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**Title: Partition as a solution to ethnic and sectarian conflicts in the Middle East: Possible Partition of Iraq as an example**

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## **List of Abbreviations**

KRI: Kurdistan Region of Iraq

ISIS: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

ISIL: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

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# **Partition as a solution to ethnic and sectarian conflicts in the Middle East: Possible Partition of Iraq as an example**

## **Abstract**

In the wake of recent ongoing bloody and protracted civil wars across the Middle East, especially Iraq and Syria conflicts, academics and policymakers are seeking an approach to prevent further calamities and manage communal strife. Some suggest that maintaining the territorial integrity in multi-ethnic countries that spilt up by conflict should be a priority. Others propose partition as an ideal solution to terminate ethnic civil strife. This study seeks to answer the following question: to what extent can territorial partition be a viable solution for ethno-sectarian conflicts, especially in the Middle East region? To answer this question, the study examines the recent and current literature on the utilising of partition as an approach to resolve ethnic and sectarian conflicts to end violence and to maintain enduring peace. The paper seeks to critically analyse partition as a theory and to discuss the extent to which partition can be used as an approach to end ethno-sectarian strife. Additionally, both sides of the arguments will be presented. Moreover, some of the partitions in the past will be reviewed and critically analysed. What is more, advantages and disadvantages of partition will be highlighted. Furthermore, the research will underline the implication of partition for regional and wider global security, peace and stability. Finally, the paper will offer a comprehensive analysis for the possible partition of Iraq; it will look at root causes of violence as well as the extent to which partition is a viable solution to end ethno-sectarian strife in Iraq. The study suggests that territorial partition can possibly provide a durable solution for ethnic and sectarian conflicts across the Middle East if partition is complete and warring groups are clearly separated both territorially and demographically supervised by international organisations such as the UN. What is more, this paper proposes that for partition to be successful, a political agreement should be in place and partition should be consensual. Finally, is it important to address the ethnic security dilemma, which is considered as a core concept of partition theory as it is essential that the concerned sides should not fear for their safety.

## Chapter One: Introduction

The study aims to analyse the existing theoretical understanding of partition and examine the relevance of this concept for countries which have been in a permanent crisis for decades, such as Iraq. The term “partition” refers to “certain types of changes in the world political map” (Waterman, 1987, p.151). The notion of partition is controversial and contentious; the international community is reluctant to accept the idea of partition in deeply divided societies (O'Leary, 2006, Borgen, 2009). Conventional wisdom suggests that civil wars, especially sectarian and ethnic conflicts, have proliferated in the last few decades and have begun to threaten the very existence of some countries and pose a great danger to global peace and security (Sambanis, 2000). Hence finding a durable solution has become a necessity to avoid more catastrophes in the world.

Several Middle East countries, especially Iraq, Yemen and Syria, have been mired in endless protracted ethno-sectarian conflicts that threaten the very existence of these countries and undermine regional and global peace and stability. Equally, Iraq and Syria are divided across increasingly ethno-sectarian lines. Implicitly this is largely an ongoing conflict between the Shiite camp led by Iran and the Sunni camp led by Saudi Arabia (Yehoshua, 2011; Myring, 2015). Despite this explicit division among various groups in both countries, Western powers emphasize the importance of keeping the two states together, simply because the West is preoccupied with the territorial integrity of states since WWII (Borgen, 2009). One of the reason for this is that Western countries avoid supporting emerging ethno-national movements is to keep the status quo of the world order and continue to lead the world with their allies in different regions such as the Middle East. Most of the oppressive neighbouring countries in the Middle East have also emphasised that they are strongly against any attempt to re-mapping the region. Therefore, these countries support territorial integrity and are against the idea of partition (Myring, 2015). However, continuing with the oppressive policies against subordinated ethnic groups has caused a permanent crisis in the region and those ethnic groups such as the Kurds who have been suppressed for decades in Iraq are asking for partition.

The Iraqi conflict is a multifaceted and very complicated issue, thus finding a solution for Iraq problem is not an easy task. Dividing the nation will not be without costs and consequences and is likely to lead to the displacement of people, especially in the ethnically mixed cities like Baghdad. However, the de facto partition is a fact on the ground, and ethnic cleansing has already taken place extensively (Downes, 2001; Eland, 2009). Myring (2015) claims that giving it a formal and legal status is the only viable solution to maintain a long-term peace in Iraq, which can also play a significant role in ending the ongoing conflict between the two main sects of Islam-Shia and Sunni- in the Middle East region.

The vicious cycle of violence across the country has revived the idea of partitioning Iraq into three federal states (Schweitzer, 2014, p.1). As Worth so eloquently phrased it, “the spectre that has haunted Iraq since its founding 93 years ago appears to have become a reality: the de facto partition of the country into Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish cantons” (Worth, 2014, p.1). The idea of dividing the country along ethno-sectarian lines is not new, the thought re-surfaces when the viciousness amongst Shiites and Sunnis reignites, and raises the question whether the artificial borders enforced by European powers be altered and replaced by fresh frontiers along region’s deeply sectarian divisions (Beauchamp et al., 2014). Nevertheless, the notion of partition to end ethnic and religious conflicts is controversial. Proponents claim that it is the most viable solution to put an end to ethno-sectarian wars, hence dividing Iraq along ethno-sectarian lines will arguably be the best remedy to end the country’s violence (Galbraith, 2006; Biden and Gelb, 2006; Joseph and O’Hanlon, 2007; Eland, 2009). On the other hand, opponents argue that breaking up the county will possibly have serious consequences; they claim that the sectarian infighting will get worse and the Shiite populated areas will be dominated by Iran, and this could possibly destabilise the region (Galbraith, 2006). Moreover, critics believe that communal conflicts that are settled through partition have possibly significant chance to reoccur, even though partition could possibly resolve some root causes of the war, however, it could consequently cause new ones (Alexander, 2016). “Partitions almost always leave behind residual members of the rival ethnicity within the boundaries of the new state. This leads to ethnic cleansing and further violence” (Alexander, 2016, p.1)

Challengers of partition often argue that partition causes new conflicts, because of its failure to separate existing multi-ethnic or multi-sectarian groups within countries

through settlements that satisfy all concerned sides (Tir, 2010). On the other hand, proponents of partition argue that partition is the only viable solution to terminate ethnic and sectarian conflicts, because they argue it is the only effective way that lessens the security dilemma through the separation of belligerent ethnic and religious groups, which can be considered as a significant element in conflict prevention (Posen, 1993; Kaufmann, 1998; Tir, 2010).

## Aims and Objectives

The main purpose of this research is to determine the extent to whether partition (either soft or hard partition) can maintain peace and stability in Iraq and the wider Middle Eastern Region.

The objectives of this piece of research is to critically analyse the partition as a theory; to evaluate territorial partition as an approach to solve ethno-sectarian conflicts; to review and critically analyse previous partition cases; to highlight the benefits and costs of partition; to evaluate the impact of partition on the regional and international peace and stability and implications for international order; to critically analyse Iraq as a core case study and to explore the possibility of KRI secession.

These analyses will determine the successes, challenges, restraints, barriers and limitations that have been identified since partition was conceptualised.



## Chapter Two: Methodology

For the purpose of this research, secondary data analysis has been conducted to gain a more in-depth understanding of the notion of partition as an approach to end ethnic and sectarian conflicts across the Middle East. Secondary data review and analysis involves collecting information, reports, statistics, and other relevant data at various levels of aggregation to conduct a critical analysis of the country concerned (McCaston, 2005).

Desk-based research is appropriate as a method of study on partition/secession. Some past case studies have been examined and evaluated and will be applied for future researches. These case studies give “a systematic way to look at the collected data to help you reach a clearer understanding of what happened, why, and what was done about it” (Matousek & Associates, n.d., p.1). Even though “case study methods remain a controversial approach to data collection, they are widely recognised in many social science studies especially when in-depth explanations of a social behaviour are sought after” (Yin, 2003, p.1). Furthermore, the case study method enables a researcher to thoroughly scrutinise the information within certain setting (Zainal, 2007, p.1).

The study of Partition is broad; the focus of this research will be on Iraq and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) as a critical case study. Iraq is mired in protracted intractable ethno-sectarian conflict which has divided the country along religious and ethnic lines. The researcher chose Iraq as the main case study because of the nature of violence; there is ongoing sectarian strife between Shiites and Sunnis and historical antagonism between the Kurds and Arabs. Moreover, Iraq is part of the hot region of the Middle East, hence a comprehensive (in-depth) examining of the Iraq conflict and suggesting a solution for its protracted civil war could arguably help to offer solution for other ethnic and sectarian conflicts in the region. To most people Desk research proposes published statistics and reports as critical sources. In the context of this study the term is broadened to include all sources of data that do not involve ground work (McCaston, 2005). This most certainly will include books, reports and scholarly journals; it will also include analysing media discourse and examining speeches of influential leaders and politicians. Books from reliable sources will be used and the researcher will avoid using biased sources, including books. The researcher will rely

on academic journals throughout the study. The researcher will maintain impartiality and use neutral resources.

Moreover, this study examines UN resolutions concerning partition and secession, for instance reports and statistics will be critically analysed. What is more, secondary data is a valuable source of information for gaining knowledge and insight into a broad range of issues and phenomena. Reviewing and analysing of secondary data can offer a cost-effective way of addressing issues, conducting cross-national comparisons, understanding the country-specific and local and regional conditions, determining the direction and magnitude of change, trends and describing the current situation (McCaston, 2005). Furthermore, if secondary research and data analysis is undertaken with care and diligence, it can provide a cost-effective way of gaining a broad understanding of research questions and be less time-consuming. Secondary data are also useful in designing future primary research and, as well, can provide a starting point with which to compare your primary data collection results. Therefore, the review of the secondary data is always a sensible starting point for any research activity (Novak 1996). Secondary research will not necessarily replace primary research but will be complementary to it. What is more, desk-based research will take a relatively shorter time to accomplish; academic sources are available online and can easily be accessed. The new advanced technologies, especially the internet, has simplified the way that information can be collected, reviewed and analysed (Church, 2001).

## **2. 1 Ethical issues**

Before commencing the research, Ethical Approval was obtained from the Research Ethics team at Leeds Beckett University and the supervisor of the project.

## **2.2 Limitation**

The scope of this study was determined by time, resources, security issues and access to data.

## Chapter Three: Literature Review

### 3.1 Partition as a theory

Conventional wisdom suggests that civil wars have increased significantly in numbers since the conclusion of the Second World War (Balcells and Kalyvas, 2013) and have become the dominant feature for global violence and instability (Hironaka, 2005; Harbom and Wallensteen, 2007; Johnson, 2008) and most of these wars have been caused by ethnic or religious tensions (Fearon and Laitin, 2003), according to Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2009, p.82) "War-induced partitions and partition induced wars continue to be prominent features in international security" and nearly 70% of all violent conflicts contain an ethnic element (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2007; Reuter, 2011;) Furthermore, evidence put forward suggests that civil wars last longer and cause more displacement and cost more human lives than conventional wars between states (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Pischedda, 2008). A study by two distinguished professors from Stanford University, James Fearon and David Laitin, concluded that the world has witnessed 27 interstate wars in the period between 1945-1999, which have resulted in more than three million deaths. Simultaneously the same period has seen 127 civil wars, but the death toll was five-fold (more than sixteen million) (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). According to Johnson (2008), ethnic civil wars have been predominant in the same period, they make between 55-72% of all civil wars occurred between 1945-1999. A similar study by Toft (2003) found that more than seventy percent of all armed conflicts contain an ethnic element. Some scholars claim that ethnic civil are more challenging and problematic than interstate conflicts and cannot be terminated through talks (Kaufmann, 1996). Ethnic conflict" is about groups of people arguing with other groups, where the "other" is usually characterized by differences in race, language, or religion" (Toft, 2003, p.3).

Several approaches have been suggested to terminate ethnic civil wars; among them is *realpolitik* military strategy which was the approach favoured (preferred, chosen) by

the Soviet Union and the U.S. throughout the Cold War era as a solution to end civil wars (Johnson, 2008). More recently, the Bush administration utilized it to end the civil war in Iraq in 2007 (Regan, 2000 In Johnson, 2010; Fearon and Laitin, 2007). The second approach is mainly about creating third-party guaranties to ensure that both concerned groups will comply with the agreed solution (Fearon, 1998; Walter 2002 In Johnson, 2010). The mid-1990's was a turning point for the termination of ethnic civil wars; partition has been put forward as solution to end ethnic civil conflicts by academics, experts and international policymakers (Mearsheimer and Van Evera 1995 in Johnson, 2010; Kaufmann 1996; Downes 2001; Downes 2006; Galbraith 2006). Samootha and Hanf (1992) suggest that there are four possibilities to deal with ethnic conflicts in deeply divided societies: ethnic democracy, Partition, liberal democracy and consociational democracy. They concluded that the suitable type of approach to every ethnic conflict depends on certain factors such as the type of ties between different communities and the history of the conflict (Smootha and Hanf, 1992).

### 3.2 Partition as a Term

Partition is “a term which appears frequently to describe certain types of changes in the world political map” (Waterman, 1987, p.151). The notion of partition is controversial and contentious; the international community is ambivalent about accepting the idea of partition in deeply divided societies (O'Leary, 2006a). Not so long ago there was a great degree of consensus among academics and policymakers about maintaining the status quo in dealing with ethno-sectarian conflicts (Kaufmann, 1998). Nevertheless, in the last two decades, the idea of splitting up warring parties has made a progress (Kaufmann, 1998), and a significant number of scholars have suggested partition as a viable solution for protracted, intense and stubborn ethnic and sectarian civil wars, to maintain durable peace (Johnson, 2010). The proliferation of ethno-sectarian civil wars has drawn the attention of academics and politicians. In the second half of the 1990s, partition has gained a significant importance as a method to resolve ethnic civil wars, especially among academics, experts and international policymakers (Johnson, 2008). Horowitz argues that “If it is impossible for groups to live together in a heterogeneous state, perhaps it is better for them to live apart in

more than one homogeneous state, even if this necessitates population transfers. Separating the antagonists – partition – is an option increasingly recommended for consideration where groups are territorially concentrated” (Horowitz, 1985, pp.588-589).

So, what is partition? Partition theory” is based on the assumption that ethnic civil wars create such intense fears and insecurities at the sub-state level that the warring sides will no longer be able to coexist in a common society (Jenne, 2012, p.255). Sambanis (2000) defines partition as a result of war that encompasses both demographic and border changes. For O’Leary (2006) a political partition is a fresh alteration in the political border for at least one nation state – a change which “objectively divides a previously unified territorial entity into two or more parts, which may be marked with borders, codified in new maps, and operationalized, for example, in demarcated lines, perhaps accompanied by fences, walls, paint or barbed wire, or punctuated with official posts where passes or passports may be demanded” (O’Leary, 2006a, p.1). Kaufmann, a prominent supporter of ethno-sectarian partition offers an in-depth description for partition and defines it as a separation” jointly decided upon by the responsible powers: either agreed between the two sides (and not under pressure of imminent military victory by one side), or imposed on both sides by a stronger third party” (Kaufmann, 1998, p.125). Baskar (2011) outlines partition as a solution to ethnic wars that entails borders alterations, these territorial changes aimed primarily to split up warring parties; the new borders are either recognised by the international community (de jure) or remains unrecognised (de facto) (Downes, 2006). Partition can be implemented in three distinct ways: by third party imposition (e.g. division of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires after WWI); by agreement between ethnic groups (e.g. the break-up of Czechoslovakia); or by the main concerned country (e.g. partition of Ireland 1920-1925) (Rankin, 2006). For Kaufmann “secessions are new states created by the unilateral action of a rebellious ethnic group.” (Kaufmann, 1998, p.125).

### 3.4 Partition as a solution for ethnic and sectarian conflicts in the world

Partition has been used as an exit clause for colonial powers in the past, while contemporary partition is utilised as peacebuilding method for conflict management (Matejova, 2014). The current theory of partition is founded on the ground of splitting up nations to maintain peace, nevertheless, its utilisation has been restricted to management and prevention of ethnic civil wars (Matejova, 2014). Partition's main objective, as a method in peacebuilding in post conflict societies is the separation of opposing groups in deeply divided communities when the violence is common place and international community is not in position intervene militarily (Johnson, 2008; Matejova, 2014). The aim of intervention is build up homogenous communities capable to defend themselves, hence creating balance of power between warring groups and eventually lessening the likelihood of conflict reoccurrence, a successful partition depends to a certain extent on ability to prevent a war to reoccur (Matejova, 2014).

There are four arguments in favour of partition that most partition theorists depends on: First, partition is an exit strategy for major powers (Kumar,1997; Kumar, 2000). Second, even though partition cannot terminate violence indefinitely, however, it can lessen bloodshed and reduce violence, particularly comparing to other options, hence partition is a lesser of two evils (Byman, 2002). Third, partition can arguably contain the drivers behind the conflict, even if it does not address them (Kumar 2000; Matejova, 2014). Fourth, separatist and nationalist movements may utilise partition as a tool to gain self-determination (Matejova, 2014). Theorists who advocate partition as viable solution to communal strife have suggested theories that entails covert and overt conditions for fruitful partition. The fundamental rational behind the success of partition as theory is that deep security dilemma is the main driver behind the violence, and it can arguably be eradicated by separating warring groups demographically (Matejova, 2014). Kaufmann's theory is among the most convinced explanations of partition modern day literature, Kaufmann asserts that ethnic conflicts undermine the likelihood for co-existence and cooperation among warring parties, because as he argues ethnic identities will eventually harden as a result of protracted ethnic civil wars and could possibly intensify security dilemma among ethnic and religious rival groups (Kaufmann, 1996; Kaufmann, 1998; Johnson, 2015). Furthermore, "Ethnic identities are stronger and more ingrained than ideological or religious identities, because the

combined components are most difficult to modify “(Riggins, 2007, p.6). What is more, civil war deepens mistrust among warring groups and could intensify ethnic security dilemma which can arguably only resolved through separating belligerent sides (Matejova, 2014)

Jenne (2012) argues that ethnic partition is a last resort to put an end to intrastate conflicts, which involves splitting-up the belligerent groups into secure territories, in addition to demographic changes. According to Samoooha and Hanf (1992, p.26), partition is an appropriate method only in specific conflicts “where the groups have incompatible nationalisms and they are largely territorially separated”. Partition theory is mainly founded on the assumption that inter-ethnic conflicts generate such exceptional insecurities and mistrust at national level that belligerent parties cannot live together under one flag (Jenne, 2012). Due to stubbornness and the intractability of the ethnic security dilemma, the warring groups will only accept the abandonment of their weapons provided “they are safely separated into defensible state-like territories” (Jenne, 2012, p.255). The failure of other alternatives such as reconciliation and power sharing to maintain durable peace and stability has led some scholars to suggest partition as a viable solution to ethno-sectarian conflicts and to build a long-lasting self-imposed peace (Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl, 2009). Sambanis (2000) supports the argument that ethnicity is a significant factor in the partition process, and argues that the religious and ethnic wars (identity wars) are strongly linked with partition. Sambanis concluded in his study that the nature of war determines whether partition should be conducted (Sambanis, cited in Licklider and Bloom, 2013).

### 3.5 Argument for partition

Partition scholars and theorists claim that demographic separation of opposing ethnic groups into regions with well-defined and well-defended borders is arguably the best solution to settle protracted ethnic civil wars (Kaufmann, 1996; Kaufmann; 1998; Johnson, 2008; Sambanis, 2000). A study by Sabala Baskar of Georgetown University concluded that territorial partition can be a best remedy for ethnic civil wars, if ethnic warring groups are completely separated both territorially and demographically with defendable frontiers and the material balance of power is maintained between new emerging entities (Baskar, 2011). A certain number of ethnic conflict theorists have

claimed that the territorial separation of antagonistic parties is the only viable answer to end protracted ethnic civil wars. They maintain that “without territorial partition and, if necessary, forced population movements, the war cannot end and genocide is likely” (Sambanis, 1999, p.1). Advocates of partition claim that partition is the ideal solution to put an end to ethnic and sectarian conflicts, because as they argue it is the only effective way that provides separation of ethnic and religious groups, which can be considered as a significant element in conflict prevention (Tir, 2010). Johnson (2008) argues that territorial partition can be considered as a reliable and effective method to inhibit the recurrence of war and violence, provided that the balance of power is maintained between the newly emerged states and warring ethnic groups are physically separated (Johnson, 2010).

### 3.6 Argument against partition

There are, however, arguments which can be put forward against partition. Opponents of partition have suggested that partition cannot offer a durable solution to end ethnic and religious civil wars. They argue that partition might have adverse consequences and create an undesirable situation for concerned people, because they claim it could substitute domestic conflicts with international wars and might consequently lead to undemocratic states (Sambanis, 2000). Suzuki (2011) supports Sambanis' view and asserts that partition converts intrastate wars into interstate conflicts, and consequently weakens the validity of partition as a method to settle ethnic wars. Suzuki supports his argument by citing the partition of British India and Cyprus as empirical evidence. According to Downes (2006), there is a general acceptance among policymakers and scholars to oppose any changes in the existing borders as a solution to ethnic civil wars (Downes, 2001); they believe that partition and secession are likely to complicate the conflict and subsequently cause a fresh war (Pischedda, 2008). Changes in states borders could be a breach of international law, because “allowing secession would clash with the territorial integrity of states, a cornerstone of the UN framework as stated in Article 2(4) of the Charter” (Borgen, 2009, p.8)

Moreover, challengers of partition repeatedly assert that partition arguably generates new conflict because of its failure to separate existing multi-ethnic or multi-sectarian countries (Tir, 2010). They believe that partition could possibly cost many lives to



achieve and may exacerbate conflicts (Lindley, 2007). Furthermore, they claim that likelihood of conflict re-emergence is possibly when a civil war is resolved through partition and could lead to further violence (Alexander, 2016). Jenne (2012) criticises partition theory and describes it as an “extreme solution” because, as he claims, it provides a protection for people who have committed ethnic cleansing. He believes that the possibility of ethnic reintegration has been underestimated by partition theorists. He argues that the theory of ethnic partition is beleaguered by weak empirical support and inconsistent grounds. Furthermore, Jenne argues that the security dilemma is a weak empirical evidence for clarifying the dynamics of prolonged ethnic and sectarian civil wars (Jenne, 2012). Another argument against partition is put forward by Fearon (2004), who claims that partition in ethnic civil wars is likely to motivate other minorities to violently seek autonomy and consequently a full independence. Fearon believes that imposing partition on sovereign states by great powers could entail relinquishing one of the fundamental conventions of international relations, namely the principal of prohibiting use of force to alter international borders. He suggests that a blanket relinquishment (abandonment) of this agreement is likely to destabilise the international order (Fearon, 2004). Daniel Wigmore-Shepherd (2013, p.11) challenges the very idea of partition and contends that partition is not a permanent solution, but rather a contingency plan. Due to the fact that even splitting-up warring ethnic groups will not necessarily end the entire cycle of violence, he claims differences in political view is the main driver for violence. He maintains that partition will only be an effective and viable answer to the violence when there is a political agreement between belligerent sides. What is more, Wigmore-Shepherd argues that interethnic antagonism cannot be simply eliminated by partition, but rather it hardens communications between warring ethnic groups. Furthermore, he asserts that population transfers – which is a significant element of partition theory – promotes violence between ethnic groups. He concluded that all these factors combined can question the credibility of partition as a solution to ethnic violence (Wigmore-Shepherd, 2013).

### **3.7 Implication of political partition for regional and wider global security, peace and stability**

Some studies have illustrated that settling communal wars through partition will arguably weaken the international order by altering the state boundaries by force, which can consequently destabilise the current international system (Fearon, 2006).

Partition may result in a failed state, which could pose a significant regional and global security issue. South Sudan is a good example (Musliu, 2015). Breaking-up of states and creating new states is not always a desirable solution. The international community opposes partition as a solution to end ethno-sectarian conflicts. Critics claim that partition transforms intrastate wars into interstate conflicts and major power intervention, India, Cyprus, Palestine and Ireland are prominent examples (Schaeffer, 1990; Kumar, 1997; Fearon, 2006; Suzuki, 2011), and consequently weakens the validity of partition as a method to settle ethnic wars. Suzuki supported his argument by partition of British India and Cyprus as empirical evidence (Suzuki, 2011). Furthermore, partition can be a precedent for other minority groups to follow and destabilise regional states. Farkas (2003) argues that partition will perhaps replace domestic conflicts with interstate wars. The partition of India in 1947 is one of the most cited examples. Ethnic and sectarian civil wars pose a great risk for regional and global peace; leaving these conflicts unsolved could spread to neighbouring countries and consequently could destabilise these states, such as the Iraq and Syrian conflicts. Furthermore, unstable countries could provide a fertile soil for terrorism to prosper, hence endangering the global peace and security. The emergence of ISIS is a clear example. Therefore, partitioning countries like Iraq and Syria along ethnic and sectarian lines will arguably help to put an end to these conflicts and other civil wars or at least contain them.

Partition has helped to create new world order and alter the geopolitical balance of power; the breakup of the USSR and the partition of Yugoslavia are prominent examples (Global Security, n.d.). The split up of Czechoslovakia is successful story of peaceful partition which saved Europe a possible ethnic conflict.

## Chapter Four: Case Studies

This section will review and analyse some chosen case studies and will draw conclusions for each case. Three previous partition cases – Czechoslovakia, South Sudan and Kosovo – have been selected to understand the implication of partition on both the rump states and the newly created states. These cases have been chosen because they are most recent partition examples. Moreover, the impact of partition is

very clear and can help the researcher to make comparisons with the research's main case study, Iraq.

#### 4.1 Czechoslovakia: a success story of partition

On 1<sup>st</sup> January 1993, the world has witnessed the birth of two new states: The Republic of Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Both states were created because of the breaking-up the federal Czechoslovakian state. Czechoslovakia was founded in 1918 by WWI winners from the remnants of the conquered Austro-Hungarian Empire (Engelberg, 1993; Pithart and Spencer, 1998; Innes, 2001). Young (1994) suggests that the break-up of Czechoslovakia was not secession, but rather a separation and was straightforward due to the political consensus on the parliament and government level, consequently the two republics agreed to dissolve the federal government (Bayefsky, 2000). Partition of Czechoslovakia – also referred to as the “velvet divorce” – was a prominent model of separation without violence (Kurmar, 1997). The partition of Czechoslovakia was an amicable divorce, peaceful agreement that was approved by both Slovaks and Czechs (Downes, 2006). Schaefer (1999) maintains that partition of Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia was the outcome of democratisation process which started in 1974 with the collapse of authoritarian regimes in southern Europe. As distinct from other cases of state dissolution, Czechoslovakia can be considered as one of the most successful partitions in our modern-day politics, and it has broadly been regarded as a triumph of liberal democracy and a sophisticated solution to nationalist and ethnic tensions (Inners, 2001).

Some scholars believe that there were several factors behind this success, among them the peaceful coexistence between Slovaks and Czechs; political agreement on the distribution of military assets and federal resources; and ethnic groups were geographically separated and homogenous (Matejova, 2014). As Samooha and Hanf noted, partition will only succeed if “the groups have incompatible nationalisms and they are largely territorially separated” (Samooha and Hanf, 1992, p.26). Both ethnic groups were unmixed and demographically separated, with only one percent of Czechs living in Slovakia and three percent Slovaks living in Czech Republic (Bookman, 1994). Matejova (2014, p.67) observes that “the lack of violence in the common Czech-Slovak history may have positively affected the country's break-up by

lessening the intensification of the security dilemma during the partition process as well as in its aftermath". Matejova (2014) argues that on top of that there are other two major factors which possibly contributed to the peaceful break-up of Czechoslovakia, specifically, leaders' perception about the advantages and disadvantages of partition and the positive role of nationalism. Additionally, she asserts that the ineffectiveness of federalism and its inability to serve the interests of both ethnic communities (Slovaks and Czechs) might also have played a significant role in separating both groups peacefully. She concluded that partition is highly likely to be more peaceful when groups' elites prefer peaceful partition and when political elites distance themselves from radical nationalistic beliefs (politics) (Matejova, 2014).

Kumar (1997) claims that the partition of Czechoslovakia was successful and the dissolution of the federation was not a complicated case, because it did not entail major population transfer and border alterations, as the two republics were clearly separated both demographically and territorially even before breaking up. Pehe (2004) noted that the EU played a significant role in supporting the separation process, and argues that without European integration, the partition would not have been possible. The dissolution of Czechoslovakia was an inevitable historic process, because it was already in progress, as O'Leary (2006) suggested was historicistic partition. Furthermore, the cost-benefit analysis can also explain the ultimate separation of the two nations, this is especially true when the benefits of separation outweighs the costs of unification (O'Leary, 2006).

To sum up, the breaking-up of Czechoslovakia can be considered one of the most successful partitions in the aftermath of the Cold War, and prevention of the recurrence of violence can be a measure for success (Kaufmann, 1998, Downes, 2006). Using Carter Johnson's Post Partition Ethnic Homogeneity Index (PEHI) (Baskar, 2011), the separation is complete (Johnson, 2008). Maintaining the balance of material power, as Johnson (2008) noted, is a significant factor in making partition smooth and peaceful (Baskar, 2011). That is why there were few security concerns and as a result the ethnic security dilemma was diminished (Johnson, 2008; Kaufmann, 1998).

## 4.2 Kosovo: End of Ethnic Cleansing

Civil wars create deep hatred, mistrust and fear among members of warring ethnic groups, which consequently complicate the possibility of resolving such conflicts through power-sharing settlements and negotiated arrangements; Kosovo, Bosnia and Iraq are good examples (Downes, 2006). After six years of Kosovar self-rule, the UN and the US concluded that partition is the best solution and is inevitable (Downes, 2006). In 1999 the international community intervened in Kosovo to halt ethnic cleansing and the forced expulsion of the Albanian minority by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. UN resolution 1244 emphasized power-sharing settlement by granting Kosovo autonomy; the UN maintained this approach, focusing on the self-styled "kick-the-can diplomacy," postponing the Albanian claim for self-determination (Downes, 2006). Nevertheless, the failure of other forms of power sharing settlement led the academics and policymakers to take another approach to resolve the Kosovo-Serbia conflict in order to protect Kosovars from ethnic cleansing, as Mearsheimer and Van Evera (1999) suggest that other settlement arrangements which maintained the existing borders, such as autonomy for Kosovo have proved to be unsuccessful. They contend that the ethnic cleansing of Albanian in Kosovo by Serbs is a great evidence that coexistence is very difficult, if not impossible. They conclude that partition is the lesser of two evils (Downes, 2001). The former Serbian President Boris Tadic stated in a press conference that partition of Kosovo is an option if all other alternatives are exhausted (B92, 2008). A British Diplomat and the former UK ambassador to Yugoslavia, Ivor Roberts suggested that partition is the only viable solution for Kosovo issue (Roberts, 2007). The partition of Kosovo became a de facto when the Yugoslavia military left the region (Murphy, 2007). Benedikter and Nowotny (2014) believes that de facto partition of Kosovo in 2008 has not resolved the Kosovo issue, but rather transferred the conflict as the Roma and the Serbs have emerged as a new disadvantaged ethnic group in the newly created state. They argue that Kosovo was a failed state from the early stages of its inception, because the fresh state was totally dependent on the EU handouts, and was thus economically unsustainable (Benedikter and Nowotny, 2014). Muller (2008) asserts that Kosovo is a clear evidence that breaking-up and ethnic cleansing strategies are unsuccessful approaches. Hudso and Bowman (2012) believes that the continuation of the de facto partition and EU and US recognition of Kosovo has only converted the ethnic strife into a frozen conflict, like

the Cyprus model. Even though partition is not a flawless approach and is not a plausible in both Belgrade and Pristina, Hamilton (2012) argues that further partition of Kosovo along ethnic lines is best way to achieve sustainable peace and to maintain security and stability in the Balkan region.

All in all, Kosovo is relatively peaceful country, and is recognised by more than one hundred UN members and a great number of EU states, which also have diplomatic relations with Kosovo (Musliu, 2015). Partition of Kosovo has failed to end ethnic conflicts between Serbs and Kosovars; partition of Kosovo is de facto imposed by a third party (Rankin, 2006). The partition was unsuccessful because ethnic belligerent groups were not completely separated into defensible enclaves (Baskar, 2011), and there was no political agreement between the newly created state and rump state in place because as, Wigmore-Shepherd (2013) maintains, partition will only be an effective and viable answer to the ethnic violence when there is a political agreement between the belligerent sides.

### 4.3 South Sudan: End of Genocide

On 9<sup>th</sup> July 2011 a new country was born to the UN family of nation states. South Sudan became the UN's 193<sup>rd</sup> member, after seceding and gaining independence from the North (Republic of Sudan) (Martell, 2011; Silva, 2014). Anderson (2013) argues that partition was inevitable because of the failure of other forms of power-sharing, especially federalism in 1980 and 2011, to maintain peace and stability. The South-based Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Central government in Khartoum signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, which ended more than two decades of civil war between the two groups (Osman, 2010). Khartoum agreed to sign a CPA under mounting pressure from the US and its Western alliance (Mandane, 2016).

The CPA culminated in a popular referendum in January 2011, nearly 99% of South Sudanese people voted in favour of secession and independence (Seri-Hersch, 2013). Sandu (2014) believes that partition was the best solution for ethnic strife between the

two nations. Partition has put an end to the bloody and protracted ethnic conflict which costed nearly 2.5 million human lives and forced more than five million people from their homes (Silva, 2014). However, the partition remains incomplete because there are some unsettled issues, such as oil revenue sharing, border demarcation and nationality/citizenship laws (Seri-Hersch, 2013; Silva, 2014). Mamdani (2016) claims that marginalisation of non-militarised political opposition in the peace agreement is among the critical factors for recent ethnic clashes. He maintains that South Sudan is a multi-ethnic society and tribalism is playing a significant role. Furthermore, unsolved ethnic tensions and disputes have led to a recurrence of violence and pose a great threat to the stability of the newly-fledged state (Silva, 2014). Critics claims that the partition was unsuccessful in maintaining durable peace in this fragile state: recurrence of violence and the magnitude of human rights violations and re-emergence of interethnic conflict questions the viability of partition as a solution for ethnic strife (Jenne, 2009; Silva, 2013).

Recent in-depth reports by The Fund for Peace – an NGO – ranked South Sudan as the most failed states in the world in 2015 (Messener et al., 2016), in its Fragile States Index 2016, South Sudan scored 113.8 and became the second most fragile sovereign country on the earth, overtaken only by Somalia (Messener et al., 2016). Hence South Sudan is now considered as a failed state (Loewenstein, 2015). Maru (2013) contends that the experience of Somaliland, Eretria and South Sudan indicates that secession is not a viable solution for ethnic conflicts in divided societies, and cannot be an assurance for peace and democratic stability.

In conclusion, partition of the republic of Sudan and the creation of the South Sudan state has ended a protracted communal violence that lasted half a century between the two belligerent groups (Carney, 2007). However, some critics argue that the partition of Sudan was to an extent unsuccessful and failed to maintain durable peace in the Horn of Africa, because the partition was incomplete. There are some significant lessons from the South Sudan experience, among them that partition should be under international observation and support; in other words, without regional and international support partition is likely to fail. Moreover, the lack of cooperation and agreement on oil and other natural resources is a significant factor behind the failure of the Sudan state and the reoccurrence of violence.

#### 4.4 Pros and Cons of Partition

In the light of above mentioned case studies, this section will highlight the advantages and disadvantages of partition as an approach to solving ethno-sectarian conflicts and peace-building.

Pros	Cons
It is possible to achieve peaceful ethnic partitions, as Czechoslovakia shows.	Separating relatively homogenous units such as the Czech republic and Slovakia should be defined as secession rather than partition. Partitions arise in demographically mixed areas and are almost always achieved only through war.
As ethnic partitions are the war aim of ethnic conflicts, intervening to partition is better than letting the conflict to drag on till it reaches partition. At least that way you save lives.	In general, partitions arise in the context of a transfer of power, and cannot be achieved without ethnic cleansing. No democratic country can intervene to ethnically cleanse another country.
Even if the partitioned lands do not fall into easily separable ethnic units, the peaceful transfer of populations can be arranged and will save lives.	People leave their homes only when forced to do so, either at the barrel of a gun or through poverty.
Partitions may not solve the root cause of the conflict, but they can at least serve as a means of containment	Partitioned lands tend to remain in a long-term situation of flux in which collective and individual security remain sensitive even to minor irritants and thus conflict erupts frequently.
In the long term, ethnic partitions lead to stability by creating ethnically pure states out of unhappily multiethnic ones.	Even in the longer term post-conflict phase, trade, infrastructure, and demographic or familial interests are unable to undermine or bypass the hostilities of partition without outside stimuli.
Partitions can at least provide an exit policy for the international community. It did so for the British empire.	For Britain's colonial subjects, partitions were the price of independence. In the post Cold War period, partition conflicts are a point of entry for the international community, and the attempt to stabilize them, as in Bosnia, only embroils the international community in an ever-extending period of engagement.

Table 1: Pros and Cons of Partition (Source: Kumar and Pacheco, 2007)



## Chapter Five: Examining Partition of Iraq

The previous sections of this paper show the hypothetical framework of partition and arguments both in favour and against partition. Some examples of successful and failed partition have been analysed. While there is some consensus among scholars on utilising partition as an approach to end ethno-sectarian conflicts, there is a significant disagreement about the practicality and effectiveness of partition as long-lasting solution for ethnic conflicts (Riggins, 2007). The violence continues to spread across Iraq and “the grotesque display of savagery from all sides has revived discussions of Iraq’s partition into three states (Schweitzer, 2014, p.1). This chapter will examine the extent to which Iraq can be partitioned and will analyse the possible secession of the Kurds.

### 5.1 The root causes of the Iraq conflict (violence in Iraq)

Several Middle East countries especially Iraq, Yemen and Syria have been mired in endless protracted ethno-sectarian conflicts that threaten the very existence of these countries and undermine regional as well as global peace and stability. The breakdown of national unity as well as secular nationalism is among the most significant obstacles to long-term solution in both Middle East states. Equally, Iraq and Syria are divided across increasingly ethno-sectarian borders. Implicitly this is largely an ongoing conflict between the Shiite camp led by Iran and the Sunni camp led by Saudi Arabia (Myring, 2015). Despite this explicit division among various groups in both countries, the Western powers, Russia, Turkey and Iran emphasize the importance of keeping the two states together. As far as realism is concerned, they oppose the idea of partition because of their own interests (Myring, 2015). Iraq is not a natural state but rather an artificial country created by Britain from the remnants of the Ottoman Empire (Anderson and Stansfield, 2004; Stansfield, 2007; Eland, 2009). The modern Iraqi state was created by the victories of the World War I powers – namely, Britain and France – following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918

(Anderson and Stansfield, 2004; Eland, 2009). The current Middle East borders were drawn by Britain and France as a part of Sykes-Picot agreement and with Russia's blessing (Alkhateeb, 2013), Britain founded the modern Iraq by combining three Ottoman *vilayets* (provinces) – Mosul, Basra and Baghdad – together in the early 1920s (Eland, 2009), forcing the Kurds and Shiites and Sunnis to participate in a creating new country (Galbraith, 2006). Britain disregarded the religious and ethnic identities of the Iraqi people, which resulted in dividing the country along ethnic and sectarian lines (Alkhateeb, 2013, Galbraith, 2006). Through the Sunni Arabisation of the Iraqi government, “the British introduced ethnicity politics which antagonised the Shiites and minority groups, especially Kurds” (Natali, 2005, p.28-29). Britain was increasingly concerned about its strategic and geopolitical interests rather than with building a unified, effective, self-sufficient state. The British rule of this deeply divided entity has included exploitation of sectarian, ethnic and tribal fractions, by utilising the “divide and rule” policy of the colonial era, supported sometimes by encouraging violence. The collapse of Saddam's regime has not made a significant change to this approach. The US replaced Britain to govern the violence (Anderson and Stansfield, 2004).


Iraq has had a turbulent history since its creation by Britain almost a century ago. There have been several uprisings, both on a national and a local level mainly due to the oppressive domination of Sunni Arabs (Byman, 1996). The failure of successive Iraqi governments to construct an extensive common legitimacy among its heterogeneous society has left the country inherently fragile. Since its foundation following the collapse of Ottoman Empire, the Sunnis who dominated the country has struggled to accommodate the interests of its Kurdish and Shiite people into the political system (Byman, 1996). Iraq had never existed as a state and had no national identity prior to that (Eland, 2009). The three main components of Iraqi society Kurds, Sunni and Shiite have lived separated for more than four centuries in distinguished semi-autonomous *vilayets* under Ottoman Empire rule (Anderson, 2014). As professor Moshe Sharon noted, this “artificial state has been a collection of contradictions, ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic” (Sharon, 2009, p.1).

Scholars working on the conflicts in the Middle East state that the root causes of the present-day ethno-sectarian disputes lie in the policies of Saddam's regime, who planted the seeds of animosity among these groups. Further, he argues that the U.S

invasion in 2003 exacerbated such grievances (Sluglett, 2007 cited in Eland, 2009, p.17; Arango, 2016). Moreover, the Iraqi civil strife has roots in Iraq's problematical history, its ethnic and religious partitions, as well as the US-led Iraq war in 2003 (Beauchamp et al., 2014). Some would argue that the policies of post-Saddam governments are the main driver behind the violence in Iraq (Stansfield, 2007). As discussed in Stansfield (2007), the historical split of Islam between Sunni and Shiite is a significant part of Iraqi history. However, he claims that the contemporary deep division between the two sects is due to the economic and political dominance of Sunnis during the Ottoman Empire and all successive Iraqi governments until the collapse of Saddam regime. Furthermore, Cordesman (2007a) claims that the post-Saddam policies of successive Iraqi governments, particularly the de-Ba'athification policy which excluded former Ba'ath party members and other Sunnis from the government and from positions of power, can be considered as an important factor in the Iraqi civil war. Cordesman noted that the execution of Saddam Hussein along with his aides in late 2006 and early 2007 was a significant source of sectarian violence in the country. This incident has weakened the trust between the two sects and has diminished the hopes for reconciliation (Cordesman, 2007a).


The conflict is a multifaceted and very complicated issue, thus finding a solution for the Iraq problem is not an easy task. According to Cordesman (2007a), the ethno-sectarian struggle for economic and political influence has dominated the Iraqi politics since the collapse of Saddam's regime. Cordesman believes that "Shiites and Sunnis, and Arabs and Kurds, seek to dominate the other side or push the weaker side out of areas where they have the majority or have superior power" (Cordesman, 2007a, p.2). He notes that these practices of what he called "soft" ethnic cleansing have driven many people out of their homes, especially in ethnically intermingled cities such as Baghdad and other main cities, which has resulted in separating the population of these cities along ethnic and sectarian lines (Cordesman, 2007a). According to the latest statistics by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) which is an NOG and a part of the Norwegian Refugee Council, nearly 3.3 million Iraqis were internally displaced across the country (IDMC, 2015). IDPs numbers have increased significantly since the 2003 and reached 3.44 million in August 2016 according to Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), which is part of IOM and monitoring IDPs in Iraq (IOM, 2016).

Figure 1: people internally displaced by conflict and Violence in Iraq, June 2015



Source: (IDMC, 2015)

Figure 2: Iraqi IDP's by Governorate of Displacement.



Source (IMO, 2016)

A UN report estimated that since 2003 nearly 1.7 million Iraqi people have become internally displaced (Cordesman, 2007a). Dividing the nation will not be without costs and consequences and is likely to lead to the displacement of people, especially in the ethnically mixed cities like Baghdad and Kirkuk. However, the de facto separation is a fact on the ground, and ethnic cleansing has already been taking place extensively (Downes, 2001; Cordesman, 2007a; Eland, 2009,). As Peter Galbraith noted, “The case for the partition of Iraq is straightforward: It has already happened” (Galbraith, 2006, p.28). The partition is a reality on the ground, Kurds control their semi-independent de facto state in the north; the central government is dominated by Shiite religious parties; most of the Sunni areas are under the control of ISIS; in the South of Iraq “Shi’ite religious parties have carved out theocratic fiefdoms, using militias that now number in the tens of thousands to enforce an Iranian-style Islamic rule” (Galbraith, 2006, p.28).

Myring (2015) maintains that giving partition a formal and legal status is the only viable solution to maintain a long-term peace in Iraq, which can also play a significant role in ending the ongoing conflict between the two main sects of Islam-Shia and Sunni- in the Middle East region. The vicious cycle of violence across the country has revived the idea of partitioning Iraq into three federal states (Schweitzer, 2014, p.1). As Worth so eloquently phrased it, the phantom that has troubled Iraq since its creation 95 years ago, this spectre turns into reality:” the de facto partition of the country into Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish cantons” (Worth, 2014, p.1).

## 5.2 To what extent is partition of Iraq possible

An examination of the root causes of the violence, the nature of Iraqi society and the forced unification of Iraq by combining different ethnic and religious groups with divergent ideologies and interests shows that Iraq has been an unstable country since its birth (Rafaat, 2007). Iraq is a fragile and even failed state; Iraq is ranked 11<sup>th</sup> out of 178 countries as one of the most vulnerable countries in the world in the Fragile States Index (Messener and Haken, 2016). As Professor Brendan O’Leary noted, Iraq is a failed state by all international standards; the government has lost about a third of its territory to so-called Islamic State (ISIS), and has no effective federal army. The relationship between KRI and central government is rocky and not functional (K24, 2015).


The idea of partitioning Iraq along ethno-sectarian lines resurfaces from time to time, especially when the violence intensifies and reaches the tipping point (Connable, 2016). Should the artificially frontiers enforced by European colonial powers be changed and the map of the region be redrawn (Beauchamp et al., 2014)? Today Iraq is in political turmoil and the political process is in stalemate and the presence of ISIS has exacerbated the situation and has deepened the ethno-sectarian division. Partitioning of Iraq is not a new thought. Scholars, academics, journalists, politicians, policy makers and pundits have suggested the idea of partitioning Iraq in different forms even though most Iraqi leaders and successive US administrations have

opposed it fiercely (Mikhin, 2014). The three-way partitioning of Iraq was first proposed by Daniel Byman of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology twenty years ago, who proposed it as solution in the event of the Saddam regime collapsing, in order to avoid a Yugoslavia scenario in Iraq (Byman, 1996). In 2006 the current US vice president Jo Biden alongside Leslie Gelb, the then-President of the Council on Foreign Affairs put forward proposals to divide Iraq into three federal regions with a loose central government control over [?] sovereign affairs such border security, oil revenues and concessions as well as national defence (Joseph and O'Hanlon, 2007; Mikhin,2014). Biden and Gelb wrote in *The New York Times* that the “the idea, as in Bosnia, is to maintain a united Iraq by decentralizing it, giving each ethno-religious group — Kurd, Sunni Arab and Shiite Arab — room to run its own affairs, while leaving the central government in charge of common interests”. They added “The Kurdish, Sunni and Shiite regions would each be responsible for their own domestic laws, administration and internal security. The central government would control border defence, foreign affairs and oil revenues” (Biden and Gelb, 2006, p.1). A year later two distinguished American scholars, Michael O'Hanlon and Edward Joseph supported the Biden-Gelb proposals and suggested that soft partition of Iraq would possibly offer the best long term solution for the ongoing ethno-sectarian strife and the lesser of two evils (Joseph and O'Hanlon, 2007; Salhani, 2007). They claim that the increasing ethno-sectarian violence and the growing number of IDPs moving into more homogenous areas is a clear indication that Iraqi people are more inclined towards partition (Joseph and O'Hanlon, 2007). The Brookings Plan suggests that with ongoing civil strife and increasing Shiite support for separation, partition will possibly be the best alternative obtainable for Iraq (Williams and Simpson, 2008). Iraq has never been a unified country and was only kept together by force by the Ottoman Empire for centuries (Edmiston, 2014) and when the Ottoman Empire collapsed successive Sunni governments, including Saddam's brutal regime, held the country together with an iron fist (Galbraith, 2006; Edmiston, 2014). Anderson and Stansfield (2004, p.157) believe that the partition of Iraq has started “in 1991 with the evacuation of Iraqi government officials from the north and the subsequent formation of the Kurdish de facto state”. What is more, post-Saddam Iraq remained united under the pressure from the US and against the will of the Iraqi people, because the successful of the US-led coalition entails participation and collaboration of all components of Iraqi society in government formation and state rebuilding (Rafaat,2 007). However, the national-unity government

has failed to govern the country and has been unable to overcome the ethno-sectarian division (Galbraith, 2006).

To a certain extent informal partition among Shiite Arabs, Kurds and Sunni Arabs already exists in Iraq, as illustrated in Figure 3 (Riggins, 2007, p.23). Partition is a reality on the ground; many areas are already divided along ethnic and sectarian lines (Cordesman, 2007b). Biden and Gelb (2006) supported this and noted that the deep division and lack of trust among the three main components of Iraqi society make it hard for them to coexist; they argue that the Kurds will never give up their demand for secession, Sunnis are unwilling to live in a country governed by sectarian Shiite militias, and the Shiites on the other hand are not in position to curb the Sunni insurgency. The current political settlement is a distribution of power among the three main components of Iraq. The president is a Kurd, the Prime Minister is a Shiite and the speaker of Iraqi parliament is Sunni (Michaels, 2014).

Figure 3: Main components of Iraq: Kurds, Sunni and Shiite



Source: Global Security.org

Today, more than any time, the partition of Iraq is becoming a reality, with the Islamic State terrorist group controlling about a third of Iraq's territory and Kurds continue to



push for independence (Michaels, 2014). Totten (2007, p.1) argues that “Iraq is finished, an expiring, cancerous nation on life support. Pulling the plug might be merciful. It might be cruel. But either way, it’s time to accept the fact that this country is likely to die and that we’ll all be better off when it does”. Totten (2007) believes that Iraq is already partitioned and there are three governments: the central and south dominated by Shiites; the barbarian fighters of ISIS control most Sunni-dominated areas; and the Kurdistan Regional Government controls the North. Totten concluded that the US should support the Kurds’ quest for independence (Totten, 2007). Hashmati et al. (2013) argue that keeping Iraq as a unitary state is very difficult, if not impossible, due to the structure of Iraqi society, which hinders the creation of a coherent political institutions, which in turn results in distrust and lack of unity in the government.

As Posen (1993) noted, the absence of an effective legitimate authority means religious, ethnic and national groups within that state will be responsible for their own security, which will arguably intensify tensions between warring groups (Roe, 1999). Years of ethnic and sectarian killing have only hardened the ethno-sectarian identities and weakened the trust among components of Iraqi society. As Posen (1993) noted, the ethnic security dilemma heightens when ethnic groups engage in prolonged civil wars. Protracted and intractable ethno-sectarian conflicts, such as the Iraq and Syrian conflicts only produce mistrust and insecurities to a degree that the warring parties will not agree to give up their weapons unless “they are safely separated into defensible state-like territories” (Jenne, 2012, p.255).

According to an IOM report “IDPs moved from religiously and ethnically mixed communities to homogeneous communities. Shias tended to move from the centre to the south. Sunnis tended to move from the south to the upper-centre, especially to Anbar (IOM, 2010, p.1). Both ethnicities fled from mixed communities to homogeneous ones within the same city, especially in volatile Baghdad and Baquba. Christians primarily fled to Ninawa, and Kurds usually were displaced within Diyala or to Tameem/Kirkuk” (IOM, 2010, p.1) Nearly three-quarters of IDPs are from intermingled cities such as Diyala and Baghdad (IOM, 2010). The authors of the report believe that

these mass movements of population will have long term economic, political and social implications for Iraq (IOM, 2006, p.1).

Soft partition is a popular concept that has been suggested as solution for ethno-sectarian conflict in Iraq. It entails establishing three strong autonomous regions sharing the natural resources' revenues and a federal government in Baghdad with limited authority (Acharya and Katsumata, 2011). However, critics claim that any form of partition – soft or hard – will not be without consequences. Cordesman (2007b) argues that dividing Iraq along religious and ethnic lines will likely result in significant displacements of the population and possibly cause major economic implications, and it would likely increase the violence level (Boot, 2007). Other detractors believe that the three-way partition is a myth and does not necessarily signify the realities on the ground, because of divisions within the three main components of Iraqi society, and these groups are increasingly linked to the regional powers and seek to advance their interests (Natali, 2016) and these “dynamics are reinforcing fragmentation, further hindering reconciliation and encouraging proxy conflicts and regional tensions” (Natali, 2016, p.1). Ottaway (2007) argues that the increasing regional tensions between the Shiite camp led by Iran and the Sunni camp led by Saudi Arabia, will likely encourage both countries to compete for power and influence in Iraq. Moreover, Kurdish independence will drag neighbouring countries with a substantial Kurdish minority into the conflict, especially Turkey, which blatantly opposes any move towards Kurdish self-determination (Ottaway, 2007; Myring, 2015,). Others argue that the lack of popular support for partition makes it the least favourable option. A recent opinion poll by ORB International, which specialises in conducting research in volatile, conflict ridden and fragile environments, illustrated that ninety percent of surveyed people believe that the political solution is possible despite existing disputes among Iraqis. The same study shows that nearly three quarters of participants believed that Iraqis can put their differences aside and live together again; only 25 percent stated that it is impossible for them to co-exist. Furthermore, the study demonstrates that nearly 75 percent of people who took part in the survey are against splitting the country into self-governed autonomous regions; only 26 percent support the partition (ORB, 2015). Moreover, more than 60 percent of participants believe that in event of partition the Kurdish example is preferred. However, nearly 40 percent stated that the USA model of federalism is the best option (ORB, 2015). Hence, as Boot (2007) noted, it would

be difficult to impose an unpopular solution on the Iraqi people. The growing tensions between the Shiites and Sunnis in the region will likely encourage neighbouring states, particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia and to certain extent Turkey, to play a significant role in any settlement. Any proposals to end the seemingly endless bloodbath in Iraq should consider the interests of the regional neighbouring countries, hence their interference in Iraq (Ottaway, 2007; Joseph and O'Hanlon, 2007).

In conclusion, critics might argue that partition will lead to ethnic and sectarian cleansing or will create new conflicts. The huge (vast) numbers of IDPs who seek refuge within their communities is a clear sign of major ethnic and sectarian cleaning. Others would argue that partition will exacerbate sectarian tensions and will give Iran the upper hand in Iraq, and it could destabilise the neighbouring countries. However, forcing Iraqis to remain in united county was a "big mistake" as Winston Churchill described the creation of country (Galbraith, 2006), and remains an illusion until today. Because the country is currently divided along ethno-sectarian lines and the partition is already taking place, this process lacks only formalisation (Galbraith, 2006; Biden and Gelb, 2007). And as Mearsheimer noted, "Wouldn't it make good practical and moral sense to recognize and plan the border changes rather than to allow the chaos of war to decide them?" He asked further, "Wouldn't it make better sense to move populations peacefully rather than at the end of a rifle barrel" (Mearsheimer, 1993, p.1). Compared to other alternatives, partition is the least of all evils. Hence partition or confederacy is the most viable solution for Iraq's conflict, as Khedery, an Iraq expert, names it "an imperfect solution for an imperfect world." (Arango, 2016, p.1) However, partition should be fair and sensibly accomplished and it needs to consider the grievances of all components of Iraqi society, especially the Sunnis (O'Hanlon and Edwad, 2014).

### 5.3 Possible secession of the Kurdistan region from Iraq (the case for Kurdistan Independence)

Most Kurds inhabit an area frequently denoted as Kurdistan, stretching across the territory of Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran (Brathwaite, 2014). Kurds are the largest stateless group in the world; today there are over 30 million Kurds dispersed across several Middle Eastern countries, namely Iraq, Iran, Turkey. The Treaty of Sèvres of 1920 promised Kurds an independent state, but it was never implemented and three years later was replaced by The Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 which denied the Kurds nationhood right (Natali, 2005; BBC, 2016). In fact, the partition of Kurdistan was part of the Sykes-Picot agreement which was signed a century ago to divide the spheres of influence between France and Britain (McDowall, 2004). The Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI) is a federal region of Iraq and home to more than five million Kurds (KRG, 2016). Kurds were compelled to join the newly created Iraq in the aftermath of disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. The historical partition of Kurdistan has led to resistance to respective governments in the countries which Kurds inhabit including Iraqi Kurds (McDowall, 2004). Perhaps it was the Kurds who led the most active national rebellion against successive Iraqi governments. The Kurds' quest for self-rule and independence was not without a price. Most Iraqi governments oppressed the Kurds and denied them the right to self-determination (Anderson and Stansfield, 2004). Kurds have suffered systematic ethnic cleansing, genocide and using of chemical weapons; the former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein wiped out hundreds of villages, killing thousands and forcing hundreds of thousands from their homes. Saddam used chemical weapons in the Kurdish city of Halabja, killing more than 5000 people. The majority were civilians (Anderson and Stansfield, 2004; McDowall, 2004).

Since the creation of Iraq, the history of the Iraqi Kurds has been characterised by devastation and constant tragedies (Anderson and Stansfield, 2005; Mohammed,2013). The turbulent history of Iraq and the failure of successive governments to integrate the Kurds into Iraq has deepened the division between ethnic Kurds and ethnic Arabs (Rafaat, 2007). Consequently, even the new power-sharing arrangements such as federalism has proven to be unsuccessful and as Salahaddin (2012) noted the concept of federalism have not only failed to bring about a sustainable government, but also exacerbated ethnic tensions between Arabs and the Kurds, especially during the government of Maliki, who consolidated the power and created Dijla Forces which openly opposed the idea of federalism. Ala Mohammed of the University of Canberra claims that even though Kurdistan has been recognised as federal region by the Iraqi constitution, “federalism has not been implemented in Iraq and has been widely rejected by Iraqi Arabs” (Mohammed,2013, p.5). Earlier this year the president of KRI Masoud Barzani called for a non-binding referendum on Kurdish independence. He stated that “Now the time is ripe for the people of Kurdistan to decide their future through a referendum” and stressed that the Kurdish political parties should respect the will of the Kurdistan people and implement it in suitable time and conditions (Rudaw,2016, p.1). The continuing struggle of Iraqi Kurds for independence suggests the artificial nature of the Iraqi state, and is the greatest controversial barometer of the political, economic, social and structural issues that have troubled Iraq since its creation almost a hundred years ago (Anderson and Stansfield, 2005). Anderson and Stansfield (2005) claim that the Kurds have been marginalised politically and geographically by Iraq and the regional powers, which has led to the Kurds being provocateurs and victims at the same time. Kurds – who make up nearly twenty percent of Iraq’s population – have seldom occupied influential positions within powerful Sunni-dominated governments. Moreover, the Kurds have never had their fair share of power equivalent to the size of their population (Anderson and Stansfield, 2005). The Kurds’ bitter experience with successive Iraqi governments has undermined Kurds trust and made them suspicious with newly “democratically” elected government in Baghdad, they are adamant about keeping their security forces and prefer to secede from Iraq and create an independent state (Downes, 2006). The rocky relationship between the central government and KRI deteriorated when Baghdad refused to implement Article 140 of Iraqi constitution concerning the status of the oil rich city of Kirkuk and other disputed areas outside KRI; relations between Erbil and

Baghdad worsened in 2014, when central government refused to pay KRI's share of the federal budget because of disputes over oil revenues (Mohammed, 2013). Furthermore, Baghdad has also refused to pay the salaries of KRI army forces, known also as the Peshmerga (Mohammed, 2013).

In 2005 a great majority (98%) of Kurds voted in favour of an independent Kurdistan in an unofficial referendum (Sluglett, 2010). However, Mohammed (2013) conducted an in-depth research about the future of the Kurds in Iraq and concluded that secession is not a feasible approach to achieve the Kurdish aspiration for independence because of internal, regional and international barriers. According to her, federalism is the most plausible arrangement for the KRI to avoid another conflict between the Kurds and Arabs (Mohammed, 2013). Recently, Iraqi Kurdistan's President Masood Barzani has promised to hold a referendum on Kurdistan's status. Barzani claims that the "time is ripe for a referendum; Kurdish independence will bring the region peace" (Rudaw, 2016, p.1). In August 2016, the American University of Kurdistan surveyed over 6000 people from the Kurdistan Region and from disputed areas. The results illustrated that the majority of participants will take part in the any referendum about the future of Kurdistan in Iraq. Moreover, nearly 85 percent of surveyed people stated that they would vote in favour of an independent Kurdistan (Dolamari, 2016).

To conclude, European colonial powers partitioned Kurdistan among four different states to maintain their strategic interests. Since the creation of Iraq nearly a century ago, Kurds have been marginalised, oppressed, massacred and displaced by successive Iraqi governments. The history of the Kurds" has been characterised by one catastrophe and tragedy after another" (Anderson and Stansfield, 2004). The rocky relationship between Kurds and central government improved after the fall of Saddam's regime but the honeymoon did not last much longer, because Maliki's government was reluctant to implement the federalism system and did not comply with the agreed constitution, especially Article 140 concerning the status of the disputed areas between the KRG and the Iraqi central government (Mohammed, 2013). Further, the relations between Baghdad and Erbil has deteriorated when Maliki's government cut the KRI's federal budget share and the presence of ISIS has

exacerbated it. Despite all internal difficulties and pressure from regional powers, the KRI has survived and become a democratic model for the rest of the Iraq. Kurdish leaders have reiterated the Kurds right of self-determination and ultimately secession from Iraq. Perhaps the KRI's president promise to hold an independence referendum indicates that Kurds want an "amicable divorce" (Barazni, 2016). The Head of the KRG intelligence service and the son of the incumbent president, Masrour Barzani confirmed his father's position and maintained that "Iraq is a failed state, and our continued presence within it condemns us all to unending conflict and enmity" (Sputnik, 2016, p.1). He added "We are subjects, not citizens. There is simply no trust between us and the central government. The relationship is irreconcilable" (Barzani, 2016. P.1).

Maintaining Iraq as a unitary state has promoted authoritarianism and violence. The level of violence and ongoing communal and sectarian conflict arguably suggests that country is on the brink of collapse. If that not the case the country is likely to slide towards dictatorship (Anderson and Stansfield, 2004). Even through the Kurds voluntarily chose to remain within a federated Iraq, it is highly likely that they will secede from it and create an independent sovereign state. The coercive coexistence among different Iraqi communities with different ideologies and interests is the main reason behind communal and sectarian violence, not the Kurdish secession (Rafaat, 2007). Anderson and Stansfield (2004) claim that Iraqi Kurdistan should be a model for the rest of Iraq; they believe that the failure of the Iraqi state will slide the country into dictatorship, hence the best option is tripartite partition.

## Chapter Six: Conclusions and Findings

The history of partition as an approach to resolve sectarian and ethnic conflicts contains both successful and failed partitions. The horrors of ethnic civil wars in Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia have illustrated that power-sharing arrangements in multi-ethnic societies are "extremely difficult or practically impossible" (Licklider and Bloom, 2006, p.3).

Solving ethnic conflicts through redrawing existing borders and establishing new states is a controversial and contentious issue among academics, politicians and policymakers. Partition scholars and theorists claim that demographic separation of opposing ethnic groups into well-defined and well-defended borders is arguably the best solution to settle protracted ethnic civil wars (Kaufmann, 1996; Kaufmann; 1998; Sambanis, 2000; Johnson, 2008). However, partition remains a controversial approach to end intense communal strife. The international community is ambivalent about accepting the idea of partition as solution to end conflicts in deeply divided societies (O'Leary, 2006a). Nevertheless, this perspective is weak because fighting civil strife hardens the identities, deepens the distrust among the opposing groups and exacerbates the ethnic security dilemma, which eventually makes the post-conflict power sharing arrangements more difficult (Kaufmann, 1998), particularly in protracted ethnic civil conflicts, where negotiated power-sharing arrangements have a little chance of success. Thus, by physically separating ethnic groups in conflict, partition promises to reduce the risk of continued or escalating violence (Kaufmann, 1998; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl, 2009). Taking into consideration these issues, the study argues that partition should be envisioned as a choice for termination of intractable ethnic and sectarian wars. The research shows that the failure to adopt partition in Iraq has left the country in endless civil war which has resulted in the killing of thousands of people and displacing millions and has eventually destabilised the region and is threatening the global peace. Hence partition is arguably the only viable option for long-term stability in the region and beyond. Furthermore, the study proposes that the international community should prepare and embrace the possible upcoming partition of Iraq instead of emphasising the unsuccessful attempt of power-sharing implementation among the three main components of Iraqi society, namely Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis (Johnson, 2008).

Some theorists and academics have suggested partition as a solution for ethnic and religious conflicts (Kaufmann, 1998). Supporters of partition argue that intense communal conflicts harden identities and deepen grievances and exacerbate the ethnic security dilemma, resulting in an increasing mistrust and “mutual vulnerability of inter-mingled civilian populations” (Licklider and Bloom, 2006, p.4). Therefore, they claim that separating belligerent parties is the most viable way to maintain long-term



peace. Detractors, on the other hand, have criticised partition and describe it as extreme solution because, as they argue, it protects the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing and redefines intrastate conflicts into interstate wars; furthermore, they claim that it creates new conflicts and encourages other ethnic minorities elsewhere and within newly created states to seek autonomy and arguably full separation. Some would argue that partition is not a permanent solution, but rather a contingency plan (Wigmore-Shepherd 2013); others claim that it is an exit strategy for the major powers (Kumar, 1997). Critics have based their arguments on the legacy of historical partitions such as Palestine, British India and Ireland; they claim that partition will increase instability and intensify violence and result in authoritarian governments. Eland (2009) argues that the long-lasting conflict was not an outcome of partition but rather because these partitions were not complete. However, some opponents of partition – Laitin, Roe and Sambanis – have shown their support for partition and population separation as a last resort (Kaufmann, 2006). Kaufmann's demographic separation is playing a significant role in the viability of partition as a remedy to end ethno sectarian conflicts. Carter Johnson (2008) conducted a comprehensive study on civil wars, between 1945 and 2005 that ended with partition and concluded that complete separation of warring groups is likely to decrease the likelihood of war occurring and of low-level violence, which proves that partition is not a product of war (Johnson, 2008). A study by Baskar (2011) concluded that territorial partition can be a best remedy for ethnic civil wars if ethnic warring groups are completely separated both territorially and demographically with defensible borders and that the balance of power is maintained between new emerging states.

The religious tensions have been exacerbated over the last decades, and sectarianism has become the root cause of most modern conflicts in the Middle East (Sherwood, 2016). The ongoing violence and ethno-sectarian conflicts in several Middle Eastern countries, especially in Iraq and Syria, has only hardened ethnic identities and intensified the ethnic security dilemma. Furthermore, large-scale sectarian and ethnic cleaning has been committed by all involved sides in both countries, leaving few intermingled areas. In Iraq, which this study focuses on, there are over 3 million IDPs and the level of mistrust and fear is so high that people are frightened and terrified to return to their homes. On top of that there is no indication that post-ISIS Iraq will be more peaceful and as Mosul offensive continues there is no political agreement

between Iraqis on country's post-ISIS political order. Moreover, Kurds are adamant in pursuing their right for self-determination and eventually full independence. What is more, any possibility of power sharing settlement is less likely to succeed and doomed to failure because of deep divisions among Iraq's main components (Ulack, 2015). This study concluded that soft partitioning of Iraq into three confederations is the best viable solutions for people's security concerns and to end the country's protracted ethno-sectarian conflict. This is because, as Michael Knights observes, "If Sunnis and Kurds are freer to manage their own affairs, then they will have more stake in cooperation with Baghdad, and there will be less room for the ISIS to operate along the tense, dividing lines between central Iraq and the northern and western peripheries" (Knights, 2016. P.1).

The idea of partitioning Iraq across ethno-sectarian lines gains more prominence as the violence continues to ripple through Iraq. Keeping Iraq as one united country was a "big mistake", as Winston Churchill stated (Galbraith, 2006). The country is already divided among Sunnis, Shiites and the Kurds. Formalising and recognising the reality on the ground will arguably put an end to the religious and ethnic violence and will save many lives (Galbraith, 2006; Biden and Gelb, 2009). Iraq is on the brink of splitting up and will ultimately be partitioned either through a peaceful agreement or by major communal war (Eland, 2009). The partition would entail a major population transfer (exchanges) and would need cooperation and political agreement over oil, water rights and other resources. The recent partition of Sudan illustrates that without agreements on these issues the conflict and the violence will recur under other excuses.

This study suggests that the international community, especially the US should consider demographic and territorial separation and voluntary population transfers, particularly when groups are less intermixed. In other words, partition should be utilised as an approach to end intense sectarian and ethnic conflicts across the Middle East. "To build a lasting peace, therefore, warring ethnic groups must be separated into homogeneous regions capable of self-defence" (Johnson, 2008, p.148). This study puts forward some hopeful areas for future research.

## Findings:

- For partition to be successful, a complete separation of populations should be implemented.
- A political agreement between warring parties is necessary to make partition a viable solution
- Long-term peacebuilding entails separating belligerents into defensible homogenous areas.

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## Appendices

### Appendix 1

## Appendix A. Cases of Partition, 1900–96

<i>Pre-partitioned states</i>	<i>Rump states</i>	<i>Secessionist states (year of independence)</i>
Austria–Hungary	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Czechoslovakia, Hungary</i> (both in 1919)
China	<i>China</i>	Mongolia (1921)
China	<i>China</i>	<i>Taiwan</i> (1949)
Colombia	<i>Colombia</i>	<i>Panama</i> (1903)
Czechoslovakia	Czech Republic	Slovakia (1993)
Ethiopia	Ethiopia	<i>Eritrea</i> (1993)
India	<b>India</b>	<i>Pakistan</i> (1947)
Malaysia	<i>Malaysia</i>	<i>Singapore</i> (1965)
Mali	<i>Mali</i>	<i>Senegal</i> (1960)
Ottoman Empire	<b>Ottoman Empire</b>	Albania (1913), <i>Bulgaria</i> (1908), Yemen (1921)
Pakistan	<b>Pakistan</b>	<i>Bangladesh</i> (1971)
South Africa	<i>South Africa</i>	Namibia (1990)
Sweden	Sweden	<i>Norway</i> (1905)
Palestinian Mandate	<b>Jordan</b>	<i>Israel</i> (1948)
United Arab Republic	<i>Egypt</i>	<i>Syria</i> (1961)
United Kingdom	<i>United Kingdom</i>	<i>Ireland</i> (1922)
USSR	<b>Russia</b>	Armenia, <i>Azerbaijan</i> , Belarus, Estonia, <i>Georgia</i> , Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, <i>Moldova</i> , <i>Tajikistan</i> , Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan (all in 1991)
USSR	<b>USSR</b>	<i>Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland</i> (all in 1919)
Yugoslavia	<i>Serbia–Montenegro</i>	<b>Bosnia</b> (1992), <i>Croatia</i> (1991), Macedonia (1991/93), <i>Slovenia</i> (1991)








Country names in *italics* have experienced armed conflict, while the ones in **bold face** have experienced civil war onset in the years under observation.

(Source: Tir, 2005, p.559)


## Appendix 2

## Iraq : Ethnoreligious Groups


### Ethnoreligious Groups

-  Sunni Kurd
-  Sunni Arab / Sunni Kurd
-  Sunni Arab
-  Shia Arab / Sunni Arab
-  Shia Arab
-  Turkoman
-  Yezidi

0 50 100 Kilometers  
0 50 100 Miles




Ethnic and religious groups by percent of population



Source: (global security.org)

### Appendix 3



**Source:** Middle East Map as Envisioned by Ralph Peter (Peters' Blood borders' map, 2013) Journal of Armed Forces.

## Appendix 4

Table 1. Ethnic Partitions, 1900-2011.

Year of Partition	Pre-Partition State	Remnant State	Secessionist State	Violent Process (i.e., absence of peaceful negotiations)?	Violent Outcome (i.e., absence of post-partition peace)?
1903	Colombia	Colombia	Panama	<b>YES</b> (independence movement; civil war in 1899-1902)	<b>NO</b>
1905	Sweden	Sweden	Norway	<b>NO</b>	<b>NO</b>
1908	Ottoman Empire	Ottoman Empire	Bulgaria	<b>YES</b> (Serbo-Bulgarian war in 1885)	<b>YES</b> (the Balkan Wars in 1912-13)
1913	Ottoman Empire	Ottoman Empire	Albania	<b>YES</b> (revolts in 1912)	<b>YES</b> (Serbo-Albanian military clashes in 1918)
1919	Austria-Hungary	Austria	Hungary	<b>YES</b> (Hungarian revolts in 1918)	<b>NO</b>
1919	Austria-Hungary	Austria	Czechoslovakia	<b>NO</b>	<b>NO</b>
1919	Austria-Hungary	Austria	Ukraine	<b>NO</b>	<b>NO</b>
1919	Austria-Hungary	Austria	Poland	<b>NO</b>	<b>NO</b>
1919	Austria-Hungary	Austria	"State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs"	<b>NO</b>	<b>YES</b> (violent break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s)
1919	Austria-Hungary	Austria	Italy	<b>NO</b>	<b>NO</b>
1919	Soviet Russia	USSR	Estonia	<b>YES</b> (war of independence in 1918-20)	<b>YES</b> (Soviet occupation in 1944 and continued Estonian insurgency)

Source: (Matejova, 2014, p.61-63) (Peace and Conflict Review 8.1 2014)

1919	Soviet Russia	USSR	Finland	<b>YES</b> (civil war in 1918)	<b>YES</b> (Russo-Finish War in 1939-40)
1919	Soviet Russia	USSR	Latvia	<b>YES</b> (war of independence in 1918-20)	<b>YES</b> (Soviet occupation in 1949 and continued Latvian insurgency)
1919	Soviet Russia	USSR	Lithuania	<b>YES</b> (wars of independence in 1918-20)	<b>YES</b> (Soviet occupation and Lithuanian insurgency in 1944-52)
1919	Soviet Russia	USSR	Poland	<b>YES</b> (Polish-Soviet war in 1919-21)	<b>YES</b> (Polish insurgency against the Soviets in the 1940s and 1950s)
1921	China	China	Mongolia	<b>YES</b> (independence movement in 1919-21)	<b>NO</b>
1921	Ottoman Empire	Ottoman Empire	Yemen	<b>NO</b>	<b>NO</b>
1922	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	Ireland	<b>YES</b> (independence movement)	<b>YES</b> (Irish civil war in 1922-23)
1947	India	India	Pakistan	<b>YES</b> (Kashmir war in 1947)	<b>YES</b> (Indo-Pakistani War in 1971)
1948	Palestinian Mandate	Jordan	Israel	<b>YES</b> (civil war in 1947-48; war of independence in 1948-49)	<b>YES</b> (Arab-Israeli war in 1967; Arab-Israeli war in 1973)
1949	China	China	Taiwan	<b>YES</b> (civil war in 1947-49)	<b>YES</b> (military clashes)
1960	Turkey	Turkey	Cyprus	<b>YES</b> (independence movement)	<b>YES</b> (Turkey- Cyprus conflict in 1974)
1960	Mali	Mali	Senegal	<b>NO</b>	<b>NO</b>
1961	United Arab Republic	Egypt	Syria	<b>YES</b> (a military coup)	<b>YES</b> (military coups following independence)
1965	Malaysia	Malaysia	Singapore	<b>NO</b>	<b>NO</b>

Source: (Matejova, 2014, p.61-63) (Peace and Conflict Review 8.1 2014)

## Appendix 4

Table 1. Ethnic Partitions, 1900-2011.

1971	Pakistan	Pakistan	Bangladesh	<b>YES</b> (independence war in 1971)	<b>YES</b> (military coups)
1990	South Africa	South Africa	Namibia	<b>YES</b> (independence war in 1966-88)	<b>NO</b>
1991	Soviet Union	Russia	Armenia	<b>NO</b>	<b>YES</b> (violence between Karabakh Armenians and Azerbaijan)
1991	Soviet Union	Russia	Azerbaijan	<b>NO</b>	<b>YES</b> (violence between Karabakh Armenians and Azerbaijan)
1991	Soviet Union	Russia	Belarus	<b>NO</b>	<b>NO</b>
1991	Soviet Union	Russia	Estonia	<b>NO</b>	<b>NO</b>
1991	Soviet Union	Russia	Georgia	<b>NO</b>	<b>YES</b> (civil war in 1991-95; Russo-Georgian war in 2008)
1991	Soviet Union	Russia	Kazakhstan	<b>NO</b>	<b>NO</b>
1991	Soviet Union	Russia	Kyrgyzstan	<b>NO</b>	<b>YES</b> (violent clashes between the Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in 2010)
1991	Soviet Union	Russia	Latvia	<b>NO</b>	<b>NO</b>
1991	Soviet Union	Russia	Lithuania	<b>NO</b>	<b>NO</b>
1991	Soviet Union	Russia	Moldova	<b>NO</b>	<b>YES</b> (riots in 2009)
1991	Soviet Union	Russia	Tajikistan	<b>NO</b>	<b>YES</b> (civil war in 1992-97)
1991	Soviet Union	Russia	Turkmenistan	<b>NO</b>	<b>NO</b>
1991	Soviet Union	Russia	Ukraine	<b>NO</b>	<b>NO</b>
1991	Soviet Union	Russia	Uzbekistan	<b>NO</b>	<b>NO</b>
1991	Yugoslavia	Serbia-Montenegro	Croatia	<b>YES</b> (Serbo-Croatian war/war of independence in 1991-95)	<b>NO</b>
1991	Yugoslavia	Serbia-Montenegro	Slovenia	<b>YES</b> (Slovenia's ten-day war with the Yugoslav Army in 1991)	<b>NO</b>

Source: (Matejova, 2014, p.61-63) (Peace and Conflict Review 8.1 2014)

#### Appendix 4

Table 1. Ethnic Partitions, 1900-2011.

1991	Yugoslavia	Serbia-Montenegro	Macedonia	<b>NO</b>	<b>NO</b>
1992	Yugoslavia	Serbia-Montenegro	Bosnia	<b>YES</b> (Bosnian war in 1992-95)	<b>NO</b>
1993	Ethiopia	Ethiopia	Eritrea	<b>YES</b> (independence war in 1961-91)	<b>YES</b> (Eritrean-Ethiopian war in 1998)
1993	Czechoslovakia	Czech Republic	Slovakia	<b>NO</b>	<b>NO</b>
2006	Serbia-Montenegro	Serbia	Montenegro	<b>NO</b>	<b>NO</b>
2011	Sudan	Sudan	South Sudan	<b>YES</b> (civil wars in 1955-72 and 1983-05)	<b>YES</b> (continued military clashes)

Source: (Matejova, 2014, p.61-63) (Peace and Conflict Review 8.1 2014)