PARADIGMS AND DYNAMIC CHANGE
IN THE TURKISH PARTY SYSTEM

A Ph.D. Dissertation

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To Aimee and Maya

PARADIGMS AND DYNAMIC CHANGE
IN THE TURKISH PARTY SYSTEM

The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University

by

F. MICHAEL WUTHRICH

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I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

     (Professor Dr. Metin Heper, Provost)
       Supervisor

I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

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ABSTRACT

PARADIGMS AND DYNAMIC CHANGE IN THE TURKISH PARTY
SYSTEM
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May 2011

This study argues that, contrary to popular assertions of the Turkish
party system as inexplicable or unpatterned or as the persistent manifestation of
an essential socio-cultural cleavage, the historic operation of the Turkish party
system in the national electoral arena has demonstrated both dynamic change
and significant sets of patterns that illuminate the outcomes of electoral contest
in different periods. These can be traced through careful observation of the
dimensions of competition and domains of identification operating in a
contingent set of circumstances, the pattern of which I refer to as the political
paradigm. One can best understand the behavior of the system, its parties and
the electorate in elections by observing these paradigmatic patterns and the
points at which they shift. Dynamic change, thus, is intended to reflect the
interactive nature of the party systems and the interdependent forces—
institutions, actors, structures—that combine and interact to bring about

significant shifts in the political paradigm—i.e. the contingent "system of interactions," a key component of the standard definitions of parties as systems.

In the Turkish case, through the study of national campaign discourse, existing social and political research and national and provincial-level electoral data for general elections, one can detect four periods in which a distinctive paradigmatic pattern is in operation. In the first period from 1950 to 1965, structural and institutional factors shaped the nature of multiparty politics such that the primary strategies for voter mobilization were various forms of patron-client relationships and the exploitation of existing local social structures. From 1965 to 1977, parties began to utilize ideological imaging to frame both themselves and their opponents within the system of party competition while also mobilizing votes through the growing power of trade unions and machine politics in the large urban squatter communities. After a three year period of military junta rule, multiparty politics and its accompanying paradigm beginning in 1983, guided strongly by the military, emphasized moderation, centrism and an aversion to ideology, and the selection of party was reduced to particular policies and the moderate appeal to service (*hizmet*) to the people while the political elites utilized rapidly expanding media technology to disseminate their appeal. The success of the religiously-oriented Welfare Party in 1994 and 1995, initiating the final paradigm, was primarily the result of an anti-establishment party capitalizing on existing mundane strategies for voter mobilization, specifically providing effective governance at the municipal level which translated to "vote banks" for the party in national elections. This paradigm witnessed the importance of local governance, strong regional tendencies in

voting behavior, and an increasingly identity-based element in campaign discourse, primarily set along a religious-secularist divide and entwined with a secondary Turkish nationalist versus Kurdish nationalist- pluralist pole.

ÖZET

TÜRK SİYASİ PARTİ SİSTEMİNDE PARADİGMALAR VE DİNAMİK
DEĞİŞKENLİK

Wuthrich, F. Michael

Doktora, Siyasi Bilimi Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Metin Heper, Provost

Mayıs 2011

Bu çalışma, Türk parti sisteminin açıklanamaz olduğu ya da belli bir motif sergilemediği, veya sosyo-kültürel bir bölünmenin süregelen bir göstergesi olduğu gibi yaygın iddiaların aksine, Türk parti sisteminin ulusal seçim arenasında tarihsel işleyişinin hem dinamik değişkenlik gösterdiğini, hem de değişik dönemlerde seçim mücadelerinin sonuçlarını aydınlatan önemli motifler sergilediğini ileri sürmektedir. Bu motifler, benim siyasi paradigma olarak adlandırdığım, bağımlı tarihsel koşullarda rekabet boyutlarının ve özdeşleşme alanlarının dikkatlice gözlemlenmesi ile ortaya konulablir. Seçim sisteminin, siyasi partilerin ve seçmenlerin seçim sırasındaki davranışları, en iyi, bu paradigmatik motifler ile bu motiflerin kayma noktaları gözlemlenerek anlaşılabilir. Bu durumda, dinamik değişkenlik, birleşerek ve etkileşerek siyasi paradigmada – başka bir deyişle, partilerin sistem olarak tarif edildiği klasik tanımların anahtar unsuru olan bağımlı "etkileşim sistemleri"nde – önemli

kaymaları meydana getiren, parti sistemleri ile bağımsız tesirlerin – kurumlar, aktörler, yapılar - etkileşimini yansıtmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Ulusal seçim kampanyaları söylemleri, varolan sosyal ve siyasi araştırmalar ve genel seçimler için ulusal ve vilayetler düzeyindeki seçim verilerinin incelenmesi sonucu, Türkiye örneğinde, belirgin bir paradigmatic motifin işlediği dört dönem saptanabilir. 1950'den 1965'e kadar süren birinci dönemde, yapısal ve kurumsal etkenler çok partili siyaseti öyle biçimlendirmişlerdir ki, seçmen mobilizasyonu için kullanılan öncelikli yöntemler çeşitli patron-yanaşma bağları ve varolan yerel sosyal yapıların istismarı olmuştur. 1965'den 1977'ye kadar olan dönemde, partiler, geniş kent gecekondu topluluklarında sendikların büyüyen gücü ve seçmenlere menfaat dağıtılmasını öngören parti politikası aracılığı ile oy toplarken, hem kendilerini, hem de parti rekabeti sistemi içerisindeki rakiplerini tanımlayacak ideolojik imaj oluşturmadan yararlanmışlardır. Üç yıllık askeri yönetimden sonra, 1983'te başlayan çok partili siyaset ile ona eşlik eden, ve ağırlıklı olarak ordu tarafından yönlendirilen paradigma, ılımlılık, merkezcilik ve ideolojiden sakınmayı vurgulamış ve parti seçimi, siyasi seçkinler, politikalarını duyurmak için hızla gelişen medya teknolojisinden yararlanırken, belli başlı politika seçimlerine ve partilerin insanlara hizmet etme söylemlerine indirgenmiştir. Son paradigmaya ön ayak olan, din-yönelimli Refah Partisi'nin 1994 ve 1995'teki başarısı, temel olarak, düzen karşıtı bir partinin varolan sıradan seçmen mobilizasyonu stratejilerinden, özellikle de, ulusal seçimlerde parti için "seçim bankası"na dönüşen belediye düzeyinde etkili yönetim sağlamak yönteminden yararlanmasının bir sonucudur. Bu paradigma, yerel yönetimin önemine, seçmen

davranışında güçlü bölgesel eğilimlere, ile temel olarak dinci-laik ekseni doğrultusunda şekillenen ve ikincil olarak Türk ulusalcı'ya karşı Kürt ulusalcı-çoğulcu karşıt uçlarıyla çevrelenen ve kampanya söyleminde önemi gittikçe artan, kimlik-bazlı unsurlara şahit olmuştur.

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I owe a very special thanks to my wife and very best friend, Aimee. She has tirelessly stood behind me and undergone much difficulty to ensure that I completed this dissertation and PhD. It was also she who at some point in the winter of 2007/2008 sat down with me and insisted that I pursue a PhD, and she even bought a preparation book for the GRE for me. The sacrifices and love that she has shown me throughout this process has known no bounds, and I can never repay her for all that she has done to help me see this through to the end. I would also like to thank my little one and a half year old daughter, Maya, for providing me with necessary diversions from my dissertation and with hundreds of extra smiles and laughter that put the whole of my work in its proper perspective.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

*Only careful historical, sociological, and political analysis
can do full justice to the distinct qualities of any given political system.*[1]

Few would dispute the proposition that the Turkish political party system in the electoral arena is a complex case. Consider that in 2002, in a spectacular reversal of fortunes, a party that received a plurality of votes in the previous election (22.2 percent) in 1999 managed to accumulate only 1.2 percent of the vote, leaving itself beneath the required 10 percent threshold and, thus, along with all the other incumbent parties, outside of parliament. In the same election, a party slightly more than a year old garnered 34.3% of the vote. In 1983, every party running for election was a party previously untested in elections. The party of the founder of the Turkish Republic—Mustafa Kemal Atatürk—the Republican People's Party (CHP), has in one election received up to 41.4 percent of the vote and as low as 8.7 percent in another; it has been banned from politics, arguably in the name of Atatürk,[2] its spirit has existed through another party (the SHP), and it has returned with its old name and is currently the leading party of the opposition

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[1] Hans Daalder, "Party Elites, and Political Developments in Western Europe," in Joseph Lapalombara and Myron Wiener, eds. *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 67.

[2] The military's intervention on 12 September 1980 was carried out with the expressed aim of preserving the essential values and unity of the Turkish Republic as entrusted to the people by Atatürk.

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taking in 20.9 percent of the vote in the last general election in 2007. These are just some of the examples of a system that has been described as exhibiting an extreme amount of electoral volatility.[3] While this observation is undoubtedly accurate, one must also not forget that in the early 1960s a student of Turkish politics observed, "[The] consistent voting pattern is the major factor in Turkey's political life today."[4] And he seems to express the existence of this stability with a sense of foreboding.

We should add to this portrait a number of other significant complicating factors. After the initiation of a multiparty system led by İsmet İnönü in 1945, and beginning in earnest with the Democrat Party in 1946,[5] the military has intervened and punched the "reset" button on democratic, electorally-mandated governance three times, two of which involved ushering in new constitutions (in 1961 and 1982) and one (in 1971) that amounted to a reset with only amendments to the existing constitution.[6] In each case, after a relatively short amount of time and with the declared intention of "re-equilibrating" the democratic system as deemed appropriate by the military, there was a return to multiparty politics. In terms of the operating (electoral and party rules, etc.) and relational structure

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[3] Sabri Sayarı, "Towards a New Turkish Party System?" *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2007), p. 200; Ergun Özbudun, "From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: The Case of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey," *South European Society & Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 3/4 (2006), p. 555.

[4] Joseph Szyliowicz, "The Political Dynamics of Rural Turkey," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (1962), p. 431.

[5] The Democrat Party was not the first political party to usher in the multiparty period. The first was the National Development Party (*Milli Kalkınma* Partisi) founded by Nuri Demirağ in July of 1945. By "in earnest" I am saying that the Democrat Party was the first party with the organizational structure and support to be a serious threat to the Republican People's Party.

[6] It is also true that in 1997, the military along with elements from civil society pushed a government out of power and, ultimately, brought about the closure of the party; undoubtedly, this too affected the political system, but it was a much softer intervention into the system than the earlier three events were.

(issues/positions parties can/cannot take in relation to other parties) of the party system, the military has certainly been a confounding factor—the influence of which is the primary explanation of the nature of the 1983 general elections, for instance.

The military is not the only group, however, that has attempted to tinker with the electoral system; governing parties have, from time to time, also played a part in restructuring the electoral rules of the game. Such tinkering, in certain instances, could be chalked up to attempts to stabilize and consolidate Turkish democracy (primarily by the military), but it has also been a means for short term gain (usually the apparent intent of governing parties); in both cases, the manipulation of the electoral system has often had effects on the interaction of the party system, even if it was not the change in electoral law itself that generated the change. The environment associated with the electoral changes has often, perhaps paradoxically, been more predictive of electoral outcomes than the changes themselves.

While the picture is indeed complex, the well-known comment by Frederick Frey in his seminal work on Turkish politics elites—"Turkish politics is party politics"[7]—essentially remains as true today as when it was penned in 1965. One is hard-pressed to find an effective vehicle for the representation of the interests of the people in the realm of government in Turkey outside the domain of political parties and the party system. Therefore, in the midst of such complexity, because of its prominent place in the operation of Turkish politics

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[7] Frederick Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965), p. 301.

and democracy, the onus falls on students of the party system in the electoral arena[8] to try to understand and explicate it, ideally illuminating patterns in such a way that its general portrait is both simplified to increase understanding yet able to capture shifting dynamics in such a way as to anticipate and explain change. In order to accomplish this, several considerations seem particularly relevant: *distance*, *tools*, and *assumptions*. By *distance*, I am referring to one's metaphorical distance from the system—i.e. the position of distance from which one observes the action and interaction of the system. Varying distances have distinct advantages. In the context of political research, if your intention is comparative and nomothetic, to get a broad picture of trends and make generalizations applicable in a vast array of cases, greater distance is necessary. Maintaining such a distance, however, while convenient and parsimonious at the comparative level, would greatly limit what one is able to glean from a particular case. Conversely, a lack of distance that results in a plethora of detail could also have clear drawbacks that would inhibit "seeing the forest through the trees," so to speak. Arguably, even when one's focus is the description of a particular case, it seems prudent to position oneself in such a way as to be able to observe the particular dynamics at work in the system, and yet be far enough away to be able to detect patterns and trends occurring at the case level. Some distance allows the student of the system, rather than just providing unframed details or observed

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[8] Bardi and Mair, in suggesting the parameters of approach toward studying party systems, argue that party systems behave and are structured differently depending on their context, and thus, that studies of party systems could be beneficially limited to specific arenas, such as electoral, governmental, or parliamentary arenas. Though there is overlap between these, certainly, it would indeed help precision of analysis to specify a particular arena and focus one's attention accordingly. Thus, this study will analyze the party system as it has operated in the electoral arena from 1946-2009. See Luciano Bardi and Peter Mair, "The Parameters of Party Systems," *Party Politics*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2008), pp. 154, 156-7.

behaviors, to explain behavior and perhaps, to some extent, make predictions. If one is trying to understand one particular system as a whole, such a mid-range position seems to optimize the observation.

Likewise, the *tools*—the language, methods and application of existing theory—that one chooses to appropriate also become crucial in maximizing the observation. Nowhere is this more obvious than with the language of description. The descriptors one uses to delineate a system can greatly hamper understanding if such descriptors are intended for different purposes or contexts. Certain descriptors are the tools of particular distances that operate only very roughly from locations other than what was intended. Fitting the Turkish case in such conceptual frameworks can be of great benefit if the intent is to integrate Turkey into a broad study of other systems, but it is of little explanative value when examining the individual case. Methods may also be extremely reliable but fall short in terms of logic and validity when applied to a specific case, as they, like descriptors, are derived for certain distances, contexts, or purposes. Although quantification and statistics can be very useful, as Sartori has warned, an uncritical reliance on such methods could be "in fact driving us into a march of either false precision or of precise irrelevancy."[9] Methods utilized and the comparative theories exploited must be carefully chosen so that their intrinsic logic harmonizes with the study at hand.

Finally, the *assumptions* one lays as the cornerstone for study of a particular system is also of critical import. If one begins with an assumption of

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[9] Giovanni Sartori, "Where is Political Science Going?" *PS: Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2004), p. 786.

stability where, in fact, change is the norm, or vice versa, it will confound the intention to explicate. Furthermore, if one relies on a paradigm that assumes established and rigid structures that pre-dominantly determine the course of political events or on one that places decisive political elites as actors on a white background—i.e. which marginalizes the framework within which an actor is also acted upon and provided with opportunities and constraints—one's picture of the system will arguably miss very significant dynamics that are in operation and shape and are being shaped by the other existing dynamics. Additionally, when appropriating the well-known descriptors and classifications existing in the literature of comparative politics, it becomes too easy to set as a reference point the classifications of countries in the particular historical juncture from which those concepts have been derived. In other words, the classification or description, rather than operating as the framework through which the system is analyzed, becomes the sufficient analysis of the system itself through explicit or implicit evaluation of how the system in question measures up to the "standard" cases though the realization of these standards might not even exist in any system at this particular point in time.

Embedded within these various approaches to party systems that have gained wide usage in comparative politics, for example, are latent standards and assumptions that invariably color the interpretation of newer systems. For example, in an excellent study of the Brazilian party system by Mainwaring, the author establishes his study on a foundational inquiry into the status quo assumptions regarding party systems in relation to newer systems in so-called

"Third Wave" democracies.[10] His argument rests on the observation that newer party systems are operating differently from the established democracies from which party system theory is derived; therefore, we need to approach them differently.[11] While this is undoubtedly true, the existing standards set by the classifications of primarily European party systems at a particular juncture in time leads to conclusions that the systems or political elites are behaving contrary to "standards" rather than manifesting current historical realities. In other words, new democracies have deficiencies because of problematic cultural norms or poor decision-making by political actors, and it is for this reason that they are not meeting the standards of "good" party systems.[12] Again, though the issue of difference (or in many cases problematic operation) among newer democracies is not the question, the issue of the explanation of *why*, for example, levels of institutionalization and volatility are different needs to be addressed.

For example, the lack of mass parties in an organizational sense in newer democracies and the frequency of catch-all parties tend to be viewed as poor choices made by new democracies rather than a natural tendency of young nations entering electoral competition with universal suffrage and widespread media access.[13] With apparently the comparative literatures' embedded standards as a guide, Mainwaring suggests that "weak party roots in society and a high degree of

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[10] Scott Mainwaring, *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).
[11] Ibid., pp. 3-4.
[12] Ibid., p. 5.
[13] Katz and Mair have also noted that patterns established in comparative organizational literature have tended to place the "mass party" structure as the teleological end of a linear process, despite the fact that such an organizational form sprung from "dated" historical contingencies. Richard Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," *Party Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1995), p. 6.

personalism enhance the role of television in campaigns."[14] If one accounts for the historical context, however, it seems more likely to propose that the inevitable role of television in campaigns weakens party roots in society and enhances personalism. Considering that these trends have been increasingly observed in the "advanced industrial democracies,"[15] it seems problematic to consistently see these trends in newer democracies as evidences of problems stemming solely from local considerations or novice political actors. Such assumptions of particularism, when in fact global and structural forces are at work, could lead the study of "non-Western" systems in particular down a less fruitful path. We might likely see "self-interested politicians" or "clientelism" or "manipulations by state elites" as the causes of the problem in these newer democracies despite the fact that such phenomena has been observed (and often still is) in the established countries though the operation of the party system was less volatile and far more institutionalized.[16] Thus, our initial assumptions when approaching the individual case can make a critical difference in analytical outcomes.

In light of these concerns, it would be helpful to briefly outline how the system has often been approached in relation to these three points—distance, tools and assumptions.

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[14] Ibid., p. 38.

[15] For an extensive account of deinstitutionalization and volatility in established democracies, see Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds., *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

[16] While I do not want to take away from the importance of state or political elites and their behavior in affecting the quality of democracy, the phenomena of deinstitutionalization and volatility, for example, seem to be operating on forces independent of these actors and global in scope.

1.2 Previous Approaches to the Turkish Party System

In describing the Turkish party system in the electoral arena as it has operated through the period of Republican multiparty politics (1946-2011), a large body of work has appropriated one of two contradictory assumptions (and their related tools and distances), both of which are arguably problematic. One assumption emphasizes the historical continuity of the dynamics in the system; the other assumes incessant unframeable change. In assuming continuity—i.e. that the essential dynamics in operation determining the outcomes of elections in 1950 are just as evident and relevant today as they were then—certain tools of interpretation, general descriptors and great overarching and static national cleavages, are often utilized in correspondence with positions arguably more distant from the system. On the other hand, where continuous change is the assertion, tools such as descriptors, if used, are often quickly passed over to focus on the rich historical details and the interactions of political parties and political and state elites without any systematic framework.

One common approach residing under the assumption of system continuity, which will be discussed in greater depth in chapter three, utilizes the descriptive tools existing in comparative politics but at a great distance, allowing for a conclusion of continuous unaltered change. The widely used descriptors, "volatility, fragmentation and polarization" are often posited, with one great brush stroke, as the key elements of the Turkish party system. [17] While such

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[17] For a few examples, see Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Turkish Democracy: Patronage versus Governance," *Turkish Studies,* Vol. 2, No. 1 (2001), p. 55; Üstün Ergüder and Richard Hofferbert, "The 1983 General Elections in Turkey: Continuity or Change in Voting Patterns," in Metin

generalities may be true, they seem to be unhelpful and even misleading for a number of reasons. For example, while volatility has indeed been a regular feature of the system, leaving the explanation to the descriptor and the numbers would suggest much more irrational and unpredictable behavior by the electorate than is the case in the Turkish context. Furthermore, stopping with conclusions of high volatility also prioritizes an assumption that the system falls short of the standard of other systems in which volatility is indeed lower, ignoring the important historical contingencies that lie behind the observed phenomena and the possibility that levels of volatility could mean very different things depending on the case.[18] Other critical factors that effectively explain the volatility need to be brought into the discussion if one wants to understand and explain the system. Political culture and such observed phenomena as the attitude toward opposition, the desire for unity, and aversion toward particular interests along with organization structure of the parties themselves, for example, could have important effects on how parties are formed and how they interact with one another, which could also account for some of the trends in these descriptors, as will be seen in chapters two and three. In other words, although volatility could be a useful tool, when used at a great distance or as self-explanative analysis, its descriptive benefit is hamstrung.

At a distance, there is ambiguity inherently embedded in these existing comparative terms at the individual case level, which requires the scholar to

Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 80s* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), p. 85.

[18] For an article strongly supporting this concern, see Scott Mainwaring and Edurne Zoco, "Political Sequences and the Stabilization of Interparty Competition: Electoral Volatility in Old and New Democracies," *Party Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2007), pp. 155-78.

provide greater precision in specifying and locating the phenomenon when it is applied as a descriptor. Polarization, for example, can be understood in different ways and can be located at different points within the system. Are we simply talking about belligerent behavior among the political elites or ideological polarization, or both simultaneously? Are we talking about polarization generated from within the system itself or polarization occurring within the society outside the system? Knowing which form of polarization that we are referring to is essential. For example, in contrast to the familiar possibility of fragmentation from ideological polarization as pointed out by Sartori, a phenomenon which is typified well by the Italian case, polarization generated within the political party system, depending on the interaction and organization structure of the parties and the values of the electorate, could arguably reduce fragmentation and volatility. If voting is polarized, it could lead to a decrease in fragmentation and reduction of volatility as, in such a case, transferring one's vote to another ideologically similar but less competitive option becomes more costly as it gives advantage to the "other" party. Thus, due to polarization around a divisive issue, votes are channeled to a major party that can address the polarizing concern opposite the dominant party on the other side. This would make general descriptions of "volatility, polarization, and fragmentation" problematic as they may indeed have a dynamic, interactive relationship. Arguably such a dynamic interaction from polarization—i.e. increasing or reducing volatility and fragmentation—has been observed in Turkey, both in the 1970s and the 2000s. After spikes in both fragmentation and volatility while the electorate shifts in relation to a new

polarizing division (as in 1973 and 2002), the stabilizing line of conflict effectively lowers fragmentation and brings volatility numbers down to lower levels as the vote is channeled toward the two major parties competing at that line (1977 and 2007). Thus, one needs to move closer to the system; the tools to understand dynamics need to be unpacked and considered *in relation* to one another, in order to maximize the benefit they offer.

These comparative descriptors often stem from observations of certain contexts, and if used elsewhere, need to be logically re-conceptualized for the specific case. While many of the descriptors derived from Sartori's classic work could be useful in the Turkish case, they were not conceived with Turkey in mind;[19] thus, in some cases, descriptors that work well for certain countries, when applied to Turkey, either hide essential dynamics or mislead. When Sartori developed his parsimonious classification of various party systems, the democratic cases that functioned as the foundational testing ground for such application were Italy and established democracies in the West. As discussed in chapter three, these systems emerged in a very particular historical juncture that greatly contributed to the eventual "freezing" that Lipset and Rokkan have so famously observed.[20] The democracies that have emerged simultaneously with universal suffrage and very different technological opportunities for the prospective competing party have exhibited less "freezing" of the party system,

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[19] Sartori does indeed refer to Turkey in his definitive work in the section where he is discussing the transition from single-party to multi-party regimes; however, my point is that his derivation and utilization of the descriptors seems to have largely had Western European systems, and particularly Italy, in mind.

[20] Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignment: An Introduction," in Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds, *Party Systems and Voter Alignment: Cross-National Perspectives* (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 50-1.

for obvious reasons.[21] The net result, though, is that such classifications, which could offer meaningful description to these frozen systems, provide little help for democracies like Turkey, emerging under more modern conditions, whose classification could potentially need revision from election to election. The description given ultimately provides the weakest of benefit, both for including Turkey in a meaningful comparison of other similarly labeled countries, and in understanding the particular system in Turkey, potentially leading to two important misinterpretations: one, that the system has consistently demonstrated the features of such a descriptor over time, or two, for the reader familiar with previous accounts, that the Turkish system is inherently unstable and changing in such a way that no meaningful framing of its dynamics is possible.

Another typical approach to establish continuity in the party system in Turkey is to sweep all the complexity under the rug of one massive, national cleavage, purported to explain the system's electoral competition since multiparty politics began in Turkey in 1945. While many scholars find the center-periphery cleavage explanative,[22] others argue a Left-Right cleavage,[23] secularist-Islamist cleavage,[24] or a traditionalist-modernist cleavage.[25] Even the most oft used center-periphery cleavage is often interpreted in different ways, sometimes, in

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[21] Of course, the "freezing" hypothesis of Lipset and Rokkan has been consistently challenged by scholars based on more recent trends since the 1970s though some have also maintained its usefulness. See Peter Mair, *Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 57-66.

[22] For one example, see Ali Çarkoğlu and Gamze Avcı, "An Analysis of the Electorate from a Geographical Perspective," in Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer (eds.), *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 2002), p. 132.

[23] See Yılmaz Esmer, "At the Ballot Box," in Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer (eds.), *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 2002), p. 110.

[24] Zeyno Baran, "Turkey Divided," *Journal of Democracy,* Vol. 19, No. 1 (2008), pp. 55-69.

[25] İlter Turan, "Unstable Stability: Turkish Politics at the Crossroads?" *International Affairs,* Vol. 83, No. 2 (2007), p. 322.

substance, suggesting a secularist-Islamist interpretation of the cleavage.[26] This ambiguity is problematic. The fact that scholars posit a single persistent cleavage without being able to agree upon its essential nature is itself a clear demonstration of the problem.   None of the cleavages expressed above can effectively encompass changes that have occurred in the system. Thus, attempting to stretch one socio-political division across more than 60 years of Turkish political space leads to an inevitable lack of consensus on interpretation.

The problem with positing a single cleavage is that, in a multi-dimensional cleavage polity, it is so easily done. If one wants to find evidence for conflict over religion, it can be found from the earliest days of the Republic, or even be taken back into the Ottoman Empire. If one proposes a traditional left-right economic divide, substantiation from the first years of multi-party politics can also be quite easily appropriated for use. The same could be said for other cultural or ethnic cleavages. Regardless of what one chooses to emphasize, there is historical material ready to be employed as anecdotal evidence to support a division in society. One cannot object to the fact that these divisions have existed in Turkish society; the critical question, however, is to what extent these particular divisions sufficiently explain how the party system has operated over time and how the parties within that system have primarily taken up space in relation to the other parties with which they have competed electorally. No one cleavage offers such explanatory power for the operation of the system (or systems) since 1950. This will be clarified further in chapters four and five.

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[26] Ali Çarkoğlu, "A New Electoral Victory for the 'Pro-Islamists' or the 'New Centre-Right'? The Justice and Development Party Phenomenon in the July 2007 Parliamentary Elections in Turkey," *South European Society and Politics,* Vol. 12, No. 4 (2007), p. 501.

Other approaches that have examined Turkish politics and the party system have taken a predominately historical perspective that enumerates all the detailed interactions and changes that have occurred in the Turkish polity through time. Rich narrative of the actions of political parties and political and state elites are provided without much of an explicit framework. These are offered as "histories" of politics in Turkey and a number of notable works fit this category.[27] While they provide the reader with an abundance of information regarding political leaders and parties throughout Turkish history, there is little framework given to contain the dynamics that are described in detail and how these dynamics have emerged, disappeared, and/or shifted to accommodate new conditions and dynamics that enter the system. To grasp the dynamics of the party system (or systems), one needs a bit more distance so that not only the dynamics between political actors—i.e. the party and elites—can be seen, but also the dynamics of the political space in which they are interacting.

Besides these studies on Turkish politics, which address the party system, and approach it with foundational assumptions of change or continuity, from great distances or close up, there is a great deal of beneficial work on the party system from one cross-section of time. While some maintain a linear cleavage[28] or simply provide a great deal of detail about the state of politics at that moment,[29]

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[27] Several good examples include Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics,* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1959); and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Dynamics: Bridge Across Troubled Lands* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
[28] A particularly problematic example of this type from recent years would be Baran, "Turkey Divided," pp. 55-69; for a stronger example of such an approach, see Ziya Öniş, "Conservative Globalism at the Crossroads: The Justice and Development Party and the Thorny Path to Democratic Consolidation in Turkey," *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2009), pp. 21-40.
[29] For example, İlter Turan, "Political Parties and the Party System in Post-1983 Turkey," in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s* (Berlin:

other studies have applied quantitative or spatial methods to specific periods of time with fruitful results. Electoral data and other statistics have been used to detect emergences of new voting alignments,[30] helping to indicate the ruptures of past patterns, leading to new spatial positioning taken up by both old and new parties across altered lines of demarcation. Other works on the party system have attempted to capture a rendering of the spatial positioning of parties within the party system at a given time through the method of spatial analysis.[31] While these works have provided synchronic snapshots of the party system that have been particularly helpful in understanding the interactions of elites and parties within the system at a particular time, it is also beneficial to see how these individual synchronic pictures of the relationships within the system have changed and adjusted through time—i.e. diachronically. One particular problem with only having access to even excellent studies of the party system within one time period is an assumption of the continuity of the relationships of one period could be interpolated into the past—i.e. stability in party positioning can be too often the conclusion that is drawn.

For example, an outside observer that is aware that the CHP has existed in

Walter de Gruyter, 1988), or Michael Hyland, "Crisis at the Polls: Turkey's 1969 Elections, *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1970).

[30] Several good examples of these are, Ergun Özbudun and Frank Tachau, "Social Change and Electoral Behavior in Turkey: Toward a 'Critical Realignment'?" *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1975); Ergüder and Hofferbert, "The 1983 General Elections in Turkey"; and Sayarı, "Towards a New Turkish Party System?"

[31] For two recent studies spatially representing political cleavages see, Ali Çarkoğlu and Melvin Hinich, "A Spatial Analysis of Turkish Party Preferences," *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 25 (2006), pp. 369-92; and Anna J. Secor, "Ideologies in Crisis: Political Cleavages and Electoral Politics in Turkey in the 1990s," *Political Geography*, Vol. 20 (2001), pp. 539-60. For studies employing electoral geography to effective ends, see Ali Çarkoğlu, "The Geography of the April 1999 Turkish Elections," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2000), pp. 149-71; and W. Jefferson West II, "Regional Cleavages in Turkish Politics: An Electoral Geography of the 1999 and 2002 National Elections," *Political Geography*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (2005), pp. 499-523.

some form throughout most of the multi-party system years might assume that it has largely occupied a similar position in the party system space. Although it has not abandoned certain positions, other positions, such as its expressed attitude toward the market, toward labor, toward the EU, toward pluralism and its approach toward nationalism have clearly shifted in response to available space existing in the political sphere, and various segments of the electorate, therefore, have approached it in different ways at different times. Furthermore, if an author argues that these cross-sectional pictures of the system demonstrate the continuity of a certain pattern or cleavage,[32] without access to a historical portrait of the system, there is little at hand to refute such a claim.

As a rare diachronic work that provides electoral geographical modeling, Güvenç and Kirmanoğlu have recently provided a geographical portrait of electoral behavior and party fortunes at the ballot box spanning from 1950 to 2009.[33] While this provides much that is of benefit to the student of Turkish electoral politics, it is limited in a number of areas that this study hopes to address. First, while the authors' intent is to provide a statistical rendering that largely speaks for itself, while it illustrates patterns of change in the electoral environment, it does not attempt to explain the "continuities and changes" evident in general elections. Furthermore, while it effectively manifests the geographical and regional elements in voting behavior, due to the reliance on Bertin Graphics, clustering voting patterns where a particular party registered a high concentration

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[32] Çarkoğlu and Hinich, "A Spatial Analysis of Turkish Party Preferences," (2006), p. 370.

[33] Murat Güvenç and Hasan Kirmanoğlu, *Türkiye Seçim Atlası 1950-2009 / Electoral Atlas of Turkey 1950-2009: Continues and Changes in Turkey's Politics* (Istanbul: Bilge University Press, 2009).

of votes, the geographical mappings of electoral fortunes ultimately placed minor parties at the forefront of the renderings. As the history of Turkish electoral politics is filled with small parties that, for whatever reason, could only manifest regional or provincial followings, the drastic nature of their vote distribution, precisely because they received so few, causes the minor parties to dominate the color-coded clusterings. The major parties that largely dictated the nature of electoral competition and voter orientations toward politics and elections are clearly represented in a position of secondary importance due to the methodology. The greater the likelihood that a party has captured the hearts and minds of the nation in an election so also is the corresponding likelihood that such a party is almost invisible in the geographical renderings as their votes are not concentrated but diffuse throughout the country. Thus, the illustrations of Turkey's general elections and the local elections of 2009 provided by Güvenç and Kirmanoğlu are a better tools to study the electoral fortunes of minor parties rather than those that more clearly manifest the contingent nature of the party system in those elections.

It must be acknowledged at this point, that there have been a number of seminal studies that have looked at the Turkish party system across time and have provided important insights into the continuities and change within the system with a high level of nuanced interpretation. In doing so they have complicated and challenged the previous simplistic descriptions of the system.[34] This study

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[34] Sabri Sayarı, "The Changing Party System," in Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer, eds., *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 2002); Frank Tachau, "An Overview of Electoral Behavior: Toward Protest or Consolidation of Democracy?" in Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer, eds., *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 2002); Sayarı, "The Turkish Party System in Transition," (1978); and Ergun Özbudun, "Changes and Continuities in the Turkish Party System," *Representation*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2006), pp. 129-37.

intends to continue the path blazed by these students of Turkish politics with an aim to expand further on their significant contributions. Though previous works have provided a great number of foundational premises underlying this particular study, those accounts of the whole system (or systems) over time were largely limited to the space of an article or chapter. Thus, this work endeavors to simultaneously summon the major factors and dynamics acting on the system (synchronically) and explore their interaction (diachronically) through the history of the multiparty system of the Turkish Republic competing in general (i.e. parliamentary) elections from 1950-2007.

1.3 An Outline of the Argument in this Study

The focus of this study will be primarily an analysis of the Turkish party system as a relational and competitive mechanism in the electoral arena. This distinguishes it from other works on the Turkish party system in two critical ways. First, though a great deal could be gleaned from a study of the operation of the party system over time in relation to the governmental or legislative arenas, this study limits itself to the analysis of the party system in electoral combat. While it is true that the party system in these various arenas—i.e. electoral, governmental, legislative—would have a number of overlapping patterns and themes, there are also important differences in behavior in the differing contexts.[35] Obviously, the space required to adequately do justice to a total history of the party systems in all of these spheres would demand multiple volumes; hence, focusing on the electoral arena in this instance seems a prudent limitation.

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[35] Bardi and Mair, "The Parameters of Party Systems," pp. 159-60.

Secondly, as the intention is an analysis of the party system, relationally and competitively, it necessarily prioritizes the pattern or system of behaviors engaged in by parties more so than a detailed profile or biography of all existing parties operating in the system at various times; thus, while many studies intend careful descriptions of parties in particular periods of time, this work sets the *behavior* and *interactions* of parties in electoral competition as its focus of analysis. Thus, while many parties will inevitably be discussed, the emphasis will be directed toward their relevant patterned behavior in the campaigns for general elections.   In the chapters addressing the various periods of party system competition, though tables providing a snapshot of the parties, leaders, and outcomes of the period will be given to assist the reader, the framework of the chapters will necessarily avoid a simple biography of the parties of the period.

The argument of this study is that, contrary to popular assertions of the Turkish party system as the persistent manifestation of an essential socio-cultural cleavage or as inexplicable or unpatterned, the historic operation of the Turkish party system in the national electoral arena has demonstrated both dynamic change and significant sets of patterns that illuminate the outcomes of electoral contest in different periods. These can be traced through careful observation of the *dimensions of competition* and *domains of identification* operating in a contingent set of circumstances, the pattern of which I refer to as the political paradigm. One can best understand the behavior of the system, its parties and the electorate in elections by observing these paradigmatic patterns and the points at which they shift. Dynamic change, thus, is intended to reflect the *relational* and

interactive nature of the party systems and the interdependent forces—institutions, actors, structures—that combine and interact to bring about significant shifts in the political paradigm—i.e. the contingent "system of interactions," a key component of the standard definitions of party *systems*.[36]

In order to operationalize this usage of "paradigm" for party systems in the electoral arena, these political paradigms are described as the summative interaction of historically contingent "domains of identification" and "dimensions of competition" referred to by Sani and Sartori and later by Mair,[37] which, to use Mair's words, help distinguish "what parties are" from "what parties do,"[38] respectively. In this study, the usage of *dimensions of competition*—i.e. what parties do—will indicate the actively employed strategies of parties to mobilize or persuade voters to cast their votes in the party's direction. Within this classification, campaign discourse takes a prominent role. How parties select and frame a constellation of issues in a certain election or series of elections and the images of themselves and other parties that they create to establish the lines or positional space in a competitive arena will be given careful attention. Non-discursive strategies for collecting votes, such as various forms of patron-client relations, the selection of certain types of candidates for representation and the utilization of local governance records, for example, will also be examined for their role in shaping electoral outcomes. These discursive and non-discursive strategies must be seen as the "front plan" in terms of engaging the electorate and

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[36] Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems* (Colchester, UK: ECPR Press, 2005), p. 39.
[37] Giacomo Sani and Giovanni Sartori, "Polarization, Fragmentation and Competition in Western Democracies," in Hans Daalder and Peter Mair, eds., *Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change* (London: Sage Publications, 1983), p. 330; Mair, *Party System Change*, p. 23.
[38] Mair, *Party System Change*, p. 20.

collecting votes in electoral contest; in other words, these strategies are explicitly used as such and not incidental features of the contingent competitive space.

Domains of identification—i.e. what parties are—on the other hand, will be utilized to describe the various secondary identities that exist within the electorate that, in some way, guide the ultimate outcome of voting. For example, in the European context, the "Christian" identity of a Christian Democrat party will undoubtedly direct certain segments of the electoral population to vote for the party despite the fact that this identity was never explicitly appealed to by the party during the election campaign. In this case, "Christian identity" acts as a secondary means of shaping electoral outcomes and is, therefore, a domain of identification. If, however, a party explicitly utilizes an image in order to appeal to voters, it must be understood as one of the existing dimensions of competition. In the Turkish context, for example, the "Alevi" identity has rarely, if ever, been used as the primary means to appeal to voters; nonetheless, parties, particularly those on the "left", have benefited from having an "Alevi-supportive" identity in accumulating votes from this population. Thus, the critical distinction in this study between a "domain of identification" and a discursive imaging strategy considered a "dimension of competition" is that, in the latter, it is actively used as a campaign tactic—hence, a strategy—whereas the former remains on the level of a passive factor.

By examining the combined relevant patterns of the dimensions of competition and the domains of identification, this study also intends to straddle the three major emphases in the comparative literature on parties and party

systems in elections—spatial modeling, alignment, and organizational studies. In the Turkish case, as with most electoral cases, how parties position themselves in relation to others and "chase votes" in elections occupy a significant place in

Figure 1.1 – Interactional Elements of a Political Paradigm

Figure 1.1 illustrates the complex interactions that constitute political paradigms in the Turkish case. "P_n" represents the individual party, while "P_N" is the sum of the interactions between the other competing parties, and where "E" represents the electorate.

explaining party and voter behavior and relates frequently to the dimensions of competition.[39] Additionally, existing social and political cleavages to which various segments of the electorate are aligned, even if not appealed to as an explicit strategy, persistently function as domains of identification in elections. Organizational structures of parties along with their institutional and "cultural" determinants also clearly shape the nature of electoral contest and have set boundaries on the opportunities and constraints available, or likely trajectories, in the arena of competition for votes.

    With these considerations in mind, this study argues that, since the late

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[39] For an excellent study that summarizes these research foci in the study of parties and party systems in elections, see Robert Rohrschneider, "Mobilizing versus chasing: how do parties target voters in election campaigns?" *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (2002), pp. 367-82.

1940s, one can observe at least four distinct political paradigms operating in the Turkish party system, in which the patterns of the dimensions of competition and domains of identification shifted with accompanying variations in response by the electorate. Thus, in a particular historical context with its particular constellation of socioeconomic, cultural and institutional forces, how parties compete with one another and appeal to the electorate, and how in turn voters responds to them undergo dynamic change (see Figure 1.1). If paradigm shifts with their composite dimensions of competition and domains of identification have occurred, the utilization of cultural cleavages as the primary explanation of voter alignment and the party system becomes increasingly problematic. Thus, as will be argued in chapter four, it seems more fruitful to put aside attempts to explain the system through an essential cleavage and look carefully at how and why the parties and electorate are interacting through these different dimensions and domains as they shift from period to period, the intent of this particular study.

Parties do not exist in a vacuum; neither do the choices made by the electorate in favor of one party or another. The usage of the term "system"—as in party system—itself leads us to the conclusion that these elements must be understood in their operation and relation to all the other elements. One cannot approach the Republican People's Party (CHP) as a stable element, for example; it must be understood within the changing paradigms by which it is being shaped but also shaping. When all the important elements affecting the dynamics of the system in the context of electoral competition are taken into account, more explanative patterns emerge that not only more precisely capture the workings of

Figure 1.2 – Percentage of vote by top two parties in Turkish national elections

Note: Due to military intervention in 1960 and the subsequent ambiguity regarding the legacy of the defunct DP, it is widely accepted that the AP and the YTP competed for the votes of this party. With this in mind, the number given for 1961, includes a combined share of these two parties.

the system over time, but also provide clues as to how, why, and/or if new paradigm shifts are occurring or will occur in the future.

An examination of trends in the party system over time reveals a number of interesting patterns. For example, if one observes the very rough aggregate measure of the percentage gains by the top two parties in parliament, two significant patterns are seen to be operating (see Figure 1.2). In the period from 1950 to 1969 and from 1983-1995, a strong formation is followed by steady and persistent fragmentation of the vote, which suggests an initial clear party alignment

 That, for whatever reason, began to weaken and fragment. The periods from 1965-1977 and from 1991-2007 show a trend of initial increasing fragmentation during a period of realignment and then a reversal of fortunes with increasing

shares going to the top two parties, suggesting that either the integrity of the previous system was rejuvenated or that the parties and electorate were consolidating around a new paradigm. As the trend is of fragmentation is reversed, one can also observe a tendency for increased voter turnout.[40]

It follows that an understanding the party system *as a system* helps us to determine the particular paradigm structuring the system in each period and how the parties and the dynamic elements of the system interact within the context of that paradigm, whatever it is, and then carefully trace how one paradigm shaping the system gave way to another, as appears to be the case in the periods beginning with 1965 and 1991. In every case there appears to be a trigger that drastically (as in 1950 and 1983) or gradually (1965 and 1991) leads to a shifting of paradigms.

Election data, campaign discourse of the period, and studies on Turkish politics have given us a number of clues as to what these varying paradigms might be. In the first paradigmatic period, with the leaders of the two largest parties in a high-stakes plurality electoral system coming from the same set of elites and operating within the same basic outlook with only a few policy differences between them, the paradigm shaping both party and voter behavior seems to be based on local cultural cleavages and how the parties approached these local communities. Voting behavior and competition for votes often took place within a framework of the social structure at town or village level. At the same time, the two major parties had tendencies to establish patron-client relationships in order to mobilize the local vote, but they did so in different ways. Even in this initial

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[40] For excellent accounts of these observations from the 1970s, see Sabri Sayarı, "The Turkish Party System in Transition," *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1978), p. 42, and Özbudun and Tachau, "Social Change and Electoral Behavior," p. 462.

period, however, when pre-existing cultural factors seem to play a greater role, one cannot empirically assert a *national* center-periphery cleavage in terms of electoral or party behavior.

From the data gathered from quantitative studies in the 1970s, we could perhaps argue that the explanative power of an urban-rural cultural cleavage in voting and party behavior was most clear in the more developed—i.e. centralized—Western provinces where the center was more densely present and toward which the more developed rural farmers and village dwellers could potentially respond.[41] However, even with this possible explanation, there is much in the literature to suggest that the rural voters in these areas were responding less to cultural oppositions and more in regard to the machine politics and promises made by the Democrat Party to these communities. In the less developed regions of the country, where the periphery resided in greater numbers, the center-periphery cleavage as indicative of voting behavior and party structuring appears to have been even less salient, and the party lines were drawn by factors relevant to the local culture.[42] This does not mean that functional approaches to voting were not relevant, but the predominant manner in which

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[41] By this, I do not mean to imply that Mardin's conception of the center-periphery cleavage was geographical on an east-west divide as some have claimed, see Çarkoğlu and Hinich, "A Spatial Analysis of Turkish Party Preferences," (2006), p. 385. The concepts "center" and "periphery" should be understood as cultural designations, of which Mardin argued that the "substance" of the center were largely bureaucrats, the military, and the intellectual elites. Obviously, in any given location, one could see themselves or be seen as a member of the center or the periphery. At the same time, especially in the 50s and 60s, those associated with the center were largely located in the major cities of the west. My point here is that, rather than the center-periphery cleavage being explanative of nationwide voting patterns, it seems that such a cleavage is explanative only in areas where those considered in the center were most accumulated. As numerous scholars such as Özbudun and Tachau point out, in the less developed areas, voting was often determined by one's association to particular local notables, and thus, operated on a completely different and locally specific cultural cleavage.
[42] Ergun Özbudun, *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey* (Princeton: Princeton Univ, 1976).

functional concerns translated into political behavior was through relevant *local* socio-cultural realities. Just as urban dwellers in Western cities were mobilized and directed to vote for mass parties representing their identities, villagers in remote areas of Turkey were mobilized by local leaders who ostensibly had the interests of the local community in mind. The dynamics of this paradigmatic period will be analyzed in greater detail in chapter six.

In the mid-1960s, students of Turkish politics observed a shift toward a new paradigm in which ideological, and to some extent, functional, concerns played a greater role. As the country industrialized and large numbers of the rural population began migrating to the cities, new spaces opened up for potential gains for innovative political parties. With the maintenance of the status quo likely resulting in continued opposition party status for the CHP, and from the courage engendered by an arguably "left-of-center" constitution[43] crafted in 1961, and the entrance of the leftist Worker's Party into the system, the party headed by İnönü triggered a paradigm shift in announcing a "left-of-center" stance shortly before the 1965 election. Though one might argue the extent to which this maneuver was ideological, it was at least undergirded with connotations of socioeconomic priorities commonly associated with the "left" in the Western European sense, including the land reform, protection of labor, economic planning and other such concerns. In any case, this explicitly referencing by a party of "left-right" image positioning brought such ideological imaging and reimaging of other parties into

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[43] İnönü used the expression that the 1961 Constitution was "left of center" to bolster support and understanding for the parties new position; see *Cumhuriyet*, Oct. 8, 1965. This perspective could be argued from the inclusion of land reform and economic planning into the document itself. The overall provisions in the 1961 Constitution, however, lend it to being more often referred to as a "liberal" constitution.

the discursive tactics of the period. This shift at first seemed to be a costly gambit for the CHP as the party lost votes in both 1965 and 1969[44] along with a faction abandoning the party and forming the Republican Reliance Party in 1967, but by 1969, scholars noticed a turn of fortunes for the CHP among the urban voters, especially the lower working class. As the tide turned, the AP increasingly shaped its rhetoric in relation to the changing CHP, and the party system took on a leftist ("communist")-anti-leftist stance until it was brought to a halt by the coup in 1980 as will be discussed in greater detail in chapter seven.

A restructuring of the electoral system by the military following its intervention in 1980 in order to suppress extreme ideologies, the memory of the violence and repercussions brought on by the ideological imaging paradigm of the 1970s, and the military's refusal of all but three new political parties to enter the initial electoral contest led to the establishment of a new, but briefly realized, paradigm with the elections in 1983. Stripped of strong ideological underpinnings along with an aversion toward emphasizing cultural cleavages, the new paradigm was indeed functional,[45] focusing on the parties' provision of goods and services (*hizmet*) and the development of the country. Distancing himself from the cleavages existing in the system in the 1970s, Turgut Özal, the leader of the victorious Motherland Party (ANAP), claimed to represent the interests of all the previously divided elements of the country—i.e. economically-liberal conservatives, Islamists, nationalists, and social-democrats—and his party, indeed,

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[44] Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977), pp. 251-3.

[45] Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Northgate, UK: Eothen, 1985), p. 1. For a similar analysis, see Ergüder and Hofferbert, "The 1983 General Elections in Turkey," p. 83.

brought together at least some elements from all of these groups. The combined environment fostered by the military and facilitated by Özal and ANAP pushed politics in a very centrist direction that led political elites to hold an aversion to being classified in "left-right" terminology.

The return of the old guard in 1987, Özal's movement into the presidency, and perhaps feelings that the party had not completely delivered on its promises, especially at the newly important level of local governance, led to the fragmentation of the coalition of the ANAP supporters. Nonetheless, the operation of the system and its cleavages embodied a truly "national" competition, with the fortunes of the parties (especially when grouped as "families of parties") largely uniform from province to province and region to region. At the same time, rivalries among political elites and fragmentation, bringing ineffective coalition governments, made it even more difficult for parties to deliver on their promises to the electorate, often couched in the discourse of service (*hizmet*) to the people. The centrist *hizmet* paradigm became a double-edged sword for the mainstream centrist parties. Though the discourse was effective in wooing voters, it also became the impetus for severe punishment by the electorate in future elections as parties were often perceived as failing to deliver on their promises, especially at the local and municipal government level. Furthermore, the rapidly-developing media and socially-based changes opened the door to new opportunities for party innovation. These considerations will be the focus of chapter eight.

It was in the midst of such a context that the Welfare Party (RP) triggered another paradigm shift. Though an Islamist party, the RP realized its strength

would come from effectively delivering goods and services (*hizmet*) and presenting themselves as a modern and moderate party to the electorate, starting with the 1991 general election.[46] This party's recognition of the potential benefits of privatizing media enabled them to engage their prospective voters directly through the medium of television in new ways, allowing the party to "get their foot in the door." Their success at local governance and particularly their subsequent victories in 1994 and 1995 brought the issue dimension of religion into the party system, altering discourse and the lines and strategies of competition.

At the same time, a strategic gambit by the center-left party (SHP) arguably opened the door for ethnic politics that drastically reshaped electoral competition in several regions of the country. The leaders of this major center-left party agreed to take under its wing an organized group of leftist Kurdish politicians, many of whom had formerly been members of the party, who were competing for votes in provinces of the southeast. Although it lead to mixed election results for the party—gains in the East, loss in the West—it generated frustration from their Western-based centers of support, especially when these politicians broke off and formed their own party once in parliament. Though historically the parties associated with the CHP had reasonable competitive success in the southeast prior to this election, the fallout from this maneuver ultimately relegated the "center-left" parties to the Western and coastal regions, and lead arguably to different lines of electoral party system contestation—i.e.

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[46] For a study of the Welfare Party's effective use of the media for advertising such an appearance, see Ayşe Öncü, "Packaging Islam: Cultural Politics on the Landscape of Turkish Commercial Television," *Public Culture,* Vol. 8 (1995), pp. 51-71.

regional party systems—in different areas of the country.[47]

Though the Welfare Party was eventually obliged to leave office by the military and certain civic groups and, ultimately, shut down by the Constitutional Court, it triggered a so-called "secularist versus religious-conservative" polarization in the system that has become the focus of many studies, especially since the AKP came to power in 2002.[48] It is important to note, however, that the AKP differs in important ways from the RP, despite provoking a similar reaction from many secularists.[49] While it could be argued that the RP emphasized providing goods and services (*hizmet*) as a means for an end which was, in some way, religiously grounded, the AKP seems to be simply devout people delivering goods and services (*hizmet*)—i.e. the act of good governance seems more clearly their expressed end (whether they have or are achieving this is another matter).

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[47] For an excellent theoretical explanation of how this might take shape, see Bardi and Mair, "The Parameters of Party Systems," pp. 154-7.

[48] For notable works focused on the Welfare Party period, see Esra Özyürek, *Nastalgia for the Modern* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006); Yael Navaro-Yashin, *Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); and Jenny White, *Islamic Mobilization in Turkey* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002). For notable works related to the AKP period, see Hakan Yavuz, ed., *The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti* (Salt Late City: University of Utah, 2006); Ümit Cizre, ed., *Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party* (London: Routledge, 2007); Hakan Yavus, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey* (London: Routledge, 2010). For notable works examining Islamists as actors, see Berna Turam, *Between Islam and the State: The Politics of Engagement* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); Cihan Tuğal, *Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); and Yıldız Atasoy, *Islam's Marriage with Neo-Liberalism: State Transformation in Turkey* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

[49] While the term secularist is commonly used in the literature, its usage could be considered a bit misleading. If it is understood as "supporters of a secular regime" on one side versus "supporters of a religious regime" on the other, the political contest is arguably poorly represented. The lines of contention are not primarily secularism versus theocracy but rather a division between existing definitions of secularism. The expression "secularist" as commonly used in the Turkish case actually best represents the more precise term "Turkish positivists," who believe that everyone in society should employ a positivist outlook to life, particularly in the public sphere. For helpful works in framing these debated secularisms see, Ahmet Kuru, *Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France and Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009; and E. Fuat Keyman, "Modernity, Secularism and Islam: The Case of Turkey," *Theory, Culture & Society*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (2007), pp. 215-34.

Furthermore, while much has been made of the secularist-Islamist (religious-conservative) cleavage of recent years, this cleavage is arguably most clearly culturally-formed for one side of the divide. In other words, the CHP under Deniz Baykal established itself during this paradigm that stretched to the national election of 2007 (and the 2009 local elections after that) as the defender of secularism and as the stop-gap against religious fundamentalists. This being true, it is not surprising to find that supporters of the AKP (and the MHP) are significantly more devout than supporters of the CHP. But the question is why? Which party is more strongly utilizing the language of religion to establish their place in the current party system relationship—i.e. as a *dimension of competition* rather than just a *domain of identification*? The voter profile for the AKP seems to be gaining from the same sort of coalition that brought the Motherland Party to power in 1983, and its voters, though more religious, have also been shown to be strongly connected to the party according to economic concerns.[50] These issues will be the focus of chapter nine.

In developing this argument, the focus will be placed on changing paradigms in the electoral party system, the indications of which can be seen through changes in discourse, strategies, and voting behavior. These patterns of competition occur in contingent institutional, cultural, and socioeconomic contexts, which in turn can both shape—i.e. alter the number of relevant parties and the primary lines of contestation—and be shaped by the party system and the

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[50] Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Attitudinal Orientation to Party Organization in Turkey in the 2000s," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2008), pp. 308-9. Even among Islamists, as Cihan Tugal and Yildiz Atasoy have pointed out, the support for the AKP has coincided with a more materialistic, neoliberal outlook. See Cihan Tuğal, *Passive Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Yıldız Atasoy, *Islam's Marriage with Neoliberalism* (London: Routledge, 2009).

nature of party interaction and spatial positioning. Though attention will be paid toward electoral behavior and shifts in voting patterns within the various paradigms, an allusion to classical electoral realignment theory is not intended. The mystical and inevitable pattern of realignment posed in earlier studies of the party system of the United States is not envisaged in this investigation of the dynamics of the Turkish party system.[51] Nor will there be particular emphasis on what V. O. Key classically described as "critical elections" as a determinant of realignment.[52] Although a number of elections in Turkish history could be termed "critical"—such as the 1950 election as the first free and fair election, the election in 1983, in which all the parties competing were new, and, in part, the 1991 election—the shifting of paradigms was just as likely to occur suddenly as it was over a period of elections—a primary example would be the succession of elections from 1965 to 1973. Furthermore, *why* the election was critical differs in each case along with the forces that led to the electoral outcome. Thus, this study will not limit itself by searching for critical elections; in most cases, a number of elections were significant or necessary for the final shape of the system.

Furthermore, this study will not limit itself to relying on simply an agency or structural paradigm, nor a cultural or institutional one. Instead, benefit will be sought from the tension that acknowledges that each of these ontological paradigms brings valuable actors/forces into the dynamics of the party system.

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[51] For an excellent critique of the classical American realignment perspective, see David Meyhew, "Electoral Realignments," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 3 (2000), pp. 449-74.
[52] V. O. Key, "A Theory of Critical Elections," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1955), pp. 3-18. Key, of course, acknowledged in a later work the possibility of "secular realignment"—i.e. realignment that occurs over a number of elections. See, V. O. Key, "Secular Realignment and the Party System," *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 21, No. (1959), pp. 198-210.

That the system functions within a context (economic, institutional, cultural), which structures the possible opportunities and constraints on parties and elites, seems to be an essential starting point. The parties and elites, however, are not merely puppets in the system; actors influenced by socioeconomic and cultural realities also have options and choices to meet those realities, their actions shape future opportunities and constraints, and they effectively frame the context in which the other elites and parties interact. The interactional, relational nature of the politics within the system requires us to look at the interaction between the individual actors, which includes parties, elites, and indeed the voters also, with one another and also the interaction of the actors with the constructed structure.

Institutions, such as the electoral system within which the party system must operate, also both determine and are determined by the social and cultural structures and the state and political elites. That social and political culture also acts within this system must also be considered and observed. Taken all together, these varying tensions help us arrive at a more three-dimensional approach to any given system, and whether or not we like the ambiguity of all of these elements in endogenous interaction with one another, it seems best to acknowledge that this tension brings us closer to a more accurate picture than one attempting a more 'purist' theoretical paradigm, messy though it may be.

1.4 Methodology

The systematic approach to studying paradigms and dynamic change in this study will involve an interactive analysis of electoral data for national—i.e. general—elections, particularly at the provincial level, along with careful

observation of the patterns of campaign strategies and discourse. Where electoral shifts in voting behavior have occurred, a search will be made to determine and explain the strategies that most logically explain these changes. Thus, priority will be placed on campaign strategies that appear to have impacted how votes were distributed across parties by various segments and regions of the population. Changes in volatility, fragmentation and party fortunes at the provincial levels will be analyzed in order to locate shifting patterns. Secondary research on elections and the party system will also be considered to help confirm or disconfirm patterns detected in the data.

Discourse analysis of the campaign speeches by national leaders and party campaign manifests during general elections will be made to determine shifts in discursive patterns in electoral contest. While a more extensive scope of analysis, such as including the speechmaking of local representatives of the party or the speeches of national leaders in between campaigning, would seem ideal, as this study intends to address patterns in national elections spanning 57 years, reasonable limits had to be established. While the author acknowledges the limitation could result in potential blind spots, it can also be argued that these would be relatively minimal. Though important issues are certainly addressed by party leaders outside of campaigns, campaign speeches most clearly represent the foci the party wants to set before the electorate. Voters universally tend to have short memories and speeches that would harm or benefit politicians, if seen as critical, are reiterated by the party or its competitors during the campaigning period. As is also widely asserted in the literature, voters tend to simplify the

nature of the electoral contest and reduce it to essential images and issues, which if related to discourse, necessarily are reinforced in campaigning. Whether or not the voters accept these discursive priorities is another matter, but this tension in fact captures the very dynamics targeted in this study; campaign discourse and voting behavior do not always match, and studies that only prioritize the speeches of politicians result in misleading associations—parties are often competing with strategies that are often unrelated or complementary to speechmaking.

The centralized nature of political parties in Turkey also provides greater confidence in the assumption that the discourse of the party leader is the official line of the party, even at the local level. Where distinctions can be made between discourse and local voting behavior, the difference is often found in the non-discursive strategies and domains of identification rather than divergence of party discourse at the local level. The primary sources available to access the speeches of national leaders are newspapers. The large mainstream daily newspapers generally covered the speeches of the national leaders of all significant parties. Where gaps were evident, newspapers that supported particular parties or ideologies were also combed for speeches that might have been absent in larger papers.

It also seems safe to assert that campaign discourse alone cannot be said to have exclusively shaped voting behavior in Turkish national elections throughout its multiparty history; therefore, secondary sources were also scoured for evidence of non-discursive strategies and domains of identification. As far as "national" campaign discourse is concerned, especially in the earlier periods of multiparty

history, for example, certain areas of the country were much less affected by the political discourse of national leaders and public opinion manifested in print or through radio. Hence, lack of access to radio along with poor and late distribution of newspapers to many of the eastern provinces along with lower literacy rates and the likely perceived lack of relevance of the affairs of distant Ankara in not fully centralized areas suggest that an interpretation of how they voted based on the discourse circulating in Western provinces, in the earlier periods, might be problematic. This knowledge alone suggests that it would be dangerous to assume that campaign discourse exclusively shaped the electoral contest throughout the multiparty period. Even when campaign speeches were widely accessible through various media, there is ample evidence that many of the successful parties did not rely on speechmaking as their primary campaign strategy. There is a great body of detailed sociological and political research that can be appropriated to this end.

1.5 Final Note on Research Paradigms in Previous Studies

How this study will prioritize and interpret the information existing in previous research must also be clarified. Although there is not enough space in this study to delve into this premise in great detail, one can propose that, if a "genealogy" of academic work on Turkey and Turkish politics were conducted, clear, if somewhat overlapping paradigms exist that frame how Turkish politics as an object has been studied.

In the earlier works on the young Turkish Republic, starting from its founding until the 1960s, most students of Turkish politics and society provided

political histories whose foundational reference point was classical modernization theory—i.e. they studied Turkey to determine its progress on the path of modernization and development that had been previously set out by the West. These foundational assumptions could be found in the writings of scholars both from Turkey—i.e. Turkish citizens—and from the work of foreign observers. Based on the assumptions laid out by the theory, the most common proxy to measure the advancement of modernity and the "moderns" versus traditionalism and the "traditionals" in Turkey was the status and attitude of religion in the country. In these works by scholars such as Karpat, Berkes, Lerner, Lewis, and Robinson, though religious discourse was detailed, it was detailed not as an emphasis but as a proxy for the greater advancement of modernity.[53] Thus, in those works, one perceives that religiosity, lack of education and conformity to traditions were the side effect of a lack of modernity and urbanization. The problem or concern was not with religion or Islam, per se, but that its existence was the evidence of a lack of development in general, and education and a scientific mindset in particular, which once appropriated by the village farmers, would cause the other issues to melt away. Religion was an issue because it fit unquestionably under the umbrella of traditionalism, and it was for this reason

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[53] It is important to note that I am referring here to scholarship written during the period in which the "modernization theory" paradigm was *the* academic ontology for scholars of the time, particularly those studying non-Western cultures. This does not mean that these works were explicitly structured to address that paradigm—though this is clearly true with Daniel Lerner's work—but that this understanding is used to frame the interpretations of observations made of the society studied—i.e. with an explicit conceptual division between "modern" members of society and "traditional" members of society, usually accompanied by analysis that assumes the slow but inevitable triumph of the former. A similar observation in regard to these authors and modernization theory has recently been made by Findley. See, Carter Vaughn Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity* (New Haven: Yale University, 2010), p. 1.

that it was highlighted and observed in the earlier work on Turkey.[54]

Toward the end of the 1960s, the research on Turkey began to shift both its methods and, to some extent, its focus. The rapid mobilization and urbanization occurring in Turkey starting from the 1950s created a rich set of questions and tensions that needed to be addressed. The previous assumptions of traditional villager and modern city-dweller became complicated by mass migration to the cities, which were ill-equipped to handle all the newcomers from the village. As these villages set up new communities largely populated with other recent arrivals, the question became which forces will ultimately win the day—the traditional village culture or the modern culture of the city. The method of measuring the questions prompted by this essential dilemma became noticeably more quantitative.[55] Rich qualitative description and interpretation gave way to tables and demographic data and other tools that could more precisely measure the drastic changes that were taking place in the country as a whole, but especially in the cities. Thus, the proxy of religion slipped into the background for the more quantifiable application of demographic statistics. It was through this essential issue that politics was approached, the interpretation of the ideological conflict occurring in politics seemed logically entwined with these issues of urbanization and industrialization.

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[54] An interesting illustration of this relationship is the famous work of Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, written in 1964. This work, when interpreted into Turkish in 1973 was entitled, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma* [Modernization in Turkey].

[55] Seminal works from this period include, Frederick Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite*; Leslie Roos and Noralou Roos, *Managers of Modernization* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1971); Ergun Özbudun, *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1976); Kemal Karpat, *The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); and Engin Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor, eds., *Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems* (Istanbul: Bosphorus University, 1975).

After the dust settled from the 1980 coup d'état, scholarship though varied in its methods seems to have begun to filter the understanding of Turkish politics through the essential center-periphery paradigm as perceived by Şerif Mardin.[56] First published as a journal article in 1973, this work became the foundational assumption upon which politics in Turkey was studied. Polarities and divisions in various contexts suddenly begun to mirror and resemble a clash between a modern and homogenous center and a traditional and heterogeneous periphery. Even those who questioned or challenged the foundational assumption asserted alternative interpretations using the same language or pattern of language.

This too began to shift in the 1990s with the rise of the Welfare Party. After the party registered surprising electoral successes and the international community seemed quite eager to read about an "Islamic menace", it seemed that very little on Turkish politics could be written without focusing on Islam and Islamists in Turkey. Scholars began to see the perpetuity of a secular versus Islamist division, and they substantiated it by skipping over the works of the late 1960s and 1970s and utilizing the definitive works of the 1950s and 1960s. An important shift had occurred, however. Islam, rather than being a proxy for the pesky persistence of traditionalism, became the chief tension and question. Particularly in the major urban centers, no longer the consequence of being an uneducated villager, Islam stood out as a separate force that could act upon the unsuspecting and uneducated subject. It was not a side effect of tradition, but an

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[56] Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" *Daedalus*, Vol. 102 (1973), pp. 169-90.

element that could operate as modern[57] and mimic the practices of the classical Kemalist modernist approach in shaping society.[58] And the perpetual center-periphery divide was re-constituted to posit an essential secularist (center)-pro-Islamist (periphery) division in society.

Each of these paradigm shifts had their own coherence and rationalization that spoke to chief issues of their respective periods. Although, with some overlap and deviation, much of the work on Turkey and Turkish politics fits within this rough sketch, it must be emphasized that not all scholars were limited to such foci. However, one tendency of the general work that fits within these trends is that non-contemporaneous history has often been re-conceptualized or reinterpreted to harmonize with the priorities of the paradigm in which they are writing. Consequently, a scholar at a particular time tends to interpret the past through the relevance of the present. It is, thus, more common for a scholar in a recent work to posit an explanative secularist-Islamist divide during the 1950s and 1960s than a scholar writing within that time period.

For this reason, this essay, when utilizing the interpretations provided by scholars of a particular period in Turkish politics, will prioritize the interpretations of the body of work contemporary to that period over more recent ones. Though all interpretations, including this one, approach the topic from a certain vantage point that emphasizes certain issues over others, it is more likely that the paradigm of the scholar complements the socio-political paradigm contemporary

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[57] Nilüfer Göle, *The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997).
[58] Alev Çınar, *Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey: Bodies, Places, and Time* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2005).

to it; in other words, such a scholar's bias, if evident, will tend to correspond to and emphasize the political paradigm from which he or she is making observations.

CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IN TURKEY

No party in the civilized world has ever represented the whole nation as completely and as sincerely as the Republican People's Party. Other parties defend the interests of various social classes or strata. For our part, we do not recognize the existence of these classes and strata. For us, all are united.[1]

We cannot accept the fact that the social classes have irreconcilable interests and have to struggle with each other. Such a conception is outdated and baseless. . . This is the sole reason why the Democratic Party is not a class party producing conflicts of interests among the social classes, but on the contrary is a "national party" assembling around itself all those citizens believing in the above principles.[2]

In attempting to determine paradigms that shaped political behavior and attitudes of elites and the electorate alike, one needs to be sensitive to areas of both relative change and continuity in the system and how these various forces might interact and influence one another. While it is accurate to claim the existence of "change and continuity" in the Turkish party system, or any party system for that matter, the location of change or relative continuity is of critical importance. With this in mind, this study will begin by positing a number of possible agents of continuity that could be seen as acting to provide opportunities or constraints for change.

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[1] Quotation by Mahmut Esat Bozkurt taken from, Paul Dumont, "The Origins of Kemalist Ideology," in Jacob Landau, ed., *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), p. 33.
[2] Quotation by Fuad Köprülü, one of the founding members of the Democrat Party, taken from, Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multiparty System* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 312.

There are a number of operative dynamics that appear to have had a regular or continuous influence on the shaping and or boundary setting for the existing political paradigms to a greater or lesser extent. While the pattern of interactions between various political actors, within which the military must also be included, and the contingent socioeconomic structural forces must be addressed within and in relation to the individual paradigms, the potential effects of what is regularly referred to as "political culture" and relevant formal institutions, in this case the electoral system, must be touched upon before proceeding to specific paradigmatic periods. Widely observed orientations toward politics by elites and the populace as a whole, tacked up to societal norms and values (i.e. "political culture"), could provide various constraints or possibilities on the shaping of the system. Furthermore, the Turkish electoral system, an institution normally functioning to provide stability and consistency (continuity), has undergone extensive alterations, including a switch from a plurality system to a proportional one and, thus, could be considered a possible instigator of change in the relational dynamics between the electorate and the parties. Hence, the nature of its affect on the system should be investigated.

2.1 Conceptualizations of Political Culture and their Relevance

Political culture is a highly charged concept. Since its inception as a possible variable and explanative factor in the variations in democratic development in the late 1950s,[3] and particularly since the seminal work on the concept, *The Civic*

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[3] See Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review,* Vol. 53, No. 1 (1959), pp. 69-105. Though the focus is certainly on structural concerns and what could be seen as significant in the realm of "political culture" seems casually tied to development, Lipset adds a number of aspects to

Culture, by Almond and Verba in 1963,[4] political culture as a valid concept for study and utilization in political research has passed through phases of favor and disfavor among scholars. The intent of this study is not to exacerbate the ongoing and fruitful debate, but to address a number of salient values or norms in the Turkish case that are located within this conceptual domain. Thus, the focus here will be to carefully demarcate the boundaries for the concept as used in this study and emphasize what is intended or not intended through its usage.

Scholars have provided us with a number of possible conceptualizations of the concept. Pye, for example, gives us the following description of political culture: "The sum of the fundamental values, sentiments, and knowledge that give form and structure to political processes."[5] While enumerating a number of essential components of the concept, the definition could be seen as containing a number of ambiguities. The usage of the term "sum" prompts the question of what and how these components are aggregated. Are we discussing the composite of all possible conflicting values, sentiments and knowledge among individuals in society or the sum of the predominate ones operating within a culture or subculture? Furthermore, "knowledge" as a component concept could send one in numerous directions if not explicitly delineated and potentially complicates the issue of what should be attributed to "culture" and what should be seen as derived from "structure"—

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the evaluation that would play a significant part in future discussions of political culture, including "participation," Protestantism, and the problematic "knowledge."

[4] Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[5] Lucian W. Pye, "Political Culture," *The Encyclopedia of Democracy, Vol. 3* (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 965.

probably the most blurry boundary line in the conceptualization and operationalization debates.[6]

Another possible conceptualization of political culture has been provided by Inglehart. Regarding political culture, he writes, "People's responses to their situations are shaped by subjective orientations, which vary cross-culturally and within subcultures."[7] This definition emphasizes that political culture as a concept needs not be fixed at the "national" level, but can be located among various subgroups within any particular polity. In this line, Diamond provides us with a working definition of the concept which seems to be a specification of Almond and Verba's definition[8] that largely harmonizes with Inglehart's understanding: "a people's predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations about the political system of the country, and the role of the self in that system."[9] This definition clarifies that the components should be understood as the *predominant* values, sentiments, orientations of *a people*; thus, we have a flexible understanding of the unit of analysis, requiring an understanding that supersedes the individual or aggregate of individuals, but that also provides flexibility in the unit of analysis. Elkins and Simeon also emphasize this aspect of the concept and write, "Political culture is the property of a collectivity—nation, region, class, ethnic community, formal organization, party, or whatever. Individuals have beliefs,

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[6] This could also be seen a potential problem with Kavanagh's definition that emphasizes "cognitions." See Dennis Kavanagh, *Political Culture* (London: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 10-11.

[7] Ronald Inglehart, *Cultural Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 19.

[8] "The specifically political orientation—attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of self in the system." Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, p. 13.

[9] Larry Diamond, *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries, Textbook Edition* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), p. 7.

values, and attitudes but they do not have cultures."[10] Such a conception will provide the framework of this study's utilization of the term "political culture."

Besides the issue of defining the concept, another potential pitfall in discussing political culture can be found in the assumptions about what political culture, once defined, can explain, how the concept can be operationalized, and the underlying "intentions" of such an approach to the study of various societies. In this vein, the complex relation between culture and structure—how it is delineated and to which category should various social phenomenon under scrutiny be attributed—the nature of political culture's stability or changeability and its historical association with modernization theory and developmentalism should be discussed.

One of the most challenging issues to be addressed in relation to the concept is to what extent a particular normative behavior or attitude toward politics should be deemed structural rather than cultural. The extent to which "culture" can be tacked up to existing structures is an important question. Furthermore, does the chicken precede the egg or vice versa? Does a particular cultural value exist through the shaping of existing structures and institutions, or do the "shaping" institutions result from pre-existing values? To what extent can the two be seen in endogenous relation with one another? Elkins and Simeon discuss this quandary and the need for careful demarcation between the two by discussing the conclusions of Almond and Verba's famous work. They argue that the variance in "civic culture" between the five countries studied in the classic work can be explained

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[10] David Elkins and Richard Simeon, "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?" *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1979), p. 129.

when the proportion of educated people is controlled for.[11] Almond himself has

pointed out that even the early scholars of political culture "recognized that

causality worked both ways, that attitudes influenced structure and behavior, and

that structure and performance in turn influenced attitudes."[12] When should we then

be looking toward structure and when toward culture? Elkins and Simeon provide a

suggestion to this potential dilemma, concluding that "political culture is a 'second-

order' explanation, appropriately applied only after institutional and structural

explanations have been ruled out or in conjunction with such explanations."[13]

This seems to be a reasonable guideline. There are a number of normative

political behaviors that have been widely touched upon and primarily designated the

offspring of political culture in the Turkish case that could be argued to spring from

structural and institutional realities. For example, one could argue that the widely

observed tendency toward patronage, which has, in fact, varied throughout time,

could be explained just as easily by structure or institutions rather than by cultural

values exogenous to these. The harsh constraints on ideological appeals and the

difficulty demarcating clear policy distinctions between parties in the 50s left them

very little room to do much else than engage in various forms of patron-client

relations to mobilize the electorate.[14] The stuffing of bureaucracies and creation of

positions in the 70s strictly along partisan lines could also be understood within the

particular contingencies of the period rather than an exogenous value or orientation

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[11] Ibid., p. 135.

[12] Gabriel Almond, "The Study of Political Culture," in Gabriel Almond, ed., *A Divided Discipline: Schools and Sects in Political Science* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990), p. 144.

[13] Ibid., pp. 139-40.

[14] This also does not imply that such relations only arise in the context of an absence of ideological politics—Italy has shown this not to be the case—but such an environment certainly creates a strong impetus in that direction in order to gather together diverse or hierarchically distinct groups.

toward patronage. Furthermore, the political emphasis on charismatic leadership at the helm of parties in Turkey, which must at least in part be separated from attitudes toward leadership and obedience in general, could also be explained by the structures that led to a vast array of "catch-all" parties, which both in theory, beginning with Kirchheimer himself,[15] and also in quantitative research,[16] are associated with strong, charismatic leadership.

Another potentially problematic assumption related to the concept of political culture is that said culture is rigid, stable and deterministic. Diamond, arguing that "such perspectives do not fairly characterize political culture theory" and criticizing a number of examples of such approaches to political culture, writes that "three decades of research since *The Civic Culture* have shown that the cognitive, attitudinal, and evaluational dimensions of political culture are fairly 'plastic' and can change quite dramatically in response to regime performance, historical experience, and political socialization."[17] He later adds that economic and social structures, international factors and the practice and operation of the political system itself can interact with and shape political culture.[18] Political culture as it is defined, and as the Turkish case tends to support, cannot be understood as primordial or transcendental values; instead, these often appear, to use Shilsian terminology, as "central system values" disseminated from the practice and

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[15] Otto Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds. *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 193, 198.

[16] Marina Costa Lobo, "Parties and Leader Effects," *Party Politics*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2008), pp. 294-5; see also, Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, "Species of Political Parties: A New Typology," *Party Politics*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2003), p. 186.

[17] Diamond, "Introduction: Political Culture and Democracy," pp. 8-9.

[18] Ibid., p. 9.

propagation of elites, especially the political elite.[19] Thus, while processes exist and are created that operate to maintain the values, and, as Shils argues, the values function to establish order, they are also ultimately negotiated and contested values within the center.

Finally, as the scholarship addressing issues of political culture was initiated through the paradigm of modernization theory[20] as an attempt to explain variance in the inevitable progression toward "modernity," the concepts associated with this school of thought that has fallen into disfavor and empirical difficulties has engendered skepticism in relation to the motivation for its continued appropriation. The usage of political culture, seen from the view of the skeptics, was simply to conjure up a villain that could explain the resistance to progress.[21] Political culture, especially as applied to "non-Western" societies, was simply a way to explain "backwardness" and the obstacles to forward progress—i.e. resembling "Western" democracies. Thus, the broad categorizations of various "civic" cultures as presented to us by Almond and Verba in their nearly half a century old work—parochial, subject, participant, or a hybrid—were determined by proxies and methods that have been argued to prioritize or advantage an *Anglo-American* citizenship "meta-narrative" rather provide a universal measurement of the meta-orientation toward politics of any particular society or group. [22] Though subsequently used with greater specificity in the research of the last couple of

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[19] See Edward Shils, *Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 4.
[20] Margaret Somers, "What's Political or Cultural about Political Culture and the Public Sphere? Toward an Historical Sociology of Concept Formation," *Sociological Theory*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1995), p. 114.
[21] For a view from this perspective, see Ibid., p. 120.
[22] Ibid., p. 116.

decades, the preponderance of work utilizing the concept still hovers around democratization and the consolidation of democracy with political culture as an intervening variable.[23]

While the merits of the use of political culture as a variable explaining variance in regard to developmentalism and democratization can be debated, this study avoids the issue by specifying and narrowing its scope. The particular values and orientations discussed below are illuminated in order to show how certain forces, not readily explainable by existing structures or institutions can have a potentially shaping influence on the party system. These "cultural" elements[24] are not seen as "inhibiting" or "obstructing" but simply acting and shaping along with the other dynamic forces operating on and within the system for outcomes that could be interpreted both positively and negatively. Finally, political culture as discussed in this study is being used for values or norms that seem to predate existing structures or institutions, but it does not deny the possibility that such "values" emerged or were disseminated by elites based on the perceived needs stemming from previous structures or institutions.

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[23] For studies of this type, see Larry Diamond, ed., *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries;* Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Centrality of Political Culture," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (1990), pp. 80-3.

[24] This author also acknowledges that, depending on one's conceptualization of culture, political culture, as defined and used could be argued not to be "cultural" at all. Just as driving on one side of the road could be a predominate behavior, norm, or orientation widely observed in a society but would be unlikely classified as "culture", many of the orientations that have a salient impact on politics could be placed more precisely in the category of social norm. However, rather than reinvent the wheel, the study intends to use the terminology widely appropriated in the field, following from the assumption that the understanding of the meaning of the concept as it is being used seems more important than whether or not the terminology used for the concept is the most exact. Thus, the former is being emphasized over the latter.

2.2 'Nation Party' Culture and the Turkish Party System

Although there are numerous aspects with which the Turkish party systems can be compared to parliamentarian systems of Western and Northern Europe, there are a few important characteristics of its operation that distinguish it from the essential pattern of interaction and party formation in these democracies on the European continent, and which direct it toward orientations more consistent with those in newer democracies or the US, for example. Consider the names of the current parties with twenty members in the Turkish Assembly (as of February 2011)—the Justice and Development Party, the Republican People's Party, the Nationalist Action Party, and the Peace and Democracy Party. Along with this, consider the names of the other major parties that have floated in and out of Turkish political history—the Democrat Party, the Justice Party, the True Path Party, the Motherland Party, the Democratic Left Party, the Welfare Party. Other minor parties have been called the Freedom Party, the Peace Party, the New Turkey Party, the Nation Party, the Great Union Party, or the Republican Reliance Party to name a few others. A perusal of the many, many parties that have tried their hand, either successfully or to no avail, to enter into the party system demonstrate a tendency toward utilizing abstract principles consistent with liberal democratic discourse or names that represent national inclusiveness. In other words, among the numerous distinct parties that have competed at one point or another for seats in the Grand National Assembly since 1950, there are very few parties who have explicitly catered to extreme or exclusive ideological interests or particular groups or interests within the country.

Granted, there have been periods of history in which the freedom to organize such a party was constitutionally curtailed, but even when such constitutional rights were provided (especially during the Second Republic period from 1961 to 1980), the parties attempting to form in the interest of exclusive ideologies, like socialism or communism, or groups, such as Alevis or 'Labor', have not been viewed favorably by the electorate, particularly when votes are cast.[25] For example, at the height of its popularity in the 1960s, the Turkey Workers' Party garnered a whopping 3 percent of the vote (in 1965).[26] The party emphasizing the welfare of Turkish Alevi's (interestingly named the Turkish Union Party) was able to boast a 2.8 percent vote total in its best election outcome, a percentage far below what a party representing Alevis could theoretically muster.[27] These two parties are arguably the success stories of particular interest parties in comparison to explicitly communist or socialist parties, which have not even been able to realize electoral support reaching one percent.[28]

An important possible complicating case to the general picture is the phenomenon of de facto Kurdish parties competing in the system since 1991 when they first entered parliament under the umbrella of the Social Democrat Populist Party and then splintered off to form their own party once in parliament. The

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[25] Consider the following analysis by Karpat in 1959: "The political parties of Turkey do not represent any specific social class but aim, theoretically speaking, at representing the *whole of the nation*. Accordingly they have reacted unfavorably to the minor political parties which were established on a class basis. All the major political parties of Turkey consequently are middle of the road parties." Emphasis is mine. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 390.

[26] Heper has also noted this phenomenon. See, Metin Heper, *The State and Kurds in Turkey* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 156.

[27] The percentage of Alevis in Turkey in relation to the total population has been reported anywhere from 10-30 percent. 20 percent is a common estimate. As they are not officially considered a minority by the Turkish state, there are no exact census figures.

[28] Electoral data for general elections since 1950 can be perused and downloaded in Turkish or English from the Turkish Statistical Istitute (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu), www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=42&ust_id=12.

highest electoral support received by such parties, which have on numerous occasions been closed down for violating article 68 of the 1982 Constitution,[29] was 6.2 percent in 2002 and less than 5 percent in all other national election contests they entered. Though this percentage seems higher than the other particular interest parties that were mentioned, at most, this level of electoral support among Kurds represents only a solid minority of ethnically Kurdish voters (probably around a one-third ratio of the total Kurdish population or smaller). Furthermore, these parties, though generally acknowledged to represent the interests of Kurds in particular, through their party names (and formal campaign platform) have always suggested an inclusive character—the People's Labor Party, the Democratic People's Party, People's Democracy Party, Democratic Society Party, and Peace and Democracy Party—along with their party programs in which they describe themselves as a "leftist mass" party.[30] This formally inclusive behavior and inclusive discourse during campaigning could be seen as a way of avoiding legal ramifications of being a particular interest party, but the fact that such a stipulation was newly added to the 1982 Constitution, despite the abysmal showing of other particular interest parties in previous national elections, is in itself indicative of what seems to be a predominantly national value (i.e. political culture)—that parties in Turkey are at least superficially seen as ideally non-class, non-sectarian, general-interest "nation parties"—parties ostensibly able to represent all segments of society.

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[29] Article 68, paragraph 4 states: The statutes and programmes, as well as the activities of political parties shall not be in conflict with the independence of the state, *its indivisible integrity* with its territory and nation, human rights, the principles of equality and rule of law, sovereignty of the nation, the principles of the democratic and secular republic; *they shall not aim to protect or establish class or group dictatorship* or dictatorship of any kind, nor shall they incite citizens to crime. The existing constitution can be accessed in English from the website, www.anayasa.gov.tr.
[30] See, *Demokratik Toplum Partisi, Program ve Tüzük* (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, 2005), p. 119.

Others might object to the fact that the historical Islamist parties could be considered general-interest "nation parties"; for example, just as Christian Democrat parties in Europe could be understood as representing particular interests and identities, these parties representing devout Muslims could be seen as functioning in a similar manner.[31] However, there are some important differences between the Christian Democrat party phenomenon in Europe and the Islamist parties in Turkey, chief among these would be that the former largely emerged as the representation of religious minorities—i.e. Catholics in polities whose population was predominantly Protestant. In cases where the "Christian" party represented the religious values of the majority, Kirchheimer, who famously brought the term "catch-all party" into widespread use, pointed out the possibility that such parties could take on a "catch-all" approach, referencing the Christian Democrat Party in Italy.[32]

Furthermore, in the Turkish case, the Islamist movement that gave birth to such parties calls itself *Milli Görüş* (National Outlook) and undeniably had a very "national" interpretation of its role, and the place of Islam, in Turkey. Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of these various parties, has famously argued that if Atatürk, the founder of the Republic, was alive at that time, he would have supported Erbakan's party (the Welfare Party—*Refah Partisi*).[33] Ayşe Öncü has also demonstrated the effectiveness and strategy of the Welfare Party in using new opportunities through

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[31] In fact, such an argument has been advanced by Hale. See, William Hale, "Christian Democracy and the AKP: Parallels and Contrasts," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2005), pp. 293-310.
[32] Kirchheimer, "Transformation of the Western European Party System," p. 185.
[33] For one of many accounts of Erbakan's comment, see note 21 in the recent article: Nora Fisher Onar, "Echoes of a Universalism Lost: Rival Representations of the Ottomans in Today's Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 2 (2009), p. 240.

commercial media to appeal *inclusively* to the Turkish electorate in its campaigns.[34]

Furthermore, as noted by Hale and Özbudun, Erbakan used the fact that Turkey is

99 percent Muslim as a justification that his party should be seen as appealing to the

whole nation.[35] All of these points suggest that even parties representing religious

interests couched those interests, not in sectarian, but in *inclusive national* rhetoric.

Why would such type of parties completely dominate the scene of Turkish

Republican politics since the inception of multiparty politics in 1945? Despite

institutional and structural changes, some of which were quite drastic, like

transitioning from plurality to a proportional representation electoral system and

operating under three different constitutions, the disinclination toward particular

interest parties has been a constant. Where minor success has been seen in this area,

the offending party has suffered the incessant disapproval and disdain of large

sections of the populace whether one looks to the political "left" or "right". Why

does the population in general seem to disapprove of group interest-based parties

and how does this affect the operation of the party system and patterns of political

interaction? In other words, how has such a "political culture" toward political

parties developed?

It is no secret that the political elites that forged the Turkish Republic from

the ashes of the Ottoman Empire were primarily concerned with unifying the fragile,

war-torn country.[36] During the last century of the dying Empire, it had suffered the

majority of its territorial losses through internal rebellion incited by ethnic and

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[34] Ayşe Öncü, "Packaging Islam: Cultural Politics on the Landscape of Turkish Commercial Television," *Public Culture,* Vol. 8 (1995), p. 61.
[35] William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP* (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 7.
[36] Metin Heper, "The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics," *Journal of International Affairs,* Vol. 54, No. 1 (2000), p. 68.

religious nationalisms often fomented by external powers. In such an environment, intellectual and bureaucratic elites pondered the means through which unity among the diverse masses could be obtained. Thus, as proposed by Lapalombara and Weiner, in the midst of such crises, "memories are established in the minds of those who participated or perceived the events that have subsequent effects on political behavior."[37] Particularly influential among these elites were the ideas of thinkers such as Ziya Gökalp who promoted corporatism as a remedy to unite the fledgling Turkish nation. Corporatist ideas, which emphasized social harmony and a rejection of class interests in favor of occupational groupings, had a strong influence on Atatürk and the "central system values"—i.e. approved orientations toward politics (political culture)—as they were established by the elites and disseminated among the public as shared values in society.

How might a corporatist-inspired worldview among the founding Republican elites affect how the party system operated decades later? Consider Gökalp who, according to Parla, saw the ideal democracy not as "liberal democracy but solidaristic democracy, in which individual liberty is meaningful to the extent that it does not act against social solidarity and public interest."[38] Contrary to what might be assumed, Gökalp was not against the existence of political parties and in fact encouraged their existence, but one is struck by his reasoning for their existence. He argued that they were a "protective device" against members of parliament acting "egotistically and self-interestedly" if not held in check by the discipline of

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[37] Joseph Lapalombara and Myron Wiener, "Origin and Development of Political Parties," in Joseph Lapalombara and Myron Wiener, eds. *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 14.
[38] Taha Parla, *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp, 1876-1924* (Leiden: Brill, 1985), p. 79.

party membership.[39] In addition to this, parties should be kept from "sectarianism and internationalism" and "subordinated to the supreme national interests."[40] A particular fear held by Gökalp and others among the Republican elite was particularly about class division. A well-known statement by Gökalp in this regard goes as follows:

> If a society comprises a certain number of strata or classes, this means that it is not egalitarian. The aim of populism is to suppress the class or strata differences and replace them with a social structure composed of occupational groups solidary with each other. In other words, we can summarize populism by saying: there are no classes, there are occupations.[41]

Such a view, if a shared value, would create clear constraints on the types of parties that could form and operate within the system. Populism (*halkçılık*) was often used interchangeably with democracy; thus, it would be very unlikely that a party system in such a democratic regime would contest explicitly along socioeconomic class or other group distinctions.

There is broad consensus among scholars that this emphasis on unity and de-emphasis on class or particularist interest was a guiding value of the political elite. Heper has argued that "Atatürk did not endorse the promotion of particular interests by political parties"[42] and that the purpose of the state "was that of ensuring that the general interest was not given short shrift." [43] Özbudun also points out that, stemming from Ottoman attitudes toward politics, "members of the ruling class

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[39] Ibid., pp. 81-2.
[40] Ibid., p. 82.
[41] Quoted in Dumont, "The Origins of Kemalist Ideology," p. 32.
[42] For another thorough treatment on this topic, see Clement Dodd, "Atatürk and Political Parties," in Metin Heper and Jacob Landau (eds.), *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991), pp. 24-41.
[43] Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (North Humberside, UK: Eothen Press, 1985), pp. 52, 60; Heper, "Ottoman Legacy," p. 72.

were supposed to serve 'the state' rather than any particular social group."[44] He also writes that, "Atatürk often expressed the view that Turkish society was not composed of antagonistic social classes with conflicting interests but of occupational groups that needed one another and whose interests were in harmony."[45] Şerif Mardin notes that this emphasis in ignoring social classes was a discourse that effectively retarded the development of Marxism in Turkey.[46] Furthermore, he argues that this extreme emphasis on social harmony led to a constant tactic of accusing the opposition of "dividing the country" for their own particular interest whenever such opposition was made manifest. Karpat also shows, that when Turkey moved to a multiparty system, the initial parties all clearly emphasized that class could not be the impetus for party and that they intended to be the representative of all groups.[47]

As Dumont shows, these considerations were at times used against the existence of oppositional parties altogether. According to the early Kemalist "theoretician" Mahmut Esat Bozkurt:

> No party in the civilized world has ever represented the whole nation as completely and as sincerely as the Republican People's Party. Other parties defend the interests of various social classes or strata. For our part, we do not recognize the existence of these classes and strata. For us, all are united. There are no gentlemen, no masters, no slaves. There is but one whole set and this set is the Turkish nation.[48]

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[44] Ergun Özbudun, "State Elites and Democratic Political Culture in Turkey," in Larry Diamond, ed., *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), p. 190.
[45] Ibid., p. 195.
[46] Şerif Mardin, "Opposition and Control in Turkey," *Government and Opposition,* Vol. 1, No. 3 (1966), p. 381.
[47] Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics,* p. 311-2.
[48] Quoted in Dumont, "Origins of Kemalist Ideology," p. 33.

If one were to argue that this might have only been the perspective of the founding Kemalists and their political party, the CHP, consider the following declaration of the Democrat Party attributed to Fuad Köprülu:

> We cannot accept the fact that the social classes have irreconcilable interests and have to struggle with each other. Such a conception is outdated and baseless. . . This is the sole reason why the Democratic Party is not a class party producing conflicts of interests among the social classes, but on the contrary is a "*national party*" assembling around itself all those citizens believing in the above principles.[49]

In contrast to Turkey, many political systems in Western Europe have approached the contestation of parties precisely on the aggregation of various classes and particular interests, in effect, understanding the accumulation of these parts as the united "general interest." The varying conceptions can be argued to derive from the distinct historical development of politics in these countries. As Hans Daalder has pointed out, in many of these countries, the bases of modern political development was founded upon united action of various particular interests against the sovereign, thus, "as the political order has in a very real sense built upon parts, the idea that men could reasonably be partisans found ready recognition even before the age of formalized party politics."[50] Furthermore, male suffrage tended to occur over time thus allowing for a relatively smooth transition in accommodating the various interests, greatly reducing the threat posed by any particular interest or the possible chaos resulting from attempting to integrate numerous interests simultaneously.[51]

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[49] Emphasis is mine. Quoted in Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 312.

[50] Hans Daalder, "Party Elites, and Political Developments in Western Europe," in Joseph Lapalombara and Myron Wiener, eds. *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 48.

[51] Ibid., p. 48-9.

Despite this point of divergence with a number of established Western European democracies, the emphasis on unity and the fear of the divisive, factional nature of parties witnessed in Turkish political history is not unique nor foreign to the philosophical debates about the dimensions within which democratic politics should function. For example, "The root idea . . . that parties are evil" featured prominently in the political thought of Anglo-American writings of the eighteenth century.[52] As Richard Hofstadter points out, the founding fathers of the United States, even those associated with political parties, were very much against the idea of a party system, utilizing many of the same arguments as were developed during the founding of Turkey's republic. In the context of the political development of the United States, the argument against parties centered around three related issues that also found a voice in the political orientations of Atatürk and other early Turkish Republican era thinkers: first, society is best served by political harmony and consensus that approaches unanimity; second, a party could easily become the tool of particular interests which could then "impose its will" on the rest of society, leading to tyranny; and finally, the existence of parties force people to give their loyalty to a group that is "much narrower and less legitimate than the 'public good' as a whole.[53] Despite behavior that betrayed a measure of favor toward the Federalists, George Washington saw himself as above party, and devoted an extensive amount of his "Farewell Address" emphasizing unity and warning the people about the dangers of party politics and factionalism. As in the Turkish case, the early American strategy toward the opposition involved both accusing the other

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[52] Richard Hofstadter, *The Idea of a Party System: The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States, 1780-1840* (Berkeley: University of California, 1969), p. 9; Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis* (Colchester, UK: ECPR Press, 2005), pp. 8-12.
[53] Hofstadter, *The Idea of a Party System,* pp. 12-3.

of trying to subversively divide the country and being in treacherous league with other foreign powers.[54] The existence or operation within a party was not seen as contradictory for these early Americans, for they, like Bozkurt, believed that their own party's justification was that it "could bring about, at last, a condition of national unity and harmony. In their eyes the only true justification of any party would be its promise of ultimately eliminating all parties."[55]

What effect might such a political orientation or political culture have on the operation of the party system and its observed patterns of interactions? In both cases, the US and Turkey, it seemed to promote and foster the emergence of "country parties"—read "nation parties"—"formed not on particular prejudices but 'on principles of common interest.'"[56] Thus, rather than drawing on explicit identities, the parties form around general worldviews that arguably envelop and include the vast majority of the national populace.

To the extent that this political orientation toward unity and general interest and against class-based and particularist parties is established as a foundational political value among political elites and the public, it should not be surprising that existing parties would tend to operate organizationally as "catch-all" parties (or cadre or clientelistic parties with a catch-all appeal) in electoral competition rather than mass parties, in particular.[57] The logic behind the campaign strategies of these types of party organization will help clarify why this is the case.

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[54] Ibid., p. 8.
[55] Ibid., p. 18. For a Turkish equivalent, see Mardin, "Opposition and Control in Turkey," pp. 378-9.
[56] Ibid., p. 23. See also, William Chambers, "Parties and Nation-Building in America," in Joseph Lapalombara and Myron Wiener, eds. *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 103-4.
[57] See also, Kirchheimer, "Transformation of the Western European Party Systems, p. 186.

As Jennifer Smith points out, the success of mass parties in campaigning is based on *mobilization*.[58] A mass party assumes an electoral base of support, and thus, the goal becomes ensuring that this identifiable population votes. For this reason, membership, dues, education and other forms of involvement are significant because they increase the likelihood that the party will maximize its vote total among its potential electorate. Such a strategy becomes ineffective, however, if one's potential electorate is unstable or unknown. Thus, these familiar mass-party strategies are the most clearly applicable to class-based or particular interest parties as its relatively loyal support base could more easily be identified, and in fact, the very impetus for support by the masses is based on *identification* with the party. It could be seen as no coincidence then that two of the three mass party subcategories provided by Gunther and Diamond are "class-mass" and "denominational-mass" parties, which formed largely around an identifiable demographic base.[59]

The tactic of catch-all parties is to *aggregate* and *persuade* the electorate.[60] Such a strategy fits well with a "nation party" culture as its organizational impetus is to appeal to and literally catch *all*. Vague or moderate ideology is preferred to very explicit ideological platforms, and thus, their success hinges on charismatic leadership.[61] If one wants to avoid the electoral consequences of being accused of representing particular interests, and if one cannot lay claim to explicit demographically-based support, the likelihood of forming a party that operates as a pluralistic catch-all party seems especially high. Such a tendency away from mass

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[58] Jennifer K. Smith, "Campaigning and the Catch-All Party: The Process of Party Transformation in Britain," *Party Politics*, Vol. 15, No. 5 (2009), p. 561.
[59] The third subcategory was nationalist parties. See Gunther and Diamond, "Species of Political Parties," pp. 177-83.
[60] Ibid., p. 186. As for 'persuasion,' see Smith, "Campaigning and the Catch-All Party," p. 561.
[61] Lobo, "Parties and Leader Effects," p. 295.

parties and functioning in ways that fit the category of catch-all parties has been widely observed in Turkey.[62] Although these parties have also been referred to as "cadre parties" or "clientelistic parties"—the traits of which can also be discerned among the prominent parties in Turkey's multiparty history—they have consistently operated through an appeal to all groups in society,[63] they have generally kept their ideological basis to a more general and fluid type of political outlook, and have relied on strong, charismatic centralized leadership—traits that seem to stem naturally from, at least ostensibly, a general interest "nation party" culture.[64]

The consequences of such a phenomenon on the pattern of interactions between the parties and the parties with the electorate would also likely lead to

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[62] For examples, see Ergun Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 2000), p. 80; Sabri Sayarı, "Aspects of Party Organization in Turkey," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1976), p. 188. For brief periods in their operation, the nationalist parties and the religiously-oriented Welfare party displayed some characteristics of a mass party, the former in membership participation and the latter in grass-roots mobilization, see Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics*, pp. 81, 92. That neither of these could sustain mass party strategy could be based on the difficulty of doing so while attempting a nationally-based, non-demographically specific appeal. Though the Welfare Party's operations were ultimately stopped by mandated closure by the Constitutional Court in 1998, there was an inherent tension in the contradiction of a religious versus an inclusive appeal that garnered suspicion from its opponents and forced the subsequent parties representing this movement to move away from mass party mobilization.

[63] Sabri Sayarı, "The Changing Party System," in Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer (eds.), *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p. 25. One might contend that the major parties in Turkish politics have functioned as a catch-all party in official outlook and appeal, that leadership of parties has largely required socially-elite status (wealth or education), resembling cadre parties, and that the localized and non-discursive strategies to mobilize votes has often been clientelistic, all of which fit firmly within a "nation party" cultural value. It might also be very reasonably argued that, especially since 1983, Turkish parties organizationally have been structured and operate in such a way to be considered "electoral-professional" as defined by Panebianco. A recent work by Kumbaracıbaşı also emphasizes the "electoral-professional" party trend in Turkish parties. Though some elements of the "cartel party" ala Katz and Mair could apply to the party system, including heavy centralization, the interparty cooperation and deemphasis of electoral stakes as suggested by such a designation does not really fit the Turkish case. For more on such organizational structures, see Richard Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of a Cartel Party," *Party Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1995), pp. 5-28; Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and for the Turkish case, Arda Can Kumbaracıbaşı, *Turkish Politics and the Rise of the AKP: Dilemmas of Institutionalization and Leadership Strategy* (New York: Routledge, 2009).

[64] For a work that ties together the catch-all party and "nation party" characteristics while observing the party system in the 1950s, see Sabri Sayarı, "The Turkish Party System in Transition," *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1978), p. 43.

greater volatility in electoral outcomes compared to polities with interest-based parties, an increased likelihood of clientelistic behaviors and patronage, and an electorate conditioned to seek out strong, charismatic leaders. Especially where multiple parties exist and ties to their electoral support is based on persuasive appeal, charismatic leadership and general and overlapping worldviews, votes are more likely to shift from election to election in comparison to other systems in which parties have a core measure of foundational support from targeted demographic groupings. A tradition of voting behavior or feelings of loyalty to a particular party leader might provide some measure of stability, but these are certainly more contigent bonds than those with parties that particularly represents one's class, ethnicity or denomination.[65] Mobilized voters know their party and connections are made between the members, their representations, and the ideology that binds them together. The distance provided for by catch-all party strategy allows the party to pick up votes broadly through persuasive appeal, but it also carries a greater chance for losing existing support as one is expected to persuade the voters at every election. This might be one reason, though certainly not the only one, that explains the relatively high, though variable, levels of volatility witnessed in Turkish elections, a topic that will be addressed in greater detail in chapter three.

Furthermore, where ideological distinction between parties is relatively small and voter loyalty is less stable, the chance of relying on other pragmatic forms of vote mobilization would carry greater weight. The widely held observations, for example, that the programmatic differences between the DP and the CHP in the

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[65] See, Kirchheimer, "Transformation of the Western European Party Systems," p. 192.

1950s were quite minimal[66] and that ideological platforms were largely restricted[67] and the simultaneous frequent practices of clientelism and patronage[68] should not be seen as coincidental or unrelated. Where distinctions cannot be clearly made in ideological outlook and party programme, a very logical strategy for both party and voters would be to seek reciprocal relationships.[69] It should also not be surprising that such clientelistic voting patterns and patronage were also observed in the US, especially in the South, during various periods of its political history.[70] Thus, these norms existing in political behavior—clientelism and patronage—at least in the case of Turkey, have to be explained light of the political environment and institutional structure rather than unexplicable aspects attributed only to a nation's "political culture." In both cases mentioned above, the frequency of such practices have clearly been reduced, arguably by intentional and unintentional changes in socioeconomic structures and political institutions.

Finally, although the qualities of such a leader might differ somewhat from society to society, the electorate's and individual party's high valuation of charismatic leadership can also be seen as springing from the consequences of an

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[66] For one of many such attributions by various scholars, see Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 391.

[67] Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 387.

[68] İlter Turan, "Political Parties and the Party System in Post-1983 Turkey," in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds), *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), p. 66.

[69] Metin Heper and Fuat Keyman, "Double-Faced State: Political Patronage and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (1998), p. 261.

[70] Hofstadter points out that the key deliberation that took place when the Jefferson took the reigns of government was over the rules of patronage during government transfer; *The Idea of a Party System*, pp. 134-5.
Hans Daalder also referred to this tendency in American politics, referring to the "full excesses of the American nineteenth-century spoils system." Daalder, "Parties, Elites, and Political Development," p. 61. The patronage and machine politics of early US democracy in the urban cities is well documented. For one example, see James Scott, "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 63, No. 4 (1963), p. 1144.

array "nation parties" competing with one another.[71] Since persuasion becomes the focus over explicit ideology, the onus slides to the leaders to carry this out. The tendency observed in Turkey for parties to be centered around such leadership, while at the same time, maintaining an ambigous ideological stance, needs to be understood in this light. The mobilization of the electorate in the context of "nation parties" competing against other "nation parties", as it seems improper to emphasize an ideology that would emphasize particular groups over others, ideology as a party locus point is replaced with a leader who is more likely to enable the flexibility needed to aggregate the vote from various groups, which in some cases have competing interest.

This political orientation, which could be referred to as a characteristic of Turkey's national political culture, which emphasizes unity and the general, non-class interests of the nation and, thus favoring "nation parties," helps illuminate some of the continuous features of parties, their interparty interaction and strategies, and the constraints on the dimensions of competition in the party system. As will be seen in the discussion of electoral system change in Turkey, prior to 1980 and after the 1961 Constitution that changed the Turkish system from plurality to proportional representation, what is most surprising is not that fractionalization was taking place, but that in 1977, five elections after the change and with numerous parties competing, the top two parties were able to garner more than 78 percent of the vote combined. This phenomenon led Sayarı and others to posit a "general

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[71] Again, there is no irony that such a requirement has also been seen as critical for "catch-all party" strategies, which coincide well with a "nation party" outlook. See, Kirchheimer, Transformation of the Western European Party Systems," p. 193, 198.

inclination of Turkish voters to favor a two-party arrangement,"[72] which accurately reflects the nature of competition during that period. Though it would have been problematic to assert such an inclination among voters in the 1990s, the parties rewarded by the electorate even in that decade all ostensibly argued that they represented the collective interests of the nation, a feature of Turkish politics that continues into the twenty-first century.

2.3 Intraparty Leadership Structure and the Turkish Party System

Another political cultural norm observed in Turkish political elites that cannot easily be attributed to existing socioeconomic or institutional structures, but important to understand relatively continuous party system dynamics, is the intraparty orientation to party leadership and authority. Consider the following analysis by Karpat in 1959:

> The political parties of Turkey are dominated by personalities. The party—whatever its program—normally becomes subordinated to the leader, and its policy is moulded in accordance with the leader's views, temper, and character. Personality problems are sources of frequent frictions which end in total submission to the leader or by the elimination of the rebels from the party.[73]

As Karpat and others have observed, more or less regardless of where a party positions itself or is positioned relationally in the widely used left-right

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[72] Sayarı, "The Turkish Party System in Transition," p. 42; see also, Dankwart Rustow, "The Development of Parties in Turkey," in Joseph Lapalombara and Myron Wiener, eds. *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 111.
[73] Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 392. Similar observations have been made in more recent years. Sabri Sayarı observes, "the personalistic control of parties by Özal, Ecevit, Erbakan, Çiller and Mesut Yılmaz has even passed the authority and influence that pary leaders enjoyed in earlier times." Sabri Sayarı, "The Changing Party System," p. 25. For a detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see Arsev Bektaş, *Demokratikleşme Sürecinde Liderler Oligarşisi, CHP ve AP, 1961-1980* (Istanbul: Bağlam, 1993); and William Hale, "Democracy and the Party System in Turkey," in Brian Beeley, ed., *Turkish Transformation: New Century New Challenges* (Cambridgeshire, UK: Eothen Press, 2002), pp. 184-8.

understanding,[74] the party leader commands enormous power and control over the affairs of the party, party policy and position-placement of party members such that Turkish parties are extremely centralized with the party leader at the most central axis.   Though the current Political Parties Law leaves the candidate selections procedure to the individual party constitutions,[75] as Özbudun and others have noted, across the political spectrum one finds that it is the party leader and his close associates that determine party nominations.[76] This is especially true of any of the parties that have managed to obtain electoral success, which at a minimum, would be passing the 10 percent national threshold imposed since the implementation of the 1982 Constitution.

Though not a behavior that is condoned—and often censured—by society at large, this oligarchic and heavily centralized approach to party leadership among political elites, often referred to in Turkish as *"lider sultası,"*[77] has important implications for the pattern of interactions within the party system.   While creating

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[74] This is also clear in the work by Bektaş, *Demokratikleşme Sürecinde Liderler Oligarşisi*, p. 195.

[75] In a 2010 study of intraparty authoritarianism in Turkey, Ayan argues that both political culture and institutional structures are at work. However, a closer look at her argument reveals that the institutional effect seems to be predominately a case where the law neither encourages nor constrains authoritarian behavior, leaving it up to the party—i.e. the laws are actually a non-effect. Although the laws do establish hierarchical levels, there is no restriction against the positions indicated being elected through local primaries. What is intriguing is that, despite the freedom, all the major parties regardless of spacial positioning—i.e. 'right' or left'—have chosen a centralized approach with decisions in the hands of a few party elites. This seems to suggest norms that are not directly attributable to institutional factors. Pelin Ayan, "Authoritarian Party Structures in Turkey: A Comparison of the Republican People's Party and the Justice and Development Party," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2010), pp. 199-201. Turan also suggests that, not the laws themselves, but the choices of the party made for authoritarian practices. Turan, "Political Parties and the Party System in Post-1983 Turkey," pp. 64, 69.

[76] Özbudun, *ContemporaryTurkish Politics*, p. 84.

[77] Sultanic or personalistic leadership. For interesting journalistic discussions of this issue, see, Hasan Cemal, "Lider sultası, parti içi demokrasi, istikrar . . ." *Radikal*, 13 May, 2010; and Şahin Alpay, "Lider sultası'ndan kurtulabilir miyiz?" *Zaman*, 3 April, 2010.

a superficially harmonious party exhibiting a great deal of party discipline,[78] it reduces the chances for alternative approaches or opposition within parties along with the opportunity for future leader development, and it increases the possibilities of factional parties[79] and tends toward polarized or belligerent attitudes toward competing parties on personal rather than ideological grounds.

Though backbenchers have shown a high degree of legislative discipline, towing the line that has been determined by party leadership, it occurs at the expense of a lack of toleration toward dissenting or alternative views. Mardin argues that this stems from "an element in Turkish political culture to which the notion of opposition is deeply repugnant," which he sees as a legacy from the Ottoman Empire[80] and the reflection of a "low tolerance of deviance" observed in Turkish society in general.[81] While its origins can be debated, the behavioral norm among political elites seems clear. When the party leader controls the nominations and the expectation that one will conform to the official party position—i.e. the position of the central leadership—is high, the consequences of proposing alternatives or expressing dissent bring a cost beyond the price that most of the hand-picked party representatives would likely bear.[82]

This also seems to likely facilitate several trends in political party composition and behavior. First, when a party leader consolidates the reins of power in his hands, particularly the nomination of candidates and the ability to

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[78] Ergun Özbudun, "Turkey: How Far from Consolidation?" *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1996), pp. 136-7; Frederick Frey, "Patterns of Elite Politics in Turkey," in George Lenczowski, ed., *Political Elites in the Middle East* (Washington, D.C: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975), pp. 67-8.
[79] Turan, "Political Parties and the Party System in Post-1983 Turkey," pp. 64-5.
[80] This phenomenon has also been observed by Sayarı. See Sayarı, "The Turkish Party System in Transition," p. 40.
[81] Mardin, "Opposition and Control in Turkey," p. 380.
[82] Ayan, "Authoritarian Party Structures in Turkey," p. 204.

determine the composition of the party's central committee, it would be a rare leader that would encourage the cultivation of strong party leaders that might soon lead to his or her replacement. Nominees are generally chosen according to their level of loyalty to the head, not on their charisma or ability to cast a new vision for the party. When such potential leadership rears its head, often in the form of alternative perspectives or opposition to centralized party decisions, the typical result is expulsion from the party. This, of course, greatly jeopardizes the fortunes of the party once the leader retires, or passes away; there is nothing left to the party but loyalists who had the characteristics of faithful followers to the now absent leader. This has been the fate of the Motherland Party, the Democrat Left Party, the True Path Party,[83] and the remains of the Milli Görüş movement long led by Necmettin Erbakan, the Felicity Party. This tendencies have been clearly observed in the CHP during the tenure of Deniz Baykal at the helm (1992-2010), and the AKP has also manifested such tendencies,[84] such that it is hard to assure successful continuation of that party post-Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

When the cost of intraparty dissent is so high, the natural offshoot is the factionalization of the parties, leading to new parties centered on potential leaders who were not "given their due" in the parent party. As expected, one sees the continual traces of such a phenomenon throughout the multiparty period.[85] Disgruntled parliament members splinter off to form a new party or join another

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[83] The Motherland Party and the True Path Party have merged to form the Democrat Party, but it too is largely filled with the loyal followers of previous leaders with no strong leader existing to direct the party (as of 2010).

[84] For more detail, see Ayan, "Authoritarian Party Structures in Turkey," pp. 197-215.

[85] Karpat writes, "All the major political parties of Turkey established after 1945 were born directly of dissension and secession in the manner of a chain reaction. . . The intra-party disputes generally were caused by personality conflicts rather than by differences of ideology." Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 390. Sayarı also makes a similar claim about later periods: "The Changing Party System," p. 27.

existing party within which there is greater hope of an upward climb.[86] This is the irony of the centralized intraparty system: a structure intended for unity and harmony in policy and behavior, forces an extreme hand even for what might appear to be minor differences, and leads to attempted and achieved fragmentation[87] in the party system as a whole. Though the electoral system rules, the nature of polarization in society and the electorate have not always rewarded such behaviors, the behavior of establishing faction parties has been a relatively constant feature in political party interaction. Furthermore, the multiplication of parties often has not served a functional purpose; as the new party also presents itself as a "nation party" and, though it usually tries to distinguish itself on one or two minor points of policy or ideology from its parent party, it does not bring any substantially new aspect of representation.

Such a situation creates an interesting paradox: despite the fact that the party system is filled with very similar types of parties, the personalistic form of opposition leads to intractability between parties, and this most often between the parties that are most ideologically similar. When the "center right" and "center left" split into factions centered around strong leaders in the 1980s and 1990s, these parties showed very little ability to work together because the rivalries of the party leaders competing for largely the same electoral population arguably could not work together as it would most clearly demonstrate the lack of necessity for the existence of separate parties with largely the same outlook. The continual polarization pointed out by many scholars, as discussed in chapter three, stems

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[86] Huri Türsan, "Pernicious Party Factionalism as a Constant of Transitions to Democracy in Turkey," *Democratization*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1995), p. 171.

[87] The electorate has not always rewarded this gambit by those attempting to woo voters away from the parent party. See chapter two.

largely from this phenomenon—i.e. party leaders' interpersonal rivalries—and not ideology per se.[88] The level of actual ideological difference has most frequently been minimal, with periodic exceptions, and the polarization that has been the continuous phenomenon of the system has been the polarization between belligerent and competing elites.[89] Polarization that is shaped around issues salient to the electorate has also been observed, but unlike the other type of polarization, this "ideological polarization" has been more periodic and turns in cycles with the waxing and waning of the significance of various political issues of contention.

Understanding this phenomenon helps to explain the regular observance of fragmentation in the Turkish party system along with the nature of competition between parties and for the votes of the public. Though on one hand, the apparent "nation party" value among the elites and the voters would suggest a system filled with numerous parties with substantially overlapping ideological and party platforms, the nature of the authority structure of the parties centralized around one leader and his or her handpicked central committee often brings about fierce and non-consensual competition, usually between parties springing from the same roots. This is not to say that issues, policy and ideology do not have an important place within the system or that Turkish politics is best explained as the public casting their votes in an elite popularity contest, but without understanding the battle of personalities occurring at the top, and the nature of factionalization in Turkey often

[88] Kalaycıoğlu, discussing polarization between parties in the 1950s refers to this as "a political culture of intolerance to opposition," an argument also made by Mardin. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu , "Elections and Governance," in Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer (eds.), *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p. 59; Mardin "Opposition and Control in Turkey," p. 380; Çarkoğlu makes a similar observation regarding this dynamic in the party system, writing that this intra-elite contest has "contributed to its intense and non-consensual nature." Ali Çarkoğlu, "The Turkish Party System in Transition: Party Performance and Agenda Change," *Political Studies*, Vol. 46 (1998), p. 546.
[89] Çarkoğlu, "Turkish Party System in Transition," p. 551.

resulting in new parties that are mirror images of the parent party, it would be difficult to explain the fairly constant polarized behaviors existing among the political elites. In fact, when we examine periods of relatively harmonious coalitions in the parliament, the parties involved have always been from differing ideological positions, not those of shared political outlook.

2.4 Electoral System Change and the Party System in Turkey

In 1961, after initiating multiparty politics with a multi-member district plurality voting, the Turkish voters entered a system operating on a type of d'Hondt proportional representation, a change instigated by the National Unity Committee put in place after the coup d'etat on the 27th of May, 1960. This new system was altered by political elites twice more prior to general elections in the 1960s. After the military intervention on September 12, 1980 and the subsequent constitution drafted by the ruling junta and passed by referendum in 1982, d'Hondt style proportional representation was maintained with the addition of a 10 percent national threshold, which was also fiddled with a number of times by political elites, but which, as of 2011, still retains its basic structure as outlined in 1982.

To what extent can we attribute change in the party system to change in the rules governing the electoral system? Certainly, the hands involved in the various manipulations of the electoral system rules, whether large or small, intended the changes to affect a result in how the existing pattern of interaction between parties themselves and the electorate was taking place. Where the military was the primary hand altering the rules of the contest, the changes were more drastic and aimed at solving what appeared to be the essential causes of regime breakdown that had

instigated military intervention and rule. Thus, when the power of the governing political elite was such that it allowed for authoritarian behavior by the ruling party, the response was to limit this power by a drastic switch to proportional representation. In the 1970s, when no party could achieve an absolute majority, minor coalition partners maximized their blackmail potential yet offered no stability or efficacy of government or legislative power; thus, in the 1980 intervention, the military tried to prevent these blackmailers, often extremist parties, and fragmentation by establishing a high national threshold. The military of course was able to carry out such measures as it did not really have to operate within a democratic framework, which would normally restrict how much change would take place.[90] Where the manipulations were instigated by political elites, the trajectory of the changes—toward increased possibility of proportionality or disproportionality—were predictably in favor of those seeking the changes. Thus, when a coalition of minor parties sought to alter the system, it was in a direction that mathematically favored smaller parties,[91] and vice versa. The intentions behind these changes signal a clear desire to reshape the pattern of electoral competition among parties in the system; were these intentions realized in actual operation? An answer to the resounding positive would suggest that it would thus be futile to look at paradigms and structures outside of the electoral system to understand party system change in Turkey, we need only observe how the rules of the system of

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[90] Consider for example, that the Justice Party, which a majority of votes and seats, was not able to pass a motion to return to the previous plurality system—they were prevented by filibuster—but were only able to manage a slight alteration in that general direction (disproportionality that favored the major parties), and that only after review by the Constitutional Court. See William Hale, "The Role of the Electoral System in Turkish Politics," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1980), p. 407.

[91] For such an example, see ibid., pp. 405-6.

competition changed and thus how those changes resulted in the changes observed in the party system. How well does such an argument hold up?

Starting with Duverger, there have been many who have claimed an important role for electoral systems in the shaping of party systems. Duverger's well-known "laws" go as follows: "The majority single-ballot system tends to party dualism" and "The second-ballot system and proportional representation tend to multipartyism."[92] Thus, the type of system would seem to create conditions that favored or limited how many parties would be involved in the contest. In the 1990s, when the concern of scholars in the field of comparative politics was directed toward the issue of democratization and consolidation of democracy due to the ambiguities arising from the explosion of so-called "third wave" democracies, the issue of electoral system engineering was allotted significant space in volumes and journals,[93] based on the assumption that the results could be deterministic for the fate of the party system and democracy, particularly in the newly emerging regimes.[94]

There has, of course, been a great deal of subsequent criticism of and attempts at amending Duverger's "laws", especially regarding the issue of determinacy and

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[92] Quoted in Giovanni Sartori, "The Influence of Electoral Systems: Faulty Laws or Faulty Method?" in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, eds., *Electoral Laws and their Political Consequences* (New York: Agathon Press, 1986), pp. 43-4.

[93] Two well-known quality works emerging from this context are, Arend Lijphart, *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). Lijphart concludes his book with a chapter entitled "Electoral Engineering," ending with "This study . . . may have more to offer to electoral engineers in the new democracies than in these twenty-seven old democracies," p. 152; Pippa Norris, "Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems," *International Political Science Review,* Vol. 18, No. 3 (1997), pp. 297-312. After demarcating the pros and cons of various systems, Norris concludes, "In constitutional design, despite the appeal of 'electoral engineering', there appear to be no easy choices," p. 311.

[94] For an example of such studies, see Christopher Anderson, "Parties, Party Systems, and Satisfaction with Democratic Performance in the New Europe," *Political Studies*, Vol. 46 (1998), pp. 572-88.

the claims regarding proportional representation in particular.[95] Sartori, in this regard, makes what seems to be a crucial distinction between *constraining* and *unconstraining* electoral systems, the former systems increasing the level of disproportionality of representation (single-ballot plurality systems with multi-member districts being at the high end of this spectrum) and the latter increasing the proportionality (pure proportional representation being at the extreme end on this side). He writes, "If it is utterly unconstraining, we have no cause to pursue the matter: the electoral system has no effect [on the voter]," and "contrary to a still widespread opinion . . . the greater the proportionality of PR, the lesser its impact."[96] In other words, as electoral systems approach pure proportional representation, the system does not cause any outcome—such as an increase of parties—but is a non-cause; voters can vote without constraints. Lijphart, in his seminal study of electoral systems and party systems, concludes that the effects of the electoral system on the characteristics of party systems "are much weaker than those between the electoral system and the degree of disproportionality. This also means that for the electoral engineers the electoral system is not as strong an instrument for shaping the party system."[97] This is particularly true in regard to the

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[95] Douglas Rae, for example, while turning Duverger's two laws into various propositions of similarity and differential, tries to quantify these relationships through his well-known index of fractionalization. Douglas Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967/1971). William Riker also attempts a clarifying revision of the laws that would account for the Indian party system through positing a "Condorcet" case amending the first "law." William Riker, "Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 76, No. 4 (1982), pp. 753-66. Sartori, perhaps most comprehensively, provides his own set of four rules in response to Duverger. Giovanni Sartori, "The Party Effects of Electoral Systems," in Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther (eds.), *Political Parties and Democracy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), pp. 90-105.
[96] Sartori, "The Influence of Electoral Systems," p. 54.
[97] Lijphart, *Electoral Systems and Party Systems*, p. 141.

total number of "effective" or competing parties in the party system.[98] Even as far as the "effective parties" in the party system is concerned,[99] in the 27 countries study by Lijphart, the electoral system was able to explain only up to 28 percent of the variance in party systems.[100] This suggests that though the electoral system has an obvious effect of constraining voter choice (if, of course, the electoral system increases disproportionality), the other possible actors, including structure, political elites and parties, and central values have an important measure of maneuverability in establishing the ultimate structure of a party system.

Sartori makes an additional claim in regard to electoral systems that could be seen as an alternative argument, which should be addressed here if only to largely dismiss its application to the Turkish case. For Sartori, the potential effect that an electoral system might have on a party system also depends on whether or not the party system itself is "structured"—i.e. institutionalized. He writes, "So long as the voter is personality-oriented, so long as he merely votes for a person, parties remain labels of little, if any, consequence. Hence, as long as these conditions prevail, the party system is not structured."[101] Thus, under such conditions, the predictable impact of electoral systems is moot. If, as will be argued below, the electoral system has had very little clear impact on the party system in Turkey, could this not be the explanative interpretation?

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[98] Ibid., p. 141; Sartori, "The Influence of Electoral Systems," p. 55.
[99] By "effective parties," Lijphart is referring here to the commonly used conceptualization of "effective parties" as conceived by Laakso and Taagepera, in which the effective number is calculated by dividing one by the sum of the squares of each parties fractional share of the vote. Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera, "'Effective' Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1979), pp. 3-27.
[100] Lijphart, *Electoral Systems and Party Systems*, p. 142.
[101] Sartori, "The Influence of Electoral Systems," p. 55.

Though, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the charisma of party leaders is a widely sought out trait and certainly impacts party fortunes and fragmentation of parties has usually occurred due to oligarchic or "sultanic" leadership approaches more than significant ideological differences,[102] there is clearly structure in the Turkish party system. There is, as Sartori calls it, a "system of channelment" within the political society through which voting decisions can be made. It would be hard to argue that for parties such as the CHP and the nationalist MHP[103] that "the individual [leader] 'elects' the party" but rather, that it is these parties "that elect (put in office) the individual [leader]."[104] Probably the space in Turkish politics commonly referred to as the "center-right" might at least superficially seem the least structured in this regard, but there are good reasons to believe otherwise. Though the party of the "center-right" has consistently changed (historically, this was often due to military intervention) and most clearly guided by a strong, charismatic leader, whose political existence has often been synonymous with the existence of the party, there has always been at least one major party functioning as a "system of channelment" for this space in national politics. Though the ideology of this particular political location has been arguably indefinite and flexible, the need for this political space—i.e. the center-right—has not been as flexible. Thus, the basis for structure was not the party or parties, which come and go, but the spatial location in Turkish politics. Leaders may emerge with new parties centered strongly on their authority, but the success of the party has arguably been in its

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[102] Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 390.
[103] The Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP) was the party founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923, and the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Haraket Partisi, MHP) can trace itself back to 1965 when Colonel Alparslan Türkeş took over party leadership. See Joseph Szyliowicz, "The Turkish Elections: 1965," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (1966), p. 477.
[104] This is one of the indicators that the system is taking on a structure. Ibid., p. 55

ability to convince a segment of the population that it is continuing the legacy of this well-established relational location in Turkish politics. Thus, prior to the 1961 election, the new parties running against the CHP were not primarily strategically bent on magnifying a particular leader, but rather convincing the electorate that they were the true legacy bearers of the defunct Democrat Party, which had first established that political space. When "left-right" terminology began to be widely appropriated in the Turkish system, new parties could argue that they were taking up that relational "center-right" (or "the social center") positioning or following the legacy of the Democrat Party, both strategies employed by the currently ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Thus, though one might argue that certain parties in Turkish politics are not institutionalized, the macro-channels of representation, shaping the party system itself, have been institutionalized. While it would be foolish to ignore the impact of strong party leadership and its effects on the party system in Turkey, possibly inhibiting the institutionalization of certain parties, electoral competition is still primarily *politically*-oriented not "personality-oriented" as an alternative argument derived from Sartori's proposition might suggest.

Though one cannot completely discount the electoral system changes, the effect of these on the party system does not seem to have the influence that is even sometimes attributed to it.[105] Consider for example, the most drastic change—the

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[105] For such a counter-attribution, see Üstun Ergüder and Richard Hofferbert, "The 1983 General Elections in Turkey: Continuity or Change in Voting Patterns," in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds), *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), p. 94. On the other hand, William Hale, while giving some significance to the electoral system, looking at the actual statistical results in conjunction with electoral system change, writes, "there is a very imperfect fit between the between the proportionality of the system and the number of parties represented in parliament." William Hale, "Democracy and the Party System," p. 177.

switch from plurality to proportional representation—in the electoral system. How much did it alter how people voted or how the parties interacted with each other? Without a doubt, there was a serious increase in proportionality, since the multiple

Figure 2.1 – Fragmentation away from Two-Party System

member district plurality led to extremely disproportionate seat allocations in the National Assembly in 1946, 1950, 1954, and 1957. With the d'Hondt system and multiple member districts, this disparity was greatly reduced, but despite some claims of increasing fragmentation of the vote, it seemed to have had only a mild impact on voter tendencies to favor the two-largest parties.

For example, the biggest effect on the number of effective parties in 1961 was due, not to new electoral laws, but to the impact of the ambiguity as to which of several parties would effectively carry the mantle of the Democrat Party, shut down by court order on a technicality in 1960.[106] If one "corrects" for this ambiguity by combining the vote totals of the two new parties most clearly making this claim,[107] the fragmentation of the vote seems to remain on the same path it was taking prior to the electoral system change (see Figure 2.1). Furthermore, that the fragmentation

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[106] Ergun Özbudun, "The Turkish Party System: Institutionalization, Polarization, and Fragmentation," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1981), p. 230.
[107] The other two parties, the CHP and the CKMP had been competitors of the DP prior to the coup.

that existed stemmed from the confusion about which party would bear the DP's legacy can be seen by the fact that if the electoral results had occurred within a pluralistic system as had been previously implemented, the disproportionality of the results would have been at its lowest level yet due to the fact that from province to province a predominantly two-party system was maintained, but the two parties contesting from province to province differed.[108]

Fragmentation of the vote away from the two largest parties had already begun in the 1950s under an extremely disproportionate plurality system. Under the plurality system, besides the CHP, DP, and the minor seat winners, the Nation Party and the Freedom Party, Karpat lists 23 other parties (including the Peasants' Party, which merged with the Nation Party) that actively competed (quite unsuccessfully) in elections, at least seven of these independently active through the last general election with a plurality system in 1957. It is true that, as time progressed, the two-party trend receded at a secular pace, reaching a low point in 1973, and one might reasonably posit "path dependence" as a possible explanation for the slow pace of fragmentation despite the significant institutional changes. However, even here, the trend away from a two-party system was clearly reversing by 1977 with the two largest parties garnering more than 78 percent of the total vote. Thus, under such a drastic proportionality change, what is surprising is not the level of fragmentation, rather the length to which the system maintained a system largely centered on two major parties considering all the other options. In this regard, the drastic change

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[108] See Erol Tuncer and Necati Danacı, *Çok Partili Dönemde Seçimler ve Seçim Sistemleri* (Ankara: TESAV Yayınları, 2003), p. 76.

from plurality to proportional representation from an electoral standpoint, would have to be understood as largely a non-effect as a reading of Sartori would predict.

On the other hand, the electoral system, though it did not distract the electorate itself from an overall two-party trend, it also certainly did not prevent (as a non-effect) factions from splitting away from major parties to form minor parties. Thus, particularly parties such as the Republican Reliance Party, a faction of the CHP, and the Democratic Party, a faction of the Justice Party could break away from the major party, knowing that the electoral system would not be a strong barrier to their fortunes. While this must be acknowledged, one might also be wary of taking this premise too far. The fragmentation of the vote in the 1950s came primarily from the Nation Party and the Freedom Party, which were both formed from factions splitting off from the Democrat Party. Furthermore, as provincially-based clustering allowed space for the Nation Party and the Freedom Party to enter parliament under very strict pluralistic rules, the splinter parties in the late 1960s and 1970s also displayed similar clustering techniques that would have guaranteed them some seats in parliament regardless of the electoral system. In other words, these parties, even under proportional representation were not experiencing even distribution of the vote throughout all the provinces; instead, in certain provinces, they were generating a following that resulted in their winning a plurality in those localities.[109]

After the military increased the possibility of disproportionate allocation of seating favoring the largest parties by instituting a nationwide 10 percent threshold,

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[109] Tuncer and Danacı, Çok Partili Dönemde Seçimler, pp. 82, 85.

despite the exact opposite intention of the military,[110] the speed of fragmentation of votes was notoriously astonishing. Although the fragmentation of *seats* was temporary curbed by government legislation that decreased constituency sizes (increasing disproportionality in favor of the largest parties) prior to the 1987 general election,[111] by the 1990s, five parties passed the threshold in each of the three general elections in this decade and by 1999, the top two parties could only garner 40.1 percent of the vote *combined*. Furthermore, unlike the regional clustering of minor parties under both electoral systems preceding the 1980 coup, votes for minor parties with under one percent of the national vote experienced diffuse support across provinces despite having no potential to pass the threshold.[112]

Under the same electoral system, since the 2002 election, the trend has reversed with only three parties passing the 10 percent threshold and the top two parties taking 67.5 percent of the vote in 2007. Thus, though the changes could be seen as changing some of the dynamics of the party system in the governing and legislative arena, in the electoral arena, which is the particular focus of this study, the electoral system changes provide only minor assistance in explicating party system change.

The fragmentation of the post-1983 period, of course, had much to do with the artificial nature of the return to politics in the initial election in 1983 and was of a different nature than the fragmentation of earlier periods. In 1983, parties were artificially established under the junta's tutelage while a large set of experienced

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[110] Sayarı, "The Changing Party System," p. 28; Kalaycıoğlu, "Elections and Governance," p. 55; and Ergüder and Hofferbert, "The 1983 General Elections in Turkey," p. 89.

[111] Sabri Sayarı, "Political Parties, Party Systems and Economic Reforms: The Turkish Case," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (1996/97), p. 34.

[112] From 1983 to 1995, for example, every party on the ballot, even the most insignificant ones, were able to receive some votes from every province.

political elites sat on the sidelines restricted from participating. When the inevitable opportunity arose for these experienced politicians and party structures to reenter the contest, starting immediately after the 1983 general election and culminating with the critical referendum that allowed for all party leaders to return in 1987, the politicians that had benefited from the absence of the veterans were, of course, not willing to simply step aside. Thus, the fragmentation of the party system, unlike the fragmentation that had occurred in earlier periods, came not from factions splitting from parties, but from the entrance of duplicate parties that had been prevented from running in the initial election. The coalition disasters that began to occur in the 1990s and the unwillingness for the ideological pairs to unite brought increasing disapproval from the electorate. The existing contraction of the party system since 2002 that has limited the contest to a "neo-center-right" governing party, a primary "center-left" opposition party, minor nationalist party with a relatively stable electoral base, and the small Kurdish leftist-nationalist party is much closer to the shape that the military framers of the electoral system initially intended, though not all the parties would have been their envisioned ideals. In this sense, it could be argued that, once the artificiality was extracted from the system, through a series of structural and ideological crises, the limiting 10 percent national threshold is beginning to bear some of the fruit of its intended purpose. The existing electoral system has begun to weed out and prevent the distracting emergence of factional parties, even those led by politicians of otherwise promising potential.[113] In this sense, we might argue that the current nature of electoral politics and the spoils of

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[113] In 2002, Ismail Cem's New Turkey Party could be seen as one example. The politicians that have split off from the AKP and formed their own party, such as Abdüllatif Şener's Turkey Party have also shown little potential to attract voters. The People's Voice Party formed by Professor Numan Kurtulmuş after he broke away from the Felicity Party also seems destined to the same fate.

the ballot box are the most closely in tandem with and explained by the electoral system than they have ever been in the Republic's multiparty system history.

2.5 Conclusion

Opportunities for change take place within contexts and within these contingent environments certain types of change are encouraged or discouraged. Though many of the attitudes and orientations toward politics have changed throughout the years, some have seemed to persist at least until the present and have had what seems to be significant impact on the functioning of the Turkish party system and electoral competition. The predominant values internalized by the voting citizen and political elites have important implications on the type of parties that flourish in the system and how those parties behave toward the electorate and one another. In Turkey, rather than emphasizing the interests of particular groups in society with the understanding that the balance of interests between parties adds up to or approaches the general interest, parties are generally expected to represent the interests of all groups and the nation at the party level. This clearly impacts how parties interact and the strategies that they employ in order to garner votes at election time. Furthermore, the existing norms related to leadership authority within parties have observable implications toward party system fragmentation and polarization stemming from uncooperative behaviors, issues that will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.

Though the institution of the electoral system, normally an agent of continuity, has been the focus of numerous changes and alterations, its power to direct change in the party system has had less of an impact than might typically be anticipated.

Though since 1961, its proportional rules have made it less a constraining force than the rules for plurality operating in the 1950s, the changes that have taken place could arguably be better attributed to other intervening forces. For most of Turkey's historical electoral competition, the electoral rules have not strongly stood in the way of either fragmentation or contraction of the system, which was instead spurred on by forces related to the political paradigms or the process of transition from one paradigm to another.

Though there have been a number of constraints that have set some of the boundaries within which contestation has taken place to this point in the history of the Turkish party system, these constraints have only provided historical limitations to its operation,[114] they cannot explain how the system has operated within these boundaries, an issue particularly salient when seeking to understand a particular case. How parties and political elites have responded in unique ways to changing contexts and how their fellow competitors have in turn responded to these initiatives, within the boundaries set by this "continuities", remains of critical importance in understanding how the system has operated through its history.[115]

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[114] The author also wishes to acknowledge once again that these observed constraints, such as the value toward "nation parties," can change or be altered in the future. These are also not fixed.
[115] In this regard, Sayarı writes, "The ability of party leaders to adapt to changing social and economic conditions and transform their parties has had a major impact on the dynamics of the party system as a whole." Sayarı, "The Changing Party System," p. 28.

CHAPTER 3

VOLATILITY, FRAGMENTATION, AND POLARIZATION:
MEASURING CHANGE

For many writers,
the classification of party systems begins with numbers;
for some, this is also where classification ends.[1]

In attempting to describe the operation of the Turkish party system, students of

Turkish politics and the party system in particular have often turned to the tools of

terminology and formulaic indices frequently employed within the field of

comparative politics for help in making sense of the observed phenomena in the

Turkish case. Most frequently, the descriptors "volatility, fragmentation, and

polarization"[2] and their widely-utilized formula have been employed to

characterize the salient features of political and voting behavior, especially since

the 1970s. Though these descriptors were conceived to measure change, they

have often been used to posit continuity—continuous change. Thus, considering

their frequent application to the party system in Turkey, it seems worthwhile to

investigate how these have been used in other contexts, what potential logical or

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[1] Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair, *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilization of European Electorates 1885-1985* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 130.
[2] By volatility "the net electoral change between two consecutive elections" is intended. See Ibid., p. 19. Fragmentation of votes refers to the change in the number of parties competing in electoral contests. Polarization reflects the "distance" between parties or social groups in relation to issues, ideology, or consensus.

explanative problems have arisen in their utilization in scholarship regarding this country, how they might logically apply to the Turkish case, and what they do and do not tell us.

While on one level it certainly seems reasonable to posit these descriptors as indicative of the Turkish case across time, how these descriptors are being used and how they interact is often left to the imagination. Lumping together descriptors that could likely be interacting in very important ways potentially removes the opportunity for a rich understanding of the dynamics of a system. These three concepts—volatility, fragmentation, and polarization—referred to in one account as the "Bermuda Triangle" of the Turkish party system,[3] though listed so as to suggest continuity, seem best employed to pinpoint and investigate change. Thus, while it might be true that these three are regularly appearing dynamics in the system, observing alterations in their interactions could be of greater benefit than emphasizing their continuous presence.

An additional danger, evident in the comparative literature in general—as the chapter's initial quotation suggest—and the Turkish case in particular, is to endow these concepts and their formulas with causal significance, suggesting that the indicators are not merely symptoms of the state of the party system, but the continuous "malady" causing undesirable results in the system. Furthermore, the convenient formulas for such descriptors, such as those put forth by Rae, Pedersen and Laakso and Taagepera, are crude measures that operate from a distant view of the system, missing crucial elements and potentially misguiding interpretations in

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[3] Üstün Ergüder and Richard Hofferbert, "The 1983 General Elections in Turkey: Continuity or Change in Voting Patterns," in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 80s (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), p. 85.

certain cases. Though useful, if distant or rough, the formulas and the data derived from them necessitate an accompanying observational logic and the understanding that these are tools to help locate the acting forces upon or within the system, not the manifestation of the primary acting forces themselves.

The clarification of how the particular concepts are being used is also of critical importance. For example, the concept "polarization" can be understood in various ways and operates very differently from context to context. Whether or not we are talking about ideological or personalistic polarization would lead us to very different conclusions regarding its interaction. While the former could be conceivably functioning to limit volatility and fragmentation, the latter would likely increase fragmentation. Is polarization occurring on an elite level or is it reflected in cleavages in society? Is the polarization pro-system—i.e. emphasizing divisions along the current lines of political contestation, which would likely increase voter turnout—or it is anti-system, challenging the existing lines within which politics is framed and leaving many in the electorate disillusioned and frustrated with the status quo. In other words, "polarization" is not simply "polarization" and must be located, delineated carefully and, ideally, measured when used to explain a particular case. Leaving the intended meaning of polarization in the text to the interpretation of the reader could further confound a full comprehension of the interactional nature of the various descriptors, the consequences of which will be demonstrated in greater detail below.

Another important consideration is the intention and context from which these descriptors were derived and how to transfer the employed formulas and

interpretation with the intention of studying the Turkish or any other particular case. Though it is true that volatility, fragmentation and polarization have been correlated with political instability, this relationship is also clearly related to particular contexts: what a certain parallel level of volatility or fragmentation means for Turkey could be associated with very different interpretations in Switzerland. If a formula tells us that volatility in some Western European country has been around 8.5 over a certain period while it hovered around 20 in Turkey across the same time span,[4] what does that tell us? Does higher volatility necessarily mean that it is representative of a systemic malady, or might different average levels of volatility relate to particular contexts and varying dynamics? If so, the different rates superficially demonstrate neither a positive or negative manifestation, but one that needs to be explained by deeper investigation.

For example, a country clearly divided across varying ethnic or religious groups who each give their vote in mass to a party that represents only their identities could conceivably have a volatility rate approaching zero, but most analysts would likely not give an optimistic prognosis for the longevity of such a democratic regime. This, perhaps, seems obvious, but the implications of underlying assumptions toward volatility, which often involve a standard of comparison to "Advanced Industrial Democracies" when "non-Western" countries are the focus of study, could be quite misleading in individual cases and, thus, the numbers for such descriptors, such as volatility or fragmentation, should not speak for themselves, but must be placed within the particular context and

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[4] This approximation has been given in the Turkish case, for example, by Çarkoğlu for the period 1954 through 1995. He determined an average volatility of 21.2. Ali Çarkoğlu, "The Turkish Party System in Transition: Party Performance and Agenda Transformation," *Political Studies*, Vol. 46 (1998), p. 547.

then evaluated. This suggests the need to be aware of both the context from whence the concepts were conceived and the environment in which those concepts are being applied in the specific case.

3.1 Volatility in Comparative Literature and in Turkish Electoral Behavior

In 1979, Mogens Pedersen established the widely used and simple formula to measure electoral volatility. If one takes the absolute value of the gain and loss of each competing party between the current and previous elections and divide by two, one can determine the level of electoral volatility from election to election.[5] With such an index, the range of volatility can range from 0, in which all parties received the exact same percentage of votes in both elections, and 100, where all parties competing in the subsequent election are new (the 1983 election in Turkey being such an example). While the formula itself is easily understood and easily applied, it is important to note the context in which Pedersen was using the formula and why.

Both the context and the purpose behind Pedersen's study can be derived from the original title of his original article: "The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility."[6] The context of the article is clearly the European—particularly consolidated Western and Northern European—party systems with the expressed intention to understand change and patterns "diachronically." According to the author, the article was prompted by the "phenomena of change . . . visible primarily, but not solely, in the Northern

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[5] Mogens Pedersen, "Electoral Volatility in Western Europe, 1948-1977," in Peter Mair, ed., *The West European Party System* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 198-9.
[6] Mogens Pedersen, "The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility," *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1979), pp. 1-26.

European countries."[7] This concern arose out of what appeared to be manifest

deviation from the "freezing" of party systems posited by Lipset and Rokkan in

1967.[8] Note how Pedersen describes the impetus for the creation of the index for

volatility:

> If we want to concentrate attention on ongoing format change, we
> therefore have to devise measures of change that will discriminate
> among systems; which will reflect similarities and differences
> between diachronic patterns; and which are fairly easy to interpret in a
> theoretically meaningful way.[9]

Thus, the purpose behind the measurements is in order to *compare* and search for

change, and perhaps, *patterns of change*. This is in fact what Pedersen does in the

article when he applies the measurement to the thirteen European countries he

studies. He's using the index to examine both the differences *between* countries

and the changes in volatility *within* a country over time.[10]

Why is this significant? Pedersen is not using the index to say that France is

a high volatility nation and that Switzerland is a country with low volatility and

leaving it at that, as if the rate itself was a meaningful descriptor of the system—

i.e. high volatility represents a poorly functioning system while low volatility is

the mark of a superior system. His emphasis is on understanding if and how

volatility rates in France or Switzerland are changing, and if so, why? The salient

issue is change and patterns of change, and whether or not similar patterns of

change can be detected across nations. Furthermore, Pedersen is evaluating a

particular set of countries whose geographical proximity and political histories

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[7] Pedersen, "Electoral Volatility in Western Europe," p. 196.
[8] Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignment:
An Introduction," in Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds, *Party Systems and Voter Alignment:
Cross-National Perspectives* (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 1-64.
[9] Pedersen, "Electoral Volatility in Western Europe," p. 198.
[10] Ibid., pp. 200, 202.

would likely demonstrate overlapping trends in relation to volatility; however, even among such a group of cases, distinct variance in patterns of volatility and trends over time could be seen. In short, the volatility numbers do not provide an explanation for any case, but simply provide the tools assisting explanation of a case or cases over time.

Additionally, in terms of volatility, there is a great deal that the numbers don't tell us. As Bartolini and Mair have pointed out, though in a very crude sense this measurement of the aggregate net electoral change could be seen as representing the minimum amount of actual volatility, even this is complicated by a regular influx of new voters and changes in electoral turnout.[11] This is an issue of considerable importance for Turkey, which experiences a net average of 3 million new voters with each national election. From the general election in 1950 to the general election in 2007, the population of registered voters went from less than 9 million to almost 43 million,[12] an increase approaching 500 percent. In contrast to the shrinking populations in the advanced industrial nations of Europe, the phenomenon of which would likely encourage stable voting patterns and limit volatility, such population increases are a serious confounding factor in national aggregate volatility scores for Turkey.

For one example of these challenges, the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi-MSP) garnered 11.8 percent of the vote in 1973. In the 1977 election, the party increased its votes by more than 4,000, but their overall percentage slipped to 8.6 percent. How can we explain what has occurred with

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[11] Bartolini and Mair, *Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability,* p. 21.
[12] Official Electoral data for general elections can be found in, *Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri 1923-2007* (Ankara: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, 2008).

volatility scores that only measure the aggregate net change in percentage of votes won? Ultimately, we cannot. Did every voter in 1973 cast their vote again for the MSP along with approximately four thousand new voters? How do we account for the four million additional voters who cast votes in 1977, but for whatever reason—disinterest, inability, etc.—had not voted in 1973? How do these changes affect the composition of votes received by parties from election to election? Accounting for a 3.2 percent loss of votes becomes extremely complicated when we begin digging under the surface. Thus, while national aggregate volatility scores give us a glance at possible changes in preferences among the electorate, it remains at a great distance and tells us very little about changes taking place at the group, class or individual level.

Table 3.1 provides the total volatility for general elections in Turkey since 1950 along with the volatility occurring between voting blocs.[13] Several observations can be made from the data fairly quickly: with the exception of elections following a military intervention and a few notable exceptions including 1954 and 2002, the general numbers for volatility have indeed hovered

Table 3.1 Electoral Volatility

Period	Total Vol.	Inter-bloc	Intra-bloc
1950-1954	4.5	4.5	0.0
1954-1957	11.0	6.0	5.0
1957-1961	56.8*	4.3	52.5
1961-1965	29.8	3.8	26.0
1965-1969	14.8	5.6	9.2
1969-1973	30.1*	2.0	28.1
1973-1977	18.3	5.7	12.6
1977-1983	100.0*	13.1	86.9
1983-1987	38.5	2.9	35.6
1987-1991	17.4	1.9	15.5
1991-1995	22.7	1.7	21.0
1995-1999	22.6	7.7	14.9
1999-2002	57.0	4.1	52.9
2002-2007	19.4	5.1	14.3
AVERAGE	23.3*	4.9	26.7

* Elections following military intervention. Average is calculated without these.

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[13] See Bartolini and Mair, *Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability*, pp. 22-3.

around 20 percent as noted also by Çarkoğlu,[14] and the volatility occurring between voting blocs has been minimal, at least from the perspective of net change. Thus, where volatility has been high, it has largely operated *within blocs* rather than across them.[15] What does such an overview tell us? Why has total volatility in general elections in Turkey remained high? Is this a sign of a lack of institutionalization? What is the significance of high total volatility in relation to fairly low volatility across blocks?

In the initial studies of volatility, as is true with Pedersen's study and a number of other seminal works on party systems,[16] the essential cases were largely well-established Western European democracies. With the explosion of new democracies in Eastern Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia after the fall of the Soviet bloc, there was new motivation to investigate and compare these new democracies with the older, established countries of Western Europe. What was discovered was that the volatility in these new countries appeared to be significantly higher than in the more established democratic regimes; [17]

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[14] Çarkoğlu, "The Turkish Party System in Transition," p. 547.

[15] This has also been noted by Özbudun, who provides a table effectively showing the continuation of percentage votes received by each bloc (left and right) over time. Ergun Özbudun, "Changes and Continuities in the Turkish Party System," *Representation*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2006), p. 130. Sayarı also has demonstrated that volatility between blocs has been substantially less than volatility within blocs. Sabri Sayarı, "Towards a New Turkish Party System," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2007), p. 200.

[16] For other seminal studies addressing volatility in Western Europe, see Bartolini and Mair, *Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability*; and Peter Mair, *Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

[17] For example, see Scott Mainwaring, *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 21-60; Scott Mainwaring and Edurne Zoco, "Political Sequences and the Stabilization of Interparty Competition: Electoral Volatility in Old and New Democracies," *Party Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2007), pp. 155-78; Christopher Anderson, "Parties, Party Systems, and Satisfaction with Democratic Performance in the New Europe," *Political Studies*, Vol. 46 (1998), pp. 572-88. A similar comparison in a well-known studies were made for old and new Latin American democracies. See, Kenneth Roberts and Erik Wibbels, "Party Systems and Electoral Volatility in Latin America: A Test of Economic,

furthermore, these fledgling countries' struggles with instability seemed to be paired with the observable rates of relatively higher volatility often with the assumption that swings in the electorate was due to "weak institutions." Compounding this has been the frequent observation that, as a whole, these established democracies in Europe are encountering a trend toward higher total volatility scores, if not on scores between blocs.[18] How should all of these observations be interpreted?

In a study of volatility between old and new democracies, Mainwaring and Zoco, studying 47 countries over time and controlling for a number of possible variables, discovered that the chief determinant of low levels of volatility is the age of the democracy, and that volatility within countries did not tend to decrease over time whether or not the democratic regime was consolidated.[19] For example, despite the impact of any other variables, the model predicted that a democracy emerging in 1945 would have an average volatility of 16 while a democracy initiated in 1980 would have a volatility of 24.4.[20] Interestingly, if one removes the elections in Turkey that occurred in exceptional circumstances following military intervention, the average falls between these two predicted values.

Why would age of the democracy but not the years of the existence of democracy make such a difference? Mainwaring and Zoco argue that the period in which enfranchisement occurred is crucial because in the older democracies, as

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Institutional, and Structural Explanations," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 93, No. 3 (1999), pp. 575-90.

[18] Mair has consistently shown that the increasing volatility is occurring within blocs rather than between them, such that the votes are staying within the "family" so to speak. Mair, *Party System Change,* pp. 79-82.

[19] Mainwaring and Zoco, "Political Sequences," p. 165.

[20] Ibid., pp. 165-6.

new blocs of voters entered the system for the first time, parties that represented these groups, such as laborers or farmers, either formed to represent these identities or fought prior to enfranchisement for these groups to become full-fledged democratic citizens.[21] Thus, for members of these groups, their identity and citizenship is bound together with these parties that facilitated or emerged during their enfranchisement. Because these groups were easily identifiable and because the parties themselves needed financial support to maintain their activities, membership and mobilization and education were emphasized and, thus, they operated as mass parties.[22] A party system that is at least partly composed of this type of party, functioning as an identity mobilizer, will tend to have lower volatility. As Bartolini and Mair write, "the mass enfranchisement of new voters represents the single most important moment in the structuring of party systems."[23] Why was it so crucial in structuring these systems? "New mass parties in the period approaching and subsequent to the extension of the franchise to the mass of the citizenry effectively minimized the potential for new political formations."[24] Mass parties limited the potentially available votes in the system with a clear consequence for electoral volatility.

On the other hand, in countries in which television became a mass phenomenon before the consolidation of electoral cleavages, the more technological, pragmatic approaches enabled politicians to persuade the masses directly through the media at a distance without the hassle and inefficiency of

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[21] Ibid., p. 166.
[22] For more on this categorization and its absence in the Turkish case, see chapter two.
[23] Bartolini and Mair, *Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability*, p. 147.
[24] Ibid., p. 147.

mass party structures.[25] New realities have made it more likely for votes to be acquired by methods of persuasion with the natural consequence of such methods being that the electorate, without close affiliational ties to any particular party, will "shop around" even if they stay within certain relational or ideological boundaries. In such a context, without mobilized voting and with an independent electorate,[26] volatility will necessarily run at higher levels. These higher volatility levels are not necessarily the result of an institutional malady then, but a difference related to historical contingencies.[27] Although it has been the tradition in comparative literature to refer to class cleavages related to mass parties and mobilized voting by social groups as "functional cleavages," the individual voter's behavior of ceaselessly voting according to his social class identity could be seen as no more "functional" than the "cultural cleavages" that predated them. Thus, though parties and their leadership are moving further away from direct contact, albeit localized and limited, with their party supporters, individual voters are also becoming empowered to choose and less limited by pre-determined identities, whether social class or cultural.

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[25] Mainwaring and Zoco, "Political Sequences," p. 167. See also Russell Dalton and Martin Wattenburg, eds., *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); and Philippe Schmitter, "Parties Are Not What They Once Were," in Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther, eds., *Political Parties and Democracy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), pp. 67-89.

[26] Anderson, in his comparative study of volatility between a number of old and new European democracies found that institutional differences, the proportionality of the electoral system, to be the prime issue effecting the rates of volatility between countries. If one peruses the data, however, it becomes clear that the prime factor causing the coefficients to be significant is the inclusion of the new countries in the analysis. The reason for this seems to be because the new countries did not have high rates of party membership or evidence of class voting in their elections—both traits of non-modern periods of democratic development. Anderson, "Parties, Party Systems, and Satisfaction," pp. 579-81.

[27] Maladies, of course, most certainly do exist within institutions in these countries as they also exist in the so-called "advanced industrial democracies"; however, the tendency when investigating new or "non-Western" democracies is to assume that institutional or cultural maladies are the problem while maladies are usually ignored when faced with similar trends and the emphasis is placed on changing technology or other global forces.

What then is the concern about high levels of volatility? By making a case that volatility is not necessarily the indication of political instability, at least at the regime level, but potentially just a reflection of the reality of the current patterns of political interaction in many democratic countries, does this imply that volatility is not a possible sign of a problem? As Mainwaring and Zoco also pointed out, electorates generally need shortcuts and cues in order to know how to vote. Most voters are not able to follow politicians and campaigns so closely that parties and images do not matter. Consistent patterns and images help voters make "informed" political judgments at the ballot box. If parties are constantly coming and going, the electorate has a terrific challenge in determining how these parties are positioning themselves in relation to one another. Such stable positioning allows a voter with limited specific knowledge to anticipate the constellation of issues that a particular party might take up, encouraging the voter to participate in the system.[28] Furthermore, volatility can be a sign that the electorate is not happy with government performance and existing political representation,[29] signally disillusionment that could potentially become directed at the regime itself if not corrected. High volatility can also open the door to new parties and political outsiders that could pose a threat to democratic consolidation.[30]

Analyzing the volatility in Turkey in light of these considerations leads us to several sound interpretations and a few points that would require deeper investigation than what volatility can provide us. Based on the context within

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[28] Mainwaring and Zoco, "Political Sequences," p. 157. This particular issue is also discussed in greater detail in chapter four.
[29] Roberts and Wibbels, "Party Systems and Electoral Volatility," p. 575.
[30] Mainwaring and Zoco, "Political Sequences," p. 156.

which Turkey's democratic regime emerged (post-World War II) and considering the three significant, but relatively brief military interventions, Turkish electoral volatility rates are within what might be anticipated. If we also consider the country's tendency to prefer inclusive, non-class based "nation parties" which have frequently demonstrated the characteristics of "catch-all" parties,[31] average volatility in the range of 20 might be expected. Furthermore, when a few exceptional cases are removed, the pattern from election to election has shown itself to be relatively stable, with neither a clear increasing nor decreasing trend being observed.

Finally, the low volatility scores between blocs seem to demonstrate that the electorate has fairly good knowledge about how parties are positioning themselves in relation to one another and that, from election to election, those major blocs are holding their ground. The greatest amount of volatility seems to be occurring within blocs among relatively similar or related choices. All of this suggests, that the party system in Turkey has been institutionalized, even if individual parties have not. In other words, the voters have a reasonable idea about where the major parties are positioning themselves in relation to one another and that the voters more or less acquiesce to the primary divisions established in the system in any given period.

Considering the stable and relatively low volatility existing between blocs (see Table 3.2), the possibility opens up for the existence of an essential cleavage that has shaped the pattern of political contestation since the advent of multiparty politics. As will be discussed in great depth in chapter four, such an essential

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[31] See chapter two.

cleavage has been posited for Turkey as a center-periphery divide. The stability observed at the net aggregate level certainly provides a least the possibility of such a continuous cleavage, but it does not in any way conclusively support it. Here we reach the limit of what electoral volatility on a national scale can tell us; it is simply too distant to rule out the possibility of shifting among groups or in the essential dividing line between blocs. It is possible for the ultimate political argument to shift in such as way as to maintain a large portion of the previous divide while picking up new voting blocks

Table 3.2 – Bloc Voting Patterns

	Bloc Left	Bloc Right
1950	39.6	59.8
1954	35.1	64.3
1957	41.4	58.6
1961	36.7	62.5
1965	31.7	65.1
1969	32.9	55
1973	34.4	57.5
1977	41.9	53.7
1983	30.5	68.4
1987	33.3	65.5
1991	32	67.9
1995	29.7	68.9
1999	36.9	60.7
2002	29	61
2007	26.5	68.6

and losing others. If this were to occur, the volatility score at the national level would not show it. Thus, continuity in blocs at the national level would not be effective evidence against change either in groups of voters switching sides or a shift in the divide as to what is considered "left" and "right". Such discussions must remain outside the scope of volatility as it is commonly used at the national level and must wait to be taken up in greater detail in chapter three and four. Thus, volatility, when used to examine trends in the Turkish case, will also be employed at the sub-national level in order to discover whether or not there exist patterns of electoral change at more localized levels, such as that of the province or district.

3. 2 What Fragmentation of the Votes in the Party System Can Tell Us

The question of party system volatility itself was conceived in conjunction with the concept and formulas for party fragmentation in the system. Pedersen, in creating his formula for volatility argued that indices for fragmentation did not greatly assist the study of party system change as these formulas are static, measuring the "states" of the systems rather than the "processes" that formed them.[32] In later work, Pedersen and other subsequent prominent works on the subject, find that volatility and fragmentation in the system are clearly correlated.[33] However, as Bartolini and Mair point out, there are limits to this relationship as a decrease in fragmentation also increases volatility; thus, the concepts, though related, are not circularly related.[34]

What does fragmentation tell us? Table 3.3[35] shows the calculations for fragmentation of votes in the Turkish party system based on two well-known formulas and two more recent indices for this descriptor. In the first column, Douglas Rae's fractionalization index,[36] through weighting the electoral returns of competing parties such that the largest parties have greater effect on the calculation, measures the extent to which a system's electoral strength is distributed among various political parties. The second column's index, provided by Laakso and Taagepera, flips the squared fractional shares so that the data can

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[32] Mogens Pedersen, "On Measuring Party System Change: A Methodological Critique and a Suggestion," *Comparative Political Studies,* Vol. 12, No. 4 (1980), p. 388.

[33] Mogens Pedersen, "Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility in European Party Systems, 1948-1977: Explorations in Explanation," in Hans Daalder and Peter Mair, eds., *Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change* (London: Sage, 1983), p. 52; Bartolini and Mair, *Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability*, p. 143.

[34] Ibid., p. 131.

[35] Data taken from, *Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri*.

[36] The formula is 1 minus the sum of the squares of electoral shares of all parties. Douglas Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967).

be read as a measurement of effective number of parties in the system;[37] thus, though the scales are entirely complementary, based on the same sum of squared fractional shares of the vote, they provide a different mental picture of the fragmentation. Furthermore, as Laakso and Taagepera point out, as the Rae's fragmentation figures increase in size, it hides the extent of party number change.[38]

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Table 3.3 – Measures of Fragmentation

Election	Rae's Index	Effective number of Parties- LT-1979	Effective number of Parties- G-2010	Effective number of Parties- TPS
1950	.536	2.2	1.9	2.11
1954	.533	2.1	1.8	2.14
1957	.587	2.4	2.2	2.22
1961	.706	3.4	3.1	2.8/2.3*
1965	.630	2.7	2.2	2.50
1969	.696	3.3	2.7	2.83
1973	.767	4.3	3.9	3.39
1977	.680	3.1	2.9	2.61
1983	.649	2.9	2.4	2.65
1987	.757	4.1	3.5	3.46
1991	.786	4.7	4.3	4.15
1995	.838	6.2	6.1	5.48
1999	.853	6.8	6.3	5.78
2002	.816	5.4	4.3	4.33
2007	.712	3.5	2.7	3.13

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* First number is actual fragmentation. The second figure represents fragmentation if one controls for the unnatural confusion regarding the legacy of the closed Democrat Party that seemed to be rectified by the subsequent general election.

In a 2010 study, Grigorii Golosov proposes a new formula for effective number of parties that is less problematic in extreme cases (column three of Table 3.3).[39] The formula, though a bit more complicated than the sum of fractional

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[37] Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera, "'Effective' Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe," *Comparative Political Studies,* Vol. 12, No. 1 (1979), p. 4.
[38] Ibid., pp. 23-4.
[39] The formula for this measurement is the sum of one over one plus the square of the party with the largest share divided by the share of 'i' party minus the share of 'i' party. Grigorii Golosov,

squares models, calculates the number of "effective" parties by juxtaposing the strength of each party in relation to the party with the largest share of the votes. While the numbers stay fairly consistent with Laakso and Taagepera's index for the moderate cases, as are typically found in Western European democracies with which the earlier formulas were tested, the Golosov index seems to produce a more intuitively accurate number for systems with a strongly predominant party or very fragmented systems with lots of little minor parties.[40] In the fourth column a derivation of this formula has been created by this author that is sensitive to the fragmentation away from a two-party system, in particular, rather than fragmentation away from the dominant party; it assumes, at minimum, a two-party format.

What interpretations can be made of the Turkish party system based on these calculations? Even one of the seminal works, creating the index for effective number of parties, bids us caution on this account. Laakso and Taagepera write, "We must distinguish between party system stability (of which the effective number of parties is one aspect) and government leadership stability."[41] Their own study of number of parties and government instability leads them to this conclusion: "There is little correlation between [average number of parties] and executive instability."[42] For example, in a case like Turkey, which has had its share of political and governmental instability, often but not always associated with coalition governments, we see a secular trend toward increasing

"The Effective Number of Parties: A New Approach," *Party Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2010), pp. 171-92.
[40] Ibid., pp. 183-7.
[41] Ibid., p. 20.
[42] Ibid., p. 21.

fragmentation, with the fractionalization index reading above .8 and effective number of parties registering above 6. One could make the evaluation that it was the level of fragmentation that created the problems of governance. However, one finds very similar numbers for Switzerland, frequently associated with stability, in the last two elections (2003 and 2007) with fractionalization numbers at .817 and .822 and the effective number of parties ala Laakso and Taagepera approaching 6. [43] Throughout Europe, one can find many similar figures corresponding to those calculated for Turkey, but in each case, how the government functions differs.

This is also true for different governments in Turkey. In 1977, the ability of the governments to effectively govern was quite notably less than the governments of 1987 and even those of 1991, even though the latter have higher scores of fragmentation. Although scholars frequently argued that it was fragmentation of the vote that led to the inability of those governments in the 1970s to govern, the actual number of parties and fragmentation was not particularly great—according to Laakso and Taagepera's index, the effective number of parties was just above three and less fragmented than even the 2007 election results. Though the two major parties following the 1977 elections had a major percentage of the vote share, the problem was intractable behavior of political leaders that would have likely led to the same net result if the two parties had 98 percent of the vote between them and a 49 percent share apiece. Fragmentation figures, then, do not tell us how political elites will behave once

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[43] Number were taken from, Clive Church, "The Swiss Elections of October 2003: Two Steps Toward System Change?" *West European Politics*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (2004), p. 525; Clive Church, "The Swiss Election of 21 October 2007: Consensus Fights Back," *West European Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (2008), p. 614.

the shares are distributed, and this seems to make a critical difference in regard to the relation between stability and fragmentation.

Furthermore, the formulas used to derive measurements of fragmentation are not precise and in certain cases mislead. The different data outcomes for 1950 and 1954 are indicative of this problem. Any formula taking into account the squares of a fraction are going to necessarily overweigh the effect of a party that garners a large percentage of the vote, which could potentially mask an increase in actual fragmentation. In 1950, the two parties combined garnered approximately 95 percent of the total vote. In 1954, they received a smaller percentage of the total vote to the favor of a growing third party along with the entrance of a fourth, but because the winning party increased its overall total, the indices suggest that fragmentation was decreasing slightly when the opposite could be seen as true, depending on what is considered relevant fragmentation. With this in mind, only the derivative of Golosov's index that is particularly sensitive to fragmentation away from two-party competition picks up the increased fragmentation.[44] Although such an index might not be relevant in all cases, a significant period of the history of the Turkish party system demonstrated a penchant toward two major competing parties, though one party was often dominant. Thus, while it functions in many cases similarly to the other indices, it detects movement away from two major parties more so than fragmentation away from simply the largest party. Thus, this index observes increased fragmentation in 1954, despite the gains of the Democrat Party, and also in periods like 1965 where overall fragmentation was increasing despite the gains of the dominant

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[44] The formula used for this index is: $N_P = \sum 2/1 + ((S_1 + S_2)^2/(S_i + S_j)) - (S_i + S_j)$

party. It is also more sensitive to fragmentation in 2007 than Golosov's index for similar reasons. The drawback to this index is that it is insensitive to predominant party systems, which could be a serious concern in particular cases, like India or Mexico, for example.

The measurements of fragmentation, though rough and distant tools, do allow us to see patterns that might help us to locate areas in which further investigation might help uncover forces at work that are shaping the system. Though the indices for this descriptor have generally increased with time, there are a number of occasions where these patterns were reversed. Although they could be anomalies, they might also signal a change in which unique patterns of interaction were taking place. Military interventions, electoral systems, and shifts in tactics of political competition could trigger the entrance of new parties or the trend toward directing votes toward several parties engaged in a particular line of competition.

These quantifiable data do not tell us that increasing fragmentation will increase government instability or polarization.[45] At this point, it might be argued that where government instability and fragmentation coexist, there are likely other factors producing these two symptoms. In other words, the malady is likely not the number of parties per se, but rather that which is causing the parties to splinter and the electorate to distribute their votes more broadly across a greater number of parties. Certainly, a fragmented system would not assist effective governing when political elites behave inflexibly, but as could be seen in Turkey in the

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[45] Sani and Sartori also emphasize this point in their notable work on fragmentation and ideological polarization. Giacomo Sani and Giovanni Sartori, "Polarization, Fragmentation and Competition in Western Democracies," in Hans Daalder and Peter Mair, eds., *Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change* (London: Sage, 1983), pp. 307-8, 336.

1950s, such belligerent and problematic behavior can exist even in the context of a party system with one party having a large governing majority. Thus, it seems that the existence of fragmentation itself is not explanative of a party system, but a phenomenon that itself needs to be explained.

A number of reasons have been posed in comparative literature to explain an increase in electoral fragmentation; several notable claims involve the size of the electorate, socioeconomic heterogeneity, the electoral system, and ideological polarization. We will discuss the issue of ideological polarization and its relation with fragmentation in the subsequent section of this chapter. As for the electoral system and its effects on fragmentation, this topic was discussed extensively in chapter two; briefly, however, the logical relationship between electoral systems and fragmentation that adheres to observed phenomena, as posited by Sartori,[46] is that disproportionate systems are more likely to constrain the system—i.e. reduce the level of fragmentation—and that as a system becomes more proportional it is non-constraining—i.e. it functions as a non-effect. Increased proportionality does not cause increased fragmentation, but it does not stop it. In the Turkish case, the rather drastic shift in systems from plurality to proportional representation seemed to have less of an effect on the fragmentation itself than did other important factors. Fragmentation was increasing under the plurality system and its increase that cannot be explained by other factors after the switch to proportional representation seems to move in the same pattern as was observed in the previous electoral system. Furthermore, when efforts were made to increase

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[46] Giovanni Sartori, "The Party Effects of Electoral Systems," in Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther, eds., *Political Parties and Democracy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), pp. 92-3.

disproportionality by altering the electoral system rules, fragmentation of the vote quickly increased.[47] Thus, at least for the Turkish case, electoral system changes appear to be a relatively weaker explanation for the observed increases and decreases in fragmentation.

As for other explanations of fragmentation, in a study of Britain, Finland and 75 other countries, Carsten Anckar found a close relationship between the size of the population and the level of fragmentation. Not only was this true in comparison internationally, it held true within countries: as the population increases so does fragmentation within a polity.[48] Turkey, with a population surpassing 70 million, would thus expect a level of fragmentation simply because of the size of its population. Furthermore, as its population has grown, fragmentation has also generally increased. As a satisfactory explanation for the existing fragmentation in the Turkish party system, however, this remains limited. It cannot account for the decreases and spikes in fragmentation while the population itself has obviously increased on a secular trend. In Anckar's study, it was of greater explanative value than other independent variables such as urbanization, presidentialism, ethnic-religious fragmentation, and effective thresholds.[49]

Beside electoral systems and size of the population, scholars have claimed that social heterogeneity could have a significant impact on the fragmentation of party systems. According to this argument, the socioeconomic or cultural cleavages are the prime shapers of the extent of fragmentation in any polity.

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[47] For more on this topic, see chapter five.
[48] Carsten Anckar, "Size and Party System Fragmentation," *Party Politics*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (2000), pp. 305-28.
[49] Ibid., p. 316.

While some have held that this causal factor is generally explanative,[50] others have specified "political cleavages" as the determinant rather than "social cleavages"[51] or have found that social forces (heterogeneity) and district magnitudes collectively determined the amount of fragmentation.[52] Might this "social" element be explanative for the Turkish case in particular? Not entirely. Although there is a measure of heterogeneity within the Turkish electorate, both socially and economically, the lion's share of the fragmentation in the party system seems to have little to do with these potential divisions in Turkish society.

As was discussed in the previous chapter, the nature of political parties in Turkey, especially among those considered at least marginal successful in electoral competition, fit the description of what could be called "nation parties"—that is, they each purport to represent the general interests of the nation and cater inclusively to all groups in society, while downplaying existing socioeconomic divisions. This being the case, new parties that fragmented the existing votes in Turkish elections often bore great resemblance to their other contemporaneous competitors. These new parties have not appeared to "add" to the existing representation in any sort of meaningful way. The only possible exception to explicit cultural representation of a particular group is with the Kurdish leftist-nationalist parties that emerged in the particularly in the southeast region of Turkey post-1991, and these parties have had very minimal success,

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[50] Lipset and Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures," pp. 1-64.

[51] Michael Coppedge, "District Magnitude, Economic Performance, and Party System Fragmentation in Five Latin American Countries," *Comparative Political Studies,* Vol. 30, No. 2 (1997), p. 157.

[52] Benny Geys, "District Magnitude, Social Heterogeneity and Local Party System Fragmentation," *Party Politics*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2006), pp. 281-97; Octavio Amorim Neto and Gary Cox, "Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1997), pp. 149-74.

even among the Turkish Kurdish population. Nonetheless, this one set of subsequent parties could not begin to account for the fragmentation observed in the Turkish party system, nor for periods of decreasing fragmentation, such as the current period. Furthermore, if we relegate the issue to political cleavages, as stipulated by Coppedge, we might get closer to an explanation, except that the cleavage lines themselves appear to have changed and shifted, and thus also require a careful examination; hence, the reasoning behind this study's attention to the political paradigms that set the political cleavage lines at various points throughout the history of the Turkish party system. It is only through investigating these that we will be able to understand the nature and pattern of fragmentation in various periods of Turkey's political history with electoral competition.

3.3 Ideological Polarization and Other Polarizations in Turkish Politics

There is one concept correlated with the existence of fragmentation that has yet to be discussed, and it is both a classic argument regarding fragmentation in comparative literature and a frequent resort of students of Turkish politics in particular. This position is that fragmentation is correlated with the manifestation of ideological polarization in the party system, or in its extreme form, that polarization is the cause of fragmentation. Beginning with the work of Sartori, a case is built that centrifugal (polarizing) forces can logically lead to an increase of parties competing in the system to fill the ideological gaps as the polarization

stretches the line from left to right.[53] Bartolini and Mair also, building from Sartori, posit the "strong relationship" between the "format of a party system" and "patterns of ideological polarization." [54]Furthermore, as Sani and Sartori point out, though these system level dynamics may exist independently of one another, their concurrent existence spells trouble for the "working of democracy."[55]

Can the existence of ideological polarization and fragmentation be correlated in Turkey such that, when one observes an increase in fragmentation, one can expect similar increases in polarization and/or vice versa? In the works that discuss the Turkish party system, this relationship has been frequently referenced.[56] While the observation of both polarization and fragmentation in the Turkish case cannot be disputed, a potential ambiguity remains in regard to what the relationship between these two dynamic is and whether or not there is a positive correlation in this particular case between *ideological* polarization and fragmentation—in other words, when ideological polarization increases in Turkey, should we expect fragmentation to also be increasing?

In order to address this ambiguity, we need to carefully delineate several points: First, how might the context within which the original derivation of the relationship between ideological polarization and fragmentation of the vote differ

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[53] Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems*, pp. 116-28. Sartori also argues that polarization can be seen as both an intervening and dependent variable in relation to party system format. Sartori, "The Party Effects of Electoral Systems," p. 94.

[54] Bartolini and Mair, *Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability*, p. 130.

[55] Sani and Sartori, "Polarization, Fragmentation and Competition," p. 335.

[56] For some examples, Birol Akgün, "Aspects of Party System Development in Turkey," *Turkish Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2001), pp. 87-90; Ali Çarkoğlu, "The Turkish Party System in Transition," p. 551; Frank Tachau, "Turkish Political Parties and Elections: Half a Century of Multiparty Democracy," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2000), pp. 136, 144; Ergun Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation (*Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000), p. 73; Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Elections and Governance," in Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer, eds., *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p. 56.

from the Turkish context; second, what type of polarization are we talking about and can we observe more than one cause or location for existing polarization in Turkey?

As in the case of volatility, the consideration of fragmentation and its initial formulas (Golosov's 2010 index is an important deviation from this) took place in the context of established Western European political systems. As discussed earlier, the historical conditions under which democracy emerges significantly influences the operation of the system. In many of these Western European democracies, enfranchisement of the peasants and laborers coincided with parties particularly created with a mandate to represent these new identities. Thus, this encouraged the tendency within these systems for parties that represented narrow ideologies and interests with the understanding that these particular interests could be aggregated for the overall national interest within parliament. Such an understanding provided an opportunity, in the context of ideological polarization, for parties to move away from the center without necessarily being punished by the electorate. As discussed in chapter two, the preponderant outlook toward political parties in Turkey is that each competing party should endeavor to represent the well-being of the whole, which forces parties that wish for electoral success centripetally toward the center. Thus, ideological polarization in Turkey, based on the historical and current constraints of political culture and values regarding political parties, is necessarily centrally based. Hence, where in other systems, ideological polarization might lead to greater fragmentation by the successes of parties that operate at greater distance from the center and with narrow ideologies, sustained *ideological* polarization seen as salient to the

electorate in the Turkish party system has directed the system toward defragmentation, not greater splintering. In such cases, the parties occupying the center-left and center-right function more effectively as "channelment"[57] or "focal arbiter"[58] for opposition against the dominant party, because the polarization revolves around one macro-issue or political outlook. Missing this pattern would lead to a great misunderstanding of the Turkish case. Thus, the context becomes very important and, particularly at this point, simply anticipating and applying trends observed by scholars in the West European democracies for the Turkish party system becomes extremely problematic.

This is not to say that polarization does not encourage fragmentation in Turkey. The important question becomes, what kind of polarization are we talking about, and in this case, a great deal of confusion can result from this ambiguity. Polarized behaviors have been a regular feature of Turkish politics, especially among political elites, but not all forms of polarization have been equally constant and explicit distinction is necessary. Consider the following observation by Ali Çarkoğlu:

> Interpersonal animosities at the very top of the party leadership fall very much in line with Turkish historical experience . . . these seemingly superficial, uncooperative attitudes in party leadership . . . exasperate the fragmentation and polarization in the system.[59]

Note here that the attribution for fragmentation and polarization in the Turkish case is placed on the leadership style of the party leaders and their inability to cooperate with other political elites. Çarkoğlu's observation here is a very critical

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[57] Sartori, "The Party Effects of Electoral Systems," p. 95.
[58] Alan Ware, *The Dynamics of Two-Party Politics: Party Structures and the Management of Competition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 17.
[59] Çarkoğlu, "The Turkish Party System in Transition," p. 551.

one. This norm, also discussed in detail in chapter two, has been a regular dynamic among political elites even preceding the foundation of the Republic. However, the polarization certainly created by this type of behavior has little to do with polarization from ideology. Furthermore, the polarization itself is specifically located at the level of political elites both *intra* and *inter*party. The net result of such polarization is factionalization within parties and uncooperative relations between parties. Because this type of polarization is not concurrently located among the electorate, there is little constraint on the voter from switching to the newly emerging parties from factionalization, and in fact, the voter might even desire to do so as a response toward the governing and opposition parties inability to work together.

This polarization might be argued to be the most constantly observed form of polarization, but its fragmenting effects are confounded by other forms of polarization, namely, *ideological* polarization. While it is true that when a new focal point for ideological polarization enters the system, it might initially encourage further fragmentation as the new issue is ultimately crosscuts the existing divisions (as can be seen in 1969 and 1973 and also in 1995 and 1999), based on the nature of ideological polarization in Turkey, this line of division and competition is generally taken up by the two center-most parties and the system begins to pull back toward what is seen as the central debate (1977 and 2007 are particularly good example of this phenomenon). As long as the electorate finds the polarizing focal point salient, the trends moves toward defragmentation until a new crosscutting division enters to compete with the old, or, as in certain

historical cases of the Turkish party system, the military intervenes and puts a halt to the contest.

There is another type of polarization related to the party system that has been observed in the Turkish case to a greater or lesser extent in different periods of its history. Çarkoğlu again expresses concern that the existence of a threshold system (implemented in 1982), which leaves minor and extreme parties out of the system, "creates a considerable danger of pushing these . . . to more extreme positions and adding to the severity of ideological fractionalization and polarization."[60] Here again, we have a pairing of fragmentation and polarization, but with a very different understanding. Obviously, the threshold system is implemented and understood to decrease fragmentation of the seats and vote within a party system. Marginal and extreme parties are either left out of the system or forced to move to the center in order to subsume a larger voting bloc, and thus, it seems clear that the author is not referring to ideological polarization. It seems that, rather than referring to polarization located *within* the system— either among the electorate or political elites or both—we are talking about polarization *outside* and directed *against* the system. In such a case, we are referring to society-located polarization against the system fostered by disillusionment or de facto disenfranchisement—the feeling that one is not able to be represented by the existing system. This form of polarization can be particularly destabilizing if the groups generating such polarized attitudes are large enough and remain on the outside of the pattern of contestation within the

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[60] Ali Çarkoğlu, "The Turkish general election of 24 December 1995," *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 16 (1997), p. 91. This claim was repeated in a later article, see Çarkoğlu, "The Turkish Party System in Transition," p. 548.

party system. Based on the restrictions against regional or ethnic parties in the 1982 Constitution, an element of this type of polarization has been observed among some within the Kurdish population since the 1980s and certainly some of the violence that occurred in the 1970s could be attributed to such anti-system disillusionment, although arguably it was also concurrently mixed with violence stemming from excessive partisan enthusiasm.

At this point, one must also acknowledge that, though ideological polarization in the Turkish case has often resulted in defragmentation as the political division that has trickled into society is channeled into two major parties, when fragmentation has existed concurrently with ideological or social polarization, as Sani and Sartori note, it "has spelled trouble." Ideological polarization that has spread to society in the midst of belligerent and uncooperative behaviors and attitudes by the political elites have been a volatile mix in Turkish politics. This particular nexus has been the object of observation of numerous students of Turkish politics, and though the particular dynamics between the forces of polarization and fragmentation are left unexplained or misunderstood, the devastating results of the instances of their combined presence on politics and governance are clearly evident to all observers.

These various manifestations of polarization in the party system or society at large in Turkey necessitate careful and particular description and attention by scholars studying and conveying system-level dynamics. A great deal of confusion can result from imprecise references to polarization or from attributing all polarization in the Turkish case to ideological polarization, being the form of polarization most frequently addressed in the comparative literature. Each form

of polarization interacts differently with the other dynamics in the system, requiring a careful study of the source and location of polarization in order to predict subsequent possibilities of volatility and fragmentation.

3.4 Conclusion

As the preceding discussion demonstrates, though we might safely propose that certain dynamics within the party system might be continuous, it is also necessary to recognize variance within these regularly occurring phenomena. The danger of remaining at pronouncements of continuity is that it may indeed hide interactions, the observations of which are of critical benefit for a proper understanding of significant changes and patterns in political competition as it occurs through history. Furthermore, the dynamics regularly observed within the system are best understood in interaction with one another. High volatility numbers might often correspond to increasing fragmentation, but it might also occur as a result of party system shrinkage and defragmentation. Certain forms of polarization at certain times and locus points in the system might increase fragmentation and volatility in some situations, but function to decrease it in others. These interactions make it imperative on the researcher to go beyond continuity and search for the variance and interaction and their potential causes as they are observed within the party system.

The indices and tools to study these system-level phenomena can be helpful but are also importantly limited when it comes to explanation. The numbers generated from the formulas are reliable in their systematic and neutral ability to generate numbers, but they are also rough and distant tools that, while

highlighting certain patterns, hide other forces at work that shape electoral outcomes. The well-known indices are often employed at the national level, and one often finds that in-depth interpretation spring from these very distant measurements, or that the measurements operate as an interpretation in and of themselves. Certainly, if something is occurring at the national aggregate level, there is likely something taking place at the provincial, group and individual levels, but it would be an important logical misstep to assume that stability at the macro-level necessarily means stability at the various micro-levels.

On closer inspection, that the observed phenomena of volatility, fragmentation, and polarization are not primarily causal agents but are themselves the product of interactions and forces operating within the system becomes evident, and it prompts us to understand how all of these forces play a role shaping the parameters and lines of contestation framing the observed electoral competition. Political culture—i.e. the predominant orientations taken by both voters and the political elites toward politics—as was discussed in the previous chapter, plays an important role in determining how these observed dynamics operate. The pattern of behavior of political elites and the electorate's tendency to prefer general interest, inclusive "nation parties" create clear constraints and opportunities for the increase and reduction of volatility, fragmentation and polarization. Thus, while observed tendencies in the comparative literature can be beneficial, they need to be applied to the specific case with care and awareness of the particular context. The preponderance of definitive literature on party systems has been developed with the established Western European democracies as its starting place; thus, its "comparative" merit is of less generalizability than has

often been attributed to it. Certainly, there are many parallels between the Turkish party system and other party systems in Western Europe, but there are important differences—such as the context of their respective emergences—that encourage us toward caution and logic when applying such literature to the Turkish case.

Once we have considered the "continuity" in the system, we are left with the case of making an argument for change. To do so, we must first address the most persuasive argument against party system change—the operation of a continuous and essential political cleavage—and then present the case for how dynamic change might be taking place in the competitive electoral arena in Turkey. This, therefore, will be the focus of the next two chapters.

CHAPTER 4

ESSENTIAL ELECTORAL CLEAVAGES AND THE TURKISH PARTY SYSTEM

Economic power, rather than domination, increasingly set the relation between notable and villagers. . . Deals, trade-offs, and bargains became much more persuasive than in earlier situations, and client politics flourished on a new level. . . It was undeniably a form of mobilization. . . that brought a greater portion of the masses into a meaningful relation with the center.[1]

While it is important to assert and discover forces or agents of a party system that have acted upon the system in fairly consistent ways through time, it is also imperative to not over-assert continuity where it does not exist, or much will be hidden by the oversight. The underlying assumption of this work is that party systems are relational and interactive in nature, and though these interactions may stabilize into predictable patterns for periods of time, the door is necessarily always open to change. The political paradigms that encapsulate these patterns of interaction are vulnerable to shifts and changes initiated by socioeconomic structural changes, creative strategy change by political actors, institutional modifications, alterations in predominant orientations toward politics and political behavior, etc. With this foundational understanding in mind, one must necessarily address an important alternative that itself also posits a primarily

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[1] Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" *Daedalus,* Vol. 102, No. 1 (1973), pp. 185.

relational understanding of party systems, but one that is ultimately stable and static—an essential[2] historical political cleavage that perpetually determines the lines on which electoral competition takes place.

In the previous chapter, when applying the inter-bloc volatility measurements to the Turkish case in particular, at the national net aggregate level, the very low levels of such volatility certain confirm institutionalization of the party system and, at least, prompt the question of whether or not Turkey has also observed an essential cleavage that has maintained the shape of the party system throughout history. This has, of course, been claimed for the Turkish case, and several varieties of essential cleavages exist, including to a lesser extent a "left-right" socioeconomic cleavage, a topic taken up in detail in the following chapter, but the most influential proposition for an essential political cleavage is that of the center-periphery division, first argued for the Turkish case by Şerif Mardin, and its offspring the traditionalist-modernist and secularist center-Islamist periphery cleavage. If indeed we take such a cleavage as the relational foundation for the party system in electoral contestation, then our work is largely done. The political paradigm would ultimately be reduced to one historical paradigm and the strategies and discourse with which electoral competition is entered into would be consistently related to this cleavage and little more would need to be said or explored in regard to the relational interaction of the system. Thus, before we are effectively able to pursue the possibilities of relational and paradigmatic change,

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[2] By 'essential', I intend to mean a predominant cleavage that bears the most weight in determining the structure of the party system. It does not suggest that no other 'social' cleavages or minor 'political' cleavages might exist, but that the 'essential cleavage' is the most explanative of voting behavior—why voters vote for certain parties.

we must carefully consider and address this very established and plausible alternative explanation.

In 1973, Şerif Mardin wrote his famous piece, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" published in the journal, *Daedalus*. It was printed again with a few additional comments in 1975 in a collected work by prominent scholars of Turkish politics and edited by Engin Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor.[3] Although not extensively referenced until the 1980s, it has now indisputably become one of the foundational works on Turkish politics, arguably the most influential single work, functioning as an ever-useful meta-narrative for almost any topic relevant to Turkish politics or society. Despite approaching the forty year mark, scores of academic articles and books published in the last year covering broad topics under the umbrella of Turkish politics still find it necessary to refer either explicitly to the work or the foundational assumptions that Mardin proposes in the seminal article. No other prominent article in the field of Turkish politics could boast more than a fraction of the shelf life of this one work.

Though the work itself, a lengthy extended narrative of the history of the relations between the State and society beginning with the height of the Ottoman Empire, makes some subtle but important concessions and nuanced statements, the general outline of the work, as it is popularly understood and appropriated, goes as follows: Stemming from the strong state tradition and educational peculiarities of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish Republic has inherited a significant cultural-political cleavage between an modernizing military-

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[3] Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" in *Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems,* ed. Engin Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor (Istanbul: Bosphorus University Press, 1975), pp. 7-32.

bureaucratic center and a heterogeneous and traditionalist periphery. The secularized and Westernized lifestyle of the central elites, who had privileged access to secular education, placed a "wedge" between themselves and the rest of the masses of society who were more comfortable with the religious symbolism and hierarchy existing in their local communities. With the advent of multiparty politics in 1945, the periphery appeared to find its voice in the vehicle of the Democrat Party (DP), while the center remained true to the Republican People"s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP). The military coups of 1960 and 1971 (Mardin"s article pre-dates the 1980 intervention) were seen as a re-assertion of the power of the center over the growing power of the periphery.[4]

Subsequent students of Turkish politics have frequently taken this division to be an explanative electoral cleavage for the Turkish party system, with the so-called "center-left" parties representing the views and voice of the center and the parties of the "right", both center and extreme, manifesting the political desires of the heterogeneous periphery. Although the substance and boundaries of this powerful-versus-powerless cultural dichotomy are frequently described in various ways, including a reduction to a simple secularist-Islamist or modernist-traditionalist divide,[5] the rough picture has generally been maintained as an underlying framework through which electoral behavior, among others, is explained. And it is without question a fairly parsimonious interpretation. The essential question, however, is whether or not this narrative is explanative as the

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[4] Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations," pp. 184-6.
[5] For a secularist-Islamist conceptualization, see Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak, *Değişen Türkiye'de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset* (İstanbul: TESEV yayınları, 2006), pp. 12-3; for a modernist-traditionalist one, see İlter Turan, "Unstable stability: Turkish politics at the crossroads?" *International Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 2 (2007), p. 322.

essential cleavage of the Turkish party system? The question of whether or not there is a "social center" that largely establishes the values and accepted practices that trickle down to the rest of society, or whether or not there are observable socio-cultural differences in lifestyle and outlook between existing political boundaries—such phenomena arguably could be observed in any polity, including those considered "advanced industrial" democracies—is not being addressed. It is another matter when one asks the question of whether or not a center-periphery divide—i.e. an explicit battle between dominating elites and the powerless rural masses—can explain how parties are formed, who they are formed by, why voters cast their votes, and how change is occurring. Are there better ways to explain the Turkish party system? Would the positing of another cleavage or approach to the party system produce greater explanative power?

In order to address these questions, a review of the theoretical concept of center and periphery in the related foundational works would be beneficial along with a closer empirical investigation of the initial state of the party system when the vast rural population entered into democratic suffrage in Turkey and the possible evidence of subsequent electoral changes. A consideration of the logic and implication of maintaining such an interpretative framework should also be taken into account and will, therefore, be discussed below.

4.1 Theoretical Underpinnings of "Center and Periphery"

Besides the seminal work by Mardin, there are two other widely-known theoretical sources for the inspiration behind the conceptualization of a center-periphery cleavage in the Turkish case. One is the essay written in 1961 by

Edward Shils,[6] and the other is the introduction to a volume of collected work by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan in 1967.[7] Although both share the concepts of "center" and "periphery", their focus and interpretations diverge, at least in a few significant points, from one another. As it turns out, both works are referenced in Mardin's piece although the latter somewhat more subtly. Mardin begins with a direct quote from the first sentence of the essay by Shils—"Society has a center," and in his first endnote he writes that his "initial formulation is derived from" this work.[8] His reference to Lipset and Rokkan appears as an embedded appendage (though introduced as "especially important") in the fifth endnote, referencing works on social cleavages in Western Europe. Whether or not Mardin intended such an outcome, most works referring to Mardin's center and periphery formulation assume an interpretation more in line with Lipset and Rokkan. Hence, it is beneficial to consider all of these works while seeking to understand the theoretical framework for center and periphery in the Turkish case as it is generally attributed to Mardin.

One is first confronted with the critical question regarding the location of the center—i.e. the center of *what*? In the essay by Shils, the understanding of "center" and "periphery" importantly transcends the political, indicating as its locus the totality of "society" in a structural-functional sense. Although politics is

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[6] The original source of Shils" essay used by Mardin is the following: Edward Shils, "Centre and Periphery," in *The Logic of Personal Knowledge: Essays Presented to Michael Polanyi on His Seventieth Birthday, 11 March 1961* (New York: Free Press, 1961), pp. 117-30. I accessed this essay through its reprint in a collected work of Shils: Edward Shils, *Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 3-16. Thus, the page numbers in this work refer to the latter source.
[7] Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignment: An Introduction," in *Party Systems and Voter Alignment: Cross-National Perspectives*, ed. Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 1-64.
[8] Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations," p. 187.

seen as one of the interdependent subsystems, it remains as only one of a number of relevant institutional formations in society. Along with the political, Shils includes the economic system, kinship system, and status system along with educational and religious institutions.[9] Hence, the center can be seen as an aggregate of the elites derived from these various institutions and the center, itself, becomes an arena—Shils refers to it as a "zone"—in which these various elites struggle to establish their hierarchical positions[10] in relation to the other intra- and inter-institutional elites.[11] Although the elites from the various central institutions are mutually affirming to a greater or lesser extent, they operate so as to establish both themselves as authority and social order that disseminates from the center. Thus, the essential line of demarcation between the center and periphery in Shilsian conceptualization is one of social authority and the lack thereof. Connection to the center is connection with social power and vice versa.

In contrast to Shils, Lipset and Rokkan's conceptualization has a notably more political, rather than social, understanding of the center and periphery, which places threatened local elements against a dominating national center. They write:

> At the *l* end of the territorial axis we would find strictly local oppositions to encroachments of the aspiring or the dominant national elites and their bureaucracies: the typical reactions of the peripheral regions, linguistic minorities, and culturally threatened populations to the pressures of the centralizing, standardizing, and "rationalizing" machinery of the nation-state.[12]

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[9] Shils, "Centre and Periphery," pp. 3-4.
[10] Ibid., p. 10.
[11] Ibid., pp. 3-4.
[12] Lipset and Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures," p. 10.

In this well-known work, the authors see center and periphery forces as political oppositions that could potentially manifest themselves, at least initially, in electoral contest. This is possible in the sense that the center-periphery cultural divide is realized *territorially*—local communities mobilize to combat the dominant urban centers in response to efforts to centralize the nation-state and the economy. Thus, it presents itself as a struggle for power between particular groups, located in specific territorial domains. Such a juxtaposition of oppositional groups, considered the likely product of a national revolution, could also be seen as "the conflict between the *central nation-building culture* and the increasing resistance of the ethnically, linguistically, or religiously distinct *subject populations* in the provinces and the peripheries."[13] Therefore, though it is particularly understood on the political level, Lipset and Rokkan's "center-periphery" cleavage is also related to the issue of power or authority—i.e. the power of the national center to impose its centralizing will on the local sociopolitical structures.

Shils, rather than seeing the cultural divide as manifested primarily territorially—i.e. urban centers versus provincial localities—frames the cultural and power distinction between center and periphery in terms of values. Particular emphasis is given to the "central value system" more so than the elaboration of particular cultural groupings or to the existence of central elites, whose importance lies in their espousal of the central values that are a self-affirmation to those elites themselves. In this sense, the values, authority to rule, and the elites are in a dynamic relationship. In a vein similar to Pierre Bourdieu, the Shilsian

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[13] Ibid., p. 14.

"central value system" is constructed from what could be understood as existing societal symbolic capital, the relative weight and authoritative interpretation of which is reinforced by those who operate at the elite level.[14] The values function in order to provide order in society and bolster the authority of that particular societies central elites; thus, Shils emphasizes the desire of the elites to inculcate these values among the masses in ever increasing margin in society, a process that goes hand in hand with centralization.[15] In a Shilsian conceptualization, the peripheral values are those that operate in opposition to society itself and the periphery associated with these values can, therefore, be described as living "outside society."[16]

Hence, one would not expect a clear delineation between the values of the center and the values of the periphery among individuals in society based necessarily on one's location from the center. Alternative values certainly circulate and those "prophets" both intimately tied and intensely hostile to the existing values exist,[17] but one's location within the center or within the periphery does not indicate one's *attitude* toward the central values. Instead, center and periphery in this case designate the *distance* one stands from the elites and authority and the extent to which one has the power to alter or authorize the central values of society. In other words, it designates one's distance and location in relation to societal power, not necessarily one's attitudinal orientation toward the dominant values.

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[14] Ibid., p. 4. Compare with Pierre Bourdieu, "Social space and symbolic power," in *In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology,* trans. Matthew Adamson (Stanford: Stanford University,1990), pp. 122-39.
[15] Shils, "Center and Periphery," pp. 5, 14.
[16] Ibid., p. 13.
[17] Ibid., p. 9.

These values are also not the monopoly of one institution but are derived from and support all institutions at the center of society. Thus, while students of Turkish politics are well-acquainted with the values of the Kemalist elites, if one takes Shils into account, it would be a mistake to see these as the incontrovertible and uncontested values of the central system in Turkish society; rather, they represent in a Shilsian sense one set of values contesting other values within the *social* center. Though the principles of Atatürk could be seen as the central values of the Republican state and the dominant founding elites, these values were in contestation with other values in the center of society, such as those stemming from the Hanefi school of Sunni Islam.

The well-documented complexity existing in the relation of the Kemalists with the pre-existing religious institution based on the Hanefi interpretation of Sunni Islam must be seen in this light. Although the Kemalists undoubtedly had secularism in mind as a chief value, as Yıldız Atasoy points out, their secular nationalist project was ultimately framed within a particular Islamic identity.[18] As Sunni Islam was such an embedded value of the system, the founders of the Republic could only alter the arrangement of the hierarchy of the center and alter the institution and structure of its elites, placing the religious elites lower in the hierarchy. But the religiously-oriented system values present in the social center meant that they could only seek to ensure greater control over this institution, they could not completely eliminate or replace the values derived from this area of society, and thus, had to appropriate them in establishing a unifying national

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[18] Yıldız Atasoy, *Islam's Marriage with Neo-Liberalism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 32.

identity.[19] The elites from even a powerful institution cannot independently determine the primary values of the entire center; they must engage them within a space of contestation within the center.

In addition, the enumeration of secondary values in Shils' essay seems particularly significant when applied to the Turkish case. Shils indicates that the secondary values of a society determine the grounds on which one is able to obtain the position of elite.[20] In Mardin's work, it is clear that the positions of elites in Turkey, at least in the periods that he discusses, are occupied largely according to merit, education and patronage, and to a far lesser degree on birthright, a fundamental conclusion affirmed by Frederick Frey,[21] setting a crucial limitation on the distance between the center and the periphery in Turkey. The distance between the central elites and those constituting the periphery could generally be said to be only one generation, many of the elites themselves in the military and bureaucracy (the primary institutional locus of the center according to Mardin and others) rising to elite status from an initially peripheral position.[22] Furthermore, the existence of such secondary values in the central value system of Turkey would anticipate far more frequent conflict among the central elites and greater chances for shifting in interpretations and emphases in regard to the primary values of the central system.

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[19] See Halil Karaveli, "An Unfulfilled Promise of Enlightenment: Kemalism and its Liberal Critics," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2010), pp. 97-9.
[20] Shils, *Center and Periphery*, p. 6.
[21] Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations," p. 172; Frederick Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965), p. 29.
[22] For support for such a claim, see Clement H. Dodd, "The Social and Educational Background of Turkish Officials," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 1 (1965), pp. 268-76; and Joseph Szyliowicz, "Elite Recruitment in Turkey: The Role of the Mulkiye," *World Politics*, Vol. 23 (1971), pp. 371-98.

In Mardin's account of Turkish society, the emphasis is placed on a sharp demarcation of the values and culture of a politically ruling center and the subjected periphery, a demarcation intensified by the secularization of the center and the subsequent marginalization of the religious elites, which were seen as the organic channel that allowed for the maintenance of communication between the center and the periphery.[23] From a Shilsian perspective, such a phenomenon would be anticipated in a society that is largely decentralized and in which interaction between the central elites and the periphery is kept to a minimum, a situation more explanative of periods in the Ottoman Empire, the primary subject of Mardin's work.[24] Thus, even national centralization and state education would necessarily reduce the demarcation of values between the central elites and the periphery.[25]

Related to this, another critical point underscored numerous times in the works of both Shils and that of Lipset and Rokkan is that democratization ultimately blurs the existing separation between the central elites and the periphery prior to the institutionalization of democracy. According to Shils:

> When . . . a more unified economic system, political democracy, urbanization and education have brought the different sections of the population into more frequent contact with each other and created even greater mutual awareness, the central value system has found a wider acceptance than in other periods of the history of society.[26]

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[23] Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations," p. 172. See also, Şerif Mardin, "The Just and the Unjust," *Daedalus* Vol. 120 (1991), pp. 113-29.

[24] Mardin devotes approximately 14 pages to "center and periphery" in the Ottoman Empire and the early Republican period, for which he makes a very persuasive case; his coverage of the multiparty period, on the other hand, extends for less than 6 pages.

[25] 'Central'ization is undeniably an intention to order a certain polity around the values and structure of those in control at the authoritative center.

[26] Shils, *Center and Periphery*, p. 11.

Shils also assumes that this contact between the center and periphery, brought on by democracy, modern economic structures and education will confound the clearer division in values that existed in "pre-modern" or "non-Western" societies.[27] Furthermore, while "central values" would be appropriated by greater numbers, contestation over the values of the center would increase, which would itself be the result of the periphery's approach, and in some cases, entrance into the center.[28] Democracy, rather than simply a vehicle through which opposing sides rigidly take position in the form of parties, requires the center to enter the periphery and vice versa, leading both to greater consensus and tension regarding central values. This is not surprising as democracy is seen as ultimately empowering the masses, which then would almost necessarily challenge a cultural schism that is primarily one between the few powerful elites and the powerless masses.

Lipset and Rokkan also question the possibility of an extended center-periphery cleavage with the expansion of democratic suffrage. They write, "Purely territorial [i.e. center-periphery [29]] oppositions rarely survive the extensions of the suffrage,"[30] and here they mean primarily the extension of suffrage to landless peasants. They also point out:

> The early growth of the national bureaucracy tended to produce essentially territorial oppositions, but the subsequent widening of the scope of governmental activities and the acceleration of cross-local interactions gradually made for much more complex systems of alignments.[31]

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[27] Ibid., pp. 10,13.
[28] Ibid., p. 13.
[29] "Territorial" here refers to the dimension specified by the authors of which the primary pole of focus is that of center and periphery.
[30] Lipset and Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures," p. 12.
[31] Ibid., p. 13.

The territorial center and periphery cleavage, as with the authority-based cleavage in Shils, tends to fragment and is complicated by the various interests of different local communities. In other words, once the power of political representation is brought to the powerless periphery, these groups are no longer united against a central force and interests begin to divide into other sociocultural or socioeconomic cleavages. Political parties would finds themselves competing in different ways for the interests of these distinct groups. Thus, as with Shils, a key assumption of the Lipset and Rokkan work is that primary cleavages determining the party system change and shift. They assert, "There is a *hierarchy of cleavage bases* in each system and these orders of political primacy not only vary among polities, but also tend to undergo changes over time."[32] Territorial cleavages, in the constellation of cleavages provided by Lipset and Rokkan, are understood as possible initial stages of electoral competition that would be cross-cut with others in time.

This brings us to another critical point regarding the inspirational roots of the center-periphery concept: classical modernization theory. In both works predating Mardin's formulation of the concept for Turkey, the strong opposition between the periphery and the center is ultimately a pre-modern one. The basis of the conflict, where it arises, is in response to actions of centralization by the nation-state; it is primarily understood as a transitional stage from pre-modern traditional societies to the unified society of the nation-state. Thus, where national education, centralization of the economy and institutions, the spread of

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[32] Emphasis in original. Ibid., p. 6.

nationalist sentiment among the masses,[33] and especially democratic suffrage have taken place, the theoretical assumption is that an explicit "center-periphery" distinction would blur and weaken. Thus, unlike in other cases where the terminology is being used in the present context in relation to minority ideologies or groups whose voice is considered illegitimate or unrepresented within a hegemonic social or political system,[34] the utilization of the terminology in relation to "elites" versus the "masses", whether one adheres to modernization theory or not, necessarily conjures up the association of a pre-modern cultural conflict, suggesting that such a society is still undergoing the pangs of nation-state centralization, economically and attitudinally. It is from the anticipation that such a cleavage would wane with the advance of modernization that Mardin states, "Until recently, the confrontation between center and periphery was the most important social cleavage underlying Turkish politics and one that seemed to have survived more than a century of modernization."[35] To be fair, Mardin also concedes the possibility of a change in the primary cleavage in the Turkish party system. Later he writes, "There is evidence both of new cleavages and of differentiation *within* the periphery," but goes on to add, "But these are future aspects of Turkish politics, and center-periphery polarity is still one of its extremely important structural components."[36]

Although there were numerous reasons to question a persistent center-periphery *electoral* formulation for those following Mardin, particularly in more

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[33] Shils, *Center and Periphery*, p. 15.

[34] In its current usage within democratic countries, extreme Kurdish nationalists, the PKK, non-Muslims, and supporters of shariah law might be said to be marginalized peripheries pitted against the Turkish social center—i.e. 80 to 85 percent of the population.

[35] Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations," p. 170.

[36] Ibid., p. 187.

recent periods of electoral history—many of these factors conceded by Mardin himself—the continuity of such a cleavage to the present period has been maintained in numerous works on Turkish politics. Though it seems plausible on a superficial level to assert the possibility of a center-periphery electoral cleavage during the initial period of the Turkish party system, there are a number of reasons highlighted in the Mardin text for why even this is problematic.

First, the very fact that, as Mardin also notes, the Democrat Party leaders were every bit as central elite as the CHP elites indicates that a new interaction was taking place between the center and periphery that complicated the lines of interaction.[37] Furthermore, as Mardin again points out, the CHP incorporated large numbers of peripheral notables into its political party machine: "What is remarkable is that a sizeable portion of the provincial, notable class was successfully co-opted into the ranks of the Republican People's Party."[38] It is remarkable because it demonstrates a phenomenon not predicted from a center-periphery *electoral* cleavage: elements from the periphery—i.e. local notables— were co-opted by the central elites.[39] Furthermore, the attribution by scholars of a Lipset and Rokkan style (center) urban-rural (periphery) conflict based on a transitional period from localized feudalism to national capitalism is extremely problematic in the Turkish case. As Mardin himself asserts, during the Ottoman Empire, there was no oppositional "feudal class" of powerful landed elites who

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[37] Ibid., p. 184. Not only were they equally elite, they were also equally committed to Kemalist values as their opponents. The leader of the DP, Celal Bayar has been described as "the Turkish leader who most consciously tried to model himself on Atatürk. George Harris, "Celal Bayar: Conspiratorial Democrat," in *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey*, ed. Metin Heper and Sabri Sayarı (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), 53.

[38] Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations," p. 182.

[39] Joseph Szyliowicz, "Elites and Modernization in Turkey," in *Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle East,* ed. Frank Tachau (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing, 1975), 34.

could counter central urban authority as the economy was in the firm hands of the state. [40]   Furthermore, as will be clarified in detail below, the electoral demographics do not confirm the anticipated result. If anything, the notables associated with "pre-modern" socio-economic structures in the East were more successfully mobilized to support the "central" CHP rather than the "peripheral" DP.

The scholars following in the footsteps of Mardin, however, by asserting a primary center-periphery cultural cleavage as the persistent determinate of the Turkish party system seem to be ignoring this anticipation of change despite the fact that much empirical evidence exists to support an assertion of multiple realignments and system change. [41] That societies have a center and operate upon a hegemonic set of central values that provide both order and authority to intra-societal relations is a possible argument for the scope of social theorists, but to say that democratic politics operates as an explicit electorally-manifested cultural struggle between a competing central elite and a powerless peripheral population is another issue entirely and must be empirically verified.

4.2 An Explanative Center-Periphery Cleavage in the Turkish Party System?

While this study is necessarily focused on the multiparty system and its operation in national elections, a brief note should be made on the major focus of

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[40] Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations," pp. 172-3
[41] Ergun Özbudun and Frank Tachau, "Social Change and Electoral Behavior in Turkey: Toward a 'Critical Realignment'?" *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vo. 6 (1975), pp. 460-80; Üstün Ergüder and Richard Hofferbert, "The 1983 General Elections in Turkey: Continuity or Change in Voting Patterns?" in *State, Democracy, and Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), pp. 81-102; Ali Çarkoğlu and Gamze Avcı, "An Analysis of the Electorate from a Geographical Perspective," in *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey*, ed. Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 2002), pp. 126-7.

Mardin's work—the Ottoman Empire and the Early Republican period. Mardin's discussion of the existence of a center-periphery cleavage extends back into the Ottoman Empire for several generations and seems to capture a fairly orthodox portrait of the social relations of the time, which indeed indicates a fairly clear cultural and power distinction between the central state—i.e. the Sultan, the military and bureaucracy and, to a lesser extent, the religious elite—and the largely powerless and non-influential masses. Of this relationship Mardin writes, "In the general, ecological sense, the center and the periphery were two very loosely related worlds."[42] It is in this period, Mardin's interpretation comes to most closely resemble the understanding of Shils, who writes:

> The mass of the population in most pre-modern and non-Western societies have in a sense lived *outside* society and have not felt their remoteness from the centre to be a perpetual injury to themselves. . . and the consequent alienation has been accentuated by their remoteness from the central value system. The alienation has not however been active or intense, because, for the most part, their convivial, spiritual and moral centre of gravity has lain closer to their own round of life.[43]

There is good reason to believe that this distance was more or less sustained during the single-party period, as Mardin also maintains. The leaders of the Turkish Revolution were, by and large, members of or closely associated with the bureaucratic and military elite that existed in the closing period of the Ottoman Empire.[44] As pointed out by Frey and others, the political elite running the country and implementing the reforms had been exposed to secular education and largely came from the western region of the country or were immigrants from

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[42] Ibid., p. 171.
[43] Shils, "Centre and Periphery," p. 13.
[44] Szyliowicz, "Elites and Modernization in Turkey," p. 24

European provinces lost prior to the end of the Empire.[45] Until the end of the single-party period, the representatives of even the far eastern provinces of Turkey were often highly educated bureaucrats from the Marmara and Aegean Region.[46] Local representation was a secondary concern, especially in the eastern regions considered the most peripheral, until the development of multiparty politics. Thus, it seems likely that in terms of interaction, values, and culture, a distant gap existed between those closely associated with the Westernized, secular political elites and the rest.[47] The values of the periphery were largely determined by local orientations and hierarchies, and the relation between the two realms was less confrontational than non-interactive.

There are significant reasons to believe that this gap would be reduced and complicated by the institutionalization of democracy. As anticipated in the theoretical works of Shils and that of Lipset and Rokkan, the logic of democratic contestation itself suggests that such a divide would necessarily be confounded by the institutionalization of democracy. When İsmet İnönü opened the door for multiparty democratic elections in 1945, it was truly a "democratic revolution"[48] in that he suddenly empowered the rural inhabitants, estimated at around 80 percent of the populace in 1950,[49] to suddenly interact with the central state elites regarding the affairs of state. Kemal Karpat writes, "High government officials who had enjoyed seclusion in the past—traveling in separate coaches, never seen

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[45] Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite*, 187; and Erik J. Zurcher, "How Europeans adopted Anatolia and Created Turkey," *European Review*, Vol. 13 (2005), pp. 379-94.

[46] Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite*, p. 191.

[47] Szyliowicz, "Elites and Modernization in Turkey," 35.

[48] Metin Heper, "The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics," *Journal of International Affairs* 54 (2000): 81.

[49] Richard D. Robinson, "Pre-Election Thoughts, March 14, 1950," *Institute of Current World Affairs*, http://www.icwa.org/articles/RDR-51.pdf (accessed 2 May 2009).

in public except on special occasions—began to talk directly to the people."[50] The buffer that essentially existed between the two worlds was suddenly removed, offering this massive population that hitherto had little influence at all to be able to place and remove governments as they saw fit.

If it existed, how might a center-periphery *electoral* cleavage operating in the party system be observed empirically? Several points of inquiry seem particularly fruitful. Such a cleavage suggests that voters are *intentionally* making their choice of a center vote versus a periphery vote based on knowledge that the recipient of the vote clearly represents one side of this cultural divide, that they as a voter are on one side, and that this cleavage is salient. Thus the nature and background of party elites become important. One would expect peripheral parties to be filled with elites that are more likely to come from or have ties with the periphery—such as local notables—than the other party.[51] One would also anticipate that the discourse of the parties would clearly resemble their respective powerful versus weak cultural positioning. Furthermore, one would assume that the areas that were most distant from the interaction with and power of the center—the least nationalistic and centralized—would be the most likely to vote in greater numbers for the peripheral party and vice versa. Finally, for it to be an essential cleavage of the system, one would anticipate that there would be some measure of stability in how the vote is cast; in other words, significant changes in

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[50] Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 339.
[51] As is necessarily the case with a center-periphery social cleavage, the primary issue sparking opposition is centralization. Therefore, it is significant that we are talking about *local* or *provincial* notables—i.e. what makes them notable is distinct from that which is *national* and their authority, hence, implicitly challenges the authority of the center.

the distribution of votes across the population and volatility would not be observed.

An investigation of the nature and the background of the party members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in the early period of multiparty politics— the period prior to the first military intervention on May 27, 1960—reveals a number of interesting trends. One trait remaining stable both across time and across political parties was a high level of secular educational attainment.[52] To use Shilsian terminology, this seems to be an incontrovertible "secondary value" determining the possibility of elite status in the central system values in Turkey. None of the parties greatly differed on this account. On the other hand, during this early period, though there was an occupational difference observed between the CHP elite and the DP in the initial turn-over election of 1950; the CHP deputies were more likely to come from an "official" background (military or bureaucratic service) while the DP parliamentarians were more likely to come from "professional" and "economic" occupational backgrounds (lawyers, doctors, businessmen, and landowners); however, this difference became negligible in subsequent elections.[53]

It is also important to note that the distinction between bureaucrats and professionals could not be understood as a distinction between elites and non-elites, but an indication that elite occupations that provided "sacred authority" to use Shilsian terminology were undergoing a transformation. During the period

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[52] Frederick Frey, "Patterns of Elite Politics in Turkey," in *Political Elites in the Middle East*, ed. George Lenczowski (Washington, D.C: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975), p. 57. This pattern has been maintained through 2007. See Sabri Sayarı and Alim Hasanov, "The 2007 Elections and Parliamentary Elites in Turkey: The Emergence of a New Political Class?" *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2008), pp. 352-4.
[53] Frey, "Patterns of Elite Politics," p. 57.

that witnessed the dramatic fall of the Ottoman Empire and the equally dramatic establishment of the Turkish Republic, it was the secularly-educated bureaucrats who effectively administered the affairs of state. There were no better claimants for a modern, Westernized and skilled pedigree than those civil and military bureaucrats educated for the purposes of statecraft. The values of modernization and Westernization were indisputably maintained in the early Republic, but the expansion of education and the model of the West began to highlight other professions such that they took on sacred social status. Doctors, lawyers, bankers and financiers represented progressive society, and thus, when the selection of elites was left to the masses in society, it is no surprise that both parties began to recruit heavily from these professional positions. Once multiparty politics got underway, these centrally elite occupational groups began to take political prominence. It is for the same reason, and no coincidence, that one begins to see the rise of the engineer and technocrat in politics beginning in the 1960s.[54] Their social desirability places them necessarily in the social center, not the periphery.

Furthermore, although some distinction initially existed at the level of centrally-elite occupational status, a significant complicating factor arises when "localism" is taken into account. Although both parties, with the advent of the multiparty system, sought to increase the level of local representation—deputies representing their home constituents—the CHP out-performed the DP in this area.[55] Though most of the DP parliamentarians were residents of the Marmara and Aegean regions, the CHP deputies were increasingly drawn from local

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[54] For more on the social forces that led to occupational transition among political elites, see Leslie Roos and Noralou Roos, *Managers of Modernization* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1971), pp. 34-52, 84-5; also, Sayarı and Hasanov, "The 2007 Parliamentary Elections," pp. 355-6.
[55] Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite*, 381. See also Frey, "Patterns of Elite Politics," 60-1.

notables in Central and Eastern Anatolia. Therefore, it would be hard to suggest, based on the overall composition of the competing parties, that the rural (peripheral) voters would have been able to make a clear choice of party on this basis. Where the parties were not largely mirrors of one another in their elite status, it could be suggested that the CHP offered greater incentive to the rural provincial farmer in this regard because it had appropriated their local (i.e. peripheral) power structures into the representative function of the party to a greater extent.

The background of the leadership of the DP was also no mystery to the populace; they were all significant members of the CHP and had sprung from the same class of political elites.[56] Thus, if these parties became the channels to reify a national center-periphery divide, it was unlikely that the background of the deputies was a decisive factor. In fact, early investigations into the rural attitudes toward the new multiparty contest show a focus, not on cultural, but on pragmatic concerns, and researchers like Richard Robinson following the elections as they transpired in the villages detected hesitancy and uncertainty regarding the DP in the rural areas he visited. He writes, "The Democrats won in the villages by a surprisingly narrow margin [in comparison to their huge wins in the big cities] . . . It was as though many trusted the Democrats even less."[57] Lerner also recounts a discussion in a village coffee house in which the older men argued that "it would be better to have a small margin between the major parties. When the parties are

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[56] Mardin also acknowledges this. "Center-Periphery Relations," 185; Frank Tachau, "Turkish Political Parties and Elections: Half a Century of Multiparty Democracy," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2000), p. 130.
[57] Richard D. Robinson, "Turkish Elections, 1950," *Institute of Current World Affairs*, http://www.icwa.org/articles/RDR-52.pdf (accessed 2 May 2009).

competing and need our votes, then they heed our voice."[58] Indeed, the accounts of attitudes in the villages in the 1950s clearly suggest voting according to functional and local concerns, not antipathy to a central hegemonic force.

Was there an observable trend of the cultural periphery to support a particular "party of the periphery" at the expense of a party representing the interests of the center elite? The answer to these question also seems to be "no". At the advent of multiparty politics, there is wide agreement that there was a significant separation between the West regions of Turkey and the central and eastern Anatolian regions in terms of both centralization and development. Power, wealth and advanced education were largely located in the western regions, especially along the Marmara and Aegean coasts. The largely rural residents of the eastern parts of the country had very little access to control but were subjected to the control of the institutions of power located in the west. Frey writes, "The East . . . was rigidly controlled; it was so unsure that it was *made* sure. Political life was closed. The West, on the other hand, was more modern and more powerful; thus political life could be and needed to be relatively more open."[59] Thus, one would expect that the provinces of the West, which had been included to a far greater extent into political deliberation and decision-making during the single-party period, and contained larger clusters of secular, "modern" and educated elements of the population, which shared the values of the Kemalist elites, would be the citadel for the party of the "center." Concurrently, the areas

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[58] Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (New York: Free Press, 1958), p. 41. See also page 31.
[59] Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite*, p. 191.

farthest in distance[60] from the institutional centers of power and its accompanying culture, which were located predominantly in the East, would most likely be the bastions of the "peripheral" party vote. Certainly, the Sheikh Said revolt in the Southeast in 1925 demonstrated the potential power of rebellion within the periphery in response to a centralizing state.[61]

The electoral geography in Figure 4.1, however, completely bewilders such an anticipated result.[62] The fifteen provinces (in red) garnering the highest average vote in the three elections from 1950-1957 for the "center" CHP are all on the Eastern "peripheral" half while those fifteen provinces providing them the least support (in blue) are predominantly Western. The Central Eastern and Southeastern regions of the country were the least centralized and the home to large portions of Kurds and Alevis whose peripheral values and socioeconomic structures placed them the furthest from the center and its social values and

Figure 4.1

The fifteen highest (red) and lowest (blue) average vote totals by province for CHP (1950-1957)

[60] By distance, I do not primarily intend a geographical understanding, but access to the possibilities of authority and elite status as determined by central system values.
[61] See also Metin Heper, *The State and Kurds in Turkey: The Question of Assimilation* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 154.
[62] Data for figures taken from *Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri 1923-2007* (Ankara: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, 2008).

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institutions. These are the provinces that were the mainspring of the CHP's electoral support in the initial elections until 1965. There are no provinces in the top fifteen that supported the CHP west of Sinop, located in the central Black Sea region. Tachau has also noted this quandary and writes:

> The CHP, the party of the modernized, urban, official elite, actually drew its greatest voting strength from less developed rural parts of the country rather than from the cities, where one might have expected it to show its greatest strength. Contrariwise, the DP, speaking for the periphery, showed greater strength in the more modernized western part of the country than in the less developed east.[63]

Can these electoral results from the initial elections in the multiparty period, which seem to confound intuition, be explained away in a manner allowing for the maintenance of a national center-periphery cleavage in the party system? Not really. It may be superficially claimed that those adhering to the values of the center (primarily bureaucrats, military, intelligentsia and Westernized elites) were in fact quite a small proportion of the total population.[64] Thus, even in the provinces of the large, developed Western cities in which such elites were clustered, they were still a clear minority of those populations; therefore, the rural masses and urban poor of those provinces voted for the peripheral party in large numbers, bringing the result that one sees in the West. Thus, it is possible— though ethnographic research of the period strongly challenges this—in a province like Istanbul that voters went to the polls and voted according to a cultural cleavage that pitted those associated with the powerful central elites against the power-deprived and resentful peripheral masses. The ethnographic

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[63] Frank Tachau, "An Overview of Electoral Behavior," in *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey*, ed. Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer (Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 2002), p. 47.
[64] One must also remember that in the 1950s, the military and security forces, supposed pillars of the center, could not vote. See Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, 389.

research of Turkish village life of the time consistently points to the fact that these villagers framed their approach to voting according to egotropic, and to some extent, sociotropic interests, not according to a sociocultural power division,[65] and this was based on the machine politics style of clientelism promised by the DP even in 1950 that worked very effectively in nationalist and centralized areas of the country.[66]

Explaining the results witnessed in the Eastern Anatolian region according to this cultural cleavage is even more problematic empirically. Although political elites might have had a hand in the outcome, forces were at play that would have to be understood as *minimizing* any sort of awareness of a national center-periphery divide when the votes were cast or the results would have necessarily been different. As will be discussed in depth in chapter six, the distribution of the vote corresponds closely to the distinct styles of patron-client relationships employed by the two major parties.[67] Patron-client relations, by its very nature, of course, is based on relationships formed by members from different positions on the social hierarchies, assuming a cross-cutting relationship between center-elites and peripheral masses for some purpose—i.e. voting. Whether there was an actual center and periphery *cultural difference* is not the question; the issue is

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[65] Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, p. 31.

[66] Just as Shils anticipates that connection with the central system values and institutions brings nationalist sentiment to the populace, a study by Frey also shows a pattern with levels of nationalism among villagers in the mid-1960s. The pattern closely corresponds with centralization, more so than economic development. Interestingly, votes for the DP came from areas where nationalism was more disseminated among the population, including the Northeast Region, one of the few places in the East where the DP had success. See, Frederick Frey, "Socialization to National Identification among Turkish Peasants," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (1968), p. 950.

[67] Mardin also refers to these patron-client relations in his work. Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations," p. 177.

whether or not the political parties and voter behavior were structured with this distinction in mind, and this seems not to be the case, at least on a national scale.

A typical justification for establishing the Democrat Party as the party of the periphery in relation to the "centrist" CHP is the claim that the DP mobilized the masses as the spokesman for the peasant farmer while the CHP maintained its position as the defender of the Republican reforms and values. The DP could, therefore, be seen as representing the discourse of alternative values to challenge the central system values embodied in the principles of Ataturk and Kemalism. To what extent might this explain the possibility of a center-periphery cultural political struggle? There are a number of reasons why such an interpretation could be seen as problematic. On closer inspection of the behavior, discourse and programs of the two parties, one observes that their approaches to electoral contestation were more complex and often closely resembled one another.[68] Furthermore, if we use party manifests and campaign speeches as our reference, the CHP seemed to appeal far more specifically to the village citizenry and their plight than the DP, who consistently emphasized a general interest approach.[69] In terms of liberalizing the legal status of religious expression, for example, the CHP strategically took the lead in the years immediately preceding the DP victory in 1950;[70] thus, even if we take the liberalization of religion to be a value of the periphery in this period, as is widely claimed, both parties seemed willing to negotiate with the periphery when electoral fortunes were at stake, and both

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[68] Karpat complains that the CHP in 1947 "chose to narrow the differences between itself and other parties" and thus lost its "originality." Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 401. For more information on discourse of the initial period, including reference to speeches and programs, see chapter 6.

[69] See chapter 6.

[70] Ibid., p. 279-81.

parties had clear limitations on how far they would liberalize the laws in regard to religious observance and secularism.[71] It was the *advent of multiparty politics* itself, and not any particular *party*, that seemed to lead to a measure of liberalization of religion based on the inevitable result of elites needing to gain approval from the peripheral masses, and the need for such measures was understood by both major parties.[72]

The DP certainly tried to initially capitalize on the grievances sustained during the single-party period, but these grievances resonated from every segment of society, not just those typically associated with the periphery. The DP was, as Menderes himself claimed, "the party of all those who wanted to end one-party rule."[73] There was antagonism toward the apparent monopolizers of the state, and therefore, the DP attracted villagers but also the intelligentsia, workers, businessmen, and even those in the military, until at least 1955.[74] Furthermore, on closer investigation, the appeals by Menderes and the DP are far more in the realm of anti-incumbency and anti-authoritarianism than a conjuring up of a *cultural* battle. Very similar charges were leveled by the CHP against the DP once they were in power during the 1954 and 1957 elections. The leaders of the DP were, themselves, firmly embedded within that elite culture and could not have easily succeeded with anti-elite discursive rhetoric.

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[71] Ibid., p. 289.

[72] İlkay Sunar and Binnaz Toprak, "Islam in Politics: The Case of Turkey," *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (1983), p. 428; Kemal Karpat, "The Turkish Elections of 1957," *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1961), p. 444.

[73] Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment with Democracy, 1950-1975* (London: C. Hurst, 1977), p. 17.

[74] Ibid., 16.

Furthermore, the effect of political discourse assumes its broad dissemination across the targeted society. How would the elements of the periphery, especially those most distance from the opportunity to interact with or inside the center, be exposed to political discourse in this earlier period? In the 1950s, rare access to radio and the likelihood of insufficient educational opportunities would make it very difficult for the periphery to be directly aware of existing *national* discourse between the parties.[75] The vast majority of the people reading the newspaper and listening to the radio at this time would have been the people who fit the profile of those near, associated with or within the social center. As indicated in studies of the time, the periphery likely received a lot of its *national* information processed through *local* word of mouth.[76] Thus, to discover what the rural masses were thinking when they went to the ballot box one has to recognize that this filter of interpretation was at play and could likely lead to a variety of symbolic representations of what a vote for the CHP or the DP meant. Such realities in the peripheral provinces make it difficult to imagine that these rural villagers were effectively aware of and mobilized by a *nation-wide* cultural struggle against the center. It was much more likely that in these isolated "peripheral" areas, "village and regional loyalties superseded national loyalty."[77]

Considering that there is little empirical evidence for a nation-wide center-periphery cleavage directing the party system at the outset, it prompts the question of why the continuity of this divide would be proposed even 60 years after the entrance into multiparty democratic elections, especially since the so-called

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[75] Richard D. Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 40-1.
[76] Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, p. 137.
[77] Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic*, p. 42. See also Chapter 6.

"periphery" parties have held the reins of government for most of this time. Could it be that the initial formation of the party system has largely been maintained throughout this period, or it is possible to propose that, though not beginning with a center-periphery cleavage, the system started to shift toward one?

Figures 4.2 and 4.3 visually help to eliminate the notion of continuity in terms of electoral behavior. The electoral maps show the behavior of the electorate in relation to the CHP and "center-left" parties.[78] There was a great deal of consensus in the 1970s that Turkey had realigned and that the system and the parties within it seemed to be dividing at new lines of contestation.[79] Thus, as one can see from Figure 4.2, although there are a few provinces that continued their strong pattern of support or opposition to the CHP, there are some striking differences from Figure 4.1. Unlike in earlier elections, suddenly the populace in the largest city centers—Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Adana—and industrialized cities like Zonguldak showed strong support for the CHP. Furthermore, the eastern provinces of the country, which in earlier elections had leaned toward support for the CHP, began to shift their vote in opposition to the party.

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[78] The "center-left" is a combination of the CHP and the DSP, and to a lesser extent the SHP since 2002. As there is less fragmentation on this side, and the "center" is regularly argued to be "the homogenous center," it seems logical to search for the possible political center-periphery cleavage by focusing on this set of parties rather than the others.

[79] See Özbudun and Tachau, "Social Change and Electoral Behavior," pp. 460-80; Sabri Sayarı, "The Turkish Party System in Transition," *Government and Opposition* Vol. 13, No. 1 (1978), pp. 39-57.

Figure 4.2

**The fifteen highest (red) and lowest (blue) average vote totals by province for CHP
(1969-1977)**

Figure 4.3

**The highest (red) and lowest (blue) average vote totals by province for the 'Center-Left'
(1999-2007)**

By the time that we reach the latest general elections, represented in Figure 4.3, the map looks to be a near spatial reversal of the 1950s portrait in Figure 4.1.[80] This might be part of the reason that the notion of a center-periphery political cleavage has successfully been maintained into the twenty-first century.

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[80] For other major works utilizing the electoral geographic mapping method in the more recent elections that conform to this more simplistic rendering, see Ali Çarkoğlu, "The Geography of the April 1999 Turkish Elections," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2000), pp. 149-71; and Jefferson West II, "Regional Cleavages in Turkish Politics: An Electoral Geography of the 1999 and 2002 National Elections," *Political Geography*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (2005), pp. 499-523.

The idea of a cultural Western modernized "center" represented by parties often referred to as the "center-left" combating the traditionalist, Islamist populace of the central and eastern Anatolian regions seemed to fit the superficial portrait of more recent voting behavior. If one does not have access to older electoral data and simply compares the present picture with the portrayal of Turkish politics found in Mardin's essay, the possibility of such a cleavage seems compelling. It should not be surprising that the famous essay really began to take flight in the 1980s when electoral patterns slowly began to fit the broad interpretation in a rough sense.[81] There still remains a logical problem, however, in that the political power and elites that have governed since the 1980s have been those attributed as peripheral parties. Thus, the power relations necessary to invoke a center-periphery understanding are not existent and, thus, proposing such a social cleavage make less sense than other cultural or functional considerations.

Especially since the work of Kalaycıoğlu in 1994, the evidence of religiosity as a determinant of party preference has led some to assert that a secularist-religious conservative cleavage is the continued manifestation of the center-periphery cleavage in more recent electoral periods.[82] Scholars, particularly since the late 1990s have found a relationship between religiosity and votes for the "left" or "right" parties, and posited this as the evidence of a center and periphery.[83] The logic of such an assertion, however, is extremely

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[81] I am not implying that Mardin asserted a geographical manifestation of the cleavage, but that the East-West divide has often been understood as a rough proxy of a possible cleavage of that nature due to the isolated and relatively underdeveloped nature of the eastern provinces.

[82] Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Elections and Party Preferences in Turkey: Changes and Continuities in the 1990s," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1994), pp. 420-1.

[83] For some recent examples, see Çarkoğlu and Toprak, *Değişen Türkiye'de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset*, p. 84; Ali Çarkoğlu and Melvin Hinich, "A Spatial Analysis of Turkish Party

problematic. While it is undoubtedly true that many of the Early Republican leaders were more secular in lifestyle and outlook than many in the peripheral masses, there is absolutely no evidence or empirical means to connect those that are more or less religious today to those in the past or to voting behavior. If the issue dividing groups in society is primarily regarding religious and secular culture and not an issue of *powerful* center versus *powerless* periphery, then it also make little logical sense to use such loaded terminology. Describing the clustering of highly educated and secular voters on the "left" against religious conservatives on the "right" as "center versus periphery" also seems to demonstrate a lack of comparative knowledge of other democracies, especially those labeled "advanced industrial democracies" where the same clustering has been observed. The terminology applied to such democracies at this stage of history, of course, would be seen as insulting as it suggests a pre-modern cleavage emphasizing unconsolidated national centralization; thus, Western scholars typically use the terminology in developmental literature regarding undeveloped regions of the world such as Africa.[84]

4.3 Conclusion

This all seems to suggest that the existing cultural divisions of a center and periphery maintained through the early days of the Republic, when confronted

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Preferences," *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2006), pp. 369-392; and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Attitudinal Orientations to Party Organizations in Turkey in the 2000s," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2008), pp. 297-316.

[84] For an example outside of Turkey, see Bruce Berman, "Clientelism and neocolonialism: Center-periphery relations and political development in African states," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1974), pp. 3-25;

with the institution of democracy, were complicated such that it would be problematic to assume an initial center-periphery cultural cleavage as the operative divide in the Turkish party system, let alone a persistent and stable manifestation of such a cleavage. The extent of change in the electoral votes of parties and families of parties at the electoral level alone challenges the positing of any explanative historically stable political cleavage.

The maintenance of the well-known center-periphery cleavage as a foundational explanation for the operating of the Turkish party system is problematic for the student of Turkish politics for several reasons. Perhaps most importantly, the constant summoning of this meta-narrative for Turkish politics, intentionally or unintentionally, serves both sides of a current political discourse in Turkey and certain assumptions regarding "non-Western" nations more than it facilitates academic inquiry and explication. Within Turkey, the concept of central elites pitted against the peripheral masses seems to be a ready-made tool appropriated by both those who identify with the Turkish "center-left" and those opposing them. Thus, in the current political battle, it is not the *existence* of a center-periphery divide that is in question, but rather the *substance* of the attributes in defining one's own position and the other side.

Those on the "center-left", who assert that the central system values are the values established by Atatürk and the "Six Arrows" of Kemalism, have often portrayed it as a struggle of modernity versus backwardness. The peripheral masses, in this rendition, are traditionalists, reactionaries, and not guided by the principles of science and modernity, but by religious faith and superstition; thus, it becomes expedient that those in the center struggle against the rise of the

periphery in its current state. This fails to take into account that the supposed "periphery" is far more "modern" and shares far greater consensus with the "center" than it is often credited with. For example, it is not secular education that is contested as much as it is the means to accessing such an education and the rewards that follow. As scholars such as Toprak and Heper have also pointed out, there does not appear to be a debate centered around a secular state versus shariah law (as it is sometimes presented in the discourse),[85] but rather a contestation of the understanding of secularism.[86] Arguably, the "central value" of secularism has been fairly successfully consolidated; it is the particulars that are being debated. This "center-periphery" discourse also seems to operate as a self-justification by the center-left for why the parties from this social outlook have not been successful: such an argument suggests that as politics is essentially cultural politics; thus, there is an inevitable limit on the percentage of votes that they can win, and there is no reason to evaluate their arguably failing political emphases and strategies.

On the other side of politics, those who readily associate themselves with the periphery understand their own position as that of the democratic masses struggling against the hegemony of elite dominance that has simply served the interests of those elites.[87] This interpretation of the struggle depicts the periphery as the democratic and liberal voice that is pitted against authoritarianism and the

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[85] Metin Heper, "Does Secularism Face a Serious Threat in Turkey?" *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, Vol. 29 (2009), p. 416; Binnaz Toprak, "Islam and Democracy in Turkey," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 6 (2005), pp. 170-1.

[86] For more regarding this debate, see Ahmet Kuru, *Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France and Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and E. Fuat Keyman, "Modernity, Secularism and Islam: The Case of Turkey," *Theory, Culture and Society*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (2007), pp. 215-34.

[87] Such an interpretation is also alluded to by Mardin who refers to the periphery as the "democratic" periphery. Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations," p. 186.

status quo. This view often ignores its own political position's tendencies toward authoritarianism and passes over areas in which it is clearly less democratic and liberal than its self-portrait would attest to. Furthermore, association with the periphery puts this group in the position of "underdog" as if its struggle was incessantly against a stronger, dominant force, completely nullifying that it has been parties from this supposed "peripheral" position that have dominated Turkish politics and set quite a lot of the social rules since the 1950s. True, there are other forces associated with the "center" that have had a strong hand in politics, such as the military and especially the judiciary in the last decade, but it would be hard to claim that what we are witnessing is that of strong versus weak, elites versus the powerless masses. Whether or not one argues that there is a cultural or worldview struggle in Turkish politics, no matter how one approaches it, arguing that this divide is between central elites with all the authority and the powerless peripheral masses—the theoretical imagery conjured up by the comparative terminology—would be the least explanative.

Ultimately, the center-periphery focus is problematic because it hides the fact that something much more complex was and is occurring. What needs to be observed is not how the Turkish electorate manifested a pre-existing cultural cleavage of power-wielding elites versus the masses, but how those elites, when initially confronted with the challenges of multiparty competition, developed divergent strategies to form successful links with those in the periphery whether or not they ultimately shared the same cultural values, and the subsequent contestation over "central values" since the critical election in 1950. Democracy pushed the rural, less educated farmer into a previously unknown position of

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power and shrank the distance between the cultural center and periphery, allowing these groups both to affect the other side and be affected by it.[88] Karpat writes:

> Party developments on the one hand, and economic and social changes on the other, affected the mentality and behavior and brought into active political life the most neglected group in Turkey: the peasants. . . Since no political party in Turkey can hope to win an election without the villagers" support, it is obvious that the peasantry will continue, under present circumstances, to play a decisive role in politics.[89]

Thus, as both Shils and the work of Lipset and Rokkan anticipated—and to some extent, the future prediction in Mardin's piece—the advent of democracy seems to have complicated the relations between the existing center and periphery divide in society, particularly in the political realm. We are left then, in the absence of such a divide, to adequately explain the dynamics of the Turkish party system, to observe more closely the nature of the interaction and to try to determine the possible changing paradigms—with its composite dimensions of competition and domains of identification—in operation that effectively established the boundaries of political contestation in the system.

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[88] Ergun Özbudun, "Political Participation in Rural Turkey," in *Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems,* ed. Engin Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor (Istanbul: Bosphorus University, 1975), p. 36.
[89] Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, 342.

CHAPTER 5

POSITIONING, INTERACTION AND THE TURKISH PARTY SYSTEM

Parties and party systems are not simply objects, but also subjects. It is they who ultimately set the agenda, and it is they who ultimately determine the terms of reference through which we, as voters and citizens, understand and interpret the political world.[1]

Once the question of one essential historical cleavage is put to rest, we are left with the endeavor of how to properly conceive and explain the competitive interaction within the electoral arena of party systems. A widely-used shorthand to delineate the positions parties take in wooing the electorate is the familiar left-right positioning, locating the parties on the spectrum of options on a linear space. Such a conception undeniably offers significant benefit to discussions of party systems depending on the objective behind the study. This is particularly true when what is needed is a parsimonious description of party positions in a single contestation—i.e. *synchronically*. The useful strengths of the left-right scale, particularly the emptiness and flexibility of its categories, become a handicap, however, when one wants to locate and understand change in party systems over time. Its flexibility allows its descriptors to maintain referential meaning even in a context where significant substantial elements of the competitive space have shifted and electoral change has occurred; thus, the substantive meaning attributed

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[1] Peter Mair, *Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 9.

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to positions in one period could not be assumed to be consistent with another. Therefore, its potential benefit as a primary tool of description is greatly limited in studies such as this one, which purports to investigate the dynamics of the system over time—i.e. *diachronically*.

How then should this arena of contestation be conceived? As Hinich and Munger have argued, spatial models that would attempt to capture all of the contestable policy space are also problematic as party systems are shaped by electoral outcomes, requiring the electorate to have a reasonable understanding of how the contestable space is organized,[2] which is an observation also noted in the Turkish case by Çarkoğlu.[3] This interaction between the parties and the electorate seems to push party systems toward simpler positioning within the competitive space. Hence, while the contestable space remains largely containable within simple models of one or two dimensions at any given time, complex changes across time lead to shifting and reconstitution of meaning of those simple dimensions, resulting in alterations in the operation of the party system, attitudes and behaviors of parties, and voter alignments. To capture this phenomenon effectively so that change can be observed and addressed, both synchronic and diachronic conceptualizations of the system are required. If we, indeed, conceive of the party system as a *system* rather than a *set of parties*,[4] then interaction

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[2] Melvin Hinich and Michael Munger, *Ideology and the Theory of Public Choice* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1994), p. 3.
[3] Ali Çarkoğlu, "The Nature of Left-Right Ideological Self-placement in the Turkish Context," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2007), p. 254.
[4] This important distinction is made by Bardi and Mair in their suggested theoretical framework for studying party systems. Luciano Bardi and Peter Mair, "The Parameters of Party Systems," *Party Politics*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2008), pp. 152-4.

becomes important, and relational interaction necessarily leaves the door open for alteration and change.

5.1 Left-Right linear descriptions and Giovanni Sartori

One of the most compelling arguments and frameworks for utilizing the left-right scale can be found in the definitive work on party systems by Giovanni Sartori; thus, it would be of benefit to examine his conceptualization of the left-right scale and his original rationale for its effective usage. Anchored in Sartori's formulation, we will be able to return to the Turkish party system and examine how the left-right scaling has been used in this particular context.

Toward the end of Sartori's famous work *Parties and Party Systems*, he devotes a chapter on how to conceive of contested space within party systems. His essential argument boils down to two propositions: First, that because of the dynamic relationship between parties, other parties, and the electorate, the need for simplicity in communicating each party's position, despite the existence of multidimensional cleavages, pushes the positioning of parties toward uni-dimensional configuration; second, because of this tendency, there is a great deal of parsimony in utilizing a left-right scale to convey this configuration because left and right can be effectively appropriated to delineate any existing political cleavage because as a signifier, it is not anchored to any particular signified.

Sartori, through an initial discussion of Downsian Theory of party competition, enumerates three "post-Downsian" concepts that he argues are relevant to party competition: issue, identification and image. An emphasis on competition at the level of issues would suggest that the space of political party

contestation would be very complex and lines of issue division would inevitably cross-cut party positions, leaving the electorate quite confused and uncertain about voting choices and affiliation, etc. Furthermore, as Sartori also suggests, issues have to be understood as extremely salient to the voter if they are to be determinant of positional space.[5] Voter identification with parties in terms of party system shape is also not completely explanative, as Sartori point out, because, due to the common existence of "negative voting," "feeble identifiers may well turn out to be very stable voters."[6] Of these three concepts, then, Sartori places the most emphasis on "image", which emphasizes the mental pictures created by parties—such as "workers' party"—to attract the electorate. He writes, "Parties communicate to mass electorates via party images and . . . much of their electoral strategy is concerned with building up the appropriate image for the public from which they expect votes."[7] In regard to how image is used in relation to competitive space, Sartori adds the concept of positioning, specifically the interaction between "position-perception" and "position-image":

> The notion of position-perception implies that the voter places himself and the parties in some kind of *spatial ordering*, in a row: and the notion of position-image implies that parties maneuver precisely for conveying to the electorate a *spatial location* of themselves.[8]

Thus, while not ignoring multiple dimensions space, Sartori argues that, in most systems, the nature of competition and the interaction of the parties with the electorate pulls the potential space from multidimensionality toward the direction

[5] Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems* (Colchester, UK: ECPR Press, 2005), p. 292. The pagination is different from the original edition of the 1976 text that was printed by Cambridge University Press.

[6] Ibid., p. 293.

[7] Ibid., p. 293.

[8] Emphasis in the original. Ibid., p. 296.

of one or two dimensions. This can be argued, according to the author, even for systems with numerous parties. He writes, "While the segmented polities surely require a multidimensional explanation for the party *identifications*, it does not automatically follow that their *competition* is multidimensional also."[9] Thus, in the arena of electoral contestation, the parties could be seen as squeezing themselves into linear space of one dimension, and in this regard, "the feeble case might well be the case of multidimensionality."[10]

Having thus argued that competitive positioning tends toward linear space, Sartori emphasis on utilization of left-right scaling becomes clearer. Critical to the understanding of such an assertion is not that Sartori is arguing that the substance of party system competition more or less falls along the same lines, but that, whatever the salient political dimensions, the system moves toward spatial simplicity. Thus, the very recommendation of employing left-right scales to manifest the positions of the parties in the competitive system is due to the inherent emptiness of the left-right terminology in comparison to other options:

> We seemingly find no contradiction in assuming *one* left-right dimension while acknowledging that it actually consists of *multiple* orderings depending on whether the criterion is economic, socioeconomic, constitutional, populistic, or, in the end, no criterion at all.[11]

Multidimensions and divergent substantial cleavages can be subsumed within the flexible space of a left-right scale, because: "We discover that the 'emptiness' of our left-right boxes facilitates, and indeed prompts, the squeezing of a multiplicity of orderings (equivalent to a variety of issue spaces) into one and the same spatial

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[9] Emphasis in the original. Ibid., p. 304.
[10] Ibid., p. 304.
[11] Emphasis in the original. Ibid., p. 300.

dimension."[12] The emptiness of 'left' and 'right', therefore, allows no conflict in various dimensions squeezing into the space because it is ultimately a 'neutral' designation, encouraging positioning along its lines. The meaning attached to 'left' and 'right' are "emotionally symbolic," providing the parties with flexibility to adapt and renegotiate the substance of its positions.

In this understanding, party system space that is demarcated with descriptors such as left and right allow the electorate to understand parties within this position-image—i.e. "center-right" or "left—thus, it can remain a relatively accurate and somewhat stable short-hand for party positioning in space while the actual substance of the delineations between parties is regularly being renegotiated through competition and changing contexts. Thus, at any given time, a party can self-describe as "center-right" or be attributed as "center-right," and the electorate, identifying or distancing themselves from such a party, can accurate locate themselves in the current positioning, but the substance of this position—its constellation of issues—can change drastically with time. For example, though at various points in history voters could accurately identify themselves and the party in relation to 'right-left' scaling, what the CHP (or its short roughly ten-year span as SHP) has *in substance* meant as "center-left" is indisputably changed from the 1970s (nationalist-social democrat), the late 1980s (pluralist-social democrat), and in the 2000s (secular-nationalist). This is an important observation when implementing left-right interpretations on a party system. The Sartorian understanding of left-right, if it is to be explanative of the system, needs to be placed and elaborated within its individual context, and it

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[12] Ibid., p. 301.

must also lead to initial assumptions of time-specificity (although this might not always be the case)—i.e. it is ultimately a *synchronic* tool, not one that effectively explains historical shifts and transitions. Within this conceptual framework, when one posits that a system has consistently tended toward a left-right distinction in the electorate, such a claim is saying very little in actual substance except that the left-right imagery has been used in party positioning in competitive space.

Such a conceptualization of left-right placement would lead us to primarily nominal relational understandings rather than ordinal value understandings of the positions as they are taken up from left to right, particularly in the Turkish case. The substantive or quantitative meaning that exists when a portion of the electorate seems to re-position themselves as "right" or "far right" rather than "center right" is therefore questionable. The difference in self-placement alone does not indicate what, if any, change occurred in the political views of the electorate; such a determination would require a deeper analysis that party or electorate placement on the left-right dimension. Though the positions are not measureable, they are necessarily relational, and thus become approximations of where one party stands in relation to one or more parties whose identification with a position on the scale anchors the relational placement.

Furthermore, left-right placement has also been used as a measure to comprehend the dynamic between the particular system of parties and the electorate. A key question becomes whether or not individual self-placement is more likely a reflection of the context of current party system dynamics or whether it is an independent placement based on non-contextual ideological criteria. Since the key work on individual self-placement by Inglehart and

Klingemann in 1976, scholars have agreed on three critical components in individual self-placement on a left-right scale: social, value and partisan components.[13] The social component reflects positioning based on one's social status in society; the value component addresses placement based on awareness of ideological values as they relate to the Western democratic polities, and the partisan component reflects an individuals' self-placement on the line in tandem with the placement of the political party with which they are affiliated. Among the works addressing these components, the vast majority give priority to the partisan component in particular,[14] although a number of studies by Freire on European polities, by enhancing the proxy measurements for the social component, have found that one's socioeconomic status in society is arguably equally or more important than the partisan component.[15] A number of studies argue for the importance of the value component—i.e. approaching one's placement on the scale according to wider ideological values—but these were still limited to a focus on traditional Western European countries in which the relation between the values, the party's positional placement, and the left-right scale are deeply intertwined,[16] or, though positing that values were growing in importance

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[13] Ronald Inglehart and Hans Dieter Klingemann, "Party Identification, Ideological Preference and the Left-Right Dimension Among Western Mass Publics," in Ian Budge et al. (eds), *Party Identification and Beyond: Representations of Voting and Party Competition* (London: John Wiley, 1976), pp. 244-5.

[14] For examples, see Philip Converse and Roy Pierce, *Political Representation in France* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 111-50, especially pp. 149-50; Ronald Inglehart, "The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western Society," in Russell Dalton, Scott Flanagan and Paul Beck, eds., *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 25-69, especially p. 38.

[15] Andre Friere, "Party Polarization and Citizens' Left-Right Orientations," *Party Politics*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2008), pp. 189-209; Andre Friere, "Bringing Social Identities Back In: The Social Anchors of Left-Right Orientations in Western Europe," *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (2006), pp. 359-78.

[16] For an example, see John Huber, "Values and Partisanship in Left-Right Orientations: Measuring Ideology," *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 17 (1989), pp. 599-621.

in European countries, they still determined that the partisan component was the strongest indicator of self-placement, especially among "less-advanced" countries when relative levels of development were taken into account.[17] Thus, it would be a reasonable conclusion that, in most cases, a voter's self-placement on the left-right scale is more a reflection of their own particular political and socioeconomic context rather than an indication of how they are measuring up to "universal" ideological norms. Where values are important or distinct from party affiliation, the values seem to be contextually-based and filtered through approximations of contemporaneous political debates and, thus, still anchored by party placement and other relevant cues to positioning within the arena of politics, even when voters are undecided. In other words, non-affiliated voters place themselves on the line in relation to their conceptions of space taken up by existing parties in their system. A brief discussion of how left-right placement has been used to discuss the party system and voting behavior in Turkey will help illuminate the importance of clarifying what left-right positioning and descriptors do and do not indicate.

5.2 The Left and Right in the Turkish Party System

The point at which the indicators of "left" and "right" became relevant in the broad sense in the Turkish party system began arguably with the initiation of ideological politics through the founding of the Turkish Workers' Party (*Türkiye*

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[17] Oddbjørn Knutsen, "The Partisan and the Value-Based Component of the Left-Right Self-Placement: A Comparative Study," *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1997), pp. 191-225.

İşçi Partisi, TİP) in February 1961.[18] Though a small "leftist" party that was never able to garner more than 3 percent of the vote, it's popularity among the intellectuals and upper class in industrial urban centers has been credited with instigating İsmet İnönü's famous placement of the CHP "left of center" [19]shortly before the general elections in 1965. [20] Once a major party established its position—"left of center"—in response to the socialist ideological party, it created an opportunity for the other parties to, in some way, positional themselves in relation to the image. While the relative positions on the left and right of the well-known parties are not debated, it is still necessary to try to clarify where the critical line of division was laid as the substance guiding the positioning. In other words, what were the substantial motivations and conceptions that led İnönü, the leader of the CHP, to position his party to the "left of center."

It is fairly clear that the "left of center" position was an attempt to delineate exactly where the CHP stood in socioeconomic outlook in relation to the socialist TİP and the other major party, the economically liberal Justice Party.   The declaration of the Seventeenth Congress of the CHP in October of 1964, which predated the announcement of the CHP's position on the left-right scale, helps to indicate the substance of their "left of center" imaging of the party. As Ahmad records:

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[18] Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977), p. 218.

[19] In Turkish, "ortanın solu." In direct translation, this would be better read as "left of middle" rather than "left of center," but the phrasal awkwardness of the former prompts the widespread use of the latter. However, as will be seen in chapter nine, there is a significant conceptual difference between "middle"—i.e. *orta*—and "center"—i.e. *merkez*—which comes into play in the impetus behind imaging in later paradigms in the Turkish case.

[20] This is a widely-held claim by many scholars. See Ergun Özbudun, "The Turkish Party System: Institutionalization, Polarization, and Fragmentation," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1981), p. 231.

> It dealt with . . . land reform, social justice, social security, economic development, 'democratic' etatism, education, secularism, the fine arts, nationalism and youth. Only through the proper socioeconomic policies, read the declaration, would the 'extreme Right' and 'extreme Left' be countered.[21]

Thus, both the understanding and position of the party in relation to the positioning of themselves as "left of center" and the public reaction indicates that the understanding of the categories was largely based on the prevalent socioeconomic ideological left-right scaling found in Western Europe.

This understanding of an ideological/functional left was not missed by scholars of the period. Joseph Szyliowicz, discussing the 1965 general election outcomes in Turkey, writes about "the rising concern with *ideological* issues and the *resulting* division of the parties into 'left' and 'right.'"[22] Thus, ideology of the socioeconomic nature as was common in Western Europe, became the substantial framework within which positions were taken up. As the ideological battle intensified, the charges of "communist" and "infidel" were leveled at the "leftists" while the left shot back accusations of fascism toward those affiliated with the "right."[23] Sabri Sayarı, writing about the polarization of politics in the period, states:

> The major source of cleavage, which acts as a principle catalyst in the ideological polarization of the party system, centers on the pro- and anti-leftist orientations displayed by the parties. Although there are some notable programmatic differences between the parties on the Right, for example, they all share a common anti-Socialist/anti-Communist world view. It is this anti-Communist fervor which seems to differentiate them from the parties on the Left.[24]

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[21] Ibid., pp. 250-1.
[22] Joseph Szyliowicz, "The Turkish Elections: 1965," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (1966), p. 480.
[23] Ibid., p. 481.
[24] Emphasis is mine. Sabri Sayarı, "The Turkish Party System in Transition," *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1978), pp. 49-50.

This interpretation of the polarization and the dynamics of the system is very interesting, and it seems to confirm an assumption of Sartori: though there were significant lines of cleavage separating the parties on the right from one another, the nature of electoral contestation and its polarization caused the parties to "squeeze" themselves into the left-right scale and enter the ideological discourse.

This socioeconomic ideological association with the usage of "left" and "right" seems to be the orthodox position among the other major scholars of party politics in that period. Kemal Karpat clarifies this interpretation in claiming that "the reason for the increased support for the [CHP] politicians among the youngest men [in the urban squatter areas] can be attributed to the 'left of center' or *welfare state policy* adopted by this party in 1965."[25] Thus, Karpat equates the designation of left with the common socioeconomic policy consistent with the contemporary understandings of left in Western Europe at that time. Ergun Özbudun also seems to have made this interpretation. In an article written along with Frank Tachau, he argues that voter alignments in this period seem to correspond to "the increasing importance of socioeconomic cleavages"[26] in which parties were competing according to "functional" rather than "cultural" cleavages.[27] Though the "left-right" scale was not utilized in that article, it is clear in his other writings that he had such an understanding. When explaining the "left" position of the CHP, he writes, "The appearance of the [socialist TİP]

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[25] Emphasis is mine. Kemal Karpat, "The Politics of Transition: Political Attitudes and Party Affiliation in the Turkish Gecekondu," in Engin Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor (eds.), *Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems* (Istanbul: Bosphorus University Press, 1975), p. 111.

[26] Ergun Özbudun and Frank Tachau, "Social Change and Electoral Behavior in Turkey: Toward a 'Critical Realignment'?" *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* Vol. 6, No. 4 (1975), p. 479.

[27] Ibid., p. 461.

seems to have been a major factor in the [CHP's] opening to the left," and "the ["fascist" nationalist MHP] was also instrumental in producing a rightward drive for the [AP]."[28] Hence, the positions on the line are established according to ideological position as was common in many other systems in Western Europe at the time.

Quantitatively, this association was also manifested in results of factor loadings for political parties competing in this same period in a study by Üstün Ergüder and Richard Hofferbert. Though they derived three separate indices for factor analysis—center-periphery, left-right, and anti-system—only the party loadings according to the left-right index (which established proxies for conventional Western European socioeconomic ideological positioning) takes the shape of the actual major political contestation of the period. Only this index pits the Justice Party (AP) on one end against the Republican People's Party on the other. The indices for center-periphery and anti-system placed the two parties in the same competitive space; in fact, the center-periphery index determined that the CHP was slightly more peripheral than the AP.[29] It is safe to say then, when the statements of the parties themselves and the scholars of the period are combined, that the substance behind the positioning of "left" and "right" in this period from the mid-1960s through the 1970s was primarily socioeconomic positioning.[30]

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[28] Ergun Özbudun, "The Turkish Party System," pp. 231-2.
[29] Üstün Ergüder and Richard Hofferbert, "The 1983 General Elections in Turkey: Continuity or Change in Voting Patterns," in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 80s* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), p. 92.
[30] For further analysis of this period, see chapter seven.

In 2007, a prominent scholar of Turkish politics, Ali Çarkoğlu, published the results of an interesting study with the intent to substantiate or associate certain characteristics with voters' self-designations along a left-right scale in Turkey.[31] His primary conclusion is "the left and right as reflected in the determinants of self-placements along the L-R scale have *no tangible socioeconomic basis* such as economic deprivation but have instead bases in ethnic [i.e. Turkish vs. Kurdish] and sectarian ["Islamist vs. secularist and Alevi] differences."[32] This leads the author, in fact, to claim that the substance of the positions taken up in the current political space as indicative of the ubiquitous resort of students of Turkish politics, the center-periphery cleavage.[33] Although the author stretches the significance of certain variables whose coefficients approach a straight line, and he downplays several variables with strong and significant coefficients, we can see from the sample population from which he derived his tables, that the "left" is associated with a secular outlook, pluralism, Alevism, Kurdishness, lack of primary school education, and a desire that society should either be radically changed or protected from any change—i.e. maintenance of the status quo.[34] The "right" was associated with "Turkishness," religiosity, desire for charismatic leaders, and positive evaluations of the state of the economy.[35]

Furthermore, the potential criticisms of this study—i.e. that it doesn't seem representative of the *mainstream* positions on left and right in the current

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[31] Ali Çarkoğlu, "The Nature of Left-Right Ideological Self-Placement in the Turkish Context," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2007), pp. 253-71.
[32] Ibid., p. 267. Emphasis is mine.
[33] Ibid., p. 256.
[34] Ibid., p. 265.
[35] Ibid., p. 265.

context—help to clarify the changes even more strongly. Çarkoğlu noted that, among the roughly 1,850 participants derived pulled with sampling methods from all regions of the country, the respondents tended to prefer one (farthest left), five (center), and ten (farthest right).[36] Although individuals on the right and left also placed themselves on spaces in-between, the mode was one, five, and ten, which subsequently leads the profiles of those respondents to more strongly determine the trends. Çarkoğlu tacks this up to participants being exposed to "ambiguous unobserved thresholds."[37] While I concur with the author that this certainly could be part of the problem, a more explanative hypothesis could be made if one assumes that the spectrum of issues over which participants self-identified on a left-right scale also reflect the significant issues establishing the placement of parties in the existing party system. The post-1991 relational placement imagery for party positioning has generally emphasized that parties with strong pro-Kurdish and Alevi elements are further left on the scale than the other "center-left" parties, and the Turkish nationalist party (MHP) has perennially been described as far right. If the constituents of these parties placed themselves on the extreme ends of the spectrums as the strong influence of the "partisan component" would suggest, we would expect the strongest coefficients to be skewed in relation to these groups. A second glance at the results in the table appears to strongly confirm this hypothesis. The five strongest coefficients in order are "does not speak Kurdish with their family" (right), "does not show signs of Alevism" (right), "prefers society should radically change" (left), "prefers

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[36] Ibid., p. 262.
[37] Ibid., p. 262.

protecting society from any change" (left), "is not a primary school graduate" (left).[38] The strongest coefficients except for "prefers protecting society from any change" suggest that the poles of right and left are occupied with the views and demographic realities of Turkish and Kurdish ethnic nationalists, respectively. This also helps explain the apparent huge contradiction that the left purportedly wants society to radically change and protect it from any change. The former is the rhetoric of the Kurdish nationalist leftists while the latter is a well-known key position of the "center-left" at the present time. Therefore, while we observe that the poles of the Turkish party system and its electorate in the 1970s were occupied by those entering into radical socioeconomic ideological rhetoric, in the first decade of the 21st century, the poles seem to represent ethnically-based concerns, which is also supported by studies by the same author in which the electorate place the parties on a left-right line.[39]

The implications of this change in left-right ideology in the 1970s are profound. The self-positioning of the electorate in Turkey along a left-right scale, whose self-placement has also been shown to be remarkably predictive of party affiliation,[40] as would be expected by the broader literature on self-placement and the partisan component, seems to be based on entirely different criteria than it was several decades earlier, rendering any sort of historical left-right comparison extremely dubious. All of the proxy variables from which a traditional left-right

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[38] Ibid., p. 265.

[39] In both 2002 and 2004, voters put the Turkish nationalist MHP on the far right and the Kurdish nationalist DEHAP on the far left. See, Ali Çarkoğlu, "The New Generation Pro-Islamists in Turkey," in Hakan Yavuz (ed.) *The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006), p. 165.

[40] Yılmaz Esmer, "At the Ballot Box: Determinants of Voting Behavior," in Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer (eds.), *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 2002), p. 105.

socioeconomic positioning could be derived turned out to be completely indeterminant in Çarkoğlu's 2007 study. Such a dramatic dynamic change contained within the superficially stable left-right framework clearly indicates the need to approach left-right scales as predominantly synchronic and with a corresponding necessity to elaborate upon what left and right signify at any given time. Unfortunately, these considerations have often not been heeded in discussing the Turkish case.

One problem has been to attach meaning to the left-right self-positioning that potentially does not exist or is ultimately circular. Yılmaz Esmer, for example, correctly determines that "the most important predictor of voter behavior in Turkey was the "left-right ideology."[41] What he means by this, however, is that the respondents' self-placement on an eleven-point scale was the most consistent significant indicator of party preference for all of the major parties. While this is an interesting finding, we still must ask, "What does it *mean*?" The author seems to assume that the self-placement was connected to a stable ideological scale exogenous from the current political environment. However, one must ask what criteria, benchmark or anchor these respondents were most likely using to determine their own placement on the scale. Is it more likely that these voters participating in this survey were basing their understanding of left and right in relation to how those terms are widely used as descriptors of parties and politicians or that they were deriving their placement from some abstract universal criteria external to their political context? It seems clear that for a strong majority, it would be the latter; hence, the meaning of the

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[41] Esmer, "At the Ballot Box," p. 110.

relationship of this coefficient with political party choice is simply that the respondents had a fairly accurate understanding of the current relational imagery in regard to the six major parties. In other words, where the parties placed themselves and have been placed in relation to the others was generally clear to the electorate. Thus, their self-placement on the scale simply becomes a proxy for party family identification or self-identification anchored within the current political context, and Esmer's work demonstrates clearly that the left-right imagery has been successful in communicating position-images to the electorate in that contemporary period of Turkish politics, not that a non-contextually-based knowledge of ideology as it occupies a left-right linear framework was determinant of how voters in Turkey choose their parties.

Another existing problem in this regard has been the tendency to compare self-placements on a left-right scale over time and translate this into an interpretation of concrete and quantitative shifting in ideological perspectives.

Figure 5.1 – Left-Right Diachronic Comparison

Consider the recreated graph in Figure 5.1, which originally appeared in a work in 1998. [42] The author is comparing self-placement results in 1977 with self-placement results in 1990 and 1995. What do these lines ultimately tell us? Critically, they tell us very little about the ideological constitution of the electorate at those times. We cannot with any certainty argue that the electorate in 1990 is quantifiably more centrist in a certain ideology than they were in 1977 or 1995. What can be said then? This graph shows us that the positioning and placement of parties and their subsequent relation with the electorate have changed quite dramatically from 1977. One could argue, in tandem with knowledge of the electoral competition in 1977, that the majority of the populace was fairly equally divided between a party casting an image of itself as "center-left" (the CHP) and a party with a "center-right" image, with a fairly decent portion of the population in the undecided position (center). [43] The 1990 line suggests that one major party, the Motherland Party (ANAP), and to some extent a number of other parties placed themselves toward the center of the contested political space. As the "centrist" party continued to lose ground to another party, the DYP, which largely shared the ideological space but for imaging reasons chose to emphasize its "center-rightness," the electorate, to some extent, seemed to follow in their re-identification. The problem in interpretation is the reference to the self-placement scale as "ideological." Although, to some extent, ideology is

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[42] This chart is reconstructed from, Ali Çarkoğlu, "The Turkish Party System in Transition: Party Performance and Agenda Change," Political Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3 (1998), p. 552.

[43] The author, having only the percentages for "center-left," "center" and "center-right" but having two numbers on the scale that fit each category, divided the percentages for each equally across the numbers for that category. The total score for center-left, for example, was divided equally across numbers three and four; center was five and six, and center-right was seven and eight. Ibid., p. 552.

involved in how parties position themselves in competitive space, *which* ideology and *relative to what* must be determined because it is from this interaction that the electorate of a polity filters its self-placement. If members of the polity are placing themselves along the scale in terms of left and right, it is much more likely that their decision is influenced more by the fact that the national parties are positioning themselves in space according to such an understanding rather than that a broad electorate has applicable knowledge of a universal substantive left-right ideological scale. The primary proxy that determines their positioning has to be the current dynamics of the party system.

Because of this, the argument that has been leveled toward the Turkish polity that it is sliding to the right (or back to the center) can be only indirectly true. For example, that self-placement scales between 2002 and 2004 showed that the electorate on the right moved back toward the center and center-right indicates not that a substantial ideological change or decrease in polarization has occurred, [44] but that the most popular party was employing effective image-positioning to fill the vacancy left behind by former parties occupying that space. The party itself could not be seen as substantially moderating its ideology from 2002, but its placement moved toward the center-right—or "social center" in their discursive imagery—away from the traditional placement of a religious party on the right. Certainly some ideological change might be taking place, but their self-placement has to be seen as strongly filtered and confounded by the individual's existing—even if quite temporary—attachment to a particular party or political

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[44] For an example of such an argument, see Ali Çarkoğlu, "The New Generation Pro-Islamists in Turkey," pp. 162-3.

context and its subsequent image-positioning. Hence, while increasing numbers of voters found themselves supporting parties traditionally identified as being located further to the right, this occurred simultaneous to those "rightist" parties moderating their rhetoric and issue formation to appeal to voters closer to the center.

Thus, though the left-right scaling has proven to be a particularly beneficial tool in explicating the synchronic relational positioning of parties competing in the system in Turkey, the problem has been how to measure substantial political change within the electorate over time and how to capture this in such a way that it can be effectively explicated. Further consideration of the relational dynamics beyond left-right spatial positioning seems to be beneficial to fill out the foundation that the discussion of Sartori's work has provided for us.

5.3 Relational Change and Party Competition—Structure and Agency

Despite the diagnosis by Lipset and Rokkan in 1967 of party system "freezing," the possibility for party system change on a number of significant levels seems to loom large. Although parties themselves can be understood as benefiting from stability in the system in which they have been able to take up a significant role, there are also potential opportunities for existing or new parties by initiating alterations in the nature of competition or the image-positioning of the party in certain competitive contexts. Besides the actions of political actors, such as parties and political leaders, the structures organizing society are themselves not static elements in the arena of political contestation and as these alter, whether drastically or gradually, they open up new possibilities that can be

appropriated by risk-taking actors. To the extent that institutions, such as the electoral system, or constitutions change, one could conceive of potential changes in the party system. While the issue of electoral system change was taken up in chapter two, a discussion below on the dynamics of structure and agents on party system change would be beneficial in highlighting the dynamics in which relational interaction between parties takes place.

Although historically, as can be observed by the assumptions of Lipset and Rokkan in their foundational piece on party systems and cleavages discussed in the previous chapter,[45] scholars have generally accorded a great deal of weight to structural and cultural factors, they have increasingly begun to leave an important place for the agency of political parties and leaders. Sartori himself, for example, attributed an important level of agency to political parties. Rather than simply being a reflection of the public will, he posits, "Parties do not only *express*; they also *channel*."[46] In other words, rather than simply being an institutionalized mouthpiece of public opinion, parties interact with and reconstitute "public interest" in a way that suits their agenda. He goes on to say that "more than expressing and reflecting public opinion parties shape, and indeed manipulate, opinion."[47] Furthermore, Sartori's own definition of party system implies the

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[45] In this account, cleavages and the subsequent party systems are seen as deriving from socioeconomic development. For example, national revolutions lead to certain tendencies and cleavages in party system operation—i.e. center-periphery and secular-religious cleavages—while later industrial revolutions lead to other cleavages that shaped the party system—industrial versus landed interests and owners versus workers. The development of party systems is thus explicated by socioeconomic structural changes and the particular period of development concurrent with the initiation of multiparty governance. Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignment: An Introduction," in Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds, *Party Systems and Voter Alignment: Cross-National Perspectives* (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 14.

[46] Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems*, p. 25.

[47] Ibid., p. 25.

significance of actors: "A party system is precisely the *system of interactions* resulting from inter-party competition."[48] The critical element of the definition, as Sartori himself emphasized, was the "inter-action" of actors—i.e. the parties. That this relational element is what distinguished party systems from other alternatives such as one-party regimes places great weight on the actions and reactions of the actors constituting the system.

Another prominent scholar of the field, Alan Ware, in a recent work on two-party systems writes, "To put the matter crudely, political science has generally understood the party/party-system relationship in the following way: parties are similar to (human) train 'drivers' on many subway systems, in that they do not actually drive their trains."[49] The rails that determine the course of the parties are often understood as socioeconomic phenomena and/or the political culture or the forces of the 'electoral market', to which parties respond robotically if these alter or shift. Such perspectives, argue Ware, among other things leave out "the interventions of individual political actors who are attempting to operate within those structures."[50] Later, he spells out more clearly the complexity of these interventions by actors:

> The party's external environment is not a 'given' to which it must respond, but rather something that the party is partly creating through its conflicts, cooperation, and communication with a whole array of different kinds of actors. Those interactions are themselves continually restructuring that environment: it is a dynamic process. Secondly, the party is itself both a single actor—with a distinct set of interests—and is also composed of individual actors who own

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[48] Emphasis is the author's. Ibid., p. 39.
[49] Alan Ware, *The Dynamics of Two-Party Politics: Party Structures and the Management of Competition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 1.
[50] Ibid., p. 2.

interests can conflict with, as well as be aligned with, those of the party.[51]

Thus, within this "dynamic process" actors interact in such a way that they are both structured and structuring their environment both within and external to the level of the party. It is also this emphasis on political actors that frames Ware criticism of the classical realignment approaches toward the American political party system. "Rather than being exogenous social variables about which the elites themselves can do little," he argues that realignments "are 'managed' by political elites."[52]

In his seminal work on party system change, Peter Mair takes a very similar position on the agency of political elites. Though much of his work is devoted to the argument that party systems are in fact changing much less than has been proposed since the 1980s, he bases his argument not on the stability of social dynamics and structures but on the agency and adaptability of political parties to counter change. He writes:

> The fact that fundamental transformations in party systems are actually quite infrequent therefore tells us more about the capacity of those party systems to constrain voter choice than it does about any inherent integrity of the equilibria themselves. . . To put it another way . . . parties and party systems are not simply objects, but also subjects. It is they who ultimately set the agenda, and it is they who ultimately determine the terms of reference through which we, as voters and citizens, understand and interpret the political world.[53]

Thus, somewhat ironically, the agency of political actors become the key factor maintaining stability, and for Mair, it is the manipulation and maneuvering of

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[51] Ibid., p. 19.
[52] Ibid., p. 34.
[53] Mair, *Party System Change*, p. 9.

parties to maintain the system in the face of changing socioeconomic conditions and structures that demonstrates the significant role of agency.[54]

This juncture between structure and the agency of political elites and parties can also be seen to impact the nature of party organization structure. Perkins, also intending to address the tension between structure and agency writes:

> Political actors are not simply pawns, acting out strategies dictated by larger structures, but are actors with their own goals and aspirations. . . For a more complete understanding of political processes we must consider neither the structures nor the political actors in isolation from one another, but how the latter work in the context of the former.[55]

At this nexus, he uses the existing knowledge and typologies of party organizations to demonstrate how actors in the newer democracies in Eastern Europe, responding to existing structural opportunities and constraints, form party organizations corresponding to available options. Where there is wide access to media resources for campaigning, cadre parties tend to often be the choice for party formation. Where existing civil society organizations exist that can be exploited for mass mobilization, parties have greater opportunity to utilize a mass party organizational structure. In countries where the bureaucracy is porous and the government in power has strong distributive possibilities, clientelistic strategies become more likely. While the author's examples demonstrate that the organizational decisions of political elites are not a given, and that they are usually confronted with a number of opportunities, the trends in

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[54] In contrast, the failure of old parties and the emergence of new parties are not seen as inevitable outcomes of structural change, but as the results of decisions made by parties in tandem with institutional constraints. See Robert Rohrschneider, "New Party versus Old Left Realignments: Environmental Attitudes, Party Policies, and Partisan Affiliations in Four West European Countries," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 55, No. 3 (1993), pp. 682-701.

[55] Doug Perkins, "Structure and Choice: The Role of Organizations, Patronage and the Media in Party Formation," *Party Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1996), p. 356.

Eastern Europe have shown rationality in terms of organizational structuring of parties.[56]

It might also be noted that, while Perkins focuses on party formation options in an organizational sense, it might be equally valid to claim that his observations of party behavior have a great deal to do with party emphases based on campaigning strategies; thus, while the author discusses "mass party" options, for example, what he is targeting is the decisions of parties to mobilize the electorate through existing support organizations.[57] This being the case, these strategies could theoretically be deployed by a party in relation to existing social and political structures whether or not the actual hierarchical or other structuring of the party changes. As will be seen in future chapters, such strategic refocusing based on existing opportunities and constraints occurred in the Turkish case whether or not the party as an elite hierarchical organization changed in its structural organization.

Beyond the dynamic between political agents—i.e. political parties and elites—with their environment, one must also consider how outcomes are formed from the interaction between agents, the existing political elites. That parties necessarily must be understood within their dynamic interaction with other parties seems foundational to a party *system* approach. Bardi and Mair establish this as a fundamental basis for party system study by emphasizing the distinction between a "set of parties" from a "system of parties" approach. Although the "system of

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[56] Ibid., pp. 355-375.
[57] Ibid., p. 362.

parties" concept certainly constitutes more than inter-party interaction, it is clearly a key element:

> In a set of parties, the individual parties involved are seen to be more or less free to move about as they wish, being limited only by the physical confines of the polity in which they operate. In the systemic approach . . . the parties are also constrained by their interactions with the other parties in the system, and in some cases, such as in the very 'strong' case of polarized pluralism, this may serve to limit severely their room for maneuver.[58]

Agency, then, must be understood as not as 'super agency' in which parties are able to make any possible decision, but as agency that is contextualized within a system that it is also affecting and engaged in action with other mutually empowered agents. This entails that they are able to initiate and act, but that options and decisions are accompanied by opportunities and constraints provided by socioeconomic structures and institutions. Bardi and Mair's emphasis on party interaction as superseding a mere summing of existing parties as the fundamental understanding of the party system draws its own assertion from Sartori's definition that "a party system is precisely a *system of interactions* resulting from inter-party competition." His elaboration on the definition might be even more helpful in this regard. Sartori writes, "The system in question bears on the relatedness of parties to each other, on how each party is a function (in the mathematical sense) of the other parties and reacts, competitively or otherwise, to the other parties."[59] The description of parties as a mathematical function of the others might seem to suggest a determination that removes agency, but in fact, Sartori could be seen as saying that parties are the result of an aggregation of

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[58] Luciano Bardi and Peter Mair, "The Parameters of Party Systems," *Party Politics*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2008), p. 153.
[59] Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems*, p. 39.

agencies, including the party itself. To the extent that each party is shaped by the existence of the other parties in the system, so too does that party shape the nature of the others. Thus, action, shaping and determination must all be seen as operating in a dynamic relationship.

Another arena of interaction, parties in relation to voters, must also be seen as involving agency on the part of parties and political leaders. Rather than the assumption that social forces determine the operation of the system, that the needs of the electorate and existing socioeconomic conditions establish the position of parties who respond in predictable and anticipated ways to such forces, parties should be seen as actors able also to shape the electorate for their own benefit and that of the mutual benefit of the existing party system. In this regard, Mair illustrates the active nature of the parties on the policy concerns of the electorate. As discussed above, Mair argues that it is the power of the parties to constrain voter choice that effectively explains why party systems have been able to maintain themselves or, to use Lipset and Rokkan's terminology, to "freeze." He writes, "The notion of constraint is crucial here, in that it is the constraints which are 'imposed' on voters by the party system *and* by the parties as individual actors which constitute the real motor of persistence."[60] Two points are critical here: one, parties act to "constrain" voter choice, and two, their actions of "imposing" choice on the voters are ultimately based on the intention to maintain the status quo and their place within it.

How then do parties constrain the choices of the electorate on whom they depend for votes and their subsequent translations into seats? One important

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[60] Emphasis is in the original. Mair, *Party System Change*, p. 9.

action of parties is to establish the discourse within which politics is conceived and discussed. The actors within the system, based on their "structure of competition," as Mair states, "act to 'freeze' into place a specific language of politics. Party competition, and politics more generally, then becomes dominated by a particular overriding choice, to which other considerations are subordinated."[61] Sartori, as discussed earlier, expresses this, perhaps, more strongly using the expressions of "channeling," "manipulating" and "distorting."[62] The summative "language of politics" that frames a given system is obviously not created by individual actors but the product of the interactions and the development of salient relational boundaries between the various actors. Understood in this way, the political discourse established by the parties competing within the system forms the boundaries and debate in which societal interests and concerns are discussed. The language guides or "imposes" the set of issues and views that the public are to be concerned about. Furthermore, with its establishment, the existing political discourse acts to stabilize the existing lines of competition operating within the system. The stabilization of the system ultimately serves the mutual interests of the parties competing in that framework. Mair argues:

> Much as rival cigarette manufacturers have a mutual interest in the promotion of smoking, however competitive they may be vis-à-vis one another as far as the marketing of their own particular brands may be concerned, the established parties in a party system may be seen to have a mutual interest in the survival of their particular conflict and their particular form of competition.[63]

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[61] Ibid., p. 13.
[62] Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems*, p. 25.
[63] Mair, *Party System Change*, p. 14.

Thus, though the electorate and other social forces and developments certainly play an active role in shaping the party system, the parties within the system are also acting to channel these other forces toward their ultimate benefit within a predictable—i.e. stable—system.

The emphasis on the salience of political parties and elites to act is in no way a suggestion that structural forces do not also act upon the system; however, just as parties and political elites are seen in dynamic interaction with the electorate, a similar parallel can be made in positing the interaction of the parties and political elites with impinging structures and institutions. To the extent that there is a dynamic interaction, the various strengths of the actors can change depending on the context; in some cases, structural forces can be seen as tying the hands of political actors. Ware writes, "Agency can matter, but there are often circumstances in which individual actors cannot change outcomes because of the role played by structure (or other factors)."[64] At the same time, an argument that proposes that political cleavages that shape the party system are simply manifestations of cultural and social realities is also problematic. As Mair argues, the very evidence that predominate cleavages change when social structure does not helps to indicate the role that parties have in shaping the political discourse.[65] The dominance of structure over agency or vice versa cannot be understood as a consistent given. Even when political actors are highly constrained by structural forces, there are usually multiple alternatives, offering more or less risk to the actor. Such a view would not likely satisfy a strong proponent of agency or

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[64] Ware, *The Dynamics of Two-Party Politics*, p. 2.
[65] Mair, *Party System Change*, p. 88.

structure, but an approach that seeks to give to each an active role in shaping outcomes, messy though it may be, might help bring us closer to accurate explication of the predominant dynamics acting on and within the system.

Mair, in seeking to understand and define party systems, uses the concept "dimension of competition" and in some cases "structure of competition." He defines this as the framework that ultimately provides stability to the particular system. It is the established pattern of strategy employed by the system of parties consisting of "the issues on which they competed, the ways in which they appealed to voters, the approaches they adopted to the process of government formation, and the various alliances and divisions which they fomented."[66] The dimension of competition is also framed by its particular "language of politics"— i.e. discourse. This concept along with its paired concept "domains of identification" closely parallels the emphasis of this current study on the concept of "paradigms." Though "government formation," one of Mair's components of the concept, is outside of the specific focus of party systems in the electoral arena, the other aspects, the strategies employed to attract voters, the issues emphasized and the framing political discourse must be seen as relevant component parts of the concept of party system paradigms as understood in this work. This also seems to closely capture the meaning of "pattern of interaction" as it is used by Sartori and Ware. Arguably, it is within this conceptual framework that a party system in its historical operation can be fruitfully investigated.

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[66] Ibid., p. 15.

5.4 Conclusion

By paying attention to electoral strategies, approaches toward the voting population, and the political discourse, we are able to observe important changes and investigate the cause of changes in the party system and locate the points or periods in which an old paradigm transitions to a new paradigm that again structures and stabilizes the system. These shifts are typically not subtle; once a paradigm begins to transform, one is usually not left to only observe the change through the discourse, but it often manifests itself in some form within the quantitative measures employed to detect change in party system behavior, such as localized measures of volatility or fragmentation or other means utilized to detect changing or realigning electoral behaviors. As Mair also writes, "When that potentially vulnerable structure of competition collapses, the party system can be subject to quite a dramatic transformation."[67] Because the party system is shaped around these paradigms, which are ultimately stabilized patterns of interaction—i.e. they are relational—they are necessarily vulnerable to change. It only takes an important push from any number of the possible forces or actors to set in motion a transformation through the inter-connected relational network of actors.

This does not mean, however, that paradigm change necessarily results in party system change in the minimalist sense—i.e. in Sartorian typology. An important paradigm shift can take place without changing the main political parties or number of relevant parties engaged. Such a case could be argued for a paradigm change that took place in Turkey in the 1960s. Although the main

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[67] Ibid., p. 16.

political parties remained the dominant forces shaping the system, their patterned dimensions of competition and domains of identification—i.e. paradigm—very clearly changed with important consequences. In other cases, it could actually be the change of party system that seems to be the impetus for a change in the patterns of interaction between the political parties and elites. In Turkey, for example, it was the institutional conditions of the party system at its outset that seemed to determine the paradigm that gave stability to the system, if briefly, at the advent of multiparty politics in the late 40s and 50s and again when the military returned power to political elites in 1983. In other cases, however, a change of the political paradigm could lead to a change in the party system itself, arguably the case in Turkey leading up to and following the 1995 national election as will be discussed in chapter nine.

An approach toward party systems that focuses predominantly on the political paradigms that help stabilize and manage the existing system requires a more restricted usage and conceptualization of the left-right linear competition framework. Because the usage of the terminology, left, right, etc. is manifestly trans-paradigm—in other words, it is able to empty out its substantive meaning to be re-employed in existing lines of political competition—in order to harmonize with the relational-interactional patterns of interaction, it must be seen as primarily a relational positioning function operating intra-paradigm. As paradigms shift it is *not* argued here that "left", for example, loses *all* of its previous significance to be replaced with entirely new meaning, but that important substantive changes or shifts can take place from paradigm to paradigm without the need to change the relational left-right positioning. This is also not meant to

deny that there are always some within any given democratic polity that utilize a conceptualization of left-right that is based on the externally anchored ideological positioning derived from Western European systems. The vast majority, however, and the most common usage of "left-right" terminology seems to be more clearly contextually based and anchored to the existing political environment. Whether or not an individual is affiliated with any current party, they most frequently place themselves *relationally* within the political context in which they are embedded. In the following chapters, this particular study of the electoral party system in Turkey will proceed grounded upon these critical conceptualizations.

CHAPTER 6

THE INITIAL PARADIGM – 1950-1965

The desire to exploit sacred beliefs and make the emotions that are deeply
embedded in the national conscience the tool of cheap political games
is clearly in evidence before us.[1]
—Celal Bayar, President of the Democrat Party (1950)

The welfare of the villager is the starting point of our election manifest . . . We are
persisting in the plan to turn our villages into cooperatives and equip them with
productive machinery. . . We are pushing for a radio in all of our villages. Those
who don't know Anatolian villages can't understand the worth of our desires.[2]
—İsmet İnönü, Leader of the Republican People's Party (1950)

Though a plethora of political parties had existed at several points toward the end

of the Ottoman Empire[3] and two opposition parties[4] had been brought into being,

albeit briefly, at different points during the Early Republican Period in Turkey, it

seems most appropriate to begin the discussion of paradigms in the multiparty

system at the point at which the right of organized and independent opposition to

the governing party could be relatively guaranteed and when the vast majority of

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[1] "Tahrik ve kargaşalığa karşı milli cephe kuruluyor," *Vatan,* 20 April 1950. Author's translation.
[2] "İnönü diyorki: Köylü refahı davası başlıca meselemizdir," *Ulus* 5 May 1950. Author's
translation.
[3] For more on these see, Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, vols. 1-2 (Istanbul:
İletişim Yayınları, 1998).
[4] The Progressive Republican Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası*) was founded in November of 1924
and last until June of 1925. See, Erik J. Zürcher, *Political Opposition in the Early Turkish
Republic* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991), pp. 52-94; Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics* (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 45-7. The Free Republican Party (*Serbest Cumhuriyet
Fırkası*) was formed at the request of Atatürk himself in order to foster the emergence of a loyal
opposition in 1930. This project was only to last from August to November of that year. See,
Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, pp. 64-7; Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 3rd ed., (London:
IB Tauris, 2004), pp. 177-9.

the population could lay claim to having a stake in determining the composition of the future government through the electoral process. It is for these reasons that we begin with the general election of 1950, though a brief comment on the development of the multiparty system would be of benefit.

In 1945, with the end of the Second World War and an assembly divided over land reform legislation, an opportunity opened up for opposition parties to contest the existing single-party governing Republican People's Party (CHP) in a context in which multiparty competition seemed amenable to all parties involved. The land-reform debates initiated at the beginning of 1945 and brought to the assembly in May inspired an Istanbul industrialist, Nuri Demirağ to submit an application to the government for the right to form a party that would be called the National Development Party (*Milli Kalkınma Partisi*) in July of 1945.[5] Perhaps, more importantly in terms of historical impact, dissent within the ruling single-party CHP was embodied by the famous "Proposal of the Four" (*Dörtlü Takrir*) submitted by former Prime Minister Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuad Köprülü, and Refik Koraltan in June of that same year, essentially requesting that the party loosen wartime restrictions and allow additional parties and open debate. These four members of the CHP for various reasons were either expelled or resigned from the party by the end of 1945. Although their had been earlier hints from the President of the Republic, İsmet İnönü, that the country would be moving in a more democratic direction,[6] his speech at the beginning of November

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[5] For more on this see, Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977), p. 10-12; Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, pp. 209-11.
[6] Metin Heper, *İsmet İnönü: The Making of a Modern Statesman* (Leiden: Brill, 1998), pp. 129-35.
[6] Metin Heper, *İsmet İnönü: The Making of a Modern Statesman* (Leiden: Brill, 1998), pp. 129-35.

in 1945, explicitly calling for opposition parties and free and direct voting in the subsequent election, further emboldened these four leaders and, in January of 1946, the Democrat Party (DP) was formed.[7]

Though general elections were held in 1946, in which it became clear that the significant line of contestation would be the organ of the single-party years, the CHP, and its newly formed competitor, the DP, the undisclosed nature of the election results and the accusations of electoral fraud demonstrated that certain remaining "kinks" needed to be worked out of the system stemming from the single party era. By the general election of 1950, however, the vast majority of the electoral irregularities had been addressed by the passage of appropriate legislation, and the country and the world witnessed a very open electoral contest.

As the nation entered into its initial transition to democratic multiparty elections, it seems particularly important to seek to understand the paradigm—i.e. the pattern of dimensions of competition and domains of identification in their historical context—within which political actors and the electorate oriented themselves to competitive politics. Though it is certainly true that each change in the political paradigm over time contributed substantial elements to the working dynamics of the party system, it seems logical to anticipate that the initial paradigm would be more foundational, likely establishing certain critical patterns that would persist despite the exposure to other changes. Therefore, with this assumption in mind, we should investigate the socioeconomic, institutional and cultural forces involved at the advent of multiparty democracy that may have

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[7] For further information, see Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, pp. 143-51; Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment*, pp. 12-3; and Zürcher, *Turkey*, pp. 210-12.

contributed to the trajectories of this early party system formation and determine the nature of the dimensions of competition—i.e. the national political discourse employed in electoral contests and the non-discursive strategies employed to mobilize the voters toward the competing parties—and the domains of identification comprising this initial paradigm.

This initial period is also of great significance in another way. As discussed in chapter four, the enfranchisement of the villagers in such a way that they suddenly had a critical influence on who would be governing the country could be seen as a revolution in its own right.[8] The profundity of this sudden and significant change has not been missed by students of Turkish politics. This drastic change could be at least partly responsible for the well-known assertions of a center-periphery political cleavage that pits the peripheral villagers against central state elites. That there was an existing cultural cleavage between the urban, bureaucratic and intellectual class, which had hitherto been the dominant force in running the country, and the vast population that lived in the rural heartland, seems fairly evident. The question is how these initial parties, each led by members of the central elite, attempted to forge alliances with a population that they had previously not had to take into account in any great measure. The strategies to woo this election-determining segment of the population, effectively integrating this populous into the affairs of the state, are of particular interest. It is to these issues that we now turn.

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[8] Heper attributes İsmet İnönü with bringing about a "democratic revolution." Metin Heper, "The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics," *Journal of International Affairs* 54 (2000): 81.

6.1 The Context of Initial Multiparty Competition

As discussed at the outset in Chapter One, the operation of a party system in the electoral arena needs to be understood as an interactive dynamic that includes both actors, such as the parties and the electorate, and also other forces, social structures and existing institutions, that are both likely to contribute to the shaping of the system and in turn be impacted by the system or actors within it. Thus, we will first outline the potentially contributing factors that impacted the direction the party system would take and the overall electoral trends observed during the period, and then the role of the political actors will be examined.

The socioeconomic condition of Turkey at the end of World War II, during which it managed to avoid having to shoot a single bullet though it abandoned its neutral position and sided with the Allies as the combat came to a close, offered a significant challenge to any potential government leadership. Rampant poverty tied to inflation and price controls, derived from the wartime necessity of spending a great deal of resources equipping a national defense, led to discontent among many elements of the population, from landowners to bureaucrats (who experienced major reductions in salary).[9] Furthermore, accompanying this austere period was the presence of military police, the gendarmerie, maintaining order but also associated with the heavy arm of the state.[10] The vast proportion of the populace (at least 80 percent) lived, not in urban environments, but in the rural villages and were in need of a great many services traditionally rendered by states, such as schools, roads and access to electricity. Thus, as Turkey approached

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[9] Zürcher, *Turkey*, pp. 206-8.
[10] Richard D. Robinson, "Pre-Election Thoughts, March 14, 1950," *Institute of Current World Affairs*, http://www.icwa.org/articles/RDR-51.pdf (accessed 2 May 2009).

elections in 1950, the country was emerging from a number of challenges that were certainly at the forefront of the Turkish voter. The state's ability or inability to provide these services throughout the country during the single-party regime left only one party to point a finger at: the CHP. For good or for ill, the country entered multiparty politics with the possibility of scrutinizing the previous record of only one of the parties competing, the CHP, which gave a terrific advantage to an untested but organized and party with a new approach, the DP.

Another important reality of this time was the lack of structural centralization connecting the state to most of the villages and especially the provinces in the eastern half of the country. Though much had been accomplished and intended in regard to rebuilding and creating a national infrastructure since the founding of the Republic in 1923, the fact remained that most villages in 1950 were without electricity,[11] without radio, and could not be easily accessed by roads (in many places these were simply ruts in the dirt); in effect, they were isolated from outside or national considerations. Richard Robinson, who did ethnographic work in Turkey in the 1950s writes:

> The sheer fact of isolation had important consequences, for isolation meant that this community lived outside of the stream of national consciousness. Communication from village to village was slow and uncertain. Communication from region to region was exceedingly difficult. Word of mouth was, of course, the most important means of communication. There was no radio in the village, no postal service.[12]

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[11] Zürcher writes that in 1953, out of 40,000 villages, only ten had access to electricity. *Turkey*, p. 206.

[12] Richard Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 40-1. This general portrait conforms to other depictions of Turkish villages in the same period. See also, Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (New York: Free Press, 1958), p. 137; Mahmut Makal, *A Village in Anatolia* (London: Vallentine, Mitchell & Co., 1954/1965), pp. 62, 99-104.

The status of structural (and attitudinal[13]) centralization at the beginning of multiparty competition has serious implications for the possible strategies that might be employed to mobilize the vote nationally. At the same time, interestingly, voter turnout in the villages was quite high, comparable to and often surpassing the national turnout rate in the urban centers during this period, which begs the question of on what basis were these villagers, composing approximately 80 percent of the population, being mobilized in such high numbers?

The international context could also be argued as having on influence on the nature of the framework within which domestic politics could be contested. The consequences and evident failure of fascism worldwide, and the political dangers posed by its ideology and forms of mass mobilization were likely on the minds of the political and state elites of this period. Furthermore, the post-World War II bullying, encountered from the Soviet Union and the domestic assertions, whether true or not, that Soviet agents were working within the country to sow chaos by encouraging both Islamic fundamentalism and communism[14] generated a great deal of anxiety toward the espousal of any sort of narrow ideology, but communism and Islamism in particular. These concerns regarding ideology resulted in the passage of amendments to the Penal Code (Articles 141, 142, and 163) that prohibited extreme "leftist" parties and the use of religion for political

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[13] i.e. level of national awareness

[14] Such accusations against the Soviet Union, for example, were asserted by the famous journalist and editor-in-chief of the daily newspaper *Vatan*, Ahmet Emin Yalman. Ahmed Emin Yalman, *Turkey in My Time* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), pp. 260-1. These attributions to the Soviet Union, though rejected by Karpat himself, can be seen in his chapter on "Communism and its Effects." Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, pp. 349-86.

purposes. Both parties that shaped the nature of politics in the 1950s, the CHP and the DP, cast their votes in favor of these changes.[15]

In addition to this, for a number of reasons including the fear of Soviet expansionism, the relationship between Turkey and the Western powers was experiencing a clear warming trend. The rising dominance of the US, their commitment to protect Turkey from the Soviets, and the initiation of the Marshall Plan in Turkey in the late 1940s were certainly factors that played a role in this. Turkey's desire to align itself with the West certainly assisted the creation of an environment that was warm to the development of a multiparty system; at the same time, however, one must be careful not to take this argument too far. An "external pressure" to democratize the country would have to be understood only in the most indirect sense; no evidence has been provided to show that the benefits of Western economic and military support were contingent upon multiparty development within Turkey. Though democratic developments within the country were certainly welcomed by their Western allies and, thus, the international context was "warm" to such a change, the ultimate impetus came from factors in the domestic context and, ultimately, İsmet İnönü.[16] The domestically-based division among the political elites regarding the contested issue of land reform mentioned earlier and a socially-based yearning for change would also have to be seen as operating as an important catalyst in the transition to multiparty, democratic politics.

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[15] Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 371.
[16] For more on İnönü's contribution to democracy, see Metin Heper, *İsmet İnönü*, pp. 128-63.

In order to understand further the context of this first political paradigm, one must also look at the nature of the political institutions in place as multiparty competition was in its infancy. The first constitution of the Turkish Republic of 1924 was not created in order to guarantee the supremacy of the one-party regime, but was left neutral on the issue of democratic practice, in fact, it gave no guidance to the regulation or prohibition of opposition parties at all. Thus, as noted by Özbudun, multiparty elections were ushered into Turkish history without the need for a single change to the constitutional document itself and "only relatively minor changes in other laws."[17] While this impressively points to the forward-thinking of Atatürk and the early Republican leaders and the fact that they did not utilize the constitution to ensure their own dominance, the lack of careful development of laws with democracy in mind seemed to have left serious loopholes that could be argued to be the ultimate instigator of the military intervention that occurred in the middle of this period (May 27, 1960).

Thus, in 1950, while voters were able to elect ministers of parliament freely and directly as opposed to only being able to vote for electors, who would then select the representatives in parliament, the electoral system remained an extreme type of electoral plurality system. Uncomfortable with dividing the existing 63 provinces into smaller voting units, voters were expected to choose candidates for all the seats in parliaments designated for their particular province. The lists of candidates were generated on separate party lists, so that the most common practice was a down-the-line selection of all the candidates from one particular

[17] Ergun Özbudun, "The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime," in Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun, eds. *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State* (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981), p. 92.

party in each province.[18] Hence, even if a political party won by the slightest of margins in a province, they generally occupied all the seats in parliament.[19] This created quite drastic levels of disporportionality in seat allocation and gave the governing party tremendous legislative power.[20] Such potential voting margins made balance of power provisions such as presidential veto power almost negligible, and the existing constitution had no constitutional judicial check on parliamentary power. Its decisions were not open for review. Thus, the conditions established by the existing electoral system as multiparty politics began strongly encouraged voting for a potentially winning party (at least at the provincial, if not, national level).

As mentioned previously, the existing laws also narrowed the boundaries in which parties could compete. Articles 141, 142, and 163 put constraints on the extent to which ideology and religion could be used in order to differentiate one's party from the others. Furthermore, the DP passed an amendment (of Article 70) soon after coming to power that would increase the penalties for groups intending to form an association or party whose aim was the supremacy of a particular group or class or the altering of the nation's existing social and economic principles.[21] These measures, limiting ideology and emphasizing general over

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[18] In fact, the DP passed a law after the 1957 election that even forbid split-ticketing. The voter was required to select the whole list; she/he could not pick and choose. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 389.

[19] William Hale gives a good example of this. See, William Hale, "The Role of the Electoral System in Turkish Politics," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1980), p. 402.

[20] This was one of the primary reasons that İnönü and the CHP campaigned for the development of a new constitution in the 1950 election.

[21] Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 371.

particular interest, stemming from the values of the political and state elites,[22] further encouraged the formation of parties along the "nation party" mold—i.e. parties that ostensibly seek to represent all the interests in society rather than the interests of a particular class or group.[23] They also, by curtailing ideological appeal and formations around certain groups or classes, presented important challenges to the competing parties, which of course need to distinguish themselves and establish the positioning of the party in relation to the others.

From the cultural standpoint, multiparty competition was initiated as a contest among the same pool of political elites.[24] For example, the leaders of the top three parties competing in the 1950 general election were all originally members of the CHP during the single-party years.[25] The leaders of the CHP and the DP in particular had matured under the shadows of Atatürk,[26] and both parties, despite the existence of revisionist historical accounts to the contrary, were clearly committed to the founding values and principles of the Republic, with the exception that the DP had issues with or at least a divergent interpretation of the economic principle of "statism". They would have all been considered elites, particularly in terms of educational status.[27] By the 1950s, professionals like

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[22] See chapter 2 and the concept of "nation parties."

[23] This is not to confuse the fact that in 1950, one of the key, albeit minor, opposition parties in the electoral contest was the Nation Party (*Millet Partisi*). Though I am referring here to the general concept, the Nation Party, in its very name, was a testament to the fact that valued the image of representing the interests of the whole. It would later become the Republican Nation Party and then the Republican Peasants Nation Party.

[24] For an elaboration of this argument, see chapter four.

[25] İsmet İnönü (CHP), Celal Bayar (DP), and Hikmet Bayur (MP). Many other members of each of these parties also had associations with the CHP.

[26] In fact, the leader of the DP, Celal Bayar has been described as "the Turkish leader who most consciously tried to model himself on Atatürk. George Harris, "Celal Bayar: Conspiratorial Democrat," in *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey*, ed. Metin Heper and Sabri Sayarı (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002), 53.

[27] Frederick Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965), pp. 29-72.

doctors, lawyers, and bankers were receiving social elite status that began to trump the previous elite designation of bureaucrats, which is why the major parties of this period, specifically the DP, AP, and CHP, began to enlist professionals into their ranks in high numbers.[28] Thus, the nature of political competition transpired such that, rather than having parties formed to represent new or various segments of society, the existing social elites competed with one another for the votes of these newly important segments of the population. This, of course, would have made it quite difficult for any of these parties to attack the identities or the class roots of the members of other parties as they would have been cutting off the branch on which they were also sitting. This led to the tendency of diminishing identities of any sort and emphasizing the faulty "actions" or policies of other parties rather than their backgrounds, especially on the level of national leadership and discourse during the campaigns. Such cultural homogeneity creates challenges for the more simplistic center-periphery cleavage interpretations that assume a strong cultural or class difference between the parties. Though their approaches and attitudes toward mass mobilization might have been different, the explanation cannot be explained by clear class distinctions among political elites.

6.2 General Electoral Trends of the Period

After the initial freely-contested election of 1950 was greeted with much national and international enthusiasm, which saw almost 90 percent of the eligible population cast their votes at the ballot box, the overall voter turnout started to

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[28] Ibid., p. 381. To see this continuance of elite backgrounds in later periods, see Sabri Sayarı, "Aspects of Party Organization in Turkey," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1976), p. 193.

wane (see Table 6.1). Furthermore, as voter turnout decreased, greater disparity in this behavior was observed between the eastern and western sections of the country. As noted by Özbudun and others, the provinces in the eastern most parts of the country continued to realize high turnout, while the western sections of the country began to observe a very noticeable decline in this regard,[29] this in itself, also suggesting divergent approaches to political participation in various regions of the country, an issue that will be discussed along with non-discursive campaign strategies below.

<div align="center">Table 6.1 – Electoral Trends of the Period[30]</div>

	1950	1954	1957	1961	1965
Top-Two Parties' vote %	93.1%	91.4%	88.5%	71.5% (85.2%)	81.6%
Effective # of Parties (Mod. Golosov) – National	2.11	2.14	2.22	2.8 (2.3)	2.5
Effective # of Parties (Mod. Golosov) – Provincial Ave.	2.08	2.20	2.28	2.52	2.59
Volatility – National Aggregate	--	4.5	10.7	56.8	29.8
Volatility – National "Inter-bloc"	--	4.5	6.0	4.3	3.8
Voter Turnout	89.3%	88.6%	76.6%	81.4%	71.3%

As can also be seen from Table 6.1, despite the secular fragmentation of the vote through the election of 1965, a clear two-party tendency could be seen, both nationally and at the provincial level. Though massive changes in the electoral system rules occurred prior to the general election in 1961, which allowed for

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[29] Ergun Özbudun, *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 104.

[30] All electoral data taken from the publication of the Turkish Statistics Institute. *Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri 1923-2007* (Ankara: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, 2008), p. 28.

much greater fragmentation due to a proportional representation system that would greatly reduce the disproportionality of seat allocation, the fragmentation continued largely on pace with previous rates if one controls for the military junta's critical effect of closing down the dominant party of the 1950s, the DP. Most of the additional fragmentation occurred as a result of the clear race between two new parties to be seen as the successor of the former DP, a contest ultimately won by the Justice Party (AP). The 1961 election provides interesting evidence toward the two-party tendency among Turkish voters of the period. In this election, as can be seen by the average effective number of parties' rate (2.52), from province to province, the race was largely between two clear parties although *which* parties were the prime competitors at the provincial level differed from region to region. If the old system would have been applied (strict provincial plurality), the AP would have won 48 percent of the seats, the CHP 26.7 percent, the New Turkey Party (YTP) 17.1 percent of the seats, and the Republican Peasants Nation Party (CKMP) would have received 8.2 percent of the seats.[31] Such an increased fragmentation of the seats had the old electoral system been applied was due to the fact that the YTP and, to a lesser extent, the CKMP, which only garnered 14 percent of the vote a piece nationally, were one of two parties competing for dominance in a number of provinces while nearly absent in other provinces.

Though generally true, especially in the East, the votes won by parties were volatile and fluid and the major parties tasted the displeasure of the electorate

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[31] Erol Tuncer and Necati Danacı, *Çok Partili Dönemde Seçimler ve Seçim Sistemleri* (Ankara: TESAV Yayınları, 2003), p. 76.

when they failed to "deliver" what was expected to their voters. As can be seen from the "inter-bloc volatility" numbers in Table 6.1, partisan lines seemed to strengthen as the 1960s progressed, even while overall volatility increased, particularly in the Western provinces. This too would encounter significant changes at the provincial level as the 1960s drew to a close due to the entrance of new discursive framing starting immediately prior to the 1965 election and leading to fragmentation and voting shifts among segments of the population until 1977. With the exception of the election immediately following the military junta in 1961, voter turnout experienced a steady decline that suggested increasing ambivalence toward the election results.

6.3 Dimensions of Competition: *6.3.1 National Campaign Discourse*

It is at this point that we should begin by seeking to understand how the electorate was mobilized and the mechanics of contestation between the parties that ultimately determined the observed outcomes. In this regard, it seems reasonable to begin with an examination of the extent to which national campaign discourse influenced or reflected the political paradigm of the period. By "national" discourse, the intent is to highlight the political speech-making of national party leaders in forums that would allow for broad, if not national, access. For example, how did these important political leaders frame the political contest and position themselves in their speeches and proclamations that were published in widely disseminated newspapers? Did their relational positioning of themselves and their parties and their emphasis of certain issues direct voters and the nation toward a certain paradigm? If campaign "stumping" did not shape the

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paradigm, did it in some way reflect or respond to the paradigm that established the nature of political contests of the period?

As time has passed, interpretations of the electoral competition of this period seem to have become more certain, delineating more explicitly the lines dividing the two major parties *ideologically*. When ideological distinctions are proposed, one assumes that these suggested positional differences would be communicated—in other words, ideology that exists usually shows up in party election manifests or in campaign discourse. In such interpretations of this sort regarding the initial phase of multiparty competition, we are often confronted with a portrait of a liberal and conservative Democrat Party pitted against a "progressive"[32] and status quo Republican People's Party.[33] Other analyses of the period have argued that the Democrat Party was the party of the peasant, rallying the periphery against a hegemonic elite and urban bureaucratic class.[34] In explaining the success of the DP with the peasants, claims have been made that the party utilized religion or an obsessive emphasis on the plight of the villager as the discursive motor that turned out the rural vote.[35] In a country whose village contingent at that time constituted up to 80 percent of the population, it seems

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[32] The term, as used in Turkish politics, has referred to those who are trying to prevent the country from moving "backward" toward "traditionalism" ala a positivist modernization understanding.

[33] For one example of the "progressives" versus "traditional" political contestation, see İlkay Sunar and Binnaz Toprak, "Islam in Politics: The Case of Turkey," *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (1983), pp. 433, 435. This work also frames the struggle in terms of a center versus periphery conflict, while at the same time, it also provides evidence and interpretations which contradict both of these categories.

[34] Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" *Daedalus*, Vol. 102, No. 1 (1973), pp. 184-6; Ersin Kalaycioglu, *Turkish Dynamics: Bridge Across Troubled Lands* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 74.

[35] For example, Sencer Ayata writes, "From its inception, the DP identified itself primarily with the countryside, with agrarian interests, and with the rural population." Sencer Ayata, "Patronage, Party, and State: The Politicization of Islam in Turkey," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (1996), p. 43.

Table 6.2 – Political Parties of the Paradigm in General Elections at a Glance

English		Turkish	Party Leader	Political Family	1950	1954	1957	1961	1965	Key Notes:
Republican Peasant Nation Party (1965)	CKMP	Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi	Alparslan Türkeş	Conservative Nationalist	-	-	-	-	2.2	Türkeş and fellow ideologues took over the party in 1965, significantly narrowing its doctrine such that its relation to the earlier Nation Party tradition became largely superficial. In 1969, it became the Nationalist Action Party.
Republican Nation Party	MP/ CMP/ CKMP/ MP	Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi	Fevzi Çakmak/ Hikmet Bayur/ Osman Bölükbaşı	Conservative/ Religious-Conservative/ Nationalist	4.6	5.3	6.5	14.0	6.3	Çakmak passed away right before the 1950 election. Bayur led the party in the 1950 election. Bölükbaşı led the party in elections after that. The party changed its name in 1954 and 1958 and once again in 1962 when a split in the party caused the reforming of the MP which competed in the 1965 election.
Peasant Party	KP	Köylü Partisi	Remzi Oğuz Arık	Conservative	-	0.6	-	-	-	Arık was a member of the DP and broke away to form the KP.
Freedom Party	HP	Hürriyet Partisi	Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ	Conservative	-	-	3.5	-	-	Faction that broke away from the DP in protest of parent party's authoritarian practices.
Democrat Party	DP	Demokrat Parti	Celal Bayar/ Adnan Menderes	Conservative/ Populist	55.2	58.4	48.6	-	-	
Justice Party	AP	Adalet Partisi	Ragıp Gümüşpala/ Süleyman Demirel	Conservative/ Populist	-	-	-	34.8	52.9	.
New Turkey Party	YTP	Yeni Türkiye Partisi	Ekrem Alican	Conservative	-	-	-	13.7	3.7	Alican was a former DP and then HP deputy.
Republican People's Party	CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi	İsmet İnönü	Centrist/ "Left of Center"	39.6	35.1	41.4	36.7	28.7	
Turkish Workers Party	TİP	Türkiye İşçi Partisi	Mehmet Ali Aybar	Democratic Socialist	-	-	-	-	3.0	

Notes: The parties are place primarily in a relational ordering, starting with arguably the most conservative, with factions placed next to one another. Parties' outlook and general behavior could place them in different positions, depending on the criteria used or the emphasis of the one positioning the parties. Election data was taken from, *Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri, 1923-2007* (Ankara: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, 2008), p. 28.

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reasonable to propose that a party dominating in such conditions must have had favor with the peasantry. How explanative, then, are these claims about the nature of political contestation in this period? Does such a reality have a reflection in the national discourse of these parties?

Upon closer inspection, the results are bewildering. Examination of the campaigning of the leaders of both parties during this period leaves us very little room for clear demarcation. Often where differences emerge, an assumption of effective or influential national discourse would have led us to conclusions that contradict the electoral results. On the national stage, both parties emphasized the peasantry and their economic and developmental welfare, with a slight edge, if any, going to the CHP in the area of discourse. Positioning of oneself and one's party in relation to the other often involved the same strategy: personal and acrimonious accusations of the other parties' leadership or record of governance—i.e. their behavior, not their cultural or social-class identities—and unfair, authoritarian or deceptive behaviors. Both parties accused the other of trying to divide the country and jeopardizing national unity. They also both emphasized economic development of some sort and criticized the other party in this regard. Contrary to popular impressions of the period, religion factored very little in the electoral speeches of the major vote receiving parties—with the partial exception of 1957—but they also showed that they were willing to make popular "liberalizing" concessions in this regard in the hope of votes or increased power. It could be argued that the lack of evident distinction in ideology—or, to a great extent, policy—was largely responsible for the intensity of the acrimonious and

personal attacks; there was very little else that could be discussed or used to distinguish the major parties from one another. [36]

From a perusal of the national election results, it is tempting to assume that the DP must have catered to the peasantry in their electoral discourse, yet upon closer inspection, this very plausible assumption encounters troubling inconsistencies. Starting with the first free and organized campaign in 1950, the CHP showed a consistent focus on the plight of the rural villagers. The focus of major speeches conducted by the Prime Minister Şemsettin Günaltay, President İsmet İnönü, and embedded as the keystone of their election manifest (*beyanname*) was the condition of the peasants. In a speech by Prime Minister Günaltay in Kastamonu, the Premier declared that the parties "primary duty would be to take into account [the conditions of our villages]."[37] Among the issues that the party would concern itself with would be water, seeds, schools, standard of living, infant mortality, and modern agricultural equipment.[38] As for President İnönü, though his speeches in 1950 were often filled—along with the proposal for a new constitution—with concerns about election-related violence, for which the DP was seen as instigating, and the need for the governing party to guarantee the security and safety of the citizen, he also began to emphasize the importance of the villager as election day approached. In Izmir, for example, İnönü declared that the prosperity of the villager was the party's primary concern and elaborated

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[36] See also, Ahmad, *Turkey's Experiment*, p. 17.
[37] "Gunaltay'in Kastamonu'da soyledigi nutuk: Koylunun kalkinmasi, refahi icin yeni tedbirler alinacak," *Ulus,* 12 April, 1950, p. 5.
[38] Ibid., p. 5.

on all the services that the CHP would provide to the rural village population if elected.[39]

As for the Democrat Party in 1950, the campaign discourse of its national leadership was notably absent of explicit references or appeals to the village voters—a trend maintained throughout the electoral contests within its ten year lifespan.[40] The DP seemed almost more concerned than the CHP about preserving its appeal to the good of the whole nation rather than any particular group.[41] In 1950, if the DP singled out any particular group in the speeches of its national leadership, they were more likely to emphasize the right of the urban workers, and particularly the workers' right to strike—a rare issue for which the DP and CHP had clearly defined and oppositional positions. Thus, where the DP believed the right of the worker would be best preserved by being granted the right to strike, the CHP argued that the rights for which workers would strike should be ensured by legal decree rather than by striking, which could jeopardize stability and national interest.[42] Interestingly, these positions were completely reversed in 1957[43] after seven years of DP rule and the ruling party's subsequent hesitation to provide the right to strike that seemed so critical in 1950, and the workers were

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[39] "Inonu'nin muhim nutku," *Ulus,* 5 May 1950, pp. 1, 5.

[40] For a notable exception, see the following campaign speech by Celal Bayar in 1957, "Bayar: köylünün küpü dolacak," *Akşam,* 20 October 1957.

[41] For a good example of this emphasis by the DP leadership, see "Celal Bayar, dün Diyarbakır ve Elazığ'da konuştu," *Vatan,* 7 May 1950, p. 4; and "Tahrik ve kargaşalığa karşı milli cephe kuruluyor," *Vatan*, 20 April 1950, pp. 1, 4.

[42] For a quick comparison, see "CHP Secim Beyannamesi," *Ulus*, 28 April, 1950; and "DP'nin Secim Beyannamesi," *Vatan*, 9 May 1950, p. 7. For other examples of the two parties positions, see also "Köprülü: 'Grevin işçinin tabii hakkı olduğuna inanıyoruz' dedi," *Vatan*, 6 February 1950, pp. 1, 4; and "İşçilerimiz de grevin sosyal nizamı bozacağını söylüyor," *Ulus*, 6 February 1950, pp. 1, 6.

[43] For a nice summary of this switch in position, see Kemal Karpat, "The Turkish Elections of 1957," *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1961), p. 445-6.

only given the right to strike with the 1961 Constitution provided by the military-appointed National Unity Committee.

It is also striking the extent to which the 1950 CHP election manifest was devoted to the villager. Within the declarations of the intended program of the party, a section composing more than a quarter of words in the total program document (26.5 percent—459 of 1730 words) was given over entirely to the concerns of the rural citizenry. This section of the manifest devoted specifically to the villager does not include the program to combat malaria and tuberculosis, the economic development program for the eastern region, or the expansion and development of electricity and energy sources mentioned elsewhere in the document, which are more generally relevant but would also be particularly relevant issues for the village population. The section devoted to the development of villages included the provision of land, seed, water and machinery along with education, medical assistance, and insurance. Within the document, approximately one in every 52 words was either "village," "villager," or "peasant" (*ciftci*).[44] It is also important to point out that the CHP election manifest was kept to a minimum amount of words, simply expressed, and organized for easy reading, perhaps for those with less extensive reading capabilities. In other words, it was meant to actually be read and understood by a broad spectrum of citizens.

This attempt to appeal to the rural voter through the election manifest seems to have been lost on the Democrat Party. Outside of a shorter section entitled

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[44] "CHP Secim Beyannamesi," *Ulus*, 28 April, 1950. "Ciftci" can also be more neutrally translated as "farmer," which would be this author's preference. Unfortunately, however, the student of historical Turkish politics would not be familiar with that translation, so in order to maintain common reference, the traditional translation of "peasant" is begrudgingly maintained.

"agriculture," representing about 13.6 percent of the document (423 out of 3099 words), very little is addressed to the concerns of the rural voter. "Agriculture" itself suggests an industry that goes beyond the scope of the interests of the individual village peasant, who may or may not own his or her own land and may or my not benefit directly from agricultural reform, and might be argued to have the large landowning farmers in mind. If we consider the frequency of reference to the rural voter, the words "village", "villager" or "peasant" appear only *nine* times in the entire document, which is approximately one reference per 344 words. If one concedes the word "agriculture," which must in any case be seen as a less direct, though relevant, reference to the villager, the reference to the village vote moves up to approximately one per 172 words (19 out of 3099).[45] Furthermore, the language and style of the document suggests that it was intended for a more highly educated audience, and useful program information regarding the party is much more difficult to pull out. Though a manifest, its rhetorical style is largely based on criticizing or belittling the suggested program put forward by the CHP. The few references to villagers often arise in response to the CHP's election manifest and its usage of the term. One would have to conclude that, quite contrary to what one might anticipate, at least at the level of national election discourse, the appeal by the DP was directed less toward the villager than was that of the CHP though it could hardly be argued that the interests and votes of the rural citizenry were lost on any of the competing parties.

Besides sharing an interest in the votes of the village citizenry, the two major parties, the DP and CHP, shared a similar approach to religion and politics

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[45] "DP'nin Secim Beyannamesi," *Vatan*, 9 May 1950, p. 7.

at the level of discourse, in that, both parties largely avoided appealing to religious sentiments in their major campaign speeches, with the notable exception of the 1957 campaign. When the Nation Party used the death of one of their founding members, the conservative but beloved former Chief-of-General Staff, Fevzi Çakmak, as a stage to inflame religious sentiment in their behalf, both major parties responded in strong condemnation against the usage of religion for political aims. The leader of the DP, Celal Bayar reacted very critically against such political behavior and stated: "The desire to exploit sacred beliefs and make the emotions that are deeply embedded in the national conscience the tool of cheap political games is clearly in evidence before us."[46] Even prior to this declaration, which led to one of the notably few consensual meetings between the two major competing parties, Bayar had declared to an audience in conservative Çankırı:

> [Though we thank God that we are Muslims,] we are a political party. It is not right for a political party to take religious issues as its foundation, and have its program and propaganda guided and supported by only this because religion is a sacred belief, and those who use religious propaganda as a tool will be accountable before God and disrespect religion.[47]

It would be hard to argue, that the DP, based on the major speeches of DP leaders that were published widely throughout the nation, were exploiting religious discourse for electoral gain. In the few instances where religious terminology was used, as in the quotation above, it was used in conjunction with a rejection of religious propaganda for political gain. In this regard, the Democrat Party bore very little difference from the Republican People's Party, and it is important to

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[46] "Tahrik ve kargaşalığa karşı milli cephe kuruluyor," *Vatan,* 20 April 1950. Author's translation.
[47] "D. Parti Başkanının Çankırıdaki nutku," *Vatan*, 6 April 1950, p. 4.

note, as Hale and Özbudun have pointed out, despite the myriad charges that were leveled at the DP leaders when they stood trial after the military coup on May 27, 1960, actions that threatened the state principle of secularism was not one of the accusations.[48]

Those who argue that there was a distinction, but that the DP's exploitation of religious sentimentality occurred not in speech but in practice, have to consider the behavior of both parties in the multiparty period while in power and in opposition. The beginning of concessions toward religious interests occurred from 1946 to 1950 when the CHP was in power. Already starting in 1947, the CHP debated the secularism amendment in their party convention, arguing that the current position was too "anti-clerical."[49] From this point on, the CHP passed resolutions to open schools for the training of imams, a Faculty of Theology in Ankara, optional religious instruction to students in primary schools, and they reopened sacred tombs of saints, which were commonly associated with mystic or sufi Islam.[50] Furthermore, when the CHP found itself in opposition to the DP, with whose leadership it shared a similar "progressive" and secular worldview, it had little qualms in seeking coalitions with parties such as the Nation Party (later reformed as the Republican Nation Party), whose political propaganda and electoral base seemed to contradict the secular principles of the CHP, though it was ultimately blocked in these efforts by the DP.

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[48] William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP* (London: Routledge, 2010), p. xix.
[49] Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, pp. 279-80.
[50] Ibid., p. 280; Sunar and Toprak, "Islam in Politics," p. 430.

On the other hand, though the Democrat Party was responsible for the building of additional mosques and lifting the ban on the use of Arabic for the *ezan,* the Muslim call to prayer, they were also responsible for cracking down on Islamist activism while in power, initiating the closure of the Nation Party in 1953 for anti-secular and anti-democratic practices, closing down periodicals of Islamist groups, and cracking down on the Ticani sect, which had been defacing statues of Atatürk.[51] In 1953, the Democrat Party also passed a law (6187) that further increased the penalty for using religion for political purposes.[52]

Although a number of scholars have noted an increase in the religious discourse of the Democrats while campaigning in the general election of 1957, less frequently emphasized is the behavior of the opposition CHP, which entered into the same discourse by also identifying themselves with religious concerns and liberalization. Political leaders from the CHP, like former Prime Minister Şemsettin Günaltay, reminded the people of the religious liberalization that began with the CHP in the late 1940s,[53] and declared that "those who accuse us of being irreligious (*dinsiz*) are the irreligious ones."[54] Others like Kasim Gülek declared to a crowd in Adana that it was their party that put an end to the "ringing of church bells in Turkey."[55] Even İnönü, though also suggesting that using religion as a political tool could set the people against one another,[56] was found ending speeches with "May God protect you" (*Allah hepinizi muvaffak etsin*) and uncharacteristically adding the departure blessing "We entrust you to God"

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[51] Ibid., p. 430; Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 283. See note 46.
[52] Ibid., p. 283. See note 46.
[53] "Partici idare kanser gibidir," *Akşam* 18 October, 1957.
[54] "Bize dinsiz diyenler dinsizdir," *Akşam* 19 October, 1957.
[55] *Cumhuriyet*, October 12, 1957.
[56] "Dış politika durumu çok naziktir," *Akşam* 19 October, 1957.

(*Allahaısmarladık*).[57]   Such behavior, though a deviation from the discourse of both parties before and after this election, does not demonstrate a particular penchant unique among the CHP to use religious sensibilities to accumulate votes or that either party had a "religious ideology", but that both parties in the context of wooing the populace were willing to "play that card" if deemed necessary.   In 1957, with the DP losing popular support as the economy stagnated and inflation soared, the party had little of positive note to reference in their speeches and, thus, became more sensitive to the religious sentiments of the people and began to emphasize religiosity and the building of mosques.   The CHP, not willing to be tagged the irreligious party, responded in kind and also put on a more devout face. Interestingly enough, in Karpat's study of the 1957 elections, he observed that the religious rhetoric paid little dividend to either party, but particularly the Democrats, who seemed to show an important electoral loss in precisely those provinces where they employed appeals to religious sentiment in their discourse.[58] Though the losses are likely not directly tied to the religious rhetoric, it seems to indicate that, whatever the topic of the campaign speech, people were not paying that much attention and were likely taking cues from the economic downturn and the other strategies of mobilization.

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[57] See, "İnönü Samsunda Adnan Menderes'e Cevab Verdi,"*Cumhuriyet*, October 15, 1957; "İnönü'nün İzmir mitingindeki nutku," *Akşam* 22 October 1957. The expression "Allahaısmarladık" is, of course, a colloquial one; thus, its embedded religious expression is often not considered or prioritized in normal usage. It seems significant in this case, however, because it came as a shift from the way İnönü normally ended his speeches and such changes were apparently strongly encouraged by others in the party.

[58] Kemal Karpat, "The Turkish Elections of 1957," p. 444. It is also true that the DP lost votes in most provinces from the previous general election and registered gains only in Aydin, Hakkari, Mus, and Sinop.

Thus, despite the claims of those who hold to an essential historical cleavage in Turkish politics, continually placing Islamists on one side and secularists on the other, a careful and disinterested observer of the early period of Turkish multiparty politics would likely come to another conclusion. To the extent to which the liberalization of religion practice entered into the political electoral contestation of the day, its manifestation seems to fit well the conclusion of Sunar and Toprak, who write:

> When the republican state elite split and reappeared manning the posts of the multi-party system, not only the newly-emergent Democrat Party (DP), but the old guardian of republican virtues and Kemalist reforms, the Republican People's Party (RPP) as well looked upon Islam as an important source of what they were after: namely, votes.[59]

Where the emergence of a "revival of Islam" was observed, rather than pointing the finger at one political party, the impetus for such a development should be sought elsewhere. As Karpat writes: "The establishment of a multi-party system in Turkey produced *as a consequence* a more liberal interpretation of secularism. . . It may be said that religious liberalization was *a natural consequence of democracy* and a necessary adjustment to it."[60] Considering the liberalizing measures, it was not the leadership of either party, whose secular worldviews offered little impetus for the liberalization of religion, but the enfranchisement of the devout Anatolian villager, previously excluded from the realm of national politics, that brought about such a result.[61] It was not a "revival of Islam" so much as simply the entrance of the existent popular Islam into political activism

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[59] Sunar and Toprak, "Islam in Politics," p. 428.
[60] Karpat, *Turkey's Politics,* p. 287. Emphasis is mine.
[61] See also, Feroz Ahmad, "Islamic Reassertion in Turkey," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1988), p. 756.

emboldened by the advent of democracy. If the DP could be accused of more extensive liberalization, it seems only the product of managing to remain in power for a longer period than the CHP. In any case, their historical record in power demonstrates that there were clear boundaries that would not be breached, and the Republican reforms were not at all imperiled by the DP or the party that subsequently assumed its mantle, the Justice Party (AP).

If the appeals to the Anatolian village population and the religious sentiments of the electorate were not the grounds on which the two parties distinguished themselves, how did they discursively position themselves in relation to the other or others? Here too, in contrast to interpretations by some students of Turkish politics, we find a great deal of similarity in the repertoire utilized in the speeches of the party leaders. For example, a continuing accusation of the period made by especially the major parties—the DP, CHP and AP—was that other parties were trying to divide the country and spoil national unity. The accusations of partisan and divisive behavior toward the major competitor were leveled by the CHP and the DP throughout the 1950s.[62] This discursive strategy continued unabated even after the military coup in 1960 changed the competitors in the electoral field. In 1961, Former General Ragıp Gümüşpala and leader of the AP, besides emphasizing togetherness[63] and that that

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[62] For examples, see "Celal Bayar, şiddet politikası iddialarını tekrar reddetti," *Vatan*, 6 April 1950; "İnönü'nün ikinci nutku," *Ulus*, 26 March 1950; "İnönü, partiler üstündeki milli birlikten bahsetti," *Vatan*, 10 May 1950; "İsmet İnönü, Malatya'da ilk seçim nutkunu dün verdi," *Vatan*, 10 April 1954; "Başbakan Menderes, İnönü'ye Erzurum'da cevap verdi," *Vatan*, 20 April 1954; "Menderes, 'Dünkü Milli Şef bugün Milli jurnalcıdır' dedi," *Vatan*, 22 April 1954; "İnönü, dün de İzmir'de 40 bin kişi önünde konuştu," *Hürriyet*, 17 April 1954; "İnönü, İzmir mitinginde 'iktidarı değiştireceksiniz' dedi," *Akşam*, 22 October 1957; "Menderes kahir ekseriyet istiyor," *Akşam*, 22 October 1957.
[63] "R. Gümüşpala, ısrarla beraberlikten bahsetti," *Hürriyet,* 1 October, 1961.

their party was not a party that privileged any particular class,[64] a statement not coincidentally made after speeches by the CHP emphasizing their focus on industrial workers,[65] also proclaimed that "those who rise up to divide the country will be condemned by history."[66] Inonu and the other CHP leaders positioned themselves against the others in much the same way, emphasizing that they were the party for national unity and that they would not resort to fomenting of anger or revenge or partisan behaviors that would divide and weaken the country.[67]

Scholarship in more recent decades has suggested that the DP and AP's appeal to the "national will" (*milli irade*) was actually a way of posturing the will of the nation (the people, or "common people") against the will of the "state" and its elites,[68] and in so doing were dividing society into separate camps. On closer inspection, however, such interpretations seem to be more in line with revisionism based on later development and present considerations and interpretations than with the reality of the period. If one had to argue that a particular party was appealing to particular interests in their campaign discourse, that party would have to be the CHP, even though it would be very hard to argue that even this party was the vehicle for particular interests or classes. Both the DP and the AP took great pains to distance themselves from being a party of narrow emphasis in their official discourse, eschewing even favoritism toward

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[64] "R. Gümüşpala, hiç bir sınıfa dayanan parti değiliz, diyor," *Hürriyet*, 3 October, 1961.

[65] See "İşçi davası CHP için en önemli konudur," Ulus, 1 October, 1961; and

[66] "AP lideri huzur istiyor," *Hürriyet,* 9 October, 1961.

[67] For examples, "Bize Güveniniz," *Ulus*, 26 September 1961; "CHP husumet grupu değil dava partisidir," *Ulus*, 3 October 1961; "Öc'le siyasi huzur kurulamaz," *Ulus*, 3 October 1961; "CHP tahriklere sabırla karşı koyacak," *Ulus*, 5 October 1961; İsmet İnönü, Malatya'da ilk seçim nutkunu dün Verdi," Vatan, 10 April 1954; "Başbakan Menderes, İnönü'ye Erzurum'da cevap verdi," Vatan, 20 April 1954.

[68] For such a recent juxtaposition, see Tanju Tosun, "The New Leader for the Old CHP: Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu," *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2010), pp. 33-4.

villagers or industrial workers. Thus, their use of "*millet*" (nation) was regularly employed to suggest their appeal to the whole nation, not as a tool to distinguish the regular folk from the elites.

While it is true that Süleyman Demirel, the successor to Gümüşpala as leader of the AP, expressed a "national will" that could be thwarted by authoritarian forces within the state apparatus, this too seems distant from a class distinction; instead, it could be argued to be a rhetorical device suggesting that Demirel's party embodied the will of the whole. In other words, it appears to be a majoritarian democratic appeal consistent with the way the predecessor Democrat Party interpreted the implication of the results from the ballot box.[69] Furthermore, if the expression were truly understood as a social division, the fact that the CHP, including İnönü,[70] also employed this expression confounds the issue. The frequent reference to this expression seems to have more to do with an intersection point between a particular interpretation of democracy (majority rule as determined by elections) and a clear internalization of the value for "nation parties" representing the whole or general interests of society, rather than any particular group.[71] How the parties behaved in practice, of course, was a different matter, but in their ideals and rhetoric, they could not escape the desire to represent themselves as the party for the whole nation.

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[69] As one moves into the second political paradigm—i.e. post-1965—Demirel's usage of the term becomes more blurred and that he is suggesting a group distinction between "state" and "nation" becomes more likely, but this was not how the Democrat party or the Justice Party initially used the term. Thus, it is with Demirel that scholars begin to interpret the expression as having such a "state versus nation" distinction. For an early assessment in this regard, see Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment*, p. 37.

[70] For examples, "Cumhurbaşkan dün Kırıkkalelilere hitap etti," *Ulus*, 26 March 1950; "İnönü'ye göre: demokrasimiz geriye gidemez," *Akşam*, 12 October 1957; "Kararı Milli İrade Verecek," *Ulus*, 9 October 1961.

[71] See Chapter Two.

The other forms of positioning that one finds throughout the period involve presenting one's own party as the trustworthy party that keeps its promises, while the other parties would promise the moon just to get votes.[72] The major parties regularly positioned themselves as the democratic party struggling against an authoritarian force.[73] The DP and the AP, of course, had to refer to past behaviors of the CHP during the single-party regime, while the CHP was able to put forward more contemporary accusations, but the ultimate pattern and functional positioning was the same. Here too, when confronted with the similar patterns of accusations from both sides, it becomes much harder to claim that accusations of authoritarian tendencies by the DP and the AP toward the CHP demonstrate a manifestation of the center-periphery cultural cleavage.

Beyond this, when other strategies seemed less effective, sometimes direct slander and character attacks prevailed. This sort of politicking was employed particularly by politicians like Adnan Menderes and Osman Bölükbaşı. Menderes's defensive posture in campaigning led to a number of colorful accusations.[74] For example, in 1957, Menderes, responding to the claims that the DP had led Turkey to a crisis point and a one man dictatorship, declares that "these claims consist only of an old dictator's fabricated lies and legendary

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[72] For examples, "AP lideri Gümüşpala Ege'de," *Hürriyet*, 28 Eylül 1961; *Ulus*, 2 October 1961; "İnönü dediki: Son hedefim huzuru temin etmektir," *Akşam*, 12 October 1957; "CH Partisi Devletçilik oyunu oynuyor," *Akşam*, 17 October 1957; "İnönü: 'Ölçüsüz vaitte bulunamayız' dedi," *Hürriyet*, 10 April 1954; "CHP'nin vaadleri ve muhalefet," *Vatan*, 29 April 1950.
[73] "Bayar, zaferin D.P.de olduğunu söyledi," *Vatan*, 6 March 1950; "İsmet İnönü, Malatya'da ilk seçim nutkunu dün verdi," *Vatan*, 10 April 1954; "İnönü'ye gore: Demokrasimiz geriye dönemez," *Akşam*, 13 October 1957.
[74] For another example from 1954, see "Menderes, 'Dünkü Milli Şef bugün Milli jurnalcıdır' dedi," *Vatan*, 22 April 1954.

tales."[75] A day later in Trabzon, he addressed the issue once more, saying "İsmet pasha [İsmet İnönü] says that there is a crisis. İsmet pasha's crisis is in his own head, beloved citizens. İsmet pasha is sick, sick like someone who has contracted Malta fever or the Asian flu. His sickness is the love of [governing] power (*iktidar hastası*), power fever."[76] İnönü, responding to allegations of being power hungry, accused the Democrats of being the prime examples of such a "primitive mentality" and used the example of the DP exploiting the radio for propaganda while denying it to the opposition parties.[77]

In 1961, the anti-establishment or alternative party was clearly the Republican Peasant Nation Party (CKMP) led by the attention generating Osman Bölükbaşı. His positioning of the party put the CKMP as the one that stood apart from the junta supporters. As the leader of one of the two parties that survived closure during the coup, his hope for electoral success was to sway old DP voters to his party by presenting the new parties as being created by the CHP to split the old Democrat Party votes.[78] His campaign speeches included evidence of the AP's leader, former General Ragıp Gümüşpala, support for İsmet İnönü, which challenged AP party's position as being distinct from the CHP and the successor to the DP. In the midst of these allegations, a photograph was leaked to the press that showed the former General kissing the hand of the CHP's leader that was

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[75] "Menderes hücuma geçti," *Akşam*, 13 October 1957.

[76] Menderes İnönü'ye çattı," *Akşam*, 14 October 1957.

[77] See, "İnönü, Menderes'e cevap verdi," *Akşam*, 15 October 1957; "Hücum şiddetlendi," *Akşam*, 17 October 1957.

[78] "Bölükbaşı hala konuşuyor," *Hürriyet*, 4 October, 1961. Interestingly, the CKMP was not alone in its attempt to woo the old DP supporters despite the fact that the party had been competing against the DP in earlier elections. Even the CHP also tried at times to win the support of former Democrat Party voters. See, "Aksal, masum DP'liler için, dostumuz, diyor," *Hürriyet*, 10 October, 1961.

allegedly the work of the CKMP.[79] Thus, one party, the CKMP, attempted to

distinguish itself by lumping the others together.[80] The others, then, addressed

the accusations by marginalizing the behavior of Bölükbaşı and accusing him of

showing a lack of etiquette for a political leader, of behaving like a tough guy,

and of being a person who spreads false rumors to cause trouble.[81]

Besides these other tactics, much of the campaign discourse throughout the

period at the national level, and likely at the local level, was economic and

developmental in nature. The need for advancement in mechanization,

industrialization, technology and trade was a point agreed upon by all segments of

the population.[82] The disagreement was largely based on the specific points of

carrying this out and the particularly policy that played a large role in the

emergence of a multiparty system, land reform. Thus, much of the political

discourse had to do with general plans and occasional specific points regarding

economic development. The CHP seemed to offer the most specific and

accessible plans in this regard, but in doing so, often fell victim to harsh and

condescending attacks by the competing parties, particularly the DP and the AP,

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[79] See, *Hürriyet,* 8 October, 1961.

[80] This anti-establishment discourse was also notably used by the Welfare Party in the 1990s and its National Outlook successors. The Welfare Party leader, Necmettin Erbakan, was famous for saying that there were only two choices, the Welfare Party or the imitators (*taklitçiler*). For one example, see the 1995 Welfare Party Election Declaration brochure.

[81] Liderler Osman Bölükbaşı'ya çattı," *Hürriyet*, 8 October, 1961.

[82] For examples, "Bayar Eskişehirde bir nutuk söyledi," *Vatan* 17 March 1950; "Celal Bayar, dün Diyarbakır ve Elazığ'da konuştu," *Vatan*, 7 May 1950; "Günaltay'ın Kastamonu'da," Ulus, 12 April 1050; "İsmet İnönü, Malatya'da ilk seçim nutkunu dün verdi," *Vatan*, 10 April 1954; "İnönü, CHP'nin mali ve iktisadi tezini açıkladı," *Vatan*, 14 April 1954; "İnönü mutedil konuştu," *Akşam*, 14 October 1957; "Amerika gibi zengin oluncaya kadar hamlelere hızla devam edeceğiz," *Akşam,* 19 October 1957; "Parti Liderleri konuştu," *Hürriyet*, 1 October 1961; "Liderler İktidar Peşinde," *Hürriyet*, 12 October 1961; "Türk Petroluna musallaf olanları yaşatmayacağız," *Cumhuriyet*, 5 October 1965; "Demirel Konya'da: Toprağı olmayan herkese toprak vermek mümkün değildir," *Cumhuriyet*, 8 October 1965.

as specifics always provide areas to be attacked, especially when communicated in language that is accessible to a wide audience.

The general election of 1965 diverged from these patterns of discourse at several points, and thus must be considered a transitional election of sorts as its pattern of interaction foreshadowed a new paradigmatic approach to electoral politics—positive and negative image positioning as a discursive strategy.[83] While certain elements of image positioning had existed prior to this election, such as the DP in 1957 presenting the CHP as the party of the irreligious or atheists (*dinsiz*), such usage was not persistent or stable at the national level. In 1965, however, several positive and negative positioning images did begin to take on frequent usage throughout the campaign. The CHP began to use the famous "left of center" (ortanın solu) expression of itself[84] as a simple way to emphasize its focus on "social justice" and fulfilling the requirements of a "social state" towards its citizens. This focus was not new and the "social justice" and "social state" discourse was already widely used by the CHP in the 1961 campaign; what was new was the shorthand "left of center" as a way to position themselves in the minds of the electorate. This position, of course, gave way to negative position imaging by their competitors, particularly Demirel and the AP, who positioned them as "communists" or "associates to communists." The banners at AP campaign speeches in 1965 began to famously read in clever Turkish rhyme, "Left of center is the road to Moscow" (*ortanın solu, Moskova yolu*). Considering the imaging on the other side, the use of the expression "*demirkırat*"

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[83] An extended explanation of these changes and the forces and actors involved will be presented in the following chapter.

[84] Which was later exchanged for the expression "democratic left" particularly in the 1970s.

(iron white horse), a popular distortion of the name of the former Democrat Party, began to be used by both sides to create an image of the AP.[85] In this sense, it could be understood both positively and negatively. The AP, of course, used the expression as image positioning in order to benefit from the old party's faithful constituents and establish that their party would continue in the style of the DP. The CHP and İnönü used the expression "second *demirkırat*" as a reminder that this party was a facsimile of a previous party—a party that ultimately came to a fateful end.

At the same time, however, the 1965 election, though demonstrating new approaches to discursive political contestation between the parties, must be placed at the border between the first and second paradigmatic period, as the electoral behavior displayed, in contrast to future elections, very little evidence that attention was being paid to this important discursive change. Thus, this particular election could be seen as closing the book on one paradigm and its electoral patterns while also initiating a new one, the results of which were relegated to the future. Ahmad, in his analysis of the 1965 elections argued that the utilization of "left of center" late in the campaign was initiated, not with that election, but with future elections in mind.[86] İnönü had used the term prior to the beginning of campaigning,[87] but waited to address it again until just days before the election took place. The vote loss suffered by the party across the nation was likely due to a combination of misunderstanding and confusion regarding the party's "left of

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[85] This actually included the changing of the party emblem from an open book to a white horse in 1965.
[86] Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment*, p. 253.
[87] İnönü first used the expression in a statement published in *Milliyet* on 29 July 1965.

center" position,[88] receiving the brunt of the punishment for the ineffective coalition governments forced upon it under threat of military intervention, and the clear position taken by İnönü regarding land reform, for which he declared that he would not abandon political life until that reform had been effectively carried out,[89] a position that did not likely sit well with the large landowners who had been mobilizing votes for the party, particularly in the eastern provinces.

After examining the patterns of discourse, we are still left with the question of why did the elections turn out the way that they did? Why did the DP and then the AP have such success against the CHP? Considering the nature of the campaign appeals, without knowing the results of the elections throughout the period, one might expect the CHP to have had greater success, first with the village citizenry and then among the urban poor and working class. The first response to this disjunct seems to be that a great portion of the outcome would have to have been determined by factors other than discourse. One piece of evidence for this is that, despite the increasing acrimonious attacks and polarization among the political elite that took place in 1957, the voter turnout dropped considerably from 1954, an unlikely phenomenon if campaign discourse was being taken seriously. Though the electorate was voting and mobilized in fairly high numbers, especially in the initial elections, the catalyst for voting must have been located outside of the major speeches of the national party leaders.

It is true, particularly in 1950, that İnönü did not initially campaign in a way that would have attracted the population at large. His initial points of interest in

[88] Joseph Szyliowicz, "The Turkish Election: 1965," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (1966), p. 492.
[89] "Reformları Yapmadan Siyaseti Bırakmam," *Cumhuriyet*, 4 October 1965.

his early speeches were those of a statesman who is concerned with the status of the nation as a whole, its security and stability, not the cares and concerns of the individual citizen. Thus, after years of leading the nation as its top statesman, he struggled, at the outset, to employ the mentality of a politician in his speeches. Nonetheless, toward the end of the 1950 campaign and then throughout the following election, he was able to capture a more effective campaign style that addressed needs likely to be felt by the audience. However, the CHP was further hampered, after losing in 1950, by the fortuitous economic conditions, particularly for farmers, in 1954 and then stifling oversight by the DP in 1957 ultimately meant that electoral campaigning was a losing battle. In 1961, arguably the connections between the CHP and the ruling military junta and its decisions to hang three DP members including Menderes a matter of weeks before the election, was a significant damper on the CHP's potential electoral gains as the party was popularly seen as supporting and being supported by the military intervention. Furthermore, the military, unhappy with the electoral outcome, ultimately pressured the parliament into accepting coalition government with the CHP as the senior partner, an arrangement that ultimately destined the party to failure. In the end, the electoral discourse and positioning of the parties in their speeches in this first paradigm seemed to matter less than the other strategies employed to mobilize the vote on their behalf. The actual mobilization of votes occurred not through successful speech-making, but through non-discursive strategies that were employed by both parties on the local level. It is to these dimensions of competition that we now turn.

Table 6.3 – Particular Election "Shapers" in 1950-1965 General Elections

	Major Campaign Issues	Concurrent Exogenous Factors
May 1950	- Election security and fairness - Social order and security - Economic Development - New Constitution Proposal (CHP)	- Death of Nation Party leader and former Field Marshall Fevzi Çakmak
May 1954	- Economic Development (foreign market) - Foreign Policy	- Major agricultural boom and fortunate weather conditions
October 1957	- Economic recession - Authoritarian behaviors of the DP - Religious Credentials	- Economic recession and inflation - Threats from Khrushchev and Soviet Union leveled at Turkey
October 1961	- Osman Bölükbaşı - National Unity - Economic Development	- Return to elections from junta rule - New constitution and electoral system - Execution of former Prime Minister Menderes and two other ministers in Mid-September
October 1965	- Communist Threat - Foreign vs. National Oil Control - Ind. Development and Workers' Rights - inflation and cost of living - "Left of Center" / Land Reform	

6.3.2 Non-Discursive Electoral Strategies

To assert that patron-client relational behavior by political parties was an important element of politics from the first days of multiparty competition in Turkey would be a fairly unextraordinary claim indeed. Such behavior has been noted widely in the mainstream literature on Turkish politics. Perhaps more interesting, and more accurate, would be the observation that *both* major parties employed patron-client strategies, not just the DP and its future mantle-bearer the AP, which has more often been the focus, but also the CHP. Furthermore, there is much to suggest that the particular form of the strategy differed between the parties, and that this difference, seems to more effectively explain the constellation of voting results across the electoral map during this first period. While the CHP largely emphasized existing patronage networks, depending on loyalties and existing local structures descending from the first years of the

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Republic, if not earlier, the DP employed what could be seen as political clientelism—or machine politics—at the local level to mobilize the votes on their behalf. It is for this reason that the DP, in general, performed much better in provinces that were more strongly linked to the centralized state; the CHP, on the other hand, greatly benefitted from the existing social structures in the least centralized[90] areas of the country. Both parties had supporters in the urban centers, but even here, as predicted by their preferred patron-client strategy, the DP and AP found greater success until the mid-1960s. It is this dimension of competition that most effectively explains the electoral fortunes and constellation of the votes in the first paradigm.

Although we could classify the strategic behavior of both the CHP and the DP within the general concept of patron-client relations, it is concurrently important to acknowledge that there are varying patterns of interaction within this general classification, which in its broad conception only requires as necessary conditions an unequal or lopsided status between patron and client, reciprocity, and proximity—i.e. face-to-face contact[91]—while other aspects, such as duration and level of loyalty, might vary from context to context. In regard to more specific demarcations, the conceptualizations utilized by Ayşe Güneş-Ayata in distinguishing "patronage" from "clientelism" seem particularly helpful for

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[90] The author here is intentionally avoiding the use of the term "developed." While there was a great deal of overlap between level of development and centralization, there were areas that were arguably more connected to the central state (centralized) than they were "developed." In many cases, particularly in earlier modernization theory literature, it becomes hard to disentangle "development" from "centralization" since that paradigmatic approach to academic study had, as an ultimate end, the fully consolidated 'nation-state', for which centralization could be seen as a foundational necessity.

[91] John Duncan Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientelistic Politics," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 64, No. 2 (1970), p. 412; see also, S. N. Eisenstadt and Luis Roniger, *Patrons, Clients and Friends* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 48-9.

understanding the Turkish case. She appropriates the understanding of *patronage* from Scott,[92] describing it as "a dyadic asymmetrical relationship where loyalty is extended in return for a share of the patron's personal resources."[93] *Clientelism*, on the other hand, the conceptualization for which Ayata draws on Powell,[94] is understood as "brokerage in party politics where the relation is instrumental, loyalty is weak and reciprocity is calculated on a one-to-one basis," and "the broker uses state resources rather than his own resources."[95]

Weingrod's distinction between the focus and location of patronage as it is discussed in anthropology versus political science is also helpful in this case to demarcate the terms. Anthropologists, who were the first to study patron-client relations, have focused on social relations among unequal partners in which enduring bonds of loyalty are formed.[96] On the other hand, political scientists have focused on the type of patron-client relationships that are intertwined with government, less enduring, and often related to the cycle of electoral campaigns.[97] Weingrod also argues that the observed patron-client phenomena typically occur in distinct contexts. The "patronage" relations discussed by anthropologists are often observed in societies "in which authority is dispersed and state activity is

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[92] James C. Scott, "Patronage or Exploitation," in Ernest Gellner and J. Waterbury, eds., *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies* (London: Duckworth, 1977), pp. 67-94.

[93] Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, "Class and Clientelism in the Republican People's Party," in Andrew Finkel and Nükhet Sırman, eds., *Turkish State, Turkish Society* (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 165.

[94] Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientelistic Politics," p. 411-25.

[95] Ayata, "Class and Clientelism," p. 171. Sabri Sayarı, in an excellent essay on mass mobilization in Turkey, also addresses these distinctions. In his work, he uses the term "dyadic patron-client relationship" in a very similar way to "patronage" as it is being used above, and "party patronage" is employed in a similar vein to the above conceptualization of "clientelism." See Sabri Sayarı, "Some Notes on the Beginnings of Mass Political Participation," in Engin Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor, eds., *Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems* (Istanbul: Bosphorus University Press, 1975), p. 128.

[96] Alex Weingrod, "Patrons, Patronage, and Political Parties," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1968), p. 380.

[97] Ibid., p. 380.

limited in scope. In such a context "mediators"—or "proxies"—are needed to fill in the existing gaps in the system due to a lack of centralization, a role often fulfilled through a landlord-peasant relationship.[98] In contrast, it is the expanding scope of the state and its activities that opens the opportunity for political clientelism—or as Weingrod refers to it, "party-directed patronage." It is the party's association with government and the spoils of the state that provides opportunities for mediation and reciprocity.[99] In the former case, the patron is a power resource independent of the state that, in a distant manner, connects the locality with the state apparatus. The latter form of patron-client relationship brings the locality in much closer contact with the state itself as the party, to which the individual forms dyadic bonds, is seen as a representative appendage of the state itself. Thus, though in both cases a vertical, unequal "dyadic contract"[100]—i.e. between a patron and a client—is in operation, the relational distance of the state is significantly different.

Turkey, during this initial multiparty period, could be described as demonstrating distinct variation in levels of centralization across the regions within its borders. Centralization, the effective connecting of the local to the "national" through a variety of means at the disposal of the state, including nationwide educational structures, taxation, state-led implementation of law and order, bureaucratic diffusion, etc., has been seen, particularly when modernization theory was the predominant approach to the "non-Western" world, as a critical

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[98] Ibid., pp. 381-3.
[99] Ibid., pp. 383-4.
[100] For more on the "dyadic contract" see, George M. Foster, "The Dyadic Contract in Tzintzuntan, II: Patron-Client Relationship," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 65, No. 6 (1963), pp. 1280-94.

foundation for the advancement of modernization and industrialization. Intertwining the local with the state apparatus and an awareness of one's connectedness at the local level seemed a critical prerequisite to societal specialization and industrial advancement. Thus, while the terminology of "development" was widely utilized at this time to distinguish regional peculiarities, the extent to which development is referring primarily to economic and industrial specialization or to state-connectedness is less clear, and in some cases, this difference seems rather important. In certain areas of the country such as Central Anatolia, despite their fairly basic socioeconomic conditions, villages and villagers had an awareness of their connectedness to the state through existing educational structures, bureaucratic offices, etc.; whereas, in the far eastern regions of the country, the state was still linked to the territory through "proxies", who were usually large landowning notables operating through local sociopolitical power structures that predated the existence of the Republic.[101] In these areas, outside the occasional visits from the gendarmerie and the tax man, governance and politics in society was largely understood within its local manifestation, and the relevance and one's own relevance to a "national body" was rather more vague, or at least, once removed (through the proxy).

Thus, depending on the level of centralization and the existence of pre-existing sociopolitical hierarchies, one's motivation for voting in national

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[101] The statistical ramifications of this can be found in an interesting study conducted by Frederick Frey in 1968. Frey demonstrates that region, access to formal education, and access to national radio or cinema were key indicators of whether or not one exhibited "national identification," the proxies for which were the association of Atatürk as one's hero, descriptions of the characteristics of Turks, and the level of preferred loyalty—family, village, region, nation. See, Frederick Frey, "Socialization to National Identification among Turkish Peasants," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (1968), pp. 934-65.

elections could differ greatly. Ergun Özbudun, in a study of political participation in Turkey in the 1960s and early 1970s, delineates four different motivations for political participation—deferential, solidary, instrumental, and civic participation.[102] *Deferential* participation "results from the actor's deep respect for and strong identification with the influencer and [the actor's] concomitant desire to be and appear to be influenced by him."[103] *Solidary* participation comes from a desire to demonstrate affinity and unity with one's social group, which could be structured around kinship, religion, village community, ethnicity, social class, etc.[104] *Instrumental* participation is engaging in political behavior with the assumption that one or one's group will receive explicit material gain as reciprocity for their action.[105] *Civic* participation, on the other hand, is entering into political behavior as a moral duty or obligation, not in anticipation of any personal gain, but based on one's sense of responsibility toward the state and its well-being.[106]

When we superimpose these motivations for political participation over the existing sociopolitical contexts, it might be reasonably anticipated that in areas where centralization was not yet completed deferential participation, and to some extent, solidary participation would be commonly observed. Voters are mobilized in deferential support and loyalty for the "proxy" and the locally-oriented

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[102] Özbudun, *Social Change*, pp. 6-9. The first three of these, as Özbudun himself also points out, parallel nicely with Scott's "nature of loyalties" in his study of "machine politics" in a 1969 article. Scott also refers to an "occupational or class orientation" that could be understood as a more specific category of Özbudun's "instrumental motivation", and Özbudun uniquely adds the "civic motivation" concept not addressed in Scott's work. See, James Scott, "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 63, No. 4 (1969), p. 1147.
[103] Özbudun, *Social Change*, p. 6.
[104] Ibid., pp. 6-7.
[105] Ibid., p. 7.
[106] Ibid., p. 7.

sociopolitical structure in which they are embedded. Furthermore, depending on how local lines of distinctions were drawn in relation to provincial borders, the national unit through which members of parliament would be determined, the members of these sociopolitical units might act with more horizontal feelings of solidarity in relation to another such community with which the election had positioned them as competitors for the limited seats.

As one then moves into the regions of the country where centralization and awareness of one's connectedness to the nation as a whole could be observed and pre-existing sociopolitical structures and actors operating as proxies were few in number, solidary, instrumental and civic participation would increase. Certain communities and groups, based on their proximity to other antagonistic groups (whether these are understood as religious, ethnic, or village groupings) could be mobilized through solidary motivations. Perhaps even more common would be instrumental mobilization through promises of material benefit, whether on individual or group level, that would accompany the support of a particular party. Furthermore, though any member of a national society might develop a civically-minded orientation toward participation regardless of their condition, it might be expected to exist in greater numbers among those with greater exposure to formal education. This could be anticipated as being so, not because of one's level of enlightenment or intelligence, but simply because it is in the state's interest to indoctrinate moral duties and obligations toward the state, and the primary vehicle for the state to accomplish such a goal is public, or state-supervised, education.

Figure 6.1a – Classic "Center-Periphery" Electoral Cleavage

Considering this formulation, how did the principle parties mobilize their respective voters?   As is illustrated in Figure 6.1b, in contrast to the oversimplified "center-periphery" electoral distinction in Figure 6.1a, the parties had greater success in general with peripheries living in distinct contexts. The CHP, as has widely been observed, encountered greater success in areas where they could mobilize "proxies"—i.e. local notables—many of whom had already

Figure 6.1b – Cross-Cleavage Competition for Peripheral Votes

developed connections with the state (and the party) during the formation of the Republic and the single-party period[107] (see "Party A" of Figure 6.2 below). The

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[107] Özbudun, *Social Change,* 111; Kemal Karpat, "Society, Economics, and Politics in Contemporary Turkey," *World Politics*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1964), pp. 51-4; for another account of this, see S. N. Eisenstadt and Luis Roniger, *Patrons, Clients and Friends*, p. 85.

notable became a client of the (patron) party, and in turn, utilized his existing patronage relationship within the local community to mobilize the votes. The loyalty existed on both levels, but, as the volatility of votes in these regions attests, the bonds of loyalty were often stronger between the communal voters and the notable than between the notable and the party.[108] In fact, it was the strong loyalty, patronage relations that existed between the notable and his community of mobilized voters that provided the leverage for switching loyalties to a patron-party that offered greater reciprocity toward the notable (see Figure 6.2). The CHP's long-standing success, extending back into the single-party years at least, in gaining the loyalty of these "proxies" served them well in the initial electoral contests. Particularly in this first period of electoral competition, the "fortress" of votes for the CHP came largely from the provinces in the far eastern regions and the fertile Mediterranean provinces where such mobilization arrangements were a much greater possibility.[109] The correlations of positive support for the CHP in Table 6.4 below clearly show such a regional trend throughout the paradigm along with a negative correlation in regard to level of development.

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[108] For another excellent portrait of such a patron-client relationship between the CHP and notables, see Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, "Roots and Trends of Clientelism in Turkey," in Luis Roniger and Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, eds., *Democracy, Clientelism, and Civil Society* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 50-2.

[109] For an account of the relations between local notables (landlords) and their communities in the fertile Mediterranean region, see Wolfram Eberhard, "Landlords in a Democracy: The Adaptability of a Traditional Elite," in Frank Tachau, ed., *The Developing Nations: What Path to Modernization?* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1972), pp. 125-136.

Figure 6.2 – Two Forms of Patron-Client Relations for Political Mobilization

Note: In the "Party B" form of patron-client relations, the broker may indeed rely on his/her own local-level resources in his/her dealings with clients, a phenomenon that has often been observed in the Turkish case. The distinction, however, is that the proxy in the Party A relationship has acquired patron status prior to and independent to his/her connection to the party, and it is for this very reason that the proxy was recruited by the party. The brokers' significance to the "mobilize-able community" is his/her presumed connection with Party B and the access to resources that such a situation would bring. In fact, these brokers may be expected by the party to often tap into their own local or individual-level resources, but their status within the community comes from being a broker of the party. The status of Party A within this scenario, on the other hand, comes from being the chosen political vehicle of the community leader (proxy).

The DP, on the other hand, seemed more adept at political clientelism and successfully used brokerage strategies to mobilize votes instrumentally (see Figure 6.2). The party often enlisted local professionals to visit towns and villages as party representatives and determined what it was that the local voters wanted and then made promises in that regard in return for their votes. The accounts of research done primarily in inner-Anatolian villages in the 1950s, particularly in the West and Central regions, are filled with the very pragmatic and instrumental declarations of villagers regarding electoral decision-making. Consider the following passage recorded by Lerner:

> The *Demokrat* men came to Balgat and asked us what was needed here and told us they would do it when they were elected. . . We all voted for them . . . and the new men did what they said. They brought us this road and moved out the gendarmerie. . . We are all *Demokrat* party here in Balgat now.[110]

Though still engaged in a unequal or hierarchical relationship, where conditions permitted it, the DP mobilizers interacted with their clientele, the rural farmers and urban periphery directly through brokerage, and the reciprocity was based on received or promised explicit material benefit—roads, mosques, schools, farm equipment, and the removal of the gendarmerie—(or the promises thereof) for support at the ballot box.[111] In this regard, as Sayarı has well noted,[112] the party mobilized votes according to a strategy closely resembling the "machine politics"—i.e. organized distribution of material rewards to mobilize masses of voters—concept in Scott's seminal article on patronage and machine politics.[113] This basic difference in regional tactics and subsequent varying success of the parties was noted by Özbudun, who writes, "While local notables were influencial enough to mobilize their supporters in the less developed east, they could not exert much influence upon the more modern peasantry of the west, who were more responsive to the leadership of provincial merchants and professionals."[114] In

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[110] Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (New York: Free Press, 1958), p. 31; for another detailed account of such political clientelism, see Joseph Szyliowicz, *Political Change in Rural Turkey – Erdemli* (The Hague, NE: Mouton & Co., 1966), pp. 136-7.

[111] Güneş-Ayata, "Roots and Trends of Clientelism," p. 52-4.

[112] Sayarı, "Some notes," pp. 126-31.

[113] Scott, "Machine Politics," pp. 1142-58. Heper and Keyman also conclude that the existing conditions and multiparty competition that necessitated attracting local support led politics down the path of patronage and utilizing the resources of the state for votes. See Metin Heper and Fuat Keyman, "Double-Faced State: Political Patronage and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (1999), pp. 261-2.

[114] Özbudun, *Social Change*, p. 49. This regional distinction in Turkey was also noted by Eisenstadt and Roniger in their comparative work on patron-client relations. See, Eisenstadt and Roniger, *Patrons, Clients and Friends,* p. 86.

most places where centralization was fairly consolidated, these sorts of material and economic interactions made sense, a fact born out by the correlations of support for the party by region and level of development in Table 6.4.[115] During the single-party regime, the party and the state were closely intertwined such that it was natural to assume, especially in the absence of clear ideological platforms,

Table 6.4 - Correlations of Party Support with Development and Regions

	Development	Marmara	Aegean	Mediterranean	North Central	South Central	Black Sea	Central East	Northeast	Southeast
CHP										
1950	-.474***	-.141	-.139	-.044	-.250*	-.166	.005	.137	.086	.474***
1954	-.025	-.139	.087	.175	-.220	-.127	-.032	.451***	.131	-.246
1957	-.287*	-.158	-.192	.221	-.301*	-.051	.070	.364**	.122	.021
1961	-.133	-.053	-.002	.179	-.278*	-.137	-.063	.248*	.147	.023
1965	-.131	-.024	-.027	.104	-.250*	-.110	-.007	.284*	.015	.050
CHP Ave	-.319**	-.165	-.076	.157	-.343**	-.145	.011	.348**	.136	.139
DP										
1950	.409**	.107	.186	.093	.083	.148	-.074	-.014	-.007	-.448***
1954	.293*	.226	.222	-.009	-.111	.031	.010	-.208	-.023	-.128
1957	.226	.310*	.270*	-.044	-.257*	-.057	-.040	-.254*	-.051	.115
(AP/YTP) 1961	.177	.160	.372**	.175	-.528***	-.186	.078	-.064	-.023	.038
(AP) 1965	.685***	.221	.372**	.149	.043	.081	.115	-.235	-.119	-.610***
DP Ave	.503***	.268*	.396**	.127	-.231	.012	.044	-.201	-.058	-.319**
MP										
1950	.135	.112	-.146	-.114	.295*	.022	.211	-.143	-.094	-.181
(CMP) 1954	.042	.018	-.193	-.154	.330**	.174	.107	-.132	.013	-.165
(CMP) 1957	.063	-.082	-.242*	-.136	.559***	.162	.088	-.152	-.036	-.214
(CKMP) 1961	-.033	-.106	-.297*	-.229	.611***	.240*	-.004	-.115	-.031	-.115
(MP) 1965	.141	-.035	-.184	-.082	.546***	.101	.007	-.072	-.142	-.212
MP Ave	.068	-.046	-.260*	-.178	.596***	.167	.055	-.137	-.065	-.194
Ind.										
1950	-.193	-.113	.016	-.115	.014	-.082	.078	-.125	-.096	.328**
1954	-.386**	-.108	-.159	-.030	-.023	-.075	-.095	-.133	-.083	.620***
1957	-.213	-.047	-.054	-.043	-.060	-.034	-.054	-.047	-.039	.346**
1961	-.194	-.030	-.084	-.020	-.074	-.050	-.101	.177	-.057	.229
1965	-.533***	-.173	-.193	-.089	-.222	-.062	.009	.135	.107	.495***
Ind. Ave	-.581***	-.184	-.192	-.101	-.172	-.102	-.047	.059	-.018	.706***

* Denotes significance at $p < .05$; ** denotes significance at $p < .01$; and *** denotes significance at $p < .001$. Pearson two-tailed correlations. Negative correlations shaded in gray.

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[115] *Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri*, pp. 29-95.

that these competing parties were rival distributive arms of the state.[116] This, of course, created bonds to the party that were much more short-term and contingent (see "Party B" in Figure 6.2), but the obligatory bonds were more directly connected to the party (and to a less extent, the broker) than in the "Party A/proxy" scenario.

In addition to this, in villages where there were existing social factions, the party lines fell conveniently within the ongoing local social cleavage.[117] At the beginning of multiparty competition, the leading faction, usually connected to the existing headman (*muhtar*), who embodied the existing government at the local level, often became supporters of the CHP, while the opposing faction supported its primary challenger, the DP.[118] This phenomenon of local faction voting behavior has been noted by a great many students of politics and village behavior in Turkey. Szyliowicz writes:

> The peasant could join either the old, established CHP or the newly-created opposition, the DP. This decision was usually made solely on the basis of local factors—mainly village rivalries. If the patriarch of such a family had connections with the government, he usually remained loyal to the CHP. His rivals, realizing that association with a political party might provide him with additional status and power, would immediately join the opposition party to strengthen their position within the community.[119]

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[116] For a similar observation, see Paul Stirling, *Turkish Village* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), pp. 268-9.

[117] For a very clear account of such political divisions according to local social factions in a more developed village in Western Turkey, see Arnold Leder, *Catalysts of Change: Marxist versus Muslim in a Turkish Community* (Austin, TX: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1976), pp. 5-24.

[118] For one such account, see Paul Stirling, "Death and a Youth Club: Feuding in a Turkish Village," *Anthropological Quarterly,* Vol. 33, No. 1 (1960), pp. 64-5; For another colorful account of these sorts of local factions becoming the basis for political partisanship, see Michael Meeker, *A Nation of Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), pp. 51-4; see also, Szyliowicz, *Political Change in Rural Turkey*, p. 151.

[119] Joseph Szyliowicz, "The Political Dynamics of Rural Turkey," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (1962), p. 432.

Sayarı writes, "Party competition meant, first and foremost, that factions could obtain support from outside the village or small-town by establishing linkages with political parties . . . For political parties . . . the prevalence of factional oppositions proved to be highly instrumental in electoral mobilization."[120] Özbudun, in his study of political behavior in Turkey, noting the "remarkably strong tendency" toward a two-party system in the villages evident from the data accumulated, also argues that its explanation must be found in the pre-existing local factions and rivalries among groups in villages.[121]

Certainly, from area to area and village to village, the lines between conditions where patronage through a "proxy" who operated through pre-existing sociopolitical power structures, dyadic "factional" village social structures, or villages where "machine party" clientelism took place might have been blurry. The relative proportion of each strategic form of mobilization, due to the lack of existing data in this regard, also cannot be exactly determined although Özbudun's work, which captures these distinctions quantitatively from a later period where these strategies continued if somewhat fading, does give us a glimpse of their prevalence if declining at the point in which his research was carried out.[122] What seems to be foundational, however, and of critical import is that determinants of voting behavior were predominantly *local* for the vast number of voters in Turkey during this initial period, as students of Turkish politics and society consistently claimed up until the 1980s when the alternative "center-periphery" national cleavage explanation began to gain prominence in the

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[120] Sayarı, "Some Notes," p. 124.
[121] Özbudun, *Social Change*, pp. 49, 180-1.
[122] Ibid.

literature.[123] Despite an apparent abandonment of the empirical electoral data of this period in recent decades, the localized nature of politics and electoral strategy in this period cannot be emphasized too strongly; as Szyliowicz states, "local events were of much greater significance in shaping an individual's allegiance."[124]

Therefore, attention to the political and campaign discourse at the national level bears little explanative power in regard to electoral outcomes. As discussed in the section above, for anyone endeavoring an investigation of the electoral discourse, its disjuncture from the ultimate outcomes of electoral contestation and voting behavior is beyond evident. Furthermore, cultural identification as occurring in a massive national cleavage—i.e. such as is proposed by a center and periphery—cannot explain election outcomes when one confronts the empirical data at the provincial level and the massive weight of sociological, anthropological and political evidence that provided unwavering observations of an emphasis on *local* considerations—whether culturally or instrumentally determined.[125] This alone holds the best explanative power for the constellation of voting behavior in this period. Where the political battle was "us" versus "them", it was understood within a *local* rather than *national* context,[126] and those

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[123] See chapter four. The classic work on this subject was first published in 1973 and then reprinted with a few additions in 1975, but it broad appearance in the literature began largely in the 1980s, with a few early exceptions. Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" *Daedalus* 102 (1973): 184-6; Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" in *Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems,* ed. Engin Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor (Istanbul: Bosphorus University Press, 1975), 7-32.
[124] Szyliowicz, "Political Dynamics," p. 432; Leder, *Catalysts of Change*, pp. 16-19.
[125] For other works with similar conclusion regarding this period, see Kemal Karpat, "Social Groups and the Political System after 1960," in Kemal Karpat, ed, *Social Change and Politics in Turkey* (Leiden: Brill, 1973), pp. 245, particularly, the second footnote; also, Lale Yalçın-Heckmann, "Kurdish Tribal Organization and Local Political Processes," in Andrew Finkel and Nühket Sırman, eds., *Turkish State, Turkish Society* (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 307, 311.
[126] Leder, *Catalysts of Change*, p. 1.

with an eye on the national scene behaved more clearly according to instrumental motivations of localized individual or group embetterment rather than some sort of solidary motivation at the national level.

The veracity of this claim can also be illustrated by the clear volatility of the vote first toward and then away from the Democrat Party and the Republican Peoples' Party in 1954 and 1957 as seen by the "Tr B Vol" columns in Table 6.5, which measure the movement between the CHP and its competitors. Had the cleavage between these primary competitors been based on identification, such as the widely-held claim that the DP and AP were the representative of the urban and rural powerless periphery and the CHP was the party of the central elite, the pattern of voting behavior would have arguably been more stable and exhibited less "instrumentally" based patterns, and of course, the village vote would not have been so divided in 1950. Had the *identity* motivation been a strong factor, the sudden and strong shift of votes away from the CHP in 1954 and then back toward the CHP in 1957, for example, could not easily be explained. One also sees from these volatility statistics that, as time passed, movement between blocks began a secular decrease, possibly suggesting that the lines of identification began to slowly grow until 1969, a change which will be discussed in the subsequent chapter.

Furthermore, consideration of these mobilization strategies points us to the significance of the initial election victory of the DP, the pattern of subsequent voting behavior, and provides clues as to why this paradigmatic approach to politics by both the parties and the electorate began to fragment, especially beginning with the election in 1957 (see Table 6.6). If the name of the game is

Table 6.5 – Regional Volatility from 1950-1965

Region	1950-1954			1954-1957			1957-1961				1961-1965			
	Tot Vol	Tr B Vol	Alt B Vol	Tot Vol	Tr B Vol	Alt B Vol	Tot Vol	TV Adj	Tr B Vol	Alt B Vol	Tot Vol	TV Adj	Tr B Vol	Alt B Vol
Marmara	8.49	6.79	3.71	11.05	6.01	4.82	59.38	7.56	1.64	3.35	30.11	12.70	4.00	2.50
Aegean	6.73	5.25	2.22	11.66	2.77	9.78	63.53	11.27	2.95	8.17	14.57	10.28	5.54	5.03
Mediterranean	5.68	3.97	2.05	13.48	6.35	4.81	57.08	11.04	5.53	3.46	19.46	11.64	5.78	7.30
North Central	9.32	6.36	5.37	16.40	6.58	9.51	49.07	17.50	5.24	13.29	29.65	26.51	5.90	13.19
South Central	8.01	5.58	6.73	13.90	6.64	5.53	52.81	14.76	5.54	12.89	31.79	26.79	4.23	11.03
Black Sea	10.31	8.31	3.63	13.13	7.34	5.41	55.22	10.48	6.63	5.18	28.82	17.82	5.46	6.58
East Central	5.90	5.63	2.95	12.47	6.43	5.50	55.26	14.62	7.42	5.36	38.45	22.85	6.49	13.46
Northeast	10.32	7.69	5.49	13.30	5.42	7.50	55.73	14.15	5.63	8.03	43.22	28.80	6.44	14.86
Southeast	27.40	21.62	7.65	20.20	10.38	9.21	62.74	20.60	10.49	16.60	45.24	42.91	11.66	24.94

Table 6.6 – Regional Effective Number of Parties from 1950-1965[124]

Region	1950	1954	1957	1961	1965	Period Average
Marmara	2.10	2.12	2.21	2.55	2.33	2.27
Aegean	2.04	2.04	2.28	2.28	2.20	2.17
Mediterranean	2.01	2.10	2.16	2.32	2.33	2.18
North Central	2.20	2.44	2.46	2.64	2.57	2.46
South Central	2.07	2.24	2.39	2.85	2.57	2.42
Black Sea	2.12	2.17	2.28	2.57	2.49	2.33
Central East	2.00	2.04	2.20	2.44	2.80	2.30
Northeast	2.02	2.12	2.23	2.53	2.68	2.32
Southeast	2.10	2.40	2.26	2.57	3.31	2.53
Provincial Average	**2.08**	**2.20**	**2.28**	**2.52**	**2.59**	**2.34**

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[127] Effective number of parties calculated by using a modified version of Golosov's formula derived by this author: $N_P = \sum 2/1+((S_1+S_2)^2/(S_i+S_j))-(S_i+S_j)$.

distributing patronage or material benefits then winning or losing has critical

implications for future elections. As Sayarı writes:

> The [CHP's] inability to come to power at a time when patronage
> distribution had become almost a prerequisite for success among the
> peasant voters proved to be a major electoral liability for the party.
> Undoubtedly, there was an element of a vicious circle at work here:
> The [CHP's] failure to come to power and hence its lack of access to
> governmental funds reduced, if not entirely precluded, the possibility
> of exchanging votes with goods and services.

In this sense, the timing of the Democrat Party's win was critical. A great

measure of the explanation for their success in 1950 could be tacked up to the fact

that they were simply on the right side of the winds of change within society—the

CHP had been the party in power for 27 years. Assisting their initial success, the

fact that they came to power at a moment in which large amounts of foreign

financial aid was pouring into the country and optimum weather conditions

provided bumper crops, both of which put extra money in the pockets of the

village farmers, turned a 50/50 split of the rural population in 1950[128] to a much

greater rural victory in 1954, a victory effectively explained by patronage and

instrumental mobilization from the machine party strategy employed by the DP.

This also anticipates that, in 1957, with the nation in debt and the coffers running

dry, there would be a significant change in the votes, and in fact, the DP lost

nearly 10 percent of the vote (from 58.4 to 48.6) while the CHP gained almost 6.5

percent from the previous election at the national level.

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[128] Özbudun points out, that in 1950, the DP did better in the cities than in the villages, and that the
CHP seemed to have held a slight margin of victory in the latter. See, Özbudun, *Social Change*, p.
47. Richard Robinson, who was carrying out research and monitoring the elections in 1950 claims
that the village vote was split between the two parties. See, Richard D. Robinson, "Turkish
Elections, 1950," *Institute of Current World Affairs*, http://www.icwa.org/articles/RDR-52.pdf
(accessed 2 May 2009).

While the gradual increase in fragmentation of the vote in each election was itself partly a result of the desire to shop for better patron-client relations at the local level, the gradual nature of the fragmentation and the two-party tendency could at least in part be explained by the electoral strategy, particularly the DP's machine politics—i.e. party-based clientelism. Though Özbudun also suggested that the two-party tendency may stem from existing dyadic social factions representing themselves as a two-party political cleavage, which seems to clearly account for one part of the explanation to this phenomena, his data and analysis also reveal, as do the data in Table 6.6, that the strong two-party cleavage was most evident in the most developed regions of the country—the Marmara, Aegean and Mediterranean regions.[129]   The first two regions were notoriously supportive of the Democrat Party and stood to gain the most from party clientelism; thus, one could also argue that, in such an environment of electoral mobilization, the voters understood the need to support a clear winner whether or not the electoral system allowed for minor parties.

If machine politics is the name of the game, any party not in first place is a loser—a reality placing clear constraints on the number of effective parties. These mobilization strategies, thus, provide the best explanation for the observable trends of the period: maintenance of a two-party tendency despite a great deal of volatility from election to election, a clear tendency and pattern of fragmentation that both progressed as dissatisfaction grew, but also remained limited despite existing possibilities in the electoral system in the 1960s, and volatility and

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[129] The relatively strong two-party showing of the Central East, with its well-known ethnic (Kurd-Turk) and religious (Sunni-Alevi) diversity might plausibly be a fitting example of the "social factions" explanation.

fragmentation that ultimately fit the pattern of the economic realities and the governing parties ability to distribute the spoils of office.

As fragmentation grew from dissatisfaction with the governing parties, it also simultaneously put stress on the power of the winning horse to effectively distribute the promised goods to those who mobilized and were mobilized on their behalf. By the 1960s, the ability of the party governing the country to distribute patronage no longer existed to the same extent that it had for the DP in the early 1950s. Furthermore, the existence of coalition governments from 1961 to 1965, and its inability to provide the largesse seen in earlier years, due in part to an unexpectedly poor showing by the CHP who won the post-coup election with a slight plurality (36.7 percent) over the AP (34.8 percent), put pressure on these predominant strategies for voter mobilization, especially in regard to the brokerage-style clientelism of the DP, which was continued by the AP.[130]

The CHP in 1961, among other issues, likely fell victim to its popular association, at least in spirit, to the military junta who made a fateful decision to execute the popular former DP Prime Minister Adnan Menderes just weeks before the electorate cast its votes. Thus, despite a plurality of the vote, it was forced to enter coalitions with parties not of the same mind—not a recipe for effective governance. The mantle of the DP, divided among two parties not-so-subtly attempting to mobilize the electorate under the old party's banner, was not clearly set upon the shoulders of the AP until after the election in 1961. Thus, in 1965, we see for the last time a shaping of the contest solely under "politics as usual"— i.e. a paradigm solely oriented toward patron-client strategies at the local level and

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[130] See Güneş-Ayata, "Roots and Trends in Clientelism," pp. 54-5.

where the national discourse and ideological positioning of parties could be seen as merely window-dressing for the former. By 1969, it became obvious that something else was intervening in electoral competition and mobilization such that the outcome of the elections was being affected by it.

6.4 Domains of Identification

One also generally expects that, beyond the "dimensions of competition"—i.e. the discursive issues and non-discursive strategies employed to mobilize voters—that "domains of identification"—"the various identities which tie particular voters to particular parties"[131]—would additionally intervene in the shaping of the lines of political contestation. In this first paradigmatic period of Turkish politics, however, it could be fairly successfully argued that no strong "identification" markers were in operation to guide voting behavior or party preference. Certainly, pre-existing social and cultural cleavages existed, but a perusal of the data and voting patterns confounds any simplistic dividing lines between these categorizations and the ultimate direction that the votes were cast. Due to the powerful influence of patron-client strategies, many unexpected bedfellows could be found. Local factions of devout Sunnis can be found casting their votes for either major party or minor parties,[132] while intellectuals and other elites cast votes for the DP in the name of democracy's advancement in the initial elections and switched to the CHP in later elections for the same reason.[133]

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[131] Peter Mair, *Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 23.
[132] For one example of this and the predominance of local factions, see Meeker, *A Nation of Empire*, pp. 51-4.
[133] Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment*, p. 16. Ahmad even counts the military as part of this group.

Furthermore, any descriptions of the parties involved or the electorate casting their votes for these parties, especially prior to 1961, as "left" or "right" would have to be understood as anachronistic. Because of the fears of extreme ideological positions, the references to "left" in the 1950s were attributions that attempted to place the targeted individual or group *outside* of the political party system. The extreme right, or religious right would also have to be seen in the same vein, and laws existed that banned the explicit demonstration of such political behavior.[134] Thus, self-positioning or relative placement of oneself or one's party in such a manner would have offered very little utility,[135] and thus these identifying symbols were not used by mainstream political parties until after the creation of the 1961 Constitution, and it was not until later that such positioning found utility as effective image positioning and cleavage forming. It is for this reason that Karpat had "positioning" difficult in trying to explain the various political parties in Turkey in 1959. He writes, "All the major political parties of Turkey, consequently, are middle of the road parties, representing the conservative, traditionalist conceptions."[136]

As discussed in the section on national discourse above, the parties' placement of themselves in relation to the others was largely based on moral distinctions—that one's party was moral, honest, and trustworthy while the other party or parties were not. Following the 1960 coup, however, one begins to notice

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[134] See, Sabri Sayarı, "The Turkish Party System in Transition," *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1978), p. 43.
[135] Hale writes, "it was impossible to say whether the Republican People's Party stood to the left or right of the Democrat Party since the issues that divided the two . . . did not lend themselves to conventional analysis." William Hale, *The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), pp. 121-2.
[136] Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 390.

the advent of a developing identification of sorts. Though "left" and "right" were not widely used by the major parties until 1965 and later, a number of post-1960 coup parties found it useful to identify themselves with the defunct Democrat Party. The use of the old party's symbols, such as the *kırat*,[137] indicated that these parties intended to pick up where the DP had left off. Thus, the same brokerage and machine politics approach that was seen so favorably by much of the village populace, who felt empowered by the act of presenting a list of demands directly to educated local professionals enlisted by the party, would allegedly be maintained by these parties, which allowed for continuance in electoral results until the end of the 1960s. It was this continuation of the old party's legacy, a logical strategy for the new parties entering the competition, that helped form the beginnings of identification with a *style* of politics—this more so than an *ideology*—and that divided them from their major competitor, the CHP. These initial formations of lines that could be perceived as "identifying" at the national level of politics and predictable in terms of the direction a vote is cast must be understood as a great deal more fluid and ambiguous at this time than they would become in later periods.

6.5 Conclusion

The political legacy from this initial period of multiparty politics in the Republic could be argued to have both positive and detrimental aspects. The application of patron-client strategic relations in the mobilization of the citizenry has often been addressed in relation to the long-standing pattern of problematic

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[137] White horse.

behavior in democratic politics, particularly in relation to the "populist" and irresponsible government spending, which seems to naturally accompany it.[138] Another problem associated with this pattern of party strategy is that, while Turkish parties ostensibly desire to represent the general interest of the whole nation (see Chapter Two), they become the vehicle for very particular, even individual, interests. From such a perspective, as Roniger points out, "clientelism is shown to neutralize the system of representation, as "friends" are placed in the strategic synapses of power and mechanisms of control."[139] Furthermore, because its purpose is ultimately to establish party loyalty through an artificial alliance of members of unequal status, this of course being one of the necessary conditions of patron-client relations, it is most effective in forging partnerships with those that are most needy, or—to represent it in another way—the most peripheral. Thus, those at the middle level of society, in between the elites and the otherwise powerless, the urban middle class, are often left out of receiving the benefits of this pattern of democracy, which prioritizes distributing the spoils of the state for mobilization and support. Kalaycıoğlu has argued that this pattern of democracy has disenchanted the urban middle class toward democracy and led them to be supportive or open to authoritarianism or even praetorian regimes to secure their way of life.[140]

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[138] The one of the best critiques in this vein is from Heper and Keyman. See, Heper and Keyman, "Double-Faced State," pp. 259-77.

[139] Luis Roniger, "The Comparative Study of Clientelism and the Changing Nature of Civil Society in the Contemporary World," in Luis Roniger and Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, eds., *Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), p. 9.

[140] Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Turkish Democracy: Patronage versus Governance," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2001), p. 64.

While these criticisms deserve the attention that they have been given, it is also possible to propose that, though patron-client relations might have slowed some of the anticipated fruits of democratization, the political brokerage and machine politics employed by the Democrat Party may have set a pattern that has ultimately guaranteed the consolidation of democracy as a political regime in Turkey. Heper, discussing the differing perspectives of state and political elites in Turkey, has stated, "In Turkey, democracy did become the only game in town, but the *rules* of that game did not resemble the rules of liberal democracy."[141] The action of the "political elites" to engage in party brokerage with a large mass of citizen clients brought the state, and importantly democracy, perhaps in overly simplistic and materialistic ways, into direct contact with vast segments of society.[142] Scott argues, that the "machine politics" form of clientelism that exemplifies how the DP and AP, in particular mobilized votes, constructs "a cacophony of concrete, parochial demands into a system of rule that was at once reasonably effective and legitimate."[143] While the increased contact and apparent open ear of the state toward individual concerns no doubt established a positive association toward democracy, Heper's observation that this did not bring about "liberal democracy" is a critical one. In anticipation of such a development in regard to political clientelism, Roniger writes, "Patrons and clients are not interested in the generality of equality and rules; they are interested in resources.

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[141] Metin Heper, "Conclusion: The Consolidation of Democracy versus Democratization in Turkey," in Metin Heper and Barry Rubin, eds., *Political Parties in Turkey* (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 142.

[142] Kalaycıoğlu, "Turkish Democracy," p. 64.

[143] Scott, "Corruption," p. 1143. S. N. Eisenstadt, one of the early scholars of patron-client relationships also emphasized the integrative, trust and solidarity building consequences of such behavior between groups which would normally experience greater social distance. See Eisenstadt, *Patrons, Clients and Friends*, p. 8-11.

They do not seek to promote a rule for citizens as such; they are on the lookout for situations that are to their advantage, on the basis of favoritism."[144]

Thus, the orientation of the hitherto largely disenfranchised rural masses and urban poor was directed toward the ballot box, largely for functional, if overly particularistic, purposes.[145] If one argued that there was a malady in Turkish political orientations stemming from the advent of democracy, rather than the more exotic and sensational claims regarding the impact of cultural identities and religion on electoral behavior and outcomes, it might be the strong egotropic—individual self-interest—approaches to voting that do not correspond with a concern for the rights or equality of others. However, considering the heterogeneous nature of the population and the great diversity in cultural outlook, one can easily imagine a worse scenario for the young country in its initial orientations toward multiparty politics. Not surprisingly, functional—i.e. economic—considerations are still identified as a prime motivator for electoral behavior.[146]

The various ways in which these patron-client relational strategies were applied also seem to be important, the distinctions still having regional repercussion in citizens' attitudes toward the state and its system. Where the DP mobilized the electorate face to face with party representatives, such as in Central and Western Anatolia, the populous is perceptibly more connected to the state and

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[144] Roniger, "The Comparative Study of Clientelism," p. 10.

[145] The point that patron-client practices has made "the game of democratic politics attractive to the masses" has also been suggested by Kalaycıoğlu. See, Kalaycıoğlu, "Turkish Democracy," pp. 62-3.

[146] For one indication of this, see Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Attitudinal Orientation to Party Organization in Turkey in the 2000s," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2008), pp. 311-2.

democracy, if also correlated with nationalism and conservatism. In the far eastern and southeastern regions, where patronage was used to mobilize the vote through proxies, anti-state and anti-system behavior are still considered chief "state-level" concerns of the region. One wonders what the outcome might have been had the CHP, and to some extent the DP and its successors, engaged in more direct contact with this populace. Obviously, the "proxies"—local notables—who were chosen to represent the party had a strong investment in this possible scenario not being the case, but the ultimate distance between the actual party and the mass of citizens in these regions was such that the integration of the masses into the state, which occurred in other places, could not be realized there.

Finally, while it has been the case that the vast body of literature addressing this period of Turkish politics has often been particularly harsh toward the political behavior and strategy of the CHP, one can also find ground to interpret the party's behavior differently. First of all, despite claims to the contrary, the CHP did engage in pragmatic and democratic behavior. While the party relied on old alliances from earlier political periods and worked through "proxies" more frequently than the direct interaction and brokerage style commonly employed by the DP, their utilization of these relations were politically pragmatic. Furthermore, the CHP rapidly adjusted to multiparty competition, and the composition of its parliamentary candidates mirrored that of the DP. In terms of prestige, professionals, doctors and lawyers in particular, were at the social center in the Shilsian sense until the 1960s, when they were overtaken by engineers. The CHP in this first paradigmatic period pulled from these elite classes no less than the DP once multiparty elections took off. The CHP, as is

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evidenced in Frey's work, actually surpassed the DP in numbers of parliamentarians who were of local origins. This was obviously a drastic change from the single-party period in which the Grand National Assembly was filled with bureaucrats.[147]

The CHP, more so than the DP, seemed to rely on campaign discourse over face to face contact and interaction with the masses, but their discourse was not elitist nor particularly "statist" and showed clear appeal to important elements of the electorate. Especially in 1950 and in 1961, election programs were created to be read by a broad spectrum of society and explicitly emphasized the concerns of the villagers and urban workers. Their declarations ultimately seemed to land on deaf ears and fell victim to the ridicule and mockery of their prime competitor, the DP and later the AP. Had the populace taken the CHP's discourse seriously, one could imagine a different scenario in the final election results. Ultimately though, the major crutch of being the party that governed for all 27 years preceding 1950 and the direct contact and promises of the DP encountered by a large section of the electorate proved to be the decisive factor. The CHP during this paradigm, through candidate selection, "proxies", and through discourse found a way to garner at least 20 percent of the votes (and often much more) in every election and every province in the country. Thus, despite the popular trend to disparage the political savvy of the CHP under İsmet İnönü, the CHP in the first decade of the 21st century, for example, could not boast the same level of competitiveness and pluralism that the CHP, though unsuccessful and unfortunate in the final analysis, managed in the initial period of multiparty competition.

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[147] See, Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite.*

CHAPTER 7

THE IDEOLOGICAL IMAGING PARADIGM – 1965-1980

The Justice Party, the holder of the civilizing and homeland loving principles handed down to us by the Great Atatürk, acts to serve the great Turkish nation.[1]
—*Suleyman Demirel*

One of the characteristics of the period that followed the Revolution of 27 May 1960, in Turkey, is the emergence of labor as a new social and political force attached to the principles of Atatürk and democracy.[2]
—*Bülent Ecevit*

While the machine politics of party clientelism, which had functioned so well under the Democrat Party and was bequeathed to its ultimate mantle-bearer the Justice Party (AP), continued or flourished in the western regions along with the "proxy" form of patronage particularly in the eastern portions of the country, by the 1969 general election, the ultimate electoral outcome could not be completely explained by these mobilization strategies and this became more evident as Turkish politics moved toward the military coup of September 12, 1980. During the transitional election of 1965, votes began to seep away from the Republican People's Party (CHP) in provinces across the country, but perhaps more

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[1] Süleyman Demirel, *Seçim Konuşmaları, 2: 5 Haziran Kısmi Senato Seçimi Öncesi* (Ankara: Adalet Partisi Genel Merkez Yayınları, 1966), p. 30.
[2] Bülent Ecevit, "Labor in Turkey as a New Social and Political Force," in Kemal Karpat, eds., *Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis* (Leiden: Brill, 1973), p. 151.

surprisingly from its traditional bases in the east.[3] By the general election of 1969,

the CHP began to draw its greatest strength from the region where it had previously

been the weakest—the Marmara Region—and became the weakest where it had

previously garnered a great measure of support—the Southeast Region.[4]   By the

time we reach the election of 1977, the electoral map indisputably attests to the fact

that the CHP was dominating in the large industrial and urban centers of the country

and managed, under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit, to accumulate 41.4 percent of

the vote nationwide.   The comparison of the regional performance of the CHP

before and after 1965 in Table 7.1[5] bears this out very clearly. While only minor

regional alterations in the AP's support occurred, a stark difference in support for

the CHP, especially in relation to development had taken place.

Scholars of the period consistently interpreted the trends over the 1969,

1973, and 1977 election as the clear manifestation of an electoral realignment. The

CHP was clearly performing in areas of the country and among segments of the

population with a measure of success that it had not previously witnessed. The

apparent electoral setback for the party in the Senate and by-elections of 1979, with

major gains going to the AP, and the military coup in 1980 caused the

interpretations of a realignment to remain in the realm of speculation and debate,

and ultimately history. While the military's forceful intervention into the political

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[3] This "seeping" of the local notable "proxies" from the party to the AP was observed and stated openly prior to the 1965 elections by a CHP parliamentary deputy and former Minister of Tourism, Ali İhsan Göğüş. See, "CHP bir ağalar partisi olmaktan çıkıyor," *Cumhuriyet*, 1 October 1965.

[4] See also, Frank Tachau and Mary-Jo Good, "The Anatomy of Political and Social Change: Turkish Parties, Parliaments, and Elections," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (1973), p. 564.

[5] Data taken from, *Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri 1923-2007* (Ankara: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, 2008), pp. 29-95.

Table 7.1 - Party Support by Development and Region, 1950-1977

	Development	Marmara	Aegean	Mediterranean	North Central	South Central	Black Sea	Central East	Northeast	Southeast
CHP										
1950	-.474***	-.141	-.139	-.044	-.250*	-.166	.005	.137	.086	.474***
1954	-.025	-.139	.087	.175	-.220	-.127	-.032	.451***	.131	-.246
1957	-.287*	-.158	-.192	.221	-.301*	-.051	.070	.364**	.122	.021
1961	-.133	-.053	-.002	.179	-.278*	-.137	-.063	.248*	.147	.023
1965	-.131	-.024	-.027	.104	-.250*	-.110	-.007	.284*	.015	.050
Ave 50-65	-.319**	-.165	-.076	.157	-.343**	-.145	.011	.348**	.136	.139
1969	.295*	.184	.076	.108	-.072	-.173	.208	.034	.062	-.419***
1973	.234	.204	.049	.163	-.120	-.225	-.024	.249*	.091	-.351**
1977	.378**	.268*	.054	.159	-.053	-.147	.030	.248*	-.060	-.472***
Ave 69-77	.341**	.250*	.064	.165	-.092	-.203	.061	.218	.028	-.463***
DP										
1950	.409**	.107	.186	.093	.083	.148	-.074	-.014	-.007	-.448***
1954	.293*	.226	.222	-.009	-.111	.031	.010	-.208	-.023	-.128
1957	.226	.310*	.270*	-.044	-.257*	-.057	-.040	-.254*	-.051	.115
(AP/YTP) 1961	.177	.160	.372**	.175	-.528***	-.186	.078	-.064	-.023	.038
(AP) 1965	.685***	.221	.372**	.149	.043	.081	.115	-.235	-.119	-.610***
Ave 50-65	.503***	.268*	.396**	.127	-.231	.012	.044	-.201	-.058	-.319**
1969	.610***	.194	.434***	-.043	.151	.116	-.003	-.394**	.014	-.471***
1973	.497***	.261*	.403**	-.132	.108	-.095	.033	-.286*	-.183	-.212
1977	.546***	.139	.412**	-.045	.167	.008	.119	-.376**	-.137	-.363**
Ave 69-77	.587***	.207	.442***	-.074	.152	.017	.052	-.377**	-.102	-.378**

* Denotes significance at p<.05; ** denotes significance at p<.01; and *** denotes significance at p<.001. Pearson two-tailed correlations. Negative correlations shaded in gray.

sphere leaves the question of "realignment" one for supposition, the facts less controversially indicate that a change had occurred in the political paradigm—i.e. the dimensions of competition and domains of identification—in the country. Orientations toward politics and strategies used to mobilize the electorate displayed a shift that deserves careful attention.

The shifting of the political paradigm also allows one to see the complex interaction between actors and their contingent environment. As will become apparent in the following sections, an insistence in proposing that structure,

institutions, or agents alone can account for the observed phenomena of the period fail to capture the very contingent "dance" that occurred between these various forces. As the paradigm shifted from one constellation of strategies and domains, the significant contributions from each of these forces cannot be discounted. Actors responded to changes and they did so in an arena of competition laid out within spaces provided by created institutional structures, but their actions cannot be seen as inevitable and determined by the existing space; instead, they acted according to an array of possibilities suggested by the existing opportunities and constraints in the system. It is the complex interaction of such forces that allow us to understand why the CHP, and not the Turkish Workers Party, during this period ultimately became the spokesman for the urban workers, taking the votes of this segment of the population, which had previously been given to the AP.

Thus, in order to understand this transition from one paradigm to another, we will first examine the historical contingency in which this paradigm emerged, and then consider the dimensions of competition and domains of identification that comprised the system of interactions within this period.

7.1 The Context of the Period

Much of the classical work on this period in Turkey's history focuses on the issue of "social change," particularly in regard to urbanization.[6] Changes in the

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[6] Examples of seminal works in this category, Ergun Özbudun, *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976; Kemal Karpat (ed.), *Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis* (Leiden: Brill, 1973); Kemal Karpat, *The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); one might also add, Leslie Roos and Noralou Roos, *Managers of Modernization:*

level of development in Turkey caused an increase in the population from not quite 21 million in 1950 to nearly 39 million in 1974. From 1950 to 1965, while the rural population increased on average by 1.8 percent per year, the urban population increased by an average of 5 percent per year over the same period. Thus, the percent of the population living in cities increased from less than 25 percent in 1950 to around 39 percent in 1970.[7] The development of roads which was one of the hallmarks of development in the early 1950s under the Democrat Party, not only made it easier to transport goods and materials to and from the provinces and villages, it created an easier access to the opportunities of upward mobility and industrial jobs in the city for many poor farmers, who benefited the least from the agricultural policies of the DP government.

This social transformation brought a number of interesting questions to the forefront of research into Turkish politics and society. Chief among them were: how do these new migrants to the urban (modern) centers compare to their (traditional) cohorts in the villages they left behind? In what ways do they orient themselves similarly or differently now that they are in the city (or at the margins of it)? And who would become the political voice of this growing mass of citizens? From a political perspective, this growing class of society constituted a significant opportunity in terms of electoral gains to a party willing to seize the nascent

Organizations and Elites in Turkey (1950-1969) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). While the first three examples address change among the masses, the final example—i.e. Roos and Roos—addresses the change among elites but largely finds that the impetus for elite change occurred through social change—i.e. modernization and industrialization (see Chapter 3, "Industrialization and Social Transformation").
[7] Karpat, *The Gecekondu*, p. 58.

opportunity. Throughout the initial paradigm, the DP and, subsequently, the AP successfully managed to woo these voters through the same form of political clientelism that they had employed in many of the villages despite the fact that the general economic policies and outlook of these parties were not especially beneficial to this particular social group, and as Karpat shows, this was true regardless of which party they traditionally voted for when living in the village.[8]

Though often living on the margins of the city and struggling to defend these squatter communities from being demolished, this population's confrontation with city and state created a heightened sense of political awareness and political action that distinguished these newly-arrived urban dwellers from their village counterparts. Having built unofficial dwellings on state lands, the members of these communities were placed in a context in which they had to be aware of political mechanisms and unite in order to realize their demands. Thus, they acquired a much more heightened awareness of both political action and of political community that bordered on class consciousness or functional concerns that transcended former social groupings and loyalties. Karpat writes:

> In the case of Turkish squatters, the demand making transformed the traditional and mythical *devlet baba* (father state), an aloof, authoritarian semideity, into a living government—into human organization that could be manipulated to do or undo certain acts, especially with regard to the *gecekondus.*[9]

This transformation in the understanding of "*devlet baba*", ultimately integrated these newly arrived urban dwellers into the urban and "national political culture,

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[8] Ibid., p. 220.
[9] Ibid., p. 198.

and this occurred "to a degree far more pronounced than the older city residents or villagers simply because [they do] it consciously and self-interestedly."[10]   Thus, these squatters, most of whom were industrial workers recently arriving from the provincial villages, entered into the politics of "demand satisfaction" and, hence, were "not inspired by radical ideologies"—except when their material demands are not met by normal political channels.[11]

These major socioeconomic changes also had an important impact in the rural areas. As the country developed and rural areas had greater contact with life beyond the village, traditional sociopolitical hierarchies continued to weaken. This was particularly evident in the regions that had relied on these sociopolitical local notables—referred to as "proxies" in chapter 6—during the previous paradigm. As noted by Özbudun in his seminal work of the period, while contingent necessities demanded that political parties—the CHP being most successful in this regard—utilize the existing sociopolitical hierarchies to mobilize votes in these attitudinally and structurally non-centralized regions, the political participatory act of voting endowed upon the people of the region necessarily began to effect the existing relationship between notable and peasant. It was the latter that, in national comparisons of attitudes toward political participation, expressed that they had a high level of personal political efficacy.[12]   This was, of course, importantly understood at the *local* level, so that while the existing "proxy" form of

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[10] Ibid., p. 199.
[11] Ibid., p. 199-200.
[12] Ergun Özbudun, *Social Change*, p. 102.

mobilization in these areas did not effectively attach these local constituents to the nation as a whole, it certainly impacted their view of democratic processes and their own role within their local context. Because of the notables need to connect themselves the new channels of power—i.e. political power—they suddenly had to listen to those people constituting the local community in a much closer way, and those beneath them felt increasingly empowered to directly address their concerns with this local political figure. Therefore, as the pre-existing bonds of power weakened, the notable's power began to decline or it began to be primarily sustained by the notable's politicking skills. These tensions are at least partially manifested in the phenomenon of large blocs of votes going to independent candidates (usually notables) in increasing numbers over time in precisely these regions and in clear contrast to the other regions of the country.[13] The inability of major parties to address the particular concerns of the region pushed many notables that had retained mobilizing power to run independently for both national and local elections.

The tumultuous socioeconomic changes proved to provide ample ground for a "national" cultivation of socialist thought and, of course, conservative counter-movements. While socialist associations and groups had existed even in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, these groups had simply "borrowed Western

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[13] For a particularly good argument for this in a similar vein, see Gilles Dorronsoro and Nicole Watts, "Toward Kurdish Distinctiveness in Electoral Politics: The 1977 Local Elections in Diyarbakir," *Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol. 41, No. 3 (2009), pp. 457-78.

political ideas without much concern for their economic and social relevance."[14]

Beginning in the 1950s, however, the social transformation in the country that had replaced the position of elite status previously occupied by bureaucrats with intellectuals with professionals, fostered among the former sentiments that tended toward socialism and a "national" reordering of society; at the same time, the amount of urban wage earners, the segment of the population traditionally seen as potentially receptive to such a political outlook was growing rapidly.[15] While the development of socialist thinking among bureaucrats and the intelligentsia could hardly be called a "grass-roots" movement, it was unique to previous socialist "movements" in that the ideology was conceived within a national container, constructed such that it could be reconciled with the foundational principles of Kemalism.[16]

This group would ultimately leave its mark on the period, not through electoral mobilization, but through the military coup on May 27, 1960, which was led by young officers and supported by bureaucrats and the intelligentsia in particular. During the interim period of the junta, prior to the elections of 1961, it was members of the latter who were entrusted with writing up the draft of the Constitution that would set the course of politics in the Second Republic. While

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[14] Kemal Karpat, "The Turkish Left," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1966), p. 169.

[15] Ibid., p. 179. For another excellent account of the supplanting of the bureaucratic class, see Roos and Roos, *Managers of Modernization*, pp. 34-52.

[16] Karpat, "The Turkish Left," p. 179.

scholars have also correctly pointed out the politically liberal features[17] or the bureaucratic emphasis[18] of this new Constitution, which was adopted by referendum on July 9, 1961, this new constitution unquestionably added a "social" component that strongly distinguished it from previous and successive constitutions. One can easily perceive this aspect in the defense of the provisions of the constitution by İsmet Giritli, one of the key members of the group of seven who were asked to draft a new constitution on the first day of the "revolution." Giritli writes:

> Western democracy provides the opportunity to utilize existing freedom to secure even wider freedoms; but wider freedoms in the chaotic social and economic structure of our present-day world require protection for individuals and groups that are weak from an economic and social standpoint. It becomes necessary to provide means of enhancing their material and spiritual existence, to give them not only the classic rights and freedoms but economic and social rights as well. This is why the new Turkish Constitution not only provides ample social and economic rights to supplement the political freedoms, but also demonstrates sensitivity towards safeguarding these rights from violation.[19]

Thus, embedded within the national constitution, which described Turkey as a "social state," were provisions for a State Planning Organization and land reform, in which portions of large land holdings would be taken and reapportioned to poor

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[17] For example, Ahmad writes that the 1961 Constitution "held forth the promise of a liberal and democratic Turkey if it was faithfully implemented." Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977), p. 186; Evin also refers to the 1961 Constitution as a "liberal Constitution." Ahmet Evin, "Changing Patterns of Cleavages Before and After 1980," in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), p. 208.

[18] In fact, Heper, besides pointing out such a bureaucratic emphasis, argues that the rights and liberties provided in the "liberal" 1961 Constitution also served to provide the bureaucratic intelligentsia "immunity from the 'absolutism of the majority.'" See, Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (North Humberside, UK: Eothen Press, 1985), pp. 86-91.

[19] İsmet Giritli, "Some Aspects of the New Turkish Constitution," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1962), p. 8.

Table 7.2 – Political Parties of the Paradigm in General Elections at a Glance

English	Turkish		Party Leader	Political Family	1965	1969	1973	1977	Key Notes:
Turkish Workers Party	Türkiye İşçi Partisi	TİP	Mehmet Ali Aybar/ Behice Boran	Democratic Socialist	3.0	2.7	-	0.1	Boran became the party leader when the party was reformed prior to the 1977 election.
Turkish Unity Party	Türkiye Birlik Partisi	TBP	Hüseyin Balan/ Mustafa Timisi	Alevi/ Pluralist	2.8	1.1	0.4	-	Timisi took over at the end of 1969.
Republican Peoples' Party	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi	CHP	İsmet İnönü/ Bülent Ecevit	"Democratic Left"	28.7	27.4	33.3	41.4	Ecevit took over leadership in 1972.
Republican Reliance Party	Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi	CGP	Turhan Feyzioğlu	Centrist	-	6.6	5.3	1.9	Centrist faction that broke away from the CHP allegedly due to its left-leaning turn
Justice Party	Adalet Partisi	AP	Süleyman Demirel	Conservative/ Populist	52.9	46.6	29.8	36.9	
Democratic Party	Demokratik Parti	DkP	Ferruh Bozbeyli	Conservative	-	-	11.9	1.8	Faction that broke away in order to allegedly more accurately represent the conservative legacy of the Democrat Party.
New Turkey Party	Yeni Türkiye Partisi	YTP	Ekrem Alican/ Yusuf Azizoğlu	Conservative	3.7	2.2	-	-	Azizoğlu was the party leader in the 1969 election.
Nation Party	Millet Partisi	MP	Osman Bölükbaşı/ Cemal Tural	Conservative/ Religious-Conservative/ Nationalist	6.3	3.2	0.6	-	Tural was the party leader in the 1973 election.
National Salvation Party	Milli Selamet Partisi	MSP	Necmettin Erbakan	Religious Conservative	-	-	11.8	8.6	
Nationalist Action Party	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi	MHP	Alparslan Türkeş	Conservative Nationalist	2.2	3.0	3.4	6.4	The party ran as the CKMP in 1965.

Notes: The parties are place primarily in a relational ordering, starting with arguably the most socialist, with factions placed next to one another. Parties' outlook and general behavior could place them in different positions, depending on the criteria used or the emphasis of the one positioning the parties. Election data was taken from, *Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri, 1923-2007* (Ankara: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, 2008), p. 28.

farmers with little or no land. In addition to this, the official leader of the junta and President of the Republic, General Cemal Gürsel is said to have openly suggested that "socialism might be beneficial to Turkey."[20]

These all points to the fact that an important institutional change had taken place within the country. Based on the actions of particular actors, arguably responding to their conditions within the socioeconomic changes occurring in the country (in turn stimulated by other actors), a new institutional framework was laid that, in sharp contrast to the previous institutions, not only allowed the formation of ideological formations, at least implicitly encouraged an indigenous form of socialist thought to take root among segments of the population. The set of laws accompanying the previous constitution of 1924 strictly prohibited narrow ideologies from forming, largely from the fear that such associations would necessarily be particularistic in interest and that this, in turn, would jeopardize the corporate "classless" nature of Turkish society and the interests of the whole. Such an opening in the political landscape seemed to represent a potential challenge to what appeared to be an established (political cultural) value, at least at the elite level, if not among the populace, of "nation parties."

One of the first challenges to such an established value was the formation of the Turkish Workers Party (TİP) in February of 1961 by a number of trade unionists.[21] For the first time, a leftist party that emphasized the plight of the urban

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[20] Karpat, "The Turkish Left," p. 181.
[21] Erkan Doğan, "Parliamentary Experience of the Turkish Labor Party: 1965-1969," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2010), pp. 315-6.

working class and the poor rural peasant was allowed to compete legitimately within the existing institutional structure. Its existence, fostered by the new conditions that allowed for "democratic socialism" (but not communism or any sort of "revolutionary" movement), brought the political position of "left" into the party system.[22] As a successor to a political environment in which "left" and "extreme right" were understood both legally and from a perspective of social values as being politically "out-of-bounds," this was an important change indeed, providing new opportunities to the other parties within the system to use this party's position to the benefit of their own positioning or imaging.

The establishment of the State Planning Organization (SPO), instituted by its provision in the 1961 Constitution, created an additional constraint on the political strategies employed in the earlier period by the DP. The SPO effectively distanced the governing power from the work of economic development and distribution of state funds ostensibly for that purpose. The ability of previous governments to sit in the captain's chair in regard to these economic development projects had been a prime vehicle for exactly the type of clientelistic, machine politics that accorded the large victories for the Democrats in the 1950s. With developmental spending taken out of the hands of the governing party and placed in the lap of bureaucrats, the valve for pork barrel spending that paralleled a community's support for the party providing the goods and services was suddenly shut off. Hyland notes that one of the strategies utilized by the Justice Party and

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[22] Sabri Sayarı, "The Turkish Party System in Transition," *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1978), p. 47.

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Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel to address this economic impotence was to place the blame on "those blankety-blank SPO technocrats back in Ankara."[23] While this might have been a short-term solution, it clearly put pressure on the AP in particular to change a strategy that had been so effective for their predecessors in the previous paradigmatic period.

While the failure of local constituencies to receive pork-barrel benefits from 1961 to 1965 could be blamed on the weak coalition governments, for most of the period led by the CHP, after the electorate provided the AP a majority of the popular vote and a strong governing position in 1965, the party was left without excuses other than the one suggested above. It is not surprising then that the AP began to lose votes in subsequent elections until 1977; they simply could not fill the role of the first "*demirkırat*"[24] under whose mantle they had competed, thanks in part to the constraints placed on them by the newly created SPO. Though the SPO under the AP largely came to represent the interests of private business rather than the public sector, the very nature of "planning" restricted the government's ability to make the kind of pork-barrel expenditures so common under the Menderes governments.[25]

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[23] Michael Hyland, "Crisis at the Polls: Turkey's 1969 Elections," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1970), p. 15.
[24] As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the expression "*demir kırat*" was a popular distortion of the previous party's title "Democrat", which means "iron grey horse."
[25] Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment*, pp. 268-76.

7.2 Dimensions of Competition: *7.2.1 National Campaign Discourse*

While a number of the features prominent within the first paradigmatic period of electoral contestation could be said to continue into this second period, such as personal attacks on oppositional party leaders and emphasis on economic policy, it brought a new discursive strategy into the system that ultimately seemed to mirror voting behavior across the country. While the political leaders during the previous period spoke and spoke and spoke some more, there was little evidence that the great expenditure of words was having much of an impact on what the voters did at the ballot box and how those voters perceived the parties and the political contest. Arguably, the effective change was a matter of simplification: establishing one's position not by clear rhetoric, but by framing one's party in such a way as to be remembered and understood in relation to other parties such that it could be easily transmitted and disseminated throughout the electoral population without the chance of much distortion—i.e. image-positioning.[26]

As discussed in the previous chapter, the CHP's positioning of itself through the expression "left of center," and later "democratic left" seemed to have an important instigating impact on the shape that the competition within the party system would take from 1965 to 1980.[27] Certainly, the existence of the leftist TİP preceded the move of the CHP to establish a "left of center" image of themselves, but it was critically important that the CHP, one of the two major parties, employed

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[26] For more on "image-positioning" see chapter five and also, Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems* (Colchester, UK: ECPR Press, 2005), p. 294.
[27] For an excellent analysis of the CHP during this time, see Sinan Ciddi, *Kemalism in Turkish Politics: The Republican People's Party, secularism and nationalism* (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 30-46.

such a strategy. Positioning oneself against a minor party, such as the Turkish Workers Party would have little utiliy for most parties, as it would fail to address their position in relation to more important competitors, but once the position of one of the major parties is established, it created an opportunity for reactive positioning that could potentially benefit all the other parties. The CHP's concern about the growth of the "left" and the existence of the TİP as a motivating source of their own positioning has been pointed out by scholars,[28] the motivations for which will be discussed in the section below, but the ultimate positioning was based, not on inevitable factors, but on specific decisions made by both parties.

An interesting piece of evidence to suggest that image-positioning was a key element in the pattern of electoral behavior in this period is simply the fact that, at the level of the discourse regarding general policy, one could find a great deal of continuity in the CHP's policy proclamations, stretching back at least to the late 1950s,[29] with the campaign promises in 1965 mirroring exactly the promises in 1961. In 1961, however, there is little to show that the electorate was responding to the CHP based on its campaign discourse. This is in stark contrast to 1965, in which portions of the electorate, large landowners in the east, who had previously

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[28] Ergun Özbudun, "The Turkish Party System: Institutionalization, Polarization, and Fragmentation," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1981), p. 231; for additional sources of this relationship, see also, Ahmad, *Turkey's Experiment*, pp. 251, 253; and Joseph Szyliowicz, "The Turkish Elections: 1965," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (1966), pp. 478, 492.

[29] Karpat, for instance, notes that the CHP started moving to the left outlook and policy-wise during its eleventh convention in 1954. He quotes Article 36 of the program drafted by the convention, which reads, "The main source of value which must be protected and made the foundation of national existence is the citizens' effort (work). It is the duty of the state to take the necessary measures to provide employment opportunities for the citizen according to his intellectual and civil capacities, to provide jobs for the unemployed and protect labor from exploitation with due regard for the employers' rights. Our party considers the job security of every citizen an inviolable right." Karpat, "The Turkish Left," p. 180.

supported the party but who would be most (negatively) effected by the CHP's position, punished the party at the ballot box. Conversely, starting in 1969, the urban industrial population and blue collar workers that would benefit from the CHP's policy, began to flock to the party in increasing numbers through the general election of 1977. However, this change in electoral behavior began not with proclamations of the party's policy, unquestionably beginning in 1961 and arguably as far back as 1957,[30] but with the announcement of the CHP's position as "left of center," which in the 1970s, became the "democratic left."[31]

In 1961, the CHP campaigned on a platform of "social justice" stemming from the "welfare state" principle. The 1961 "Foundational Aims Manifest" posted by the party in their newspaper organ, *Ulus*, delineates these themes in a one-page, twenty-five point declaration. Included in the document are promises for land for poor farmers, water for dry ground, proper wages for the Turkish worker, health, education, and social security. The document promises that the increase in wealth for both the city-dweller and the rural citizen will occur within a "just" framework (*adil bir düzen*) and that the provisions of the new constitution will be implemented immediately.[32] The usage of the expression "social justice" as a description of the

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[30] Although the CHP in 1957 was focused primarily on the authoritarian practices of the DP, in terms of economic policy, they took positions emphasizing just behavior toward poor farmers and urban workers, including the right to strike. See, for example, "İnönü, Menderes'e cevap verdi," Akşam, 12 October 1957; for an excellent discussion of the 1957 elections, see Kemal Karpat, "The Turkish Elections of 1957," *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1961), pp. 436-59.

[31] Starting in the 1973 general election, the CHP replaced "left of center" with the "democratic left" terminology. For examples of its usage in speeches, see "Ecevit: Hiç bir parti tek başına iktidar olamaz," *Milliyet*, 10 September 1973; "Ecevit: CHP'nin düzeninde komünizmin kaynağı kurutulacak," *Milliyet*, 9 May 1977.

[32] "Temel Hedefler Beyannamesi," *Ulus*, 28 August 1961.

party's economic policies entered many of the election speeches, particularly by the General Secretary İsmail Rüstü Aksal.[33] İsmet İnönü in a campaign speech over the radio stated that the situation of the [urban] worker was the most important topic for the CHP.[34] In his fourth radio speech, he reiterated this point and emphasized the need for justice in the agricultural sector with land from those with more than enough going to those who do not have enough land to live off of.[35] Emphasis on these points by the leaders of the CHP can be found throughout the campaign.[36]

These were the identical issues of the 1965 campaign for the CHP. Land reform, water reform, tax reform to benefit the working man, social justice, implementing the provisions in the 1961 Constitution[37]—all of these issues can be traced back to declarations made in 1961. Thus, the "change" to left of center was not really a change at all in terms of party ideology, policy or outlook. What changed in the 1965 election was the decision by the party to clarify a political position that could operate as a simplifying image explaining where the party stood in relation to the others.

One might counter this claim by arguing that the CHP gains occurred largely due to the change in party leadership from İsmet İnönü to Bülent Ecevit. While Ecevit's leadership might certainly play a role in the big gains in the two

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[33] "Sosyal Adalete Yürekten İnanıyoruz," *Ulus*, 28 September 1961; "Büyük hamleler yapmalıyız," *Ulus*, 2 October 1961.
[34] "Sözde, işte, hedefte doğruluk," *Ulus*, 1 October 1961.
[35] "Biz dirlik ve düzeni kuracağız," *Ulus*, 11 October 1961.
[36] Karpat also noted this emphasis by the CHP in the 1961 campaign and writes, "With İnönü's support, the Republican Party committed itself to the solution of social and economic problems and especially to social justice." Karpat, "The Turkish Left," p. 180.
[37] See, "Reformları yapmadan siyaseti bırakmam," Cumhuriyet, 4 October 1965.

elections in the 1970s, the change in leadership does not explain the general trends

for several reasons. First, while one cannot discount the personal popularity of

Ecevit among the electorate, this could only explain increases in the vote for the

party, it cannot explain the clear shifting of voting centers, including gains and

losses, that transformed where and from whom the party was taking votes.

Furthermore, the clear pattern of the CHP making gains in the large industrial cities

among the urban workers began in 1969 with İnönü still at the helm, and Ecevit's

hand in this outlook by the party was known at least by 1965 with the initiation of

"left of center" and with no noticeable gains in the cities. Thus, it safe to say that

the imaging of the party, simplified so that it was easily disseminated, bore an

important responsibility for *where* the CHP began to acquire votes, even if we

attribute the *extent* of the gains in part to the change of leadership.

Though the positioning of the CHP on the moderate left had a significant

impact on the lines of contest in the party system, the campaign discourse of the

period did not translate into a situation in which all parties clearly positioned

themselves along a left-right placement scheme; instead, while the other parties

reacted to the declared positioning of the CHP and, in fact, tried to muddle its

imaging by positioning it much further left (or right in the case of TİP[38]), the parties

themselves, for the most part, tried to avoid explicit self-positioning, favoring

instead a general positioning *away* from the left, or anti-left. Thus, while it was a

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[38] In its 1965 election pamphlet, for example, the TİP described the CHP as actually "right of center"
and that CHP governments after Atatürk had either been "right of center" or "extreme right." *Türkiye
İşçi Partisi Seçim Bildirisi* (İstanbul: Yenilik Basımevi, 1965), p. 25.

safe bet to position most of the other parties on the right, considering their anti-left positioning, exactly *where* they were located, especially in relation to the other anti-left parties, was open to conjecture.

The AP, as the dominant "anti-left" party, and its leader, Süleyman Demirel were particularly adept at muddling the position of the CHP. Even with the CHP image-positioning occurring late in the 1965 campaign, the election meetings held by the AP quickly were filled with the infamous rhyming slogan, "ortanın solu, Moskova yolu," [the left of center is the road to Moscow].[39] Demirel and the AP began to focus on the communist threat immediately, suggesting that if the CHP was not communist at the moment, it was traveling down that path.[40] The reimaging of their major opponent as communist leftist played a major part in the AP's strategy of appealing to rural and conservative voters in lieu of employing machine politics. The conservative populace in the towns and villages across the country, in a similar way to their counterparts in many Western countries of the period, were easily aroused by the fear of the threat of communism. As the "leftist" CHP continued to expand it support base, this anti-communism, anti-leftist strategy began to pay off. Furthermore, the anti-communism was particularly effective for the AP in comparison to the other minor "anti-left" parties like the Democratic Party and the Republican Reliance Party; in fact, anti-communist rhetoric could be seen as being damaging for the latter, because the rhetoric assumed the need for a

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[39] "Demirel Konyada: Toprağı olmayan herkese toprek vermek mümkün değildir," *Cumhuriyet*, 8 October 1965.
[40] "Demirel: CHP iki'ye bölünecek," *Cumhuriyet*, 7 October 1965; "Vatandaşı Yıldırmak istiyorlar," *Cumhuriyet,* 9 October 1965.

strong, major party to take the lead and establish a stable government that could counteract a communist threat.[41]

The CHP responded to this reimaging of their party by the "anti-left" parties by pushing the latter away from any possible image of moderation by positioning them, particularly the AP and the National Action Party (MHP) as exploiters or as collaborators with foreign exploiters.[42] Although the AP had been labeled fascists by groups on the left, especially after the National Front coalitions, this terminology was used rarely in official campaign discourse.[43] Erbakan, and to a lesser extent Ecevit, were fond of referring to Demirel as a Mason;[44] thereby calling into question his "Muslim-ness" and suggesting that he might be in league with dark international forces.[45]

The AP, of course, was primarily interested in identifying itself as the successor to the Democrat Party; in contrast, its self-placement on the right was much more ambiguous and fluid. In July, prior to the October 1965 general election, the AP changed its symbol from that of a sun rising over an open book, to the figure of a white horse,[46] symbolizing its relationship with the old *Demirkırat*[47]

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[41] For another account that emphasizes such a line of contention—i.e. as that of "left" versus "anti-left" or "anti-communist," see Sayarı, "Turkish Party System," p. 49-50.

[42] For examples, "Ecevit'in konuşması, *Cumhuriyet*, 7 October 1965; "Demokrasiyi herkes başka türlü anlıyor," *Cumhuriyet*, 5 October 1969; "Bülent Ecevit İzmir'de," *Cumhuriyet*, 8 October 1973; and "Ecevit: AP ile MSP ganimet kavgasında," *Cumhuriyet*, 16 May 1977.

[43] For a rare exception, see "Ecevit, Demirel bir faşcist olduğunu kanıtladı," *Cumhuriyet*, 29 May 1977.

[44] For example, "Ecevit'in konuşması," *Cumhuriyet*, 7 October 1965; "Erbakan yabancı sermaye istemiyor," *Cumhuriyet*, 9 October 1969.

[45] See "CHP adına Ecevit," *Cumhuriyet*, 1 October 1969; "Erbakan, AP hükümetini siyonizm ve 'solu' himaye etmekle suçladı," *Cumhuriyet*, 2 October 1969.

[46] Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment*, p. 237.

[47] Iron white horse.

party. Especially in the period prior to the polarization of the 1970s, the AP was content to attack the leftist position of the CHP, identify themselves as the successor to the DP, and remain ideologically ambiguous. Demirel, in the 1965 campaign declared, "We are against all 'isms' including liberalism and capitalism. We are not for any diehard ideology or system. We establish our economic view according to the conditions of the day."[48]

While the party system was readjusting to this change of tactics through the introduction of ideologically-based image-positioning, it began to display clear evidence of fragmentation, particularly in 1969 and 1973 (see Table 7.3). As certain factions composing the traditional support of the major parties noted the movement away from the status quo, the "Old Guard" broke away to form new parties that took chunks of support away from the parties, engaging in a new form of electoral combat. In 1967, the "Old Guard" of conservatives and land owners broke away from the CHP and formed the Republican Reliance Party led by Turhan Feyzioğlu, snatching 6.6 and 5.3 percent of the total vote in the 1969 and 1973 elections, respectively.[49] Demirel's rift with member of the party concerned about his big capitalism policies, many of them in the "declining sectors" like local notables and land owners affected by the expanding industrial sector, caused the formation of the Democratic Party in 1970.[50] This party managed to acquire 11.9 percent of the national vote in the 1973 election.

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[48] *Vatan*, 15 September 1965.
[49] Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment*, p. 257. See also Table 7.2.
[50] Ibid., p. 247.

Further fragmentation occurred when a personality conflict between Demirel and Necmettin Erbakan caused the latter to break away from the AP and run successfully as an independent in 1969 and later form the first explicitly Islamist-oriented party to compete in the general elections in the multiparty period. His first party, the National Order Party, was closed down in the 1971 intervention and was not able to compete in a national election, but it reopened as the National Salvation Party, garnering 11.8 of the national vote in the 1973 election.[51] "Islamist" or "religious conservative" factions had always been an element within the major parties, particularly the DP and the AP and the smaller Republican Nation Parties, but the environment of change, the damage done to the reputation of the AP in conjunction to the 1971 intervention, and the related uncertainty provided a window of space for these other parties. Meanwhile, the existence of the "communist/socialist" threat seemed to encourage the formation of a type of extreme religious nationalism as a reaction to its entrance to the system.[52] This party, led by one of the instigators of the 1960 coup, Alparslan Türkeş, ultimately became known as the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), whose electoral fortunes began inauspiciously but managed to receive 6.4 percent of the vote in the 1977 general election.[53]

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[51] For more on Erbakan, see Elisabeth Özdalga, "Necmettin Erbakan: Democracy for the Sake of Power," in Metin Heper and Sabri Sayarı, eds., *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey* (Lanham, MY: Lexington Books, 2002), p. 129. See also Table 7.2.

[52] Jacob Landau, "The Nationalist Action Party in Turkey," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1982), p. 588.

[53] For a more detailed electoral snapshot and their change from the CKMP to the MHP, see Table 7.2.

Table 7.3 – Electoral Trends of the Period [54]

	1965	1969	1973	1977
Top-Two Parties' vote %	81.6%	74.0%	63.1%	78.3%
Effective # of Parties (Mod. Golosov) – National	2.50	2.84	3.39	2.61
Effective # of Parties (Mod. Golosov) – Provincial Ave.	2.59	2.89	3.45	2.72
Volatility – National Aggregate	29.8	14.8	30.1	18.3
Volatility – National "Inter-bloc"	6.8	3.9	5.8	8.1
Voter Turnout	71.3%	64.3%	66.8%	72.4%

Table 7.4 – Regional Effective Number of Parties, 1965-1977

Region	1965	1969	1973	1977
Marmara	2.33	2.49	2.81	2.29
Aegean	2.20	2.35	2.89	2.26
Mediterranean	2.33	2.84	3.44	2.63
North Central	2.57	2.77	3.60	2.65
South Central	2.57	2.82	4.11	3.05
Black Sea	2.49	2.83	3.48	2.56
Central East	2.80	3.79	3.58	2.97
Northeast	2.68	2.84	3.80	2.89
Southeast	3.31	3.37	3.73	3.39
Provincial Average	**2.59**	**2.89**	**3.45**	**2.72**

Though the shift initially allowed for fragmentation and decrease in voter turnout, as the line of contest became clear, the new pattern of politics actually reversed these trends (see Table 7.3 and 7.4). Within the campaign discourse, both parties exploited the use of positioning to try to move their major competitor further

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[54] Electoral data taken from the publication of the Turkish Statistics Institute. *Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri*, p. 28. Effective number of parties calculated by using a modified version of Golosov's formula derived by this author: $N_P = \sum 2/1 + ((S_1 + S_2)^2/(S_i + S_j)) - (S_i + S_j)$.

away from the center in the minds of the voters. Thus, though neither the AP or the CHP could have been accused of actually resembling anything close to fascism or communism, respectively,[55] the intense rhetoric along "ideological" lines effectively polarized the populace into one of the two major party's camps, the bipolar trend clearly evident in all of the elections post-1973, and it did so in a manner that fit the nature of the ideological contest. Particularly for those parties not engaged in this polarizing line of contestation—i.e. "left" versus "anti-left"— they suffered devastating electoral defeats as the polarization intensified in the 1970s.[56] Only the MHP, which actively engaged in this ideologically-based polarizing imagery both in parliament and outside of it, experienced electoral gains as a minor party in the tense atmosphere of the 1977 general election.[57]

In an interesting study conducted by Ergüder and Hofferbert, which used factor analysis to determine the partisan structure of the Turkish party system in the four general elections from 1965 to 1977, the voting returns of the parties were measures across three factors: center/periphery, left/right, and anti-system. The first factor was weighted toward development and centralization, the second according to industrialization, and the third was weighted according to where the MHP, the most clearly anti-system party, accumulated its votes. The results showed that for

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[55] In fact, if we ignore the caricatures and observe the actual policies and minor themes of the parties, their distinction from one another becomes much less clear. For example, after the rhetoric began with the CHP, Demirel also chose to emphasize his party's support of "social justice" from 1969 through the 1977 election. See, the 1977 brochure in *Milliyet*, 31 May 1977.

[56] Üstün Ergüder and Richard Hofferbert, "The 1983 General Elections in Turkey: Continuity or Change in Voting Patterns," in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), p. 88; Sayarı, "Turkish Party System," p. 54.

[57] Sayarı, "Turkish Party System," p. 54.

both the "center/periphery" factor and the "anti-system" factor the AP and the CHP were clustered together and set against the other minor parties. In fact, the AP proved to be the more "central" of the two major parties with the CHP positioned closer toward the peripheral end of the center, especially the CHP of 1965. The factor that pits the AP and the CHP against one another in regard to partisanship is that of "left/right." Furthermore, this opposition is demonstrated most strongly in the polarizing elections of the 1970s with the parties' electoral outcomes from these two elections sitting as opposing bookends on the extreme ends of the factor loadings.[58] These outcomes, based on electoral data, demonstrate the significance of the discourse on the polarization; not only did the electorate move to bolster the votes of the two major parties, but they did so in ways that could be predicted by their ideological positioning. While it would be overstating the facts to argue that image-positioning discourse totally determined voter behavior, for which we also need to consider the non-discursive tactics of the parties during the period, the connection between the nature and intensity of the observed social polarization and this ideologically-based self-imaging and reimaging of one's opponents would be very hard to ignore.

Considering the discussions of ideological polarization in other contexts, one might wonder why the clear manifestation of intense ideological polarization, such that extremists from both sides were shooting it out on the streets in the final years before the 1980 coup, did not result in greater fragmentation but instead

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[58] Ergüder and Hofferbert, "1983 General Elections," pp. 91-4.

decreased the fragmentation as the conflict intensified, particularly after 1973 (see Table 7.3).[59] As discussed in chapter two and three, the nature in which the electorate and political elites are oriented toward politics and the party system seems critical in this regard. Arguably, in an environment in which "nation parties," which represent the general interests of the whole nation, are valued, polarization that exists in the system ultimately tends to be bipolar. For ideological polarization to fragment, it often necessitates narrowing ideologies to the point of representing particular interests, especially if we consider the traditional ideological left. Where parties are understood as representing a collection of interests, serious constraints are placed on centrifugal movement in an ideological sense; hence, political divisions are not segmental under such orientations experiencing polarization but instead massive and binary in scope, cutting across the social center. Thus, in Turkey, whenever the electorate, and not simply the political elite, has become politically polarized, the party system has ultimately shrunk in size as political polarization in society at large intensified.

Despite some of its earlier promising indications, the leftist TİP ultimately suffered from this orientation in society to electoral contest and in its misunderstanding of how to woo its desired electoral contingent—the working class. Although the party was established with this particular social group in mind

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[59] For the classical relationship between ideological polarization and fragmentation, see chapter three and also Sartori, *Parties and the Party System*, pp. 111, 310-12.

and beginning in 1962 was directed by a number of Marxists,[60] there is ample evidence to show that the party intended to address more inclusive concerns and operate, at a minimum, within a nationalist framework. The slogan on the party emblem during the 1960s was "land to the villager (peasant), work for everyone," communicating even in its most essential declaration that it had in mind not only the largest segment of the population—the village citizenry—but in fact intended to produce work or jobs for everyone. Furthermore, if one peruses the party's election declaration pamphlet for 1965, for example, one is necessarily confronted with the extensive usage of the word "nation" and "national." The declaration (*bildiri*) begins by reminding the reader of the National War of Independence and then portraying Turkey as once again the target of imperialistic designs and occupation.[61] The first two concerns in the election document by subtitle are "Foreign Policy" underneath which is a special section on the "Cyprus Issue" and then "National Defense."[62] All of this precedes the economic policy and ideology for which the socialist party was ostensibly created. This could not be considered accidental. These issues could be seen as providing the emotional associations to suggest nationally unifying rhetoric and that they were a party concerned about the *nation*'s benefit.

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[60] Kemal Karpat, "Socialism and the Labor Party of Turkey," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1967), p. 159; Doğan also describes the TİP as "an amalgamation of Kemalism, Western social democracy and Marxian socialism." Doğan, "Parliamentary Experience of the Turkish Labor Party," p. 315.
[61] *Türkiye İşçi Partisi Seçim Bildirisi*, p. 3.
[62] İbid., pp. 6-7.

Although these gestures by the party probably enabled it to avoid being shut down by court order until 1971 (its low election returns probably also helped), the national focus and inclusiveness did not help TİP at the ballot box. Part of its failure has to do with the party's leadership composition, which will be discussed in the section below, but one could also argue that at least a share of the party's problems sprang from an overemphasis on discourse as a strategy and from discursive inconsistency. While there was clear evidence that discursive image-positioning was having an impact on voting behavior, the other major parties, including the CHP were also utilizing practical, non-discursive means to mobilize their support. Furthermore, effective discursive methods for a party involved simplifying the message—i.e. "image-positioning"—so that the information could be disseminated. As noted by Karpat in his study, "oral communication and personal relations played a major part in spreading information and in facilitating the *gecekondu* dwellers' choice of a political party."[63]

TİP, on the other hand, seemed to put a great deal of weight on wooing voters by its discursive struggle in parliament. Mehmet Ali Aybar, the leader of the party after 1962 and the product of an aristocratic family and French-based education with a law degree from Istanbul,[64] claimed, "In the capitalist system, parliament is the most effective platform for socialist parties. Parliament reflects parties. What these parties are and whose side they are on clearly comes to light."[65]

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[63] Karpat, *The Gecekondu*, p. 213.
[64] Karpat, "Socialism and the Labor Party," p. 159 (see note 4).
[65] Quoted in Doğan, "Parliamentary Experience of the Turkish Labor Party," p. 321.

Doğan points out the optimism of TİP after they managed to acquire only 3 percent of the national vote, mostly from the three largest cities and from the middle and upper classes (not the workers for whom they were ostensibly campaigning), and argued that this was because they thought that they only needed a parliamentary foothold through which to demonstrate the party's virtue to the worker through its discursive struggle in the Assembly.[66] The assumption that the working class, in particular—most of whom would be struggling to make ends meet and primarily concerned with immediate remedies to material problems, like water and electricity—would be closely following TİP's performance in parliament seems to demonstrate a critical lack of awareness of the conditions with which most of this class was confronting. The working class primarily needed assistance with good and services, not ideology or "enlightenment", and the electoral returns in 1965 and the even weaker returns (2.7 percent) in 1969 seem to bear this out.

Finally, the contradictions noted in this party's discourse likely also created ambivalence and uncertainty in the minds of potential voters. Karpat argues that the party wavered between an "orthodox Marxist" outlook and simple "opportunism."[67] The "amalgamation of Kemalism, Western social democracy and Marxian socialism" under the same roof,[68] and the significant factional differences derived from this mixture certainly provided confusion as to where the party actually stood. Although it continually emphasized its democratic credentials, the

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[66] Ibid., p. 321.
[67] Karpat, "Socialism and the Labor Party," p. 170.
[68] Doğan, "Parliamentary Experience of the Turkish Labor Party," p. 315.

tension between these factions would have brought serious questions to many as to whether this party could represent the Turkish nation as a whole. As for the other distinctions between itself and the other major parties, these will be addressed in the following section.

Table 7.5 – Particular Election "Shapers" in 1965-1977 General Elections

	Major Campaign Issues	Concurrent Exogenous Factors
October 1965	- Communist Threat - Foreign vs. National Oil Control - Ind. Development and Workers' Rights - inflation and cost of living - "Left of Center" - Land Reform	
October 1969	- "Social Justice" - Foreign Markets - Constitutional Amendments & Implementation - Land Reform - Communist Threat	
October 1973	- Development / foreign and domestic markets - Social Welfare / cost of living - Placing blame for above-party governments from 1971-1973 - Implementing provisions in Constitution - "Exploitation" versus "Communism"	- Followed a period of military oversight and "above-party" governments - The "October War" between Israel and Arab States in the days leading up to the election
June 1977	- Avoiding coalition governments - "Exploitation" versus "Communism" - Anarchy / peace of mind (*huzur*) - Industrial development - Cyprus	- Disaster and murder of 34 marchers at a trade union demonstration in Taksim Square on May 1, 1977.

7.2.2 Non-discursive Campaign Strategies

TİP is a particularly interesting case for this period, but not because it was that powerful in an electoral sense. The power that may be attributed to it would have to be based on the supposed connection between this party and the changes in tactic by the CHP, such as the "left of center" positioning. What makes TİP such a

beneficial focus of study for this paradigm is that its failure to be a party that represented the working class helps illuminate the mindset of this segment of the population and why the non-discursive tactics of the CHP were both important and successful with these voters. While TİP remained an intellectually elitist party with tutelary tendencies toward the working class that enabled the party to garner votes only among its own class—the intelligentsia—the CHP applied the pragmatic and needs-focused approach to politics in the big cities, understanding the mentality of this segment of voters and then utilizing existing civil associations—i.e the unions—officially or unofficially to mobilize large segments of urban voters.

Though TİP was initially founded by a small group of union workers in February of 1961, it took on its more familiar shape when the party asked the lawyer, Mehmet Ali Aybar, to assume the role of party leader.[69] From that point on the leadership of the party increasingly went to those with "political consciousness"[70]—i.e. members of the intelligentsia who understood the ideology—rather than leaders among the working class. Perhaps deriving from the Marxian socialist ideology which framed the outlook of many in the party's leadership, the intelligentsia was seen as largely necessary to guide the party until the workers, according to their 1964 Party Program, "acquired class consciousness,"[71] assuming, of course, that this had not yet occurred. Thus, though many workers were included on the TİP election ticket in 1965, all of the top spots

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[69] Karpat, "Socialism and the Labor Party," p. 159.
[70] Ibid., pp. 162, 165.
[71] Ibid., p. 163.

were filled by the intellectual elites, and as a consequence, of the 15 seats allocated to the party after the election, only 2 of these were filled by workers.[72]

Perhaps it is not surprising then that the majority of the votes that went to the Turkey Workers Party in the early 1960s came from affluent neighborhoods in the largest cities.[73] Had the party managed to garner a significant amount of votes from the peasants and urban workers in 1965 as the party enthusiasts had hoped, they would have stolen those votes away from the AP. As it was, generating enthusiasm as they did among university students, journalists and the intelligentsia, TİP was snatching away a potentially fruitful segment of the CHP urban voting base.[74] These groups, though not always faithful CHP supporters, had been a fruitful base of support for the party starting in 1954 and especially by 1957 when the DP was very actively curtailing freedom of expression and association rights held dear by these groups. Ironically, though not ultimately a major electoral threat to the CHP, the popularity of the TİP among these groups, influential if numerically slight, might have been the trigger that led the CHP to try harder to shore up the votes on the left and as İnönü declared, "protect the country from communism."[75] Success for the TİP among the workers, had it occurred, though an initial attack on AP votes, would have significantly hurt the CHP's long-term strategy and ultimate electoral success as both parties were positioning themselves to attract this critical segment of the voting population. As the election demonstrated, however, it was

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[72] Ibid., p. 170.
[73] Ibid., p. 161; See also Doğan, "Parliamentary Experience of the Turkish Labor Party," pp. 320-1.
[74] Szyliowicz argues that of the one million votes lost by the CHP from 1961 to 1965, 300,000 of those went to the TİP. Szyliowicz, "Turkish Elections: 1965," p. 492.
[75] "İnönü AP'ye 'ikinci demirkırat," *Cumhuriyet*, 5 October 1965.

only the students and intelligentsia, not the workers, peasants and urban poor for whom the party was ostensibly created, that flocked to support the party in 1965 and accumulated a mere 3 percent of the vote.[76]

After the election of 1961, the future leader of the CHP, Bülent Ecevit was appointed the Minister of Labor. His experience in this position and his understanding of the mentality of the Turkish urban worker played a large role in the strategy the CHP was to take in the industrial cities. Ecevit, in an essay written on the status of labor in Turkey around 1969 clearly expresses his belief in the political mobilizing power latent among this group. He writes:

> The power and the direct political influence of the workers are far greater than those of the peasants. The significance of this development lies in the fact that at least one group of people outside the elite has, for the first time in Turkish history, attained a real position of influence and is now able to balance to some extent the traditional elites' power.[77]

What Ecevit particularly noticed about the labor force and their unions is that, despite lacking traditional elite status, they were able to mobolize and act together politically, attaining their aims without the support or patronage of elites or the intelligentsia.[78]

While many might have been able to recognize the mobilization power of workers' associations like Türk-İş (Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions, *Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*), the largest trade union, Ecevit in his essay spells

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[76] Sabri Sayarı, "Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976-1980? A Retrospective Analysis," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2010), p. 200.
[77] Bülent Ecevit, "Labor in Turkey," p. 152.
[78] Ibid., p. 153.

out the political mindset of this work force.[79] The objectives and outlook of the

majority of this segment of the population was only moderately progressive—i.e.

they were in favor of "evolutionary unionism"—nationalist in orientation and

strongly supported the existing regime within the reforms of Atatürk and

democracy.[80] Not overburdened with ideology or assumptions that this group

needed to "acquire consciousness," Ecevit displayed, even down to his blue shirt

and simple cap, a stance toward labor that was one of admiration and respect, and

for this reason seemed to gather a great deal of popular support from these voters.[81]

Table 7.6 – Changing Fortunes of the CHP in Large Industrial Centers

	1965	1969	1973	1977
İstanbul	29.7	33.8	48.9	58.2
Ankara	30.2	34.3	41.9	51.3
İzmir	29.8	35.1	44.0	52.7
Adana	35.6	33.7	39.8	46.4
Zonguldak	24.6	30.7	39.8	45.7
AVERAGE	**30.0**	**33.5**	**42.9**	**50.9**
Nat. Ave	28.7	27.4	33.3	41.4

So strong was the connection between Ecevit and the unions that, when

interparty turmoil between İnönü and Ecevit regarding the party's stance toward the

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[79] Besides the large Türk-İş, in 1967 a branch of this confederation broke off and formed a more radically leftist union, the Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions (DİSK). A smaller nationalist trade union was also formed in 1970, the Confederation of Nationalist Trade Unions (MİSK), along with a religious conservative trade union, Hak-İş, formed in 1976.

[80] Ibid., p. 154.

[81] For other assertions of this important relation between Ecevit and the unions, see Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, "The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1983), p. 31; Ahmad also writes, "He won for himself the reputation of being the friend of the unions and new labor legislation was passed during his ministry." Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment*, p. 255.

military's March 12 Memorandum (1971), there was speculation that the latter would leave and form his own party with dissident leaders from Türk-İş.[82] Though the major confederation (Türk-İş) did not initially openly declare any political affiliation, it along with another major trade union (DİSK) began to more clearly support the CHP as the 1970s progressed, demonstrating that the party had developed significant allies and vote banks in these important civil associations in the country's large industrial centers (see Table 7.6).[83] That trade unions for nationalists (MİSK) and religious conservatives (Hak-İş) were also formed and mobilized for parties with the respective ideologies further indicates that the power of activating these groups electorally was not lost on the other competitors. Such a development could be anticipated based on the work of Perkins who suggests that parties, in an environment in which support organizations exist, tend to exploit this opportunity to mobilize the electorate.[84]

Furthermore, beyond this class of employed work, there was a large percentage of the population living in the shantytowns (*gecekondus*) of these large industrial centers. Hale writes that estimates from the late 1970s put approximately 65 percent of the population of Ankara, and 45 percent of those in Adana and Istanbul in such dwellings.[85] In contrast to TİP which primarily tried to appeal to

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[82] Ibid., p. 314.

[83] For more on this, see Ciddi, *Kemalism in Turkish Politics*, p. 53-6; and for the development of labor unions in Turkey during this period, see William Hale, "Labor Unions in Turkey: Progress and Problems," in William Hale, ed., *Aspects of Modern Turkey* (London: Bowker, 1976), pp. 59-74.

[84] Doug Perkins, "The Role of Organizations, Patronage and the Media in Party Formation," *Party Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1996), pp. 355-375.

[85] William Hale, *The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 223.

this population through sympathetic ideology, both the AP and the CHP were effectively pragmatic in their interactions with these urban communities. Though hampered by the existence of the State Planning Organization, the needs of these *gecekondu* communities were relatively easy to address, and it was naturally those critical needs, such as promises of legalization of communities so that they would not be destroyed, and not ideology that was prominent on the minds of these voters. Throughout the majority of the 1960s, the AP was in the best position to grant these promises as they controlled most of the municipalities, but as the balance of power shifted, the CHP also benefited from this pragmatic clientelism.[86] Karpat writes, "the political parties exposed the *gecekondu* to constant propaganda and pressure under the assumption that the squatters' votes might easily be won with various promises of reward."[87] As the study also demonstrates, despite the voting background of these newly arrived city dwellers, they showed a clear tendency to vote for the party in the position to grant favors—i.e. the incumbent party. Because the voting behavior in these areas was largely pragmatic and needs based, whether or not the minor parties wanted to offer such promises, their appeals fell, for the most part, on deaf ears.

While a party's ideology and outlook were not the primary impetus in the voting behavior in these communities, the CHP's gradual success in these communities suggest that it was a secondary concern. Karpat noted in his study

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[86] Ciddi, for example, also argues that the CHP's willingness to engage in machine politics during this period brought them electoral success in these communities. Ciddi, *Kemalism in Turkish Politics*, p. 51.

[87] Karpat, *The Gecekondu*, pp. 210-11.

that ideology was a growing concern among the youth in these communities and that this was accounting for a shift toward the CHP.[88] It seems that for the youth, especially, there was ideological inconsistency in seeking help from the party of big business, particularly when another major party, whose general outlook more clearly favored the community, was willing to make similar offers. Thus, in the bidding war for the votes of the *gecekondus*, these voters began to select the pragmatic (i.e. clientelistic) party that was realistically large enough to deliver on their promises and who shared a more complementary political outlook. Özbudun and Tachau show the clear gains of the CHP at the expense of the AP among this populous. In the *gecekondu* communities studied by these authors, the CHP went from 19.1 percent in 1965 and 21.8 percent in 1969 to 47.5 percent in 1973 while the AP's electoral fortunes went from 62.4 to 53.8 to 26.7, respectively.[89]

If professionals, such as doctors, lawyers and bankers were used as candidates to evince an aura of competence and quality among one's deputies in the first paradigmatic period, one notes that the ranks of parliamentary members during this period began to be filled with engineers in particular or "technocrats" in general. The rapid industrialization and economic development created an elite status for those who were able to enter the field of engineering. Thus, members from this category were brought into the political camps of all the major parties, and notable politicians of the period such as Demirel and Erbakan (and later Turgut

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[88] Ibid., pp. 216, 225.
[89] Ergun Özbudun and Frank Tachau, "Social Change and Electoral Behavior in Turkey: Toward a 'Critical Realignment?" *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1975), p. 473.

Özal) could claim engineering educational backgrounds.[90] Both the AP and CHP could boast the existence of engineers among their parliamentary members and this represented the shifting pinnacle of the understanding of competent "educated elite" within Turkish society, having moved from bureaucrats in the single-party period to professionals, such as bankers, doctors, and lawyers, to engineers and technocrats.[91] Each of these, during their heyday were associated with both educational and intellectual advancement and governing competence.

Finally, with the malady of fragmentation accompanied by uncooperative political elites, another well-documented strategy of political parties during this period was the utilization of ministerial posts and state enterprises to reward faithful supporters of the party, a strategy notoriously engaged in by the smallest of parties and even independent parliamentarians. This behavior seems to be the result of the juxtaposition of two factors, the SPO's limiting of previous governments' engaging in the pork-barrel distributive machine politics version of economic development, and the extremely tight margins of difference between the major parties that gave even the smallest parties and independent members in parliament blackmailing coalition potential.[92] Kalaycıoğlu writes:

> Political parties continued to act as excellent popular patronage
> mechanisms, distributing largesse and emoluments from the state

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[90] To understand the socioeconomic changes that caused such changes in elite status, see Roos and Roos, *Managers of Modernization*, pp. 34-52.

[91] See also, Sabri Sayarı and Alim Hasanov, "The 2007 Elections and Parliamentary Elites in Turkey: The Emergence of a New Political Class?" *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2008), p. 355-6.

[92] See, Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey*, pp. 120-1; and Ergun Özbudun, "Turkey: Crises, Interruptions, and Reequilibriums," in Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, 2nd Edition* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 236.

budget to their key supporters, as best and efficiently as they could. The easiest way to distribute largesse was to employ their supporters in their Ministries they occupied or the state enterprises their Ministries had control over.[93]

The MHP, who held only three seats in parliament in 1973 and 16 seats in 1977, used this tactic particularly successfully.[94]   Thus, while the various ministries occupied by different coalitions partners encountered tremendous difficulty in communicating effectively with one another, they served as reward mechanisms for key party (or personal) supporters. If anything, this behavior most notably engaged in by the minor parties, while superficially according respectability to the minor parties like the MHP and the National Salvation Party by giving them the status of governing coalition partners,[95] had a negative effect on the perception of the major coalition partner, who was to be governing the country but whose ministries where anything but the efficient means of effective governance that they should have been. Because all the parties were engaged in this behavior, however, its only effect on the electorate might have been a push toward anti-system behavior and disillusionment; in any case, the inability of the governments in the 1970s to govern did little to stop the revolutionary and reactionary violence occurring simultaneously on Turkish streets.

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[93] Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Dynamics: Bridge across Troubled Lands* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 114. Kalaycıoğlu also relates the coalition with Ecevit and 11 independent deputies, each of whom acted like their own party leader and occupied a Ministry and distributed its "plunder" accordingly, p. 114.

[94] Landau, "The Nationalist Action Party," p. 592.

[95] Ibid., p. 591; Kalaycıoğlu even argues that Bülent Ecevit's willingness to work with the Islamist National Salvation Party is what accorded the party and its leader, Necmettin Erbakan, the affirmation it needed to become a serious political contender. Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Dynamics*, p. 113.

7.3 Domains of Identification

The "left/right" positioning that became central to campaign discourse in this period initiated a new "domain of identification" that would continue to help bind voters to the party system and party blocs within the system in future paradigms. Though, as argued in chapter 5, the essential substance and primary dividing line between left and right has shifted, its usage consistently seems to limit the amount of transfer of votes from one side to the other regardless of how the distinction is understood in any particular period of time. Continuities in substance between "left" and "right" can certainly be seen—such as the tendency for religious conservative citizens to be on the right and for secular positivists to be on the left; however, even here it is important to acknowledge that the priority given to these considerations and the power they have had to determine the contingent political environment and its discursive debates have fluctuated drastically. Minimizing Turkish politics to an essential and perennial secular versus religious cleavage would be as foolhardy as making such a suggestion in most other democracies in Western Europe or North America where similar trends on the right and left can be posited. One must be careful not to translate electoral tendencies and domains of identification into the explanation of the impetus behind voting behavior, suggesting that a cultural cleavage is explanative of the political divide and motivation behind decisions at the ballot box. What has essentially divided the populace between left and right has shifted in important ways, causing certain domains of identification such as "worker" to migrate, and the careful observation

of such changing motivations provides the only effective explanation of the observed phenomena in the Turkish party system.

At the same time, however, as noted by others, though "left" and "right" was used as the mantra for much of the violence of the period, underneath this supposed ideological emphasis also hid preexisting social cleavages (domains) that more or less overlaid the national division.[96] Thus, street battles in the name of "left" and "right" ideologies were often, at least in part, battles between Kurds and Turks, or Alevis and Sunnis. Alevis, especially, were associated with the left, and attacks on this group by Sunni Turks caused a blurring of the distinction between ideological identities and religious-cultural identities. In the violent clashes in places like Kahramanmaraş where 109 people, mostly Alevis, were killed, the ultimate impetus behind the violence (whether left-right or Alevi-Sunni) seems hard to flesh out and might have even been unclear to those engaging in the violence.[97] Where these cultural factions existed among communities, party affiliations were often correlated to these preexisting domains of identification, as is true in the previous period.

7.4 Conclusion

The shift from the initial paradigm to one that emphasized ideological image-positioning seems to effectively demonstrate the complex and composite

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[96] For an excellent account of how such overlapping domains played out in a local community, see Arnold Leder, *Catalysts of Change: Marxist versus Muslim in a Turkish Community* (Austin, TX: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1976), pp. 24-35.

[97] Sayarı, "Political Violence and Terrorism," p. 204.

nature of the "hand" involved in instigating the change. Important socioeconomic and institutional changes obviously played a role in the entrance of ideology, but the *how* and *who* seems to have been strongly influenced by the decisions, for good or ill, of particular actors, amongst whom decisions guided other decisions and reactions, etc. The Turkish Workers Party could have made any number of decisions that would have affected how the other parties responded, and the CHP, could have taken any number of courses in response to it, or another faction, such as that led by Turhan Feyzioğlu, who broke off to form the Republican Reliance Party, or Kemal Satır, could have taken the helm and steered the party back toward the center.

The need for the CHP to have explicitly identified with the left is certainly questionable. TİP never showed an ability to understand well the population they were trying to court, the workers. The majority of the workers seemed to be directed to the center of the political spectrum, their heads not filled with revolutionary change guided by big ideology, but with "evolutionary progress" and a party that would acknowledge their basic concerns. This was also true for the masses of voters living on the margins of the cities in *gecekondu* communities; they had practical needs and would have been willing to consider any centrist party which paid attention to their particular needs and had realistic aspirations of acquiring governing power. The loss of the intelligentsia to TİP, from an electoral perspective, was a minor one.

In 1971, once again, the entrance of the military into politics, resulted in critical consequences, in unexpected ways. The actions of the military in 1961 and the execution of former Prime Minister Menderes weeks before the election proved problematic for the CHP who was widely understood as benefiting from the intervention. When the military intervened again in 1971, İnönü chose to comply with the military's demands in order to prevent a complete military takeover and speed the process back to democratic politics.[98] Bülent Ecevit, on the other hand, chose to take an oppositional stance toward the military's demands and resigned from his position as the General Secretary of the party in protest. As it turned out, Ecevit was ultimately brought to the helm of the party in 1972 prior to the country's return to electoral contest in 1973. With Ecevit as leader, the party could not easily be seen as bedfellows with the military for which he had protested so vehemently against and this coincided with electoral gain.

Süleyman Demirel, meanwhile, as the Prime Minister and leader of the government, being faced with the military's ultimatum on March 12, 1971, was placed in an extremely difficult position. The previous intervention by the military had resulted in the execution of the Prime Minister. Demirel, rather than fight the imposition by the military, chose to walk away. As Kalaycıoğlu argues, "the attitude of the AP to the ultimatum of March 12, 1971 seemed to have undermined the party."[99] Even in more recent days and from a politician on the right, Abdullah

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[98] Metin Heper, *İsmet İnönü: The Making of a Turkish Statesman* (Leiden, NE: Brill, 1998), pp. 234-41.

[99] Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Dynamics*, p. 108.

Gül, selected as President of the Republic in 2007, discussing with the journalist Hasan Cemal the night of the e-memorandum[100] posted on the military's official website, used Demirel's actions as representative of weakness that he would not show in the face of opposition, saying, "Unlike Demirel, we did not put our hat on our head and walk away."[101] Thus, the military intervened again, but the tables had turned. In 1973, the CHP, despite internal weakness due to remaining factional struggles, managed to gain nearly 6 percent from their previous vote total (from 27.4 to 33.3 percent) while the AP dropped from 46.6 percent to 29.8, giving the CHP just enough of an electoral edge to further intensify the lines of contest and polarize the populace. Once again, the political consequences of the military's intervention, just as in 1960, created unexpected results in the subsequent election.

On September 12, 1980, the military would again intervene; however, unlike in previous interventions in which the military's impact on electoral dynamics occurred *within* the existing paradigm, the context of emerging out of this junta's rule to democratic politics would impact the system in much more dramatic ways, in this case even playing the lion's share in constructing the paradigm in which politics would be contested.

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[100] April 2007. It was posted allegedly to address the selection of Abdullah Gül as the AKP's candidate for president and the concern that a man whose wife wears a headscarf would be sitting in the seat first bestowed on Atatürk.

[101] Hasan Cemal, *Türkiye'nin Asker Sorunu* (İstanbul: Doğan Kıtap, 2010), p. 36; Ecevit also made such a comment, "When my party is attacked, I do not pick up my hat and run as Demirel did, leaving my party colleagues behind." Quoted in Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment*, p. 353.

CHAPTER 8

THE NATIONAL CENTER PARADIGM – 1983-1991

Those who govern the country in the name of the people
are allowed no discrimination, have no right to divide the nation
and create enmity among the citizens.
In this context, the democratic regime, as can be understood from the connotation,
is not a separatist, but a unifying factor.
It is for this reason that the Turkish nation,
based upon the principles of Atatürk, will survive by its unswerving adherence to
the motto "a single state, a single nation" in the future,
just as it has remained in the past.
No power will be able to divide it.[1]
—Kenan Evren (1981).

People from all four old political tendencies have united within our party.[2]
—Turgut Özal (1983).

On September 12, 1980, for the third time in twenty years, the tanks rolled

through Ankara once again. The parliament, filled with so-called "bandits",

"communists", "anarchists", and "fascists"—at least as these deputies in the

assembly were known and described by one other in their political rhetoric—was

disbanded, its leaders taken into confinement, and, after a period of uncertainty, in

1981 the political parties were all closed and the deputies banned from politics from

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[1] Quote taken from, Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, "The State, Politics, and the Military in
Turkey," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1983), p. 27.
[2] "Özal: İşçinin dostu, kaşıkla verip kepçeyle alan değildir," *Cumhuriyet*, 19 October 1983.

5 to 10 years. The junta, running the affairs of the country through the National Security Council and a nonpartisan technocratic cabinet run by Prime Minister (and former General) Bülend Ulusu, went about the business of rebuilding a party system. What concerned the Chief of Staff, and later president, was not just the existing parties and leaders, but what was seen as the whole degeneration in the approach toward politics and the disorder and fratricide that seemed to spring from it. Thus, in contrast to previous interventions, the military did not intend to only create new parties and a party system, but to construct a new paradigm that would put an end to the divisive political behavior that was tearing the country apart, at least from the military's vantage point.

The military, drafting under their tutelage what would be the third constitution in the short history of the Republic, far beyond crafting the formal rules and regulations by which politics would be played, endeavored to reshape and reinitiate a political state of affairs that was *centered* on the general will and stripped of all the previous ideological excess. It is not surprising, then, that the political party that rose to prominence during this period was a party that, whether one agrees or not with their self-identification, appealed to the voters as the party for everyone, a party that encapsulated the four dominant political tendencies—the economically-liberal conservatives, the "democratic left",[3] the Islamists, and the nationalists. The electorate, weary of the fratricide of the previous period and the

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[3] I am intentionally choosing not to use "center-right" and "center-left" here as these expressions were not widely used in campaign parlance until later; and its emergence as an expression was contingent on and an important manifestation of the political orientations and norms developing within this paradigm as it extended to the following one.

military's strong response to those engaged or associated with ideological activity of the previous period, rushed to be identified with moderation (or centrism). Furthermore, with some minor exceptions, when one classifies the parties of the period into families occupying what has come to be known as the center-right and center-left, one finds a terrific amount of similarity in voting patterns toward these families throughout the period, with the proportions distributed to each family remaining within a relatively narrow range from province to province, so that regional variety, though evident in minor patterns, seemed to be temporarily absorbed in a more national electoral pattern. Table 8.1 points out the distinct pattern between elections in this paradigm (1983 and 1987) and the elections immediately following it. While there is almost no regional difference in vote distribution in 1983 and 1987, starting from 1995, clear variation is evident from region to region, especially in the distribution of the votes for "center left" and "far right" parties.

This paradigmatic period, however, remained brief and gave way to another paradigm with very different patterns. The new orientation to politics, constructed abruptly and somewhat artificially by the military, ultimately fragmented itself away. The 1991 election, producing an electoral outcome uniquely dissimilar to the elections preceding and following it, sparked particular consequences which would only become evident in the subsequent general elections of 1995 (and local elections of 1994), bringing the short life of this moderation-focused paradigm to its ultimate end.

Table 8.1 - Regional Variation in Voting Behavior Comparison

Region	1983			1987		
	Center Right	Center Left	Other	Center Right	Center Left	Far Right
Marmara	64.86	34.63	0.51	53.36	38.40	7.63
Aegean	69.20	29.52	1.28	62.64	31.67	4.99
Mediterranean	67.48	31.88	0.63	54.63	33.90	10.78
North Central	72.13	27.15	0.72	58.44	29.35	10.92
South Central	74.50	23.48	2.03	59.05	24.78	14.68
Black Sea	69.07	28.78	2.16	57.70	30.40	10.87
Central East	62.56	36.39	1.06	50.07	36.09	12.74
Northeast	68.06	29.54	2.40	54.42	32.82	11.22
Southeast	71.63	27.90	0.47	49.68	27.02	18.39
St Deviation	**3.68**	**3.92**	**0.76**	**4.29**	**4.29**	**3.83**

Region	1995			1999		
	Center Right	Center Left	Far Right	Center Right	Center Left	Far Right
Marmara	41.36	33.64	21.99	26.43	40.89	26.60
Aegean	50.02	27.20	19.41	31.79	35.47	26.20
Mediterranean	35.38	25.45	32.68	24.42	29.85	36.28
North Central	38.30	23.28	35.15	24.03	27.25	42.18
South Central	34.88	17.58	44.43	23.40	20.73	48.10
Black Sea	45.58	23.00	28.17	33.22	26.28	33.90
Central East	32.26	19.34	37.96	19.51	20.84	38.17
Northeast	32.92	18.36	37.88	26.36	19.80	33.34
Southeast	31.53	5.93	31.03	28.92	10.01	22.37
St Deviation	**6.43**	**7.69**	**7.98**	**4.30**	**9.19**	**8.21**

Table 8.2 – Electoral Trends of the Period[4]

	1983	1987	1991	1995
Top-Two Parties' vote %	75.6%	61.1%	51.0%	41%
Effective # of Parties (Mod. Golosov) – National	2.65	3.46	4.15	5.48
Effective # of Parties (Mod. Golosov) – Provincial Ave.	2.60	3.40	3.56	4.39
Volatility – National Aggregate	100.0	38.5	17.4	22.7
Volatility – National "Inter-bloc"	12.1	2.9	1.5	1.7
Voter Turnout	92.3%	93.3%	83.9%	85.2%

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[4] Electoral data taken from. *Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri 1923-2007* (Ankara: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, 2008), pp. 96-7. Effective number of parties calculated using a modified version of Golosov's formula: $N_P = \sum 2/1+((S_1+S_2)^2/(S_i+S_j))-(S_i+S_j)$.

8.1 The Context of the Period

Prior to the coup on September 12, 1980, the polarization between "left" and "right" in the previous paradigm had trickled down from the political elites and into much of the fabric of society. As is widely documented, not only did civil organizations, university campuses, unions and other social elements become bipolar, the division extended itself into bureaucracy and even the police force—effectively exacerbating the growing disorder and tension.[5] The tightness of the margin between the largest two parties and the intransigence of the party leaders, refusing to cooperate or look beyond their own party's interests, brought effective governance to a halt. Without a functioning state apparatus, which beyond the incapacity of the parties in parliament to legislate, was hampered by the "occupation" of the ministries by coalition partners, using these bureaucratic structures for entitlement mechanisms for the party faithful, polarization and partisanship descended from political orientation to social cleavages and disorder and violence in the streets. While there are discrepancies in the exact number of "political" murders occurring in the last years prior to the military's intervention, it is widely reported that such deaths amounted to nearly eight per day on average in the final year[6] and over twenty deaths per day in the final months.[7] Certainly, the

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[5] See also, Tachau and Heper, "The State, Politics, and the Military," p. 24.

[6] For such an account, see William Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1994), p. 224. Tanel Demirel points out a number of various reported figures in his careful narrative of the military's analysis of society in the lead up to the coup. Tanel Demirel, "The Turkish Military's Decision to Intervene: 12 September 1980," *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2003), p. 276 (see note 15).

social conditions provided ample encouragement to move away from such intense ideological engagement and get back to day to day governance and the restoration of order. There is much to indicate that society as a whole was seeking a way out of the political impasse, including the by-elections of 1979, which was a clear vote of no confidence to the Ecevit-led government, and also the initial relief and enthusiasm for the military when they finally decided to intervene on September 12.

Besides social aversion to the chaotic and security-deprived state of the country prior to the intervention, the military itself actively engaged in de-politicizing (de-ideologizing) the society and establishing a new foundation and party system for the operation of democracy. Though martial law was in effect prior to the coup, under junta control, swift and decisive action against ideological extremism, association with or suspicion of association with such elements could occur without constitutional constraints. Demirel writes:

> [The junta] dealt with suspects without being restrained by any legal procedures as they would have been under a democratic regime, even with martial law, and the public at large trusted and therefore helped them as they were able to restore the confidence that they would finally be able to grapple with the problem of terrorism.[8]

The military's actions against those with leanings on the ideological left and right was severe, and of course, in the international press much was made about the high

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[7] Tachau and Heper, "State, Politics, and the Military," p. 25; see also, Sabri Sayarı, "Political Violence and Terrorism in Turkey, 1976-80: A Retrospective Analysis," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2010), p. 202.
[8] Demirel, "Turkish Military's Decision to Intervene," p. 266.

incidence of human rights violations and torture during this period.[9] Needless to say, the military used its free hand to forcefully direct the society at large away from ideological politics.

In addition to rounding up the perpetrators of ideological politics, the military took an active role in trying to "reset" the social mindset and orientation toward politics. Heper has noted this objective of the September 12 junta and writes that, from the military's perspective, "it was necessary to create a wholly new and different party system so as to heal the deep cleavages which had resulted from the mistaken notion of democracy."[10] Evidence of this stems from the junta leader, Kenan Evren's, disavowal of the expression "restoration of democracy," for which he replaced it with "re-establishment of democracy"[11]—in other words, it would not be a return to democracy as previously practiced, but a reshaping of the foundations upon which democracy could more effectively function. From the military's perspective, this would be accomplished by returning to an emphasis on the old value of the "national general interest," which would establish the proper environment of unity and common good in which political competition could more securely operate.[12] Evren has been quoted as saying:

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[9] Hale reports that within a year of the intervention, 167 mass trials were underway, investigating the actions of known extreme rightist and leftist groups, along with a few organizations with little evidence of violent behavior, such as the labor union, DISK, and the Turkish Peace Association. For more on the military's crackdown on ideology, see Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, pp. 252-4.

[10] Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (North Humberside, UK: Eothen Press, 1985), p. 133.

[11] Ibid., p. 132.

[12] Kemal Karpat, "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980," in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., *State Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), p. 152.

Those who govern the country in the name of the people are allowed no discrimination, have no right to divide the nation and create enmity among the citizens. In this context, the democratic regime, as can be understood from the connotation, is not a separatist, but a unifying factor.[13]

Thus, political competition between parties, in such a context, rather than dividing the country along partisan lines, would unify the country in a rational search for the good of the nation.

In order to accomplish such a task, society needed to be directed toward a national center, for which unifying—i.e. centering—symbols were employed that could be accepted by all segments of society. The objects that the military chose for such a purpose were Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and a moderate infusion of unifying Islamic morality sometimes referred to under the expression "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis." The former, to a far greater extent than the Kemalist ideology that had appeared in previous decades—though the ideology, of course, bore his name—or any of the particular principles embedded therein, was an extremely powerful and flexible symbol to attract the vast majority of the population despite the divergence of social or political outlook. Atatürk, in this vein, represented a pragmatic and non-ideological approach to politics that ultimately has the development of the nation as its focus.[14] The latter—a foundation of generic Islamic social morality—seems to be a recognition of the fact that, though Atatürk

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[13] Tachau and Heper, "State, Politics, and the Military," p. 27.
[14] For more on the role of the junta's "Atatürkist" thought (as opposed to what was commonly referred to Kemalism) in centering the society on the nation, see Heper, *The State Tradition*, p. 143; also, Ahmet Evin, "Changing Patterns of Cleavages Before and After 1980," in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), pp. 212-3.

had provided the Republic with a pragmatic framework of principles in which to progress, those principles offered little guidance to the daily affairs of the individual or harmony within society. Thus, within a primary container of Turkish nationalism,[15] a rationalized civic morality and fraternity was derived based on Islamic principles, stemming from the existing faith of nearly the entire population.[16]

The military, of course, besides utilizing the discursive methods above to re-center the polity's mindset, created a number of institutional changes to address the concerns of the previous era of politics and establish a new political environment in which democracy would then operate. Within the new constitution, Article 14 prohibited the right of "violating the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation . . . or establishing the hegemony of one social class over others, or creating discrimination on the basis of language, race, religion, or sect, or of establishing by any other means a system of government based on these concepts and ideas."[17] Thus, the military was attempting to rule out leftist and rightist ideological parties in particular,[18] and the secular nature of the state along with the

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[15] By which I do not imply an ethnic nationalism, but one that is primarily territorially and secondarily culturally focused.

[16] For more on this, see Sam Kaplan, *The Pedagogical State* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), pp. 73-124; and Yıldız Atasoy, *Islam's Marriage with Neoliberalism: State Transformation in Turkey* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 91-4.

[17] As of the completion of this work (May 2011), the 1982 Constitution, though undergoing a number of significant amendments, still operates as the foundational legal framework of the country; this particular article, however, was subsequently amended in 2001, removing the statement regarding social class and with additional provisions that protect the individual from the State.

[18] See also, George Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkey in the 1980s," in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), p. 193.

appropriate form of nationalism among other items, were enumerated in Article 2 of the Constitution, an article that was also deemed to be "inalterable" in Article 4.

The military also passed legislation that forbid members of associations (such as trade unions) to be involved in politics; their role was understood to occupy a separate civic non-political sphere. Thus, the kind of non-discursive mobilization used effectively by leaders such as Ecevit in the previous period was effectively shut off to politics in this new political system constructed by the military. Furthermore, the military established a Supervisory Board connected to the Office of the President in order to monitor the bureaucracy and curb its politicization.[19] This, of course, had come as an attempt to address the patron-client tactics of political parties in the previous period, who stuffed their occupied ministries with as many faithful supporters as possible. Hence, the military reset a number of rules that would intentionally challenge the electoral strategies that had been employed in the previous decade.

In addition to these provisions, the military, aware of the blackmail potential of small parties that proved to be disastrous in the previous era of political competition and that these small parties, such as the National Salvation Party, the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), the Unity Party and the Turkish Workers Party, tended to represent sectarian elements or extreme ideologies, established a 10 percent national threshold that must be obtained for a party to enter the National Assembly. Furthermore, the new rules for political parties and elections did not

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[19] Harris, "The Role of the Military," p. 198; and Heper, *The State Tradition*, p. 139.

allow these parties that gained less than 10 percent of the national vote air time for campaign propaganda on the national television stations.[20] Therefore, while maintaining the broad outlines of a proportional representation of the previous period, these changes would conceivably both leave out the "undesirable" parties and enable strong governments and moderate and effectively-functioning coalitions.

The military, beyond attempting to establish a new ideologically-light and centrally-focused mentality and a new legal foundation for the fostering of a less divisive and more orderly form of democratic politics, decided to initiate the party system by artificially constructing two moderate parties, one with a slight leaning to the left, the Populist Party (HP), and the other slightly to the right, Nationalist Democracy Party (MDP), that would compete for the right to govern in a very civil and orderly manner. The former, was established by a seasoned bureaucrat who founded the party only after receiving permission from Evren and Ulusu.[21] The MDP, on the other hand, when the junta could not convince Ulusu to lead the party, was led by a former General, Turgut Sunalp.[22] The Political Parties Law that was passed in April 1983 did not forbid the founding of other parties, but the stringent process of founding a party and the strong veto powers of the junta, effectively curtailed the natural development of parties and effective rise of new leaders in the

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[20] Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Cyclical Development, Redesign and Nascent Institutionalization of a Legislative System," in Ali Çarkoğlu and William Hale, eds., *Politics of Modern Turkey, Volume 2* (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 66.
[21] Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, p. 263.
[22] Ibid., p. 263.

1983 elections.[23] While the military was involved in constructing parties just to the left and right of center, two other parties formed by more seasoned political elements vied for those same positions. Faced with the threat that these more professionally organized parties posed the two parties propped up by the military, the junta used the loophole of vetoing enough members within the list of founders so that they would not have the legally mandated number of members to officially establish a party until the deadline for party registration had passed.[24] Thus, two parties with more "political" credentials—one of these led by Erdal İnönü, the son of İsmet İnönü, were left on the sidelines of the electoral contest.

The only party that escaped the veto strategy of the junta, which itself suggests that the military willfully allowed this party to compete, was the Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*, ANAP), led by Turgut Özal who had acquired fame as the man directing the economic recovery under the military regime. Though Özal was a key technocrat running the affairs of the country while the military was trying to "reestablish democracy," the formation and organization of the party was more clearly external to military guidance and support. This would prove to be a critical to the fortunes of the party as it entered the elections. Thus, the military, whether or not in ways that were intended, had a large impact on the course of electoral politics and its paradigm as it emerged from under their hovering wings in November of 1983.

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[23] Ibid., p. 262.
[24] William Hale, "Transition to Civilian Governments in Turkey: The Military Perspective," in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), p. 172.

The military junta's foci and strategies following the coup also demonstrate certain sociopolitical changes that would become increasingly critical forces as politics progressed through this short paradigm and into the next. In the early period of multiparty politics, the regions highly populated with Kurdish speaking citizens were largely guided through pre-existing sociopolitical "proxies"—local notables that were often large landowners (*ağa*), tribal leaders and/or religious community leaders known as sheikhs (*şeyh*)—who for various reasons including, of course, personal benefit had come to accept the authority of the state and the relational status quo between the central governing bodies and the region. However, the expansion of education throughout the country in the 1950s and 1960s led to the growth of what could be called a Kurdish intelligentsia.[25] This group was profoundly influenced by the concurrent development of leftist ideology[26] and, particularly in the 1960s but also to a lesser extent in the 1970s, engaged in revolutionary ambitions with their Turkish brothers to liberate Turkey from an unjust regime and establish distributive justice that would provide dignity to all the country's inhabitants. These leftist Kurdish intellectuals did not only challenge the legitimacy of the state, they also strongly opposed the traditional authority of the Kurdish *ağas* and *şeyhs* for supporting the state's "exploitation" of the land for their own personal benefit.

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[25] Hakan Yavuz, "Five Stages of the Construction of Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2001), p. 9.

[26] Metin Heper, *The State and Kurds in Turkey* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 155-6; see also Joost Jongerden and Ahmet Hamdi Akkaya, "Born from the Left: The Making of the PKK," in Marlies Casier and Joost Jongerden, eds., *Nationalisms and Politics in Turkey: Political Islam, Kemalism and the Kurdish Issue* (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 123-42.

Ethnic-based protest and what could be indisputably understood as Kurdish nationalism, hence, seems to have largely developed within and in conjuncture with leftist ideology and among the elite.[27] As time passed, some of these Kurdish intellectuals ideologically nurtured in the existing leftist organizations began to form their own particularly Kurdish-focused Marxist organizations, one of the most famous of these being the Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths (*Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları*, DDKO), which was established in 1969.[28] Abdullah Öcalan began as a member of this group and later became the founder of the Marxist-inspired Kurdistan Workers Party (*Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan*, PKK) in 1978.[29] The fractionalization of the left, and the Kurdish left in particular, often set the various groups in violent opposition to one another along with the traditional "feudal" elements of Kurdish society, who were seen as being in cahoots with the Turkish "occupiers." Thus, prior to the coup, along with the violent clashes between the extreme right and extreme left, the predominantly Kurdish areas of the southeast were in a state of relative chaos and insecurity.

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[27] Mesut Yeğen writes that "Kurdish unrest of the sixties and seventies assumed the form of giving popular support to left-wing parties or political groups," which suggest that pre-existing "Kurdish"—i.e. in the name of Kurdish ethnicity proper—protest was channeled toward the leftish movements. This "protest" then would have to be understood as largely residing with the educated Kurdish intelligentsia living in large cities, whose grievances were largely abstract rather than personal. Had it been otherwise, one should expect that the leftist movements and parties such as the TİP would have received a notable share of votes from densely-populated Kurdish provinces of the southeast (Heper has also noted this contradiction. See, Heper, *The State and Kurds*, p. 156). This, however, was not the case, and the popular movement of Kurdish nationalism, proper, took time to trickle down to the masses, a movement that seems to have been drastically sped up by the aftermath of the 1980 military intervention. See, Mesut Yeğen, "Turkish Nationalism and the Kurdish Question," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (2007), pp. 132-3.
[28] See also, Heper, *The State and Kurds*, p. 156.
[29] Yavuz, "Five Stages," p. 12.

The military, therefore, after taking the governing reins of the state in 1980, saw the "sectarian" and "regional" manifestations of the superimposed "left-right" ideological conflict as particularly problematic. Immediately following the coup, the military banned the usage of Kurdish language, forced Kurdish families to give Turkish names to their children, and changed the names of Kurdish towns and villages.[30] Large numbers of Kurds, particularly those associated with political organizations, were taken into custody.[31] Needless to say, the military also effectively "destroyed the organizational power of Kurdish networks within Turkey."[32] By pushing society toward the "center" around unifying symbols like Atatürk and Muslim identity,[33] the latter being seen as a particularly important shared identity between Turks and Kurds,[34] the junta clearly signaled that all forms of cultural, ethnic, or regional politics would be left on the outside of institutionalized politics.[35]

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[30] Doğu Ergil, "The Kurdish Question in Turkey," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2000), p. 127.

[31] David McDowall writes that the International League of Human Rights claimed no fewer than 81,000 Kurdish detainees by the military junta. David McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), p. 414.

[32] Yavuz, "Five Stages," p. 10.

[33] This connection between Islam and Kurdish separatism was also noted by a number of scholars. For one example, see Ayla Kılıç, "Democratization, Human Rights and Ethnic Policies in Turkey," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1998), p. 99.

[34] It must be added here that, though the majority of Turks and Kurds share Sunni Muslim identities, even here there is some difference; Turks generally ascribe to the Hanefi school of interpretation of Sunni Islam while the Kurds tend to adhere to the Shafi school of interpretation. A sizeable minority of both Turks and Kurds are considered *Alevi*s and among these, though they share a number of common points, there are great differences among various *Alevi* communities in terms of both religious outlook and practice.

[35] In this regard, Ayla Kılıç writes that "new parties were to represent *national political interests*." Emphasis is in original. Kılıç, "Democratization," p. 94.

Unfortunately, this forceful removal of ethnic or sectarian views from the formal political sphere, while artificially facilitating the moderate and national tendencies in institutionalized political competition observed during this paradigmatic period, did not have such a pacifying effect on this issue at the social level, outside the sanctioned walls of debate in the Grand National Assembly. Starting in 1984, the PKK under Abdullah Öcalan began to launch violent attacks against the military or any other perceived organs of the state, whether these were Turks or Kurds. Ergil writes that these violent repercussions were not inevitable but "stemmed . . . from the harsh treatment that they suffered at the hands of the Turkish security forces."[36] This harsh treatment toward Kurdish leftists and activists and the removal of the possibility of addressing the Kurdish question within the reestablished institutions limited the options available to redress grievances within this community. According to Yavuz:

> The 1980 coup and its oppressiveness helped to create a siege
> mentality among the Kurds . . . They had two options: move to
> Europe as political refugees and search for a new life, or join the
> PKK to fight against the Turkish state. The PKK became more
> popular as the oppression of the military coup increased.[37]

If we understand Yavuz's interpretation as the sentiment and available choices for all Kurds, it seems to be strongly overstating the case. This description of options seems particularly true for the Kurdish political activists of the pre-coup period, but this was clearly not the essential dilemma for *all* Kurds. Though the impact of

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[36] Ergil, "Kurdish Question," p. 127.
[37] Yavuz, "Five Stages," p. 12.

military junta rule created sympathy for violent resistance under the banner of "self-defense," there were many other Kurds who more or less acquiesced to the status quo or who were wary of the "godless" leftist Kurdish nationalists. In any case, the military's actions to sterilize the political sphere in such a way so as to remove Kurdish, or any other particularistic grievance from the debate, created the temporary centrist and national tendencies in political contestation, but became a fomenting pressure in that the formal denial of space to such issues ultimately led to their explosive and violent manifestation within society beginning in 1984. The violent anti-system protest during this period occurring external to the existing legal channels of political behavior could be seen as one of the prime forces that curtailed the lifespan of this paradigm.

Finally, growing widespread access to television and its further development would come to have a major impact on the means of contestation in the electoral arena. The impact of television on society was beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Kalaycıoğlu provides us with a vivid account of this social transformation:

> The entire gamut of social interactions between families changed for a while in the early 1970s. Those who owned the new status symbols suddenly discovered that they, or rather their TV sets, constituted a great attraction. Relatives, friends, and neighbors, who they had not had very close interactions, suddenly rushed to take their seats in front of the TV sets, in their now 'beloved' relatives', friends', or neighbors' homes. . . If urbanization was the main force driving social mobilization in the 1950s, the transistor radio in the

1960s, and the black and white TV sets in the 1970s were the added influences, which fueled the process of social mobilization.[38]

The fascination with this new media technology led to its rapid dissemination throughout society; such that, household ownership of televisions doubled from 1980 to 1987,[39] and by 1991, 60 percent of Turkish households owned a color television.[40] As the transforming nature of these developments in media technology on party systems have been widely observed elsewhere,[41] it seems logical to predict that its growing widespread use would have implications for the dimensions of competition within this paradigm.

8.2 Dimensions of Competition: *8.2.1 National Campaign Discourse*

As could be predicted from the previous discussion, the arena of contest initiated after the three year period of junta rule began rather tamely and, particularly for the MDP and its leader Sunalp, with inexperienced campaign speechmaking. By the next general election of 1987, the bitter attacks and snipes from party leader to party leader returned along with a number of patterns reminiscent of earlier periods, but there were a few notable distinctions in this discourse of this period spanning the three general elections from 1983 to 1991: First, there was a particularly clear evasion of designation of parties in terms of

[38] Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Dynamics: Bridge Across Troubled Lands* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 118-9.

[39] It rose from 3.3 million to 7.2 million. See, Gerard Groc, "Journalists as Champions of Participatory Democracy," in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds.), *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), p. 204.

[40] Ayşe Öncü, "Packaging Islam: Cultural Politics on the Landscape of Turkish Commercial Television," *Public Culture,* Vol. 8, No. 1 (1995), p. 58.

[41] For one reference to its impact, see Peter Mair, *Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 39.

"left" or "right" terminology and, when such terminology was directed toward parties, they tended to distance themselves from explicit position imaging in that regard, although not from other forms of imaging that were less definitively comparative, such as "nationalist" or "social democrat"; and second, stripped of any sort of strong emphasis on ideology, the discourse was largely given to particular concerns regarding the economy and legislation regarding the liberalization of democratic practice. This second pattern could not be argued to be particularly new in its broad outline, but it came with a greater emphasis on the concept that political parties' primary function was service (*hizmet*) to its nation's citizenry. Although it has been a noted discursive practice of ANAP in the scholarly literature, one finds the conception employed by most of the major parties of the period.

The practice of persistently evading a "left/right" positioning distinction seems to be a regular feature of this period. For example, in an interview with Turgut Sunalp, former General and leader of the MDP, Sunalp chose cryptic language to avoid any sort of clear categorization, declaring, "I am a lover of humanity (*insancıl bir adamım*), but I do not call myself a humanist. I am driven by a profound belief in social justice, but I do not call myself a socialist."[42]

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[42] "Sunalp: Biz faniyiz, parti ölümsüz," *Cumhuriyet*, 7 September 1983.

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Table 8.3 – Political Parties of the Paradigm in General Elections at a Glance

English	Turkish		Party Leader	Political Family	1983	1987	1991	Key Notes:
Reformist Democracy Party	Islahatçı Demokrasi Partisi	IDP	Aykut Edibali	Conservative Nationalist	-	0.8	-	Joined an electoral coalition under the RP banner along with MÇP in 1991. Became the Nation Party prior to 1995 election.
Nationalist Working Party	Nationalist Çalışma Partisi	MÇP	Alparslan Türkeş	Conservative Nationalist	-	2.9	-	Joined an electoral coalition under the RP banner along with IDP in 1991. Became the MHP again in 1993.
Welfare Party	Refah Partisi	RP	Necmettin Erbakan İsmet /	Religious Conservative	-	7.2	16.9	Benefited from a coalition with the MCP and IDP in 1991.
Nationalist Democracy Party	Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi	MDP	Turgut Sunalp	Conservative	23.3	-	-	Conservative unexperienced party artificially created by the military junta to restart moderate multiparty politics.
True Path Party	Doğru Yol Partisi	DYP	Süleyman Demirel	Conservative/ Populist	-	19.1	27.0	Party was vetoed out of eligibility for competing in the 1983 election to try to stifle "politics as usual."
Motherland Party	Anavatan Partisi	ANAP	Turgut Özal/ Mesut Yılmaz	Conservative/ Populist	45.1	36.3	24.0	
Democratic Left Party	Demokratik Sol Parti	DSP	Bülent Ecevit	Nationalist Left	-	8.5	10.8	
Social Democrat Populist Party	Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti	SHP	Erdal İnönü	Social Democrat/ Pluralist	-	24.8	20.8	Party was called the Social Democrat Party until it merged with the Populist Party in 1985.
Populist Party	Halkçı Parti	HP	Necdet Calp	Social Democrat	30.5	-	-	Inexperienced party artificially supported by the military junta to restarty moderate multiparty politics. Merged with Social Democrat Party to become SHP in 1985.
Socialist Party	Sosyalist Parti	SP	Doğu Perinçek	Democratic Socialist	-	-	0.4	Closed by Constitutional Court in 1992. Perinçek became the leader of the Workers Party.

Notes: The parties are place primarily in a relational ordering, starting with arguably the most minor conservative party, ending with the most minor socialist party. Parties' outlook and general behavior could place them in different positions, depending on the criteria used or the emphasis of the one positioning the parties. Threshold passing results for party are indicated in bold. Only party leaders who occupied the seat during general elections are listed. Election data was taken from, *Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri, 1923-2007* (Ankara: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, 2008), pp. 96-7.

In a televised debate that turned out to be critical in the outcome of the 1983 elections, the interviewer asked the ANAP leader, Turgut Özal, where his party's political basis was located—i.e. was ANAP on the left or right. Özal replied, "Such a declaration is a Western conception. The political bases of the parties will become obvious after the elections on November 6. From this perspective, I want to be able to say that we are gathering votes from the four previous political tendencies."[43] Later, Sunalp would announce, "I am not a rightist, nor a leftist; I am predominantly an Atatürkist."[44] Necdet Calp, the leader of the HP also tended to emphasize, if any emphasis in this regard was made, that his party was a "social democrat" party, rather than provide any explicit positioning on the "left," though their positioning seems to have been largely understood.[45]

The two parties commonly interpreted as being parties in some degree of the "right"—i.e. the MDP and ANAP—were particularly concerned with not being labeled as such, but they engaged in two distinct strategies in order to avoid such nomenclature. Sunalp, as can be seen from the example above, regularly relied on a discursive emphasis on Atatürk in order to place himself in the center without using the expression "centrist" or "center party." At one point, he told reporters that, if he had been legally able to, he would have named his party the "Atatürkist Nationalist

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[43] "Liderler bol bol vaadde bulundu," *Milliyet*, 23 October 1983.
[44] "Sunalp: Ne sağcıyım ne solcu, Atatürkçüyüm," *Milliyet*, 30 October 1983.
[45] Ergüder and Hofferbert, for example, show in their electoral analysis that the basis for the vote for the HP strongly correlated with the electoral basis of the CHP in 1973 and 1977. Thus, the voters who voted for the "left of center" or "Democratic left" CHP largely transferred their vote to the HP in 1983. Üstün Ergüder and Richard Hofferbert, "The 1983 General Elections in Turkey: Continuity or Change in Voting Patterns?" in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), pp. 98-9.

Party."[46] Throughout the campaign, he regularly referred to nation's founder as the source of his various political inspirations. Özal, on the other hand, which can also be seen in the reference above, conceptually placed ANAP in the center by arguing that it appealed to all of the political perspectives of the previous period of politics—Islamist, nationalist, social democrat and economically-liberal conservatives.[47] At one point, he attributed his party's all-inclusive approach to politics to the realization that "there is no question of an emptiness on the right"[48]— i.e. the MDP was filling the political position of the "right." Throughout the 1983 general election campaign, Özal frequently used that expression for his party's political base in order to place himself in the center without using the expression "centrist."[49]

The attempt to keep one's party clear of an explicit "left/right" positioning continued in subsequent elections. For example, in the 1987 general election, upon returning to politics, Bülent Ecevit immediately began to question the "positioning" of the Social Democrat Populist Party (SHP),[50] accusing them of not being social democrats, and of being "captured by the left." A member of the SHP, Aytekin

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[46] "Denenmişi Denemeyin," *Cumhuriyet*, 18 October 1983. It is forbidden to use any reference to Atatürk in the naming of a political party. It also must be remembered that "nationalist" (*milliyetçi*) has a very flexible meaning that, in mainstream politics, especially during that particular period, represents something close to "patriot" or one who loves one's country/nation.

[47] It is also interesting that, although Özal regularly referred to these "four old political tendencies", he never referred to them specifically by name.

[48] "Özal: Eski 4 siyasi eğilimin tabanından da oy alacağız," *Cumhuriyet*, 25 October 1983.

[49] Regarding Özal's success in this regard, see Sabri Sayarı, "Political Parties, Party Systems and Economic Reforms: The Turkish Case," *Studies in Comparative International Development,* Vol. 31, No. 4 (1996/97), p. 36.

[50] This party was the result of the unification of the Populist Party (HP) of Necdet Calp and the Social Democrat Party (SODEP), which was effectively vetoed out of the 1983 elections, led by Erdal İnönü, the son of İsmet İnönü.

Kotil, replied by saying, "The SHP's position is obvious. No one has the strength to move the party to the right or to the left of this position."[51] Interestingly enough, though defending the party's position as "obvious", Kotil did not want to venture to say where that position was, only that they could not be moved to the right or the left of it, leaving one to assume a fairly central position for the party. The attacks between Ecevit and İnönü would continue into the 1991 general elections, while Ecevit attacked SHP as being the shelter for separatists and leftist elements, İnönu accused Ecevit of being protected by the leader of the ultra-nationalist party, the Nationalist Endeavor Party (*Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi*, MÇP), Alparslan Türkeş and rightist journalists, thus accusing him of being a rightist politician.[52] Ecevit was even accused, not only of being a rightist, but also a fascist by supporters of the SHP, hence, the ironic wheels of fate having turned full circle from the mudslinging imaging of the 1970s; thus, Ecevit spent much of the 1991 campaign insisting that he was not a fascist or a rightist,[53] without, of course, ever indicating where exactly he was positioning himself. Throughout the period, whenever one sees the usage of "left" or "right", it is not being used by the party leaders themselves, but is being externally placed on them while they dodge any such distinction, leaving the audience with the impression that they are located somewhere near the center.

One must also acknowledge, however, that there were some milder indications of image positioning at work, especially in the elections of 1987 and

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[51] "İnönü, Ecevit'in suçlamasına cevap verdi," *Milliyet*, 10 November 1987.
[52] "Liderlere yaylım ateş," *Milliyet*, 17 October 1991.
[53] For examples of this see, "Ecevit: İktidar olacağız," *Milliyet*, 14 October 1991; "Ecevit: Seçimler at yarışı değil," Milliyet, 15 October 1991.

1991. Süleyman Demirel, upon his return to politics after the forced hiatus, engaged in politics in much the same way he had left it seven years earlier, attempting to rally the voters around the old "*kırat*" imagery employed so frequently by the AP in the 1960s and 1970s, and itself an intentional reference to the Democrat Party of the 1950s.[54] Thus, even in the 1980s, Demirel was creating party imagery that intended to channel the electorate through the practices of the defunct governing party of the 1950s, a tactic that once again demonstrates a positional instutionalization of the Turkish party system despite the number of changes in the party that fulfilled that particular *role* position. Although the extent to which the explicit summoning of the *kırat* were behind the modest election outcome for Demirel in the 1987 general elections is unclear, and he moved away from its explicit reference by 1991, the *kırat* imagery remained firmly affixed to the party emblem. At the same time, the SHP, especially as time went on, clearly demonstrated that it was channeling votes through the legacy of the CHP. For example, the emblem of the SHP was undoubtedly intended to conjure up the image of the old CHP emblem. While the latter has six arrows that shoot like a ray of light from an orb to the right on a red background, signifying the six foundational principles of the Turkish Republic attributed to Atatürk, the former has six rays of light shooting upward from an orb on a red background.

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[54] For examples, see "Saç, boşuna ağarmadı," *Milliyet*, 16 November 1987; "Başbakanlık için aşermiyorum," *Milliyet*, 17 November 1987; "Kırat'ın Doğru Yol'unda Karanlıktan Aydınlığa," Campaign Advertisement, *Milliyet*, 25 November 1987.

In the 1983 general elections, with the more seasoned politician Turgut Özal pitted against the political novices of Sunalp and Calp, one observes what appears to be an important difference in sloganry. In short, ANAP made its appeal and party propaganda through catchy slogans, helping its distinctions to stick in the minds of the electorate. Özal realized that you have to repeat ideas in order for them to stick, and thus his continued references to the party of the four old political tendencies and party slogans, such as "flower for the bee, honeycomb for the honey, and Özal for Turkey,"[55] and "the friend of the worker does not give with a spoon and take with a ladle."[56] Such discursive tactics were completely lost on the leaders of the other two parties, and this distinction has to be at least in part responsible for the outcome of the paradigm's first general election. It was not until the return of skilled and seasoned politicians in the following general election of 1987 that Özal could be said to have competition in the area of creative sloganry in political propaganda.

The political environment in this paradigm following the coup of 1980 put pressure on the politicians to avoid ideological rhetoric and focus on the issues of economic policy and democratic development. While a focus on economic policy and development was not a new feature of campaign discourse, the broad usage of the concept of the party as in the service (*hizmet*) of the nation was a notable feature of the period. While Hakan Yavuz has argued that this usage of *hizmet* has

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[55] "*Arıya çiçek, peteğe bal, Türkiye'ye Özal.*" See, "Büyük Milletimiz tecrübeli kaptanı hemen tanır," *Cumhuriyet*, 17 October 1983
[56] "Özal: İşçinin dostu, kaşıkla verip kepçeyle alan değildir," *Cumhuriyet*, 19 October 1983.

traditionally been an Islamic conception employed by Islamic political movements in Turkey,[57] a phenomenon which might have indeed been true for periods preceding multiparty politics, its wide appropriation by political parties in the 1980s belies such a narrow conceptualization. Furthermore, the first regular appropriation of such a concept of political parties by a mainstream politician could be argued to have been by Demirel in the 1977 general election.[58] His use of *hizmet*, of course, was strongly overshadowed by the other discursive patterns and imaging of the period. In any case, at least during this paradigmatic period from 1983 to 1991, one could argue that its supposed Islamic inspiration was largely put aside for a more secular and broad usage, conveying a type of appeal that seemed appropriate for an increasingly individualistic and consumer-oriented electorate.

The idea of their political parties being at the service of the society was a regular aspect of the discourse of all political parties starting in 1983, not just ANAP. Necdet Calp, the leader of the "social democratic" HP argued, for example, that the very existence of political parties was to govern the country and provide service (*hizmet vermek*).[59] Turgut Sunalp the leader of the MDP, established by the secularist military junta, was found declaring, "I will *serve* you with the people you

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[57] Yavuz defines *hizmet* as "rendering services to the state and society." M. Hakan Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 41.

[58] For examples, see the AP advertisement in the newspaper *Milliyet* on 3 June 1977, "Hizmet için tek başına iktidar"; "CHP ve MSP'yi eleştiren Demirel," *Cumhuriyet*, 21 May 1977; "Demirel: MSP olsa olsa maymuncuk olur, dedi," *Cumhuriyet*, 19 May 1977. Bülent Ecevit even used such rhetoric to define "left of center" in his defense of its usage, arguing that "left of center" meant that the state's purpose was to serve the people. See Bülent Ecevit, *Ortanın Solu* (Ankara: Kim Yayınları, 1966), p. 18.

[59] "Calp: Koalisyondan korkmamak gerekir," *Cumhuriyet*, 9 October 1983.

elect."[60] Erdal İnönü, the leader of the SHP in the 1987 and 1991 elections also regularly appropriated the language of *hizmet*. He declared, for example, that if the SHP was in government, "*hizmet* would go to every corner of the country,"[61] and that "in our understanding"—i.e. the understanding of the SHP—"the state exists to serve" (*devlet hizmet için vardır*).[62] The emphasis on *hizmet* also continued with Mesut Yılmaz in the ANAP party leadership seat. Among other references to *hizmet*, at a campaign rally he suggested that "in our homeland, lets remove politics from mere fighting and engage in politics in order to *serve* you."[63]

The stripping of strong ideological underpinnings and an emphasis on *hizmet* by the major centrist parties seems to have had a number of consequences. The idea of parties existing as competing services for the people logically decreases the voters' sense of responsibility toward the party and increases the chosen party's responsibility to the people who selected it. The voting citizen, thus, enters into the electoral contest as a potential consumer weighing out the quality and features of various options, and with the expectation that services *will be rendered*. Thus, the attractive and depolarizing *hizmet* discourse acts as a double-edged sword. While focusing on the value of *service*, one then expects that notable services will be accomplished by the party. Thus, the perceptions by voters that the previously chosen party had not been able to deliver—this being particularly important for

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[60] "Sunalp: Eksizsiz bir vekalet talep ediyorum," *Cumhuriyet*, 17 October 1983.
[61] "Özal göz boyuyor," *Milliyet*, 15 November 1987.
[62] "İnönü: ANAP'ı süpürün, gitsinler," *Milliyet*, 15 October 1991.
[63] "Yılmaz'dan, Özal'a taşlama," *Milliyet*, 13 October 1991; for other observations of ANAP in particular in terms of a focus on *services*, see Üstün Ergüder, "The Motherland Party, 1983-1989," in Metin Heper and Jacob Landau, eds., *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991), pp. 156, 159.

governing parties—justifies the subsequent search for another "service provider." Hence, while such rhetoric undoubtedly decreases the levels of politically-based social polarization, it also relieves the citizens of strong feelings of *duty* to any particular party and volatile voting patterns become a likely consequence. The observations of fragmentation, volatility and de-institutionalization of parties as the period progressed provide strong affirmation of these assumptions. Especially in this period, the "service" discourse stayed largely at the level of rhetoric and framing the nature of the "ideal" relationship between government and the electorate. As will be seen in the next chapter, the Welfare Party effectively altered this status quo by ostensibly putting the "service" discourse into practice.

At the same time, the relatively "boring" political sphere and the realization that society was not at the throats of one another led to the fairly positive contemporary interpretations of the trajectory of Turkish democracy by many students of Turkish politics, especially prior to 1994.[64] Outside of the eastern provinces of the country, many of which were embroiled in violent actions between the PKK and the military and its security organs, the relative peace-and-quiet in the political realm stood in stark contrast to the previous period and seemed to indicate that the hopes of the military regime, outside of the growing fragmentation, were being realized.

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[64] For examples of contemporary positive interpretations in this regard, see Nilüfer Göle, "Toward an Autonomization of Politics and Civil Society in Turkey," in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 213-22; Ergüder and Hofferbert, "The 1983 General Elections in Turkey," pp. 94-102; Kemal Karpat, "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980," in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), pp. 155-8. Evin, "Changing Patterns of Cleavages," p. 213.

Table 8.4 – Particular Election "Shapers" in 1983-1991 General Elections

	Major Campaign Issues	Concurrent Exogenous Factors
Nov. 1983	- Privitization (selling operation rights for the Bosphorus Bridge) - Inflation - Social Welfare / Urban Housing - National Economy	- Election followed three years of strict rule by military junta - New Constitution - Two parties with large grassroot support sat on the sidelines (occasionally interferring) - Widely spreading access to state television
Nov. 1987	- Strict provincial electoral threshold implemented by the ANAP government - ANAP's record in government - Inflation / National Economy - PKK terror / Marshall law in Southeast	- Sudden return of the pre-1980 political elite
Oct. 1991	- Need for change from ANAP governance - Television propaganda and private stations - Inter-party alliances - PKK terror - Better deliverance of social services	- Sudden emergence of privately-run television channels like Star-1 and Mega-10

Finally, with system fragmentation occurring following the 1983 campaign and picking up speed as the old political leaders returned to the contest in the 1987 general elections, as the Provisional Article 4 of the Constitution, which forbade the political activities of former party leaders, was repealed by referendum, the discursive attacks took on a new pattern.[65] With multiple parties competing on the moderate left and moderate right, political engagement became an electoral battle on two fronts, between what Kalaycıoğlu refers to as opponents (those opposite one's political outlook) and competitors (those competing within the "same

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[65] The referendum to repeal the article passed by a razor-thin majority (50.1 percent). For more on the controversial decisions and events in regard to bringing back the old guard, see Ergun Özbudun, "Democratization of the Constitutional and Legal Framework," in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 43-4; and Ahmet Evin, "Demilitarization and Civilianization of the Regime," in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 32.

electoral turf").[66] Thus, campaign speeches took on the role of attacking one's competitor—greater priority seemed to be leveled at this aim—and then one's largest opponent. Ecevit and, to a lesser extent, Erdal İnönü, would attack one another and then ANAP. Demirel and Özal (later Yılmaz) would go at each other before dealing with the parties located to the "left". Such a two-pronged strategy had a clear rationale; one was most likely to attract or persuade new voters from the parties that took similar positions and catered to overlapping domains of identification. Though not an impossibility, the difficulty of wooing voters from opponent parties made attacks on those parties a secondary concern.

Figure 8.1 – Two-Pronged Campaign Attack (1987-1991)

"Left"   "Right"

SHP (İnönü)   ANAP (Özal Yılmaz)

DSP (Ecevit)   DYP (Demirel)

8.2.2 Non-discursive Campaign Strategies

With the utility of nearly all previous forms of non-discursive mobilization on the wane, though these were not entirely discarded, the need to gather large segments of the electorate demanded new and creative strategies. The penchant for charismatic leadership and the growing distance between the voter and a particular party gave a window of opportunity to those able to master the fast-developing means of propaganda through media technology, particularly television and its later

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[66] Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "The Motherland Party: The Challenge of Institutionalization in a Charismatic Leader Party," in Barry Rubin and Metin Heper, eds., *Political Parties in Turkey* (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 53.

expansion with the advent of private channels outside the direct control of the state. In addition to this important new tool of contestation, in what would become an important catalyst in shifting the paradigm away from the "center", minor ideological parties formed a unified electoral platform with one another or with a larger party in order to leap the 10 percent threshold set by the military and enter the parliament, re-fragmenting into their original parties once their seat in the Assembly was secure. These minor religious or nationalistic ideology parties, virtually ignored prior to 1991, suddenly became a force to be reckoned with and began to change the entire divide (or divides) on which political parties and the system drew up the lines of battle.

On October 22, 1983, Turkey tuned in to the state-run television channel TRT to view the first ever open-forum campaign debate in the nation's history. It was estimated that 33 million Turkish viewers across the country—the largest number of viewers for a television program in the country's history up to that point[67]—gathered together to watch Turgut Sunalp, Necdet Calp and Turgut Özal discursively "duke-it-out" in a live debate. Sunalp's long experience as a high-ranking officer and Calp's lifetime in bureaucratic civil service paid little dividend against the naturally-gifted speaker, Özal. Polling and analysis following the results of the debate clearly show that Özal had dominated.[68] Milliyet, conducting surveys

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[67] "Liderler bol bol vaadde bulundu," *Milliyet*, 23 October 1983.
[68] For examples see, *Cumhuriyet*, 23 October 1983; and "Özal önde gidiyor," *Milliyet*, 24 October 1983. Students of Turkish politics who have discussed the role of television in this election also come to the same conclusions. For example, Hale writes, "For the first time in Turkey's electoral history, television played a major role in the campaign," and describes Özal as "an accomplished TV performer." Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, p. 267.

regarding the results of the televised debate, found that based on certain qualities of leadership demonstrated in the debate, Özal was found to lead the others with 58 percent of those surveyed choosing him while 25 percent chose Calp and 17 percent selected Sunalp.[69] When asked to choose which party they would vote for in the upcoming election, though more than half were still undecided, ANAP had more than twice as many votes as the next closest party—i.e. Calp's HP.[70] The clear electoral margin acquired by Özal from the success of the debate was more or less maintained steadily the following two weeks and in the election.

Much has been made of the speech President Evren made right before the election that suggested that Evren and the junta was clearly in support of the MDP and concerned about ANAP.[71] Some have even gone so far to suggest that the speech led to a "protest vote" against the military's interference into "the nitty-gritty of politics,"[72] suggesting that the motivation behind voting for ANAP was largely due to a desire to protest the military's muddling into democratic affairs. The general emphasis further suggests that, whether intended or not, that the cryptic proclamations of Evren had a substantial effect on the outcome of the election.[73] If one takes this course of action, one is confronted with a number of confounding

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[69] "Özal önde gidiyor," *Milliyet*, 24 October 1983.
[70] Ibid.
[71] For an account of the speech, see "MGK icraatını sürdürecek yönetimi getireceğinize inanıyorum," Milliyet, 5 November 1983.
[72] Ahmet Evin, "Demilitarization and Civilianization of the Regime," in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 25.
[73] For example, Kalaycıoğlu's analysis—"When President Evren declared his dislike for ANAP right before the November 6, 1983 elections, the electorate rejected his tutelary predisposition, and signaled that they desired a fast return to multiparty, civilian rule"—leaves open the possibility of a non-effect but the causal structure of the sentence suggests that the declaration had a consequential effect on the election results. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Dynamics: Bridge Across Troubled Lands* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 132.

problems. First of all, the polling results available before the election all point to the fact that, in what is the most astonishing aspect of Evren's last-minute election tutelary guidance, the speech had basically a non-effect. In fact, if it had any effect, it might have reduced ANAP's share of the vote by a slight margin and given it to MDP, but based on inevitable polling error and such a slight difference, such notions could not be confirmed.[74] Second, with very little difference between the polling estimates and the final results, considering that Evren had not shown any clear preference prior to the speech on November 4, it becomes hard to claim that the impetus behind support of ANAP was a "protest vote." In addition to this, Turgut Özal, had been appointed in 1980 as the deputy prime minister of economic affairs and worked in such a capacity until 1982; the military was clearly on board with his economic program, the very platform on which ANAP was campaigning. Furthermore, while two other centrist parties sat on the sidelines of the campaign unquestionably due to the will of the junta, ANAP was allowed to compete also obviously through the will of the junta; they could have easily have also vetoed ANAP out of the elections. Finally, Özal himself, when asked by the reporters which party was closest to the desires of the junta, argued that ANAP was closest to the junta regime in terms of outlook and a desire for a unified Turkey.[75] Taken together, these considerations make it very hard to claim that Evren influenced the elections or that the electorate chose to support ANAP simply in protest of the

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[74] Hale also points out that Özal, in fact, claimed that the speech cost him five percentage points. Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, p. 268.
[75] Cumhuriyet, October????

military. What seems less controversial in lieu of the evidence, is that, while the military's tutelary guidance regarding the election had little effect, the ultimate shape of the election outcome can be attributed to Özal's more effective discursive campaigning in general and his success against the others in the newly exploited medium of television in particular.

In the general election of 1987, Özal, now confronted with politicians more of his political mettle, utilizing his government's power of the state-run television channels, chose to block debates or any extended campaigning by the other political parties on television. The government's refusal to let the other parties compete in a forum and have campaign-related interview programs with reporters led Süleyman Demirel, who had recently returned to politics through a referendum along with the other old guard, to refer to the election as the "silent election."[76] The other political leaders were limited to taping a short political infomercial that was aired beginning just one week prior to the elections. Once again, success in this medium, even considering the short duration allotted, appeared to have a significant impact on some of the party's fortunes. Based on polling of the public and other experts on the political advertisements, Erdal İnönü was considered to have been the most successful at the infomercial endeavor.[77] The polling company KONDA, which had been conducting regular polling research for the daily newspaper *Milliyet* showed that İnönü's SHP had jumped in strength from 18 percent prior to the airing of the campaign informercial to 29.8 percent the day after it first appeared on

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[76] "Çelik ceket parçalandı," *Milliyet*, 22 November 1987.
[77] "Ekran Savaşı," *Milliyet*, 23 November 1987.

television.[78]   While the other parties maintained their previous percentages or dipped very slightly, the SHP made a huge gain and appeared to pick up a large number of the undecided voters. Though they would lose a few points by election day (they ended up with 24.8 percent of the national vote), the potential power of successful campaigning through the new and widespread medium of television seemed to have been demonstrated once again.

In 1991, with the advent of private television channels, the ability for the government to control who was broadcasting what and when was suddenly stripped away, and for the right price, political parties and politicians could make their case on these new Turkish channels beamed into the country by satellite. In an excellent study of the 1991 general elections, Ayşe Öncü describes the new environment:

> More than sixty-five percent of Turkish households switched on their television sets to gaze at color-sound images of politicians and political parties created by marketing consultants. In the living rooms of some seven million families, close-ups of electoral candidates competed with familiar faces of talk-show hosts and anchorpersons. Popular tunes of political commercials intermingled with video-clips of rock music and advertising jingles. Voice-over flashes of ideo-terms such as "welfare," "freedom," "rights," "representation," and the master-term "democracy," superimposed over pictures of cheering crowds in political rallies, joined the stream of flashforwards announcing various forthcoming attractions.[79]

This account demonstrates the electoral "gold-rush" by political parties and politicians to capitalize on the goldmine of visual media, which through private television opened up new spaces of competition in rapid fashion. The tools to

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[78] "SHP oylarında patlama," *Milliyet*, 27 November 1987.
[79] Öncü, "Packaging Islam," pp. 57-8; see also, Ergun Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), p. 84.

attract voters to one's party were no longer simply discursive or materially-based, as was the case with the effective machine-politics of the DP in the 1950s; instead, the goal became to draw the electorate and make one's appeal *visually*.

This exploitation of visual elements could be seen even in advertisements by political parties in newspapers. While the trend to pay for newspaper advertisements became a regular practice by 1977, they originally started as basically open letters with a memorable slogans and the party symbol. The public enthusiasm for new visual mediums, best represented by television, seemed to coincide with newspaper advertisements that were increasingly visual in their appeals. Attractive pictures of the party leader rousing a massive crowd at a huge rally, the actual event of which consequently became less relevant as parties could more rapidly spread their messages to greater numbers in less time through more technological means, became the backdrop of an appeal for support.

As Öncü also notes one of the more creative and image-transforming visual appeals in 1991 came from the Islamist-oriented Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*, RP). Traditionally seen as the party of small town merchants of Central Anatolia, they suddenly were able to increase their votes in every segment of the country, including the large urban areas where they had previously been almost non-existent. While Öncü interprets the 1991 election results for the party as only a moderate success,[80] which seems an understatement considering that they more than doubled their previous election totals in the vast majority of provinces and managed to

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[80] Ibid., pp. 59-60.

hurdle the threshold and enter parliament for the first time in post-1980 politics, she points out the critical point that the party capitalized on the new visual environment by creating a new image of the party, presenting itself as "simply ordinary."[81] Rather than present the viewing public, whether on television or through newspapers, with images of the aging leader Necmettin Erbakan, who by the way, was rated poorly by the public in his television infomercial in 1987, they provided images of regular citizens explaining why they would support the RP. They included people from all portions of society, and their problems were usually based in existing economic injustices.[82] The images created the impression of a thoroughly modern and mainstream party concerned about the cares of the current economic environment and was a far cry from the traditional caricatures of voters for an Islamist party.

While one might also pose other reasons why the RP might have gained in strength at the loss of votes from ANAP, including increasing defection of leaders from the Islamist faction of the party as the liberal faction gained strength culminating in the appointment of Mesut Yılmaz as party leader,[83] the creative and unexpected advertising campaign by the RP certainly played a role in their acquisition of votes in new and unexpected segments of the population. Thus, once again effective and creative utilization of the new opportunities provided in the

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[81] Ibid., p. 60.
[82] For a quick snapshot of a number of these characters and advertisements at once, see the RP advertisement in Milliyet, "Sizi Anlıyoruz," *Milliyet*, 19 October 1991.
[83] Their electoral merger with the MÇP and very small IDP also played some role in the final result, but their vote totals far surpassed what these other parties could bring in simply by their addition. The significance of this merger will also be discussed below.

arena of contestation demonstrated that one could alter ones electoral fortunes by "packaging" one's campaign message in the newly available visual mediums.[84] Its regular exploitation by political parties would be completely consolidated by the following paradigmatic period.

The ability to communicate with wide audiences simultaneously also created clear consequences for party organizational structures. Although the military junta had no doubt intended to reduce centralized party power and increase intraparty democratic procedures, the new technologies put natural pressure on parties to consolidate power around national charismatic leadership.[85] As long as the party could communicate its message broadly from a central location to local communities spread throughout the country, the electoral mobilization utility of local party leaders was once again diminished. To pay for marketing and broadly disseminated advertisements through existing media, capital and emphasis necessarily had to be channeled toward the center rather than the other way around in order to get the message out.[86] These new realities along with large subsidies provided by the state strongly directed electorally successful political parties in Turkey toward an "electoral-professional" form of party structuring.[87]

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[84] Toprak has also noted how this expansion of technological communication has affected politics. See, Binnaz Toprak, "Islam and Democracy in Turkey," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2005), p. 174.

[85] This observation has also been made by Özbudun. See, Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics*, p. 84.

[86] See, Russell Dalton and Martin Wattenberg, "Unthinkable Democracy: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies," in Russell Dalton and Martin Wattenberg, eds., *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 13.

[87] For the description of this type of party in comparative literature, see Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). This trend is

Another particularly important strategy effectively employed in 1991 was entering into electoral alliances with other parties in order to pass the 10 percent national threshold established by the military junta. From the perspective of the military regime that ruled in the interim between 1980 and 1983, the explicit purpose of the relatively high national threshold was to prevent a fragmented system with weak coalition governments and the entrance of small regional and ideological parties into parliament. Both of these aims would presumably help to foster the sort of centrist and consensual politics the military, and of course, many in society, were hoping for. In 1991, several parties that had been only a marginal force in the 1980s merged their candidates onto lists with other parties to ensure that they would pass the necessary national threshold. While in the 1980s, the views of Islamists, Turkish nationalists and Kurdish nationalists had been moderated through factional representation in large centrist parties, suddenly each of these groups were representing themselves in their own right underneath their individual party banners. What appeared to be an inauspicious beginning, ended up having huge ramifications for the Turkish party system.

In 1987, the RP, the MÇP, and the Reformist Democracy Party (*Islahatçı Demokrasi Partisi*, IDP) had managed to garner only 10.9 percent of the national vote between them, the lion share of this going to the RP (7.2 percent) while the MÇP and IDP received less than 3 percent and 1 percent respectively. All of the

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also noted in Perkin's study regarding structure and agency. Doug Perkins, "The Role of Organizations, Patronage and the Media in Party Formation," *Party Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1996), pp. 355-75.

parties, of course, fell below the 10 percent threshold. These parties made an electoral calculation that by pooling their candidates into one list, under the banner of the RP, that their combined strength would push them over the 10 percent hurdle. This, of course, happened as the RP coalition was able to garner 16.9 percent of the vote, and then, once in parliament, the electoral alliance ended with the division of the parties once again under their old party banners. Certainly, the alliance probably served to encourage voters to vote for this coalition of conservative right parties as their combined strength, particularly of the RP and MÇP would likely put them over the institutionalized barrier. This foot in the door of the Assembly, which brought them into the realm of legitimized parties, suddenly gave particular voice to religiously conservative and ultra-nationalist concerns and proved to be a critical spark for the RP whose electoral shares continued to climb to their peak in 1995. Its ability to creatively utilize the media during campaigns and combine electoral lists with competitors played important roles in its electoral successes in the first half the 1990s.[88]

In terms of electoral alliances, another very critical merger took place on the "left" between the SHP and the largely Kurdish and southeast-oriented HEP (People's Labor Party—*Halkın Emek Partisi*). As can be seen from the previous periods, the CHP, in whose shadow the SHP walked, had always been comprised of a national coalition that connected the West with the East. The Kurds in the

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[88] One must also include with this their application of *hizmet* and partnering civic organizations at the local government level, but this issue will be covered in the following chapter. It is less relevant in this period as the RP's rise to power seems to have been first dependent on these electoral strategies, and their mobilization at the local level built off of the foot in the door that occurred in 1991.

southeast had always been an important element of this formula though for different reasons at different times. With the growth of various "leftist" ideologies among the Kurds, connections were maintained with the CHP and then the SHP on these lines. Parliament deputies like Ahmet Türk had been the representative face of the CHP in the southeast in the 1970s and the party had, even when experiencing a break with many of the area's large landowners, always managed to gather together at least a moderate amount of votes from these provinces. As a "social democratic" party, the SHP also presented the image of being pluralist and an advocate of the expansion of democratic freedoms, which encouraged the maintainance of a faction of Kurdish political elites within the party. Furthermore, the total elimination of "Kurdish" political organizations following the coup and the continued suppression of such non-violent political expression made the SHP the closest legal association to represent the concerns of Kurds that were under "State of Emergency" (OHAL) rule in the southeast.

With the rise of PKK terrorism and the actions of a conservative faction within the SHP led by Deniz Baykal to steal the party leadership away from Erdal İnönü and move the party in a more conservative direction, the "Kurdish and Alevi" faction in the party increasingly came under attack from within the party itself following the 1987 general elections. According to some, the SHP was under the occupation of Kurds and Alevis.[89] After a number of confrontations and pressure within the party from General Secretary Baykal and others in his faction like Ali

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[89] Osman Ölmez, *Türkiye Siyasetinde DEP Depremi* (Ankara: Doruk Yayınları, 1995), p. 62.

Topuz, a large number of these Kurdish deputies had been pushed out of the party and left to their own devices. On June 7, 1990, 11 of the 19 deputies expelled from the SHP formed HEP (some of the remaining deputies would join later).[90] Thus, the core of this new party had come from the SHP and, for the most part, formed the vote potential for the SHP in the southeastern provinces. It was very likely that, for this reason, as the 1991 election approached, the SHP made the initial gestures toward HEP to form an alliance, despite the fact that the gestures were toward politicians that had been pushed out of their own party. Though it took a while for both sides to agree on the terms, the two parties agreed to an electoral alliance under the SHP in early Septemeber of 1991.

This merger turned out to be the last hoorah to date for the long-standing East-West alliance begun under CHP and continuing with the SHP, operating in its place after the former party's closure. With the military and security forces in armed combat with the PKK and its leader Abdullah Öcalan, it was easy for the western-based Turkish supporters of the party, who typically had a culturally homogenious understanding of "Turkishness", to see the alliance with Kurdish nationalists, who were seeking an acknowledgment of a "Kurdish" problem and decentralization, as a move to shelter separatists. The general election results showed a clear pattern: the SHP took clear electoral hits in the western provinces while they held their ground or made gains in the east (see Table 8.5). For these supporters of the party in the western provinces, their worst fears seemed realized

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[90] Ibid., p. 108.

after these SHP/HEP members famously insisted on speaking Kurdish during their oath-swearing inauguration ceremony in parliament on December 6, 1991, an action that initiated international fame (or infamy) for Leyla Zana who came to the podium wearing a bandana of the colors commonly associated with "Kurdistan", and their ultimate separation from the party and reformation as ÖZEP and then HEP through the course of 1992.[91] Though the lists of HEP candidates that would campaign under the SHP umbrella were largely determined by Erdal İnönü and other members of the SHP, popular accusations arose that these HEP candidates to run under the SHP ticket were personally approved by the PKK leader Öcalan.[92]

Table 8.5 – The Changing Regional Fortunes of the SHP[93]

	1987	1991	1995
Marmara	26.7	18.0	9.8
Aegean	24.3	19.3	11.1
Mediterranean	28.3	25.4	14.5
North Central	22.4	19.0	10.7
South Central	17.3	16.6	8.2
Black Sea	17.9	13.9	7.1
Central East	28.8	28.4	14.8
Northeast	24.7	23.0	11.9
Southeast	19.8	36.5	3.8

Thus, what appeared to be, at least on the superficial level, a reconciliation between the major elements on the "left" of the Turkish political spectrum,

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[91] One of the reasons that HEP had agreed to join with the SHP in the first place was that its party had been officially banned from competing in the elections. They had debated running as independents or even join in an alliance with the RP (which had accrued some sympathy among Kurds in general), but the leftists in the party ultimately rejected the latter possibility. ÖZEP was the acronym for the Freedom and Equality Party (*Özgürluk ve Eşitlik Partisi*) that was a short-lived transition party prior to returning to the HEP label. Ibid., pp. 163, 195-202.

[92] Ibid., p. 195-202.

[93] The SHP joined with the CHP prior to the 1995 elections after the latter was reformed in September of 1992. The reformed CHP under the leadership of Deniz Baykal had been a split-off faction of the SHP; thus, the merger of the two parties could be seen as a re-merger of the old SHP but under new leadership. Election data taken from, *Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri*, pp. 98-243.

ultimately led to a severe cleavage that would ultimately divide the country into "East" and "West" as far as political "left" positioning is concerned. While the leftists of the East maintained an understanding of left that emphasized socioeconomic justice, "pluralism", and a decentralized state, albeit with a clear "Kurdish" identity underlying the appeals, those on the West were left with a guiding ideology that increasingly became centered on a maintenance of the status quo and a focus on a fairly rigid interpretation of Kemalism, the resulting underlying nationalism of which allowed these parties to make headway toward reconciliation with the nationalist right, with whom many of their young members had been in mortal combat with in the 1970s. This drastic cleavage on the left would come to have a significant impact in shaping the party system and the discursive framework of the subsequent paradigm.[94]

8.3 Domains of Identification

Though the Turkish electorate in this short paradigmatic period, which managed to be maintained only through the general election of 1991, tended to view themselves as centrist[95] and society, if not the political elite themselves, tended to approach political competition much more harmoniously, the old line of "left" and "right" held a great deal of its shape. As discussed above, though the political

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[94] This ideological division on the "left" is excellently manifested in Çarkoğlu's fascinating empirical study of the "left" and "right" in Turkey as a dependent variable. See the discussion of this work in chapter five, and Ali Çarkoğlu, "The Nature of Left-Right Ideological Self-Placement in the Turkish Context," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2007), pp. 253-71.

[95] A phenomenon also effectively demonstrated by the work of Çarkoğlu, who has done successive graphing of "left/right" self-identification of voters, showing a huge clustering of the electorate in the center, particularly in 1990. Ali Çarkoğlu, "The Turkish Party System in Transition: Party Performance and Agenda Change," *Political Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 3 (1998), p. 552.

parties seemed to intentionally deemphasize their "positioning," especially in its "left/right" understanding, the voters still behaved, in large measure, according to the understanding of "left/right" in the previous paradigm.[96] Urban blue-collar workers and the lower classes tended to vote for parties on the left, while the middle-class and rural communities showed a preference for parties on the "right." In other words, although the existing "institutionalization" from the previous periods had been deemphasized and the parties appeared to take fairly middle-of-the-road positions, except with notable but moderate distinctions in economic policy approaches, voters still acted according to the pre-coup institutionalized patterns. ANAP, especially at the beginning, had overlain the divide somewhat even between "left" and "right." But their major electoral achievement was to gather the old "National Front" coalition of the previous decade in one party and under the guidance of "liberal" leadership. This phenomenon was partly inspired by the centrist outlook of the country coming out of junta rule and, to some extent, was itself an inspiring element that encouraged centrism. Ironically, the lack of polarization in society due to the centrist outlook, beside the return of the old guard in 1987, probably also hastened the fragmentation back into nationalist, Islamist, and economically-liberal conservative groupings, as there was no threatening menace for which a common front was necessary.

The results and ramifications of the 1991 general elections would come to rattle the foundational line between left and right. With the East-West cleavage

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[96] Ergüder and Hofferbert, "The 1983 General Elections in Turkey," pp. 98-9.

occurring on the left, the constellation of attributes and meanings associated with the left, especially in the West, shifted away from the economy and toward socio-cultural concerns that created a platform primarily focused on maintaining the status quo. In the West, those who had supported the parties on the left largely from class and economic concerns found a more sympathetic ear in the populist and distributive parties of the religious right. Thus, while the designations of "left" and "right" enabled these blocs to contain a decent portion of the electorate who had been associated with the corresponding labeling of previous paradigms, the changing of substantive meanings in these relational positionings allowed for a measure of electoral shifting between these blocs. This shift will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

8.4 Conclusion

Although one could level a great many criticisms toward decisions made by the military junta in the process of "reestablishing democracy" in the country, it is easy to imagine how they could justify their overall aims and motivations inspiring their decision-making, even if some of their apparent hopes were a bit unrealistic. It was not only the military that was seeking an end to the years of fratricide that was snuffing out the futures of many of its young citizens in particular; certainly society as a whole was happy to see the reprieve in violence under the military regime. The objective to foster a harmonious society that was bound together by essential shared values seemed a worthy endeavor, at least on paper. The assumption, however, that the disgruntled ethnically Kurdish or Kurdish-speaking

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citizens of the country would be pacified by restrictive laws and physical force and be willing to acquiesce to a political system that allowed them to enter only if muzzled seems particularly problematic. Removing legal and legitimate channels for protest from elements in society that have grievances, whether or not these are seen as warranted, strongly encourages social violence and anti-system behavior as the remaining outlets for protest. Perhaps the excessive measures to direct society toward the center actually fragmented it in the end as all potential pressure valves had been closed off.

The military's decision to punish the old guard of political elites was probably also an action for which plausible self-justification by the junta could have been made. Removing politicians like Ecevit and Demirel who, despite their slight differences in actual political outlook, fomented extreme opposition and caricatures of one another and created an unnecessary political impasse that simply exacerbated the growing societal chaos, might seem understandable. However, the military's subsequent decision to artificially prop up inexperienced but loyal leaders who had little political charisma only served to encourage the justification of the return of the more experienced political leaders. Had moderate parties like SODEP and DYP, which clearly had more grassroots organization and impetus, been allowed to compete with ANAP rather than the MDP and the HP, the need for the others to return might have seemed less pressing and fragmentation might have not reached the levels it did.

Finally, whatever Evren and the leaders of the junta thought about Özal, his personality and social outlook essentially embodied the centrist paradigm that the leaders of the military regime were ultimately hoping for. His eclectic personality and pragmatic behavior allowed him to seem an approachable figure for a large swath of society, from Islamists to secularists, liberals to nationalists. ANAP's ability to straddle, more or less, the political center ultimately hinged on Özal's ability to represent and moderate the various factions collected within the party. Subsequent leaders of the party did not have the charisma (Akbulut in particular) or the ability to inspire confidence and loyalty in other factions (Yılmaz could not be seen as an effective leader of Islamists or ultra-nationalists) that could keep the party's internal coalition together. His exiting the party to fill the vacant seat of the Presidency raised a critical question of legitimacy for the party both internal and external the party walls. Özal's rather short career as a national politician, thus, coincides well with the rather short paradigmatic period with which he is associated. Though he could be attributed with a great many mistakes and shortcomings, it is hard to not conclude that one could see in his leadership an essential incarnation of the brief paradigmatic national centralist orientation.

CHAPTER 9

THE CULTURE-IDENTITY PARADIGM – 1995-2007

Don't burn your own mattress by your anger at Deniz Baykal. He has also saddened and disappointed me. He eliminated democracy within the party and has taken the party in the wrong direction. But what can we do; these are our friends. For this reason alone, it is both right and necessary to give our support to the CHP.[1]
--SHP politician Dr. Gürbüz Çapan on why the CHP should be supported (2007)

With our conservative democrat identity, the Ak Party desires to rebuild the fragmented center-right in Turkey along with eliminating the old understandings of politics, and place our political foundations in the center. . . The Ak Party, in a very short period, has reached its objective and sits at the very center of Turkish politics.[2]
--Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (2002)

In 1965, one party's campaign strategy became an important factor in the shifting of the paradigm that structured the party system. This party (the Republican People's Party, CHP), which operated in the center of politics, brought from the outside of the traditional arena of contest, not an entirely new discourse or policy outlook, but the novelty of the "left of center" imaging.[3] Thus, without

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[1] "İttifakı destekliyoruz," *Cumhuriyet*, 5 July 2007.
[2] "Erdoğan: Merkeze talibiz," *Radikal*, 17 October 2002.
[3] As discussed in chapter 6 and chapter 7, the constraints on ideological associations put the concept of "left" outside the realm of legitimate competition. This constraint had been relaxed significantly by the 1961 Constitution, paving the way for an electorally marginal leftist party, the Turkish

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drastically changing its political program or approach to politics, which had begun to coincide with its "left of center" imaging at least into the late 1950s, it infused the system with an ideological flavor by bringing the taboo expression "left" into mainstream politics. Approximately thirty years later, nearly the converse situation occurred, an "outsider" party with a taboo but long-standing image—i.e. Islamist / religious conservative—and "anti-establishment"[4] rhetoric brought itself into the center of the system, not by changing its image, but by newly taking on and prioritizing (and ultimately mastering) mainstream (ordinary) policies and tactics again resulting in a critical shift in the national political paradigm. Ultimately, they took the "service" discourse of the previous period and very deliberately put it into practice, particularly in needy urban communities, and through incarnating the discourse, catapulted themselves into a mainstream political contender; however, it was arguably not the Welfare Party's *practices* or policies that led to an altering of the paradigmatic approach to politics, but rather their *image* as an Islamist party endowed with governing power, as they were the leader of a coalition with the True Path Party for about a year from June of 1996 to June of 1997 when they were pushed out of government through pressure from the military and a number of civil society organizations, largely comprised of various business and economic organizations and those groups commonly associated with what is referred to as "the secular establishment."

Workers Party, to compete legally, and for the CHP to specify their position in "left/right" terminology.
[4] See Robert Barr, "Populists, Outsiders and Anti-Establishment Politics," *Party Politics*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2009), pp. 29-48.

Thus, the "rise of Islamic Fundamentalism" began to color the interpretations of politics and society in Turkey in general, and most issues in Turkish society, including electoral behavior, have become popularly compartmentalized into oppositional secular and religious camps.[5] While the accuracy of such oppositional formulations is also the subject of considerable debate, what seems more evident in this paradigmatic period of electoral competition is that, socio-cultural identities, issues and cultural cleavages have come to play a role in campaign discourse at a level never before encountered in electoral contest in Turkey—one could, in fact, argue that it was almost entirely absent in the strategies of all major parties in all previous paradigms, the parties of which explicitly avoided dividing society into any notable cultural divisions. The Welfare Party scare, however, triggered a heightened-sensitivity to any manifestation of religious devotion in the public sphere that encouraged a significant segment of society to rally in defense of the existing interpretation of secularism and the preservation of the status quo and their way of life. Electoral discourse, thus, switched from policy, campaign promises and "service", to the persuading of segments in society of the existence of a national and socio-cultural threat that must be defended against.

Meanwhile, the ethnic terrorism and retaliatory violence that began in 1984 in the eastern and southeastern provinces with large populations of ethnically

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[5] For a clear example of this binary conceptualization in caricatured form, see the pseudo-academic work: Zeyno Baran, "Turkey Divided," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2008), pp. 55-69.

Kurdish citizens continued at a heightened pace in the 1990s. With the death-toll rising and the fears of Kurdish separatism, the fortunes of the explicitly nationalist National Action Party (MHP) also began to rise.[6] Thus, the poles of discourse in the electoral arena, which, of course, also found its place in the governmental and legislative arenas, began to take shape as a primary pole between religious conservatives and secularists[7] with a secondary pole of Turkish nationalists versus Kurdish nationalists and pluralists. For parties such as the CHP, the MHP and the succession of Kurdish leftist nationalist parties, their representation of particular identities (secularism, Turkishness, Kurdishness, respectively) in response to a perceived threat has become more of a primary dimension of competition—i.e. an explicit strategy employed to mobilize votes. For the Justice and Development Party (AKP), in particular, and to a lesser extent, the Welfare Party (RP), their religious identities, as it relates to electoral competition, were at least instrumentally

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[6] The nationalism of the National Action Party (MHP, which had been known as MÇP for a brief period from 1983 until early 1993) is hard to classify, certainly as it has existed in different periods of time. If we discuss it in terms of its official positions at the national leadership level, it would have to be understood as a mixture of primarily cultural and partially civic nationalist characteristics. Although "ultra" nationalist in the sense that the party gives extreme priority to "nationalism" as a guiding principle, this principle has most consistently placed the "unitary state" as its ultimate object of attention, not with ethnic or racial concerns; thus, it found itself expressed in extreme anti-communist sentiment in the 1970s, and its position in regard to Kurds is not ethnic, but if anything cultural with an emphasis in prioritizing the homogenizing unity of the state over that of any group or individual. Hence, I use the expression "explicitly nationalist" because it more accurately emphasizes their focus on nationalism as a political paradigm more than the nature of the nationalism itself. See also, Metin Heper, "Turkey: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow," *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (2001), p. 8.

[7] By this I am referring to those adhering to Kuru's concept of "assertive secularism," which means that "the state excludes religion from the public sphere and plays an "assertive" role as the agent of a social engineering project that confines religion to the private domain." For more, see Ahmet Kuru, "Passive and Assertive Secularism: Historical Conditions, Ideological Struggles, and State Policies Toward Religion," *World Politics*, Vol. 59, No. 4 (2007), p. 571.

placed in a secondary position—i.e. as a domain of identification.[8]   Though

certainly some voters supported these parties because of their religious credentials,

the mobilization and appeal to the voters very intentionally prioritized, not the

sacred, but the profane material and policy-based concerns of the electorate. Hence,

ironically, in this paradigmatic period, the parties most associated with the

"modernization" discourse that emphasizes functional approaches to voting

behavior relied heavily on a platform that depicted a cultural conflict, portraying a

secularist identity "threatened" by the "backward" Islamists, while those with

devout Muslim credentials excessively focus on development and economic

concerns in their attempts to mobilize voters.   Furthermore, the nationalists

traditionally placed at the extreme poles of the political spectrum have benefited

from the current political environment by playing a moderating and conciliatory

role in between the polar positions of the larger parties.[9]   All of this will be

elaborated in the following sections of this chapter.

9.1 The Context of the Paradigm: The Rise of the Welfare Party

In 1984, the ANAP government passed legislation that was hailed as a major

step to decentralizing government and putting democratic participation at the

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[8] As will be discussed, the Welfare Party DID tend to emphasize its association with religious concerns in its discourse, but the electoral strategy of the party suggests that electoral discourse itself was seen as a secondary vehicle for mobilization behind the strategies for which it exerted far greater effort—i.e. the focus on the local and material context of voters.

[9] In fact, in the party's 2009 political program, it describes itself as occupying the "social center" position in Turkish politics. See, *Parti Programı: Geleceğe Doğru* (Ankara: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, 2009), p. 15; this 'centrist' understanding of the party in the current paradigm has also been observed by Heper and İnce. See Metin Heper and Başak İnce, "Devlet Bahçeli and 'Far Right' Politics in Turkey, 1999-2002," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 6 (2006), p. 874.

doorstep of the population at the local level. Starting with Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, in contrast to the old system in which large cities were subsumed under provincial governance with little financial discretion, large metropolitan areas were redrawn into a two-tiered system of governance with an elected greater metropolitan municipal mayor and a number of district governments under the mayors domain but also with their own level of autonomy and responsibilities.[10] Along with an increased level of elected local governance, the new laws also provided for a large expansion in the financial resources and autonomy at the local level.[11] This change that brought about popular representation by parties with large budgets at their disposal led, of course, to greater democratic accountability and participation at the local level, but it also provided opportunities for parties competing for governing power at the national level.

First, by presenting a local party leader to run for mayor of a large metropolitan area, if that leader demonstrated success in distributing local funds for the improvement of the city in recognizable ways, a party could create a huge potential vote bank for itself from these densely populated metropolitan centers. As Öncü points out, "the mayor of Istanbul has more votes behind him than any national politician."[12] This, of course, was a sword that could cut both ways.

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[10] For more on this, see Metin Heper, "Introduction," in Metin Heper, ed., *Democracy and Local Government: Istanbul in the 1980s* (North Humberside: Eothen Press, 1987), pp. 4-8.

[11] See Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Decentralization of Government," in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 91-4.

[12] Ayşe Öncü, "The Potentials and Limitations of Local Government Reform in Solving Urban Problems: The Case of Istanbul," in Metin Heper, ed., *Dilemmas of Decentralization: Municipal Government in Turkey* (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1986), p. 63.

Furthermore, with successive channels of machine politics shut down or greatly limited at the national level, the new financial windfalls at the local level could provide an avenue to engage in clientelistic brokerage on the parties' behalf in the local context with much the same consequence when national elections roll around.[13] While it would be difficult, and perhaps unfair, to argue that ANAP's impetus for decentralizing local governance was self-serving and political, it would also be difficult to claim that they were unaware of the possibilities provided to political parties stemming from the new municipal government legislation. Kalaycıoğlu points out, for instance, that the ANAP national government also saw fit to try to recentralize local governance after it suffered major losses in the 1989 local elections.[14] Thus, though we cannot argue that ANAP's motivation for changes in local government was simply electoral strategy, their behavior in this regard suggests that they were at least cognizant of local governance's strategic power.

While this local restructuring offered the possibility of a critical new channel for "decentralized" machine politics for national parties, potentially mobilizing the electorate for national parties through the performance and distribution of services by the local party leaders to their constituents, by the late 1980s the increasing fragmentation of governments at both the national and local level, the growing debt of localities in relation to the state despite the increased

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[13] Ibid., p. 73.
[14] Kalaycıoğlu, "Decentralization in Government," p. 95. Öncü also discusses potential electorally strategic motivations behind the two-tiered system in order to mitigate potential losses at one of the two levels. Öncü, "Potentials and Limitations of Local Government," pp. 72-3.

local budgets and revenues, and the reversion of the local leaders to corruption and particularistic clientelism[15] caused party performance at the local level to become largely a hindrance rather than a benefit to the national party organ (particularly to the SHP),[16] with the critical exception of the Welfare Party.[17]

Starting with only two provincial governments (Van and Urfa) following the first post-coup local elections in 1984, the RP managed to maintain and add to the provinces it controlled until their surprising success in the local elections of 1994, in which it managed to take the reins of 28 of the 76 provinces, including the two largest provincial administrations, Istanbul and Ankara.[18] Once the power passed into the hands of the local RP leaders, their strategy seems to have been to do the utmost to show that they were providing services to the community and developing

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[15] Heper and Keyman point out that, by the late 1980s, public expenditure was increasing dramatically and this was in large part due to both the increase in number of public employees along with the salaries granted them, indicating that, just as their national-level counterparts, local party leaders were stuffing the local government payrolls with party supporters. Metin Heper and Fuat Keyman, "Double-Faced State: Political Patronage and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (1998), p. 268. As for corruption at the local level and its effect on national elections, an interesting example can be shown by an article in the daily newspaper *Cumhuriyet* leading up to the 1995 general elections. A plumber in Üsküdar, a working class district in Istanbul, explains why people are voting for the Welfare Party in the national elections: "I've visited many homes and the people here are pleased with the RP's administration of the district. During the district's SHP-run period, I went to the administrative offices to make the necessary tax declarations. They wanted bribes. Even for the simplest tasks they wanted bribes . . . because of this, I decided to avoid these tax declarations for two years. Now all of this is gone. Now that RP has come when I go to the administrative offices, my work is completed in 15 minutes." "Seçim öncesi Üsküdar'dan izlenimler," *Cumhuriyet*, 14 December 1995.
[16] See Sinan Ciddi, *Kemalism in Turkish Politics: The Republican People's Party, secularism and nationalism* (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 88.
[17] Hakan Yavuz writes, "WP mayors have offered better services than their predecessors and worked hard to improve public services. Moreover, they reduced corruption and nepotism in their municipalities." See, M. Hakan Yavuz, "Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (1997), p. 72; Sabri Sayarı, "Turkey's Islamist Challenge," *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1996), pp. 35-43; Jenny B. White, "Pragmatists or Ideologues? Turkey's Welfare Party in Power," *Current History*, Vol. 606, No. 1 (1997), p. 26.
[18] Uğur Akıncı, "The Welfare Party's Municipal Track Record: Evaluating Islamist Municipal Activism in Turkey," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 53, No. 1 (1999), p. 78.

the municipality. For the average voter, the most direct impact of the government and the visible test for the suitability of a particular party to govern the nation was seen at the local level. With a paradigmatic emphasis on service (*hizmet*), the success of any political party depending not on ideology or discourse, but on their ability to *visibly* demonstrate their effectiveness to the voters, and parties had no better way of manifesting such behavior than at the level of the local municipality. The RP, at this period of history, seemed to have understood this opportunity for national vote mobilization through local effectiveness better than any other party, and by 1995 had managed to be the victors and convinced a plurality of voters that they were the *hizmet* party.

Their success in this framework of politics fell upon three political strategies at the *local* level: the appearance of effective and service-oriented municipal governments, the mobilization of civil society organizations with similar outlook on their behalf, and the willingness to enable local party leaders to establish the issues of mobilization for their constituents in various regions of the country. First, as discussed above, the administering of services at the local level embodied by the slogan used by the party "service to the people" (*halka hizmet*). The party did whatever it could to show that it was at work for the people, speeding up bureaucratic services, having such things as once-a-week "open office" sessions with the face-to face contact with the public, and where possible using municipal

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revenues to clean up, repair and develop the municipality.[19] This does not mean

that the RP's municipal strategy was a sustainable long-term solution. As Akıncı

has pointed out, though the RP municipal governments were receiving "high

marks," there were indications that the populist spending was putting local

governments into a great deal of debt.[20] Furthermore, while they seemed more apt

at preventing corruption that rankles the sensibilities of the rank and file in the

communities, there was also ample evidence that various types of patronage—place

party supporters into municipal-run service jobs—and corruption—giving local

contracts to party supporters or those donating to the party directly or to party-

supportive charities and associations.[21] Thus, while the RP's municipal track record

caused it to stick out positively in the eyes of many voter, one must wonder how

long their success in distinguishing themselves would have continued, and their

success at appealing to voters through their municipal records was a strategy

heightened by the general neglect of effective municipal governance demonstrated

by many of the local leaders of the major parties.[22]

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[19] Jenny B. White, *Islamic Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics* (Seattle, WA: Washington University Press, 2002), pp. 170-5. White also compares the once-a-week sessions between the Welfare party and the previous SHP/CHP administration for the district within which she conducted her research.

[20] Akıncı, "The Welfare Party's Municipal Track Record," p. 80.

[21] These behaviors, of course, were not unique to the RP but were widely practiced by parties of both the "left" and "right"; they are mentioned only to point out that the RP was not able to maintain a unique pattern of behavior, but instead imitated the other parties (which the party frequently referred to as imitators (*taklitçi*) in their campaign rhetoric). See, White, *Islamist Mobilization*, pp. 194-5; Akıncı, "The Welfare Party's Municipal Track Record," pp. 88-9.

[22] Jenny White, addressing the rise of the Welfare Party, writes, "Turkey's large urban centers, especially Istanbul and Ankara, are plagued by a lack of services." Jenny B. White, "Islam and Democracy: The Turkish Experience," *Current History*, Vol. 588 (January 1995), p. 8.

Furthermore, the party also mobilized civil society in its behalf in order to serve the community and demonstrate the party's "just (economic) order" (*adil düzen*). The level of mobilization and organization at the local level among both official and unofficial associations that shared the party's philosophy caused Özbudun to argue that the RP was the Turkish party to come the closest to resembling a "mass party."[23] As White and others have observed, Islamist charitable organizations, though often claiming autonomy, operated to ensure that the needs of those in the community were being met.[24] This was a particularly effective strategy in poor and working-class neighborhoods in the big cities, where the social-democratic parties had traditionally been receiving strong support.[25] The RP along with Islamic foundations began operating as organs of social welfare,[26] dispensing material assistance explicitly or implicitly in the name of the party.[27]

Finally, the Welfare Party managed to pull together a diverse national coalition of voters—including both Kurdish and Turkish nationalists—by allowing local considerations and party leaders shape the appeal in those communities. This was the double-edged sword of the ease of utilizing new media opportunities to dispense party campaign propaganda: while effective in reaching large numbers of voters quickly, the party message remains at the distant "national" level and

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[23] Ergun Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), p. 92.

[24] White, *Islamist Mobilization*, pp. 178-211; see also, Yavuz, "Political Islam," pp. 77-8.

[25] Haldun Gülalp, "Political Islam in Turkey: The Rise and Fall of the Refah Party," *The Muslim World*, Vol. 89, No. 1 (1999), pp. 31, 35; Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics*, p. 91; White, *Islamist Mobilization*, pp. 123-9; White, "Pragmatists or Ideologues?" p. 30.

[26] Metin Heper, "Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a Reconciliation," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 51, No. 1 (1997), p. 36.

[27] Gülalp, "Political Islam in Turkey," p. 35; Sayarı, "Turkey's Islamist Challenge," p. 37.

requires one to make the same appeal to every sector of society. When parties are formed on largely a "catch-all" model, in which one hopes to gather together disparate elements of society under the party banner, one national message might be limiting if others are willing or have the capability to speak differently to distinct constituencies to mobilize their voters. Yavuz argues that a key element of the success of the RP in the 1995 election was that it could "adopt a local language to win elections" in different regions of the country; thus, though centered around a "just order" they focused on regional issues in the Black Sea, Central Anatolia, the Southeast and in the Western industrial cities.[28] This allowed them to gather farmers, urban workers, Turkish nationalists, Kurds, and Islamists under one party's umbrella.

Whether or not the RP's strategies at the local level would have been sustainable in the long term to distinguish themselves from the other "imitator" parties, at that particular juncture in time, these strategies were both effective and largely "ordinary" rather than religious. The party's success over previous strongholds of the leftist parties cannot be understood as a radical religious transformation of the constituents on the left, but rather that this segment of the electorate seemed to consider that the Welfare Party more closely embodied the type of populist, social welfare party that they were hoping for. While the place of an academic is arguably not to propose the nature of the hidden intentions behind the party or the Islamic civil society that worked on its behalf, regardless of these

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[28] Yavuz, "Political Islam," pp. 78-9.

intentions—whatever they were—the fact of the matter is that these organizations were popular in their communities, not because of religious propaganda, but because of the charitable services and concern they demonstrated in their behaviors to their communities. Rather than arguing that the RP exploited religion for political purposes, the opposite might be argued: one could reasonable claim that the party, intentionally or unintentionally addressed economic issues such that it translated into religious gain. Certainly some of the interest shown toward religion and Islamism during this period in Turkey's political history could be attributed to the fact that people were pleased with the RP's handling of municipal governments and their concern for people's economic situations. In other words, because the RP was seen as governing so effectively and it also carried the image of "religious government," it created a temporary increase in greater acceptance or desire for religious government because the party was the definitive proxy for this notion.

The big gains for the RP in the 1990s, until the party was shut down by a ruling of the Constitutional Court for undermining the secular regime in January of 1998, were most dramatically registered in the poor and working class populations of the major urban centers. While they also seemed to make gains at the expense of the dramatic collapse of the "center right" parties of the period in all areas of the country, for which less explanation of the vote switching is needed—i.e. voters on the right were "abandoning the ship" of two parties steeped in extensive corruption allegations and poor governance records—it seems more significant for a party, whose image positioning was undoubtedly on the right, to register such gains from

a bloc of voters who had been casting their votes on the left. Understanding this phenomenon and removing it from the realm of "Islamization" and "identity politics" and focusing on how and when this bloc of voters has been willing to make a change. As was true when Ecevit managed to capture these voters for the CHP from the Justice Party (AP) in the late 1960s and 1970s, the electorate in these poor and working class urban communities have consistently responded well to those who have an expressed plan to address their needs and are willing to interact with them face to face. Whether the party is clearly secular or has a religious conservative flavor seems to make less of a difference.

A return to the conclusions of Karpat's seminal work on squatter areas in Istanbul in the late 1960s, when the winds of fortune were changing among these communities for the Justice Party and the CHP. Karpat observes, "Politics in the squatter settlement is not inspired by radical ideologies. However, such ideologies can find acceptance in the settlement if the normal channels for demand satisfaction and political participation are closed to squatters."[29] Note that what is critical for the members of these communities are the satisfaction of their basic needs and demands and political participation—i.e. the right of political contact and interaction. Ideology is peripheral or accidental in relation to the focus on explicit material concerns. Studying this period of politics in the late 1960s and 1970s, Geyikdağı expresses a similar conclusion, relegating religion to a secondary

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[29] Kemal Karpat, *The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 200.

concern: "If a relatively secularist party looks more promising in the economic sphere, the majority of voters are likely to vote for it rather than the less secularist party which manipulated religion but whose economic policy does not look promising to the voter."[30]

In analyzing the electoral success of the Welfare Party, Heper takes Geyikdağı's argument and demonstrates its logical converse—i.e. that if a religious party looks more promising in the economic sphere, they are likely to vote for it than for other secularist parties who have no clear economic plan to address their needs. After pointing out Geyikdağı's analysis, he writes, "In the 1995 national elections, the secular parties, including the ones on the left, did not offer the electorate well-thought-out and persuasive policy packages.[31] In a similar vein, White writes:

> Although the other parties continued to represent themselves as populist, in the reshuffling of economic priorities in the 1980s they had lost either the ability to deliver egalitarian programs or interest in the paternalistic *himaye* support and protection of the masses.[32]

The populism of the party was demonstrated by the fact that local party leaders and the party faithful were making "face-to-face" contact with the voters in these urban communities and making an effort to address their explicit material needs.[33]

Finally, it is also interesting to note that, as the RP's success increased at the local government level and grassroots organizations were able to mobilize on their

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[30] Mehmet Yaşar Geyikdağı, *Political Parties in Turkey: The Role of Islam* (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 119.
[31] Heper, "Islam and Democracy," p. 36.
[32] White, *Islamist Mobilization*, pp. 124-5.
[33] Ibid., pp. 121, 198, 210.

behalf, unlike the other major political parties, they began to rely on media propaganda less and on actually providing noticeable services as the primary means of mobilizing voters. As the goal of the party in the 1990s seemed to be to legitimize itself and present the party as an "ordinary" party, though this strategy was employed in media propaganda in 1991,[34] it seems that by 1995, the party counted on local mobilization and its municipal record to more clearly convey this message. Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the party, showed a near ambivalence toward media propaganda throughout the campaign, and in fact when he chose to speak, often expressed extreme sentiments that, of course, played into the worst fears of the secularists. He also chose to avoid participation in any of the open forum debates among the major political party leaders,[35] and to use the terminology provided in a recent study by Barr, he took the role of an *anti-establishment outsider*.[36] Considering the RP's careful and non-religious appeals in 1991, it is interesting that he made statements such as describing his party candidates as praying, fasting and Qur'an reading personnel that would remove the last personnel (*kadro*) of the Republic, referring to the West as infidels (*gavur*), and promising to tear up the Customs Union agreement with Europe.[37]

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[34] Ayşe Öncü, "Packaging Islam: Cultural Politics on the Landscape of Turkish Commercial Television," *Public Culture,* Vol. 8, No. 1 (1995), pp. 51-71; White, *Islamist Mobilization*, pp. 120-1.

[35] "Erbakan açıkoturumdan kaçtı," *Cumhuriyet*, 12 December 1995; "Erbakan yine kaçtı," *Cumhuriyet*, 13 December 1995.

[36] Barr, "Populists, Outsiders and Anti-Establishment Politics," pp. 29-48.

[37] "Erbakan'a sönük karşılama," Milliyet, 10 December 1995; "Erbakan: Rize bizim olacak," Milliyet, 11 December 1995; "Gümrük Birliğini Tanımam," Milliyet, 14 December 1995.

Whether intentional or not, the occasional outbursts of wild opinion by Erbakan became the focus of attention of the other parties and operated in effect as a smoke screen distracting the parties from how the RP was *actually* mobilizing voters—simple bread and butter issues and grassroots mobilization. Thus, while the major parties emphasized an electoral attack on Erbakan at a discursive level and in regard to its religious identity, they remained distant from the voters and failed to address the concerns that the general populace was actually interested in.[38] Deniz Baykal, the leader of the newly reformed CHP, indicated that he preferred to talk to people through television rather than to hold public meetings.[39] In one of the advertisements of the CHP in 1995, Baykal's idea of *populism* appeared to be suggesting that the people could send their concerns to him *through fax*.[40] Thus, while the RP was focusing on their own appeal to voters through *hizmet*,[41] the approach of the previous paradigm, the rest of the major parties began to shift their approach to campaigning in national elections. Thus, while the Welfare Party had a very short stint as the leader of a coalition government at the top, from June 1996 through June of 1997, the repercussions of the *image* of a religious party in power managed to shape the political paradigm through the general elections of 2007.[42]

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[38] The outlines of the discursive competition will be described in greater detail below. See, "Liderler halkı unuttu," *Milliyet*, 13 December 1995.

[39] "Meydan yerine medya," Cumhuriyet, 21 December 1995.

[40] "Seni dinliyorum Türkiye," CHP advertisement, *Cumhuriyet*, 21 December 1995.

[41] Erbakan actually argues that they would be the first party to enter into government on the basis of their service to the people. "RP'nin Ankara çıkarması," *Zaman*, 4 December 1995.

[42] Although this work is focused on the national elections for members of parliament, it would be accurate to say that the paradigm maintained itself at least through the local elections for municipal government in March of 2009.

Table 9.1 – Electoral Trends of the Period[43]

	1995	1999	2002	2007
Top-Two Parties' vote %	41%	40.2%	53.7%	67.5%
Effective # of Parties (Mod. Golosov) – National	5.48	5.78	4.34	2.60
Effective # of Parties (Mod. Golosov) – Provincial Ave.	4.39	4.84	4.13	2.90
Volatility – National Aggregate	22.7	22.3	57.0	21.0
Volatility – National "Inter-bloc"	1.7	7.9	4.1	7.5
Voter Turnout	85.2%	87.1%	79.1%	84.2%

9.2 Dimensions of Competition: *9.2.1 National Campaign Discourse*

9.2.1.1 Religion-Secularism Axis

The entrance of the Welfare Party into mainstream politics brought with it a secular and religious discursive environment never before seen in Turkish electoral contest.[44] Though parties had used religious discourse in the past, it was short-lived—as in the 1957 elections—or operated as a defense mechanism that generated little response from mainstream parties, such as Demirel's occasional use of religious terminology in the 1960s, especially, in response to attacks regarding his religiosity. When the apparent exploitation of religious sentiment was employed, the reaction of other parties was to refer to it as such—i.e. religious exploitation.

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[43] Electoral data taken from *Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri 1923-2007*, pp. 96-7.
[44] For example, Sayarı writes, "The nature of the polarization was quite different from that which prevailed two decades earlier when Turkish politics was immersed in ideological battles between the left and the right. Polarization . . . was based largely on the growing conflict between the secularists and the Islamists." Sabri Sayarı, "The Changing Party System," in Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer, eds., *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p. 20.

Table 9.2 – Major Political Parties of the Paradigm in General Elections at a Glance

English		Turkish	Political Leader	Political Family	1995	1999	2002	2007	Key Notes:
People's Democracy Party	HADEP / DEHAP / DTP	Halkın Demokrasi Partisi/		Left-Kurdish Nationalist	4.2	4.7	6.2	?	HADEP ran as DEHAP in 2002. In 2007, they ran as independent and formed the DTP in parliament
Democratic Left Party	DSP	Demokratik Sol Parti	Bülent Ecevit / Zeki Sezer	Center-Left	14.6	22.2	1.2	-	Zeki Sezer was the party leader in 2007, but the party chose not to run in order to assist the CHP.
Republican People's Party	CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi	Deniz Baykal	Center-Left	10.7	8.7	19.4	20.9	
Youth Party	GP	Genç Partisi	Cem Uzan	Centrist/ Populist	-	-	7.2	3.0	Led by businessman, Cem Uzan, this party was famous for outlandish promises and distributing food and gold at campaign rallies.
Motherland Party	ANAP	Anavatan Partisi	Mesut Yılmaz	Center-Right	19.6	13.2	5.1	-	See below.
True Path Party/ Democrat Party	DYP / DP	Doğru Yol Partisi/ Demokrat Parti	Tansu Çiller / Mehmet Ağar	Center-Right	19.2	12.0	9.5	5.4	The DYP merged with ANAP to become the Democrat Party (DP) in 2007.
Justice and Development Party	AKP (Ak Parti)	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	Center-Right / Right	-	-	34.3	46.6	Party members prefer the reference Ak parti ('Ak' means 'white' or 'pure' in Turkish), but most scholars use the acronym AKP.
Welfare Party/ Virtue Party/ Felicity Party	RP / FP / SP	Refah Partisi/ Fazilet Partisi/ Saadet Partisi	Necmettin Erbakan / Recai Kutan	Right-Religious Conservative	21.4	15.4	2.5	2.3	The Welfare Party became the Virtue Party (FP) in 1998 led by Recai Kutan. When this party was closed, it became the Felicity Party (SP) in 2001.
Nationalist Action Party	MHP	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi	Alparslan Türkeş / Devlet Bahçeli	Right-Nationalist	8.2	18.0	8.4	14.3	Devlet Bahçeli has led the party since Türkeş death in 1997.

Notes: Parties are listed in the order in which they are commonly positioned according to left-right placement. The parties' outlook and general behavior could place them in different positions, depending on the criteria used or the emphasis of the one positioning the parties. Election percentages in bold indicate the party passed the threshold. The vast number of minor parties during this period required that parties that always managed less than 1.5 percent be excluded. Election data was taken from, *Milletvekili Genel Seçimleri, 1923-2007* (Ankara: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, 2008), pp. 96-7.

New to the political debate were persistent cries to rally around the banner of the state-endorsed interpretation of secularism; appeals that effectively called on the secularist faithful to gather around the banner of a party primarily for that reason. The continuation of terrorist actions and actions against the state by the PKK and the persistent continuance of political parties with a strong but unofficial Kurdish nationalist underbelly also brought regular references to nationalist themes by most parties, with the surprising exception of the 1999 elections when, ironically, the two largest vote getters were a nationalist party on the left and right.

In addition to discursive competitive debate colored with religious and nationalist themes, the entrance of certain parties, which had previously been understood as extremist or radical, into the center of the political arena as power players brought with it a greater emphasis on positioning one's party in the center (*merkez*). While journalists and students of Turkish politics had begun to use such terminology earlier, the period beginning with the 1995 elections (and the "specter" of the Welfare Party) initiated the usage of such terms by political party leaders themselves to describe themselves in campaign speeches. Interestingly enough, it was the peripheral parties, such as those derived from the "National Outlook" (*Milli Görüş*) movement and the National Action Party (MHP) led by Devlet Bahçeli that were most insistent in describing themselves as "centrist." Of course, along with the sacred discourse also came the traditional discussion of the profane—i.e. the typical promises for economic and structural development. And, while the *hizmet* discourse was maintained to some extent by parties considered to be on the right,

the discourse on both sides was often colored with arguments of who was more corrupt and who was more honest.

Though the party with a clearly Islamist identity[45] (the RP) was removed from the picture after the 1995 elections, this discourse was maintained among the major competing parties through the 2007 general elections. Such a discursive environment allowed two possible responses (see Table 9.3), either a decision to mobilize the electorate through the cultural worldviews of religious conservatism or Turkish secularism, which necessitated a somewhat exclusionary discourse, or an attempt to avoid a position on either side in hopes of appearing inclusive and attracting voters from both major *kulturkampfs*.

In 1995, as mentioned above, the Welfare Party's success that initiated a new paradigm, shifting the poles along which politics was contested, primarily resided in their explicit performance of *hizmet* at the local and municipal level. When Erbakan, the party leader, did enter into campaign discourse, while also addressing the economic promises and the parties record of service, he tended to send out religiously-laced messages that fulfilled the conspiracy-filled concerns

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[45] Although "Islamist", "Islamist-oriented", or "Islamic" are regularly employed for the Welfare Party and the *Milli Görüş* movement as a whole, and such terminology is accurate if one means by this "the belief that religious values have a place in politics," the question of the *degree* and *extent* of the combination of religious values, morals, norms and politics is an issue of contention. There is an important difference between the belief that Shariah law should be the basis of the regime and the desire for the consideration of a number of moral issues that are inspired by Islamic beliefs. The latter fits closely with much of the activity of "religious conservatives" in most developed democracies in the "West"—in terms of legislative debates over issues like birth control, abortion and gay rights—and, outside of a few isolated declarations regarding Shariah by Welfare Party members, this interpretation best fits the mainstream discourse and behavior of the parties. Thus, my usage of "Islamist" in the text should be understood as interchangable with "religious conservative," which is perhaps a better, less loaded, and more accurate term, but rarely used in the literature when it comes to politics in countries with majority Muslim populations.

burdening the minds of many of those in the secularist camp, and instigated a

discourse by the mainstream parties considered to be in the center (the Motherland

Party and the True Path Party on the center-right, and the Democratic Left Party and

the Republican People's Party on the center-left) that left issues of policy behind to

focus on the issue of religion and devout voters. For example, Erbakan tended to

Table 9.3 – Religious Discourse in Elections for the Major Parties

	Intentional appeals to the devout	Attempt to avoid a position	Intentional appeal to secularists
1995	*Welfare Party (R)** *Motherland Party (R)*	*True Path Party (R)*	*Republican People's Party(L)* *Democratic Left Party (L)*
1999	*Fazilet Party (R)* *True Path Party (R)*	***Democratic Left Party (L)*** *Nationalist Action Party (R)*	Republican People's Party(L) *Motherland Party (R)*
2002	*Republican People's Party (L)*	***Justice & Development Party (R)*** Nationalist Action Party (R) True Path Party (R)	Democratic Left Party (L) Motherland Party (R)
2007		***Justice & Development Party (R)*** *Nationalist Action Party (R)*	*Republican People's Party(L)*

* (R) and (L) represent parties that are generally understood as occupying a right or left
position in Turkish politics, respectively. Parties in italics successfully passed the 10 percent
threshold in elections. Parties in bold took the plurality in the elections.

make statements such as: "Three weeks from now, the mentality that has ruled the

country since the Tanzimat Edict in 1839 will change, and a new world will be

constructed,"[46] "18 days from now, we will conquer Turkey,"[47] and "Turkey has

been governed for 70 years by the Western mentality, from which it is high time for

us to be rescued. Our political staff prays five times a day, fasts, reads the

Qur'an—they are morally spotless. Our devout party members will become the

government. The existing members in government are the Republic's last

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[46] "RP'nin Ankara çıkarması," *Zaman*, 4 December 1995.
[47] "Erbakan: RP'yi iktidara kadınlar taşıyacak," *Zaman*, 7 December 1995.

personnel, and the time till we are rescued from them is short."[48]   Although it is possible for one to interpret these remarks innocently, especially if one takes the comments in conjunction with the party's moderate positions in its election manifest,[49] their bold and vague claims certainly triggered the sensitivities and imagination of Turkish secularists and those competing against him. For the latter, they were certainly committed, in one way or another, of proving wrong Erbakan's statement that "there are two types of people in Turkey: those who are Welfare supporters and those who are candidates to be Welfare supporters."[50]

As the leaders of all the four parties considered to be in the center had unmistakable ties to the secular *kulturkampf*, whether or not the same could be said for all of the candidates under their parties' banners, the discursive positions each "competitor' party took often seemed to be complementary to their positional counterpart. In 1995, however, for the most part, the competitor parties mirrored one another. For example, on the center-right, while Tansu Çiller, the leader of the True Path Party (DYP), promised not to form a coalition government with the RP, she also said that her party is busily working to put more mosques in Europe."[51] The leader of the Motherland Party (ANAP), Mesut Yılmaz appealed to religious voters even more, hoping to swipe some voters away from Erbakan's ranks. While he accused Erbakan of being a religious merchant and that he was exploiting religion for political purposes, in the same speech he proclaimed that "the

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[48] "Erbakan'a sönük karşılama," *Milliyet*, 10 December 1995.
[49] "Refah'tan tarihi dönüş," *Hürriyet*, 3 December 1995.
[50] "RP'nin Ankara çıkarması," *Zaman*, 4 December 1995.
[51] "Camiyi Avrupa'ya götürüyoruz," *Milliyet*, 16 December 1995.

Motherland Party actually provides the best service to religion" and that the enemy of religion is a separatist and unbeliever (*kafir*).[52] Elsewhere, while he argued that "the glorious religion of Islam is too big to squeeze into one party, he also proclaimed that ANAP was a party for nationalists and conservatives.[53] In the advertisements for the party, that largely attacked Tansu Çiller, as Prime Minister, many of these featured a woman with full head-covering complaining about being deceived by the government,[54] thus creating a visual connection between devout people and a vote for ANAP.

While the leaders of the center-right tried to steal religious votes away from Erbakan and the RP, the center-left parties tried to scare the secularists into their party folds. The leader of the DSP, Bülent Ecevit, claimed that the RP would make Turkey even more backwards than Iran, and that the mentality of that party was anachronistic, feudalistic and intolerant of women.[55] In almost every speech, Ecevit emphasized that the RP had failed to nominate any women as candidates for parliament and declared that women voters would punish the party for this.[56] Deniz Baykal, the leader of the CHP, took a strong secularist stance and accused the right of being taken over by radicalism and religious cults.[57] Both parties on the left took on rhetoric that suggested that the party offered, not alternative policy, but salvation

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[52] "Din düşmanı bölücü, kafir," *Cumhuriyet*, 21 December 1995.
[53] "Bacıdan kaçıp hocaya tutulma," *Cumhuriyet*, 19 December 1995.
[54] For an example, see the advertisement for ANAP in *Hürriyet*, 10 December 1995.
[55] "RP'ye en büyük dersi kadınlar verecek," *Cumhuriyet*, 11 December 1995.
[56] For a number of examples, Ibid.; "Ecevet'ten RP'ye geri kafalılar," *Cumhuriyet*, 13 December 1995; "Refah çağdışı, CHP'nin yeni sol uydurma," *Cumhuriyet*, 19 December 1995; "Ecevit: RP ikiyüzlü bir parti," *Cumhuriyet*, 23 December 1995.
[57] "CHP'den köklü reform vaadi," *Cumhuriyet*, 2 December 1995.

from the religious threat. Baykal used the language of the country being surrounded as if under siege (*kuşatma*), from which the party would offer salvation (*kurtarmak*)[58] or be the antidote (*panzehir*).[59] In the political advertisements for the party, Turkish society was divided into two parts; on one side was the CHP, and on the other, the RP. The latter represented a desire to drag everyone back into the "darkness of the Middle Ages" and made "open calls for Shariah."[60] Both parties also used the threat of the Welfare Party as a means to suggest that it would be dangerous to vote for other parties.[61] Baykal advised voters that, due to the RP threat, they were in no position to throw their votes away on other parties (such as the DSP).[62]

In subsequent national elections—i.e. in 1999, 2002, and 2007—a slightly different strategy was employed. "Competitor" parties, occupying similar image-positions or competing among the same segments of the electorate tended to differentiate themselves on this issue somewhat. Thus, in 1999, on the center-right, Tansu Çiller of the DYP went out of her way to present herself as *the* leader of the devout.[63] She stopped speaking at the reading of the *ezan* from the mosque, accuses other parties of the right of closing down Qur'an course and preventing headscarved

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[58] Ibid.
[59] "RP'nin panzehiri biziz," *Cumhuriyet*, 11 December 1995.
[60] "Ben, Deniz Baykal. Ben de bir seçmenim," CHP political advertisement, *Cumhuriyet*, 20 December 1995. Similar dichotomies can also be found in the other CHP advertisements. See, "Ben, Deniz Baykal. Benim de bir ailem var," *Cumhuriyet*, 21 December 1995; "CHP, Türkiye'dir. Yeni CHP: Yeni Türkiye," *Cumhuriyet*, 22 December 1995.
[61] "Ecevit: Sahte sosyal demokratları sandığa gömeceğiz," *Cumhuriyet*, 20 December 1995; Yeni CHP: Yeni Türkiye," *Cumhuriyet*, 22 December 1995.
[62] "Güvercin, at-kurt izinde ilerliyor," *Cumhuriyet*, 18 December, 1995.
[63] She actually made that explicit claim. See, "Çiller, Hoca gibi," *Radikal*, 10 April 1999.

women from entering universities. [64]   In contrast, Mesut Yılmaz, the leader of ANAP, spent much of his campaign discourse claiming that the other parties were either exploiting religion or Atatürk[65] although he also made a point to pause his speeches during the *ezan* after Çiller had done so the day before.[66]   In the 2002 elections, both parties moderated their religious references.   Çiller largely avoided the topic, but Yılmaz, at several occasions, indicated that a vote for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) would be an invitation to another secularism-religion crisis as had occurred on February 28, 1997, which started the process that ousted the RP from power and then shut the party down.   As these two parties traditionally occupying the "center-right" began to implode throughout the period, a process clearly evident by 1999, if not by 1995, and finalized by their inability to pass the threshold in 2002, their influence on campaign discourse at the national level became largely irrelevant by 2007, such that their opinions rarely made it into even mainstream newspapers, despite the fact that they had merged to reform the new Democrat Party.   Their position and the mantle of the center-right was bestowed by the electorate onto the AKP.

On the center-left, one finds Ecevit of the DSP speaking very moderately, if at all, about the religion-secularism issue in the 1999 elections, proclaiming that

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[64] "Çiller'in Kırat'ı hala doymadı," *Radikal*, 8 April 1999; see also, "Çiller: Fazilet din istismar yapıyor," *Radikal*, 7 April 1999.

[65] In terms of religion, he was particularly criticizing the Virtue Party (FP), the successor to the Welfare Party, and the DYP. As for exploiting Atatürk, he was targeting Baykal and the CHP. See, "Yılmaz'dan Baykal'a ret," *Radikal*, 6 April 1999; "Yılmaz'dan hile uyarısı," *Radikal*, 12 April 1999.

[66] "Yılmaz'ın hedefi Erbakan," *Radikal*, 8 April 1999

they give complete respect to the beliefs of the devout while attempting to prevent the exploitation of religion in the political arena,[67] ultimately garnering for itself the plurality of the vote. The CHP, meanwhile, continued its presentation of itself as the defender of secularism and as the party of Atatürk.[68] During the protests by secularist civil society groups and individuals regarding the Welfare Party, the image of Atatürk became a popular symbol that represented opposition and protection from the perceived religious threat, the momentum of the symbolic power of the popularized images of Atatürk culminated with great fanfare at the 75th anniversary of the Republic in 1998.[69] However, the appropriation of the nation's founder by staunch Turkish secularists as a talisman-like charm to ward off a religious threat has continued throughout the period.[70] Baykal and the CHP also tried to capitalize on DSP's apparent softness on the secularism issue by accusing the party of being a branch on the same tree as the phoenix of the RP, the Virtue Party (FP).[71] Ecevit, not surprisingly, accused the CHP of exploiting the symbol of Atatürk.[72] In the end, the DSP received a plurality of the vote and the CHP found itself unable to pass the 10 percent threshold and remained out of politics.

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[67] "Çiller'e ağır suçlama," *Radikal*, 13 April 1999. For another example of Ecevit's moderate discourse, see "Ecevit: Çiller hırçın," *Radikal*, 11 April 1999.

[68] "Laik Cumhuriyeti ödünsüz koruyacağız," CHP advertisement, *Cumhuriyet*, 15 April 1999; see also the advertisement by the CHP regarding Atatürk in *Cumhuriyet*, 17 April 1999.

[69] For more on this see, Esra Özyürek, *Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006).

[70] See also, Yael Navaro-Yashin, *Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

[71] "Baykal: Yılmaz yargılansın," *Radikal,* 12 April 1999.

[72] "Ecevit kendini kutladı," *Radikal*, 10 April 1999.

In 2002, with the emergence of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the impending retirement of Bülent Ecevit due to ailing health, the CHP tried to conveniently slide into the space left by the fading DSP, and thus suddenly presented itself as a moderately (friend of the devout) secularist party. Baykal toured the country with the party's new members, Kemal Derviş and Yaşar Nuri Öztürk, the former a well-known economist and former member of the World Bank and the latter a well-known religious scholar with a famous translation of the Qur'an into Turkish. Thus, with Baykal pictured in every photo-op with these two men, he symbolically seemed to be directing the "center-left" party with liberal economy on one side and rational religion on the other. In stark contrast to his earlier discourse, he began to mix religious language into his speeches, pronouncing expressions such as "if we are not able to make you happy, may God withhold this office from us"[73] and, for the winners of the election, "those upon whom God rained down favor."[74] References to "sin," "morals" and the "Kaaba" peppered the political leader's speeches, and he began to pause his speeches when the *ezan* was being read from the mosque.[75] Though the CHP was still trying to attract the secularist voters, who often communicated that they voted for the party in light of the threat of religious society not out of desire,[76] Baykal seemed to be trying to, at

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[73] "Baykal: Oyumuzu satmayın," *Cumhuriyet*, 16 October 2002.
[74] "Baykal: Bizim alnımız 'ak'," *Radikal*, 30 October 2002.
[75] "Hesap sorun, şimdi öfke zamanı," *Cumhuriyet*, 4 October 2002; "Erzakı al, oy verme," *Radikal*, 16 October 2002; "Baykal: Oyumuzu satmayın," *Cumhuriyet*, 16 October 2002; "Hedefimiz önce insan," *Cumhuriyet*, 17 October 2002;
[76] "Baykal: Laikliğe sahip çıkın," *Cumhuriyet*, 20 October 2002; "Sol kerhen CHP diyor," *Cumhuriyet*, 24 October 2002; "Birleşme adresi CHP," *Cumhuriyet*, 16 October 2002.

least superficially, soften the anti-religious rhetoric in order to open the party more toward the center and the right.[77] Ecevit and the DSP, shrouded in problems inevitably caused by the failing health of its *raison d'etre*—i.e. Ecevit—returned to a religious threat discourse in order to attract voters to the party.[78] Following up the less than 20 percent garnered in the 2002 elections, the CHP of 2007 maintained the idea of religious threat through supportive media and civil society organs, but largely dropped the religion-secularism discourse at the official national level of the campaign for the issues of corruption and nationalism.

What distinguishes this paradigm from all other previous paradigms is that religion became an issue of identification that, based on the discourse surrounding the elections, was a primary source of polarizing voters along religio-cultural, rather than functional, lines.[79] The even greater irony is that this phenomenon seemed even more true for the parties of the traditional center, particularly parties of the center-left.[80] The center-right exploited religious discourse to steal votes from the RP and the FP, but the appeals were made in cultural terms, not in relation to religious policy, *per se*; on the center-left, the party appealed to those of the Turkish secularist worldview—i.e. staunch positivists—by framing the political contest as a

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[77] This behavior by Baykal and the CHP in the 2002 elections was also noted by Ciddi, calling this period CHP's experiment with an "Anatolian Left" agenda. Sinan Ciddi, "The Republican People's Party and the 2007 General Elections: Politics of Perpetual Decline?" *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2008), p. 445.

[78] "AKP gerçek kimliğini saklıyor," *Cumhuriyet*, 6 October 2002.

[79] Sayarı notes the same polarization arising from the 1994 local election. Sabri Sayarı, "Towards a New Turkish Party System?" *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2007), p. 204.

[80] For a similar observation of this trend regarding the CHP in particular, see Ziya Öniş and Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, "Europe and the impasse of centre-left politics in Turkey: lessons from the Greek experience," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2010), p. 265.

battle between two forces, darkness and enlightenment. The attitude of the supportive media organs and the other political parties on the center-left helps clarify this identity based mobilization. In the 2007 elections, for instance, Zeki Sezer, the new leader of the DSP, opted to keep his party out of the elections, but toured the country for the CHP, presenting the struggle as one between darkness and enlightenment.[81] A former Social-Democrat Populist Party member gives the following explanation for his support of the CHP:

> Don't burn your own mattress by your anger at Deniz Baykal. He has also saddened and disappointed me. He eliminated democracy within the party and has taken the party in the wrong direction. But what can we do; these are *our friends*. For this reason alone, it is both *right* and *necessary* to give our support to the CHP.[82]

One notes that the reason for support is based on relational ties, and despite the harshest criticism toward a party leader that one could level out and ideological difference, this relational connection with the party is presented as the necessary reason for aligning with the CHP and that there is no other choice. The Kemalist daily *Cumhuriyet*, on numerous days prior to the election, placed a black box at the top of the front page with a slit in the middle, from which one can see the eyes of a woman looking through, creating the impression of the black *çarşaf*, typically worn by women in Turkey who are members of one of a number of religious cults or sects. The image is accompanied by the words: "Do you see the danger within this

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[81] "Karanlığı devam mı?" *Cumhuriyet*, 3 July 2007.
[82] "İttifakı destekliyoruz," *Cumhuriyet*, 5 July 2007. Emphasis is mine.

election's voting box? We need to unify our votes for the sake of a secular and democratic Turkey. Take ownership of our Republic."[83]

Ironically, if one considers the religious-secular discursive strategy together with the election results, one finds that, with the exception of the 1995 election, the parties that took the plurality of the vote were parties that generally attempted to *avoid* taking a position in this discourse. The center-left DSP won in 1999 with such a strategy and the campaign discourse of the AKP, the top leaders of whom were groomed within but broke away from the *Milli Görüş* movement that undergirded the RP, the FP, and the Felicity Party (SP), and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has largely avoided clear religious appeals. Even when constantly pressured by the electorate to discuss religious issues, like the headscarf and imam hatip schools, Erdoğan tended to frustrate both secularists and religious conservatives by passing the buck or not taking a clear position on those topics. In 2002, Erdoğan repeatedly insisted that such questions should not be addressed toward him, but rather to the other parties. In the 2007 election, while he tended to enter into a discursive framework of "us versus them"—i.e. "them" being the CHP[84]—religious policy and expressions were almost non-existent in Erdoğan's campaign speeches, which were primarily focused on the party's economic accomplishments.[85] The 1995 exception

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[83] *Cumhuriyet*, 8, 11, 13, 21 July 2007.
[84] "367 diyenlere 467'yi verelim," *Yeni Şafak*, 1 July 2007; "İpin yoksa millet sana gönderirdi," *Yeni Şafak*, 2 July 2007; "CHP'nin peşine takılmak kimseye hayır getirmez," *Yeni Şafak*, 7 July 2007.
[85] For some examples, "Alım Gücünüz Düştüyse AK Parti'ye Oy Vermeyin," *Yeni Şafak*, 4 July 2007; "Borsa'da haklı çıktım," *Yeni Şafak*, 6 July 2007; "Kasalar Dolunca iştahları kabardı," *Yeni Şafak*, 8 July 2007; "Bunlar yalanı 1 YTL'ye satıyor," *Yeni Şafak*, 11 July 2007; "Daha güçlü ekonomi daha fazla demokrasi," *Yeni Şafak*, 16 July 2007.

is also not a strong exception to this trend—i.e. that the RP won the plurality of the vote despite religious discourse in speeches—if we consider that the RP was basing its mobilization of voters on other factors and placed campaign speech-making in a very clearly secondary role. In other words, the observation by Karpat regarding the 1957 elections seems to still hold true: explicit recourse to religious (or secularist) rhetoric in Turkish political campaigns offers little benefit, or perhaps in some cases harm, to those parties that employ it.[86]

9.2.1.2 Left-Right and Center Imaging

Corresponding to the entrance of parties traditional understood as being located on the radical right, the self-identification and imaging of parties along a position returned to campaign discourse. While parties on the "left" debated about the appropriateness of the adjectives that they placed next to their image—such as "democratic left" or "new left"—parties on the right hovered around the usage of "center" (*merkez*). The employment of *merkez* by parties on the right to create a position image, though the expression had been used by journalists and scholars to describe parties for some time, does not seem to be an accidental appropriation. If one considers that the imaging of the second paradigm was focused on the "left of center" (*ortanın solu*) expression, which is actually more precisely interpreted "left of the middle," the usage of "center" (merkez) rather than "middle" (*orta*) seems to

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[86] Kemal Karpat, "The Turkish Elections of 1957," *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1961), p. 444. One must be careful to distinguish the utilization of religion in campaign discourse from religiosity as a domain of identification. While explicit dependence on religion as a discursive strategy seems to not have much effect on voters, an image of devotion or moral character might offer benefit. This will be discussed in detail in the section regarding domains of identification.

be making a substantive distinction. As in English, where "middle" signifies an average between two poles or points—i.e. designating a position in space—"center" conveys a substantive place around which other positions hover and which has a location of its own accord. In other words, the "middle" is determined by the other points; the "center", however, sets itself as the point upon which other positions are measured. The reason why both the parties designated as radical or extreme right and the moderate right resorted to such terminology has to be understood in light of this distinction.

In the previous paradigm, parties like ANAP and DYP chose not to delineate themselves in regard to any sort of "left" or "right" positioning. Even the expression "center" seemed to be intentionally avoided. If we consider that Turgut Özal regularly claimed to represent the interests of the four previous political tendencies, it would have been much easier for him to declare that his party was a centrist party, but he never used such terminology, despite its logical appropriateness. By 1995, with the rise of the Welfare Party, it seems to have become necessary for these two parties to position themselves in relation to the RP and MHP on one side and the DSP and CHP on the other. The external usage by journalists and political scientists of the center-right, though previously avoided in earlier electoral contests, suddenly became a convenient image of their position.[87] "Center", thus, represented inclusion in the *political* center—i.e. being a party

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[87] For some examples of this usage by the parties, see "Sağın adresi ANAP olacak," *Cumhuriyet*, 9 December 1995; "G. Doğu'ya silahsız çözüm," *Milliyet*, 6 December 1995; "Yılmaz DSP'ye oy istedi," *Radikal*, 17 April 1999.

within the accepted boundaries of the state system—and "right" indicated that they were still representing the views of conservatives.

The parties traditionally placed on the radical or extreme right countered this positioning, not by claiming that they were also "center-right", but by arguing, in fact that they were *the* center party, particularly starting with the 1999 elections. Recai Kutan, the leader of the FP announced that the position of the FP's political foundations was directly in the center and that all the other parties were fringe parties."[88] Devlet Bahçeli the newly appointed leader of the MHP after the death of the party founder, Alparslan Türkeş, declared that with all the discussion of center-right and center-left parties, "Where is the center? The center is exactly the MHP."[89] In this case, the meaning intended by these political leaders was that their party represented the *societal* center—i.e. the central values of the nation (*millet*). For example, Kutan considered the FP the exact manifestation of the nation and the national will, and that voting for the FP would be like bringing the national will into parliament.[90] While the FP did not survive to the following national election in 2002,[91] the MHP continues to be an important player in the party system, and it has maintained its insistence that it occupies the social center. In the party's 2009

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[88] "Kutan: Fazilet merkez partisi," *Radikal*, 6 April 1999; "En iyi neticeyi aldık," *Milli Gazete*, 21 April 1999.

[89] "Bahçeli: Faşist ve ırkçı bir parti değiliz," *Milli Gazete*, 3 April 1999; "Barışa ihtiyaç var," *Hürriyet*, 11 April 1999; "Sağ partilerde büyük kapışma," *Cumhuriyet*, 13 April 1999.

[90] "Fazilet milletin kendisidir," *Milli Gazete*, 5 April 1999; an almost identical claim was made by the MHP in their campaign advertisements, see "Meclis 'iradesine' kavuşuyor," *Radikal*, 6 April 1999.

[91] It was closed by the Constitutional Court on June 22, 2001 on the grounds that they violated the constitutional principle of secularism. See, William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP* (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 19.

program, it writes that while taking its foundation as the poetic composition of the nation's total national and spiritual values, the party is the political representation of the social center.[92]   The initiation of the AKP into national elections in 2002 also found this party placing itself in the center. Erdoğan stated:

> With our conservative democrat identity, the AKP desires to rebuild the fragmented center-right in Turkey along with eliminating the old understandings of politics, and place our political foundations in the center. . . The AKP in a very short period has reached its objective and sits at the very center of Turkish politics. The AKP is in the center.[93]

Although the party only chose to utilize this expression in 2002, it began electoral competition with the same discursive imaging as the two parties on the right that had employed it with relative success in the previous election.[94]

By emphasizing their *centeredness*, these parties were able to communicate several messages through the image simultaneously. First of all, it was a discursive challenge to their placement by external observers on the far right, claiming instead that they had moved into a more moderate or mainstream position. This was a particularly effective strategy in the 1990s when the parties traditionally understood as occupying the center-right were in the process of imploding on themselves like dying stars. By arguing for a center position, they seemed to transmit cues to the public that they could effectively carry the burden of the institutionalized space that was being vacated by the DYP and ANAP. Kutan explicitly said as much following

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[92] *Parti Program: Geleceğe Doğru* (Ankara: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, 2009), p. 15.
[93] "Erdoğan: Merkeze talibiz," *Radikal*, 17 October 2002.
[94] Sayarı, has also pointed out that in 2002 the "perceived ideological moderation of the AKP" helped it steal votes from centrist parties. Sayarı, "Towards a New Turkish Party System?" p. 201.

the election in 1999, "The nation sent a clear message that the [voter] concentration on the right would no longer be the domain of ANAP and the DYP; instead they have moved the MHP and FP to the center in their place."[95]   This strategic approach, therefore, also complicates popular interpretations of Turkish voters that suggest that there has been a terrific ideological shift to the right;[96] it might also be reasonably proposed that there has been, at least at the discursive level, an ideological shift of the far right toward the center. This confusion of placement on the right can arguably account for the apparent sliding of self-identification of the electoral on the left-right scale toward the right. While individuals increasingly identified with parties which were still externally designated as "far right," the constellation of values and policies of those parties had been moving toward moderation and the political center.

Secondly, even more explicitly than the underlying intentions of using expressions such as "center-right" and "center-left", the appropriation of the term center by the MHP and the FP intended a break with the benchmark of the previous image-positioning. Rather than adhere in some fashion to the older European conceptions of "left", "right" and "center", these parties argued through their interpretation, that the center was located within Turkish society itself, and as they represented the average or predominant values of society, they were, therefore, the

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[95] En iyi neticeyi aldık," *Milli Gazete*, 21 April 1999; the interpretation of the daily newspaper *Cumhuriyet* after the election was also that the MHP's centrist discourse allowed them to pick up a large segment of the center-right voters.
[96] Ali Çarkoğlu, "The New Generation Pro-Islamists in Turkey," in Hakan Yavuz, ed., *The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006), p. 162.

parties that actually occupied the center. This reestablishment of the benchmark for positioning coincides with the significant distinctions between the substance of older categorizations of left and right in Turkish politics and the politics and substantive meanings of categorizations in this paradigm as manifested in Çarkoğlu's study on the left and right as a dependent variable.[97] In this paradigm, left-right distinctions offered no significant indicators of one's economic outlook, but placement has become correlated with social and cultural values and identities.

On the left, there was no officially recognized threat[98] to the two parties (DSP and CHP) that dominated the vote in that area of voter concentration; hence, the appropriation of "center" by the parties in this bloc was generally not observed. While journalists, the media, and traditional parties on the "center-right" referred to the CHP and DSP as "center-left" parties, the parties identified themselves as "the new left" and "democratic left" respectively. Thus, while these two parties were competing against one another in 1995, the argument over imagery had to do with which adjective and its substantive meaning better represented the electorate in Turkey who identified themselves as being on the left. Campaigning for the DSP in 1995, Ecevit would proclaim, "There is only one left in Turkey: the democratic

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[97] Ali Çarkoğlu, "The Nature of Left-Right Ideological Self-placement in the Turkish Context," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2007), pp. 253-71.

[98] Of course, the legacy of parties that have descended from the leftist party formed by Kurdish nationalists in 1990—i.e. HEP, followed by DEP, HADEP, DEHAP, DTP, and since December 2009, BDP—originally broke from the SHP and consider themselves a leftist mass party. They have accounted for an average loss of from 5-7 percent of the national total from "center-left" parties since their entrance into electoral contest. Despite this relationship and loss of votes to these parties, the existing ideological break from these two party families are so large that the center-left has chosen to characterize this party as "Kurdish nationalist", not leftist.

left"[99] and that this type of leftist, was not new, but true, national and modern.[100] The CHP's advertisements, in contrast, declared, "The CHP is Turkey. The New CHP, the New Left, a New Turkey"[101] and placed the DSP in the same category as the ultra-nationalist parties (MHP and BBP).[102] In 1999, the two parties largely left one another alone, but Baykal chose at one point to attack Ecevit by claiming that he was no longer an Atatürkist and harbored religious reactionaries in his party,[103] and Ecevit, not surprisingly, accused Baykal of exploiting Atatürk for political gain.[104] Throughout this paradigm, as has been observed since the second paradigm, parties on both sides tended to attack their competitor parties by repositioning them on the other side, or by accusing them of being puppets of the other side.[105]

As the number of parties in the party system shrunk, particularly during the 2002 campaign when it became clear that the contest would be between two major players (CHP and AKP), the need utilize left-right or center imagery declined and arguably became more dangerous to do so.[106] As the number of parties declined,

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[99] "Ecevit, CHP'ye vuruyor," *Cumhuriyet*, 22 December 1995.
[100] "Ecevit: Sahte sosyal demokratları sandığa gömeceğiz," *Cumhuriyet*, 20 December 1995; see also, "Refah çağdışı, CHP'nin yeni solu uydurma," *Cumhuriyet*, 19 December 1995.
[101] See CHP advertisement, *Cumhuriyet*, 22 December 1995.
[102] See CHP advertisement, *Cumhuriyet*, 20 December 1995.
[103] "Baykal: kaçmayın," *Radikal*, 3 April 1999.
[104] "Ecevit kendini kutladı," *Radikal*, 10 April 1999.
[105] "CHP and DSP sağa destek oluyor," *Cumhuriyet*, 17 December 1995; "Refah tek başına iktidara geliyor," *Cumhuriyet*, 21 December 1995; "Çiller, Yılmaz'a 3 puan avans verdi," *Radikal*, 4 April 1999; Baykal: Yılmaz yargılansın," *Radikal*, 12 April 1999; "Hesap verecekler," *Milli Gazete*, 11 April 1999; "Bahçeli Köskü sola bıraktı," *Yeni Şafak*, 1 July 2007; "Bu kadar ayak oyunu olduğunu düşünmedik," *Yeni Şafak*, 1 July 2007.
[106] In fact, after the failure to pass the threshold in 1999, Baykal resigned from the leadership position for about 15 months, but was brought back in 2000 with the platform that he and the party had changed and described themselves as "Anatolian Left," which suggested a return to their

the social bases of the existing parties expanded, causing any clear positioning of the party to potentially scare away certain voting blocs that congregated beneath the party banners. While it was critical, for example, for CHP to maintain their traditional leftist voters, the party's policies began to slide increasingly to the right—i.e. taking an increasingly pro-market stance and employing nationalist rhetoric—in an attempt to widen the party's voting base. Any clear delineation of the parties position could threaten to upset the party's fruit basket. The same was at least as true for the AKP. Huddled underneath the party's banner were conservatives, Islamists, some nationalists and secular liberals. Rather than place themselves definitively on a line, as time passed they chose instead, if anything, to their identity as "conservative democrats," which by the party's official definition conjures up a forward-thinking, fairly progressive democratic outlook, offering a little something for everybody.[107] Though the MHP, through 2009, still considered itself the party of the social center, it also largely moved away from such classifications in the national elections in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

Turkish roots, and would put them in a position to compete against the DSP. When it became clear that the DSP would not be a serious electoral threat, the need to use the image-positioning of "Anatolian Left" no longer remained, and while the behavior and discourse of the position remained, the label was largely dropped. See, Ciddi, *Kemalism in Turkish Politics*, p. 96.

[107] For further discussion of the "conservative democrat" description, see, Yalçın Akdoğan, "The Meaning of Conservative Political Identity," in Hakan Yavuz, ed., *The Emergence of a New Turkey* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah, 2006), pp. 49-65; Sultan Tepe, "Turkey's AKP: A Model 'Muslim-Democratic' Party?" *Journal of Democracy,* Vol. 16, No. 3 (2005), pp. 69-82; and Hale and Özbudun, *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism*, pp. 20-9.

9.2.1.3 Nationalist Discourse in Campaigns

The issue and language of nationalism as a discursive strategy in this paradigm has been both important, often in ironic ways, and fluctuated widely from election to election. While 1995 and 2007 involved a great deal of nationalist and emotional rhetoric—accusing other leaders of supporting separatists, for example—the 1999 and 2002 elections passed with little recourse to nationalist discourse. This might seem particularly surprising as the two parties with the strongest nationalist credentials on the right and left—the MHP and the DSP, respectively—finished the elections as the two largest vote getters. Parties also showed varying levels of nationalist fervor in their speeches from election to election. In general, however, parties that chose an intra-national inclusive discourse generally ended up with greater electoral success than those with more strident discourse, including the varying fortunes of MHP from election to election.

Table 9.4 – Nationalist Discourse by Major Parties from 1995-2007

	Inclusivist / No Nationalist Discourse	Moderate Nationalist Discourse	Strident Nationalist Discourse
1995	*CHP*	***RP**** *ANAP* *DSP* MHP	*DYP*
1999	***DSP*** *MHP* *FP* *ANAP* *DYP* CHP		
2002	***AKP*** *CHP*		MHP
2007		***AKP***	*CHP* *MHP*

* The party that received the plurality of the vote is in bold. Parties that passed the 10 percent threshold are in italics.

In 1995, with the struggle against the violent actions of the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) in full swing, the issue of terrorism was a regular aspect of the campaign debate. Most parties, however, even when touching on nationalist sensibilities, approached nationalist discourse in moderation. For example, the leader of the MHP, Alparslan Türkeş, while suggesting that his party could bring an end to the pain of mothers whose children were falling victim to the violence and that he prioritized the unity of the nation, he also emphasized that he was against, in fact afraid, of ethnic discrimination.[108] ANAP's Mesut Yılmaz and the DSP's Bülent Ecevit described their parties as representing nationalism (*milliyetçilik* for the former and *ulusalcılık*[109] for the latter) appealed to nationalists, but both showed concern for the conditions in the Southeast, where a high number of ethnic Kurds live.[110] Necmettin Erbakan's nationalism, was framed in relation to Turkey and the West and religious in nature, referring to Westerners as infidels (*gavur*); in terms of

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[108] "Üniter yapı bozulmasın," *Milliyet*, 11 December 1995.

[109] Nationalists on the political left and right in Turkey tend to make a rigid distinction between *milliyetçilik* (right) and *ulusalcılık* (left). In more recent decades, it has become hard to demarcate the boundaries between the two, in their mainstream manifestations, in matters of outlook and the general requirements for Turkishness in their cultural nationalisms. If anything, the distinction is most easily made, not in their recipes for nationalism, but in the lifestyle differences between the two. The former tend to be more socially conservative while the latter tend to live according to what has developed into a rigid social outlook derived from a particular interpretation of Kemalism. For an interesting article regarding the blending of and distinctions between the two strands of nationalism in recent decades, see Ioannis Grigoriadis and Irmak Özer, "Mutations of Turkish Nationalism: From Neo-Nationalism to the Ergenekon Affair," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (2010), pp. 101-13.

[110] "Bacıdan kaçıp hocaya tutulma," *Cumhuriyet*, 19 December 1995; "Ecevit: Sahte sosyal demokratları sandığa gömeceğiz," *Cumhuriyet*, 20 December 1995.

Muslims in Turkey, however, he was undoubtedly inclusivist.[111] The CHP and Baykal, meanwhile, enamored with the religious threat posed by the Welfare Party, tended to avoid the topic, and its leader even made a speech suggesting the need for decentralization,[112] a popular topic among Kurdish nationalists. The DYP and Tansu Çiller, however, chose to use nationalist sensitivities to her advantage, and accused her major competitor on the center-right, Yılmaz, of harboring separatists within his party and being willing to sit at the table with Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK.[113]

The issue of nationalism in the 1999 election is particularly interesting. The two largest victors from the ballot box were the party on the right (MHP) and left (DSP) with the most explicit nationalist credentials. Furthermore, in February, approximately two months prior to the election, the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, was captured and brought back to Turkey and was in custody awaiting trial. Prior to his arrest, the new leader of the MHP, Devlet Bahçeli, had promised that, if given a chance, he would ensure that the death sentence for Öcalan would be carried out if the courts handed down a death penalty.[114] This has led some students of Turkish politics to assume that nationalism was a potent issue in the 1999 elections, and that people's votes for the MHP, in particular, was largely do to their nationalists credentials and promises to have Öcalan executed. When one studies

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[111] "Erbakan: Rize bizim olacak," *Milliyet*, 11 December 1995; "Gümrük Birliğini Tanımam," *Milliyet*, 14 December 1995.

[112] "RP'nin panzehiri biziz," *Cumhuriyet*, 11 December 1995.

[113] "DYP lideri Çiller ölümden döndü," *Cumhuriyet*, 20 December 1995; "Apo'ya Masaya otururuz diyor," *Cumhuriyet*, 21 December 1995.

[114] Heper and İnce, "Devlet Bahçeli," p. 878.

the actual campaign discourse of all parties, however, this argument becomes extremely problematic as the most shocking feature of the campaign speeches of parties during the election was the near total absense of nationalist rhetoric, a huge departure from the 1991 and 1995 elections, and the parties leading the way in avoiding nationalist discourse were, in fact, the MHP and the DSP.

Ecevit of the DSP clearly avoided inflammatory rhetoric of both religious and nationalist varieties in his speeches. When such topics were touched upon, he was the opposite of inflammatory. For example, in Sivas he declared, "It was here that we laid the foundations of the Republic. When we did so, we did not ask anyone, 'Are you a Turk? Are you a Kurd? Are you a Sunni? Or are you an Alevi?'"[115] He went on to indicate that his point was that the Turkish Republic did not discriminate or care about various identities and that for this reason the actions of those who desire to divide the country would be thwarted.

Besides insisting that the MHP was neither fascist or racist and that it had discarded its practices from the past,[116] Bahçeli seemed to go out of his way to avoid mentioning the word "nationalist" even. Instead, in his speeches, he emphasized his personal integrity and the party's anti-corruption stance,[117] and made statements like, "in the National Assembly, tolerance and reconciliation should hold sway. The MHP will bring about such an Assembly"[118] and "When we

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[115] "Centilmen Başbakan," *Radikal*, 1 April 1999.
[116] "Bahçeli: Faşist ve ırkçı bir parti değiliz," *Milli Gazete*, 3 April 1999.
[117] "MHP'den Yolsuzluk Mücadele Kurulu vaadi," *Hürriyet*, 6 April 1999; "Bahçeli'den Çiller'e: Hadi Oradan," *Hürriyet*, 10 April 1999.
[118] "Yalan vaatler ahlaksızlıktır," *Hürriyet*, 2 April 1999.

receive governmental power, all social problems will be solved, not in the streets, but in the Assembly."[119] In fact, the two discursive elements most prominent in campaign speeches were the location of the party in the center and the concept of *hizmet*—i.e. service.[120] Despite the election being the first for Bahçeli as the leader of the MHP, the party's previous inability to pass the threshold and the non-sensational nature of his campaign speeches resulted in a near absence of coverage of his campaign in the major daily newspapers. The daily *Hürriyet* was one of the few papers to regularly cover the MHP's campaign, and in fact, also gave it little space. While the surge in support for the MHP flew under the radar among the big newspapers, who were dually shocked on election night,[121] the massive crowds showing up at MHP rallies covered by *Hürriyet* caused this newspaper to take the party seriously as the day of election drew near.

If nationalist discourse was not the key, why were the DSP and the MHP so successful? Each arrived at a successful election result for a different reason. Because Ecevit happened to be sitting in the Prime Minister's seat and was instrumental along with President Süleyman Demirel in the diplomacy that ultimately led to the capture and return of Abdullah Öcalan to Turkey. This was

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[119] "Bahçeli: Barışa ihtiyaç var," *Hürriyet*, 11 April 1999.
[120] "Bahçeli: Faşist ve ırkçı bir parti değiliz," *Milli Gazete*, 3 April 1999; "Barışa ihtiyaç var," *Hürriyet*, 11 April 1999; "Sağ partilerde büyük kapışma," *Cumhuriyet*, 13 April 1999; "MHP'den Yolsuzluk Mücadele Kurulu vaadi," *Hürriyet*, 6 April 1999; "Visyonumuz, lider ülke olabilmek," *Hürriyet*, 7 April 1999.
[121] Other daily papers like *Radikal* were questioning whether or not the MHP would pass the threshold even days before the election. Both *Radikal* and *Cumhuriyet*, by the last days, anticipated that the plurality of the vote would likely go to the FP, and that the front runners were FP and the DSP. They, of course, were correct about the latter, while the FP managed to come in third. The MHP was nowhere in their analysis prior to the election.

fresh on the minds of the electorate and the campaign began with Ecevit and DSP leading in the polls. His success had more to do with a general vote of confidence on his conduct as Prime Minister rather than any particular strategy or discourse employed in the campaign. Bahçeli, on the other hand, benefitted from the conjuncture of a number of points. The deinstitutionalization of the existing parties on the center-right due to corruption and poor governance created a party vacuum for a substantial number of voters. The party's determination to take a moderate stance and identify themselves as "centrist" undoubtedly assisted their electoral gains. Furthermore, the passing of Türkeş and the emergence of Bahçeli lent credence to the party's apparent shift toward moderation and the center. Had nationalism and the question of the death penalty for Öcalan been the key for the MHP's success in 1999,[122] their standings in the polls would have been much higher at the beginning of the campaign, not at the end, months from proclamations about the execution of the PKK leader. Furthermore, in 1999 the war against PKK was perceptibly winding down; it seems hard to propose that the MHP's gains were due to a rise of nationalist sentiment stemming from terrorism. The election during which terrorism and the death toll were at their highest was 1995, and in that election, the MHP could not manage to pass the 10 percent threshold.

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[122] In my discussions with those close affiliation to the MHP, they point out that the local party branches and nationalist associations like the Ideal Hearths (*Ülkü Ocakları*) mobilized existing nationalists through the promise of hanging Öcalan, which likely consolidated their base of around 9 percent; however, as Bahçeli was intentionally emphasizing "center-right" issues in his campaign speeches, it is likely that this strategy had an important influence on the spike of votes going to the MHP in the course of the campaign.

The MHP chose to return to an appeal to nationalist sentiment in 2002 and 2007 as it became clear that the AKP was collecting much of the center-right votes. Nationalism became an effective way to distinguish the two parties competing in indefinite positions on the right (or center according to their self-positioning). In 2002, Bahçeli used the threat of the impending US war against Iraq and the uncertainty surrounding EU membership and its subsequent obligations to touch on nationalist sentiment,[123] and this time, the party found itself going from having the most deputies in parliament to not passing the threshold. In 2007, with the reemergence of PKK actions against the Turkish Armed Forces and the AKP taking a pluralist and sympathetic stance toward the Kurds, the MHP once again used nationalist sensitivities to distinguish themselves from the governing AKP. Bahçeli argued that a vote for the AKP would be a vote to divide the country into 36 parts and that a "New Sevres Plan"[124] was in the works.[125] The competition for conservative nationalists ultimately led the AKP to remind voters that the MHP was in the government coalition when Öcalan received the death sentence, but they neglected to hang him, which led to a speech in which Bahçeli produced a rope and told Erdoğan that he could hang him with it.[126]

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[123] "Kürt devleti başımızı ağrıtır," *Cumhuriyet*, 13 October 2002; "Bahçeli ANAP'a yüklendi," *Cumhuriyet*, 14 October 2002; "Bahçeli'den 'ajan' suçlaması," *Cumhuriyet*, 26 October 2002.

[124] The Treaty of Sevres was the agreement reached between the Ottoman Empire and the victorious European powers following World War I (1920) that effectively parceled out much of Anatolia to the victorious parties, notably France, England, Italy and Greece with the possibility of turning some territory over to Armenians and Kurds.

[125] "Dunyaya tek bir cevap yeter," MHP advertisement, *Cumhuriyet*, 11 July 2007; "Uçurum öncesi son çıkış," *Cumhuriyet*, 16 July 2007; the party also vowed to move Öcalan to a less luxurious prison cell. "MHP Öcalan'ı F Tipi'ne koyacak," *Yeni Şafak*, 4 July 2007.

[126] "Erdoğan'a 'ip'li yanıt," *Cumhuriyet*, 1 July 2007.

While it was less surprising that the nationalist MHP would employ a nationalist discourse in 2007 to compete against the AKP, the real surprise was the strong appeal to nationalism employed by the CHP, which had not done so since Ecevit was the leader of the party in the 1970s. Baykal, discursively concerned with the status of secularism and the religious threat in 1995 and 1999 and then concerned about corruption and lifting the untouchable status of parliament deputies in 2002, made nationalist rhetoric through the issue of terrorism a key component of the 2007 campaign.[127] The party emphasized an apparent secret meeting between the US and AKP officials in Dubai in 2003 in which the latter agree to accept a billion dollars in return for staying out of Northern Iraq.[128] The idea that the AKP was in the pockets of both the US and PKK and that they showed impotence in the face of terrorist actions was a regular image of the AKP created by the CHP during the campaign.[129] Interestingly enough, though there were no other real contenders besides the AKP, the CHP and the MHP in the election, with the exception of the Kurdish leftist-nationalist DTP members running as independents, the combined votes of the two parties appealing to nationalist sentiment through the terrorism issue fell far short of the votes received by the AKP.

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[127] See also, Ciddi, "The Republican People's Party," p. 445.
[128] "Terör sicilleri yanlış dolu," Cumhuriyet, 3 July 2007; "Suçüstü yakalandılar," *Cumhuriyet*, 4 July 2007; "Kilavuzları Barzani," *Cumhuriyet*, 5 July 2007; "Tayyip'in Terör karşısında duruşu," *Cumhuriyet*, 15 July 2007.
[129] "Tayyip'in Terör karşısında duruşu," *Cumhuriyet*, 15 July 2007; "Yeni dönemin zamanı geldi," *Cumhuriyet*, 17 July 2007.

9.2.1.4 Economy, Corruption and "Hizmet"

While economic promises and policy were once again a regular feature of campaign discourse, the level to which the discussion of corruption and dishonesty dominated the speeches and debates between party leaders was certainly unique to this particular paradigm. The open forum debates in 1995 largely centered on Mesut Yılmaz and Tansu Çiller arguing about whom was more corrupt. Though the private television station, Kanal D, broke a record for the number of viewers, the reports following the debate indicated immense disappointment by those viewing the debacle.[130] The RP, which received the plurality of the vote in 1995, ran on a platform of honest, moral government. Ecevit and Bahçeli both ran on credentials as "honest politicians" and managed to lead their parties to first and second place finishes in 1999. Both the AKP, as a new party, and the CHP, which had failed to pass the threshold in 1999, benefited from a clean record and an anti-corruption discourse, while the rest of the parties in parliament were swept out entirely in 2002. Baykal, who focused the majority of his speeches on clean government and a repeal of the law that provides untouchable status to corrupt politicians while they are in parliament in 2002, continued to address corruption issues in the campaign in 2007, this time directing them against the AKP. The CHP pointed out that the AKP municipal governments were distributing coal to poor families in the middle of the

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[130] "Kanal D izleme rekoru kırdı, *Milliyet*, 13 December 1995; Liderler halkı unuttu, *Milliyet*, 13 December 1995; Vatandaşı inandıramadılar, *Milliyet*, 13 December 1995.

summer right before the elections,[131] and that Prime Minister Erdoğan had been giving construction bids to his father-in-law in Northern Iraq.[132] A rising star in the party, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who in 2010 was appointed the party leader, enumerated the boats, mansions and manufacturing plants that were owned and operated by children of AKP leaders and heads of ministries.[133]

Although one find dirt on all the parties,[134] the level of corruption by the end of the paradigm seemed to pale in comparison to the situation in 1995 and 1999, the prime offenders having been the DYP and ANAP. Nonetheless, the success of party leaders with anti-corruption agendas and clean hands seemed to encourage maintaining the focus on this issue. The election results of this paradigm certainly favored the parties who were led by "honest" politicians.

The utilization of the *hizmet* discourse—i.e. presenting the impetus of one's party to be at the service of the people—continued into this paradigm; however, whereas in the previous paradigm one could find leaders on the left, such as Necdet Calp and Erdal İnönü using such expressions, from the general election of 1995 to the general election of 2007, the expression was only used by parties on the right.[135] While some parties, like ANAP, the RP-FP, and AKP consistently used such

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[131] "Seçenekli Dayatma," *Cumhuriyet*, 11 July 2007; "Yoksul sömürülüyor," *Cumhuriyet*, 6 July 2007; "Aflar Erdoğan'a yaradı," *Cumhuriyet*, 7 July 2007. According to the daily *Cumhuriyet*, whose editors gave strong support to the CHP, the AKP distributed 340,000 tons of coal prior to the election. "Al kömürü ver oyu," *Cumhuriyet*, 16 July 2007.

[132] "Kilavuzları Barzani," *Cumhuriyet*, 5 July 2007.

[133] "Söz konusu vatansa CHP," *Cumhuriyet*, 15 July 2007.

[134] Ironically, Baykal himself was forced to give up his seat as party leader in 2010 when a cassette tape was leaked that apparently showed him having sexual interaction with his former secretary, who had later been appointed, under his tutelage, as a parliament deputy and whose husband has subsequently received the bids for the party's security needs.

[135] The leader of the "center-right" DYP, Tansu Çiller, was an exception to this discursive trend.

expressions in the elections they contested, the MHP used it frequently in only one national election, 1999.[136]   Yavuz has argued that *hizmet* is a discursive phenomenon derived from Islamic movements,[137] that it is non-ideological discourse,[138] and that the AKP is the only *hizmet* party, a fact which distinguishes it from all other parties.[139]   Based on campaign speeches, however, it is reasonable to propose that the *hizmet* party discourse began as a modern and non-ideological appeal. Furthermore, its wide usage in the Turkish party system on both the left and the right, starting in the 1980s creates a problem for the assertion that the expression is primarily the domain of Islamic movements and that the AKP or even its *Milli Görüş* predecessors, from which it splintered off—i.e. the RP and FP—could be considered as having a monopoly on representing themselves as such.   However, the *application* of the "service" discourse became associated with its manifestation through the Islamist Welfare Party and its supporting religious associations. Along with this, the more recent emphasis on service to God and society that can be seen in the mission statements of communities and associations connected to the controversial religious leader, Fethullah Gülen, probably relegated the utilization of the *hizmet* discourse to the parties on the right during this paradigm.

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[136] For examples, "MHP'den Yolsuzluk Mücadele Kurulu vaadi," *Hürriyet*, 6 April 1999; "Visyonumuz, lider ülke olabilmek," *Hürriyet*, 7 April 1999.
[137] M. Hakan Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 41.
[138] Ibid., pp. 82, 85.
[139] Ibid., p. 113.

Table 9.5 – Particular Election "Shapers" in 1995-2007 General Elections

	Major Campaign Issues	Concurrent Exogenous Factors
Dec. 1995	- Corruption - European Customs Union - PKK and terrorist actions in the Southeast - Welfare Party	- Major economic crisis in 1994
April 1999	- Corruption - Headscarf Issue - Addressing the national debt	- Unfolding Tragedy in Kosovo - Capture of Abdullah Öcalan in February
Nov. 2002	- Corruption / lifting the 'untouchable' status of parliament deputies - European Union Membership - Impending US invasion of Iraq - IMF debt repayment	- Major economic crisis in 2001 - Impending US invasion of Iraq - Attempts to close down DEHAP and the AKP by the Chief Prosecutor Sabih Kanadoğlu during the election campaign
July 2007	- PKK terrorist actions reportedly launched from Northern Iraq - Corruption / lifting the 'untouchable' status of parliament deputies - EU accession process - Who would select the future President following the election	- The posting on the Turkish Armed Forces website during the Presidential selection process that appeared to be a cryptic threat against the selection of the AKP's Abdullah Gül as President - The Court's ruling that a quorum of 367 deputies was necessary to count as an official vote during the selection of a President

9.2.2 Non-discursive Campaign Strategies

As their importance as a dimension of competition was initiated in the previous paradigm, this paradigm witnessed the consolidation of the electoral strategies related to the two giant M's: media and municipalities. While seeking creative and professional avenues to present the propaganda of one's party became a major facet of all serious contenders for political power in Turkey, ratcheting up the costs of campaigning in general, its actual effects on the elections became increasingly indefinite. Arguably, this was true for two reasons: the novelty of media usage had worn off by the 1995 election, especially following the

disappointing open forum debates,[140] and Turkish voters in general have not been strongly inclined to respond solely to political propaganda and campaign discourse; furthermore, the fact that all major parties were employing professional advertising firms to conduct their campaigns simply raised the bar, and cost, for everyone but leveled the playing field for those parties that had enough money to spend on the now standard media blitzes and advertising. One might argue that unless a party has major financial banking, through support mobilization, or, in the case of Cem Uzan and the Youth Party in 2002 and 2007, a rich patron, or is already a party with significant social backing, the high financial expense of national campaigns has become a limiting force on the number of parties—at least as effective as the 10 percent threshold. The combined juggernaut of the cost of media campaigns and the existing threshold has effectively made a new or minor party's entrance into the field of major contributors a very unlikely proposition, barring a severe delegitimizing crisis among the current contenders. State electoral regulations also provide free airtime to parties that are represented in the parliament, but these benefits are also weighted according to number of seats in parliament,[141] again providing advantage to existing power contenders and limiting the opportunities for small and new parties to make electoral headway.

The foundational standard of a strong media-based campaign has a times been a seductive siren to certain party leaders. Deniz Baykal's early success on

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[140] Liderler halkı unuttu, *Milliyet*, 13 December 1995; Vatandaşı inandıramadılar, *Milliyet*, 13 December 1995.
[141] For an example of such distribution in an election, see "TV'de en çok söz MHP'nin," *Radikal*, 12 October 2002.

television in 1995 led him to prioritize this avenue of electoral competition over other forms of mobilization.[142] He actually told reporters that he preferred to talk to the nation on television rather than having to go around and speak to them directly.[143] The CHP's advertisements in 1995, which featured a smiling Baykal, encouraged people that they could *fax* their concerns to the party—a suggestion reminiscent of parents encouraging their children to mail a wish list to Santa Claus.[144] Besides the minimal chance that people might believe that their fax would actually be read, in 1995, the amount of effort it would have taken for the vast majority of the population, especially those not in large cities, to access a fax machine—outside of bureaucrats and businessmen—made it a very restricted populist appeal indeed. In 1999, Baykal spent most of the election trying to convince the other politicians to debate with him on television,[145] which no one did, and the party found itself below the threshold at election's end. Though the party could be described as having a number of potential weaknesses, certainly the overemphasis on disseminating propaganda through the media over other forms of voter mobilization probably limited the success of the CHP, especially in the 1990s when there were alternatives.

No party in this paradigm that received the plurality of the vote could claim to have done so by their media and propaganda campaign alone. In 1995, the

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[142] See, "Kamuoyu 'Yılmaz ve Baykal' dedi," *Milliyet*, 12 December 1995.
[143] "Meydan yerine medya," *Cumhuriyet*, 21 December 1995.
[144] "Seni dinliyorum Türkiye," CHP advertisement, *Cumhuriyet*, 21 December 1995.
[145] "Baykal: kaçmayın," *Radikal*, 3 April 1999; "Baykal: Kaçak güreşiyorlar," *Cumhuriyet*, 5 April 1999.

Welfare Party was already leading prior to the election campaign, and their lead was clearly attributed to their municipal performance. Bülent Ecevit and the DSP were already leading with the campaign got underway in 1999, and his votes and lead have to be attributed to a vote of confidence in his leadership as Prime Minister in the period leading up to the election, a period which included the capture of the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan.[146] The very young AKP started the electoral campaign in 2002 with a lead and much of this was attributed to the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, whose popularity was frequently tied to his effective governance of the greater Istanbul municipality. The AKP's increase in votes in 2007, the first for a government party in Turkey since 1954, could be attributed to two causes: First, as has been widely claimed, it seemed to be a reaction against the perceived partisan ruling of the Constitutional Court that effectively blocked the AKP from appointing a President and forced early elections and the "e-memorandum" posted on the Turkish Armed Forces website that seemed to be a threatening reaction toward the AKP's selection of Abdullah Gül as the Presidential candidate. Secondly, it could be argued that the AKP also benefited from their performance in government as both the national and local level, but particularly the latter; the AKP made huge new gains in provinces in the Southeast region, and while they made gains in nearly every province in this section of the country, the biggest gains occurred in provinces in which the party had been voted in as municipal governors in the local elections of 2004 (see Table 9.6).

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[146] See also, Ciddi, *Kemalism in Turkish Politics*, p. 100.

Table 9.6 – AKP National Election Fortunes in Relation to 2004 Local Election

AKP won 2004 local election				AKP lost 2004 local election			
	2002	2007	Swing		2002	2007	Swing
Ağrı	17.7	63	45.3	Diyarbakır	16	40.9	24.9
Muş	16.9	38.6	21.7	Batman	20.6	46.4	25.8
Bitlis	17.7	58.8	41.1	Şırnak	14	26.9	12.9
Bingöl	31.7	71.1	39.4	Hakkari	6.8	33.5	26.7
Van	25.9	53.2	27.3	Mardin	15.4	44.1	28.7
AVERAGE	21.98	56.94	**34.96**	**AVERAGE**	14.56	38.36	**23.8**

* Note: Siirt was not included in the provinces above due to the need in 2002 for a rerun, which only featured the AKP and the CHP, and in which Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was running for a seat in order to enter parliament and be elligible to be selected as Prime Minister.

Therefore, every party that has acquired governmental power since 1995 has owed a great measure of their success to previous successful governance, at the local or national level, but usually demonstrated at the local government level.[147] This suggests a significant level of functional behavior underlying the logic of voters in national elections. While it is true that ideology or party affiliation may be the overarching cause of a correlation between a party's local government and national parliamentary success, there are a number of examples during this period that clearly show that local communities showed ideological flexibility in relation to political parties that somehow demonstrated that they would prioritize the needs of the community and govern effectively. The converse, of course, was also true; parties to which the local community was sympathetic could be punished severely if

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[147] Özbudun writes, "Turkish parties generally lack deep and lasting roots in society, and their performance in government becames the main criterion of voters' choice." Ergun Özbudun, "From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: The Case of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey," *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 3-4 (2006), p. 555.

they failed to perform their administrative duties effectively.[148] Though it is a quite

factor influencing the electoral gain of parties in national elections, it is hard to

imagine any party registering significant gains in a national election without having

had an effective demonstration of the party's ability to govern at the local level.[149]

Finally, the CHP and the DSP, while it was still a contending party under

Ecevit's tutelage, benefited during this paradigm from the mobilization of a number

of Kemalist or secularist civil society organizations on their behalf. During the rise

(and fall) of the Welfare Party, in particular, just as social action associations

worked with the RP to address the perceived needs of the community, existing and

newly formed associations and foundations established on the premises of Atatürk's

modernization project for Turkey went to work on behalf of the "center-left"

parties. Groups like the Atatürkist Thought Association, the Support of Modern

Life Association, the Modern Education Foundation and the Modern Woman and

Youth Foundation sprung into action in order to address the perceived needs of the

community, which was, in general, a lack of appropriate education.   The

pedagogical nature of these associations, however, tended to most effectively

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[148] The ideal example of this is the performance of the SHP/CHP in local and national elections from 1989 to 1995. The rising popularity of İnönü, starting from 1987, and the sympathy toward their social democratic platform helped the SHP capture a national plurality of the vote in local elections. The poor performance and the evidence and allegations of corruption by these municipal and provincial governments, especially in Istanbul, cause the party to be swept out of local office in 1994 and led to steady losses in general elections in 1991 and 1995. For more on SHP local governance disaster, see chapter eight and also, Ciddi, *Kemalism in Turkish Politics*, p. 88; see also, Öniş and Grigoriadis, "Europe and the impasse of centre-left politics," p. 266.
[149] For more information on the impact and strategic importance of local elections for political parties, see Nihal İncioğlu, "Local Elections and Electoral Behavior," in Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer, eds., *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 73-90.

mobilize those who shared their general culture and worldview, and had relatively limited success targeting those who were yet to be fully "modern" and "educated," while the groups mobilized in support of the RP tended to find new bases of support, stemming from the fact that they had placed the material needs of the communities as a top priority, while the spiritual pedagogy was placed second, at least in its presentation.

Furthermore, associations of this sort, particularly those mobilized on behalf of the CHP and the DSP, operate the most effectively in the urban environment. In the case of the Welfare Party, which had historically been able to generate some support from small towns in Anatolia, what they needed to build onto their base was a way to mobilize voters in urban areas. As the exact opposite had been the case for the CHP and DSP since the late 1960s, these mobilized groups had limited vote-building potential. In fact, as the primary mobilization technique from such civil society groups was that the secular Republic and the principles of Atatürk were under attack by religious reactionaries, who have been waiting for the right moment to curb all social liberties and freedoms,[150] such accusations did little to ingratiate them to conservative and devout voters and seemed to confirm that the political lines were being drawn between secularist urban culture and those in the countryside and urban squatter communities. If we consider that the CHP has

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[150] For one example of civil society mobilization on behalf of the CHP in this vein, see "Birleşme adresi CHP," *Cumhuriyet*, 16 October 2002. Even as of spring 2011, the threat mobilization strategy is still evident in publications by these associations. The Modern Education Foundation just release a new title, for example, called *Ufkun Ötesinde ne Var? [What is on the other side of your horizon?]* by Gülseven Güven Yaşer with a woman's eyes peering through a thin sliver on a black background.

primarily mobilized voters through political discourse channeled through the media and urban-based associations, their geographical vote distribution isn't particularly surprising—i.e. largely clustered in urban and industrialized centers in the West and coastal areas.

9.3 Domains of Identification and the Emergence of Regional Party Systems

The distinction between the dimensions of competition—strategies employed by parties to mobilize votes—and domains of identification—social identities that play an indirect role in voter choice—points out an interesting paradox of this paradigm, spanning from 1995 until the last general election covered in this study, 2007. Though it is accurate in some way to say, as many students of Turkish politics have, that the major political divide during this period has been between secularist and religious conservatives, for one side of the divide, the identity has been a dimension of competition—i.e. voters have been explicitly mobilized through the cultural identity—while the identity of the other side has operated very clearly as a domain of identification—i.e. a secondary factor influencing voting decisions. Since the rise of the Welfare Party in local elections of 1994 and the subsequent general election in 1995 when they received a plurality of the vote, the "center-left" has shifted tack and made the "social democrat" or "leftist" identity a domain of identification and prioritized mobilizing votes through an appeal to those with secularists worldviews through the threat of impending religious takeover and backwardness.

In contrast to secularist mobilization around the CHP, the parties that were the target of their fears were primarily mobilizing supporters through means and issues not directly associated with religion. The consistent foci of the voters on the right and the parties for which they cast their vote, are material concerns and the economy. In fact, if one follows the fortunes of parties that have taken turns for the better and worse, one finds that, as the party puts material and economic concerns first, they gain votes. This was true of the Welfare Party, the MHP in 1999, and the consistent priority of the AKP in election programs and campaigns. When the successors of the RP, the FP, and the SP, in particular, moved away from prioritizing the economy,[151] their electoral fortunes turned. Not only is such a trend made clear through the observation of party election programs and campaign speeches, and the emphasis of sympathetic media organs on the economy and material concerns,[152] there are indications in existing research that back this up. In an interesting quantitative study by Ersin Kalaycıoğlu with very a solid representative sample, when numerous variables were regressed in relation to identification with various parties, the data shows that the strongest factor

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[151] This can be measured in some fashion by perusing these parties' election manifests. The RP in 1995, for example, put the issues of the "just [economic] order" first along with its economic program and then dealt with social and moral issues toward the end of the manifest. The FP put human rights before the economy in 1999 in their election manifest. The SP in 2002 and 2007 chose to place economic concerns at the end of the manifest and legal and social concerns toward the beginning. In 1999, the MHP emphasized clean government that would effectively deliver services to the people, but the party subsequently has deemphasized that message to focus on terrorism and separatists in 2002 and 2007.

[152] As opposed to the daily *Cumhuriyet*, which stood clearly in support for the CHP in 2002 and 2007, whose columnists and voluntary advertisements for the party demonstrated an emphasis on secularists' cultural concerns, the AKP's clear supporter, *Yeni Şafak*, centered its election coverage and concerns on policy and the economy, with no mobilization against the "other" as seen in the former newspaper.

determining identification with the AKP is attitudes toward the economy. A very distant second factor, but also significant is the index for religiosity. If we examine these same variables for the CHP, the order of power for these two indices is reversed. Thus, while parental identification for the CHP trumps both of these other significant indices, which is another cultural domain influencing votes for the CHP, the index for religiosity, which is negatively regressed, is the second strongest indicator of identification for the CHP followed by the index regarding the economy.[153] Furthermore, in a recent study on the AKP in Konya by Yavuz, he observed that those who voted for the party tended to refuse to identify with it, "The identity of the AKP does not stick on people."[154] He argued that this consideration seemed to be tied to pragmatism and a lack of ideology within the party, such that their supporters had come to support them with the expectation that they would deliver goods and services (*hizmet*), not because of an identity or ideology.[155]

The policy and issue-based focus of the AKP, along with its distributive tendencies prior to elections, tend to confirm that the party is not primarily mobilizing through identities. While is also certainly true that Islamist voters do vote for the AKP—a KAS agency poll in 2007 found that roughly 16 percent of AKP supporters polled described their political tendencies as Islamist[156]—it is also

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[153] Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Attitudinal Orientations to Party Organizations in Turkey in the 2000s," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2008), pp. 308-10.
[154] Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy*, p. 84
[155] Ibid., pp. 84-5.
[156] *Yeni Şafak*, 16 July 2007. Akıncı, in his study of the Welfare Party, quoted research that showed that, even for this party with a stronger religious identity, the number of "hard core" Islamists constituted only 7 percent of the party's support. Akıncı, "The Municipal Radicalism," p. 91.

important to note that the party is not mobilizing on the basis of Islamism, and it would be hard to imagine that existing Islamist voters would be encouraged to vote for the CHP. The supporters of the MHP, which also does not mobilize according to religion, has also been found to be significantly linked with religiosity, but to a slightly weaker degree than the AKP.[157] In other words, the religious conservatives in Turkey have to either boycott the elections, which is still technically illegal, or vote for some party. Considering the anti-religious mobilization that forms a large segment of the CHP's support, it seems difficult to comprehend the apparent shock embedded in studies that find that religiosity is tied to the parties on the "right" and secularist worldviews are correlated with voters on the "left".

Within the large categories that take the name of "left" and "right" in Turkish politics, the juncture of this paradigm seems to demonstrate the manifestation of a number of political domains that operate as sub-categories, helping to form stability between the two large camps. On the left, there are four major domains of identification: Kemalists, secular nationalists, social democrats, and Kurdish nationalists. The separation between the substantial bloc of Kurdish leftists and the other three domains has been rather severe through the general election of 2007. On the right, one also finds four major domains: conservatives, nationalists, Islamists, and conservative Kurds. In this group, there is an important divide between nationalists—i.e. Turkish nationalists—and conservative Kurds.

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[157] Çarkoğlu, "The New Generation Pro-Islamists," p. 173; this relationship was also significantly correlated in data collected in an unpublished study by this author. See, F. Michael Wuthrich, M. Murat Ardağ and Deniz Uğur, "Politics, Cultural Heterogeneity and Support for European Union Membership in Turkey," unpublished manuscript.

This has created an important measure of tension for catch-all parties on the right, a tension visible since the heyday of ANAP in the 1980s. It is nearly impossible to have staunch nationalists in the same party as conservative Kurds;[158] hence, when a party tries to maximize its appeal to identities on the right, one of the domains almost necessarily is left out. The AKP, in 2007, managed to attract conservatives, Islamists and Kurdish conservatives (along with small segments of social democrats and liberals) into an electoral coalition,[159] which allowed the MHP some success in accumulating a threshold surpassing number of nationalist supporters.

Furthermore, the paradigmatic period from the 1995 to the 2007 general elections has increasingly evidenced the importance of regional identities, such that one might reasonably argue that the Turkish electoral party system of this period could be described as three regional party systems, each with their own separate axis of competition. While it must be emphasized that the boundaries between the regions, particularly the Western/Coastal Region and the Central Region, are somewhat fluid, within the heart of these regions, one can recognize a definitive party system shape that distinguishes it from the other regions. This fragmentation of the national party system into distinct regional systems has also ironically required the party who hopes to truly be a "nation party" to fragment its appeal to

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[158] Both the DYP and ANAP tried to keep all of these together, with certain periods of success, but also with clear periods of fragmentation.

[159] Özbudun has also observed that the AKP collected these political identities underneath its party's banner in the 2002 election. See Ergun Özbudun, "Changes and Continuities in the Turkish Party System," *Representation*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2006), p. 131.

voters on a regional basis. Since 1995, election results have clearly confirmed this

trend (see Table 9.7).[160]

Table 9.7 – Regional Patterns of Party System Electoral Competition

		Industial Centers	Western/Coastal	Central Anatolia	Southeast
1995	Center R	36.3	46.3	32.8	31.9
	Rel R	20.8	9.0	33.3	22.0
	C+R R	57.1	55.4	66.0	54.0
	Nat R	7.5	6.8	12.8	4.8
	Center L	30.9	34.0	17.6	6.3
	K Nat L	2.9	2.2	1.4	28.5
1999	Center R	23.5	31.3	20.8	27.2
	Rel R	15.2	5.5	21.7	13.8
	C+R R	38.7	36.8	42.5	41.0
	Nat R	17.2	14.4	28.6	5.0
	Center L	36.6	41.5	19.5	9.5
	K Nat L	2.9	2.6	1.2	32.2
2002	Center R	13.9	23.2	12.1	12.8
	AKP	36.8	16.9	48.7	23.6
	Rel R	2.7	1.1	2.8	2.9
	C+R R	53.4	41.2	63.6	39.3
	Nat R	7.2	9.6	10.1	3.1
	Center L	21.8	28.7	15.6	8.5
	K Nat L	3.9	3.6	2.0	37.8
2007	AKP	48.0	30.4	60.1	45.4
	Nat R	13.4	16.4	14.3	2.7
	CHP	22.2	32.0	14.4	4.5
	K Nat L	2.4	2.0	2.0	39.7

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[160] It could also be argued that, in previous paradigms, there were trends that suggested a proto-manifestation of these regional distinctions—i.e. the tendency of the Western region to adhere tightly to competition between the major centrist parties with few votes going to extremists or narrow ideology parties on the right; the tendency for voters in the Central region to show increased support for the various offshoots of the Republican Nation Party, which was a conservative party that catered to both religious conservatives and conservatives; and the tendency in the Southeast Region to produce a higher number of independent candidates in elections that ran outside of the existing party frameworks. Nonetheless, these distinctions from region to region were less explicit with center parties like the CHP and the AP taking the lion's share of the votes everywhere. This paradigm's pattern seems to suggest a consolidation of the slight murmurings of regional distinctions in previous paradigms.

The consolidation of regional cleavages among party systems could be attributed to a number of developments. First, the critical break between the SHP and Kurdish leftist-nationalists following the 1991 elections resulted in a near shutout of "center-left" parties in the Southeast region that has led to a two party contest between the conservative/religious conservative party family versus the existing Kurdish leftist-nationalist party (see Table 9.7).[161] Beginning in 1995, a geographical map of the fortunes of the center-left demonstrate a stark regional reality: strong performance on the western and southern coast with diminishing success as the party moves inland and a near absence of any "center-left" party in the Southeast, with combined vote shares for all center-left parties falling into the 10 percent or less range. Another explanation for the clear regional party system tendency could be found in the fragmentation of the party system in the 1980s and 1990s that led "competitor" parties with the same general ideological framework to compete against one another by occupying separate demographic domains. The excellent study by Başlevent et al. used voter profile data to show that the ideological similar parties were appealing to voters of different demographics. For example, while voters for ANAP and DYP identified themselves politically in similar ways, they differed markedly from one another demographically. ANAP voters tended to be highly educated urban voters while DYP supporters tended to be

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[161] The core provinces of the region used to gather electoral data are Ağrı, Batman, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Şırnak, and Van.

rural and less educated. A nice parallel can be seen in the voters of the CHP and the DSP. CHP supporters, like ANAP supporter, tended to be urban and educated while the DSP voters, as was true for DYP, tended to be less so. For this reason, though not strongly emphasized by the authors, it was the pairs of CHP and ANAP and the DYP and the DSP that bore the most similarity in terms of voter profiles.[162] This also logically explains the relational groupings during the fragmented parliaments and electoral contests, often pitting the DYP-CHP/SHP alliance against the ANAP-DSP alliance. The parties had these working affinities with oppositional parties because the latter were the parties the least likely to jeopardize the votes from their targeted demographics. This fragmented appeal in order to firm up voting bases undoubtedly encouraged localized appeals over pure generalized interest, and it would encourage parties to invest greater attention toward demographics—particularly in terms of provinces and regions—where they were strong, especially as one's support base and finances were dwindling.

Thus, the provinces bordering the Aegean, Marmara, and Mediterranean Region, have tended during this paradigm to exhibit a three (or two and a half) party system. The contest could be shaped as a predominantly center-right versus

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[162] Cem Başlevent, Hasan Kirmanoğlu and Burhan Şenatalar, "Voter Profiles and Fragmentation in the Turkish Party System," *Party Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2004), pp. 307-24. The authors conclude that these demographic differences between ideologically similar parties illustrates that fragmentation has not been "artificial." This seems to be a rush to judgment, however. If demographic similarity between voters should be the determinant of whether or not fragmentation is artificial or not, then the demographic similarity of the DSP and the DYP and, similarly, ANAP and the CHP would suggest that their coexistences were artificial. Furthermore, the voter profiles of competitor parties after almost two decades of competition would be bound to show demographic distinction as a simple result of simplifying campaign mobilization; thus, the demographic portrait exists as a side effect of campaigning not necessarily the cause the existence of the parties.

center-left conflict with the nationalist MHP functioning as a strong third party (see Table 9.7).[163] In the broad center of the country, spanning from just inland of the coastal provinces on the west to the interior northeast corner, the party system is primarily a competition between the center-right, which would be considered the predominant party, and the conservative nationalists and the center-left functioning as weak alternatives—their combined strength is often still half the strength of the conservative/religious conservative showing (see Table 9.7).[164] If we compared these geographical regions to provinces with large industrial and production activity, due to their more culturally complex populations, the latter tend to demonstrate the national aggregate with a slight advantage to the center-left (see Table 9.7).[165] These outlines have been observed by excellent studies of using clustering methods in electoral geography,[166] demonstrating these distinct regional trends even while the electoral picture was far more fragmented. With the reduction of the national party system to a much smaller number of power players, this trend has become even more explicit.

The result of this pattern of regional electoral party systems is the irony that, parties that primarily operate on a national message tend to limit themselves to

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[163] The provinces use to gather data for this region were Edirne, Tekirdağ, Kırklareli, Çanakkale, İzmir, Aydın, Muğla, Antalya, and the two northeast-most provinces Artvin and Ardahan.

[164] Core provinces used from this region: Sivas, Kayseri, Yozgat, Tokat, Çorum, Maraş, Malatya, Niğde, Nevşehir, Aksaray, and Konya.

[165] Provinces included in this category, which didn't display a clear geographical regional tendency, are Ankara, Adana, Bursa, Eskişehir, Gaziantep, İstanbul, Kocaeli and Zonguldak.

[166] Ali Çarkoğlu, "The Geography of the April 1999 Turkish Elections," *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2000), pp. 149-71; and W. Jefferson West II, "Regional cleavages in Turkish politics: An electoral geography of the 1999 and 2002 national elections," *Political Geography*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (2005), pp. 499-523.

becoming a regional party; whereas, those parties with an electoral claim to "nation party" status have to fragment their appeal to the concerns of the various regions and compete along the lines of contestation drawn up at the local level. Yavuz, for example, noted that much of the success of the Welfare Party in 1995 could be attributed to their success in making appeals and identifying themselves in distinct ways in different regions.[167] ANAP's Mesut Yılmaz, in contrast, cautioned the DSP's Bülent Ecevit from getting too excited about his growing popularity prior to the 1999 campaign, reminding him that his party was almost non-existent in 40 provinces of the country, particularly in the Central, East and Southeast provinces.[168] In the 2002 elections, when the CHP was attempting new strategies to compete against the rising AKP, the party made a special campaign brochure that was to be distributed to the East and Southeast provinces, making promises particular to that region that would not have sat well with their voters in the Western provinces.[169] Although it stayed at the discursive and media level, it indicated the awareness of the party that they needed distinct regional appeals. The AKP in 2007, largely bringing together a center-right, religious conservative and Kurdish conservative coalition found themselves as the first or second place party in almost all the provinces of every region.

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[167] Yavuz, "Political Islam and the Welfare Party," pp. 78-9.
[168] "Ecevit boşuna heveslenmesin," *Radikal*, 1 April 1999.
[169] "CHP'den Doğu'ya özel ilgi," *Cumhuriyet*, 6 October 2002.

As a result of the distinct lines of competition in various regions of the country,[170] the CHP, the first official political party of the Turkish Republic, has found itself being only regionally representative.[171] The same is true for the MHP, which functions in a reciprocal relationship with the CHP in the West and Central provinces—i.e. as one moves to the West, the fortunes of the CHP generally grow as those of the MHP mostly decline and vice versa. Not surprisingly, the fortunes of the successions of Kurdish leftist-nationalist parties completely lie in the votes they receive in the Southeast, and to a lesser extent, the East.

9.4 Conclusion

The electoral period spanning from the election in 1995 and the election in 2007 has experienced a number of significant and visible changes throughout the period, including the collapse of three major centrist parties, the emergence of a new center-right catch-all party, and the shrinking of the party system to four serious contenders listed by electoral strength—the center-right AKP, the center-left CHP, the conservative nationalist MHP, and the existing Kurdish leftist-nationalist manifestation.[172] These changes also make it reasonable to propose that a new party system has emerged since 2002, whose contours have remained fairly stable

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[170] As mentioned before, the author acknowledges that provinces in the border areas between these regions display mixed or combined characteristics of the adjacent regions.
[171] See also, Ciddi, "The Republican People's Party," p. 438-9. Ciddi points out that the CHP was unable to have representatives elected in 36 provinces in 2007, which doubled from 18 provinces in 2002, despite the fact that they were competing against fewer serious contenders.
[172] In 1995 and 1999, this was HADEP; in 2002, it was DEHAP; in 2007, the party members competed as independents, and once in parliament, became the DTP. It was closed in December 2009 and has subsequently become the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP).

in the one general election and two local elections that have taken place since that point. While the party system has indeed changed and visible transformations are evident, if we examine the period from the standpoint of a structuring paradigm, the causes behind the party system change and the underlying identities and strategies for competition have remained remarkably stable. The forces unleashed on the party system beginning in 1991 and fully evident in 1995 are the same forces that ultimately led to the disappearance of parties and the primary lines of competition, including the substantive associations of "left" and "right". Observing the system relationally in terms of dimensions of competition and domains of identification, not only help clarify the continuity within this particular paradigm, these paradigmatic components also help pinpoint the logic behind the transformations.

Obviously, this is not intended to suggest that the results were predetermined; however, understanding the logic and success of various strategies points out the range of constraints and opportunities existing in the system. For example, had the MHP, the FP, and the AKP not intentionally tried to moderate their discourse and present themselves as "center" parties clearly impinging on the storehouse of "center-right" voters, and if they had continued to project a more radical image, it seems likely that the DYP and ANAP might have survived the legitimacy crisis, even if somewhat wounded. Had the personality conflict between Çiller and Yılmaz not been so great, had they resigned and entrusted the parties to other leadership, it is likely that the two parties would have joined together prior to their mutual collapse, and combining forces while still retaining legitimate electoral

strength would have made a big difference. By the time they decided to unite to form the renewed Democrat Party, to use the well-known English expression, they were simply "beating a dead horse."[173]

The fragmented nature of the geographical electoral landscape, the fractures of which were evident from 1995, also presented new landmines to parties competing in the party system. With the tag team of regional political cleavages and a ten percent national threshold, the arena of contest suddenly made surviving the political topography and establishing oneself as a legitimate power-player a difficult proposition. Unlike in the 1960s and 1970s, when factions were emboldened to split from the mother parties and form a new electoral contender, the period from 1995-2007 has shown that one will not be rewarded for engaging in such a venture. The split of the FP in 2001 lead to a drastic victory in 2002 to the moderate faction (the AKP) that held slightly greater parliamentary power over the other faction (the SP) that acquired only about 2.5 percent of the national vote. Party members with name recognition have broken away from both the AKP and the CHP, forming parties, which even in their first days of existence, are unquestionably doomed to the graveyard of insignificance. If a party wants to survive in the current context, they need access to both of the two M's: municipalities and money for extensive media campaigns.

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[173] Çağaptay, following the 2002 elections, also made the observation that it would be very difficult for ANAP and the DYP, at that point, to make a comeback. Söner Çağaptay, "The November 2002 Elections and Turkey's New Political Era," *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (2002), p. 43.

Finally, while it is impossible to understand the structure of the current paradigm without comprehending the underlying cultural clashes and the conflict between Turkish secularists and religious conservatives, it would also be a mistake to miss the functional and economic behavior of voters, even in this most culturally-based of all the historical political paradigms. Even as Çarkoğlu has observed the impact of macroeconomic considerations on voters' attitudes toward incumbent governments from 1950 to 1995, the same pattern could be utilized to explain subsequent elections.[174] Thus, to overemphasize the cultural component would be to suggest that one could predict voting behavior primarily on cultural concerns; the electoral volatility of the voters in response to retrospective and prospective economic concerns strongly challenges the primacy of culture alone as an explanative factor.[175] While the topics of Islam and Islamism seem to hold a great deal of attraction to students of social sciences in the current historical juncture, its "exotic" appeal as an *explanative* devise in electoral politics might, in fact, misrepresent actual dynamics that can be explained by more mundane factors.

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[174] Ali Çarkoğlu, "Macro-economic determinants of electoral support for incumbents in Turkey, 1950-1995," *New Perspectives on Turkey*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1997), pp. 75-96.

[175] For an interesting study of how such economic concerns were translated into party support prior to the 2002 elections, see Cem Başlevent, Hasan Kirmanoğlu and Burhan Şenatalar, "Empirical investigation of party preferences and economic voting in Turkey," *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 44, No. 4 (2005), pp. 547-62.

CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSION

10.1 The Relevance of this Work for Individual Case Studies of Party Systems

When a student of political science approaches a particular national case for study, such an individual is immediately confronted with a barrage of potential forces and actors influencing the system. When extracting from the myriad of possible factors, the critical question becomes, how does one discriminate? What system of study will enable the researcher to arrive at the constellation of elements that offer explanative power for the case at hand? This study argues that this question bears profound significance. If one fails to explicitly address the question at the outset, the conclusions arrived at and the emphases made might very well be misleading or off the mark.

The current historical juncture in social sciences is infused with its own priorities and realities, and if one enters the endeavor to make a historical interpretation of the system, its changes and continuities, without questioning the priorities of the present, one is likely to drag the issues of relevance from the current context into the past to formulate an interpretation. While it is certainly relevant to trace issues of present import into the past, what is dug up, if taken for

an explanation of the past historical environment, would be a very misleading portrait of earlier periods. It is not by accident that students of Turkish politics, enamored with the role of Islam in politics, have chosen to use as the historical basis for their claims the works on Turkey produced during the heyday of classical Modernization Theory in which the role of religion and traditional culture were a frequent topic as the countries progress toward "modernity" determined by the Western model.

It is also not a coincidence that a large body of work produced in the late 1960s and 1970s with data and interpretation of great significance has been ignored, largely because these works forcefully demonstrate the secondary importance of religion in the political context of the time. For a number of reasons, the cultural impetus behind the scholarship produced in many nations has been a magnification of the issue of Islam in politics, and its relevance in terms of the security or insecurity of the so-called "advanced industrial" nations. Thus, the possible emphasis on the Islam factor becomes an extremely attractive focus of interpretation when studying countries with large Muslim populations, and the tendency to try to explain all phenomena through Islam or traditional culture is often evidenced.

In addition to this, if one tries to establish a systematic framework in order to study a particular case, the previous approaches to using the conceptual and methodological frameworks in comparative politics have also led explanations, particularly of newer democracies, in problematic directions. The inevitable result

of honing the descriptors, concepts, and methodological tools on the "advanced industrial" democracies during a particular historical period has set, at least at the subconscious level, system standards that have biased explanations—or even inhibited explanations—of the newer or "non-Western" cases under review. The descriptors themselves have often ended up as embedded judgments on new cases, such that careful examinations to understand why these systems differ have been significantly hampered.

Though party systems in the long-established liberal democracies have begun to display many of the traits of the newer systems, the standards of measurement and expectation are still fixed on the trends of a particular historical period. As Mainwaring has asserted, party systems need to be rethought;[1] unfortunately, the reasoning and interpretations in the studies regarding newer democracies often remain unconsciously stuck in the old patterns. Ironically, while authors recognizing changes in the patterns of party systems in the long-established democracies are quick to accurately acknowledge the impact of global and technological trends,[2] the same observed phenomena in newer or non-Western democracies are more often then not regrettably tacked up to cultural factors or inability to understand or consolidate democratic norms. Such interpretations should not necessarily be tacked up to chauvinism or ill intentions; instead, it seems

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[1] Scott Mainwaring, *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).

[2] For a good example, see Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds., *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

more likely the context of analysis within the existing framework of interpretation that directs the researcher to anticipate such biased analytic outcomes.

While this author acknowledges that subconscious biases of one sort or another may persist within this study, the impetus of the work has been to search for a new framework with which to approach the individual party system, such that comparisons enable further investigation rather than judgment, but also provide a systematic framework for study that empowers logical and prioritized explanations of the system. With this in mind, a careful analysis of the dimensions of competition and the domains of identification within their historical contingencies has offered such an approach to this study of the Turkish case. Careful observation of the behavior of parties in interaction with other parties and the electorate enables the researcher to pinpoint areas requiring emphasis and analysis. When patterns shift in relation to mobilization or discursive strategies, it also prompts an investigation of the other actors and the contingent environment in order to decipher the dynamic interactions and decisions of actors within the constraints and opportunities operating in a particular context.

One must not be too quick to make a strong extrapolation from an individual case, however. The methodology and systematic approach of this case study of Turkey, while seemingly an effective approach to explain important patterns and transitions in the Turkish party system, might not bear the same fruit for other studies. Just as the particular issues within the Brazilian case might not be applicable to other new democracies despite the fact that macro trends in volatility

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and other measures resemble one another, one must not assume that Turkey's micro-level political trends hold for the other countries. The military coups and interventions and other rapid social changes in Turkey created an environment in which the political elites had to continually experiment and adjust; hence, the relatively frequent paradigmatic transitions that have occurred in Turkey's more than 60 years of multiparty competition might not be observed in many other cases.

What this study does provide, however, is a possible systematic approach to the individual case study that is largely descriptively neutral and less loaded with embedded judgment. Rather than establish a few "universal" trends that should or should not be observed, this approach emphasizes observation of existing behaviors, discursive or otherwise, and establishing their patterns and consequences in electoral competition. Observing the patterns that exist, whatever they may be, helps the student of the individual case understand how elites and the electorate are approaching electoral politics and why and when these patterns might change.

10.2 Interactive Principles of the Turkish Party System, 1950-2007

After careful analysis of the various paradigms that have structured the Turkish party system in the electoral arena, several general principles that transcend any particular period can be derived. The first and, perhaps, most predominant principle is that the economic context matters to Turkish voters, and this has translated into predictable attitudes toward incumbent governments, explaining much of the impetus behind the support toward both existing and emerging parties.

If we consider the trends in national elections, even from simply a "retrospective" voter standpoint, the trend follows. After the initial vote for the new party, the Democrat Party in 1950, economic success brought about victory again in 1954, but an electoral setback and gains for the CHP when the economy was faltering in 1957. Ineffective coalition government brought an electoral rebuke to the CHP in 1965 and relatively strong performance translated in only a minor dip in 1969 for the Justice Party. The gains by both major parties in 1977 seemed to clearly indicate a disapproval of ineffective and fragmented coalition governments, a tendency that was also demonstrated in the by-elections and senate elections in 1979. The punishment at the ballot-box by the government party or governing coalitions since 1983 has maintained the similar trends, mostly to the detriment of incumbent governments, with the exception of the DSP in 1999—benefiting from the capture of the PKK leader Öcalan during Ecevit's short term as Prime Minister prior to the election—and the electoral gains received by the AKP in 2007, gains arguably at least partially due to the strong and stable performance of the economy from 2002 to 2007.

The parties that have most effectively captured the hearts of the electorate have been those who approached the nation with *both* sociotropic and egotropic[3] incentives for support. Though egotropic considerations have at times led to corrupt or irresponsible populism, Turkish voters are swayed by parties that appear to pay attention to them and their explicit material concerns and base their

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[3] Voting for the economic good of the society at large and voting for the economic good of the individual, respectively.

campaign platforms on the emphasis of "getting things done."[4] This explains a great measure of the success of the Democrat Party, in first making face to face promises to the people contingent on their victory in 1950 and then distributing material goods broadly to supportive communities. The success of Bülent Ecevit and the CHP in the 1970s also coincides with increased attention, contact with and promises to the non-elite masses. The rapid rise of the Welfare Party can also be tied to their distributive performance in local governments and the mobilization of supportive community organizations to deliver assistance to their communities. Though parties need a realistic sociotropic appeal—one wonders, for example, how far the Welfare Party would have gotten on the "just order" plans had they stayed in government for longer—the reliance on such abstract economic goals has not paid dividends for parties at the ballot box. Even parties with very explicit social identities—whether religious or nationalist—plaster the billboards and their election speeches with populist policy promises much more so than identity-based concerns.

The CHP in a number of elections in which they offered a clear but abstract economic agenda—2002 and the program developed under the tutelage of Kemal Derviş would be a recent example—often did not see clear fruit from such a strategy. Parties that address issues of fundamental economic importance and have a recognizable plan—even if not distributing economic largesse—for issues such as jobs and health insurance are more likely to find an attentive ear, especially if they are placing those issues in a priority position and discussing the agenda actively

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[4] Sinan Ciddi, *Kemalism in Turkish Politics:The Republican People's Party, Secularism and Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 8.

among the masses. This flexibility of voters has been clearly evident in the pragmatic voting of the urban middle and lower classes.

While culture and religion have played greater or lesser roles in the system at various points, its general influence has nearly always been a secondary influence, relegated most frequently to the role of "domain of identification." While it might be more sensational to claim otherwise, electoral behavior has consistently shown that the majority of the population has demonstrated a practical attitude toward voting. One cannot have it both ways: to claim that electoral volatility has been a regular feature of the system with swings in fortune between the center-right and center-left and with nationalist and religious conservative parties and then claim that one's cultural identification has been the overwhelming motivation behind one's vote presents problems of logic. As Ciddi repeatedly noted, "no political party in Turkey can lay claim to a core of eternally loyal voters, which it can depend on."[5] Voter willingness to switch from religious conservative to nationalist to center-left parties is explained less convincingly by massive cultural identity switching than by voter pragmatism based on the behavior of the parties toward the issues over which these voters are concerned. Though generalized identities have offered some measure of stability as domains of identification, their impact on the system in Turkey is quite comparable to similar phenomena in the party systems in Western Europe and North America.

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[5] Ibid., p. 92.

Another principle of the Turkish party system is that campaign discourse impacts party to party interaction far more than it affects outcomes among the electorate. Beginning in the 1950s, though the CHP discursively had a more populist appeal in their campaign speeches and election manifests, they did not receive the votes from the targeted groups, like the village farmers, that would have been expected had campaign discourse been a decisive factor. Even in the late 1960s and 1970s, when the discursive pattern began to match the electoral map with large vote swings to the CHP in industrialized areas, other non-discursive factors, such as the connections made between the party and unions and populism in the squatter areas, can also explain the electoral shift; in all likelihood, it was the harmony of the populist discourse with the non-discursive strategies that translated into the voter gains by the party. In the more recent periods of high corruption and inability to keep one's word, the honest government and service discourse only worked for new and untested parties. Furthermore, the phenomenon of pre-election polling that became widespread beginning with elections in the 1980s regularly predicted the rough shapes of the election outcomes far in advance before official campaigning speech-making began.[6] Most speech-making was ignored at the national level; retrospective economic considerations and the success or failure of local governance played much larger roles. In the current electoral context, a party

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[6] These early polls were rarely wrong about the front-runner, but in a few elections, the fortunes of an opposition party contending in the elections were shown to change in the course of campaigning—examples of this would be the apparent late gains by the SHP in 1987 and the gains of the MHP in 1999.

relying on an effective campaign message without other existing assets that could provide confidence in the party will not pass the 10 percent threshold.[7]

Where discourse *did* and does make a difference was at the level of party competition. The discourse of the Turkish Labor Party in the early 1960s, which had very little electoral support, led to the self-imaging strategy of "left of center"—and later, "democratic left"—by the CHP, which in turn led to the essence of political contestation revolving around the axis of "left" or "communist" versus "exploiter" and "fascist". Though ideology behind the actual party programs differed only in moderate degree, the strident discourse fostered an intensity that found itself ultimately being played out violently on the street. The parties in 1995 deemphasized their own programs and instead developed various strategies to address the religious discourse and identity of the Welfare Party. The party's existence created definite changes in the appeals of the other parties to the voters, seemingly always with the RP on the back of their minds. The clear effect on the discourse, in whatever direction they chose to compete, did not result in positive gains for these other parties. Since the second paradigm, parties have used the self-identifications of a contending party to distort and marginalize that party's position. In the post-Baykal CHP under the leadership of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the clear change in discourse by the new leader toward more social democratic themes had noticeably taken the AKP out of its comfortable rhythm. As the CHP has shown

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[7] A particularly good example of this is the fate of the New Turkey Party in 2002. Though the charismatic leader, Ismail Cem, was a favorite of the media and received respectable coverage, the party only managed to garner 1.2 percent of the vote.

more interest in leftist themes, the AKP, once the only party with social democratic rhetoric, has found itself retreating from these domains and beginning to address more conservative concerns. How the CHP will fair among the electorate in June of 2011 is still less obvious, but their change of discourse has certainly had an impact on the AKP and forced it to alter its discursive tack in a number of ways.

The party system in Turkey has also shown that, though certain parties themselves might not be institutionalized, an institutionalization of the channels of representation has persisted; thus, the system has exhibited institutional fluidity. The CHP and the MHP, for example, certainly function as institutionalized parties. Though their role in the party system and emphases have shifted from period to period or election to election, they have retained a core identity that has enabled a measure of stability. Even when these parties were not legally allowed to exist, explicit proxy parties operated (the SHP and the MÇP, respectively) in their stead, filling their channeling function until they were legally able to retain the old party name. The position in the system currently referred to as the "center-right"—which has always championed a market economy, conservative values, and populist practices—has shown fluidity in terms of the party occupying its coveted domain, but it has never been completely abandoned or emptied out. The parties that have entered and exited its prized seat in Turkish politics have always connected themselves to the legacy of this positions first champion, the Democrat Party. The Justice Party, the True Path Party and even the current ruling AKP insist on their birthright to this royal lineage. Even when this position in the party system was at

its weakest points with the traditional parties occupying that space imploding in the 1990s, close observation of electoral campaigning shows that the parties outside of this position attempted to move themselves into its place, the voters themselves could be argued to have largely stayed within it framework of appeal—i.e. the voters outlook did not become significantly more radical but, instead, the radical parties wooed these voters by displaying more moderate discourse.

Another important principle of the system is that, due to the organizational structure of parties—i.e. catch-all or cartel parties—which depends on the voter-wooing potential of charismatic leaders, change in party leadership in a party that is a serious contender but not running the government has proven to provide an electoral boast in the subsequent general election. For example, the rise of Süleyman Demirel in 1964 proved to be, among other factors, an important boost to the Justice Party in the 1965 election. Similarly, the transition of the seat of leadership in the CHP from İsmet İnönü to Bülent Ecevit coincided with significant gains in 1973 and 1977. The passing of the MHP's founder, Alparslan Türkeş, and the appointment of Devlet Bahçeli as party leader was followed by the party's largest electoral victory to date. In each case, at the appointment of the new leader, the party had existing electoral strength but was not the governing party. Furthermore, the newly appointed leaders were not "caretakers" for the previous leader, but each appointment suggested fresh wind for party; this aspect seems particularly critical to the new leader's success. The electorate tends to not reward more of the same or a second-class representation of the old leader. This could also

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explain why, during the party split at the break-up of the Virtue Party, that many of the old supporters of the Welfare and Virtue Parties took their allegiance to the AKP though this party was separating itself from the long-standing National Outlook (*Milli Görüş*) movement that had been the inspiration of these Erbakan-led parties. The leader of the Felicity Party, Recai Kutan, who maintained its connection to the Erbakan movement, has always been seen as the caretaker leader for Erbakan. Thus, despite the fact that the AKP was moving away from the foundational approaches of the religious conservative party, a large number of long-time supporters moved with it along with a great number of traditional center-right and nationalist voters, and the party was able to garner more than 34 percent of the vote in 2002.

Parties that have made changes in leadership while in power have fared quite poorly in subsequent elections, usually because the change in leadership suggests weakness in the party. In 1989, ANAP's Özal resigned from Premiership and the party leadership (officially) to become President and left the seat to Yıldırım Akbulut, who was then wisely replaced by a more charismatic leader, Mesut Yılmaz. Nonetheless, the party dropped more than 12 percent in the subsequent national election. When Süleyman Demirel left the Prime Ministry also to become President in 1993, the head of the party and the seat of Prime Minister was given to Tansu Çiller. The party lost 8 percent in the polls. Other parties who have made changes after massive electoral collapses, like DSP, ANAP and DYP,

when they are no longer legitimate contenders, have generally suffered from the "too little, too late" syndrome.

Finally, coalition governments, for a number of reasons, have been a disaster from an electoral standpoint primarily for the senior partners that enter into them. Voters have rarely been kind to coalition government partnerships, even when these have functioned with relative stability. The most stable or enduring coalitions, DYP-SHP/CHP and DSP-MHP-ANAP, were formed from parties whose political outlook should have made harmony extremely difficult. Instead, the coalitions between parties of similar ideology have either never materialized or were volatile and short-lived. The challenges to passing legislation by coalition governments brings a lack of confidence toward the economy and usually economic hardship. In the 1970s, the bargaining potential of minor parties was so high that appointments of these parties to ministries hamstrung effective governance. Furthermore, the consensul, concessionary nature of coalition politics flies in opposition to the ideal of the uncompromising politician,[8] especially when it appears that the representatives of one's political outlook are compromising and kowtowing toward a party whose identity is oppositional to one's own.

This tendency along with the widespread value for "nation parties" pushes the electorate, particularly in periods of polarization, toward a smaller party system. The desire toward a simplified debate between a government party and a strong

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[8] See, Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "The 1983 Parliament in Turkey: Changes and Continuities," in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), pp. 55-6.

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opposition could be said to manifest itself in political caricature. For example, if one peruses the recent (2010) publishing of the major political cartoons and cover pages for the popular weekly comics magazine *Penguen*, every satirical comic of political leaders involves either Erdoğan and the AKP or Kılıçdaroğlu and the CHP or both of them together. One is hard pressed to find even one or two comics regarding Devlet Bahçeli and the MHP despite the fact that their share of the vote is only 6 percent less of the national total than the CHP.[9]

10.3 Conclusion

Though it is beyond the ability and methodologies of social science to accurately predict the outcome of a future election, an analytical framework prioritizing essential dimensions of competition and domains of identification arguably directs our focus to the critical elements that demand our attention and explain the logic of both party and voter behavior and allow us to anticipate the consequential boundaries of a forthcoming election. Other approaches to describing party systems that indicated levels of volatility and fragmentation, institutionalization and/or party system classifications offered little to no anticipatory value. A systematic analysis of the patterns of electoral interaction— i.e. the dimensions of competition and domains of identification—allows us to follow the "tracks" of the system such that a logical trajectory can be anticipated. While other (or better) systematic approaches to studying an individual party

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[9] *Penguen Karikatür Yıllığı 2010* (Istanbul: Getto Basın Yayın, 2010). In fact, in the entire volume, there are two caricatures of Bahçeli. In one, he is standing in the background; in the other, he is suggesting to Erdoğan that the MHP has fallen beneath the 10 percent threshold. See pages 89 and 90.

system may be found in the future, hopefully, this study will encourage the field of comparative politics in general to recognize the need for new approaches toward parties and party systems that are both framed and interactively dynamic and that shed light on the logic of any given electoral party system.

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