

Kurdish Factor in Provision of Regional Security in Middle East

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Abstract

In the article, an attempt of studying of the role of the Kurdish problem in ensuring regional security and in relations between the countries of the Middle East and their participation in regional socio-political processes. Also, it has been studied the positions of the Middle East states on this issue and the influence of the external factor are considered. Main purpose of the article is clarifying Kurdish people in one whole and unique ethnicity as the largest nation where no its own country. Outcomes can be drawn as four different point of views on evaluation of the political situation in international collaboration. Conclusion considered that political threat and inequality still dominates in Middle East and only cooperation with international community can provide balance and peace in the region.

Keywords: Islamic regional, peace, security, Kurds, Kurdish problem, political processes.

INTRODUCTION

The Kurdish issue has been and remains one of the most pressing issues in the Middle East. The study of this issue by world political scientists as an object of research, their interest in the current state and development of the problem depends on a number of factors. The uniqueness of the Kurdish issue as a political process is that they remain the largest nation in the world without a state of their own. At the same time, the fact that the analysis of "Kurdistan" by world political scientists is interpreted mainly as an ethnic concept and its "boundaries" are very conditional requires further analysis and study of this issue. This is actually another additional problem because there are no clear boundaries within this ethnic boundary. Undoubtedly, any socio-political processes in the region are monitored by four countries in the Middle East - Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. This, in turn, means that the Kurdish issue has an impact on the political situation in the region and plays a special role in ensuring regional security.

The extreme subtlety and urgency of the Kurdish problem lies in the fragmented nature of the Kurdish people. That is, the Kurds today live in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, as well as partly in Israel, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Europe. The total number of Kurds in recent data is about 30-40 million [1]. It is shown that according to its location, 47-54% (about 15 million) of Kurds live in Turkey, 20-32% (6.6 million) in Iran, 16-20% (6 million) in Iraq, and the rest in other countries (Syria - 2.8 million). , Germany - 800 thousand, Azerbaijan - 150 thousand, Israel - 100 thousand, Lebanon - 80 thousand, Turkmenistan - 40 thousand, the United States - 20 thousand) [2]. The area inhabited by Kurds is 400-500 thousand sq. Km. territorially equal to the present French state [3].

Picture 1. Geographic widespread of Kurds



Source: <https://ethnicgeography.wordpress.com/2013/10/07/the-feyli-kurds-part-3-the-feyli-kurds-of-iraq/>

Most Kurds live in the Republic of Turkey. In Turkey, the Kurds lived under pressure until the 1960s, when the republic was first proclaimed. With the transition to a multi-party system in Turkey in the 1960s and the development of democratic processes, the Kurds also had the opportunity to participate freely in life, freedom of thought, freedom of speech, and membership in various political organizations. However, this did not last long. It should be noted that the Kurdish issue in the country is still unresolved and has an "explosive" nature.

METHODS

In this paper work were used various scientific approaches in the study of the history of different regions. In some cases, ethnographic methods were used, taking into account the cultural and ethnic characteristics of the Kurds who were the object of study. The ethnogenesis of peoples and nations in the Middle East and adjacent regions is also studied through the method of historical-comparative analysis of the participation of the Kurds in socio-political processes and the formation of states in the region. In particular, the role of the Kurds in the recent history of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria and the emergence of the Kurdish problem in the current political situation in the region have been studied.

RESULTS

1. Kurds in Turkey

The Republic of Turkey has not yet been proclaimed, but at a meeting of the Grand National Assembly on May 1, 1920, which was being held at a time when national movements (liberation) were underway, he said: The only thing that unites them all is the Anasir-i Islami, a sincere complex.

Anasir-i belongs to a community of Islam (elements made up of Muslims). This is what we called our national borders. However, there are Kurds in the north of Kirkuk, just as there are Turks. We did not separate them. Therefore, the nation we are concerned with protecting and defending is not a single element. It stems from various Islamic elements [4].

Picture 2. Kurds in Turkish Regions



Source: <https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/07/03/where-do-borders-need-to-be-redrawn/lessons-from-the-idea-and-rejection-of-kurdistan>

However, from the proclamation of the republic until the 1960s, the Kurds were not recognized as a nation in practice. In the 1930s, Ankara pursued a serious policy on the Kurdish issue and began an effort to eliminate Kurdish leaders from the political arena. McDowell, who has studied the modern history of the Kurds, writes: "The cold wind from Ankara was quickly felt. In the summer of 1923, in the new elections to the Grand National Assembly, deputies were forbidden to go to their constituencies [5]. The new candidates from the Kurdish regions were nominated by the government, not by the people, according to the Kurds. Therefore, the Kurdish opposition was expelled from the republic in a democratic form.

On March 4, 1924, Mustafa Kemal announced the end of the Khilafah. A special law was enacted and all processes related to religion and the caliphate were strictly controlled. The closure of religious schools, madrassas and cells has led to the disappearance of the last source of education for the Kurds. Mustafa Kemal

closed his religious institutions and became an enemy of the Kurds. They were religiously educated sheikhs and former Hamadian leaders who believed in the protection of the caliphate in every way.

Then, in the 1930s, Kurdish uprisings took place in Turkey (Mush, Hanisa, Agri (Ararat), Menemen, Erzurum, Diyarbakir, Dersim and others). Almost all of these uprisings took the form of national conflicts. Between 1925 and 1938, a total of 17 Kurdish uprisings took place [7]. On October 3, 1927, with the participation of all committees and public organizations, the Hoybun (Independence) "National Kurdish Union" was established. Ihsan Nuri Pasha from Bitlis was elected chairman of the union. However, the organization was disbanded in 1928 and its leaders were executed.

The policy of assimilation against the Kurds was evident on May 5, 1932 with the adoption of a law on their relocation to the interior of Anatolia (the western regions of the country). The law was supposed to be implemented in the summer of 1934 after a visit by the king of Iran, who planned to visit Ankara. (It is estimated that more than 3 million Kurds live in Istanbul today). Such mistakes led to the revolt of the Zaza Kurds in Dersim in 1937-1938 [8]. The uprising was led by Said Riza. However, this revolt, which was brutally suppressed, was a great loss for the Kurds. Dersim's name was removed from the map after Said Riza and his companions were hanged in Elazig. Dersim (in Kurdish - silver door) was replaced by Tunceli (Turkish, Tunç - bronze, eli - people, that is, a strong people like bronze). However, even today there are ambiguities between the name Dersim and Tunceli. In addition, in the early years of the republic, the names of several other historical sites were completely or partially changed. For example, Urfa - Sanliurfa, Antep - Gaziantep.

After the Dersim incidents, the Kurdish uprisings in Turkey remained silent for a long time. However, the establishment of martial law in Kurdish-populated areas (even today, some lands are like that) has sometimes led to unjustified military inspections of the population and interrogation of suspects. For example, in the spring of 1945, in Diyarbakir and Giavar, the military interrogated and arrested several people and executed 120 people [9]. Kurdish enlighteners were also under pressure. In 1959, 49 intellectuals were arrested and convicted of separatism [10].

By 1960, with the coming to power of the Democratic Party after the military coup in Turkey, the liberalization process had allowed the Kurds to breathe freely as well. Articles about Kurdistan began to appear and the Kurds became more active in the Turkish press. Between 1965 and 1968, Turkish-Kurdish newspapers (Dicle Firat ve Deng), a book on Kurdish linguistics, a Kurdish-Turkish dictionary, Birine Reş's play "Kara Yara" were published, and the epic Mem-ü-Zin was created [11]. However, they were soon banned, books and newspapers stopped being published, and publishers and writers were prosecuted.

At that time, there were several illegal Kurdish parties and movements operating in Turkey. One of them is the Democratic Party of Turkish Kurdistan, which was established in 1965 to recognize the Kurdish people in the Republic of Turkey and to have an autonomous administrative system aimed at developing its language and national culture [12]. In essence, the party was controlled by the leader of Iraqi Kurdistan, M. Barzani, and was aimed at supporting the Turkish Kurds to defend their national destiny. Article 2 of the party's program states that the organization's goal is for the Kurdish people to "determine their own destiny" [13]. Party members believed that this goal could be achieved through a national-democratic revolution. Therefore, it was also envisaged to organize armed forces to resist.

The next and most powerful movement in Kurdish history was the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Kurdish Party Karkeren Kurdistan - PKK), founded on November 27, 1978 by Abdullah Ocalan. According to Ocalan, Kurdistan and the Kurds were being exploited by Turkey [14].

On September 12, 1980, another military coup took place in Turkey. This caused difficult days for the Kurds. The period of armed conflict has begun, especially in the south-eastern and eastern Anatolia region. Kurdish PKK-led guerrilla warfare against Turkish troops has begun. Between 1987 and 2002, a state of emergency was declared in the region. This has led to the displacement of 1.5 million Kurds in mountainous areas [15].

In the 1990s, there was a process of rapprochement between the Kurds and the government due to the liberal-democratic views of Prime Minister Turgut Ozal and especially the religious (Naqshbandi) views of Prime Minister Dr. Najmaddin Erbakan in 1996-1997. With the arrival of the IT Party (Justice and Development Party - Justice and Development Party) in government in 2002, the rights of the Kurds were restored for the better. In particular, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's statement to the Kurds that "Turkey must

recognize the existence of Kurdistan, as well as Lazistan," was a long-awaited news not only for the Kurds but also for the Laz, Circassians and other nations [16]. Also, the conservative views of the AK Party were naturally supported by the Kurds, whose main electorate was the conservative stratum. Under the AK Party, the Kurdish-populated areas have indeed received more financial aid and investment than in previous periods.

2. Kurds in Iraq

In the socio-political processes of the Kurds in the region, the Iraqi Kurds are undoubtedly the most active and influential. As a result of such political activism, the Iraqi Kurds gained the status of autonomous Kurdistan. Of course, this was not easily achieved, Balkshi gave a lot of blood and life.

During the British-led invasion of Iraq, Suleiman's governor, Sheikh Mahmoud Berzenji, declared himself the "ruler of Kurdistan" in northern Iraq. Although 1922-1924 established governance in practice, it was helpless in the face of British military power [17]. As a result of the frequent revolts of the Kurds, the British promised them autonomous status, but this did not happen.

After Berzenji, another uprising broke out in 1931 under the leadership of Sheikh Ahmad Barzani. In these uprisings, leadership passes to the Kurdish Barzani family, and this family (ashirat) continues to hold the leadership to this day. However, the uprising was suppressed in 1932 because it was not fully supported by the entire Kurdish community[18].

Picture 3. Kurds in Iraq Regions



Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Autonomous_Region_Kurdistan-en.png

In 1943, Sheikh Ahmad's revolt was continued by his brother, Mulla Mustafa Barzani, and the revolt took on a more nationalist character than previous revolts. Mustafa Barzani called for the formation of a Kurdish state, which would include Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah, Khanakin and Dukhak, the establishment of a competent body in the Iraqi government to govern the country, the Kurdish language as an official language, and cultural and economic independence.

This uprising, which coincided with World War II, was suppressed in 1945, and Barzani was forced to leave Iraq and go to Iran. Continuing his political career in Iran, Barzani is actively involved in the formation of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad with the help of the former Soviet Union. In 1946, he formed the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).

After the dissolution of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, which lasted 11 months (by the King of Iran), Barzani fled to the former Soviet Union and was forced to stay there for 12 years (he also lived in Tashkent). Abdulkarim Qasim Barzani, who came to power in Iraq in 1958 with the overthrow of the monarchy through a military coup, was invited to Iraq and agreed to allow the KDP to operate legally in the country. Abdulkarim Qasim also promises to give autonomy to the Kurds in return for supporting his policies. However, with the failure to keep his promises, Barzani resumed the armed conflict in 1960, which lasted for almost 10 years. The conflict with the Kurds ended in 1968 with the capture of the ruling Ba'ath party in Iraq, and ended in 1970 with the signing of an autonomous agreement.

Under an agreement signed on March 11, 1970, by Saddam Hussein on behalf of the Ba'ath party and Mullah Mustafa Barzani on behalf of the KDP, it was accepted that the Kurds, along with the Arabs, were among the historical peoples of Iraq. The Kurdish-majority areas have been included in the borders of the Kurdistan Region. It was agreed that the disputed territories would be resolved through a referendum.

It was also decided that the vice-president in the central administration would be from the Kurds and that he would be represented in parliament according to population, and that Kurdish would be the official language. The Kurdish region was given the right to be independent in its internal affairs, to legislate and govern (execute) [19]. In short, the Iraqi government responded for the first time with autonomous demands for the political status of the Kurds.

Although the deal is set to take four years to implement, the Iraqi government, along with Kirkuk, has pursued a policy of Arabization in the areas where the referendum will take place, and this has led to new controversies. By 1974, although things had gone well on some issues, the problems in the disputed areas had not been resolved and no referendum had been held. At the same time, on March 11, 1974, the Ba'ath party declared and recognized the autonomous region of Kurdistan, whose borders were clearly defined. He said the disputed territories belonged to the Iraqi government. The KDP protested and Mustafa Barzani revolted again [20].

Regional and international games also played an important role in Barzani's rise this time. During the Cold War, the United States sought to reduce the influence of pro-Soviet governments by supporting opposition groups. Therefore, the United States and its then ally Iran (during the monarchy) supported the Barzani movement against the Ba'athist rule. Iran was also at odds with Iraq over the border at the time. Israel was also in close contact with all non-Arab elements in the region at the time due to its conflicts with Arab states. Thus, Barzani revolted in April 1974 with the help of the United States, Iran and Israel. However, this rebellion ended in failure. Meanwhile, in 1975, when Iraq and Iran resolved the border issue and reached an agreement in Iran's favor, Iran also stopped aiding the Kurds. The Barzani uprising, which did not receive aid from Iran, was quickly suppressed [21].

Although the KDP in the north of Kurdistan and the KYUB government in the south experienced various periods of war and peace in 1994-1997, the two governments reached a peace agreement in 1998 and the crisis eased and full unification was achieved.

As the Kurds formed their governments in this way and gradually developed, by 2003, U.S. military action in Iraq was changing the situation in favor of the Kurds. The Kurds took advantage of the situation and were able to expand their borders. With the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, an Provisional Government was formed, in which the Kurds gained important positions.

The interim government passed a law declaring Iraq a Federal State. It was renamed the "Kurdistan Regional Government" and was accepted by the Peshmerga as a security force in the region. The law also gives Kurdistan a 17% share of Iraq's central budget, while giving Kurdish official status in the region [22].

This adopted law came into force on October 15, 2005 by a unanimous vote of the people. In this way, the Kurds were able to find a legal solution to their problems and issues. Meanwhile, after the 2005 general election, KUB leader Jalal Talabani became the first president of the new Iraq, and KDP member Hoshyar

Zebari was appointed foreign minister. As a result of successful Kurdish negotiations, Kurds have also been appointed to senior positions in several ministries.


3. Kurds in Iran

The Kurds in Iran lived in a better situation during the Pahlavi era, which came to power after World War I, than during the 1978 Islamic Republic of Iran. This is because during the Pahlavi period, the notion that the Iranian people were an "Aryan" race and that the Kurds were one of them was a factor of mutual respect and rapprochement. However, this "Aryan" race did not always have a unifying character. Minorsky, a Russian orientalist known for his famous research on the Kurds, writes: The Iranian Kurds have always been in a different situation from the Turkish Kurds. Indeed, the Iranian government has focused on the racial and historical closeness of these two peoples (Persian and Kurdish means the author's emphasis). However, this situation did not prevent the emergence of socio-political protests from time to time, sometimes uncertainty, sometimes bloody conflicts [23].

Iraq, Turkey and Iran were equally concerned about the Kurdish uprising. Therefore, in 1937, Riza signed a treaty at the Shah's palace in Sadabad, according to which the signatories recognized the existing borders and undertook to abide by the laws of good neighborliness. This meant that for the Kurds, it would be an obstacle to interstate cooperation in realizing their dreams. In addition, these states agreed not to use the Kurds, who were in mutual disagreement, to oppose each other [24].

However, World War II provided another important opportunity for the Iranian Kurds. On August 20, 1941, the combined forces of the USSR, Britain, and the United States entered Iran. Riza formed another government instead of Shah. This government in Tehran had no influence in the regions under British and American rule in the south, in the north under the Soviets. Various political parties in the country began to be given democratic rights.

Picture 4. Kurds in Iran Regions



Source: https://www.reddit.com/r/MapPorn/comments/ekzo4a/kurds_in_iran/

The Mahabad region was almost under Soviet influence but, in a state of subordination to no one. It was a land with a long history of Kurdish nationalism. In September 1942, in order to seize this opportunity, the first Kurdish political movement of the Mahabad Kurds, the Komala (Jiyaniy Kurdistan - Kurdistan Awakening) movement, was launched [25].

In 1945, a new party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (Iraqi Barzani followed suit, was formed). All members of the Komala joined this party movement. The KDP has announced a program with eight key items:

1. The Kurdish people in Iran must have their own territorial administration and Iran must recognize an Autonomous Kurdish state on its territory;
2. The right to education in the mother tongue, the official language in places where Kurds live, must be Kurdish;
3. The country's constitution should guarantee the election of territorial governors in Kurdistan through public and state affairs;
4. Heads of state should be elected by the local population;
5. A common law should be enacted as a basis for agreement between villagers and landowners to secure the future of both parties;
6. The KDP fights for brotherhood and unity with the people of Azerbaijan (at that time the Azeris in Iran also started the national movement) and all ethnic minorities in Azerbaijan (Syrians (Assyrians, Armenians, etc.);
7. The KDP will work hard to develop agriculture and trade, improve the conditions of education and health, and ensure the material and spiritual development of the Kurdish people;
8. The KDP wants to ensure the political freedom of all the Iranian people and the development of the state in this way.

On January 24, 1946, the first Republic of Kurdistan was proclaimed at a large meeting (congress) attended by delegates from around Saqqez. KDP leader Kadi Muhammad was elected president. In a short time this republic began to form state institutions, built schools and hospitals. He gave Kurdish official language status and began publishing books and newspapers in Kurdish.

However, under the Tehran agreement, the combined forces of the United States, Britain, and the USSR began to leave the country within six months. Kurdistan, built with the help of the Soviets and left defenseless as the Soviet army left the country, was occupied by the Iranian army in December 1946. Kadi Muhammad and his brother and nephew were arrested and sentenced to death. The Barzani people fought a long war with the Iranian army and finally defeated and fled to the USSR with their family and team.

Dr. Musaddiq, who came to power in Iran in 1951, was fully supported by the Kurds when he pursued a policy of nationalizing Iran's oil reserves. However, Musaddiq was ousted in a 1953 coup by the British. In the following periods, until the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Kurds helped the Iraqi Kurds fight for their autonomous status in Iraq.

In 1980, Khomeini disbanded all political parties after the Islamic Revolution. The transition to a sectarian system of government. However, over time, national and religious political parties were formed, and the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (EKDP) was reorganized. Iraqi Barzani fully supported the party. EKDP Secretary A. Hasanzadeh demanded the use of the Kurdish language in state organizations, the media, the judiciary and educational institutions, and the equalization of the social status of the Kurds[26].

In general, the Iranian Kurds are still under intense pressure today. According to the United Nations (UNPO) in 2017, the Kurdish people are being discriminated against by the government and subjected to military and political pressure [27].

4. Kurds in Syria

Under French rule until 1946, Syria's economic situation was better than that of Turkey, Iraq and Iran in the region. Even the Kurds in Turkey went to Syria to work and live. Many Kurds fled to Syria under pressure from the Kurds in Turkey. This is probably why Damascus has for years called the Kurds in Syria their homeland and officially denied the existence of the Kurds [28].

During the French era, the Kurds played an important role in the economic development of cities such as Jazeera and Afrin. They were active in trade with Turkey and Iraq. Only in 1957 did the Arab Belt plan create political difficulties and problems for the Kurds. Under this plan, under the pretext of land reform in


1963, the lands of 120,000 Kurdish rural families were confiscated and at the same time deprived of their citizenship [29]. Thus, the children of these families were deprived of the right to education, access to public schools, access to civil services, and placement in public hospitals. All Kurdish books and music activities were banned in the region. The Kurdish names of the villages were replaced by Arabic names. The Kurds were expelled from the villages and replaced by Arabs.

On November 6, 1970, Major General Hafez Assad came to power through a coup. Hafez Assad has developed an autocratic regime based on mythology that portrays the Syrian people as more of a protector than a pan-Arabist. Therefore, in his time, opponents of the regime were brutally punished. This can also be seen in the events of 1982 in Hama [30].

However, in the 1970s, the Syrian Kurds formed the Syrian Kurdistan Democratic Party (SKDP). He was essentially a manifestation of the KDP. The goal of the SKDP was to get the Kurds to recognize their constitutional existence as a national ethnic minority. Leaders of the PKK, which was founded in Turkey in 1978, fled to Syria after the 1980 coup in Turkey under the leadership of A. Ocalan. Syria provides political asylum to PKK leaders. Analysts say there were several reasons for this: first, the old feud between the two countries over the annexation of Alexandretta (Hatay) to Turkey in 1939, second, the pressure on Turkey to have a Syrian Euphrates (Euphrates) water supply, and third, Syria at the time He felt he was stuck in an alliance between Israel. Fourth, we think that Hafez Assad was an ally of the USSR at the time, and that the PKK, an organization based on Marxist-Leninist ideas, had no ideological support (against Turkey, a NATO ally), although it was not financially supported by the USSR [31].

In general, the PKK's presence in Syria has been a major political support for the Syrian Kurds. The PKK held official meetings there. In particular, it culturally served the function of uniting all Kurds. The most important Kurdish holiday, Navruz, is widely celebrated. During the festivities, Kurdish dances and music performed in colors (red, green, yellow, and white) imagining the Kurds, making the Kurds a single political society. However, this situation did not last long. Concerned about the 1998 invasion of Turkey, Syria ended its PKK activities. In early 1999, Ocalan was arrested in Kenya and brought to Turkey.

Picture 5. Kurds in Syria Regions



Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurds_in_Syria

Although the PKK's activities ended, it left a very strong mark among the Kurds. 2000 Hafez Assad dies. He will be replaced by ophthalmologist Bashar al-Assad, who lives in London. Bashar al-Assad will carry out liberal reforms, but they will not yield the expected results. In its early years, the opposition (consisting of Sunni Arabs, other nationalities and religions) had high hopes for Assad. Over time, the situation will change and the opposition will openly move against it. In the meantime, the Kurdish Union Party will be formed. In 2003, the PKK's successor in Syria, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), was formed and began to demand autonomy for Kurdistan. By 2011, the Arab Spring had begun and the country was in chaos.

DISCUSSION

All analyses can be examined as an outcomes that Kurds in the total indicated region is 25-30 million, it can easily compete with the dominant Turkish, Persian and Arab nations in the region nowadays. On top of that, although the level of education among the Kurds in the region is low, fertility and reproduction are higher than in other peoples of the region. This will not go unnoticed by the ruling nations. Therefore, it is difficult to wait for the pressure on the Kurds to end or to talk about a democratic solution to the problem.

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In short, if we consider that the number of Kurds in the region is 25-30 million, it can easily compete with the dominant Turkish, Persian and Arab nations in the region. On top of that, although the level of education among the Kurds in the region is low, fertility and reproduction are higher than in other peoples of the region. This will not go unnoticed by the ruling nations. Therefore, it is difficult to wait for the pressure on the Kurds to end or to talk about a democratic solution to the problem.

The Kurds are pushing for the establishment of Kurdish-language channels in the media, as well as the opportunity to communicate in their own language, receive education, work in Kurdish in the judiciary and government agencies in the countries where they live. While these demands have been met by the Kurds in Iraq today, they are sometimes met in Turkey, sometimes not, and in Iran there is almost no positive work, except for some recent changes. In Syria, such demands have never been met, but today Syria is divided into three or four parts. In the north of the country, the Kurds are now independent and the Kurds are demanding autonomous rule as in Iraq. Of course, calling the Kurds a completely authoritarian people would be a one-sided approach. The reason is that the Kurds are also flying to external provocations. He promotes different ideas and ideologies. One of them is the idea of a "Greater Kurdistan." In this case, the countries of the region are treating the Kurds very harshly and, at times, exaggerating. Increased pressure on the Kurds is not only fueling Kurdish hatred, but Kurdish politics is also on the agenda for outside actors.

As mentioned above, Turkey is one of the four countries directly involved. Indeed, Turkey is one of the leading countries in the Middle East and the Islamic world. Here is the Kurdish national movement

It became more active in the early twentieth century. The main driving force of the Kurdish national movement, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the official government, has been fighting for more than three decades to ensure the security of civilians [32]. The establishment of Kurdish radio and television channels in Turkey, Kurdish-language education in schools, the creation of Kurdish-language media, and the ability of Kurdish lawmakers to speak their mother tongue have led to the cessation of conflict that has killed thousands and displaced millions [33].

In recent years, the Kurdish issue in Turkey has reached a new level.

In March 2013, a peace truce was signed between the KIP and the official government. An address by Abdullah Ocalan (KIP leader) to representatives of the Kurdistan Workers' Party will be read on March 21 in Diyarbakir during the celebration of the national holiday of Navruz. The statement said that the Kurds fought not for religion or any nation, but for human rights, freedom and democracy, positive political changes were taking place in Turkey and the Middle East, and new political, social and economic processes had begun. In

the statement, Ocalan also called on KIP supporters to put an end to the armed struggle, switch to diplomatic methods of dialogue and work together against the Islamic State (ISIS) [34].

In the summer of 2015, the situation changed radically. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) won more than 10 percent of the seats in the June 7 parliamentary elections, prompting protests from some political forces [35].

Yannis Mazis, one of the leading political scientists in the Middle East, said that in order for such problems not to arise again, the Turkish government must radically change its attitude towards the Kurds and make a clear decision to prevent new conflicts [36]. There are, in a sense, grounds in his views. Indeed, one of the reasons for the recurrence of this problem at any time is that Ankara does not fully meet the social needs of the Kurds [37]. The fact that hundreds of innocent Kurds have been killed in military operations against Kurdish militants in southeastern Turkey as a result of misconceptions about the entire Kurdish population shows that the above statements are valid.

From the above, it is clear that the Kurdish issue will remain one of the central issues in Turkey's domestic political processes in the near future, as this issue is one of the key factors in ensuring the socio-political stability of the country. In recent years, Turkey's transition from a parliamentary to a presidential system, and in this case the government's policy, has limited the possibility of full political stability in the country unless it is supported by Kurdish political forces (including the Kurdish People's Democratic Party). In turn, the Kurds are considered a major force in the entire region in the fight against various terrorist organizations, including ISIS. Therefore, the Kurdish support of the official government's domestic and foreign policies in coordination with common goals would have provided an opportunity to overcome a number of problems in ensuring security and stability not only in Turkey but in the whole region.

The issue of the Kurds, or the Kurdish factor, is becoming increasingly important in ensuring the security of the Middle East region. This issue is relevant not only in Turkey, but also in Iran and Iraq, where many Kurds live.

In Tehran, the capital of the Islamic Republic of Iran, many central streets and social facilities are named in Kurdish. In Iran, the Kurds have become integrated into Iranian society and have become a key element that makes up the entire nation.

Syria is a country where the government has never had a serious political confrontation with Kurdish ethnic groups. Friendly relations between several ethno-confessional societies have been maintained in this state. The Syrian government has pursued a very prudent polytheistic policy, preventing external influences and interference in the Kurdish issue while maintaining the unitary form of the state. However, if the situation in Syria worsens, the Kurds, like in Iraq, will inevitably have greater influence in the country. In this case, it is natural that the Kurdish sphere of influence in the Middle East will expand and pose a great threat to Iran and Turkey.

In the past, the Kurdish issue was discussed between Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, but now it is being discussed in Europe and the West in general, and the Kurds are actively involved in this. Kurdish political activists are emerging as participants in all regional political processes with their own voices and positions. Politicians in the region are also realizing that the Kurds' participation in political debates will be effective in addressing security concerns. Indeed, today the political positions of the Kurdish political forces are playing a decisive role in some issues. The establishment of relations with the Kurdish political forces, parties and organizations in the field of overcoming regional problems in the world's leading countries is a sign that the Kurds have formed a new political force in the Middle East. The fact that Kurdish political parties emerged from problematic situations with their effective and unique policies even in the wake of the war and political crisis in Iraq at the beginning of this century has shown that Kurdish political forces can emerge as a modern entity.

Seeing the United States and Britain supporting Kurdish political independence in northern Iraq, the region's leading states have also realized the need not to raise the Kurdish issue as a problem and to cooperate with Kurdish political forces, unite for common goals and thereby maintain their territorial and political integrity [38].

CONCLUSION

Taking into account the Kurdish issue plays a major role in ethno-political relations in the Middle East, in the political processes in the region. The establishment of a stable situation in the region depends in many respects on the extent to which the Kurdish problem is resolved in the future. As long as the Kurds do not stop pursuing their political goals, the Kurdish factor will remain relevant in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. The Kurdish problem is one of the most serious problems not only in national or regional, but also in global security and the development of the world community, and the extent to which these issues are resolved today depends on the decisions taken in international relations. These circumstances are one of the important aspects that determine the place and role of the ethnic factor in the creation of a security system.

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