools'. The Soviets warned Turkey against any attack on Syria. On 13 September Nikolai Bulganin, the Russian Prime Minister, sent a letter to Menderes, which contained thinly veiled threats about the consequences of a Turkish move against Syria. On 30 September Menderes returned a firm reply to Bulganin's letter. Also, the United States warned the Soviets against attacking Turkey. On 12 October Nikita Khrushchev, Secretary-General of the Soviet Communist Party, accused the United States and Turkey of conspiring to attack Syria. On 16 October Syria complained to the United Nations about the Turkish threat.

The next day Turkey denied any wish for war with Syria. By the time the Syrian complaint had been brought to the United Nations, the Turkish government was already wholly absorbed in preparations for the general elections which were going to take place on 27 October. Moreover, as Lenczowski notes,

it was doubtful whether, even in the case of Communist take-over in Syria, Turkey would want to resort to force and thus expose herself to the double charge of aggression and intervention in Syrian's internal affairs. More likely the Turks' intention was to dramatize the issue before the world and indicate, especially to the United States, that Turkey would fully support some kind of intervention or preventive action in Syria – if the United States decided upon such a move.

Menderes received a further letter from Bulganin on the eve of the meetings of the NATO heads of government in Paris on 16 December at which he was warned of the dangers to Turkey of tying herself to the United States. The Turco-Syrian crisis was eventually overshadowed and displaced by the movement for the unification of Syria and Egypt, which had gained momentum during the Turco-Syrian crisis.⁸⁴

The Ankara meeting of the Ministerial Council of the pact (27–30 January 1958)

The next meeting of the Ministerial Council was scheduled to take place in Ankara in January 1958. Menderes, however, sought to postpone it until April, apparently for two reasons. First, Macmillan had a prior commitment to a Commonwealth tour in January, and Menderes was anxious, in view of the Cyprus question, to use the Ankara meeting to make a public reaffirmation of the strength of Turkey's own bilateral relations with Britain, something more easily achieved by the presence of the British Prime Minister. Second, Turkish opinion was still smarting from the effect of Iraq's United Nations vote on Cyprus.⁸⁵ However, the British Foreign Office thought that it would be a great mistake to postpone the Ankara meeting, since it might be thought that the reason for postponement was the bad state of Turco-Iraqi relations and that the Baghdad Pact was collapsing. The Turkish government finally agreed that the Ankara meeting should be held as planned and that Macmillan should pay a special visit to Turkey in April, as Macmillan had given Menderes to understand he would be able to do.⁸⁶

Meanwhile, the regional members of the Baghdad Pact were calling increasingly clamorous attention to the necessity of making some progress towards solving the Arab–Israeli problem if Russian penetration of the Middle East was to be effectively checked. On the initiative of Pakistan, a meeting was hurriedly called of representatives of the four regional powers in Ankara on 10 December 1957. At the talks in Ankara, it was agreed that

Menderes should explain the views of the group on this issue and other aspects of the Middle East situation at the NATO meeting in Paris between 16 and 19 December 1957. Menderes duly carried out this role. In a conversation with Eisenhower during the NATO meeting in Paris on 18 December 1957, Menderes emphasized the benefits which would follow from United States accession to the Baghdad Pact, in (a) its effect on the 'undecided' Arab states, such as Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia; and (b) taking the heat out of the Palestine question by reducing the possibility of an Israeli threat to the Arab states. Eisenhower replied that the objections to United States accession remained the same as before, namely that in order to get the Senate's approval it would entail a balancing agreement with Israel which would outbalance the good effect on the Arabs of United States accession to the Baghdad Pact.⁸⁷ On the following day, Menderes had a meeting with Dulles and emphasized the importance of US accession to the Baghdad Pact. Dulles replied that the United States could not join the pact without at the same time becoming involved in a security guarantee for Israel, which would have serious repercussions in the Arab states. Dulles added that the influence of the friends of Israel in Congress, together with that of those people who opposed treaties anyhow, could block in Congress US accession to the pact if it was not accompanied by a security arrangement with Israel. However, if Turkey could get the Israeli government to agree not to press for a security arrangement with the United States if it joined the pact, then the State Department would take a new look at the problem. Menderes replied that Turkey was going to do so. Menderes added that if the United States joined the pact, Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia would do so also. However, Dulles doubted this.⁸⁸

Also, on 24 December the Foreign Office urged the State Department that the United States should announce its full accession to the Baghdad Pact at the Ankara meeting. According to the Foreign Office, this would have a great effect on the morale of the regional members of the pact. The Foreign Office suggested that if full United States accession was ruled out for the present, the United States should make some major gesture at the Ankara meeting to offset the disappointment that would be caused to the regional members of the pact. The Foreign Office pointed out that Britain was considering what she could do to help, but her own resources were very strained. Britain had made a major effort at the Karachi meeting and could not do more for the moment.⁸⁹

On 24 January 1958 Menderes unexpectedly went to Baghdad. The primary purpose of his sudden visit was to ask the Crown Prince to come to Turkey during the period in which Dulles was there. The object of the Crown Prince's visit would be to reinforce the pressure of regional members on Dulles to secure full United States membership of the Baghdad Pact, the development of United States policy on Palestine towards the Arab point of view, and additional United States economic and military support for the pact. However, the King decided that it would not be proper for the Crown Prince to be publicly involved in pursuit of these goals on this occasion, and they should be left to the government. Therefore the invitation was declined.

However, the King and the Crown Prince agreed to send Nuri Said to Ankara. They had a long meeting with Nuri Said, at which it was agreed that the following points should be put to the Americans and the British during the Ankara meeting: the need to take some action towards a settlement in Palestine and not to allow matters to drift, the need for the United States and the United Kingdom to declare their readiness to supply the Arab countries (other than Egypt and Syria) with arms for defensive purposes and the need for further economic and military aid for the Baghdad Pact.⁹⁰

The other reason for Menderes's sudden visit to Baghdad was probably his anxiety about the steadfastness of the Iraqi government. Menderes had been badly shaken by the former Iraqi government's vote for the Greek resolution over Cyprus in the United Nations and did not think that the present Iraqi government was much stronger. Menderes felt that the internal situation in Iraq was deteriorating and it was vital that Nuri should be brought back into power. The King and the Crown Prince told Menderes that their plan was to get the budget through, to have the election and then to put Nuri back into power, but it might be May before the latter happened. Menderes pronounced himself as fairly satisfied with the result of his visit.⁹¹

On 25 January the Turkish Foreign Minister, Zorlu, had a meeting with the British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, who was in Ankara to attend the Ministerial Council meeting of the Baghdad Pact. Zorlu told Lloyd that strong pressure should be brought to bear on the United States to become a full member of the Baghdad Pact. The American argument that the Israeli government would object to full American membership of the pact was unfounded. The Turkish government had taken confidential soundings of the Israelis and the reaction had not been unfavourable. All they required was an assurance that the pact was not intended to serve the Arab objective of eliminating Israel. As regards the Arab countries, Zorlu said, public opinion there was questioning the value of the pact and even arguing that it had opened a door to communism in the Middle East. American accession would serve to eliminate such thoughts. Lloyd replied that the United Kingdom had repeatedly pressed the United States to become a full member of the Baghdad Pact. The Americans, however, had argued that the Israeli difficulty and the difficulty of securing Congressional approval had made it impossible for them to accede. Lloyd said that his information confirmed the Turkish view that the Israelis now recognized that the Baghdad Pact served their interests. Lloyd suggested that when he was in Ankara Dulles should be asked to re-examine the question of United States accession in the light of the information which was available about the Israeli attitude.⁹²

At a meeting with Dulles on 26 January, Lloyd repeated the arguments which Zorlu had presented to him and expressed his belief that Israeli objections to full American membership would be few. Dulles agreed that the attitude of the Israeli government had changed. Nevertheless the political difficulties in Congress were no less and it was an absolute impossibility for the United States to become a full member of the Baghdad Pact. He said that

American commitments to the defence of the Middle East under the Eisenhower Doctrine were no less effective than membership of the pact. He thought that it was foolish of the members of the pact to go on pressing this matter because it gave the impression that the United States was not fully behind the Baghdad Pact.⁹³

On 27 January the fourth meeting of the Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact was opened in Ankara. As had become the usual practice, the Ministerial Council meeting was preceded by the meetings of the Committees. The Council meeting was attended by the prime ministers of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. The British delegation was led by Selwyn Lloyd. As a demonstration of support for the Baghdad Pact in the face of increased Soviet influence in the Middle East, Dulles attended a Baghdad Pact Council meeting for the first time as the principal American observer. Nuri Said, assisted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and two ex-prime ministers, led the Iraqi delegation in the absence of the Iraqi Prime Minister.⁹⁴

Although the Ankara meeting demonstrated that the Baghdad Pact was an ongoing concern, there were no spectacular results. The Economic Committee did not propose any new projects to the Council, but recommended completion of those already approved or under way. It recommended that priority should be given to the communications projects. A publication issued by the Baghdad Pact Secretariat at that time described existing communications facilities as follows:

Telephone calls from one capital to another now sometimes take two or three days . . . A tourist trip by automobile from one country to another now is virtually impossible, and at best a long, arduous and hazardous undertaking . . . It is now costly, hazardous and time consuming to send goods abroad by truck; truckloads of exports cannot travel at all between some of the friendly, neighbour states for want of passable roads; where there are roads, they cannot be used in some seasons . . . There now are railway lines in only small parts of the vast trading area of the Middle East Baghdad Pact Nations; goods cannot go by rail from Tehran to Karachi, or from Tehran to Ankara, or from Iraq into Iran.⁹⁵

Although Dulles expressed the conviction that 'the economic program of the pact deserves to be pushed with vigor', he offered only a \$10 million conditional grant for telecommunications projects. He referred to the possibility of obtaining additional financing for joint projects from the World Bank and the Export Import Bank. Britain committed a further slice of her £1 million for economic projects, which she had made available at the Karachi meeting in June 1957, but had nothing new to offer. At the Ankara meeting, further announcements of financial support for the technical assistance programme were made by Iran and Turkey. Iran allocated the equivalent of £50,000 for technical assistance and Turkey offered TL 750,000 (about £35,000) for technical assistance over five years.⁹⁶

On the military side, Turkey pressed for a command structure on the lines of NATO or at least for progress in that direction. However, the Council refused a command structure on the NATO pattern, but confirmed the establishment of a Combined Military Planning Staff, whose duties would be the planning and coordinating of combined staff training exercises. On the political side, the Council discussed the impending Egyptian–Syrian union and agreed that the initial reaction should be cautious and no move should be made which might have the effect of cementing the union. According to Bowker, the principal achievement of the meeting had been that dissatisfaction on the part of the regional members with the amount of aid being given had been at least partly dissipated. The feeling that the regional members were getting nothing worthwhile out of the pact seemed to have disappeared. The demands for increased aid had not been pressed extravagantly in restricted sessions of the Ankara meeting.⁹⁷

At a National Security Council meeting on 6 February, Dulles stated that the Baghdad Pact Council meeting in Ankara had been satisfactory, though it had been shaky at the start. Dulles pointed out that the shakiness in the meeting came primarily from Iran and Iraq. In Iran, factors of personality, particularly the personality of the Shah, caused serious complications. The Shah considered himself a military genius, and was insistently demanding further military build-up in Iran. In arguing for assistance to this end from the United States, he compared the situation of Iran with that of her strong military neighbours, Pakistan and Turkey. Moreover, continued Dulles, the Shah had not been willing to play the role of constitutional monarch. This refusal made for severe internal complications in Iran because the government did not agree with the Shah's estimate of his proper role. The government was seeking more economic development and less military build-up, and it wanted something approaching a balanced budget. The Shah was actually talking about getting out of the Baghdad Pact if the United States did not join it when Dulles arrived in Ankara, but he had taken a different view by the time Dulles left. Dulles had invited the Shah to come to Washington to talk over Iran's military problems with the President. As to Iraq, Dulles said that Iraq was in an awkward position because she was the only Arab country in the Baghdad Pact. There had been heavy pressures on Iraq from the other Arab states, who played up the theme of Arab unity as opposed to the Baghdad Pact, which they regarded as a barrier to this unity.⁹⁸

7 The collapse of the Baghdad Pact (1958–9)

The military coup in Iraq and the London meeting of the Ministerial Council of the pact (27–8 July 1958)

The Ankara meeting of the Baghdad Pact Ministerial Council in January 1958 took place against a background of mounting concern at the prospect of an imminent union between Egypt and Syria. After the Suez crisis, Nasser had resumed his forward policy in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan in order to keep these countries away from the Baghdad Pact and, if possible, to form a union with Syria. The concept of an Egyptian–Syrian union had become an active issue shortly after the conclusion of the Egyptian–Syrian military pact in October 1955. Enthusiasm for union was then confined essentially to Syria, and since then the campaign for union had been periodically revived in the Syrian parliament. Although, in November 1957, a Syrian initiative led to the adoption of a joint resolution by the Egyptian and Syrian parliaments declaring support for the principle of federal union, Nasser did not take it seriously. He delayed serious consideration of union until he might consolidate his influence in Syria completely.¹

However, as 1958 began, developments leading to the formation of an Egyptian–Syrian union were under way. In mid-January the pro-communist Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army, Bizri, and the Baathist Foreign Minister, Bitar, travelled separately to Cairo to present to Nasser their separate views on the internal situation in Syria and on Egyptian–Syrian union. Nasser's reluctance to limit his freedom of action in the Middle East by embracing a union with an unstable ally had placed him in a strong tactical position in dealing with the Syrian leaders. Nasser was convinced that his dominant position in Syria could only be maintained by acceding to the insistence of his supporters in Syria that union should not be further delayed. Although Nasser dealt rudely with Bizri, he reached an agreement in principle with him and Bitar for union in the near future on Egyptian terms, which included one president (Nasser) residing in Cairo, one parliament, one party (thus eliminating the Communist Party in Syria), one army and one diplomatic service. On these terms, the Egyptian–Syrian union, or United Arab Republic, was eventually proclaimed on 1 February 1958.²

The proclamation of the UAR coincided with the Ankara meeting of the Baghdad Pact, where all delegates expressed their deep concern over the dangerous implications of the projected Egyptian–Syrian union. They feared that it would facilitate Nasser’s domination of the Arab world, and complicate and exacerbate Arab–Israeli relations, as well as the relations among the Arab states themselves, exposing Jordan in particular to pressure to join the UAR in order to provide a geographical link between Syria and Egypt. Saudi Arabia, it was argued, would fear the extension of Nasser’s hegemony. Iraq would not welcome the extension of Nasser’s dominion to her frontier or the setback of her ambition to bring Syria within her own sphere. Turkey would likewise look with disfavour upon the union. The delegates agreed that the union was dangerous and should be opposed, but the question was how to do so. Dulles pointed out that the impression should not be given that the Baghdad Pact was alarmed over the UAR. He suggested that the Baghdad Pact and its individual members should not make a concerted public statement condemning the UAR, but should reserve their position pending developments, and wait for Iraq to work out a united position with other Arab countries (Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Lebanon). The delegations agreed to send separate messages to King Saud, King Hussein and President Chamoun urging that they should concert among themselves and with Iraq with respect to the situation arising out of the formation of the UAR.³

The formation of the United Arab Republic created immediate fears in Jordan and Iraq, which believed that the next step would be the overthrow of their own regimes by domestic forces favourable to the United Arab Republic. King Hussein took the initiative and proposed an Iraqi–Jordanian federation, the ‘Arab Union’. Agreement was quickly reached on the formation of the Arab Union, because King Hussein was willing to compromise over the headship of the Union and over Iraqi membership of the Baghdad Pact. On 14 February, two weeks after the Egyptian–Syrian union, Jordan and Iraq formed their own federation.⁴ On 12 May the Arab Union became effective with mutual approval of a federal constitution, which provided that each country was to retain its own political system. Jordan was given an escape clause that released her from joining the Baghdad Pact. On 18 May Nuri Said, who had come back to office on 3 March following the resignation of Murjan on 2 March, was appointed to the premiership of the Arab Union.⁵

The formation of the Arab Union was essentially a response to the United Arab Republic rather than something naturally desired by the Iraqi people, who, according to the British Embassy in Baghdad, regarded it as little more than a union of two royal houses and as opposing rather than advancing the unity of the Arab people. The heavy financial burden on Iraq, due to its decision to meet 80 per cent of the Union’s budget, led to much criticism by the Iraqi public, which feared the union would drain Iraqi resources and squander precious oil money on Jordan.⁶

In the spring of 1958 the United Arab Republic became deeply involved in the Lebanese civil war, which had started because of President Chamoun’s

bid, in violation of the constitution, to seek a second term of office. The opposition, which mainly consisted of pan-Arabist and pro-Nasser elements and was supported by the UAR, began to stimulate themselves throughout the country to resist amendment of the constitution and the re-election of Chamoun. On 8 May Nassib Matni, a critic of the regime and the editor of *Al-Telegram*, a newspaper known for its outspoken pan-Arabism, was killed as he left his office in Beirut. The opposition blamed the government for tolerating terrorist activities against its political opponents and called for a general strike throughout the country until President Chamoun resigned. The strike turned into riots and armed clashes between rival political groups, and finally into an armed rebellion in May and June. The rebels were encouraged and supported by the UAR, which from its Syrian province supplied them with arms, ammunition, money and some personnel. The United Arab Republic's political and military intervention converted the Lebanese civil war from a mere domestic event into an international issue.⁷

On 22 May Lebanon submitted a letter to the United Nations Security Council protesting against the UAR's intervention in the internal affairs of Lebanon. A similar complaint was made to the Arab League. However, both bodies failed to satisfy Lebanon's appeals for protection against the UAR and as a result, in July Lebanon appealed to the United States for direct military aid under the provisions of the Eisenhower Doctrine.⁸

Meanwhile, King Hussein, fearing that the civil war in Lebanon might spread to Jordan, had appealed to the Iraqi government to send Iraqi troops to protect Jordan's frontiers. On 13 July the 19th and 20th Brigades stationed at Jalawla, north-east of Baghdad, received orders to proceed to Jordan in response to a request from King Hussein, who had discovered a plot against himself. When Brigadier Abdul Karim Qasim, the commander of the 19th and 20th Brigades, received the order to move to Jordan through Baghdad he decided that this afforded an opportunity to eliminate the regime. According to his subsequent statements, Qasim had been waiting since at least 1956 for a chance to overthrow the regime. The brigades marched to Baghdad instead of Jordan. In the early hours of 14 July the palace was surrounded and attacked. The King, Crown Prince and other members of the royal family were killed. The dead body of the Crown Prince was handed over to the mob and dragged by the crowd through the streets. Nuri Said managed to escape, but a price of 10,000 dinars was set on his head, and on 15 July he was captured and killed, while trying to escape from a friend's house disguised in a woman's black cloak.⁹

The military coup in Iraq had taken the Western powers and the members of the Baghdad Pact completely by surprise. On 14 July the King, the Crown Prince and Nuri Said had been due to leave for Ankara for discussions with the presidents of Turkey and Pakistan and the Shah of Iran prior to the meeting of the Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact in London on 28 July. President Bayar, together with the Shah and the President of Pakistan, were awaiting the arrival of the King, the Crown Prince and Nuri Said

at the airport in Istanbul when they were told of their deaths. They, particularly the Turks, were greatly shocked by the news. The King, the Crown Prince and Nuri Said had been frequent visitors to Turkey since the signature of the Baghdad Pact and were on terms of personal friendship with President Bayar and his principal ministers.¹⁰

The Iraqi coup frightened President Chamoun and King Hussein as to their own positions and they called on the United States and the United Kingdom for assistance in sustaining their governments. On 14 July President Chamoun appealed to the United States for direct military aid under the provisions of the Eisenhower Doctrine. The United States responded quickly. From an American point of view, the Iraqi coup constituted another link in a chain of threatening developments in the Middle East. If Lebanon fell, the rest of the Arab world would follow and the Baghdad Pact would be undermined. The United States therefore decided to send military forces to Lebanon to defend the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon, and American marines landed in Beirut on 15 July 1958. Two days after the American landing in Lebanon, Britain dispatched a paratroop force to Jordan, in response to an appeal from King Hussein.¹¹

The heads of state of the Baghdad Pact's regional members met in Ankara between 14 and 17 July. Until the receipt of the news of the landing of American forces in Lebanon on the second day of the meeting, the talks were largely incoherent and conducted in an atmosphere bordering on panic. They welcomed the United States initiative in Lebanon and urged practical support for other Middle Eastern countries threatened like Lebanon, i.e. Jordan and Iraq. The main results of the three days of consultations were the two messages from the heads of states of the Baghdad Pact regional members to President Eisenhower, communicated to the United States Chargé d'Affaires on 16 and 17 July.¹² The messages called on the United States first to implement the Eisenhower Doctrine in the case of the Arab Union, and second to take direct action in Damascus, Baghdad and Jordan to forestall action likely to be taken in those places by Russia. These two messages were answered with a message stating that the United States intended to take all the necessary measures to safeguard the independence of the small states in the Middle East and that the United States, with particular reference to Jordan, had already declared its support for King Hussein.¹³

The military coup in Iraq had two important implications for Turkey. First, it was a blow to Menderes's Middle East policy, and placed the Baghdad Pact in jeopardy. With the Baghdad Pact, Turkey had started to follow an active foreign policy in the Middle East. In the pact, Turkey had relied upon Iraqi support, which had now been taken away. Second, the violent overthrow of an allied regime in Iraq scared the Turkish leaders in Ankara, particularly Menderes. Their own military establishment had been rocked by accusations of plotting, leading to the arrest of nine middle-grade officers in December 1957. This incident sharpened Menderes's fears that the Iraqi coup might be a contagious disease and spread to his country. Turkey's

geographical position and in particular her membership of the Baghdad Pact and her active Middle Eastern policy had guaranteed that any major developments in the Middle East would have their effect both on her domestic and foreign policies.¹⁴ The Turkish government proposed 'some highly unrealistic suggestions' to the United States and the United Kingdom for military action against Iraq. The Turkish government was willing to intervene militarily in Iraq, both in the aftermath of the coup and subsequently. It saw the Iraqi coup as an encirclement of the eastern flank of Turkey and NATO by the Soviet Union. It feared that the coup would bring Moscow's involvement to the southern frontier of Turkey. It sought support from the United States and the United Kingdom, but the response was discouraging. Moreover, on 16 July the Turkish government sent a message to King Hussein on behalf of the three powers advising him to apply for application of the Eisenhower Doctrine in the case of the Arab Union.¹⁵

According to the British Ambassador at Ankara, in reply to a question put by the United States Chargé d'Affaires on 17 July Zorlu said that Turkey was not contemplating taking any direct action against Iraq on her own, but would be prepared to consider any support that might appropriately be given to action taken by the United States. Zorlu was most probably referring to the use of the Adana airbase, which had been used by American troops during the invasion of Lebanon. Zorlu emphasized that the essential requirement was that the initiative should be taken by the United States. Later that day, Zorlu told the Chargé d'Affaires that Turkey wished to invade Iraq, and would be glad to know what support and guarantees she would receive from the United States in that event. The Chargé d'Affaires pointed out the doubtful feasibility of the proposed Turkish action given the military difficulties, and concluded by saying that until they had further details of Turkish plans the United States thought that it would be premature for them to encourage Turkish action.¹⁶

For some weeks following the coup in Iraq, Zorlu continued to urge Turkish, British or American military action against Iraq, and said so more or less publicly in an ill-judged interview with the correspondent of the London *Daily Mail* on 18 July. The gradual toning down of the Turkish government's attitude to the coup in Iraq and its implications were reflected in Zorlu's public statements. His first announcements were violent. He spoke with great vehemence about the weakness of American policy in the Middle East. He even suggested that it was Turkish pressure alone which had brought about the American military initiative in Lebanon, which should however be extended to Jordan and, further, to Iraq.¹⁷

Bowker commented that this astonishing Turkish attitude might have been a sudden decision of Zorlu himself to try out on the United States the idea of direct Turkish intervention and see what the response would be. In the face of the uncompromisingly discouraging American reply, Zorlu appeared to have dropped the idea as lightly as he put it forward. In view of her position vis-à-vis the Soviets, Turkey was unlikely to take any military action against Iraq without guarantees or permission from the United States

and NATO. Moreover, Bowker noted, such Turkish action would not have the approval of world opinion in view of the absence of domestic resistance to the new Iraqi regime, and might bring not only consolidation and support for the new Iraqi government but also dangerous Soviet reaction.¹⁸

Washington and London feared that an armed venture in Iraq could bring Soviet forces into the Middle East, and unite the whole Arab world against the West. If a civil war had developed in Iraq, it might be different, but there was no resistance to the new Baghdad regime, which appeared to be popular and in full control. The fact was that the whole royal family had been liquidated and that all the leading political figures had been seized, with the result that there was no prominent figure to raise an immediate voice of resistance. Moreover, the coup appeared to Britain and the United States to be Iraqi in its origins, and also the new Iraqi regime seemed to them to be anxious to maintain good relations with the West. It had not yet indicated a desire to leave the Baghdad Pact. Qasim had made no move to join the United Arab Republic, and he had given an assurance that oil would continue to flow to the West.¹⁹ By the end of July Bowker was confident that the Turkish government had come to realize that the despatch of an American force to Lebanon and of a British force to Jordan represented the appropriate limit to direct action by the Western powers in the Middle East. It had also come to realize that there could be little question of putting the clock back in Iraq, since the new Iraqi government had established control over the whole country and received general popularity.²⁰

At a Cabinet meeting on 18 July Dulles said that the United States had not favoured Iraqi membership in the Baghdad Pact; hence the United States had not joined it. He thought that the strain placed upon the Iraqi government by membership in the pact might have considerably contributed to the Iraqi government's downfall. Dulles said that he did not see much chance of retrieving the Iraqi situation since there were very few troops or people loyal to the old government. Dulles also noted that the Baghdad Pact was not constituted in such a way that it could properly intervene to retrieve the Iraqi situation. Moreover, Dulles said that the overthrow of the Iraqi government was due partly to the British mistake of bringing Iraq into the Baghdad Pact.²¹

On the same day, as regards US accession to the Baghdad Pact, policy planning staff of the State Department concluded that,

On balance, US adherence to the Baghdad Pact shortly after an Iraqi withdrawal would now appear to be a useful political and psychological move, provided that it can be accomplished without estranging Greece [which was opposed to the Baghdad Pact and was on bad terms with Turkey because of the Cyprus issue] from the United States and the West generally.²²

Foy Kohler, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, sent Dulles a memorandum, agreeing with the conclusions of the policy planning staff that

if Iraq left the pact it would be in the United States' interest to join it. On 23 July William Rountree, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, sent Dulles a memorandum, stating that US accession to the Baghdad Pact shortly after Iraq's withdrawal would be a useful political and psychological move. In a note to the Executive Secretariat of the State Department on 24 July, Joseph Greene, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, said,

What is really needed is an entirely new pact, with a new name, as the Baghdad Pact does not lend itself to adherence by US even if the Iraqis should denounce it. The new pact would comprehend the present Moslem members of the Baghdad Pact and it would be for decision what the US and UK would do about participation in or adherence to a new treaty.²³

At a National Security Council meeting on 24 July, with regard to the forthcoming Baghdad Pact Ministerial Council meeting in London on 28 July and US accession to the pact, Dulles said that at Baghdad Pact meetings there was always pressure on the United States to join the pact. He said that he had originated the northern tier concept, but that it had taken up by the British and spoiled by adding Iraq to it. In his view, the hijacking of his original northern tier idea and its subversion to British imperial ends was one of the reasons for the overthrow of the Iraqi regime. He added that the Iraqi government had fallen because Iraq was in an unnatural association with the northern tier countries (Turkey, Iran and Pakistan) and Britain in the Baghdad Pact. In his view, Iraq's interests were more closely identified with those of the Arabs of the south than with the northern tier. Iraqi membership in the Baghdad Pact was unnatural and tended to involve the pact in Arab-Israeli issues. Nuri Said had always insisted that the pact must be anti-Israel as an offset to the unpopularity of the pact in Iraq. Dulles pointed out that now Iraq might be eliminated as a member of the pact, one of the former reasons for the United States' refusal to join the pact (i.e. Iraqi membership) would be no longer valid. He added that the United States government might now wish to consider whether the United States should join the pact or not, and that he was not seeking a decision on this question urgently.²⁴

At the same National Security Council meeting, George Allen, the Director of the United States Information Agency, argued that it would be undesirable for the United States to accede to the Baghdad Pact even if Iraq dropped out, because the pact, in Arab minds, was an imperialistic instrument as long as the United Kingdom was a member. If the pact were an indigenous instrument and the United Kingdom were not a member, he said, it could then be supported by the United States, but the Arab people considered the pact to be a new cover for British imperialism in the Middle East.²⁵

As a result, it appears that the real reason for the United States' decision not to join the pact, as George Allen pointed out, was British membership in it rather than Iraqi membership. It was British membership, in American

eyes, which had destroyed the original concept of the pact. Britain had always viewed the pact as a framework for her political and economic interests in the Middle East. In his article 'The Hijacking of a Pact', Nigel Ashton argues that the military coup in Iraq accelerated the deterioration of the position of the Western powers in the Middle East, particularly the United Kingdom. It undermined Britain's Middle East policy, which had been pursued since the formation of the pact. The British Joint Planning Staff indicated that 'the United Kingdom from the start has viewed the military affairs and organization of the pact rather as a framework for its political aims than as a serious military undertaking'.²⁶

Meanwhile the revolutionary authorities in Iraq had begun to declare their intentions. A republic was formed under a provisional military regime, which announced that it was committed to neutrality between East and West and the closest cooperation with other Arab countries, particularly the United Arab Republic. It took no action to terminate Iraq's membership of the Baghdad Pact, but declared that the Arab Union was dissolved.²⁷ At a press conference on 26 July, when Qasim was asked what policy his regime would follow with reference to the Baghdad Pact, he gave no direct reply. He said that the countries of the Baghdad Pact had not yet recognized the new regime. However, the new regime's feeling towards the Baghdad Pact was made clear by Foreign Minister Jumard, during a talk with the American Ambassador in Baghdad on 2 August. According to Gallman, Jumard claimed that the Baghdad Pact had been signed on behalf of Iraq with the authority and knowledge of no more than twenty people. It did not have popular support, and the Iraqi people had been kept in ignorance of the obligations assumed by Iraq under the pact.²⁸

Siddiq Shanshal, the Minister of Information, expressed views on the Baghdad Pact which were stronger than those of Jumard. Shanshal claimed that the Baghdad Pact was no more than an instrument through which the West had imposed its control over Iraqi affairs without regard for the wishes of the Iraqi people. He insisted that the United States and the United Kingdom had an agreement with Nuri Said under which Nuri, in exchange for Iraq's membership of the Baghdad Pact, was allowed to continue his 'corrupt control' of Iraq.²⁹ In spite of these negative views on the Baghdad Pact, the new regime did not formally terminate Iraq's membership; it declared its intention to adhere to Iraq's existing commitments, but it seemed doubtful that it would wish to stay in the pact. However, the question was whether or not the rest of the pact members and the United States wished to keep Iraq in.

Since the Iraqi coup of 14 July, the State Department had been giving serious thought to the possibility of the United States joining the Baghdad Pact, under another name, in the event of Iraq leaving it. Iraq's defection would do away with the need for giving corresponding guarantees to Israel. Although the idea met with some opposition within the State Department on the grounds of adverse Indian and Greek reactions, Dulles was quite favourable. A memorandum, which was drafted by the State Department for

Dulles's guidance, stated that as long as Iraq remained in the pact there could be no question of the United States joining the Baghdad Pact. In the event of Iraqi withdrawal, the United States would consider joining if the pact were to be recast in a more precise form. In other words, it should be reconstituted as a northern tier arrangement. The memorandum also stated that United States accession to the pact shortly after an Iraqi withdrawal would be a useful political and psychological move. However, the State Department did not want to leave the impression that the United States expected Iraq to leave the pact.³⁰ United States accession would require Congressional approval and there could be no question of the United States giving any undertaking to join without such approval. Yet the consensus of opinion in the State Department was that the Senate would never agree to United States accession to the Baghdad Pact in its present form, with or without Iraq. The pact constituted a less firm commitment than the Eisenhower Doctrine. Moreover, it was so generally worded that it would leave the administration more room for manoeuvre than Congress would wish.³¹

Britain, in contrast, did not wish to exclude Iraq from the Baghdad Pact in the future, but to hold the door open for eventual Iraqi participation in some form. The British did not want to describe the forthcoming London meeting, which Faisal and Nuri Said had been scheduled to attend, as a session of the Baghdad Pact Council. From the British point of view, to describe it as a session of the Baghdad Pact Council without providing for Iraqi participation would be to invite rejection by Iraq of the pact as a whole. The British preferred to describe the London meeting as a meeting of the heads of governments of some of the Baghdad Pact powers (Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and Britain) and the United States Secretary of State. The meeting would thus be analogous to those held by the regional members of the pact at the time of the Suez Crisis.³²

In contrast, the United States was strongly opposed to describing the heads of government meeting as anything other than a regular meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council. They argued that the main object of the meeting was to show that the Baghdad Pact was still an ongoing concern despite the events in Iraq. Moreover, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan were all under the impression that the London meeting was a regular meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council. Consequently, the fifth session of the Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact, without Iraqi participation, opened as previously scheduled in London on 28 July 1958. The delegations from member countries were led by their prime ministers, who, according to Dulles, were in a state of considerable gloom as a result of the coup in Iraq.³³

Prior to the formal session of the conference, Dulles met separately and jointly with the heads of the delegations. On 27 July Dulles met the Iranian Prime Minister, Manuchehr Eqbal, and discussed bilateral relations as well as Baghdad Pact issues, particularly the consequences of Iraqi non-participation in the pact. Next, Dulles met Pakistani Prime Minister Firoz Khan Noon and discussed events in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. Both agreed that it would be

better if Iraq officially left the Baghdad Pact. Noon pressed Dulles to make a US promise to join the pact when Iraq withdrew, but Dulles would make no commitment at that point, citing the need for Congressional consultation. However, Dulles stressed the need to strengthen the northern tier countries. At a meeting with Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd on 27 July, Dulles said that it was highly unlikely that Iraq would wish to stay in the pact. The Iraqis were already publishing the Baghdad Pact documents, and Dulles therefore suggested that they should encourage Iraq to leave it. The pact would then be limited to the Moslem countries of the northern tier. There would be advantages in reorganizing the pact as a northern tier group, without Arab participation. The primary purpose of the pact was, Dulles said, to preserve the unity of the northern tier countries. He suggested that the countries of the Baghdad Pact should go on without either rejecting or embracing Iraq. The pact might continue to exist theoretically though not in practice. Moreover, he pointed out that there would be a greater possibility of the United States becoming a formal member of the pact if Iraq were out of it. So long as Iraq was a member the United States would have to give a parallel commitment to Israel. There was no doubt that difficulties with the Senate would be reduced if Iraq were out.³⁴ Later on that day the heads of all the delegations met to set an agenda for the formal session on 28 July, exchange preliminary points of view, and agree on the general need for a public statement affirming the pact in light of the Iraqi coup.

On 28 July before the opening of the formal session of the conference, Dulles met Menderes and his Foreign Minister, Zorlu, who stated that he was authorized to speak for the Turkish, Iranian, and Pakistani delegations in appealing to the United States to join the Baghdad Pact in order to give it 'new life'. Dulles responded that the pact was a 'very loose' obligation requiring only consultation; perhaps, he said, what was needed was a 'fresh start'. Dulles hoped that some 'formula' could be found within the circumference of existing legislation such as the Middle East Resolution (the Eisenhower Doctrine). Dulles suggested that the members of the pact should decide upon starting a new organization or building upon the Baghdad Pact. Zorlu replied that under either option the United States should be within the pact as a full member.³⁵

Consequently, Dulles called Eisenhower and told him that the United States had to make some kind of statement of its intentions towards the three countries of Pakistan, Turkey and Iran. Dulles proposed to issue a declaration. He proposed to enter into 'special agreements' with those nations attending the London meeting, which excluded Iraq, in accordance with Article 1 of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Eisenhower was unhappy with the word 'special', pointing out that Congress would interpret that as something like SEATO or NATO. Dulles assured him the wording did not go beyond the Eisenhower Doctrine. He said that he had told the prime ministers of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan that the United States could not undertake to make a

treaty with them or join the Baghdad Pact. Dulles pointed out that before any military aid was given to Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, 'special agreements' had to be made, and that the proposed declaration would refer to agreements of that kind. Dulles said that the word 'special' could come out, and that he did not think there would be any trouble with Congress because the proposed declaration would be within the limits of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Eisenhower suggested that in a public statement Dulles could emphasize 'peace, tranquillity, etc.' to show that it was defensive, not aggressive, in purpose. Following this telephone conversation Eisenhower dictated,

Foster Dulles feels that it is absolutely necessary that we give some special reassurance to our support for Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. He apparently thought this might put him in disagreement with my statement in the telegram I sent him last evening, where I advised going slow in trying to establish some substitute for the Baghdad Pact. Since, however, he intends to make only a statement of our purpose of living up to the Middle East Resolution [the Eisenhower Doctrine] passed in March of 1957, I see no harm in making such a statement.³⁶

After the opening session on 28 July, the Council met in restricted session, in which the heads of delegations first paid their personal tributes to the king and leaders of Iraq. They then discussed the world situation with particular reference to the Middle East. With regard to Lebanon and Jordan, they appreciated the recent prompt action taken by the United States and the United Kingdom in responding to the call for help from the local governments. They all felt that the allied occupation in Lebanon and Jordan should continue until either the threat had been removed, or the United Nations presence there had been strengthened.³⁷ The question of whether substantive alterations should be made in the pact and its organizations, or whether the pact would be continued in its present form, was considered by the Council. The countries represented at the London meeting declared their determination to maintain their collective security and while agreeing that the Iraqi coup had been a serious setback to the Baghdad Pact, which no longer existed in its original form, they decided to continue with or without Iraq.³⁸

With regard to recognizing the new regime in Iraq, there was general agreement that early recognition was desirable. However, Dulles appeared to have some personal reservations about recognition and was convinced that the new regime in Iraq was so far committed to Nasser that there was no prospect of Iraq remaining an honest member of the pact, though Iraq might decide to stay in for the time being in order to make mischief, or as reinsurance, or to see what she could get out of it. Moreover, if Iraq did remain in the pact, Dulles said, the United States would not take the risk of exchanging serious information or views in, e.g. the Military, Counter-Subversion or Liaison Committees. However, the regional members of the pact were anxious to recognize the new regime in Iraq. They thought that

although Iraq would turn out to be dominated by Nasser and the Soviet Union, there was nothing to be gained by refusing recognition. They argued that if Iraq was to be recognized eventually, it was better to accord recognition quickly rather than seem to give in under pressure later. As regards the timing of recognition, the prime ministers of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan said that their governments would recognize the new regime on 31 July. The United Kingdom decided to recognize the new Iraqi regime on the following day.³⁹

As regards Iraqi membership of the pact, the Council decided that a policy of 'wait and see' should be adopted. If after recognition, the Iraqi government expressed the wish to continue membership, further consultation would take place between the governments. In the meantime, they would allow things to go on normally. Although Iraq would be left out of the workings of the pact, no steps would be taken to eject her from it.⁴⁰ A decision in principle to move the pact headquarters to Ankara was taken by the Council. Until moved to Ankara the secretariat would stay in London. It was unable to use its headquarters in Baghdad, and for both political and administrative reasons it was not possible for it to move to the new provisional headquarters in Ankara before the middle of October 1958. During this period a working committee would be formed to ensure liaison on day-to-day business. Baig, Pakistan's High Commissioner in Canada, was appointed as successor to Khalidi, so that he could assume office as soon as Khalidi's appointment was terminated. In the meantime, Kestelli, Deputy Secretary-General, would assume the post of Acting Secretary-General. On the economic side, the Council reaffirmed its desire to develop the pact's economic activities, but decided to make no recommendations on projects which directly concerned Iraq. Britain committed a further slice of her £1 million for economic projects, bringing the total to £800,000.⁴¹

At the end of the conference on 28 July a declaration was issued, which stated that the signatories agreed to help each other preserve security and that the United States agreed to sign bilateral defence agreements with Turkey, Pakistan and Iran as provided for in Article 1 of the Baghdad Pact. At a National Security Council meeting on 31 July Dulles said that the actual undertaking contained in the declaration fell short of the undertaking in the Eisenhower Doctrine, but the essential thing was that all five powers had signed the same declaration. Dulles said that the declaration apparently satisfied the representatives of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, who went back home feeling that they had gained something which would help to compensate for the loss of Iraq. Dulles added that the parity of approach to security in the Baghdad Pact area, which had been lacking, was now supplied. However, although for the United States the reason for signing this declaration was to prevent serious weakening of the Baghdad Pact, at the same time it was to provide a suitable alternative to United States accession to the Baghdad Pact.⁴²

The final meeting of the Ministerial Council (26–8 January 1959) and Iraq's withdrawal from the pact (24 March 1959)

After the London meeting in July 1958, the first formal and private meetings of the council of deputies, without Iraq, were held in Ankara in October 1958, and during these meetings it was agreed to hold the sixth session of the Baghdad Pact Ministerial Council in Karachi in January 1959. As the Karachi meeting approached, the three remaining Moslem members of the pact began to press the United States to give more support to the pact and more military and economic aid to themselves. There were many expressions of dissatisfaction.

In particular, Iran, it seems, not content with the existing support received from the West, sought blackmailing tactics in order to get further support from the West, and entered into negotiations with the Russians for a non-aggression agreement. The Shah tried to play one major power against another and thus to derive the maximum advantage to Iran, and to prod the United States into a promise of greater financial assistance. In January 1959 a special Soviet delegation visited Tehran to conclude with Iran a pact of non-aggression and economic aid, involving explicit renunciation by Russia of her right to send troops to Iran under Article 6 of the Soviet–Iranian Treaty of 1921. In return, Iran would be expected to withdraw from the Baghdad Pact, not to conclude a bilateral defence agreement with the United States, and to deny all foreign powers the right to establish military bases on her territory.⁴³ The State Department had the following reports:

The situation in Iran has taken an ugly turn. The Shah has stated that he will have to turn more to the Communists for help if American aid is not increased. He may sign a non-aggression pact with the USSR. Pakistan has shown discouragement over the amount of aid received by India, and has expressed a view that there is nothing to be gained by 'standing up to be counted'. The policies of the opposition in Turkey advocate withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact. This is significant in view of the fact that the regime of Menderes is losing strength.⁴⁴

On 17 January 1959 Fletcher Warren, the United States Ambassador to Turkey, expressed serious concern 'over mounting feelings [of] discouragement attending [the] build-up for [the] Karachi meetings', because of differences between the United States and the regional members of the Baghdad Pact on funding economic projects, the unwillingness of the United States to host the next pact council meeting, and dissatisfaction over the wording of a series of bilateral agreements for mutual security and defence. Warren suggested that the United States should agree to the regional pact members' wording for the bilateral agreements, reorganize the Military Committee of the pact, host the next Council meeting in Washington, and send to Karachi a message of presidential support to be delivered by Secretary Dulles or Vice President Nixon.

Warren expressed additional concern about the prospects for the Economic Committee meeting and recommended that the United States should announce at the meeting that it approved in principal financial support for a Turkish–Iranian railway project.⁴⁵

On 19 January the State Department sent a telegram to Ankara, repeated to Karachi and Tehran, which expressed United States objectives for the Karachi meeting as follows:

- a to increase awareness of the benefits and obligations of collective security;
- b to reaffirm United States support of the pact's collective security efforts;
- c to emphasize that current US aid programmes were designed to enhance defence and economic development;
- d to exchange views on current Middle East developments, without committing the United States;
- e to counsel restraint against possible actions against Iraq;
- f to promote better relations between Afghanistan and its free-world neighbours; and
- g to dissuade the pact from involving itself publicly in intra-area disputes.⁴⁶

The Karachi meeting began on 26 January in an unpromising atmosphere. The routine side of the pact's activities was carried forward appreciably. Difficulty occurred, however, as soon as any question arose which affected the general nature of the pact. There were clear signs of irritation on the Turkish side at what they regarded as the failure of the pact to grow teeth in the NATO sense. The Turks proposed to set up a permanent military deputies group. This group would replace the existing Military Deputies Committee. Its broad functions would be to give impetus and direction to the Military Planning Staff and to speed the processing of military plans and studies. Its chairman would attend meetings of the council deputies to give military advice, receive political guidance and ensure efficient cooperation between the military and civilian sides of the pact. The director and deputy director of the Combined Military Planning Staff would be replaced by a single chief of staff, who would be responsible to and receive his direction from the permanent military deputies group. The Iranians opposed these Turkish proposals. They were not prepared to go further than agreement in principle to the strengthening of the military organization. The proposals were therefore referred to the deputies for further study and immediate implementation in the event of agreement.⁴⁷

The Pakistani approach was less clear. On the one hand, the Pakistani revolution of October 1958 had placed in power a military regime under Ayub Khan and had suppressed political criticism of membership of the pact. On the other hand, the new regime, like its predecessors, realized that little could be expected from the pact relevant to their preoccupation with India. According to the UK High Commissioner in Pakistan, Symon, there was a powerful

trend of feeling in Pakistan in favour of the neutralist line. The feeling was that Pakistan might have the best of both worlds by abandoning her alliance, though not necessarily her Western alignment, seeking a rapprochement with Russia, India and the UAR and yet remaining eligible for economic help from the West. Before and during the Karachi meeting these feelings were canalized into widespread press demands that the United States should quickly conclude a bilateral agreement with Pakistan, including a guarantee against non-communist aggression, or otherwise risk the collapse of regional members' interest in the pact. However, in opening the Council's session, President Ayub affirmed his government's belief that Pakistan's interests were best served by membership of the Baghdad Pact. Symon commented that the present regime was even less likely than its predecessor to jeopardize the tangible benefits of membership of the pact for the problematical advantages of neutralism or some other alignment.⁴⁸

However, these Turkish and Pakistani reservations were relatively minor in importance compared with the situation in Iraq and the danger of the ultimate collapse of the pact implicit in the Iranian negotiations with the Russians over a non-aggression agreement. According to Symon, the Karachi meeting had been dominated by the glum and uncooperative attitude of the Iranian delegation. The general assumption was that they had been instructed to adopt a non-cooperative attitude on every issue unless and until the Americans agreed outside the conference to give them further additional budgetary and military aid and some kind of territorial guarantee against Soviet aggression.

The regional members, in particular Iran and Pakistan, were dissatisfied with the progress of the pact's economic activities. In the case of Pakistan this largely arose from the feeling that Pakistan had benefited less than the other regional members, but these feelings were considerably mollified by various developments announced in the course of meeting. The British delegation announced that Britain was prepared to increase her technical assistance to £850,000 a year. Britain would also give sympathetic consideration to a request for assistance by the Pakistani government for providing a high-frequency radio, telephone and telegraph link between Pakistan and London. The United States, however, did not enjoy the same success as the United Kingdom at the Karachi meeting, largely because they had nothing new to offer. This irritated the regional members of the pact. The United States only agreed to render financial support to the Turkish–Iranian railway project if it proved to be economically and technically feasible.⁴⁹

At the Karachi meeting the Council also agreed on the establishment of a multilateral technical cooperation fund with an amount of \$150,000 (\$50,000 from the United States, \$50,000 from Britain and \$50,000 from the regional members) and on financing a regional training centre in the use of agricultural machinery and in soil and water conservation methods to be set up in Iran. The Council also agreed to relocate the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Centre from Baghdad to Tehran at the invitation of the Iranian government. However, little progress was made in the negotiations of the bilateral agree-

ments between the regional members and the United States, referred to in the London Declaration of 28 July 1958. The Iranians were not prepared to go along with Turkish and Pakistani willingness to sign on American terms. No action was therefore taken during the Council meeting in Karachi.⁵⁰ Subsequently, bilateral agreements between the United States and Turkey, Iran and Pakistan were signed in Ankara on 5 March 1959, as envisaged in the London declaration. The agreements were designed to strengthen the military and economic potential of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan against direct or indirect aggression. They were a restatement of existing policies and obligations rather than new assumptions. The United States agreed, in case of aggression, to take appropriate actions, including the use of armed forces, as envisaged in the Eisenhower Doctrine. By these agreements, the United States had become no less linked to the Baghdad Pact than if it had signed the original pact. The United States had become a member of the pact in all but name.⁵¹

Iraq was not present at the Karachi meeting and the Council agreed not to press Iraq for a decision on her relationship with the Baghdad Pact. Iraq was still legally a member of the Baghdad Pact, but she had taken no part in the activities of the pact since July 1958. On 24 March 1959, at a press conference, the Iraqi Prime Minister announced the withdrawal of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact. He said that the Baghdad Pact was destroyed on 14 July 1958 and uprooted on 24 March 1959. On the same day, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the states party to the Pact of Mutual Co-operation between Iraq and Turkey concluded in Baghdad on 24 February 1955 (the Baghdad Pact) of Iraq's decision to withdraw from membership of the Baghdad Pact with effect from 24 March 1959.⁵²

However, according to Article 7 of the pact, it did not appear to be possible for Iraq to withdraw from membership of the pact with effect from 24 March 1959. Technically, Iraq could only notify her intention to withdraw six months before the termination of the pact, which was to take place on 23 February 1960. Moreover, legally, Iraq's withdrawal required the consent of the other parties to the pact. However, this consent had in fact been given by the public statements which had been made by the members of the pact from time to time, but from the legal point of view it was not made clear that the termination of Iraq's rights and obligations as a member of the pact was dependent on their consent.⁵³

With the withdrawal of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact, the question of the pact's name had come up for consideration. The matter was discussed by the council of deputies on 2 April but no decision was reached. However, as a result of further consideration, the name Central Treaty Organization was accepted on 21 August 1959. The Central Treaty Organization signified that the countries occupied a central area between the NATO and SEATO regions.⁵⁴

Conclusion

After the Second World War, Britain's old system of alliances and base agreements with the Middle Eastern states came under challenge from rising nationalist forces in those countries. It also became inadequate to meet British strategic requirements, which had to focus on the post-war threat of Soviet expansion in the area. Nationalist anti-Westernism, intensified in the Arab states by the creation of Israel in 1948, made difficult the development of any alternative form of politico-military cooperation between the Middle Eastern states and the West as a whole. Between 1950 and 1952 two Middle East defence proposals initiated by Britain with support from the United States, France and Turkey failed to be accepted by the Middle Eastern states. In 1953, however, the United States proposed a new approach to the defence problem in the Middle East. In April 1954 Turkey and Pakistan, forming the anchor positions under the United States-sponsored 'northern tier' defence concept, were persuaded to join in a loose agreement providing for limited defence cooperation between the signatories.

In February 1955, Turkey took the initiative in concluding a somewhat more binding pact with Iraq, the so-called Baghdad Pact. This pact had two main purposes. First, to secure the defence of the Middle East against any possible aggression from whatever quarter. Second, and equally important, to provide for cooperation between the countries concerned in their efforts to achieve economic progress. On 5 April 1955 Britain joined the pact, and at the same time entered into a subsidiary base agreement with Iraq to replace the old Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. In September 1955 Pakistan followed suit, and in October so did Iran.

With the Turco-Iraqi pact, a basis for a regional defence organization in the Middle East was established, but it was uncertain how effective such a northern tier grouping would be in attracting the cooperation of other Middle Eastern states, and in generally furthering British and American politico-military aims in the area. The assumption was that the attractions of military and economic aid, which membership promised, would sooner or later encourage other Arab states to follow Iraq's example, but this did not happen. Opposition to the pact had been various and complex in motivation. Although the pact was only one factor among many which had caused strains and

pressures in the Middle East, it had served as one of the focal points for anti-Western sentiment in the area, and as a target for propaganda attacks on the Western powers. It had been included in Nehru's criticism of military pacts in general as tending to create discord and diminish the prospects of peace. It was also considered by the Indian government as further evidence of United States support for Pakistan vis-à-vis India. For the Soviet Union, the pact was a part of the Cold War. The Soviets regarded the pact as a step towards the extension of Western bases along their exposed south-western flank.

More important, the Baghdad Pact was regarded by many of the Arab states as a vehicle for the extension of Britain's influence and control in the region, and even as a means by which the Western powers might attempt to force a peace with Israel. The pact aggravated a sharp split within the Arab world, serving as the starting point in the strong controversy between pro-Western and pro-neutralist elements. In the eyes of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the Baghdad Pact posed challenges to their prestige and interests. In particular, Egypt saw the pact as a challenge both to her leadership in the Arab world and to the concept of Arab unity. Nasser viewed the pact as a new intrusion of Western colonialism. Saudi Arabia also opposed the pact because of her dynastic rivalry with Iraq and her suspicions of British and American intentions.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia attempted to check the spread of Iraqi influence and to undermine the Baghdad Pact. They attempted to promote a new Arab alignment based initially on Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria, aimed at isolating Iraq and reaffirming under Egyptian leadership a unified Arab position against defence arrangements with the West. The result was a struggle for influence over government leaders and important political elements in the uncommitted states, such as Jordan and Lebanon, with Egyptian and Saudi pressures and inducements ranged against those of Iraq and Turkey. The resulting crisis in Arab affairs was further complicated by growing Israeli agitation over the prospective increase in the military strength of Iraq and other Arab states, and by French manoeuvres to safeguard French interests in Syria and Lebanon.

The Baghdad Pact was also weakened by each member's preoccupation with its national interests. All pact members except Britain were weak economically, politically and militarily, and each wished to enhance its economic and military position. For these reasons, the pact members continued to press the United States to become a full member. They themselves had joined the pact for widely varying reasons, not all directly concerned with the security of the Middle East against Soviet communism. They valued the pact first as a means of ensuring the integrity of their frontiers, and second as a device to obtain Western military and economic aid. While Turkey and Britain, and to a lesser degree the other members, were influenced by a genuine desire to develop a more effective defensive posture vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the Middle East, each member also hoped that membership would advance its special national interests in the region. The ruling groups in Iraq, Iran and

Pakistan also expected to gain additional external support for maintaining themselves in power. Iran hoped for an Anglo-American security commitment with increased military aid. Pakistan was primarily motivated by a desire to improve her military position vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan. Iraq acceded mainly in hopes of increasing her influence in the Arab world, obtaining a politically more acceptable form of defence agreement with Britain, and obtaining an increase of United States military aid. The differences of interest between the members, and the peculiar position of the United States, outside the pact but crucial to its credibility, inhibited the development of a strong defence organization. Nevertheless, the Middle Eastern members of the pact had for one reason or another all felt that their political and national interests would be best served by close ties with the West and with the United States in particular, and that adherence to the pact was the best means of assuring increased American economic and military support.

Although Iraq's signature of a defence pact with Turkey reflected some appreciation of the Soviet military threat, it was largely motivated by the following factors: (a) the desire to replace the old Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 with an arrangement more acceptable to nationalist sentiment, (b) the wish to promote Iraqi-Syrian union (the Fertile Crescent plan), (c) the desire to obtain further American military aid and (d) the wish to increase Iraq's prestige among the Arab states at Egypt's expense. For Iraq, the Baghdad Pact was a screen for a bilateral agreement with Britain, rather than an instrument for a regional defence pact against Soviet aggression.

Pakistan's accession, as noted, was motivated primarily by hopes of obtaining further American military aid, and strengthening her military position against India and Afghanistan. Soon after her accession to the pact, Pakistan's attention was to be diverted from Middle East defence questions by her immediate and pressing political and economic problems, her strained relations with Afghanistan and her suspicions of India.

Turkey's primary concern was with the defence of her frontiers with the Soviet Union, to which end she was interested in strengthening her NATO ties. She was also concerned with protecting her exposed southern flank from a Soviet thrust through Iran and Iraq. There were other reasons behind Turkey's wish to promote a Middle East defence system. Turkey had embarked on an economic development programme when the Democratic Party came to power in May 1950. The Democratic government needed to satisfy the public in order to win their votes again. The principal state able to support Turkey's economic development programme was the United States. Turkey expected more economic and military aid in return for her support of the United States in the Middle East.

For the British, too, the pact was a means to achieve particular regional aims. It is difficult to dismiss Dulles's charge that while the creation of the Baghdad Pact was an outgrowth of the northern tier defence concept, which envisaged a regional grouping to resist Soviet aggression, the British had

taken it over and run it as an instrument of British policy, and as a means to protect their economic and military position in the Middle East.

Despite some initial reservations about the northern tier concept, Britain had accepted it as the best available means of providing for the defence of the Middle East and of retaining British rights of access to bases in the Middle East in the event of war. Britain was deeply concerned with protecting as much as possible of her own special interests and influence in the Middle East, particularly her strategic position and oil interests in the Persian Gulf. To this end she encouraged the Turco-Iraqi rapprochement. Britain acceded to the Turco-Iraqi pact chiefly because it provided a framework for a new base agreement with Iraq, and moreover it provided the next best option for Britain since the idea of a MEDO based in Egypt had failed. British views on developing the pact, as well as British efforts to bring other Middle Eastern states into the pact, reflected her overall political and economic interests in the Middle East as well as her military concern over the Soviet threat. Britain wished to make the Baghdad Pact an effective instrument for cooperation with Middle Eastern states and for safeguarding her interests in the region, to which end she attempted to obtain American political, economic and military assistance. While seeking to retain her influence in the Fertile Crescent area and making formal arrangements less offensive to nationalist sensibilities, Britain also had an eye to protecting her strategic position and oil interests in the Persian Gulf, which had been weakened by the British withdrawal from India and Palestine, and by British reverses in Egypt and Iran. The principal object of her Middle East policy was the security of the oil on which Britain so greatly depended. The main instrument by which the British hoped to achieve their policy was the Baghdad Pact. Its value to Britain was primarily as a means of improving the Western position in the Cold War and retaining the good will of two of the oil producing countries, namely Iran and Iraq.

The divergent aims of the pact members were not, however, the pact's chief weakness. Much more important were the continuing decline in Britain's regional influence, exemplified in her failure to induce other Arab states, particularly Jordan, to join the pact, and, above all, the cautious and even sceptical attitude of the United States. Although the Baghdad Pact formed part of the political landscape, its significance as the shield of the Middle East had been progressively diminished by the refusal of the United States to join it. The United States saw the pact as only one of several ways of attempting to achieve American objectives in the Middle East. Indeed, it came to believe that the pact was largely an instrument of Anglo-Arab politics, and that the British were using the pact to advance their political and economic interests in the Middle East. The development of United States policy towards the Baghdad Pact was a result of the development of the pact and of Middle Eastern events rather than of precise United States plans regarding the pact. In fact, the United States' objectives were conflicting. On the one hand, US accession to the pact would work to contain Soviet expansion in the region and would strengthen the pact economically and militarily. On the

other hand, accession might involve the US more directly in local disputes, since the pact was strongly opposed by many Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, where the US had important economic and military interests. The US did not believe that accession would serve US objectives in the region. If the United States stayed outside the pact, it would have a better chance to retain some extra room for manoeuvre in dealing with the Arab states. Furthermore, the US doubted the effectiveness of the pact in preventing Soviet penetration of the Middle East. It wanted to avoid new sources of friction with the Soviets, and it believed that US accession to the pact might exacerbate poor Soviet–American relations. The United States paid more attention to the political problems in the area, such as the Anglo-Iranian, Anglo-Egyptian and Arab–Israeli disputes, since it considered the defence of the region as primarily a British responsibility. The United States believed that these problems had to be solved before an effective Western-oriented regional defence pact could be feasible. It was lack of progress in solving these problems that led to the US hesitating to join the pact, although it publicly supported it. The US priority was to obtain an Arab–Israeli peace settlement. US accession before such a peace settlement, the State Department believed, could lead to irresistible pressure from Israel for a security guarantee from the United States. Moreover, US accession to the pact without such a security guarantee would not have met with Senate approval. However, the members of the pact repeatedly pressed the United States to make a firm and open commitment to the pact. Although these pressures abated somewhat after the United States’ decision in early 1956 to participate in the economic and counter-subversive activities of the pact and to sit in as an observer on the military side, the pact members remained unsatisfied. Pressure for United States accession was renewed by the four Middle Eastern members of the pact following Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal at the end of July 1956 and in the wake of the Suez war. Their feeling was that positive United States action was needed as a result of increased Russian influence in the Middle East and the intense bitterness which had been generated throughout the Middle East and Asia against the pact and its only Western member, Britain. As a result, in March 1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine was adopted as an alternative to deflect the pressure for United States accession to the Baghdad Pact. After the Iraqi coup in July 1958, the United States also agreed to sign bilateral agreements with the remaining three regional members of the pact. These agreements were signed in March 1959.

From the military point of view, although the Baghdad Pact provided at least a basis on which Turkey and Iraq could begin to coordinate policies for defence of their eastern flank in cooperation with Britain, it represented little more than expressions of willingness to cooperate. It did little to reduce the area’s vulnerability to Soviet aggression. Except for Turkey and Pakistan, the regional members of the pact had no ability to withstand a Soviet attack and their political and military weaknesses constituted a strategic liability for the pact. The defence of the Middle East hinged on the willingness and ability of

the United States and Britain to commit the necessary forces, to which they were reluctant. This was a basic handicap to developing a militarily more effective organization. Britain and the United States from the start had viewed the military affairs and organization of the pact rather as a framework for their political aims than as a serious military undertaking. The Baghdad Pact contained no precise military provisions. Cooperation for security and defence was not defined in the pact and liabilities could only be assumed as a result of separate agreements reached under Articles 1 and 2 between the parties to the pact.

However, the Baghdad Pact was more than a strategic device to contain a potential Soviet attack. It was intended as an instrument of social and economic cooperation in the Middle East. This economic side of the pact emerged from the appreciation by the pact members that military planning and security vigilance would be ineffective in building up resistance to communism if poverty was not eliminated. The pact provided a framework for development plans, especially in Iraq and Iran. From the very beginning the member states stressed the economic side of the pact. At the inaugural meeting of the Ministerial Council in November 1955, the Economic Committee was set up. The member states hoped that other Middle Eastern countries would in time associate themselves at least with the economic programme, if not with the pact itself. The Economic Committee's terms of reference provided that membership could be extended to states not signatories of the pact, and it was on this basis that the United States joined the Economic Committee. However, no Arab states joined. Attempts to recruit states from outside the region, such as West Germany, Italy and Switzerland, also failed. The military side of the pact continued to overshadow its economic side, and even the economic projects had a military twist. The communications projects were intended to serve strategic and military objectives as much as to contribute to economic development of the pact's members. Moreover, there were formidable obstacles in the way of economic cooperation between the members of the pact on a regional scale. The member countries were separated by tremendous distances. The pact area did not constitute a natural economic unit, as did the Fertile Crescent or the Nile basin. Therefore cooperation between the member states was limited to specific fields, such as, between Pakistan and Iran, timber and mineral sources; between Turkey and Iraq, Tigris and Euphrates waters; and between Iran and Turkey, roads and railways.

Although the United States and Britain continued to regard the pact as an anti-Soviet instrument, the fact was that battle lines in the Middle East were drawn between those states favouring the West and those favouring Nasser's pan-Arabism. The reverse of nearly everything that the pact was designed to promote occurred less than twenty months after its formation. The Baghdad Pact failed in its basic objective of preventing the expansion of Soviet influence in the Middle East. The Soviets succeeded in 'leaping' the northern tier and in expanding their influence in the Middle East. They provided extensive military and economic aid to Egypt and Syria.

Moreover, far from strengthening their external defences and internal stability, the consequence of the pact for the regional members was worsening relations with their neighbours. The pact improved neither the internal stability of the regional members of the pact nor the security of the Middle East. In July 1958 the military took over in Iraq, which later, in March 1959, opted out of the pact. In Pakistan, in October 1958, the government was overthrown by the army. Approximately eighteen months later, in May 1960, the same thing happened in Turkey.

The military coup in Iraq in July 1958 accelerated the deterioration of the position of the Western powers in the Middle East, particularly of Britain. The fall of the Iraqi monarchy further reduced the possibility of carrying out a policy to develop the Arab Union as a counterweight to the UAR. After the Iraqi coup in July 1958, and particularly after Iraq's withdrawal from the pact in March 1959, earlier notions of building up Iraq's membership to expand the pact further into the Arab world had to be abandoned. It was recognized that of the remaining regional members, Turkey looked primarily to NATO for support, and Pakistan to SEATO. The pact, it seemed, increasingly became a device to bolster and support one member, Iran, which was a member neither of NATO nor of SEATO.

Although the Baghdad Pact provided the only major framework in the Middle East for regional cooperation, it became neither a nucleus for a larger Middle East development agency nor an effective defence organization. Rather than bringing security to the region, it caused Iraqi–Egyptian rivalry, in which Jordan, not Syria, was the decisive battleground. It represented a Western effort to build a Middle Eastern organization to contain the Soviet Union. It failed in that purpose and turned instead, as John Foster Dulles put it, into ‘a forum for Arab politics and intrigue’.

Appendices

Appendix I Agreement of friendly cooperation between Pakistan and Turkey, Karachi, 2 April 1954¹

Pakistan and Turkey

Reaffirming their faith in the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their determination always to endeavour to apply and give effect to these Purposes and Principles,

Desirous of promoting the benefits of greater mutual cooperation deriving from the sincere friendship happily existing between them,

Recognising the need for consultation and cooperation between them in every field for the purpose of promoting the well-being and security of their peoples,

Being convinced that such cooperation would be to the interest of all peace-loving nations and in particular also to the interest of nations in the region of the Contracting Parties, and would consequently serve to ensure peace and security which are both indivisible,

Have therefore decided to conclude this Agreement for friendly Cooperation, and for this purpose have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

For Pakistan: The Honourable Chaudhry Mohammad Zafrullah Khan, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations;

For Turkey: His Excellency Monsieur Selahattin Refet Arbel, Ambassador of Turkey, who after presentation of their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1 The Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from intervening in any way in the internal affairs of each other and from participating in any alliance or activities directed against the other.

Article 2 The Contracting Parties will consult on international matters of mutual interest and, taking into account international requirements and conditions, cooperate between them to the maximum extent.

Article 3 The Contracting Parties will develop the cooperation, already established between them in the cultural field under a separate Agreement, in the economic and technical fields also by concluding, if necessary, other agreements.

Article 4 The consultation and cooperation between the Contracting Parties in the field of defence shall cover the following points:

- a exchange of information for the purpose of deriving benefit jointly from technical experience and progress,
- b endeavours to meet, as far as possible, the requirements of the Parties in the production of arms and ammunition,
- c studies and determination of the ways and extent of cooperation which might be effected between them in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, should an unprovoked attack occur against them from outside.

Article 5 Each Contracting Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Agreement and that this Agreement shall not affect, nor can it be interpreted so as to affect, the aforesaid engagements, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Agreement.

Article 6 Any State, whose participation is considered by the Contracting Parties useful for achieving the purposes of the present Agreement may accede under the same conditions and with the same obligations as the Contracting Parties.

Any accession shall have legal effect, after the instrument of accession is duly deposited with the Government of Turkey from the date of an official notification by the Government of Turkey to the Government of Pakistan.

Article 7 This Agreement, of which the English text is authentic, shall be ratified by the Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification in Ankara.

In case no formal notice of denunciation is given by one of the Contracting Parties to the other, one year before the termination of a period of five years from the date of its entry into force, the present Agreement shall automatically continue in force for a further period of five years, and the same procedure will apply for subsequent periods thereafter.

Appendix II Pact of mutual cooperation between Iraq and Turkey (the Baghdad Pact), Baghdad, 24 February 1955 (with the exchange of letters between Nuri Said and Menderes regarding Palestine)²

Whereas the friendly and brotherly relations existing between Iraq and Turkey are in constant progress, and in order to complement the contents of the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourhood concluded between His Majesty the King of Iraq and His Excellency the President of the Turkish Republic signed in Ankara on the 29th of March, 1946, which recognized the fact that peace and security between the two countries is an integral part of the peace and security of all the Nations of the world and in particular the Nations of the Middle East, and that it is the basis for their foreign policies;

Whereas Article 11 of the Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation between the Arab League States provides that no provision of that Treaty shall in any way affect, or is designed to affect, any of the rights and obligations accruing to the Contracting Parties from the United Nations Charter;

And having realized the great responsibilities borne by them in their capacity as members of the United Nations concerned with the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East region which necessitate taking the required measures in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter;

They have been fully convinced of the necessity of concluding a pact fulfilling these aims, and for that purpose have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:—

His Majesty King Faisal II, King of Iraq;

His Excellency Al Farik Nuri As-Said, Prime Minister;

His Excellency Burhanuddin Bash-Ayan, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs;

His Excellency Jalal Bayar, President of the Turkish Republic;

His Excellency Adnan Menderes, Prime Minister;

His Excellency Professor Fuat Köprülü, Minister of Foreign Affairs;

Who having communicated their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1 Consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter the High Contracting Parties will co-operate for their security and defence. Such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this co-operation may form the subject of special agreements with each other.

Article 2 In order to ensure the realisation and effect application of the co-operation provided for in Article 1 above, the competent authorities of the High Contracting Parties will determine the measures to be taken as soon as the present Pact enters into force. These measures will become

operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the High Contracting Parties.

Article 3 The High Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any interference whatsoever in each other's internal affairs. They will settle any dispute between themselves in a peaceful way in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

Article 4 The High Contracting Parties declare that the dispositions of the present Pact are not in contradiction with any of the international obligations contracted by either of them with any third State or States. They do not derogate from, and cannot be interpreted as derogating from, the said international obligations. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into any international obligations incompatible with the present Pact.

Article 5 This Pact shall be open for accession to any member State of the Arab League or any other State actively concerned with the security and peace in this region and which is fully recognized by both of the High Contracting Parties. Accession shall come into force from the date on which the instrument of accession of the State concerned is deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq.

Any acceding State Party to the present Pact may conclude special agreements, in accordance with Article 1, with one or more States Parties to the present Pact. The competent authority of any acceding State may determine measures in accordance with Article 2. These measures will become operative as soon as they have been approved by the Governments of the Parties concerned.

Article 6 A permanent Council at Ministerial level will be set up to function within the framework of the purposes of this Pact when at least four Powers become parties to the Pact. The Council will draw up its rules of procedure.

Article 7 This Pact remains in force for a period of five years, renewable for other five-year periods. Any Contracting Party may withdraw from the Pact by notifying the other Parties in writing of its desire to do so, six months before the expiration of any of the above-mentioned periods, in which case the Pact remains valid for the other Parties.

Article 8 This Pact shall be ratified by the Contracting Parties and ratifications shall be exchanged at Ankara as soon as possible. Thereafter it shall come into force from the date of the exchange of ratifications.

In witness whereof, the said plenipotentiaries have signed the present Pact in Arabic, Turkish and English, all three texts being equally authentic except in the case of doubt when the English text shall prevail.

Done in duplicate at Baghdad this second day of Rajab 1374 Hijri corresponding to the twenty-fourth day of February, 1955.

(Signed) NURI AS-SAID
For His Majesty the King of Iraq.

(Signed) BURHANUDDIN BASH-AYAN
For His Majesty the King of Iraq.

(Signed) ADNAN MENDERES
For the President of the Turkish Republic.

(Signed) FUAT KÖPRÜLÜ
For the President of the Turkish Republic.

**Note from the Prime Minister of Iraq to the Prime Minister of
Turkey, Baghdad, 24 February 1955**

Excellency,

In connection with the Pact signed by us to-day, I have the honour to place on record our understanding that this Pact will enable our two countries to co-operate in resisting any aggression directed against either of them and that in order to ensure the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East region, we have agreed to work in close co-operation for effecting the carrying out of the United Nations resolutions concerning Palestine.

Accept Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Nuri As-Said.
His Excellency Adnan Menderes
Prime Minister of Turkey,
Baghdad.

**Note from the Prime Minister of Turkey to the Prime Minister
of Iraq, Baghdad, 24 February 1955**

Excellency,


I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's letter of to-day's date, which reads as follows: 'In connection with the Pact signed by us to-day, I have the honour to place on record our understanding that this Pact will enable our two countries to co-operate in resisting any aggression directed against either of them and that in order to ensure the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East region, we have agreed to work in close co-operation for effecting the carrying out of the United Nations resolutions concerning Palestine'.

I wish to confirm my agreement to the contents of the said letter.

Accept Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Adnan Menderes.
His Excellency Nuri As-Said,
Prime Minister of Iraq,
Baghdad.

Appendix III The Baghdad Pact organizational diagram




Source: NA RG 59 780.5/1-1557.

Appendix IV The agreed structure for the Middle East Command

TOP SECRET
GUARD

Command Organization

12 In our view, the best organisation to meet the above strategic considerations and claims for national representation would be as follows:



The Allied Command in the Mediterranean Sector will be conducted on a joint basis by the C-in-C Mediterranean, C-in-C in the European Southern Flank, and the French Naval C-in-C in the Mediterranean, co-ordinating with other National Commands as required. Air Support for C-in-C Mediterranean will be provided by C-in-C MEAF.

Source: DEFE5/32.

Notes

Introduction

- 1 Bruce R. Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East* (Princeton, NJ, 1980), passim. Michael Dockrill, *The Cold War 1945–1963* (London, 1988), passim. W. Roger Louis, *The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945–1951* (Oxford, 1984), pp. 51–102. Michael J. Lacey (ed.), *The Truman Presidency* (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 410–44.
- 2 David Reynolds, *Britannia Overruled* (London, 1991), pp. 145–79. F. S. Northedge, *Descent from Power: British Foreign Policy, 1945–1973* (London, 1974), pp. 38–67. W. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull (eds), *The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations since 1945* (Oxford, 1986), passim. Louis, *British Empire*, pp. 3–50, 51–102. Lacey (ed.), *Truman Presidency*, passim. Kuniholm, *Origins of the Cold War*, passim.
- 3 Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952* (Cambridge, 1989), passim. Joseph Smith (ed.), *The Origins of NATO* (Exeter, 1990), passim. Lacey (ed.), *Truman Presidency*, passim. NATO was extended to Turkey and Greece in 1952, West Germany in 1955 and Spain in 1982. For the text of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) see Margaret Carlyle (ed.), *Documents on International Affairs, 1949–1950* (London, 1953), pp. 257–60.
- 4 CAB129/37 C.P.(49)209, 19 October 1949. For American anti-colonialism and the dissolution of the British Empire see W. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull (eds), *Special Relationship*, passim. Also see John Darwin, *Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-war World* (London, 1988), passim.
- 5 CAB21/2086 DO (46) 80, 18 June 1946.
- 6 DEFE4/20 JP (49)29 (Final), 30 March 1949. CAB129/37 CP (49)209, 19 October 1949.
- 7 David R. Devereux, *The Formulation of British Defence Policy Towards the Middle East, 1948–56* (London, 1990), p. 43. Ann Deighton (ed.), *Britain and the First Cold War* (London, 1990), pp. 254–6. Louis, *British Empire*, pp. 3–50. CAB129/37 CP (49)209, 9 October 1949.

One of Britain's agencies for bringing about improved social and economic conditions and for coordinating Britain's political, strategic and economic interests was the British Middle East Office (BMEO), which was set up in 1945. Its tasks were to give expert guidance to Middle East countries in economic and social matters, and to make recommendations on political questions affecting the Middle East as a whole. However, Britain had neither the money nor the manpower to make this agency an effective institution. Also, the Arabs saw it as economic imperialism. See John Zametica (ed.), *British Officials and British Foreign Policy, 1945–50* (Leicester, 1990), pp. 228–49.

- 8 Louis, *British Empire*, pp. 226–65.
- 9 CAB129/45 CP (51)95, 30 March 1951. PREM8/1432, Alignment of US–UK policy in the Middle East, 11 September 1951. Louis, *British Empire*, pp. 226–65. Since 1899, the Sudan had been controlled through an Anglo-Egyptian condominium agreement. Cairo cited plausible historical, ethnic, and cultural reasons for union under the Egyptian crown, but her strongest argument was strategic; the upper reaches of the Nile should not be controlled by another nation. Standing steadfastly upon principle, London insisted that the Sudanese should enjoy the right of self-determination. See Walter S. Poole, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Vol. 4, 1950–52* (Washington, DC, 1980), p. 333.
- 10 DEFE4/20 J.P. (49)29 Final, 30 March 1949.
- 11 Rashid Ali, who was pro-German and hoped to use German aid to reduce the British position in Iraq, organized a military coup and seized power in April 1941. However, in May British troops ousted Rashid Ali and restored pro-British Iraqi leaders, Regent Abdul Ilah and Nuri Said, to power. See George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, 4th edn (Ithaca, NY, 1980), pp. 273–5.
- 12 FO371/115759/VQ1051/199, Wright to Macmillan, 17 May 1955. CAB129/68 C(54)181, Future Defence Arrangements with Iraq, 31 May 1954. Louis, *British Empire*, pp. 331–6, 366–72. Lenczowski, *Middle East*, pp. 276, 474. Zametica (ed.), *British Officials*, pp. 121–55. J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record, 1914–1956*, Vol. II (Princeton, NJ, 1956), pp. 178–81.
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 Louis, *British Empire*, p. 381 ff. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy*, pp. 25–7, 218–26, 281–96, 299–304.
- 15 Rashid Khalidi *et al.* (eds), *The Origin of Arab Nationalism* (New York, 1991), passim. W. Scott Lucas, *Divided We Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis* (London, 1991), pp. 5–6. Lenczowski, *Middle East*, passim. CAB129/37 C.P. (49)209, 19 October 1949. FO371/127749/V1051/71, ‘Arab Nationalism’, 20 March 1957. FO371/133821/V1076/45, ‘Arab Nationalism and Arab Unity’, [12 June 1957].
- 16 Thomas A. Bryson, *American Diplomatic Relations with the Middle East, 1784–1975: A Survey* (Metuchen, NJ, 1977), passim. NA-Lot 57 D298 Box 16 ‘Britain Position in the World and its implications for our [United States] Middle East policy’, 3 June 1952. Louis and Bull (eds), *Special Relationship*, passim.
- 17 FRUS, 1947, Vol. V, pp. 485–626. FRUS, 1948, Vol. IV, p. 79. FRUS, 1949, Vol. VI, pp. 50–90, 165–79. DEFE4/10 JP (47)16, 13 January 1948. DEFE4/10 COS (48)8th meeting, 16 January 1948. DEFE4/20 JP (49)29 (final), 30 March 1949. FO800/477, record of a conversation between Hector McNeil and George Kennan, 11 August 1949. CAB129/37 CP (49)209, 19 October 1949. George McGhee, *Envoy to the Middle World* (New York, 1983), pp. 53–60, 80–7.
- 18 FRUS, 1950, Vol. V, pp. 1–8, 188–92, 193–6, 217–38, 591–3, 610–11. FRUS, 1950, Vol. III, pp. 233–8, 1686–9, 1691–3. FRUS, 1951, Vol. V, pp. 144–7. FRUS, 1951, Vol. III, pp. 522–4. CAB129/45 CP (51)95, 30 March 1951. CAB128/19 CM36 (51), 22 May 1951. DEFE4/42 JP (51)88, 10 May 1951. DEFE4/43 COS (51)84th meeting, 21 May 1951. DEFE5/31 COS (51)309, 28 May 1951. DEFE4/44 COS (51)100th meeting, 20 June 1951. DEFE4/44 COS (51)103rd meeting, 25 June 1951. DEFE4/44 COS (51)109th meeting, 2 July 1951. DEFE4/45 JP (51)129, 24 July 1951. DEFE4/45 JP (51)130, 24 July 1951. Geoffrey Aronson, *From Sideshow To Center Stage: US Policy toward Egypt 1946–1956* (Boulder, CO, 1985), pp. 17–22, 25. Devereux, *Formulation of British Defence Policy*, pp. 39–42. Louis, *British Empire*, pp. 588–9, 714.
- 19 Peter L. Hahn, ‘Containment and Egyptian Nationalism: the Unsuccessful Effort

- to Establish the Middle East Command, 1950–53', *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 11, No.1 (winter 1987), pp. 23–40. Melvyn P. Leffler, 'Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: the United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945–1952', *Journal of American History*, Vol. 71, No. 4 (March 1985), pp. 807–25. DEFE5/23 COS (50)331, 28 August 1950. DEFE4/36 JP (50)138, 13 October 1950. FO371/87933/RK1011/1, Charles to McNeil, 4 January 1950. FO371/87949/RK1011/31, Charles to Bevin, 15 August 1950. FO371/87948/RK1071/16, Minute by Rumbold, 16 June 1950. FO371/87949/RK1071/34, Minute by Rumbold, 9 August 1950. FO371/87949/RK1071/42G, FO to Washington, 7 September 1950. FO371/95285/RK1073/38, Washington to FO, 3 March 1951. FO371/95284/RK1073/28, Washington to FO, 21 February 1951. FRUS, 1950, Vol. III, pp. 1218–20, 1284–5.
- 20 CAB129/45 CP (51)95, 30 March 1951. CAB128/19 CM24 (51), 5 April 1951. CAB131/11 DO (51)57, 4 May 1951. CAB129/46 CP (51)214, 27 July 1951. FO371/96845/JE1011/2, Creswell to Eden, 26 June 1952. FRUS, 1951, Vol. V, pp. 162–3, 372–5. FRUS, 1951, Vol. III, pp. 552–4. DEFE4/44 COS (51)109th meeting, 2 July 1951. DEFE4/45 JP (51)129, 24 July 1951. DEFE4/45 JP (51)130, 24 July 1951.
- 21 PREM8/1432, Washington Talks, 10–14 September 1951. PREM8/1379, Ottawa Talks, 14–20 September 1951. FO371/90182/JE11910/109, Stevenson to FO, 15 October 1951. FO371/90182/JE11910/141, A letter from the Egyptian Foreign Minister to the American Ambassador in Cairo, 28 October 1951. WO216/796, Quadripartite Statement on MEC, 10 November 1951. FRUS, 1951, Vol. V, pp. 258–62, 436. FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 168–91.
- 22 DEFE4/54 COS(52)89th meeting, 23 June 1952. FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 247–9, 251–5.
- 23 DEFE11/87 United Kingdom memorandum on the Allied Middle East Defence Organization, 11 August 1952. FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 268–74, 296–9, 300–3, 310–15, 1860–5, 1877–8.
- 24 Devereux, *Formulation of British Defence Policy*, pp. 73–4.

1 The Northern Tier Defence Project (1953–4)

- 1 CAB129/58 C(53)17 Revise, 14 January 1953. PREM11/485, Robertson to Prime Minister, 22 June 1953. FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 1920–3, 1931–4. For the United States' role in the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations of 1953–4 for the evacuation of the Suez Canal base see Laila Amin Morsy, 'The Role of the United States in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (July 1993), pp. 526–8.
- 2 CAB129/58 C(53)17 Revise, 14 January 1953. PREM11/485, Robertson to Prime Minister, 22 June 1953. FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 1920–3, 1931–4. PREM11/485, Stevenson to FO, 12 May 1953.
- 3 CAB129/58 C(53)17 Revise, 14 January 1953. PREM11/485, Robertson to Prime Minister, 22 June 1953. FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 1931–3, 1966–7 and 1995–7. PREM11/484, Brook to Prime Minister, 21 November 1953.
- 4 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 1934–64, 2022–3.
- 5 CAB129/58 C(53)17 Revise, 14 January 1953. FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 1937–41.
- 6 CAB129/58 C(53)17 Revise, 14 January 1953. FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 1958–9.
- 7 CAB129/58 C(53)17 Revise, 14 January 1953.
- 8 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 1969–70.
- 9 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 1946–8. CAB129/58 C(53)17 Revise, 14 January 1953.
- 10 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 1997–2000.
- 11 On 12 February 1953, the Anglo-Egyptian agreement on Sudan was signed, which allowed for self-determination after three years along with a complex transitional

- formula and a schedule for elections. This agreement, it was hoped, would assist the discussions on the Suez dispute. For the full text of the agreement see Hurewitz, *Diplomacy*, pp. 335–7.
- 12 CAB128/26 C.C.(53)17, Eden's report from the United States, 9 March 1953. Sir Anthony Eden, *Full Circle: The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden* (London, 1960), pp. 249–53. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953–1956* (London, 1963), pp. 150–9. Also see FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 2009–10 and 2013–14.
 - 13 Eden, *Full Circle*, p. 253. CAB128/26 C.C.(53)17, 9 March 1953.
 - 14 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 2026–7. DDE Papers, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diaries, December 1952–July 1953, Box 3 (Churchill to Eisenhower, 18 March 1953), Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.
 - 15 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 2027–8.
 - 16 DDE Papers, Ann Whitman File, International Series, Box 16 (Dulles to Eisenhower, 19 March 1953), Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.
 - 17 Muhammad Abd el-Wahab Sayed-Ahmed, *Nasser and American Foreign Policy, 1952–1956* (Surbiton, 1989), p. 79.
 - 18 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 2027–8. PREM11/486, Eisenhower to Churchill, 19 March 1953.
 - 19 CAB128/26 C.C.(53)26, Churchill's report to the Cabinet, 14 April 1953.
 - 20 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 2074–6. For more information on the United States' defence policy towards the Middle East see Behçet K. Yeşilbursa, *İngiltere ve Amerika'nın Ortadoğu Savunma Projeleri ve Türkiye, 1950–1954* (Ankara, 2000).
 - 21 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 2060–1. Sayed-Ahmed, *Nasser*, p. 81.
 - 22 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 9–18.
 - 23 Muhamed H. Heikal, *The Cairo Documents: The Inside Story of Nasser and his Relationships with World Leaders, Rebels and Statesmen* (New York, 1973), p. 51.
 - 24 Ibid.
 - 25 Ibid.
 - 26 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 57–64, 90–4, 121–4, 134–6.
 - 27 Ibid., pp. 137–54. On 1 June 1953, with regard to Middle East defence, the Turkish government handed a memorandum to the American Embassy in Ankara. The memorandum reviewed the lack of favourable reaction from Egypt and other Arab states on the Middle East Defence Organization proposals and concluded that Arab participation in a defence organization was unlikely in the foreseeable future. The Turkish government, therefore, concluded that the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Turkey should immediately establish a MEDO open to later accession by any Middle East states. On 8 June at a meeting with McGhee, the American Ambassador in Ankara, Menderes repeated Turkish 'setting up shop' theory, emphasizing that the United States, Britain, France and Turkey should proceed immediately towards setting up a formal MEDO in hope that the Arab states might participate later. The British Foreign Office was in favour of a MEDO along the lines of the Turkish proposal. However, the State Department was against the idea. On 18 June in reply to Turkish proposal to 'set up shop' promptly, the State Department argued that in face of Arab opposition openly establishing an exclusively Western defence organization for the Middle East would be dangerous. See FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 387, 390–2, 406–8.
 - 28 Report on the Near and Middle East by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, 1 June 1953. See Hurewitz, *Diplomacy*, pp. 337–43. For more information on the Northern Tier Defence Project see Behçet K. Yeşilbursa, 'The American Concept of the Northern Tier Defence Project and the Signing of the Turco-Pakistani Agreement, 1953–1954', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 3 (July 2001), pp. 59–110.
 - 29 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 379–86. 'Conclusions of the Trip', John Foster Dulles

- Papers, Box 73 Seely G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 394–406.
- 33 Ibid. One year later, on 11 July 1954, a progress report was issued and combined with the original document to create NSC-5428, which was adopted as an updated version of American Middle East policy on 23 July 1954. NSC-5428 retained the essential elements of NSC-155/1, and basic American policy towards the region was not changed until January 1957 with the announcement of the Eisenhower Doctrine.
- 34 US Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East, National Security Council: 155/1, July 14, 1953, DDE Papers, Ann Whitman Files, White House Office for the Special Assistant for National Security Council Affairs, Near East (2) Box 5, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.
- 35 Deighton, *Britain and the First Cold War*, p. 258. Devereux, *Formulation of British Defence Policy*, p. 72.
- 36 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. VI, pp. 992–3.
- 37 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 389–90.
- 38 DEFE4/63 COS(53) 71st meeting, 8 June 1953. Devereux, *Formulation of British Defence Policy*, p. 72.
- 39 DEFE4/63 COS(53) 77th meeting, 23 June 1953.
- 40 DEFE11/60, Letter from Sir John Troutbeck to the Foreign Office, 13 June 1953.
- 41 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 2088–91.
- 42 PREM11/485, Robertson to Prime Minister, 6 and 22 June 1953. FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 2094–6.
- 43 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 2108–9, 2111–14.
- 44 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 2113–17.
- 45 PREM11/425, Visit of Salisbury to Washington, July 9th–15th, 1953. FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 2117–21.
- 46 DEFE5/47 COS(53)316, 1 July 1953. Devereux, *Formulation of British Defence Policy*, pp. 73–4.
- 47 Devereux, *Formulation of British Defence Policy*, pp. 73–4.
- 48 Ibid.
- 49 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 2123 ff.
- 50 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 389–90, 394–8.
- 51 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 399–406.
- 52 Peter L. Hahn, *The United States, Great Britain and Egypt, 1945–1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War* (Chapel Hill, 1991), p. 159. FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 406–8.
- 53 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 408–12.
- 54 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 416–17.
- 55 H. W. Brands, 'The Cairo–Tehran Connection in Anglo-American Rivalry in the Middle East, 1951–1953', *International History Review*, Vol. 11 (August 1989), pp. 434–56. FO371/114813/EP10110/1, 'Annual Review of Iran: 1953'.
- 56 H. W. Brands, 'India and Pakistan in American Strategic Planning 1947–54: The Commonwealth as Collaborator', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (October 1986), pp. 45–9. For the details of Anglo-American interest in Pakistan in the context of Middle East defence see FO371/92875, 92876 and 101198. Also see Ayesha Jalal, 'Towards the Baghdad Pact: South Asia and Middle East Defence in the Cold War, 1947–1955', *International History Review*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (August 1989), pp. 409–33. Pashtunistan was a disputed border area between Afghanistan and British India, but the issue had been settled by the Treaty of Kabul of 1921. In August 1947 Britain had been succeeded by Pakistan

- as a sovereign power south of Afghanistan. Politically, however, this meant a reassertion by Afghanistan of her interest in the disputed border area. In December 1953 Afghanistan asked Britain to agree to a revision of the treaty. The Afghans held to their view that the Pathans had a right to sovereign existence as a state of Pashtunistan, which would embrace the territory between southern Afghanistan and the Indus River. This would mean the major part of Pakistan and would include Pakistan's capital Karachi, as well as Baluchistan, a province bordering on Iran and the Indian Ocean. See Lenczowski, *Middle East*, p. 243.
- 57 FRUS, 1952-4, Vol. IX, pp. 418-19.
- 58 Lucas, *Divided We Stand*, p. 30. FRUS, 1952-4, Vol. IX, pp. 416-17, 420-3. The United States was concerned about the possible reaction of India to aid to Pakistan due to its dispute over Kashmir. The State Department believed that if the aid were used to equip Pakistani troops being sent to Korea, it would help to mollify India's disapproval.
- 59 FRUS, 1952-4, Vol. IX, pp. 423-8.
- 60 FRUS, 1952-4, Vol. IX, pp. 430-2.
- 61 FO371/112319/DY1192/154, Bowker to FO, 13 March 1954. FRUS, 1952-4, Vol. IX, pp. 433-4.
- 62 FRUS, 1952-4, Vol. IX, pp. 436-8.
- 63 DEFE5/49 COS(53)521, 19 October 1953. FRUS, 1952-4, Vol. IX, pp. 424-8. Steven Z. Freiburger, *Dawn over Suez: The Rise of American Power in the Middle East, 1953-1957* (Chicago, 1992), p. 87.
- 64 FO371/106937/FY1192/66, Minute by Eden, 4 December 1953, and subsequent minutes.
- 65 FO371/106937/FY1192/76, Record of a conversation between the Secretary of State and Dulles, 7 December 1953. On 11 December 1953 the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Pakistan reported to the Commonwealth Relations Office that India objected to the United States' military aid to Pakistan because Nehru feared that Pakistan's alliance with the United States would 'bring the Cold War to India's borders'. However, the basic reason for Nehru's opposition was that a stronger Pakistan would threaten the dominance of India in Asia, the Middle East and Africa. See FO371/106937/FY1192/75, from UK High Commissioner in Pakistan to CRO, 11 December 1953.
- 66 Nixon had visited India from 29 November to 4 December 1953, as part of his goodwill trip to the Far East and South Asia.
- 67 DDE Papers, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 5, Discussion at the 176th meeting of the NSC, 16 December 1953, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.
- 68 FRUS, 1952-4, Vol. IX, pp. 441-3. NA-RG 59-790d.5/1-454.
- 69 FRUS, 1952-4, Vol. IX, pp. 439-41. CAB129/65 C(54)4, 5 January 1954.
- 70 FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. IX, pp. 439-41, 448-9.
- 71 FRUS, 1952-4, Vol. IX, pp. 441-4.
- 72 FO371/112315/DY1192/31, Makins to FO, 25 January 1954. FRUS, 1952-4, Vol. IX, pp. 441, 448-50.
- 73 FRUS, 1952-4, Vol. IX, pp. 448-50. FO371/112315/DY1192/45, Fox to FO, 23 January 1954. FO371/112315/DY1192/31, Makins to FO, 25 January 1954.
- 74 FO371/112315/DY1192/45, Fox to FO, 23 January 1954.
- 75 FRUS, 1952-4, Vol. IX, pp. 448-50. FO371/112315/DY1192/31, Makins to FO, 25 January 1954. FO371/112315/DY1192/45, Fox to FO, 23 January 1954.
- 76 FO371/106937/FY1192/93, Minute by Falla, 1 January 1954. PREM11/1520, FO to Washington, 1 January 1954. CAB129/65 C(54)4, 5 January 1954.
- 77 CAB128/27 C.C.1(54), 7 January 1954. For further information about British defence policy in early 1950s see Devereux, *Formulation of British Defence Policy*, pp. 100-20. Also, in review of global defence strategy in 1952, the British Chiefs of Staff had set out a forward strategy for the defence of the Middle East, which was

- based upon Iraq and Jordan. It, in a major war, was based upon the power of the United Kingdom and its allies to inflict on the enemy at the outset of hostilities such damage by air attack as would reduce the land threat to Iraq to manageable proportions. The British intention was to deploy north-eastwards from Jordan in support of Iraqi forces with the object of holding the enemy land forces as far forward as practicable, if possible in the passes leading from Iran to Iraq. See DEFE5/52 COS(54)152, 'Future Defence Arrangements with Iraq', 8 May 1954.
- 78 FO371/112314/DY1192/16, FO to Washington, 5 January 1954.
- 79 FRUS, 1952-4, Vol. IX, pp. 444-6, 450-52. FO371/112314/DY1192/14, Makins to FO, 6 January 1954. However, on 12 January 1954 Joseph Palmer, the Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, warned that the smaller NATO powers would be unhappy about the Turco-Pakistani defence arrangement and consider it as a further extension eastwards of NATO's commitments. FRUS, 1952-4, Vol. IX, pp. 444-6, 450-2.
- 80 DEFE5/51 COS(54)66, 26 February 1954. DEFE5/51 COS(54)12, 11 January 1954. DEFE4/68 COS(54)6th meeting, 15 January 1954.
- 81 FO371/112315/DY1192/34, 'Brief for the Secretary of State at Berlin; United States military aid to Pakistan and Middle East defence', 15 January 1954. DEFE11/88, 'Brief for Berlin Conference', 15 January 1954.
- 82 CAB129/66 C(54)53, 'Middle East: Anglo-American Policy', 15 February 1954.
- 83 FO371/112314/DY1192/13, Makins to FO, 6 January 1954. PREM11/1520, from UK High Commissioner in India to CRO, 4 January 1954. On 5 January 1954 the *New York Times* carried on the front page an article by Walter Waggoner with the headline 'United States Pushing Defence Pact of Pakistan, Turkey and Iraq.'
- 84 FO371/112314/DY1192/6, Extract from *Red Star*, 29 December 1953.
- 85 FO371/112314/DY1192/24, Extract from *Pravda*, 5 January 1954. FRUS, 1952-4, Vol. IX, pp. 441-2.
- 86 FO371/112314/DY1192/13, Makins to FO, 6 January 1954. FO371/112319/DY1192/140, Extract from *Izvestia*, 27 February 1954.
- 87 FRUS, 1952-4, Vol. IX, pp. 454-9, 463-4, 473-4.
- 88 CAB129/66 C(54)58, 16 February 1954.
- 89 FO371/106937/FY1192/78, Minute by Cable, 15 December 1953.
- 90 FO371/112314/DY1192/9, 'United States Military Aid for Pakistan'. FO371/106937/FY1192/78, Minute by Cable, 15 December 1953. PREM11/1520, UK High Commissioner in India to CRO, 23 and 30 December 1953.
- 91 FO371/112314/DY1192/14, FO to Washington, 8 January 1954. FO371/112314/DY1192/9 'United States Military Aid for Pakistan', [10 January 1954].
- 92 The Berlin Conference, which took place between 25 January and 18 February 1954, was the first Soviet-Western (American, British and French) foreign ministers' meeting since 1949. The main issue at the conference was the peace treaty with Germany, which was not made directly after the war. However, divisions on this issue between the Western powers and the Soviets were too deep to allow a settlement. The Western powers put the emphasis on the need for free elections to create a united German government; the Soviets instead wanted East Germany (which was under Russian control) to have an equal role with West Germany in forming a unified government. Both sides failed to agree on the German question, but they did agree to meet in April 1954 to discuss two Far Eastern issues: Korea and Indo-China. See John W. Young, *Cold War and Détente, 1941-1991* (London, 1993), p. 163.
- 93 FO371/112314/DY1192/14, FO to Washington, 8 January 1954. FRUS, 1952-4, Vol. IX, pp. 462-3.
- 94 FO371/112316/DY1192/57, Minute by Lloyd, 28 January 1954. FO371/112315/DY1192/47, Eden to FO, 24 January 1954. FO371/112317/DY1192/98, Minute by Tahourdin, 9 February 1954. PREM11/1520, FO to Berlin, 4 February 1954.

- 95 FO371/112317/DY1192/77, Minute by Falla, 13 February 1954. PREM11/1520, Bowker to FO, 10 February 1954. FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 480–1.
- 96 FO371/112315/DY1192/45, Fox to FO, 23 January 1954; FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 454–57. The Treaty of Friendship and Collaboration (the Balkan Pact) between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia was signed in Ankara on 28 February 1953. The countries contracted to consult each other on matters of common defence interest. There was, however, no commitment to assist each other in the event of attack. See Young, *Cold War and Détente*, p. 204.
- 97 FO371/112315/DY1192/45, Fox to FO, 23 January 1954; FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 454–7.
- 98 CAB129/66C[54]58, 16 February 1954. FO371/112317/DY1192/98, Minute by Tahourdin, 9 February 1954.
- 99 FO371/112314/DY1192/14, Makins to FO, 6 January 1954. FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 480–1.
- 100 FO371/112316/DY1192/57, Minute by Lloyd, 28 January 1954. FO371/112317/DY1192/87, Minute by Tahourdin, 11 February 1954. CAB129/66 C(54)58, 16 February 1954.
- 101 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 486–7.
- 102 For the full text of President Eisenhower's letter to Indian Prime Minister Nehru and the statement by the President on American military aid to Pakistan see *The Department of State Bulletin*, 15 March 1954, pp. 400–1. The final agreement between the United States and Pakistan regarding American military aid to Pakistan was signed on 19 May 1954 and entered into force immediately.
- 103 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 487–8.
- 104 FO371/110787/V1073/29, Bowker to Allen, 26 March 1954.
- 105 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, p. 491, 527. For more information on the Turco-Pakistani Agreement see Behçet K. Yeşilbursa, 'The American Concept of the Northern Tier Defence Project', pp. 59–110.
- 106 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 491, 527. For the full text of the Turco-Pakistani Agreement see Hurewitz, *Diplomacy*, pp. 345–6.
- 107 FO371/110787/V1073/45, Minute by Powell-Jones, 12 July 1954.
- 108 FO371/112321/DY1192/179, from the British Embassy in Ankara to FO, 10 April 1954.
- 109 FO371/112319/DY1192/154, Bowker to Eden, 13 March 1954.
- 110 FO371/112321/DY1192/201, Bowker to FO, 19 June 1954. FO371/110787/V1073/47, Bowker to Eden, 18 June 1952. FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, p. 513.
- 111 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 491–2.
- 112 FO371/112321/DY1192/201, Bowker to FO, 19 June 1954. FO371/110787/V1073/47, Bowker to Eden, 18 June 1954. FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, p. 513.

2 The extension of the Northern Tier Defence Project (1954–5)

- 1 The Saadabad Pact was signed between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan in 1937. It amounted to little more than an agreement to consult, and it had hardly any practical application. The Arab League Collective Security Pact was concluded in June 1950. It came into force in August 1952 and by this time it had been signed and ratified by all Arab League states except Yemen, which ratified the pact in October 1953. For the texts of the Saadabad Pact and the Arab League Collective Security Pact see Hurewitz, *Diplomacy*, pp. 214–16, 245–9, and 311–14.
- 2 FO371/110787/V1073/34, 'Iraq: Possible Accession to the Turkish–Pakistani Pact', 10 April 1954. FO371/110787/V1073/7, Troutbeck to Eden, 24 February 1954. Nuri Said was out of office from 17 September 1953 to 4 August 1954.
- 3 FO371/110787/V1073/34, 'Iraq: Possible accession to the Turkish–Pakistani Pact', 10 April 1954.

- 4 FO371/110787/V1073/7, Troutbeck to Eden, 24 February 1954. FO371/110995/VQ1023/5, Minute by the Levant Department of the Foreign Office, 30 April 1954. FO371/110787/V1073/32, Chancery in Baghdad to the Levant Department, 7 April 1954. For the Iraqi Communist Party see Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq* (Oxford, 1985), *passim*.
- 5 FO371/110997/VQ10344/2, Minute by Falla, 20 January 1954. FO371/110997/VQ10344/3, FO to Troutbeck, 29 January 1954.
- 6 FO371/110997/VQ10344/3, FO to Scott, 29 January 1954.
- 7 FO371/112315/DY1192/47, Eden to FO, 24 January 1954. FO371/110819/V1193/8, Minute by Eden, 12 January 1954.
- 8 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 2371–4. FO371/110821/V1193/44 ‘United States Military Aid to Middle East Countries’, 18 March 1954. FO371/110821/V1193/52 ‘United States Grand Military Assistance to Iraq’, 17 March 1954. DEFE5/50 COS(53)571, ‘United States Military Aid to Iraq’, 23 November 1953.
- 9 FO371/110787/V1073/11, Troutbeck to Eden, 10 March 1954. FO371/110787/V1073/26, Gardener to Falla, 23 March 1954.
- 10 FO371/110787/V1073/17, Troutbeck to Allen, 17 March 1954. FO371/110787/V1073/39, Troutbeck to Allen, 27 April 1954. FO371/110787/V1073/11, Troutbeck to Eden, 10 March 1954. FO371/110787/V1073/39, Minute by Powell-Jones, 7 May 1954.
- 11 FO371/110787/V1073/11, Troutbeck to Eden, 10 March 1954. FO371/110787/V1073/39, Troutbeck to Allen, 27 April 1954.
- 12 FO371/110787/V1073/11, Troutbeck to Eden, 10 March 1954. FO371/110787/V1073/39, Troutbeck to Allen, 27 April 1954.
- 13 FO371/110787/V1073/12, Troutbeck to FO, 15 March 1954.
- 14 FO371/110787/V1073/29, Bowker to Allen, 26 March 1954.
- 15 FO371/110787/V1073/28, from the British Embassy in Cairo to FO, 29 March 1954.
- 16 FO371/110787/V1073/34, ‘Iraq: Possible Accession to the Turkish–Pakistani Pact’, 10 April 1954. FO371/110787/V1073/12, Troutbeck to FO, 15 March 1954.
- 17 FO371/110787/V1073/34, Allen to Troutbeck, 14 April 1954. FO371/110787/V1073/34, ‘Iraq: Possible accession to the Turkish–Pakistani Pact’, 10 April 1954. FO371/110995/VQ1023/5, Minute by the Levant Department of the Foreign Office, 30 April 1954.
- 18 FO371/110787/V1073/34, ‘Iraq: Possible Accession to the Turkish–Pakistani Pact’, 10 April 1954; and Allen to Troutbeck, 14 April 1954.
- 19 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 2380–90.
- 20 According to Article 2, Iraq also agreed that she would (a) join in promoting international understanding and goodwill, and maintaining world peace; (b) take such action as may be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes of international tension; (c) make, consistent with its political and economic stability, the full contribution permitted by its manpower, resources, facilities and general economic condition to the development and maintenance of its own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the Free World; (d) take all reasonable measures which may be needed to develop its defence capacities; and (e) take appropriate steps to insure the effective utilization of the economic and military assistance provided by the United States. For the text of the military aid agreement between Iraq and the United States see Hurewitz, *Diplomacy*, pp. 346–8.
- 21 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 2380–90. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy*, pp. 346–8.
- 22 FO371/110787/V1073/40, Fox to Falla, 10 May 1954.
- 23 Summary of Record of Conference of Mission Chiefs in NEA Area, Istanbul, May 14, 1954, DDE Papers, White House Office, National Security Papers, OCB Central Files, Near East (1) Box 77, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS. FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 506–12.

- 24 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 516–20.
- 25 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 525–36, ‘Statement of policy by the National Security Council, NSC-5428, 23 July 1954’. NSC-5428 was composed of the statement of policy in NSC-155/1 with a supplementary statement of policy on the Arab–Israeli conflict. It reached many of the same conclusions as had NSC-155/1 a year earlier.
- 26 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 525–36, ‘Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, NSC-5428, 23 July 1954’.
- 27 Lucas, *Divided We Stand*, p. 32. For the text of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty see Hurewitz, *Diplomacy*, pp. 383–5.
- 28 Lucas, *Divided We Stand*, p. 32.
- 29 FO371/112316/DY1192/62, from the British Embassy in Ankara to FO, 2 February 1954. FO371/110828/V1196/3, ‘Brief for the Washington talks on Middle East defence’, June 1954. FO371/112314–112322/DY1192/File.
- 30 CABI29/68 C (54)181, 31 May 1954.
- 31 CABI29/68 C (54)181, ‘Future Defence Arrangements with Iraq’, 31 May 1954. DEFE5/52 COS (54)160, ‘Future Defence Arrangements with Iraq’, 17 May 1954. DEFE5/52 COS (54)152, ‘Future Defence Arrangements with Iraq’, 8 May 1954.
- 32 FO371/110787/V1073/47, Bowker to Allen, 18 June 1954. FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 513–16.
- 33 FO371/110787/V1073/11, from the British Embassy in Baghdad to FO, 10 March 1954. FO371/110787/V1073/34, ‘Iraq: Possible Accession to the Turkish–Pakistani Pact’, 10 April 1954. FO371/110988/VQ1015/17, ‘Confidential’, 29 March and 11 May 1954.
- 34 FO371/110988/VQ1015/17, ‘Elections in Iraq’, 24 June 1954. FO371/110988/VQ1015/17, ‘Confidential’, 29 March and 11 May 1954. Lenczowski, *Middle East*, pp. 282–3.
- 35 FO371/110787/V1073/45, Hooper to FO, 9 July 1954.
- 36 FO371/110787/V1073/45, Minute by Powell-Jones, 12 July 1954.
- 37 FO371/110991/VQ1015/83, Troutbeck to Eden, 9 December 1954.
- 38 FO371/110990/VQ1015/46, FO to Hooper, 20 July 1954. FO371/110990/VQ1015/49, Minute by Brewis, 14 July 1954. FO371/110990/VQ1015/47, Minute by Shuckburgh, 16 July 1954.
- 39 Patrick Seale, *The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-war Arab Politics, 1945–1958*, 2nd edn (London, 1987), pp. 199–201.
- 40 FO371/110990/VQ1015/46, FO to Hooper, 20 July 1954. FO371/110787/V1073/39, Troutbeck to Allen, 27 April 1954. FO371/110787/V1073/11, Troutbeck to Eden, 10 March 1954.
- 41 FO371/110788/V1073/52, Minute by Powell-Jones, 26 July 1954. FO371/110791/V1076/43, FO to Baghdad, 6 October 1954.
- 42 FO371/111000/V1073/[542], Minuted by Lloyd, 29 July 1954.
- 43 FO371/110990/VQ1015/62, Memorandum by the Commonwealth Relations Office, 25 August 1954.
- 44 FO371/110990/VQ1015/62, Memorandum by the Commonwealth Relations Office, 25 August 1954.
- 45 FO371/111000/VQ1051/10, Troutbeck to Eden, 11 September 1954. FO371/110791/V1076/8, Troutbeck to FO, 1 September 1954. In 1951, when the question of a Middle East Command was being considered, Nuri Said had suggested that Britain should build her defence scheme on the Arab League Collective Security Pact. Cold water was then thrown on this proposal by the British government. Some of objections were as follows: (a) Israel would be singled out for exclusion from the proposed Middle East regional defence pact; (b) Britain should find it more difficult to deal with the Arab states collectively than it was to deal with individual states, such as Iraq and Jordan; (c) the Arab League states would tend to

- regard the pact simply as an instrument for extracting as many arms as they wanted from the West on easy terms. See FO371/111000/VQ1051/10, Troutbeck to Eden, 11 September 1954. FO371/110791/V1076/8, Troutbeck to FO, 1 September 1954.
- 46 FO371/110791/V1076/9, Hooper to Eden, 27 August 1954. FO371/110791/V1076/16, Troutbeck to Shuckburgh, 2 September 1954. Details of the Sarsank talks appear in Seale, *Struggle for Syria*, pp. 201–6. Much of Seale's information is based on his interview with Salah Salim in April 1960. Also see Waldemar J. Gallman, *Iraq under Nuri: My Recollections of Nuri al-Said, 1954–1958* (Baltimore, MD, 1964), pp. 22–4.
- 47 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 541–5.
- 48 FO371/110791/V1073/7, Troutbeck to FO, 1 September 1954. FO371/110791/V1076/17, Minute by Brewis, 10 September 1954.
- 49 FO371/110791/V1076/2, from the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Levant Department, 21 August 1954.
- 50 FO371/110791/V1076/3, Hooper to FO, 20 August 1954. FO371/110791/V1076/26, Troutbeck to Eden, 11 September 1954.
- 51 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 541–5. FO371/110791/V1076/7, 'Summary of Telegrams from US Ambassador, Baghdad, Recording his Talks with Nuri after the Nuri-Salah Salem Meeting', Troutbeck to FO, 1 September 1954.
- 52 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 544–5.
- 53 FO371/110791/V1076/3, Shuckburgh to Kirkpatrick, 24 August 1954. FO371/110791/V1076/4, FO to Baghdad, 31 August 1954. FO371/110791/V1076/17, Minute by Brewis, 10 September 1954. FO371/110791/V1076/17, Minute by Falla, 11 September 1954. FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 545–6.
- 54 FO371/110791/V1076/8, Troutbeck to FO, 1 September 1954. FO371/110791/V1076/17, Minute by Brewis, 10 September 1954.
- 55 FO371/110791/V1076/13, Stevenson to FO, 10 September 1954. FO371/110791/V1076/9, Hooper to Eden, 27 August 1954. FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 545–8. On 8 September 1954, Nasser granted Salah Salim a month's leave. Caffery, the American Ambassador in Cairo, commented that the action was a way of putting Nuri Said on notice that the Egyptian government did not consider itself bound by any commitments made by Salah Salim to Sarsank. See FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, p. 548. The heads of agreement regarding the Suez Canal base were initialled on July 27, and the final agreement was signed on 19 October 1954. For the text of the agreement see Hurewitz, *Diplomacy*, pp. 383–5.
- 56 FO371/110791/V1076/22, Stevenson to FO, 16 September 1954. FO371/110788/V1073/56, 'Middle East Defence', 7 October 1954. Seale, *Struggle for Syria*, pp. 206–8.
- 57 FO371/110791/V1076/33, Stevenson to FO, 20 September 1954.
- 58 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 548–9.
- 59 FO371/110791/V1076/38, Troutbeck to Shuckburgh, 17 September 1954.
- 60 FO371/110791/V1076/36, Falla to Troutbeck, 24 September 1954. FO371/110791/V1076/45, Minute by Falla, 1 October 1954. FO371/110791/V1076/43, FO to Baghdad, 6 October 1954.
- 61 FO371/110791/V1076/26, Troutbeck to Eden, 11 September 1954. FO371/110791/V1076/44, Bowker to Shuckburgh, 27 August 1954.
- 62 FO371/110791/V1076/45, Minute by Falla, 1 October 1954.
- 63 DEFES/54 COS (54)325, 14 October 1954. FO371/110791/V1076/45, Minute by Falla, 1 October 1954.
- 64 FO371/110791/V1076/43, FO to Baghdad, 6 October 1954. FO371/110791/V1076/43, Minute by Falla, 5 October 1954.
- 65 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 549–50.
- 66 FO371/110774/V1025/1, Bowker to Eden, 3 August 1954. FO371/110791/

- V1076/38, Troutbeck to Shuckburgh, 17 September 1954. Also see Hüseyin Bağcı, *Demokrat Parti Dönemi Dış Politikası* (Ankara, 1991); Philip Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East* (London, 1991); İsmail Soysal, 'Seventy Years of Turkish–Arab Relations and an analysis of Turkish–Iraqi Relations, 1920–1990', *Studies on Turkish–Arab Relations*, (Annual 1991), pp. 23–84.
- 67 Lenczowski, *Middle East*, pp. 142–3.
- 68 FO371/110774/V1025/1, Bowker to Eden, 3 August 1954. The Balkan Pact was signed by Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia at Bled on 9 August 1954. The pact built on earlier military talks (since 1952), was encouraged by NATO and promised cooperation in the military and non-military fields. However, the pact's significance was undermined when Yugoslavia became reconciled to the Soviets in 1955. Greece and Turkey then fell out over the future of Cyprus. The pact became defunct on 24 June 1960. See Young, *Cold War and Détente*, p. 204.
- 69 Mahmut Dikerdem, *Ortadoğ'u'da Devrim Yılları* (Istanbul, 1990), pp. 104–10. İsmail Soysal, 'The 1955 Baghdad Pact', *Studies on Turkish–Arab Relations* (Annual 1990), pp. 55–7.
- 70 FO371/110773/V1024/17, Bowker to FO, 31 July 1954. FO371/110774/V1025/1, Bowker to Eden, 3 August 1954. Soysal, '1955 Baghdad Pact', pp. 55–7.
- 71 FO371/110773/V1024/17, Bowker to FO, 31 July 1954. FO371/110774/V1025/1, Bowker to Eden, 3 August 1954. Soysal, '1955 Baghdad Pact', pp. 55–7.
- 72 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 504–12. FO371/110773/V1024/10, Fox to Falla, 26 May 1954. FO371/110773/V1024/11, Bailey to Brewis, 9 June 1954.
- 73 FO371/110773/V1024/10, Minute by Falla, 11 June 1954. FO371/110773/V1024/10, Minute by Selby, 16 June 1954.
- 74 FO371/110773/V1024/18, Sir Sterndale-Bennett to FO, 2 August 1954.
- 75 FO371/110773/V1024/18, Minute by Shuckburgh, 5 August 1954. FO371/110773/V1024/18, FO to Ankara, 7 August 1954.
- 76 FO371/110773/V1024/24, Bowker to FO, 12 August 1954. FO371/110773/V1024/25, Bowker to FO, 17 August 1954.
- 77 FO371/110791/V1076/20, Bowker to FO, 14 September 1954. FO371/110791/V1076/27, Bowker to Eden, 14 September 1954. FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 550–2.
- 78 FO371/110791/V1076/20, Bowker to FO, 14 September 1954. FO371/110791/V1076/27, Bowker to Eden, 14 September 1954. FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 550–2.
- 79 FO371/110791/V1076/20, Minute by Mallet, 16 September 1954.
- 80 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 554–5. Gallman, *Iraq under General Nuri*, pp. 25–7. Soysal, '1955 Baghdad Pact', pp. 58–61.
- 81 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 554–5.
- 82 FO371/110788/V1073/68, Bowker to Eden, 26 October 1954.
- 83 FO371/110788/V1073/63, Bowker to FO, 20 October 1954. FO371/110788/V1073/68, Bowker to Eden, 26 October 1954.
- 84 FO371/110788/V1073/54, Bowker to FO, 6 October 1954. FO371/110788/V1073/68, Bowker to Eden, 26 October 1954.
- 85 FO371/110788/V1073/54, Bowker to FO, 6 October 1954. FO371/110788/V1073/68, Bowker to Eden, 26 October 1954.
- 86 FO371/110788/V1073/66, Bowker to FO, 25 October 1954. FO371/110788/V1073/69, Troutbeck to Falla, 27 October 1954. FO371/110788/V1073/71, Troutbeck to Falla, 2 November 1954.
- 87 The Turkish National Pact was drawn up by Kemal Atatürk in November 1919, as a statement of the aims of the new Nationalist movement. It said that all Ottoman territories inhabited by an Ottoman Moslem majority were regarded as part of the indivisible Turkish homeland. This description was taken to include the Kurdish population of Iraq and the province of Mosul. This part of the declaration was, however, overtaken by the treaty concluded in June 1926 between Iraq, Turkey

- and Britain, which defined the present Turco-Iraqi frontier and declared it inviolable. The Treaty of 1946 between Iraq and Turkey confirmed that settlement. There thus appeared to be small justification for Nuri's suspicions that Turkey had designs on Iraqi territory. See Hurewitz, *Diplomacy*, pp. 74–5.
- 88 FO371/110788/V1073/69, Troutbeck to Falla, 27 October 1954. FO371/110788/V1073/68, Bowker to Eden, 26 October 1954. FO371/110788/V1073/74, Bowker to Falla, 9 November 1954.
- 89 FO371/110788/V1073/84A, Murray to FO, 7 December 1954. FO371/110788/V1073/84, Shuckburgh to Hooper, 24 December 1954. FO371/110788/V1073/69, Troutbeck to Falla, 27 October 1954. FO371/110788/V1073/68, Bowker to Eden, 26 October 1954. FO371/110788/V1073/74, Bowker to Falla, 9 November 1954.
- 90 FO371/110824/V1193/107, Troutbeck to FO, 6 November 1954. FO371/110824/V1193/126, Minute by Falla, 16 December 1954.
- 91 FRUS, 1952–4, Vol. IX, pp. 562–5. FO371/110824/V1193/121, Makins to FO, 10 December 1954.
- 92 Seale, *Struggle for Syria*, pp. 209–11.
- 93 Ayesha Jalal, 'Towards the Baghdad Pact', pp. 431–3.
- 94 B. H. Reid, 'The Northern Tier and the Baghdad Pact', in J. W. Young (ed.), *The Foreign Policy of Churchill's Peacetime Administration, 1951–1955* (Leicester, 1988), pp. 160–1.
- 95 *Ibid.*
- 96 Nigel John Ashton, 'The Hijacking of a Pact: the Formation of the Baghdad Pact and Anglo-American Tensions in the Middle East, 1955–1958', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (April 1993), p. 123.

3 The formation of the Baghdad Pact (1954–5)

- 1 FO371/110788/V1073/86, Fox to Ward, 29 November 1954. FO371/115486/V1073/77, Bowker to FO, 22 January 1955. FO371/118830/JE1011/1, Trevelyan to Lloyd, 31 January 1956.
- 2 FO371/115495/V1073/389, Bowker to Eden, 1 March 1955. FO371/110788/V1073/86, Fox to Ward, 29 November 1954. Dikerdem, *Ortadoğu'da*, pp. 109, 163.
- 3 FO371/110788/V1073/86, Fox to Ward, 29 November 1954. FO371/115484/V1073/4, Hooper to FO, 5 January 1955. FO371/115485/V1073/54, Hooper to Shuckburgh, 8 January 1955.
- 4 FO371/115484/V1073/8, Bowker to Shuckburgh, 3 January 1955. FO371/111003/VQ1054/46, Minute by Brewis, 5 January 1955.
- 5 FO371/115484/V1073/5, Minute by Powell-Jones, 11 January 1955.
- 6 FO371/115484/V1073/2, Minute by Falla, 5 January 1955. NA RG 59 780.5/1–755, Aldrich (London) to Secretary of State.
- 7 FO371/115484/V1073/5, Bowker to FO, 7 January 1955.
- 8 FO371/115484/V1073/6, Hooper to FO, 10 January 1955. FO371/115484/V1073/11, Hooper to FO, 12 January 1955. FO371/115486/V1073/90, Hooper to Eden, 18 January 1955. On 3 January 1955 Iraq broke off diplomatic relations with Russia, arguing that she was interfering Iraq's internal affairs. It was a climax to Nuri's systematic suppression of communist activities since he came to power in August 1954.
- 9 FO371/115484/V1073/6, Hooper to FO, 10 January 1955. FO371/115484/V1073/11, Hooper to FO, 12 January 1955. FO371/115486/V1073/90, Hooper to Eden, 18 January 1955. Nuri Said himself, when out of office in 1946, negotiated a treaty of friendship with the Turks, which the Iraqi Parliament approved the following year in June 1947. The treaty included the following areas: cooperation in the preservation of public security; supervision of the distribution of Tigris and Euphrates waters; cooperation in the areas of economic, communications, and

- culture; and border arrangements. See Michael Eppel, 'Iraqi Politics and Regional Policies, 1945–49', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (January 1992), pp. 108–19.
- 10 NA RG 59 682.87/2–655, Gallman (Baghdad) to Secretary of State. NA RG 59 682.87/1–1455, Gallman (Baghdad) to Secretary of State. On 12 January 1955 Menderes, who was the first foreign statesman to be invited to address the Iraqi Parliament in its thirty years of existence, briefly addressed a joint session of the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies and Senate. (NA RG 59 682.87/2–655, Gallman (Baghdad) to Secretary of State. NA RG 59 682.87/1–1455, Gallman (Baghdad) to Secretary of State.
 - 11 For the text of the Turco-Iraqi joint communiqué see Noble Frankland (ed.), *Documents on International Affairs, 1955* (London, 1957), p. 286.
 - 12 FO371/115484/V1073/14, Hooper to FO, 8 January 1955. FO371/115485/V1073/54, Hooper to Shuckburgh, 8 January 1955.
 - 13 FO371/115486/V1073/76, from Her Majesty's Consul General in Istanbul to FO, 22 January 1955. FO371/115484/V1073/14, Hooper to FO, 8 January 1955. FO371/115485/V1073/54, Hooper to Shuckburgh, 8 January 1955.
 - 14 FO371/115484/V1073/11, Hooper to FO, 12 January 1955. FO371/115486/V1073/90, Hooper to Eden, 18 January 1955. NA RG 59 780.5/1–1855 'Agreement between Turkey and Iraq'.
 - 15 FO371/115486/V1073/83, Bowker to Shuckburgh, 18 January 1955. FO371/115489/V1073/180, Bowker to Shuckburgh, 1 February 1955. Dikerdem, *Ortadoğu'da*, pp. 109, 163.
 - 16 FO371/115484/V1073/33, FO to Baghdad, 14 January 1955.
 - 17 Gallman, *Iraq under General Nuri*, pp. 45–6. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 2–5. NA RG 59 682.87/1–1455, Message to the Turkish Prime Minister Menderes from Dulles.
 - 18 FO371/115486/V1073/89, Bowker to FO, 21 January 1955.
 - 19 FO371/115485/V1073/54, Hooper to Shuckburgh, 8 January 1955.
 - 20 FO371/115484/V1073/26, Minute by Shuckburgh, 11 January 1955. NA RG 59 780.5/1–755 and NA RG 59 780.5/1–1155. Ashton, 'Hijacking of a Pact', p. 129.
 - 21 FO371/115484/V1073/26, Minute by Shuckburgh, 11 January 1955. NA RG 59 780.5/1–755 and NA RG 59 780.5/1–1155. Ashton, 'Hijacking of a Pact', p. 129.
 - 22 FO371/115489/V1073/180, Bowker to Shuckburgh, 1 February 1955. NA RG 59 682.87/1–2955, and NA RG 59 780.5/2–255. According to the British Ambassador in Tel Aviv, reactions in Israel to the prospective conclusion of a defence agreement between Iraq and Turkey were mixed. On the one hand, the pact would split the Arab League, drive Egypt and Iraq apart, and so diminish the combined political and military strength of Israel's enemies. Turkey, hitherto positively sympathetic to Israel, might be able gradually to influence Iraq, and through Iraq some at least of the other Arab states, to adopt a constructive policy towards Israel. On the other hand, instead of Turkey influencing Iraq, Turkey might herself agree, as the price of Iraqi cooperation, to abandon her sympathy for Israel. According to the Ambassador, another nightmare for Israel was that Iraq, strengthened by her pact with Turkey, might proceed to realize her dream of a 'Greater Syria', which would bring Iraq right up to Israel's frontier. See FO371/115488/V1073/156, from the British Embassy in Tel Aviv to FO, 1 February 1955.
 - 23 FO371/115484/V1073/20, Gardener to FO, 15 January 1955. FO371/115486/V1073/91, Gardener to Eden, 19 January 1955. FO371/115486/V1073/92, Gardener to Falla, 19 January 1955.
 - 24 FO371/115484/V1073/29, Andrews to FO, 17 January 1955. FO371/115484/V1073/34, Andrews to FO, 18 January 1955. FO371/115486/V1073/92, Gardener to Falla, 19 January 1955. Nuri Said's commitment to a defence agreement with

Turkey faced strong opposition in the Arab world and Egypt was the Arab state most against the Turco-Iraqi agreement. Nuri's decision put the Egyptian government in a difficult position. They had to choose between denouncing Nuri, and thus revealing a split in the Arab League, or accepting a situation which amounted to a rebuff to Egypt's claim to be the leader of the Arab League. According to Stevenson, the British Ambassador in Cairo, the Egyptian government believed that the Arab League must be strengthened first. They also argued that Arab public opinion was not yet ready to accept open alignment between the Arab states and the West. In January the Egyptian Foreign Minister told Stevenson that it was too early for members of the Arab League to make separate agreements with outside powers and that for this reason the Egyptian government was not in favour of Iraq's accession to the Turco-Pakistani pact. See FO371/115484/V1073/28 and 33, Minutes by Brewis, 14 and 15 January 1955. FO371/115491/1073/244, Stevenson to Eden, 10 February 1955. However, according to Stevenson, the real Egyptian motive seemed to be an anxiety to maintain her hegemony within the Arab League and in that way to secure the lion's share of Western aid. The Egyptian attitude, therefore, was inspired to some extent by a desire to control the Arab League and to manipulate it to Egypt's advantage. Her negative attitude to the proposed Turco-Iraqi agreement was also due to fear of isolation; that is, if some other Arab states joined Iraq in signing the pact with Turkey, Egypt would be relegated to the second rank in any defence arrangements made by the West and her bargaining power vis-à-vis the West would thereby be weakened. See FO371/115486/V1073/75, Stevenson to FO, 22 January 1955. FO371/115491/V1073/244, Stevenson to Eden, 10 February 1955. Since the signature of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, Nasser had been suffering from internal crises such as land reform. Therefore he wanted to divert public opinion from internal affairs and thus consolidate his internal position before approving a step which, in the eyes of Egyptian public opinion, recalled the MEDO proposals of 1951. Moreover, according to the American Embassy in Cairo, Nasser was probably under pressure from the Free Officers who were not as yet reconciled to the idea of association with the West or of Arab association with Turkey. Nasser also regarded Iraq's move as in contradiction to the spirit of the Arab League Charter, according to which the Iraqi government should have at least consulted the rest of the Arab states. However, Nuri Saïd argued against this by saying that Egypt herself had not consulted Iraq before signing the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, so, he asked, why should Iraq consult Egypt now? See FO371/115485/V1073/57, Stevenson to FO, 20 January 1955. NA RG 59 682.87/1-1755 and NA RG 59 682.87/1-1955, Jones (Cairo) to Secretary of State.

- 25 FO371/115491/V1073/243, Hooper to Eden, 8 February 1955. FO371/115487/V1073/131, Hooper to Eden, 26 January 1955. NA RG 59 780.5/1-2355. Gallman, *Iraq under General Nuri*, pp. 39-41. Seale, *Struggle for Syria*, pp. 215-17.
- 26 FO371/115486/V1073/71, Wright to FO, 22 January 1955. FO371/115491/V1073/243, Hooper to Eden, 8 February 1955. FO371/115488/V1073/148, from CRO to UK High Commissioner in Canada, 1 February 1955. Meanwhile, the British government on the one hand encouraged Nuri Saïd to attend the meeting in Cairo, since Iraq could rely on the support of fellow members of Arab League like Jordan and Lebanon. On the other hand, the British government, in order to support Iraq, urged Egypt and other Arab states to express approval of Iraq's move or, at any rate, to do nothing to frustrate it or to deny the possibility of its developing into a wider defence organization in which they could participate. Britain also urged the Arab states to recognize Iraq's special position, which compelled her to take precautions. See FO371/115484/V1073/28, FO to Cairo, 15 January 1955. NA RG 59 780.5/1-2755, Aldrich (London) to Secretary of State.

- 27 FO371/115491/V1073/244, Stevenson to Eden, 10 February 1955. FO371/115491/V1073/243, Hooper to Eden, 8 February 1955. FO371/115488/V1073/148, from CRO to UK High Commissioner in Canada, 1 February 1955. Seale, *Struggle for Syria*, pp. 215–17. NA RG 59 682.87/1–2755, Jones (Cairo) to Secretary of State.
- 28 FO371/115491/V1073/244, Stevenson to Eden, 10 February 1955. FO371/115488/V1073/148, from CRO to UK High Commissioner in Canada, 1 February 1955.
- 29 FO371/115488/V1073/148, from CRO to UK High Commissioner in Canada, 1 February 1955. Seale, *Struggle for Syria*, pp. 215–17.
- 30 FO371/115488/V1073/148, from CRO to UK High Commissioner in Canada, 1 February 1955. Gallman, *Iraq under General Nuri*, p. 48. NA RG 59 682.87/1–1955, Gallman (Baghdad) to Secretary of State.
- 31 FO371/115488/V1073/152, Wright to FO, 3 February 1955. FO371/115491/V1073/243, Hooper to Eden, 8 February 1955. Gallman, *Iraq under General Nuri*, pp. 46–9. NA RG 59 682.87/2–255, Gallman (Baghdad) to Secretary of State.
- 32 FO371/115488/V1073/159, from Her Majesty's Consul-General in Istanbul to FO, 4 February 1955.
- 33 FO371/115488/V1073/154, Minute by Ward, 2 February 1955. FO371/115484/V1073/33, Minute by Brewis, 14 January 1955.
- 34 FO371/115491/V1073/243, Hooper to Eden, 8 February 1955. FO371/115490/V1073/216, from CRO to UK High Commissioner in Canada, 10 February 1955. Seale, *Struggle for Syria*, pp. 215–17.
- 35 FO371/115488/V1073/161, Makins to FO, 4 February 1955.
- 36 Ashton, 'Hijacking of a Pact', pp. 129–30.
- 37 FO371/115491/V1073/242, Beeley to Shuckburgh, 9 February 1955.
- 38 FO371/115489/V1073/196, Makins to FO, 9 February 1955.
- 39 FO371/115488/V1073/165, Wright to FO, 6 February 1955. NA RG 59 682.87/2–655, 'Iraqi draft of Proposed Treaty of Mutual Cooperation between Iraq and Turkey', Gallman (Baghdad) to Secretary of State. The remainder of the Iraqi draft was as follows:

Article 3 This treaty shall be open for accession to any member state of the Arab League or any other state concerned with the security and peace in this region. Accession shall come into force from the date on which instruments of accession are deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of [. . .].

Article 4 This treaty remains in force for a period of five years renewable for another period of five years unless one of the high contracting parties notifies the other party of their desire to terminate it six months before the date of its expiration.

Article 5 This treaty shall be ratified by the two high contracting parties and ratifications shall be exchanged at [. . .] as soon as possible. Thereafter it shall come into force from the date of the exchange of ratifications.

- 40 FO371/115489/V1073/192, Bowker to FO, 9 February 1955. FO371/115489/V1073/209, FO to Baghdad, 8 February 1955. NA RG 59 682.87/2–955, Draft Turco-Iraqi pact as amended by the Turkish government.
- 41 FO371/115488/V1073/165, Wright to FO, 6 February 1955. NA RG 59 682.87/2–555, 'Turkish Draft for a Treaty of Mutual Cooperation between Iraq and Turkey', Warren (Ankara) to Secretary of State. The remainder of the Turkish draft was as follows:

Article 3 Exchanges of views and information shall be carried between the respective competent military authorities of the contracting parties for the sake of benefiting from technical experiences and progress achieved by any of the parties in the field of defensive armament. The contracting parties will confer and cooperate with a view to meeting, in so far as possible, the needs of each of them

in the field of arms and ammunition production, and in that of military training and instruction.

Article 4 The contracting parties undertake to furnish all facilities and assistance for the passage of arms, military equipment, supplies and other material used for defensive purposes pertaining to their respective armies, through the territory of the other party without being subject to customs or any other duties.

Article 5 The contracting parties declare that the provisions of the present treaty are not in conflict with any of the international commitments undertaken by any of them with one or more third states and cannot affect, or could not be interpreted as affecting, the said contractual commitments, and [they] undertake not to enter into any international commitment incompatible with the present treaty.

Article 6 This treaty shall be open for accession to any member state of the Arab League or any other state concerned with the security and peace in this region. Adherence shall take place upon agreement between the contracting parties and the state applying and shall come into force from the date on which instrument of accession are deposited with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of [. . .].

Article 7 This treaty remains in force for a period of five years renewable for other five-year periods unless one of the contracting parties notifies the other of their desire to terminate it six months before its expiration.

Article 8 This treaty shall be ratified by the contracting parties and ratifications shall be exchanged as soon as possible. Thereafter it shall come into force from the date of the exchange of ratifications.

- 42 FO371/115489/V1073/209, Minute by Rose, 7 February 1955. FO371/115490/V1073/216, from CRO to UK High Commissioner in Canada, 10 February 1955.
- 43 FO371/115489/V1073/182, Wright to FO, 8 February 1955. FO371/115490/V1073/216, from CRO to UK High Commissioner in Canada, 10 February 1955.
- 44 FO371/115489/V1073/182, Wright to FO, 8 February 1955. FO371/115489/V1073/194, Wright to FO, 9 February 1955. FO371/115489/V1073/192, Bowker to FO, 9 February 1955. NA RG 59 682.87/2–955, Warren (Ankara) to Secretary of State.
- 45 FO371/115489/V1073/192, Bowker to FO, 9 February 1955.
- 46 FO371/115489/V1073/192 and 194, Bowker to FO, 9 February 1955. FO371/115490/V1073/229, Minute by Rose, 10 February 1955. NA RG 59 682.87/2–1055, Warren (Ankara) to Secretary of State.
- 47 FO371/115489/V1073/209, FO to Ankara, 8 February 1955. FO371/115492/V1073/262, FO to Ankara, 10 February 1955. FO371/115490/V1073/229, Minute by Rose, 10 February 1955.
- 48 Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Nuri Said's new draft were as follows:

Article 2 The measures which will be taken between Turkey and Iraq will be those contained in Articles 3 and 4 below.

Article 3 Consultations and discussions shall be held between the respective competent military authorities of the two high contracting parties for the purpose of obtaining reciprocal information regarding the security measures and defence plans in the countries of the high contracting parties. Exchange of views and information shall also be carried for the sake of benefiting from the technical experience and progress achieved by any of the two high contracting parties in the field of defensive armament.

Article 4 The high contracting parties undertake to furnish all facilities and assistance for the passage of arms, military equipment, supplies and other materials used for defensive purposes pertaining to their respective armies, through the territory of the other party without being subjected to customs or any other duties.

See NA RG 59 682.87/2–1555 Gallman (Baghdad) to the Department of State.

- 49 FO371/115489/V1073/192, Bowker to FO, 9 February 1955. FO371/115489/V1073/211, Bowker to FO, 10 February 1955. FO371/115492/V1073/262, Bowker to FO, 10 February 1955. FO371/115490/V1073/233, Minute by Rose, 11 February 1955. NA RG 59 682.87/2-1055, Warren (Ankara) to Secretary of State.
- 50 FO371/115490/V1073/219, Bowker to Eden, 8 February 1955. NA RG 59 780.5/1-3155, Warren (Ankara) to Secretary of State.
- 51 FO371/115492/V1073/262, Makins to FO, 9 February 1955. FO371/115490/V1073/262, FO to Ankara, 10 February 1955.
- 52 FO371/115490/V1073/225, Bowker to FO, 13 February 1955.
- 53 FO371/115491/V1073/245, Wright to FO, 16 February 1955. NA RG 59 682.87/2-955, Aldrich (London) to Secretary of State.
- 54 FO371/115491/V1073/245, Wright to FO, 16 February 1955. NA RG 59 682.87/2-1055, Warren (Ankara) to Secretary of State.
- 55 FO371/115492/V1073/268, Minute by Powell-Jones, 16 February 1955.
- 56 FO371/115492/V1073/267, Minute by Rose, 15 February 1955. FO371/115492/V1073/268, Minute by Powell-Jones, 16 February 1955.
- 57 Gallman, *Iraq under General Nuri*, p. 52.
- 58 FO371/115492/V1073/281, FO to Ankara, 19 February 1955. FO371/115492/V1073/282, FO to Ankara, 20 February 1955. FO371/115492/V1073/281, Minute by Brewis, 19 February 1955. NA RG 59 780.5/2-255, Warren (Ankara) to Secretary of State.
- 59 FO371/115492/V1073/287, Bowker to FO, 20 February 1955.
- 60 FO371/115492/V1073/300, Bowker to FO, 22 February 1955.
- 61 FO371/115492/V1073/283, Wright to FO, 20 February 1955. FO371/115492/V1073/285, Wright to FO, 20 February 1955.
- 62 FO371/115492/V1073/285, Wright to FO, 20 February 1955. FO371/115493/V1073/309, Minute by Rose, 20 February 1955.
- 63 The South-East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) was proposed by the United States in the spring of 1954 and the treaty signed on 8 September 1954 in Manila. Its aim was to protect South-East Asia against communist expansionism. It was made up of Western powers (the US, Britain and France) and their close allies (Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan). SEATO had a central headquarters in Bangkok, held joint military exercises and included intelligence cooperation against communists, but it never gained widespread respect in the region. Its creation antagonized China and the Soviet Union. The treaty also offered protection to certain non-members, including Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam, but only committed members to 'consult' about communist expansionism. See Young, *Cold War and Détente*, p. 204.
- 64 FO371/115492/V1073/289, Stevenson to FO, 21 February 1955. Eden, *Full Circle*, p. 221. Robert Stephens, *Nasser: A Political Biography* (London: 1971), pp. 143-4. Also see Anthony Nutting, *Nasser* (London, 1972), p. 89.
- 65 FO371/115493/V1073/314, Wright to FO, 23 February 1955.
- 66 FO371/115493/V1073/316, Wright to FO and FO to Wright, 24 February 1955.
- 67 FO371/115493/V1073/331, Wright to FO, 24 February 1955.
- 68 For the full text of the Baghdad Pact see Frankland (ed.), *Documents 1955*, pp. 286-9, and UNTS, 199, Reg. No. 3264. FO371/115490/V1073/216, from CRO to UK High Commissioner in Canada, 1 March 1955.
- 69 Frankland (ed.), *Documents 1955*, pp. 286-9.
- 70 Ibid.
- 71 FRUS, 1955-7, Vol. XII, pp. 40-1. Also see Nutting, *Nasser*, passim; and Stephens, *Nasser*, passim.
- 72 FRUS, 1955-7, Vol. XII, pp. 77-97.
- 73 Ibid.
- 74 Ibid.

- 75 Ibid.
- 76 Gallman, *Iraq under General Nuri*, p. 38. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 77–97.
- 77 Frankland (ed.), *Documents 1955*, pp. 326–7. Seale, *Struggle for Syria*, pp. 220–6. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 25–6, 28.
- 78 Frankland (ed.), *Documents 1955*, pp. 326–7. Seale, *Struggle for Syria*, pp. 220–6. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 25–6, 28.
- 79 FO371/115502/V1073/582, Bowker to FO, 26 March 1955. FO371/115510/V1073/786, Bowker to Macmillan, 3 May 1955. FO371/115513/V1073/856, Minute by Rose, 7 June 1955. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 34, 55.
- 80 FO371/115501/V1073/415, Stevenson to FO, 21 March 1955. FO371/115498/V1073/389, Stevenson to FO, 14 March 1955.
- 81 Peter Woodward, *Nasser* (London, 1992), pp. 44–5.
- 82 FO371/115510/V1073/786, Bowker to Macmillan, 3 May 1955; and minutes by Powell-Jones, 12 May 1955; Hadow, 16 May 1955; and Rose, 7 June 1955. FO371/115513/V1073/856, Shuckburgh to Bowker, 10 June 1955.
- 83 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 77–97.
- 84 Ibid.
- 85 FO371/115486/V1073/96, Chapman to Shuckburgh, 19 January 1955. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 77–97.
- 86 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 77–97. NA RG 59 682.87/3–355, Lawson (Tel Aviv) to Secretary of State. NA RG 59 780.5/2–255, Warren (Ankara) to Secretary of State.
- 87 FO371/115498/V1073/471, Nicholls to Shuckburgh, 7 March 1955.
- 88 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 77–97.
- 89 Ibid.
- 90 FO371/115488/V1073/168, Bowker to FO, 5 February 1955.
- 91 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 77–97.
- 92 FO371/115534/V1073/1405, Sir Gladwyn Jebb to FO, 21 December 1955.
- 93 FO371/115534/V1073/1404, Minute by Shuckburgh, 13 December 1955.
- 94 PREM11/1344, Sir Gladwyn Jebb to FO, 19 and 20 March 1956.
- 95 Seale, *Struggle for Syria*, pp. 230–7. In a telegram to Selwyn Lloyd in October 1957, Patrick Reilly, the British Ambassador to Moscow, said that the Soviet government was ideologically committed to supporting ‘national liberation’ movements in the Middle East. Its principal agents were Arab nationalism and Afro-Asian neutralism. The implication was that the essential aim of Soviet policy in the Middle East was defence against American intervention there. Soviet opposition to the pact could be explained by dislike of any manifestation of the will of non-communist countries to unite in their own defence, particularly where cooperation of Arab or Asian countries with the West was involved. And the desire to prove that such schemes were dangerous for those who undertook them might well have been one of the Soviet government’s motives in stepping up their Middle Eastern activities. The Russia of Stalin might have stomached the American presence in Turkey, but was it really surprising that post-Stalinist Russia should be highly nervous about its extension to the Middle East as a whole or at least to the countries immediately bordering on the Soviet Union. See FO371/127737/V10338/159, Sir Patrick Reilly to Selwyn Lloyd, 2 October 1957.
- 96 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 77–97.

4 The extension of the Baghdad Pact (1955–6)

- 1 FO371/115759/VQ1051/199, Wright to Macmillan, 17 May 1955.
- 2 FO371/115484/V1073/18, Minute by Powell-Jones, 19 January 1955. FO371/115759/VQ1051/199, Wright to Macmillan, 17 May 1955. Gallman, *Iraq under General Nuri*, p. 28.

- 3 FO371/115497/V1073/462, Minute by Rose, 14 March 1955. FO371/155759/VQ1051/199, Wright to Macmillan, 17 May 1955.
- 4 AIR8/1771, Brief for the Chief of the Air Staff, 9 February 1955. DEFES/56 COS (55)33rd meeting, 18 February 1955. FO371/115759/VQ1051/199, Wright to Macmillan, 17 May 1955.
- 5 FO371/115751/VQ1051/14, Wright to FO, 22 February 1955. FO371/115759/VQ1051/199, Wright to Macmillan, 17 May 1955. AIR8/1771, Telegram from Baghdad to the Foreign Office, 22 February 1955. CAB129/74 C (55)70, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Middle East Defence: the Turco-Iraqi Agreement and the Revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, 14 March 1955.
- 6 FO371/115751/VQ1051/14, Wright to FO, 22 February 1955. FO371/115759/VQ1051/199, Wright to Macmillan, 17 May 1955. AIR8/1771, Telegram from Baghdad to the Foreign Office, 22 February 1955. CAB129/74 C(55)70, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Middle East Defence: the Turco-Iraqi Agreement and the Revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, 14 March 1955.
- 7 FO371/115759/VQ1051/199, Wright to Macmillan, 17 May 1955.
- 8 CAB129/74, C (55)70, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Middle East Defence: The Turco-Iraqi Agreement and the revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, 14 March 1955.
- 9 FO371/155759/VQ1051/199, Wright to Macmillan, 17 May 1955.
- 10 CAB129/74 C (55)70, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Middle East Defence: the Turco-Iraqi Agreement and the Revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, 14 March 1955. FO371/115759/VQ1051/199, Wright to Macmillan, 17 May 1955. FO371/115751/VQ1051/15, Hooper to FO, 15 February 1955. FO371/115751/VQ1051/3, Minute by Levant Department, 7 January 1955.
- 11 FO371/115759/VQ1051/199, Wright to Macmillan, 17 May 1955.
- 12 For the full text of Eden's statement in the House of Commons see Frankland (ed.), *Documents 1955*, pp. 290–2. Also see Eden, *Full Circle*, pp. 220–3.
- 13 For the full text of the Anglo-Iraqi Special Agreement see Frankland (ed.), *Documents 1955*, pp. 293–300. The Anglo-Iraqi Special Agreement consisted of nine articles, two letters addressed by Nuri Said to the British Ambassador to Iraq with a note attached to one of them, and three letters addressed by the British Ambassador to Nuri Said with a note attached to one of them. These letters were considered complementary to the agreement. The central theme of the Special Agreement was that there would be close and continuous collaboration between the armed forces of Iraq and Britain. There would be joint planning and exercises in peacetime so that if ever there were aggression against Iraq, Britain would be in an effective position to help. Britain would advise and give technical assistance in establishing an air defence organization including a radar warning system. Britain would be able to stock military stores and equipment in Iraq for use in war. Repair workshops and storage depots would where necessary be maintained for the benefit of Iraqi and British forces. There would be British advisers and instructors to assist in the training of the Iraqi army. Britain would also provide personnel to assist in the training of the Royal Iraqi Air Force and to offer continuous consultations regarding methods and techniques of training at all stages. Britain would maintain her facilities for over-flying, landing and servicing her aircraft in Iraq. There was also provision for mine watching and mine clearance. As part of these agreements the airfields in Habbaniya and Shaiba which were occupied by the RAF would pass under Iraqi control and the British squadrons stationed there would be progressively withdrawn. However, Royal Air Force squadrons would visit Iraq in particular for the purpose of joint training at all times. British service personnel would remain in Iraq to service British aircraft; to install, operate and

maintain facilities and equipment; as well as to assist in the training of the Iraqi Air Force. These men would be commanded by British officers acting in loose liaison with the Iraqi officer in command of each establishment. They would enjoy the appropriate immunities and provision was made for the requisite services and accommodation for them. The installations at the airfields which were required for Britain's use would remain British property. The remainder would be sold either to the Iraqi government or to other purchasers. Where Britain maintained an interest they would be handed over to the Iraqi government under mutually satisfactory terms and conditions. In December 1955 Britain and Iraq reached agreement on the implementation of the Special Agreement. Iraq agreed to pay Britain the sum of £2,755,000 for installations handed over to Iraq according to the Special Agreement. Britain on the other hand agreed that the payment of this sum should be waived. In return the Iraqi government undertook to devote the money to the following: (a) at least £2 million to be spent on the purchase from Britain of arms, equipment or defence stores; (b) the remainder to be used towards expenses connected with the training of Iraqi forces in cooperation with those of Britain. On 2 May two British bases at Habbaniya and Shaiba were transferred to Iraqi control. On that day the Iraqi government arranged a ceremony at Habbaniya, at which the King and a group of visitors from Arab countries participated. While the British flag was lowered and the Iraqi flag was hoisted, an RAF squadron flew overhead saluting the base on their way to Cyprus, although, in fact, they would return for a prolonged visit for training purposes. According to Wright, the transfer of the bases to Iraqi command was naturally well received in Iraq simply because no one knew about the military arrangements between the two sides.

- 14 Eden, *Full Circle*, pp. 220–3.
- 15 FO371/115506/V1073/697, Nicholls to Macmillan, 12 April 1955. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XIV, pp. 149–51.
- 16 FO371/115506/V1073/697, FO to Tel Aviv, 20 April 1955.
- 17 FO371/115515/V1073/913, Minute by Rose, 8 July 1955. According to the Foreign Office, the point was that Britain had deposited her instrument of accession to the Turco-Iraqi pact on 5 April, before the pact was technically in force between Iraq and Turkey. Britain was therefore committed to being a party to the Turco-Iraqi pact as from that date, but she only fully became a party when the pact came into force on 15 April. FO371/115515/V1073/913, Minute by Rose, 8 July 1955.
- 18 FO371/115511/V1073/816, Wright to Shuckburgh, 10 May 1955.
- 19 FO371/115759/VQ1051/199, Wright to Macmillan, 17 May 1955.
- 20 Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends not Masters* (London, 1967), pp. 154–5.
- 21 *Ibid.*
- 22 FO371/115500/V1073/533, Minute by Rose, 29 March 1955; and Shuckburgh to Wright, 1 April 1955. FO371/115499/V1073/505, UK High Commissioner in Pakistan to CRO, 31 March 1955. Ashton, 'Hijacking of a Pact', p. 133.
- 23 NA RG 59 682.877–155, Memorandum of Conversation, Pakistani membership in the Turco-Iraqi Pact.
- 24 FO371/115514/V1073/894, 'Aide-Memoire Given to the Prime Minister of Pakistan by UK High Commissioner in Karachi', 17 June 1955.
- 25 FO371/115499/V1073/505, Bowker to FO, 17 March 1955; and CRO to UK High Commissioner in Pakistan, 19 March 1955.
- 26 FO371/115499/V1073/505, UK High Commissioner in Pakistan to CRO, 31 March and 1 April 1955. FO371/115504/V1073/640, Bowker to FO, 2 April 1955.
- 27 NA RG 59 780.5/5–2655, Hildreth (Karachi) to Secretary of State.
- 28 FO371/115513/V1073/869, UK High Commissioner in Pakistan to CRO, 14 June 1955; and minute by Hadow, 16 June 1955.
- 29 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 58–9. NA RG 59 780.5/5–2655, Hoover to American Embassy in Karachi.

- 30 FO371/115515/V1073/922, Bowker to Macmillan, 6 July 1955. FO371/115514/V1073/900, Bowker to FO, 29 June 1955. NA RG 59 780.5/7–1155, from American Embassy in Ankara to the Department of State.
- 31 FO371/115515/V1073/903, UK High Commissioner in Pakistan to CRO, 1 July 1955. NA RG 59 682.87/6–2855, Warren (Ankara) to Secretary of State. NA RG 59 780.5/7–1255, Arthur Gardiner (American Embassy in Karachi) to the Department of State.
- 32 NA RG 59 780.5/7–155, Hildreth (Karachi) to Secretary of State.
- 33 FO371/115518/V1073/987, Minute by Rose, 11 August 1955. NA RG 59 780.5/7–2655, Warren (Ankara) to Secretary of State.
- 34 FO371/115516/V1073/942, Bowker to FO, 23 July 1955. FO371/115516/V1073/949, Bowker to Shuckburgh, 19 July 1955. NA RG 59 780.5/7–2655, Warren (Ankara) to Secretary of State.
- 35 FO371/115516/V1073/954, CRO to UK High Commissioner in Pakistan, 28 July 1955; and minute by Rose, 27 July 1955.
- 36 FO371/115503/V1073/620, CRO to UK High Commissioner in Pakistan, 6 April 1955. NA RG 59 780.5/7–2655, Warren (Ankara) to Secretary of State.
- 37 FO371/115517/V1073/969, UK High Commissioner in Pakistan to CRO, 29 July 1955.
- 38 FO371/115518/V1073/1001, CRO to UK High Commissioner in Pakistan, 22 August 1955. FO371/115518/V1073/1001, UK High Commissioner in Pakistan to CRO, 26 August 1955. NA RG 59 780.5/8–1855, Hildreth (Karachi) to Secretary of State. NA RG 59 780.5/8–1955, Warren (Ankara) to Secretary of State. FO371/115519/V1073/1014, Pakistan's accession to the Turco-Iraqi Pact, 3 September 1955.
- 39 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 139, 403–4.
- 40 FO371/115511/V1073/804, Minute by Shuckburgh, 10 May 1955. FO371/115499/V1073/513, Minute by Shuckburgh, 15 March 1955. FO371/115500/V1073/521, Stevens to FO, 20 March 1955. FO371/114815/EP10338/5, Minute by Stewart, 25 March 1955. Rouhollah Ramazani, *Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941–1973: A Study of Foreign Policy in Modernizing* (Charlottesville, 1975), p. 276.
- 41 FO371/115511/V1073/809, Kimber to James, 11 May 1955. FO371/115500/V1073/521, Stevens to FO, 20 March 1955. FO371/115520/V1073/1032, Wright to Macmillan, 15 September 1955. FO371/115499/V1073/511, Bowker to FO, 18 March 1955. NA RG 59 780.5/3–2255, Aldrich (London) to Secretary of State. NA RG 59 780.5/9–2755, Philip Clock (American Embassy in Tehran) to the Department of State.
- 42 FO371/115511/V1073/809, Kimber to James, 11 May 1955. FO371/115500/V1073/521, Stevens to FO, 20 March 1955. FO371/115520/V1073/1032, Wright to Macmillan, 15 September 1955. FO371/115499/V1073/511, Bowker to FO, 18 March 1955. NA RG 59 780.5/3–2255, Aldrich (London) to Secretary of State. NA RG 59 780.5/9–2755, Philip Clock (American Embassy in Tehran) to the Department of State. The Soviet–Persian Financial and Frontier Agreement was ratified in May 1955. It provided for minor rectifications of the Soviet–Persian frontiers at a number of points. The changes were of purely local significance and had no military or economic consequence. The largest of the areas to be transferred from one country to the other was only a few square kilometres. The Soviet government was also obliged to hand over 11 tons of gold and goods to the value of \$8 million in satisfaction of wartime debts to Persia. For the text of the agreement see Hurewitz, *Diplomacy*, pp. 385–90.
- 43 FO371/114820/EP1071/17, FO to Tehran, 18 March 1955.
- 44 FO371/115511/V1073/804, Minute by Shuckburgh, 10 May 1955. NA RG 59 780.5/3–2155, Dulles to Tehran. Gökhan Çetinsaya, 'Türk–İran İlişkileri', in Faruk Sönmezoğlu (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi* (Istanbul, 1998), pp. 135–58.

- 45 FO371/115498/V1073/496, Stevens to FO, 15 March 1955; FO371/115511/V1073/809, Kimber to James, 11 May 1955.
- 46 FO371/115502/V1073/580, FO to Washington, 24 March 1955; NA RG 59 780.5/3-2255, Aldrich (London) to Secretary of State.
- 47 FO371/115502/V1073/580, Makins to FO, 26 March 1955; and minute by Rose, 4 April 1955. FO371/115511/V1073/809, Kimber to James, 11 May 1955. NA RG 59 780.5/3-2155, Dulles to Tehran.
- 48 FO371/114815/EP10338/13, Minute by Stewart, 10 May 1955. FO371/115511/V1073/804, Minute by Shuckburgh, 10 May 1955. For the texts of the 1921 and 1927 Soviet–Iranian Treaties see Hurewitz, *Diplomacy*, pp. 90–4, 154–6.
- 49 FO371/115514/V1073/883, Pickard to James, 21 June 1955. FO371/115513/V1073/870, Makins to FO, 16 June 1955. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 755–7.
- 50 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 103–22, 135–51.
- 51 FO371/115533/V1073/1392, Minute by Hadow, 8 December 1955. FO371/115520/V1073/1020, Minute by Rose, 29 August 1955. FO371/115519/V1073/1012, Report by Brigadier T. E. Williams, 18 August 1955.
- 52 FO371/115519/V1073/1015, Minute by Rose, 5 September 1955. FO371/115520/V1073/1020, Wright to FO, 23 August 1955. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 765–6, 773–5. The Iranian claim to Bahrain was based on the fact that Iran had ruled Bahrain from 1602 to 1783.
- 53 FO371/115519/V1073/1015, FO to Tehran, 6 September 1955. FO371/115520/V1073/1028, FO to Tehran, 14 September 1955. FO371/115520/V1073/1027, Wright to FO, 10 September 1955. FO371/114820/EP1071/21, Minute by L. A. Fry, 4 August 1955. FO371/115521/V1073/1048, Minute by Stewart, 24 September 1955. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 773–5.
- 54 FO371/115520/V1073/1038, Stevens to FO, 21 September 1955. FO371/115519/V1073/1015, FO to Tehran, 6 September 1955. FO371/114816/EP10344/7, Stevens to Macmillan, 29 September 1955.
- 55 FO371/115521/V1073/1074, Minute by Hadow, 5 October 1955. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 778–80.
- 56 FO371/115521/V1073/1060, Stewart to FO, 30 September 1955. NA RG 59 780.5/9-2755, Memorandum of Conversation: Iranian adherence to the Baghdad Pact. In the House of Commons on 18 May 1950 Bevin stated that ‘His Majesty’s Government remain vitally concerned in the independence, integrity and security of Greece, Turkey and Persia. His Majesty’s Government are determined to continue their policy of direct support to these and to other countries which are striving through military and economic efforts to safeguard their independence and territorial integrity.’ FO371/115534/V1073/1435, statement by Mr Bevin after meeting of Atlantic Council Foreign Ministers, 19 May 1950.
- 57 Frankland (ed.), *Documents 1955*, pp. 370–2.
- 58 FO371/118830/JE1011/1, Trevelyan to Lloyd, 31 January 1956.
- 59 Stephens, *Nasser*, pp. 161–2.
- 60 *Ibid.*
- 61 Harold Macmillan, *Tides of Fortune, 1945–1955* (London, 1969), p. 639.
- 62 FO371/115521/V1073/1051, Dixon to FO, 28 September 1955.
- 63 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 778–80.
- 64 FO371/115522/V1073/[1182], FO to Washington, 6 October 1955. FO371/115469/V1073/[975], Middle East policy in the light of the Egyptian–Czechoslovak arms deal, 6 October 1955. FO371/115521/V1073/1074, Minute by Hadow, 5 October 1955.
- 65 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 158–68, 780–6.
- 66 *Ibid.*
- 67 *Ibid.*
- 68 *Ibid.*

- 69 FO371/115526/V1073/1190, Stevens to Macmillan, 26 October 1955. Ramazani, *Iran's Foreign Policy*, p. 278. Frankland (ed.), *Documents 1955*, pp. 304–6. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 158–69, 780–9. The ratification bill was approved by the Iranian *Majlis* on 23 October 1955, and the procedure of ratification was completed when the Shah signed the law on 25 October 1955. Finally, on 3 November 1955, Iran deposited the instrument of accession with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq, in accordance with Article 5 of the pact.
- 70 FO371/115526/V1073/1190, Stevens to Macmillan, 26 October 1955. Ramazani, *Iran's Foreign Policy*, p. 278. Frankland (ed.), *Documents 1955*, pp. 304–6. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 168–9, 788–9.
- 71 Frankland (ed.), *Documents 1955*, pp. 304–6.
- 72 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 169–71.
- 73 FO371/140706/EB10334/3, Harrison to Lloyd, 19 February 1959. FO371/120710/EP1011/1, Stevens to Lloyd, 1 January 1956. Ramazani, *Iran's Foreign Policy*, pp. 274–8.
- 74 John C. Campbell, *Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy* (New York, 1960), p. 61. ‘The Baghdad Pact’, Reference Division, Central Office of Information, London, June 1958, p. 13. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, p. 403.
- 75 For the texts of the Egyptian–Syrian and Egyptian–Saudi Arabian mutual defence pacts see Frankland (ed.), *Documents 1955*, pp. 327–31. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, p. 178. The texts of the pacts were almost identical and the principal points were that (a) the contracting parties would consider any attack directed against one of them to be directed equally against the other, (b) they would consult each other in the event of a threat to the security of any part of the Arab world, and (c) they agreed to set up a supreme defence council and to nominate a commander-in-chief who would have under his command in peace as in war the armed forces.

5 The development of the Baghdad Pact (1955–6)

- 1 FO371/115500/V1073/533, Wright to Shuckburgh, 16 March 1955; and Shuckburgh to Wright, 1 April 1955.
- 2 NA RG 59 682.87/4–155, Allen to the Secretary of State (Dulles), and Aldrich (London) to the Secretary of State. NA RG 59 780.5/9–1755, US views on Middle East defence. NA RG 59 780.5/8–1155, Memorandum of conversation, Middle East Defence. FO371/115500/V1073/534 ‘A’, Minute by Rose, 18 March 1955.
- 3 Evelyn Shuckburgh, *Descent to Suez: Diaries 1951–56* (London, 1986), pp. 210–12, 242–3. Freiberger, *Dawn over Suez*, pp. 107–32.
- 4 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XIV, pp. 118–19.
- 5 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 48–50, and Vol. XIII, pp. 5–6. FO371/121282/V1079/1, Beeley to Shuckburgh, 24 March 1955. FO371/115866/V1073/1349, Beeley to Shuckburgh, 24 March 1955. NA RG 59 682.87/4–155, Allen to Dulles.
- 6 FO371/115866/V1073/1349, FO to Washington, 31 March 1955.
- 7 FO371/121282/V1079/1, Eden to Beeley, 31 March 1955.
- 8 FO371/115504/V1073/637, Stevenson to Shuckburgh, 28 March 1955. FO371/115866/V1073/600, Stevenson to Shuckburgh, 16 March 1955.
- 9 FO371/115504/V1073/637, Minute by G. G. Arthur, 12 April 1955.
- 10 NA RG 59 682.87/4–155, Aldrich (London) to Secretary of State. NA RG 59 682.87/4–155, Allen to Dulles. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XIII, pp. 5–6; and Vol. XII, pp. 48–50.
- 11 FO371/115504/V1073/637, Shuckburgh to Stevenson, 28 April 1955.
- 12 Shuckburgh, *Descent to Suez*, p. 252. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 46–8, 50–1. Actually the main ideas of the Alpha Project were revealed to Nasser by Eden during the latter’s visit to Cairo in February 1955. However, according to Shimon

- Shamir, Nasser's interest was motivated by his desire to freeze or neutralize the Baghdad Pact. On the other hand, the British aim was exactly the opposite. The British wanted to use the Alpha Project as a means to get Nasser to accept the Baghdad Pact as a established fact. According to Shamir, in an interview with Shuckburgh the latter admitted to him that 'we simply overlooked the absolute hostility of Nasser to the Baghdad Pact; I don't think we quite understood these jealousies'. See Louis and Owen (eds), *Suez 1956*, pp. 82, 86, 90. In his diaries, Shuckburgh says: 'In bringing about the Baghdad Pact and in inducing Jordan to join it we aroused the fierce opposition of the Egyptians, who saw the whole thing as divisive of the Arab world and as a threat to their leadership. Thus our concern for area defence came into conflict with our concern for a Palestine settlement. We did not face up soon enough to this basic contradiction in our strategy.' See Shuckburgh, *Descent to Suez*, p. 211.
- 13 FRUS, 1955-7, Vol. XIV, pp. 34-42, 45-7, 98-107. However, the success of the Alpha Project depended on another peace initiative, the so-called Johnston mission, which was launched by the United States in October 1953 and designed to create an agreement over water usage in the Jordan river valley. The State Department hoped that by developing the Jordan river valley it would maximize the efficient use of the region's water resources, and this would assist in providing a large area for Palestine refugee resettlement. The State Department believed that once the Johnston mission was successful, the way would be paved for a larger settlement. See FRUS, 1952-4, Vol. IX, pp. 1347-53.
 - 14 FO371/115511/V1073/816, Wright to Shuckburgh, 10 May 1955.
 - 15 FO371/115500/V1073/534 'A', Minute by Rose, 18 March 1955. FO371/115513/V1073/871, 'Confidential', 15 June 1955.
 - 16 FO371/115518/V1073/(372), Shuckburgh to Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 18 June 1955.
 - 17 Ibid.
 - 18 In February 1955 Dulles had told the Lebanese Ambassador to the United States that it was to the advantage of the Arabs to move as far as possible now, in 1955, 'since in 1956 the atmosphere is likely to be such that it will be difficult or impossible for the administration to act towards the Arabs in such ways as it is now in a position to do'. See Memorandum of Conversation, 27 January 1955, John F. Dulles Papers, General Correspondence, Memorandum Series, Box 1, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.
 - 19 FRUS, 1955-7, Vol. XIV, pp. 287, 322. NA RG 59 780.5/8-1155, Memorandum of Conversation, Middle East Defence. Lucas, *Divided We Stand*, p. 50. A Foreign Office minute expressed British annoyance as follows: 'It is maddening that we should be pushed around by the requirements of American politics in this way. But this is not the first time this has happened nor will it be the last.' See FO371/115871/V1073/[465], Minute by Anthony Nutting, 8 July 1955.
 - 20 FRUS, 1955-7, Vol. XIV, pp. 295-8. NA RG 59 780.5/9-1755, US views on Middle East Defence. NA RG 59 780.5/8-1155, Memorandum of conversation, Middle East Defence. Lucas, *Divided We Stand*, p. 50. Shuckburgh, *Descent to Suez*, pp. 269-70.
 - 21 FRUS, 1955-7, Vol. XIV, pp. 300-1, 320-3. NA RG 59 780.5/8-1155, Memorandum of Conversation, Middle East Defence. Shuckburgh, *Descent to Suez*, p. 272.
 - 22 FRUS, 1955-7, Vol. XIV, pp. 335-6. Shuckburgh, *Descent to Suez*, p. 274.
 - 23 FRUS, 1955-7, Vol. XIV, pp. 366-9. Frankland (ed.), *Documents 1955*, pp. 361-5. On 30 August Shuckburgh wrote in his diary, 'Alpha seems like a beautiful dream.' He later admitted that 'at no stage was there any indication that the Israelis would make any concessions whatever, even for a guaranteed peace on their borders'. See Shuckburgh, *Descent to Suez*, pp. 211, 275.
 - 24 FO371/118830/JE1011/1, Trevelyan to Lloyd, 31 January 1956. FO371/121461/

- VJ1011/1, Duke to Lloyd, 27 July 1956. Shuckburgh, *Descent to Suez*, p. 275. Louis and Owen (eds), *Suez 1956*, pp. 82, 85.
- 25 FO371/115523/V1073/1113, Minute by Shuckburgh, 12 October 1955. FO371/115523/V1073/1107, Minute by Hadow, 7 October 1955. FO371/115523/V1073/1107, FO to Baghdad, 10 October 1955. FO371/115522/V1073/1094, Titchener to FO, 12 October 1955. Further arguments for meeting in Baghdad were, first, that Iraq was an original signatory of the pact; second, that Baghdad was the natural place for the permanent machinery; and, third, that Britain particularly wanted to strengthen and support the Arab member of the pact in the face of Soviet moves elsewhere in the Arab world. In addition, other Arab countries might think it remarkable if the meeting took place anywhere else than Baghdad and might regard it as indicating lack of confidence in Iraq. See FO371/115523/V1073/1112, FO to Ankara, 17 October 1955.
 - 26 FO371/115532/V1073/1342, 'Record of the Restricted Session of the Baghdad Pact Ministers on November 22, 1955', from the British Embassy in Baghdad, 23 November 1955. Gallman, *Iraq under General Nuri*, p. 67.
 - 27 FO371/115531/V1073/1305, Wright to FO, 22 November 1955. FO371/115531/V1073/1309, Wright to FO, 23 November 1955. FO371/115531/V1073/1318, Wright to FO, 25 November 1955. Gallman, *Iraq under General Nuri*, p. 67.
 - 28 FO371/115533/V1073/1357, 'Terms of Reference of the Deputies', 23 November 1955. FO371/115532/V1073/1349, CRO to UK High Commissioner in Canada, 24 November 1955. FO371/115532/V1073/1339, 'Final Communiqué by the Council of the Baghdad Pact', 22 November 1955. Gallman, *Iraq under General Nuri*, p. 67.
 - 29 FO371/115526/V1073/1200, FO to Geneva, 1 November 1955. FO371/115529/V1073/1286, Bowker to FO, 16 November 1955. FO371/115529/V1073/1286, FO to Ankara, 17 November 1955. FO371/115532/V1073/1345, Minute by Hadow, 18 November 1955. FO371/115531/V1073/1311, Wright to FO, 22 November 1955. On 18 November 1955 the Turkish government had informed the Foreign Office that 'they were aware of the need to go slowly, but budget considerations made it necessary for them to draw up now some idea of the sort of structure there would be, so that they could get appropriations for the staff which they would have to be providing for the pact organization'. See FO371/115532/V1073/1345, Minute by R. M. Hadow, 18 November 1955.
 - 30 FO371/115531/V1073/1311, Wright to FO, 22 November 1955. FO371/115531/V1073/1309, Wright to FO, 23 November 1955. FO371/115531/V1073/1318, Wright to FO, 25 November 1955. Oded Remba, 'The Baghdad Pact: Economic Aspect', *Middle Eastern Affairs*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (April 1958) pp. 131–40. 'The Baghdad Pact', Reference Division, Central Office of Information, London, June 1958, pp. 12–13. FO371/115532/V1073/1349, CRO to UK High Commissioner in Canada, 24 November 1955. FO371/115531/V1073/1311, Wright to FO, 22 November 1955. FO371/115532/V1073/1339, 'Final Communiqué by the Council of the Baghdad Pact', 22 November 1955.
 - 31 FO371/115529/V1073/1286, Bowker to FO, 16 November 1955. FO371/115529/V1073/1286, FO to Ankara, 17 November 1955.
 - 32 FO371/115531/V1073/1305, Wright to FO, 22 November 1955. FO371/115531/V1073/1311, Wright to FO, 22 November 1955. FO371/115532/V1073/1349, CRO to UK High Commissioner in Canada, 24 November 1955. FO371/121259/V1073/273, United Kingdom Commitments under the Baghdad Pact, Annex to C.O.S. (56). FO371/115529/V1073/1286, Bowker to FO, 16 November 1955. FO371/115529/V1073/1286, FO to Ankara, 17 November 1955.
 - 33 FO371/115531/V1073/1305, Wright to FO, 22 November 1955. FO371/115533/V1073/1361, Wright to FO, 30 November 1955. FO371/115532/V1073/1336, Macmillan to the Prime Minister, 25 November 1955. FO371/115532/V1073/1342,

- 'Record of the Restricted Session of the Baghdad Pact Ministers on 22 November 1955', from the British Embassy in Baghdad, 23 November 1955. Shuckburgh, *Descent to Suez*, p. 304.
- 34 FO371/115531/V1073/1305, Wright to FO, 22 November 1955. FO371/115533/V1073/1361, Wright to FO, 30 November 1955. FO371/115532/V1073/1336, Macmillan to the Prime Minister, 25 November 1955. FO371/115532/V1073/1342, 'Record of the Restricted Session of the Baghdad Pact Ministers on 22 November 1955', from the British Embassy in Baghdad, 23 November 1955. Shuckburgh, *Descent to Suez*, p. 304. FO371/115532/V1073/1349, CRO to UK High Commissioner in Canada, 24 November 1955. FO371/115533/V1073/1361, Wright to FO, 30 November 1955. FO371/115531/V1073/1311, Wright to FO, 22 November 1955.
- 35 Gallman, *Iraq under General Nuri*, pp. 69–70. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 203–4. FO371/115531/V1073/1305, Wright to FO, 22 November 1955. FO371/115533/V1073/1361, Wright to FO, 30 November 1955. FO371/115532/V1073/1336, Macmillan to the Prime Minister, 25 November 1955. FO371/115532/V1073/1342, 'Record of the Restricted Session of the Baghdad Pact Ministers on 22 November 1955', from the British Embassy in Baghdad, 23 November 1955. Shuckburgh, *Descent to Suez*, p. 304. On 26 November 1955 the State Department responded that the United States was prepared to give prompt consideration to a Lebanese request for assistance under the reimbursable military aid agreement with Lebanon of 23 March 1953. Lebanon, however, had not yet made any purchases under this agreement nor had it taken action on a United States offer of a \$5 million loan made in February 1955. The State Department also noted that the United States was unable to extend military assistance without a grant aid agreement with Lebanon and did not wish to propose such an agreement to Lebanon, because of probable Congressional opposition. See FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 203–4.
- 36 FO371/115532/V1073/1336, Macmillan to the Prime Minister, 25 November 1955. FO371/115532/V1073/1339, 'Final Communiqué by the Council of the Baghdad Pact', 22 November 1955.
- 37 FO371/115533/V1073/1361, Wright to Macmillan, 30 November 1955. Gallman, *Iraq under General Nuri*, p. 71. 'The Baghdad Pact', Reference Division, Central Office of Information, London, June 1958, pp. 12–13.
- 38 FO371/121302/V1104/28, 'Council of Baghdad Pact Economic Committee', 11 January 1956. T220/1314, Minute by Johnston, 3 May 1957.
- 39 FO371/115525/V1073/1152, Bowker to FO, 22 October 1955. FO371/115523/V1073/1111, Stewart to FO, 14 October 1955. FO371/115718/V1073/[1321], Shuckburgh to Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 18 June 1955.
- 40 FO371/115523/V1073/1115, Duke to FO, 15 October 1955. FO371/115525/V1073/1165, Duke to FO, 25 October 1955. FO371/121461/VJ1011/1, Duke to Lloyd, 27 July 1956. FO371/115523/V1073/1125, Scott to FO, 17 October 1955.
- 41 AP20/23, Minute by Eden, 14 October 1955. FO371/115524/V1073/1148, FO to Ankara, 20 October 1955.
- 42 NA RG 59 780.5/10–2455, Hoover to Ankara. NA RG 59 780.5/11–255, Hoover to Ankara. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 176–7, 180–2. FO371/115526/V1073/1206, Bowker to FO, 2 November 1955.
- 43 FO371/115527/V1073/1224, Duke to FO, 6 November 1955. FO371/115500/V1073/534 'A', Minute by Rose, 18 March 1955. FO371/115527/V1073/1218, Duke to FO, 4 November 1955.
- 44 FO371/115527/V1073/1234, Duke to FO, 8 November 1955. FO371/115527/V1073/1235, Duke to FO, 8 November 1955. FO371/115653/VJ1051/27, Memorandum on Jordan and the Baghdad Pact by General Glubb, 9 November 1955. FO371/115527/V1073/1225, Duke to FO, 6 November 1955.

- 45 FO371/115527/V1073/[1325], FO to Amman, 7 November 1955.
- 46 FO371/115528/V1073/[1345], Shuckburgh to his superiors, 7 November 1955. At the beginning of November 1955 Nasser had informed the British and American governments that he was ready to discuss the Alpha Project on a confidential basis if the United States or any other Arab states did not join the Baghdad Pact. See FO371/115649/V1023/20, Cairo to FO, 2 November 1955.
- 47 FO371/115653/VJ1051/27, Duke to Shuckburgh, 10 November 1955. FO371/115653/VJ1051/[29], Bowker to FO, 10 November 1955. FO371/115528/V1073/1246, Duke to FO, 9 November 1955.
- 48 FO371/115532/V1073/1348, Memorandum by General Glubb, 28 November 1955.
- 49 FO371/115653/VJ1051/27, Duke to Shuckburgh, 10 November 1955. FO371/115654/VJ1051/46, Memorandum by Duke, 22 November 1955. FO371/115528/V1073/1246, Duke to FO, 9 November 1955. FO371/115655/VJ1051/57, Duke to Rose, 24 November 1955.
- 50 FO371/115654/VJ1051/42, Record of a conversation between the Secretary of State and the Turkish Prime Minister at Baghdad on 22 November 1955; FO800/678, Macmillan–Menderes meeting on 22 November 1955. Shuckburgh, *Descent to Suez*, p. 304. FO371/115533/V1073/1361, Wright to FO, 30 November 1955. FO371/115532/V1073/1342, ‘Record of the Restricted Session on 22 November’, 23 November 1955. FO371/115654/VJ1051/34, Minute by Rose, 18 November 1955. Lucas, *Divided We Stand*, p. 75.
- 51 FO371/115532/V1073/1336, Macmillan to the Prime Minister, 25 November 1955. Macmillan, *Tides of Fortune*, pp. 655–6.
- 52 FO371/115469/V1073/(442), FO to Washington, 25 November 1955. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 205–7. NA RG 59 780.00/11–2555, Aldrich (London) to the Secretary of State.
- 53 FO371/115649/V1023/20, Cairo to FO, 2 November 1955, and V1023/24, Macmillan–Dulles meeting, 9 November 1955. FO371/115533/V1073/1370, Morris to Hadow, 2 December 1955. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XIV, p. 722.
- 54 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 200–3.
- 55 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XIV, p. 820–1. FO371/115469/V1023/28, Aldrich to Macmillan, 6 December 1955. NA RG 59 780.5/11–2555, Dulles to London. FO371/115528/V1073/1260, Tichener to FO, 12 November 1955.
- 56 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XIV, pp. 820–1. FO371/115469/V1023/28, Aldrich to Macmillan, 6 December 1955. NA RG 59 780.5/11–2555, Dulles to London. FO371/115528/V1073/1260, Tichener to FO, 12 November 1955.
- 57 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XIV, pp. 820–1. FO371/115469/V1023/28, Aldrich to Macmillan, 6 December 1955. NA RG 59 780.5/11–2555, Dulles to London. FO371/115528/V1073/1260, Tichener to FO, 12 November 1955.
- 58 FO371/115658/VJ1051/127, Report by General Sir Gerald Templer, on his visit to Jordan, 16 December 1955. FO371/115655/VJ1051/61, Minute by Shuckburgh, 5 December 1955. Michael B. Oren, ‘A Winter of Discontent: Britain’s Crisis in Jordan, December 1955–March 1956’, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 22 (1990), pp. 171–84.
- 59 FO371/115655/VJ1051/61, Minute by Shuckburgh, 3 December 1955. FO371/115658/VJ1051/127, Report by Sir Gerald Templer, on his visit to Jordan, 16 December 1955.
- 60 FO371/115655/VJ1051/61, Minute by Shuckburgh, 5 December 1955. FO371/115654/VJ1051/51, FO to Amman, 3 December 1955. FO371/115658/VJ1051/127, Report by General Sir Gerald Templer, on his visit to Jordan, 16 December 1955.
- 61 FO371/115655/VJ1051/68, Duke to FO, 7 December 1955.
- 62 FO371/115658/VJ1051/127, Report by General Sir Gerald Templer, on his visit to Jordan, 16 December 1955. FO371/115656/VJ1051/81, Amman to FO,

- 10 December 1955. FO371/115657/VJ1051/103, Amman to FO, 13 December 1955. Oren, 'A Winter of Discontent', p. 177.
- 63 FO371/121461/VJ1011/1, Duke to Lloyd, 27 July 1956. FO371/115659/VJ1051/[130], Duke to FO, 29 December 1955.
- 64 FO371/115658/VJ1051/127, Report by General Sir Gerald Templer, on his visit to Jordan, 16 December 1955. Oren, 'A Winter of Discontent', p. 177. On 12 December 1955 Israeli forces attacked Syrian border posts and killed more than fifty people.
- 65 FO371/121476/V1073/3, Mason to Rose, 31 December 1955.
- 66 Anwar Sadat, *In Search of Identity: An Autobiography* (London, 1978), p. 136.
- 67 FO371/121241/[V1073/264], Duke to FO, 11 January 1956. Stephens, *Nasser*, pp. 173–5.
- 68 Oren, 'A Winter of Discontent', p. 178. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XIII, p. 19.
- 69 Keith Kyle, *Suez* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991), p. 91. Deighton (ed.), *Britain*, p. 267. Lucas, *Divided We Stand*, p. 76.
- 70 Alistair Horne, *Macmillan: Vol. I 1894–1956* (London, 1988), pp. 387–8.
- 71 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XV, p. 31.
- 72 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, p. 234. FO371/121270/[V1073/462], Shuckburgh to Rose, 20 January 1956. For the full account of Shuckburgh's talks in Washington see FO371/121270 file, 'Brief for Washington talks, January–February, 1956'.
- 73 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 216–44. PREM11/1334, Washington Talks, 30 January–3 February 1956. Lucas, *Divided We Stand*, pp. 89–90. Devereux, *Formulation of British Defence Policy*, pp. 178–9. FO371/121270/[V1073/482], Secretary of State to FO, 28 January 1956.
- 74 FO371/121234/[V1073/247], Report on the Anglo-American policy in the Middle East, 22 February 1956.
- 75 Eden, *Full Circle*, p. 336.
- 76 Oren, 'A Winter of Discontent', pp. 171–84. The charge that Glubb used the Arab Legion to dispense pamphlets supporting the Baghdad Pact was prominent in Egyptian propaganda in January and February 1956, and later cited by King Hussein as one of the reasons for Glubb's dismissal. See FO371/121491/V1073/11, Jerusalem to FO, 8 January 1956.
- 77 FO371/127876/VJ1011/1, Johnston to Lloyd, 19 March 1957. Lucas, *Divided We Stand*, p. 94. Eden, *Full Circle*, p. 348.
- 78 Anthony Nutting, *No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez* (New York, 1967), pp. 17–36. Robert Rhodes James, *Anthony Eden* (London, 1986), pp. 430–2.
- 79 Nutting, *No End of a Lesson*, pp. 17–36. James, *Anthony Eden*, pp. 430–2.
- 80 Shuckburgh, *Descent to Suez*, p. 341.
- 81 CAB128/30 C.M.18 (56), 5 March 1956. FO371/121541/VJ1201/37G, Amman to FO, 4 March 1956. FO371/121541/VJ1201/41G, FO to Amman, 5 March 1956. Shuckburgh, *Descent to Suez*, pp. 342–3. Meanwhile, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia renewed their offer, first made in January 1956, to replace the British subsidy to Jordan.
- 82 CAB128/30 C.M.18 (56), 5 March 1956. FO371/121541/VJ1201/37G, Amman to FO, 4 March 1956. FO371/121541/VJ1201/41G, FO to Amman, 5 March 1956. Shuckburgh, *Descent to Suez*, pp. 342–3.
- 83 CAB128/30 C.M.19 (56), 6 March 1956. FO800/734, Nutting to Eden, 5 March 1956. Shuckburgh, *Descent to Suez*, p. 343.
- 84 FO371/121235/V1054/70G, Shuckburgh to Kirkpatrick, 10 March 1956. FO800/734, Nutting to Eden, 12 March 1956. Shuckburgh, *Descent to Suez*, p. 346. Lucas, *Divided We Stand*, p. 98.
- 85 Nutting, *No End of a Lesson*, pp. 34 ff. Nutting later claimed that Eden's original words were: 'I want him murdered, can't you understand?'; also see Lucas, *Divided We Stand*, p. 347.

- 86 Shuckburgh, *Descent to Suez*, p. 346.
- 87 CAB128/30 C.M.21 (56), 9 March 1956. Shuckburgh, *Descent to Suez*, p. 345. Lucas, *Divided We Stand*, p. 99.
- 88 FO371/121243/V1071/102, Foreign Office minute, 13 March 1956.
- 89 CAB128/30 C.M.24 (56), 21 March 1956.
- 90 CAB128/30 C.M.24 (56), 21 March 1956.
- 91 FO800/734, FO to Washington, 5 March 1956. PREM11/1177, FO to Washington, 5 March 1956. NA RG 59 780.5/3–556, Letter from Eden to the President. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, p. 249.
- 92 FO800/734, FO to Washington, 5 March 1956. PREM11/1177, FO to Washington, 5 March 1956. NA RG 59 780.5/3–556, Letter from Eden to the President. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, p. 249.
- 93 Selwyn Lloyd, *Suez 1956: A Personal Account* (London, 1978), pp. 44–7. FO800/734, FO to Karachi, 7 March 1956.
- 94 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 250–2. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XV, pp. 302–9. NA RG 59 780.5/3–656, Dulles to Hoover.
- 95 FO800/734, Nutting to Eden, 6 March 1956.
- 96 FO371/118842/JE1022/11G, Karachi to FO, 7 March 1956. FO371/121271/V1075/64, Baghdad to FO, 9 March 1956. On the same day (8 March 1956), Shuckburgh wrote in his diary, ‘Today both we and the Americans really gave up hope of Nasser and began to look around for means of destroying him.’ See Shuckburgh, *Descent to Suez*, p. 345. The Johnson plan was a peace initiative launched by the United States in October 1953 and designed to create an agreement over water usage in the Jordan River Valley.
- 97 DDE Papers, Ann Whitman Files, Dulles–Herter Series, Box 5, Dulles to Hoover, 8 March 1956, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS. In 1952 a dispute developed between Britain and Saudi Arabia over the Buraimi oasis. Although disagreement centred on the border between Saudi Arabia and the Sultan of Muscat, the underlying reason was the strong possibility of oil reserves in the area. In 1952 Saudi Arabia occupied the disputed area. Britain, who was also concerned about oil reserves, supported the claim of the Sultan of Muscat. All attempts to get Saudi Arabia’s withdrawal failed, and in October 1955 the armies of the ruler of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat, commanded by British officers, reoccupied the Buraimi oasis. Dulles was upset by the British action as he saw in the Buraimi dispute another obstacle for American policy towards the Middle East. See FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 191, 214.
- 98 DDE Papers, Ann Whitman Files, DDE Diaries, Box 13, March 1956 Diary, 8 March 1956, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS. Also see DDE Paper, Ann Whitman Files, Dulles–Herter Series, Box 5, Eisenhower to Foster Dulles, 10 March 1956, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.
- 99 DDE Papers, Ann Whitman Files, DDE Diaries, Box 13, March 1956 Diary, 8 March 1956, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS. Also see DDE Paper, Ann Whitman Files, Dulles–Herter Series, Box 5, Eisenhower to Foster Dulles, 10 March 1956, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.
- 100 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XV, pp. 337–8. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, p. 250.
- 101 John Foster Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda, Chronological, Box 4, Hoover to Foster Dulles, 12 March 1956, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS. Lucas, *Divided We Stand*, p. 107.
- 102 DDE Papers, Ann Whitman Files, DDE Diaries, Box 13, March 1956 Diary, 13 March 1956, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.
- 103 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 258–9.
- 104 John Foster Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda, Chronological, Box 4, Meetings with the President, January–July 1956 (4), Hoover to Foster Dulles, 16 March 1956, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.

- 105 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, p. 261.
- 106 DDE Papers, Ann Whitman Files, DDE Diaries, Box 13, March 1956 Diary, Foster Dulles memorandum, 28 March 1956, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XV, p. 409.
- 107 DDE Papers, Ann Whitman Files, DDE Diaries, Box 13, March 1956 Diary, Foster Dulles memorandum, 28 March 1956, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XV, p. 409.
- 108 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 250, 258–9, 264, and Vol. XV, pp. 302–9, 421 ff. DDE Papers, Ann Whitman Files, DDE Diary Series, Box 13 (March 1956 Diary), Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.
- 109 DDE Papers, Ann Whitman Files, DDE Diary Series, Box 13, March 1956 Diary, Memorandum of conference with the President, 28 March 1956, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS. Lloyd, *Suez 1956*, pp. 44–7. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 267, 270, 275–6, 294–5.
- 110 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 294–5.
- 111 FO371/121253/V1073/178, ‘Records of discussions held in Karachi on March 24, 1956.’ NA RG 59 780.5/4–1256, Memorandum of conversation. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 268–9. FO371/121215/V1073/123, Bowker to FO, 31 March 1956. NA RG 59 780.5/4–756, Memorandum of Conversation. On 7 April 1956 Gallman, the United States Ambassador to Iraq, informed the State Department that ‘unquestionably considerable impatience and discouragement are developing with what is regarded as equivocal US position regarding pact. I am not convinced however that at this late date half measures are going to help. As I have indicated before, our formal adherence is needed more than anything else to transform pact into a really going concern.’ See NA RG 59 780.5/4–756, Gallman (Baghdad) to the Secretary of State.
- 112 DEFE5/65 COS (56)79, 21 February 1956. DEFE4/84 JP(56)127, 28 February 1956. DEFE4/86 COS (56) 46th meeting, 3 May 1956. Devereux, *Formulation of British Defence Policy*, pp. 179, 182–4.
- 113 FO371/121253/V1073/170, Stevens to FO, 18 April 1956. FO371/121253/V1073/160, Stevens to FO, 16 April 1956. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 286–92, 299–302.
- 114 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 279–80, 282, 284–5, 312–15. NA RG 59 780.5/4–1156. NA RG 59 780.5/4–1756.
- 115 FO371/121253/V1073/175, ‘Final Communiqué by the Council of the Baghdad Pact’, 19 April 1956. Oded Remba, ‘The Baghdad Pact: Economic Aspect’, *Middle Eastern Affairs*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (April 1958), pp. 131–40. Devereux, *Formulation of British Defence Policy*, p. 184.
- 116 FO371/121253/V1073/175, ‘Final Communiqué by the Council of the Baghdad Pact’, 19 April 1956. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 295–7, 303–7, 312–15.

6 The decline of the Baghdad Pact (1956–8)

- 1 For the events leading to the withdrawal of American and British loan offers to Egypt for the Aswan dam project and to the Suez war see Lucas, *Divided We Stand*, pp. 93–135; also see Freiberger, *Dawn over Suez*, pp. 133–87.
- 2 CAB128/30 C.M. (56)54, 27 July 1956. Of the total of seventy million tons of oil which passed from the Persian Gulf through the Suez Canal, sixty million tons were destined for Western Europe and represented two-thirds of its oil supplies. To move this amount of tonnage around Cape Horn would require twice the tonnage of existing tankers. At the time of nationalization Britain only had a six-week supply of oil. Of the 14,666 ships which passed through the canal in 1955, one-third was British. See CAB128/30 C.M. (56)54, 27 July 1956.
- 3 PREM11/1177 (No.3358), FO to Washington, 27 July 1956. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XVI, pp. 9–12.

- 4 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XVI, pp. 9–12. Robert D. Murphy, *Diplomat among Warriors* (New York, 1964), pp. 380–1.
- 5 PREM11/1098, Record of a meeting, 1 August 1956. CAB128/30 C.M.(56)57, 1 August 1956. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XVI, pp. 98–105. Freiburger, *Dawn over Suez*, pp. 168–9.
- 6 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XVI, pp. 451–8. Memorandum of Conversation with the President, 8 September 1956, John F. Dulles Papers, White House Memorandum Series, Box 4. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS. PREM11/1174, Makins to FO, 2 October 1956. Eden, *Full Circle*, pp. 556–7.
- 7 The Sèvres Protocol consisted of the following: ‘On the afternoon of 29 October 1956 Israeli forces would launch a full-scale attack on Egyptian forces. On 30 October the British and French governments would appeal to Egypt for an absolute ceasefire, the withdrawal of forces ten miles from the Canal, and acceptance of the temporary occupation of the key positions on the Canal by Anglo-French forces. There would, simultaneously, be an appeal to the Government of Israel for an absolute ceasefire and withdrawal of forces to ten miles east of the Canal. If either of the two governments rejected the appeal, or failed to give its agreement within twelve hours, the Anglo-French forces would intervene; if the Egyptians refused, the Anglo-French forces would attack early on 31 October. Israel agreed not to attack Jordan, but if Jordan attacked Israel the British would not go to Jordan’s assistance, as the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty referred specifically to the defence of Jordan against Israeli (or other) attack. Israeli forces would seize the western shore of the Gulf of Aqaba and ensure the control of the Gulf of Tirana.’ See James, *Anthony Eden*, p. 531.
- 8 Lucas, *Divided We Stand*, pp. 237–323.
- 9 *Ibid.*
- 10 FO371/121295/V1073/[234], Eden to Lloyd, 29 July 1956. FO371/128038/VQ1011/1, Wright to Lloyd, 8 February 1957.
- 11 FO371/121662/V1073/[342], Minute by Wright, 30 July 1956. FO371/128038/VQ1011/1, Wright to Lloyd, 8 February 1957.
- 12 FO371/121282/V1073/ Minute by Rose, 26 July 1956.
- 13 FO371/128038/VQ1011/1, Wright to Lloyd, 8 February 1957.
- 14 FO371/121266/V1073/405, Stevens to Lloyd, 19 November 1956.
- 15 FO371/121788/VR1091/590, Stevens to FO, 4 November 1956. Elie Podeh, ‘The Struggle Over Arab Hegemony after the Suez Crisis’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (January 1993), p. 98.
- 16 FO371/121266/V1073/405, Stevens to Lloyd, 19 November 1956.
- 17 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 318–20.
- 18 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 318–20. NA RG 59 684A.86/11–656.
- 19 FO371/121789/VR1091/[456], Stevens to FO and FO to Stevens, 6 November 1956. For the text of the final communiqué see FO371/121793/VR1091/766, Stevens to FO, 8 November 1956. FO371/121266/V1073/405, Stevens to Lloyd, 19 November 1955.
- 20 FO371/121266/V1073/405, Stevens to Lloyd, 19 November 1956. Frankland (ed.), *Documents 1955*, pp. 313–14.
- 21 FO371/121266/V1073/405, Stevens to Lloyd, 19 November 1956.
- 22 FO371/121788/VR1091/589, Stevens to FO, 4 November 1956. Kyle, *Suez*, pp. 486–8. FO371/121266/V1073/405, Stevens to Lloyd, 19 November 1956.
- 23 FO371/121266/V1073/405, Stevens to Lloyd, 19 November 1956.
- 24 NA RG 59 684A.86/11–956.
- 25 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 318–22.
- 26 *Ibid.* At the same meeting, Pakistani Prime Minister Suhrawardy stressed the importance of bringing Iraq and Saudi Arabia closer together, an action in which he felt the United States could be most effective. The example of the US joining

- the pact would be very influential in determining the Saudi attitude. He pointed out that President Mirza would proceed, following an informal visit to Iraq, to Saudi Arabia in an effort to persuade King Saud of the importance of the Baghdad Pact. See FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 318–22.
- 27 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 318–22.
- 28 FO371/121662/VQ1051/51, Wright to Lloyd, 7 December 1956.
- 29 FO371/121265/V1073/387, Wright to FO, 9 November 1956. Podeh, ‘Struggle over Arab Hegemony’, p. 98.
- 30 Muhamed H. Heikal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail: Suez through Egyptian Eyes* (London, 1986), p. 209.
- 31 FO371/121223/V1022/2 and 3, Wright to FO, 21 November 1956. Podeh, ‘Struggle over Arab Hegemony’, pp. 99–100.
- 32 FO371/121265/V1073/387, Stevens to FO, 10 November 1956. FO371/121265/V1073/[389], UK High Commissioner in Karachi to Commonwealth Relations Office, 13 November 1956. FO371/121266/V1073/[458], FO to UK High Commissioner in Canada, 31 November 1956. FO371/121265/V1073/[395], Stevens to FO, 10 November 1956. FO371/121266/V1073/399, Bowker to FO, [12 November 1956].
- 33 FO371/121647/V1073/[294], FO to UK High Commissioner in Canada, 16 November 1956. Podeh, *Struggle over Arab Hegemony*, p. 99.
- 34 FO371/121647/V1073/[296], Bowker to FO, 17 November 1956.
- 35 NA RG 59 780.5/11–1956, Gallman to Secretary of State.
- 36 FO371/121648/VQ1022/20, Wright to FO, 19 November 1956. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 353–4.
- 37 NA RG 59 780.5/11–2356, Gallman to Secretary of State.
- 38 FO371/121648/VQ1022/20, Wright to FO, 19 November 1956. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 353–4.
- 39 FO371/128038/VQ1011/1, Wright to Lloyd, 8 February 1957.
- 40 NA RG 59 780.5/11–1856, ‘Position Paper on the Baghdad Pact’, from William Rountree to the Acting Secretary of State. NA RG 59 780.5/11–1556, Gallman to the Department of State. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 320–2, 325–6, 331–7.
- 41 NA RG 59 780.5/11–1856, ‘Position Paper on the Baghdad Pact’, from William Rountree to the Acting Secretary of State. NA RG 59 780.5/11–1556, Gallman to the Department of State. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 320–2, 325–6, 331–7.
- 42 NA RG 59 780.5/11–1856, ‘Position Paper on the Baghdad Pact’, from William Rountree to the Acting Secretary of State. NA RG 59 780.5/11–1556, Gallman to the Department of State. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 320–2, 325–6, 331–7.
- 43 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 324–5.
- 44 *Ibid.*, pp. 327–31. Nuri Said’s ambition was to form a union, the so-called Fertile Crescent, between Iraq, Syria, Jordan and possibly Lebanon.
- 45 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 331–7, 340–2.
- 46 *Ibid.*
- 47 *Department of State Bulletin*, 10 December 1956, p. 918. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, p. 360.
- 48 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 361–3, 404.
- 49 *Ibid.*
- 50 *Ibid.*, pp. 373–6.
- 51 *Ibid.*, pp. 369–76.
- 52 *Ibid.*, pp. 395–7.
- 53 *Ibid.*, pp. 398–409.
- 54 *Ibid.*
- 55 *Ibid.*
- 56 *Ibid.*, pp. 415–17.
- 57 *Ibid.*, p. 413.

- 58 Ibid., pp. 420–9.
- 59 Ibid., pp. 420–31.
- 60 Ibid., pp. 432–9.
- 61 FO371/127824/VB1072/23, Ankara to FO, 21 January 1957. FO371/127824/VB1072/24, Ankara to FO, 21 January 1957.
- 62 FO371/127824/VB1072/33, Bowker to Lloyd, 25 January 1957.
- 63 FO371/127824/VB1072/23, Ankara to FO, 21 January 1957. FO371/127824/VB1072/24, Ankara to FO, 21 January 1957. FO371/127824/VB1072/33, Bowker to Lloyd, 25 January 1957.
- 64 FO371/127824/VB1072/23, Ankara to FO, 21 January 1957. FO371/127824/VB1072/24, Ankara to FO, 21 January 1957. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 448–51.
- 65 FO371/128047/V1073/[758], ‘State Visit to Iraq of King Saud of Saudi Arabia’, 30 May 1957. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XIII, pp. 413 ff. Upon his return from the United States King Saud supported other Arab states in the Middle East which were seeking to resist communist pressures and Egyptian–Syrian leadership of the Arab states.
- 66 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 448–57, 459–60, 463.
- 67 Ibid.
- 68 Ibid.
- 69 Ibid.
- 70 FO371/127813/[V1073/426], Lloyd to Caccia, 25 January 1957.
- 71 Gallman, *Iraq under General Nuri*, p. 74.
- 72 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 494–5.
- 73 Ibid.
- 74 T220/1314, Minute by M. E. Johnston, 3 May 1957. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 494–5.
- 75 T220/1314, Minute by W. Armstrong, 6 May 1957. T220/1314, Minute by M. E. Johnston, 14 March 1957.
- 76 T220/1314, ‘Aid for the Baghdad Pact’, 9–10 May 1957, and letter from Lloyd to Peter Thorneycroft (MP), 29 April 1957. FO371/127755/V1075/8, ‘Bermuda Conference: Anglo-American co-operation in the Middle East’, 11 March 1957.
- 77 DEFE11/150, ‘Pakistan: Third Session of the Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact’, from UK High Commissioner in Pakistan to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 15 June 1957. DEFE11/150, from Karachi (UK Delegation) to FO, 3 June 1957.
- 78 DEFE11/150, ‘Pakistan: Third Session of the Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact’, from UK High Commissioner in Pakistan to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 15 June 1957. DEFE11/150, from Karachi (UK Delegation) to FO, 3 June 1957.
- 79 DEFE11/150, ‘Pakistan: Third Session of the Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact’, from UK High Commissioner in Pakistan to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 15 June 1957. DEFE11/150, from Karachi (UK Delegation) to FO, 3 June 1957.
- 80 DEFE11/150, ‘Pakistan: Third Session of the Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact’, from UK High Commissioner in Pakistan to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 15 June 1957. DEFE11/150, from Karachi (UK Delegation) to FO, 3 June 1957.
- 81 T220/1314, ‘Baghdad Pact Economic Committee’, Minute by R. B. Moberly, 22 May 1957. FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 494–5. Remba, ‘Baghdad Pact’, pp. 131–40.
- 82 DEFE11/150, ‘Pakistan: Third Session of the Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact’, from UK High Commissioner in Pakistan to Secretary Of State for Commonwealth Relations, 15 June 1957. Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq*, pp. 116–22. Gallman, *Iraq under General Nuri*, pp. 83–4.

- 83 FO371/127829/VB1072/176, Wright to FO, 22 December 1957. The administration of Cyprus had been transferred to Britain in 1878 in return for a commitment on the part of Britain to come to the aid of Turkey in case of Russian aggression. Upon declaring war against the Ottoman Empire in November 1914, Britain annexed Cyprus, and in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 Turkey recognized the annexation retroactively. In 1925 Britain converted Cyprus into a crown colony and, following disorders in 1931, suspended autonomous institutions on the island. No serious efforts were made to restore limited self-government until 1947. The British offer at that time was rejected by the Greek-speaking population, who represented 80 per cent of the half-million total and demanded *enosis* or union with Greece, a movement that ultimately elicited official sponsorship from Greece. However, Britain refused to entertain *enosis*, partly because of unsettled conditions in Greece and because of the Anglo-Egyptian problem. Once the decision was taken up to wind up the British base at Suez, Cyprus was selected to replace the Suez base after the signature in October 1954 of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement. By then, however, the Cyprus issue had expanded into a tripartite dispute, for Turkey took up the cause of the Turkish-speaking minority on the island, roughly 20 per cent of the total. The Turks were strongly opposed to the emancipation of Cyprus under Greek rule, and insisted on the partition of the island between its Greek and Turkish components if British rule were to come to an end. The British were also reluctant to grant independence or union with Greece, since Cyprus was one of their remaining strongholds in the Middle East. In order to reduce existing divergences and to find a political solution to the question, the representatives of Britain, Turkey and Greece met in London in early September 1955. However, the tripartite conference in London failed to reconcile the conflicting views. As a result, on 5 September, riots broke out in Istanbul, in the course of which angry mobs attacked and burned most of the Greek properties in the city. By the end of 1955 relations between Greece and Turkey had reached their lowest point in the thirty-five years following the peace settlement. See Lenczowski, *Middle East*, pp. 143–7. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy*, pp. 398–401.
- 84 FO371/136450/RK1011/1, Bowker to Lloyd, 4 February 1958. Lenczowski, *Middle East*, pp. 145–6.
- 85 PREM11/2408, from FO to Ankara, 21 December 1957. PREM11/2408, Bowker to FO, 27 December 1957.
- 86 PREM11/2408, FO to Ankara, 21 December 1957 and Bowker to FO, 22 December 1957. FO371/127829/VB1072/176, Wright to FO, 22 December 1957.
- 87 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 673–4. PREM11/2408, Bowker to FO, 24 December 1957. FO371/136450/RK1011/1, Bowker to Lloyd, 4 February 1958.
- 88 FRUS, 1955–7, Vol. XII, pp. 674–5.
- 89 PREM11/2408, FO to Washington, 24 December 1957.
- 90 FO371/133908/VB10345/12, Crawford to FO, 25 January 1958. DO35/10112/224, Record of conversation between Selwyn Lloyd and Nuri Said, 26 January 1958.
- 91 DO35/10112/224, Record of a conversation between the Secretary of State and Menderes, 25 January 1958.
- 92 FO371/133916/VB1072/77, Record of the meeting at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 January 1958.
- 93 DO35/10112/224, Record of conversation between Lloyd and Dulles, 26 January 1958.
- 94 FO371/133916/VB1072/70, Wright to Lloyd, 12 February 1958.
- 95 Remba, ‘The Baghdad Pact’, pp. 131–40.
- 96 FO371/133915/VB1072/59, Minute by Hadow, 5 February 1958. PREM11/2408, Bowker to FO, 30 January 1958. FO371/133915/VB1072/47, CRO to UK High Commissioner in Canada, 31 January 1958. Remba, ‘The Baghdad Pact’, pp. 31–40.

- 97 FO371/133916/VB1072/70, Wright to Lloyd, 12 February 1958. FO371/133915/VB1072/59, Minute by Hadow, 5 February 1958. FO371/133915/VB1072/47, CRO to UK High Commissioner in Canada, 31 January 1958. PREM11/2408, Bowker to FO, 30 January 1958.
- 98 Discussion at the 354th Meeting of the National Security Council, 6 February 1958, DDE Papers (Ann Whitman File), NSC Series Box 9, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS.

7 The collapse of the Baghdad Pact (1958–9)

- 1 Nutting, *Nasser*, pp. 196–217. Stephens, *Nasser*, pp. 277–302. FRUS, 1958–60, Vol. XIII, pp. 409–11.
- 2 Nutting, *Nasser*, pp. 196–217. Stephens, *Nasser*, pp. 277–302. FRUS, 1958–60, Vol. XIII, pp. 409–11.
- 3 FRUS, 1958–60, Vol. XII, p. 36. FRUS, 1958–60, Vol. XIII, pp. 409–13.
- 4 FO371/140896/VQ1011/1, Iraq: Annual Review for 1958. Gallman, *Iraq under General Nuri*, p. 142.
- 5 FO371/140896/VQ1011/1, Iraq: Annual Review for 1958. Marr, *Modern History of Iraq*, pp. 121–2. Campbell, *Defense*, pp. 135–8.
- 6 FO371/140896/VQ1011/1, Iraq: Annual Review for 1958. Marr, *Modern History of Iraq*, pp. 121–2. Campbell, *Defence*, pp. 135–8.
- 7 Lenczowski, *Middle East*, pp. 366–72.
- 8 FRUS, 1958–60, Vol. XI, pp. 207–8. Lebanon was the only Arab country which officially accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine and, on 16 March 1957, signed an agreement with the United States.
- 9 Marr, *Modern History of Iraq*, pp. 123, 155–7. Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship* (London, 1990), pp. 47–9. Majid Khadduri, *Republican Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics since the Revolution of 1958* (London, 1969), pp. 15–61. Also see Robert A. Fernea and W. Roger Louis (eds), *The Iraqi Revolution of 1958: The Old Social Classes Revisited* (London, 1991). The events of the 14 July 1958 coup are recorded in the files FO371/133068, 133069, 133139, 134198, 134199, 134200, 134201, 134202 and 134210. Also in CAB128/32, C.C.(58) 55th, 56th, 57th, 59th and 60th conclusions. In his report of 21 August 1958, in file FO371/133068, Wright gave a comprehensive account of the coup in Iraq on 14 July 1958. The report throws good light on how the coup was planned and achieved and the internal and external influence which caused the overthrow of the old regime. The effect of the Suez crisis on the future of the Iraqi regime and Nasser's role in the Iraqi coup of 14 July is also recorded in the file FO371/133068.
- 10 FO371/144739/RK1011/1, Burrows to FO, 17 February 1959.
- 11 Campbell, *Defense*, pp. 140–3. Lenczowski, *Middle East*, pp. 366–72. For more information about American intervention in Lebanon see FRUS, 1958–60, Vol. XI, pp. 1–107. British troops remained in Jordan for more than a year. After the American intervention President Chamoun declared that he would not seek reelection for a second term. After considerable negotiations, all the warring factions (including the UAR) agreed that President Chamoun would stay in office until the end of his term in September 1958, then he would relinquish his position to a legally elected president. On 31 July 1958, General Fuad Chebab, Commander of the Lebanese Army, was elected president by the Chamber of Deputies, and on 23 September he assumed office. American troops finally evacuated Lebanon in October 1958. See Lenczowski, *Middle East*, pp. 366–72.
- 12 FO371/144739/RK1011/1, Burrows to FO, 17 February 1959. FO371/133919/VB1072/176, Bowker to Lloyd, 25 July 1958. FO371/133918/VB1072/154, Communiqué issued to the press at the end of Ankara meeting of the heads of state of

- the Baghdad Pact regional members, 17 July 1958. Dikerdem, *Ortadoğu'da*, pp. 183–5. The Turkish government did not appear totally deterred from pursuing a military intervention in Iraq. In early 1959 the Turkish government was alarmed at the growing influence of the communists in Iraq and the increased dependence upon them of the new Iraqi regime. However, the United States and the United Kingdom urged Turkey that ‘any idea of intervention [in Iraq] by Iran or Turkey would be most unfortunate. See FO371/144739/RK1011/1, Burrows to FO, 17 February 1959. Also see Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East*, pp. 26–7.
- 13 FRUS, 1958–60, Vol. XI, pp. 306–8. FO371/133919/VB1072/176, Bowker to Lloyd, 25 July 1958. PREM11/2408, Bowker to FO, 16 July 1958.
- 14 Mehmet Ali Birand, Can Dündar and Bülent Çaplı, *Demirkurat: Bir Demokrasinin Doğuşu* (Istanbul, 1991), pp. 148–9. Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East*, pp. 26–7.
- 15 Birand, *Demirkurat*, pp. 148–9. Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East*, pp. 26–7.
- 16 FO371/133919/VB1072/176, Bowker to Lloyd, 25 July 1958. Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East*, p. 27. For Menderes’s suggestion to send four Turkish military divisions to Iraq to put down the revolution see FO371/134212.
- 17 FO371/144739/RK1011/1, Burrows to FO, 17 February 1959. FO371/133919/VB1072/176, Bowker to Lloyd, 25 July 1958.
- 18 FRUS, 1958–60, Vol. XII, pp. 90, 311. FRUS, 1958–60, Vol. XI, p. 325. FO371/144739/RK1011/1, Burrows to FO, 17 February 1959. FO371/133919/VB1072/176, Bowker to Lloyd, 25 July 1958.
- 19 Gillian King (ed.), *Documents on International Affairs, 1958* (London, 1962), p. 300. Campbell, *Defense*, p. 147.
- 20 FO371/133919/VB1072/176, Bowker to Lloyd, 25 July 1958.
- 21 FRUS, 1958–60, Vol. XII, pp. 79–81, 132.
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 Ibid., pp. 96–7.
- 24 Ibid., p. 104.
- 25 Ibid., p. 105.
- 26 DEFE6/51, The Baghdad Pact: Review of existing plans and studies, Joint Planning Staff, 22 August 1958. Ashton, ‘Hijacking of a Pact’, pp. 123–37.
- 27 FO371/140896/VQ1011/1, Iraq: Annual Review for 1958. Farouk-Sluglett, *Iraq since 1958*, p. 50.
- 28 Gallman, *Iraq under General Nuri*, pp. 85–7.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 FRUS, 1958–60, Vol. XII, pp. 96–7. PREM11/2408, Viscount Hood to FO, 22, 23 and 26 July 1958. FO371/133919/VB1072/191, Minute by Millard, 26 July 1958.
- 31 FRUS, 1958–60, Vol. XII, pp. 96–7. PREM11/2408, Viscount Hood to FO, 22, 23 and 26 July 1958. FO371/133919/VB1072/191, Minute by Millard, 26 July 1958.
- 32 PREM11/2408, FO to Washington, 22 and 23 July 1958.
- 33 PREM11/2408, Hood to FO, 23 and 24 July 1958. FRUS, 1958–60, Vol. XII, p. 78.
- 34 FRUS, 1958–60, Vol. XII, pp. 111–12. FO371/133918/VB1072/172, Record of a meeting held at 10 Downing Street on 27 July 1958.
- 35 FRUS, 1958–60, Vol. XII, pp. 111–12.
- 36 FRUS, 1958–60, Vol. XII, pp. 113–14. DDE Papers, Ann Whitman Files, International Series, Box 39, Telephone Calls, 28 July 1958, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, KS. At the National Security Council Meeting on 31 July 1958 Dulles recalled that it soon became apparent that ‘our statement of attitude towards the [Baghdad] Pact, which we had prepared in advance, was inadequate’, and that the United States would have to make some gesture which could be used effectively by the prime ministers of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan in their own countries. They wanted a statement which could be signed by the United States and Britain as well as by them. Therefore the members of the pact had one paper, and the United

- States had another paper (the Eisenhower Doctrine), and even though ‘our paper was stronger, the fact that it was separate and bothered the members of the pact. Therefore, it was necessary to develop a five-country declaration which would wipe out the feeling of separateness.’ See FRUS, 1958–60, Vol. XII, pp. 126–7.
- 37 DO35/10113/225, The fifth session of the Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact, London, 27–9 July 1958.
- 38 DO35/10113/225, The fifth session of the Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact, London, 27–9 July 1958.
- 39 PREM11/2408, Hood to FO, 26 July 1958. FRUS, 1958–60, Vol. XII, pp. 126–7. DO35/10113/225, The fifth session of the Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact, London, 27–9 July 1958. At a National Security Council meeting on 31 July 1958, Dulles said that he had been surprised by the feeling of the prime ministers of Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, that the United States should recognize Iraq, and was particularly surprised in the case of Turkey because Turkey had thought of taking strong action against Iraq. See FRUS, 1958–60, Vol. XII, p. 126.
- 40 DO35/10113/225, The fifth session of the Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact, London, 27–9 July 1958.
- 41 FO371/140697/EB1019/35, LeQuesne to Wyatt, 20 March 1958. DO35/10113/225, Fifth session of the Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact, London, 27–29 July 1958.
- 42 FRUS, 1958–60, Vol. XII, pp. 111–14, 126–7, 639–40. DO35/10113/225, Fifth session of the Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact, London, 27–29 July 1958. King (ed.), *Documents*, pp. 369–70.
- 43 FO371/140706/EB10334/5, ‘Background Brief for Washington: Iran and the Baghdad Pact, 14 March 1959’. FO371/140691/EB1016/23, from UK High Commissioner in Pakistan to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 20 February 1959. However, this manoeuvre failed. The bilateral agreement which was subsequently signed on 5 March 1959 between Iran and the United States fell short of the Shah’s original hopes and his attempt to have the best of both worlds did not succeed. The Shah got the worst of all worlds and succeeded in provoking the Russians and not getting all he wanted from his allies. See FO371/140706/EB10334/5, ‘Background Brief for Washington: Iran and the Baghdad Pact, 14 March 1959’.
- 44 FRUS, 1958–60, Vol. XII, pp. 205–8.
- 45 Ibid.
- 46 Ibid.
- 47 FO371/140691/EB1016/23, from UK High Commissioner in Pakistan to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 20 February 1959. FO371/140691/EB1016/20, ‘Sixth Session of the Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact, Karachi, 26–8 January 1959’. FO371/140706/EB10334/5, ‘Background Brief for Washington: Iran and the Baghdad Pact, 14 March 1959’.
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