



Master in European and International Studies - University of Trento
Course on European and International Politics
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The Syrian war: the Kurdish question under a marxist and feminist perspective.

Introduction.

The aim of the essay is to analyze one of the main player involved in the Syrian war. More specifically, we will focus on the role played by the Kurdish fighters in the conflict which started in Syria in 2011. Hence, for the purpose of this research we are not aimed at analyzing all the aspects of the conflict, but we will limit our research on the role of the Kurdish fighters under a marxist and feminist perspective. In the first part, we will describe the ideology of Abdullah Öcalan (the leader of the Kurdish liberation movement), comparing it with the more relevant marxist ideologies, mainly about nationalism and building-state. Then, we will describe the model of direct democracy which the Kurds have attempted to establish in the Rojava region. In the second part, we will look at the role played by the Women Kurdish fighters: a description of their female division, the YPG and how did they developed the concept of self-defense, in accordance with Abdullah Öcalan's ideology.

Who are the Kurdish-Syrian fighters? A brief overview¹

The Kurdish-Syrian fighters are one of the most relevant players involved in the Syrian conflict. Due to their nature, they are both fighting against the Turkish Army, and the ISIL's troops. The Kurdish are in fact leading a secular movement, which embraces Arabs, Christians and Assyrians present in the Syrian territories. The Kurdish population is between two and four millions of people (with a much greater number living in Turkey), *de facto* governing a piece of land in

¹ Due to length reasons, look at the suggested readings for a more complete overview over the conflict.

Northern Syria, where also lives a great number of Arabs and refugees coming from the territories of Iraq and Southern Syria.

The Kurds call this region “*Rojava*”, the shorter version for “*Rojava Kurdistan*”, that means Western Kurdistan. The Rojava’s government is controlled by the Democratic Union Party, a socialist-libertarian oriented party. Here great relevance is given to the self-governance of the local communities. The Rojava is divided into three districts: the conquest of Tal Abyad during the Spring 2015 permitted to unify those of Kobane e Jazira, while Kobane and Efrin are still divided by a part of territory that the ISIL still controls next to the Turkish borders. Almost 60% of the Syrian oilfields are in this region, and so far, it is the main source of financing for the Kurds. The Government is not taxing its citizens and schools and hospitals are build thanks to the oil revenues or the contribution of the local communities. The Rojava gained its independence *de facto* in 2011. They proved to be capable to conquest and then defend their territories from the ISIL (there is in fact a non-belligerent pact with the government army).

The Rojava’s Army is often referred as the People's Protection Units, in Kurdish **Yekîneyên Parastina Gel** or simply, **YPG**. It is generally considered as the guarantor of the Rojava’s existence. The army is made of almost fifty-thousand soldiers, men and women. Although sometimes it is confused with the Peshmergas (an army payed by the Kurdish Iranian regional government), the YPG can be considered as a National Liberation Movement. The members are trained not only to the use of weapons, but they must attend history and philosophy courses, and they are introduced to the political thought of the PYD. The YPG also has Women’s Protection Units, in Kurdish **Yekîneyên Parastina Jin (YPJ)** that it has, as of late 2014 over 7,000 (or 10,000, according to TeleSUR) volunteer fighters between the ages of 18 and 40².

The “Kurdish Question” under a marxist perspective: Abdullah Öcalan and the “democratic confederalism”

The Democratic Union Party, or **Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat** in Kurdish, (**PYD**), is a Kurdish-oriented party, founded in 2004, which openly refers to Abdullah Öcalan’s ideology and his party, the **Partîya Karkerên Kurdîstan (PKK)**³. Since its foundation, the PYD aimed at creating a dual power situation with the government. Its task was to center its policy on an anti-state, anti-

² "YPJ: The Kurdish feminists fighting Islamic State". The Week UK. 7 October 2014. Retrieved 21 October 2014.

³ To better understand the relations between the PYD and the PKK, look at:

capitalist, feminist and ecological critique stemming from the influence of the PKK's founder, Öcalan, and his model of **Democratic Confederalism**. Democratic Confederalism is a form of self-management and thus stands in contrast to the model of the state. It is an attempt at permanent social revolution, as is reflected in every aspect of the social structure. Overcoming the nation-state is seen as a long-term goal. The state will be overcome when Democratic Confederalism will assume in practice all structures into its self-organization and self-management. In that society neither statist nor territorial boundaries will play a role.

The classical marxist-leninist ideology suggests “instead of fighting for defending or expanding the boundaries of the bourgeois state, [that] the proletariat would finally resume its mission of abolishing state boundaries and merging all the peoples into one socialist family”⁴. At the same time, in his work, Lenin considers the “awakening of national life and national movements, the struggle against all national oppression, and the creation of national states”⁵. Despite Karl Marx (and more in general the Marxists), who “had underestimated the crucial importance of nationalism and the state”⁶, Lenin recognized particular groups (he mainly referred to the Jews) which were oppressed and persecuted because of their religion or ethnicity. At the same time, he supported a federal approach “which would grant national groups significant autonomy within existing states”. In Lenin's ideology, in fact, national groups would have been forced to choose between the complete secession and continued membership of the State, but with exactly the same rights as all other citizens.⁷

A relevant contribution on the development of nationalist marxist oriented theories comes from the “Austro Marxists”, a marxist theoretical current led by Victor Adler, Otto Bauer, Karl Renner and Max Adler, aiming at conciliating nationalism with socialism. All of these thinkers are mainly coming from the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. Otto Bauer, for instance, in his work “*The National Question and Social Democracy*” (1907), developed his strategy for national autonomy, and almost completely excluded classes and the class struggle from the sphere of national culture. For him, autonomy should be based of course on national culture. He worked hard in order to

⁴A. Linklater in “Theories of International Relations”, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2013

⁵V. Lenin “Collected Works” No: 27, Progress, Moscow, 1964

⁶ A. Linklater, *ibidem*

⁷ A. Linklater, *ibidem*

nationalize socialism and workers and rejected what he called the “naive cosmopolitanism” of the proletariat. As Michael Lowy (1976) says, Bauer’s theory was to some degree contaminated by the nationalist ideology he was seeking to defeat.⁸ It is thus not surprising that it became the doctrine of ‘nationalist/cultural’ currents in the workers’ movement, not just in Austria-Hungary but also in the Russian and Ottoman Empires (Bund, Caucasian social-democrats, etc.) and elsewhere.

Looking at the Öcalan’s doctrine (and so at the PYD’s) we can find some similarities with the theories we expressed above. As Prof. Tamir Bar-on from the University of Mexico underlines, Öcalan’s philosophical background is pretty solid and heterogeneous: we can find the democratic theory, the ecologist theory of Murray Bookchin, Immanuel Wallerstein, the New Left, the feminist theory, Marx and Hegel. However, his principal objective is a new civilizational model in which “democratic civilization” will be merely one component of a still emerging global, civilizational.

Öcalan has been the leader of the militant Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK). Fulfilling this role, he was a former practitioner of terrorism. After his arrest by the Turkish State, Öcalan reflected on his organization's changing fortunes. He made a turn from the lionized leader of the PKK to an intellectual who largely eschews the violence of his past. The transition is remarkable, as Öcalan was enemy number one in Turkey from 1984, the year he began the PKK's violent uprising, until his spectacular kidnapping in Nairobi and subsequent arrest by Turkish authorities in 1999. Öcalan currently resides in the Turkish prison of *Imrali*, where he penned his *Prison Writings* (2007).

In Chapters 4 and 5 of his book, there is the call for a “New Program for the Kurdish Movement”: here the acceptance of modern democracy and federalism. The new democracy he suggests will be superior to the Euro-American one. In his conversion, Öcalan now is for the spread out of democratic principles, criticizes both nationalism and a rigorous interpretation of marxism. The refusal for the violent practice is more pragmatism than ideological⁹. As he also states in his book, many terrorists groups (the PLO, the IRA or the ETA), left the armed struggle to achieve their objectives. That is why, also the armed struggle of the Kurds will not conduct to the creation of an

⁸ M. Lowy, “Marxists and the National Question”, in “New Left Review” no.1/1976

⁹ It is to be underlined that in July 2015 the PKK suspended the ceasefire due to the airstrike conducted by the Turkish Army. Thus, the upcoming of military actions may be seen as a self-defense measures rather than a preemptive attack led by the Kurds.

independent Kurdish State. Öcalan's theory is basically similar to that of the Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci, who does not believe in a teleological character of history and political is something continuously in movement. Here he finds the strategical importance of civil society, which "enshrines a range of democratic possibilities"¹⁰. Both Öcalan and Gramsci also postulated the view that a ruling class does not maintain itself in power just by force of arms but establishes an ideological hegemony over society which shapes the mindset of the whole population. His conversion is something that Bar-on defines as "tactical acumen in a context in which political conditions have changed. The imprisonment accelerated Öcalan's conversion, abandoning a more dogmatic marxist perspective".¹¹

Öcalan implements his idea of democracy with the creation of a **Koma Civaken Kurdistan** the Group of Communities in Kurdistan. The KCK is an "umbrella-group" which includes all the kurdish democratic organizations currently in the Kurdish civil society. In his view, the KCK should take the place of the PKK. Even with some ambiguities he declares that is willing to accept "the institutions and the current borders of the Turkish Republic as legitimate". At the same time, he rejects the idea of a United Turkey, federal or confederal. He strives for an institution which, surpassing the classic state model, can enshrine the plurality of the country even at an institutional level. Öcalan comes to the conclusion that the reason for humanity's "freedom problem" was not the statelessness, but the emergence of the state. The aim is then to subvert the domination of the system that institutionalized itself across the globes a synthesis of patriarchy, capitalism and the nation state, this alternative paradigm based on the very opposite (women's liberation, ecology and grassroots democracy). The Constitutional solution should then guarantee cultural, individual and collective rights as should include the entire society. He is not for a top-down process. The Kurds should fulfill their roles within the Turkish Republic¹². He also provides that the Turkish Army will be employed only for external threat and not against the Kurds. Lastly, the KCK can be enlarged to embrace other cultural communities present in Turkey such as Armenians, Assyrians and Turkmens while a confederation would comprehend Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran.

¹⁰ A. Öcalan, *Prison Writings: The Roots of Civilisation*. Pluto Press, Michigan, 2007

¹¹ T. Bar-On "Understanding Political Conversion and Mimetic Rivalry" in *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, Volume 10, Issue 3-4, 2009

¹² A. Öcalan, *ibidem*

How the PYD empowered Öcalan's ideology

For describing the structure and organization of these communities, we refer to the research conducted by Dilar Dirik, a PHD researcher at the University of Cambridge (2016)¹³. The system places democratic autonomy at its heart. People organize themselves directly in form of communes and create councils. The commune is made up of a self-organized neighborhood and constitutes the most essential and radical aspect of the democratic practice. It has committees working on different issues like peace and justice, economy, safety, education, women, youth and social services. The communes send elected delegates to the Councils. Village Councils send delegates to the towns, towns councils send delegates to the cities and so on. Each of the communes is autonomous, but they are linked to one another through a confederal structure for the purposes of coordination and the safeguarding of common principles. When issues cannot be resolved at the basis, or they transcend the concerns of the lower-level councils, are delegated to the next level. The communes are the areas for problem solving and organizing everyday life, while the councils create action plans and policies for cohesion and coordination.

In practice, the PYD has established what Prof. Şener Aktürk, from Koc University of Istanbul, defines as a "one-party regime that can be best described as a "belated Soviet experiment in Syria"¹⁴. As already said, in Rojava, the Kurds established and now defend an experiment in direct democracy, as Öcalan designed. In Rojava, a new form of self-government has been built up. It is made of a central government and local communities (cantons) which enjoy a wide range of political autonomy. Self-government in Rojava means that, as much as possible, decisions are made at the local, communal level. In one village, women and men sat separately, reflecting local tradition. As a long reportage from the New York Times recorded, anyone can speak, without distinction, and young and old alike stood up to debate jobs, medical services, even the menace of kids riding their bikes too fast around the village. It is common that among the military forces there are no ranks. The Kurds maintain an uneasy informal truce with the Assad regime, but they emphatically want an end to the dictatorship, and believe that their form of inclusive,

¹³ D. Dirik, Building Democracy without the State", in ROAR Magazine, April 2nd 2016

¹⁴Ş. Aktürk, "The PKK and PYD's Kurdish Soviet Experiment in Syria and Turkey", in Daily Sabah, Jan. 27/2016

decentralized democracy can provide a model for the whole of Syria, and beyond, in accordance with Öcalan's ideology¹⁵.

In Rojava, the Kurds attempt at creating a government of the people, by the people, more vital and valuable than the classic concept. The Mesopotamian "ziggurat" model of a centralized state has been a catastrophe for Syria and Iraq in recent decades. The experiment of a "government by the people" is something already tested in the region (look at the Bakur case, for instance, in Northern Iraq), but of course the Syrian war gave the opportunity to put the Democratic Confederalism into practice.

The Kurdish-feminist debate and the active role of the Kurdish Women fighters

Conventional theories of International Relations generally ignored the political activism and political activities of women. In sum, approaches to international relations, fails to take gender "seriously". Or, if the role of women within the conflicts was taken into account, it was just in terms of ones who needed to be protected together with children¹⁶. According to a number of studies (Pettman, 1996; Ticker, 1999; Cockburn, 2001; Giles and Hyndman, 2004)¹⁷, in fact, three-quarters of casualties resulting from war, (military personnel and noncombatants) are civilians, the majority of whom are women and children. However, the increasing number of women in combatting roles, raised a debate around gender and militarism, in particular the ways the presence of women in the military speaks to both feminist and masculine militaristic agendas. On one hand, we have feminists (mainly standpoint and empiricist feminism) who believe that women enlisting to the armies are an evident form of co-optation into militarism (Enloe, 2000; Eisenstein, 2008); on the other side, liberal feminists interpreted this phenomenon as an achievement of equality with men (Shepherd, 2013). The debate arose around the Middle East brought to similar critiques over the role played by the Kurdish women fighters. According to Azadeh Davachi, a PHD student at the University of Wollongong in Australia, in fact, "women's taking up arms and going to war is associated with another form of violence against women, and

¹⁵ A. Öcalan, *ibidem*

¹⁶ J. Elshtain, "Sovereignty, Identity, Sacrifice". In *Gendered States*, edited by Petersen, V. Spiker. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, Publishers

¹⁷ R. Baksh, W. Harcourt, "The Oxford Handbook Transnational Feminist movement", Oxford University Press, New York, 2015

further exposes women to violence promoted by extremist groups”¹⁸; on the other side Mansoureh Shojaee, an Iranian women's rights activist and writer is wondering whether “the Kurdish women will ever be recognized as equals to men by Kurdish society”¹⁹ and goes further placing the images of Kurdish women fighting ISIL, in the same category as the images of fundamentalist Muslim women who are leaving Europe for Syria to help the ISIL army.

In the case of Kurdish women fighters we register a double nature of this group: in fact, the feminist element is connected with the ethnical one: they are fighting to establish their own state. In this sense, as expressed by an Iranian Kurdish journalist, Roya Toloui, “the women of national and ethnic minorities face not only cultural differences but also differences resulting from the uneven distribution of political power and hence political, social and economic inequalities and problems which in turn undoubtedly intensify men’s violence against women or even women’s violence against women”²⁰.

The Women's Defense Units (YPJ), have been constituted in 2013 to defeat ISIL, however, Kurdish women have historically fought against who they consider as their oppressor: Assad’s regime certainly, but also Turkey and Iran. There are, for instance, some references proving that the first Women Kurdish riot took place at the time of the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th Century²¹. While describing the role and action of the YPG, we find a sort of “Western fascination” towards these fighters. Dilar Dirik, comments this practice as a “typical of Western media's myopia, instead of considering the implications of women taking up arms in what is essentially a patriarchal society - especially against a group that rapes and sells women as sex-slaves - even fashion magazines appropriate the struggle of Kurdish women for their own sensationalist purposes”²². The Western description of the phenomena in fact, is much more focused on the orientalist elements rather than on the real role played by the YPJ in the war against the ISIL. This element was made much clearer during the liberation of Kobane in January

¹⁸ F. Afary, “Iranian Debate Combating ISIL and defending Kurd/ Kurdish women”, in www.kurdistanfeministparty.com/en/articles-2/

¹⁹F. Afary, *ibidem*

²⁰ F. Afary, *ibidem*

²¹ O. Bengio, “Kurdish Awakening: Nation Building in a Fragmented Homeland”, University Texas Press, Austin, 2014

²² D. Dirik “Western fascination with 'badass' Kurdish women”, in Al Jazeera, 29 October, 2014

2015. The canton was under attack from Daesh for over a year, but in September 2014 the offensive intensified. After months of heavy fighting, Kobane was liberated by both the YPG and YPJ, but it was the YPJ that received a lot of the recognition. Kobane became a symbol of Kurdish women's resistance, also because it had there, the highest percentage of female fighting in Rojava. The sacrifices that were made there have also considerably influenced the high number of women that later have joined the YPJ. Arin Mirkan, a YPJ commander, was the first woman to blow herself up in the fight against Daesh, and she became a symbol for women's tenacity, bravery, and freedom. However, we cannot deny that the YPJ has been instrumental in the battle to take back control of Kobane in Syria, from ISIL. According to some statistics reported by the Kurdish Regional Government of Iraq, in fact, the involvement of Kurdish women in the military is higher than other world army: 40% of members of the Kurdish Army is made of women, followed by the Israeli (33%), then the American (14%), the Russian (10%) and the Chinese (7.5%)²³.

After this brief description the question now is whether the involvement of Kurdish women fighters introduced or not a feminist approach to the conflict. According to the leader of the Kurdish movement, Abdullah Öcalan, feminism is considered as a "central pillar" of the democratic confederalism that the Kurds are strongly aimed at building²⁴.

That is why, in accordance with this principle, the Protection Units (both YPG and YPJ) are separated by sex. The military structures of the Units are very similar, with only a few differences in their very internal organizations. Just to give some example, the YPJ puts much more emphasis over the women social role and attacks the specific patriarchal system they face. Despite the classical approach according to which women and children are the categories to be protected by men fighters, the YPJ aims at self-defending the Kurdish women. This principle of legitimate self-defense is crucial for the YPJ. Meryem Kobane, a YPJ commander states that: "through history, women nature is described as opposed to war. Of course this is true regarding those wars of

²³ The Kurdish Project, accessed March 20, 2016. <http://thekurdishproject.org/history-and-culture/kurdish-women/>

²⁴ A. Öcalan "Democratic Confederalism", Transmedia Publishing Ltd, London, 2011

domination. But in this case, we are speaking of a self-defense war, that is a natural property of us”²⁵.

The central ideology of Kurdish movement is that women should not rely on anybody else to protect themselves or, using the words of Abdullah Öcalan “a woman’s army is not only a requirement of the war against the patriarchal system, but it is also a requirement in opposition to sexist mind-sets within the freedom movement”²⁶. Of course, the upcoming of Daesh have also influenced the motivations of women joining the YPJ. They are fighting a radical struggle against societal patriarchy, as well as breaking Orientalist stereotypes of women in the Middle East. However, Daesh have waged a war on women, targeting and dehumanizing them in all areas they attack. They represent at a maximum level a patriarchal society; they characterize misogyny and fascism, and they stand in stark opposition to what the Rojavan revolution strives for. Furthermore, it is reported that if a Daesh fighter is killed by a woman then they will not go to heaven²⁷. As Daesh symbolize women’s oppression and the YPJ symbolize their freedom, we can see that the YPJ soldiers are not only engaged in a physical fight, but an ideological one too.

Thanks to the Kurdish encouragement of women’s participation and organization, women were a key element during the revolution in Rojava; they took up important roles in the *Asayîş*, the local councils, communes, and decision-making bodies. YJA has founded women’s academies in every city in Rojava. Power is distributed equally between men and women at all levels, and women organize themselves autonomously.

The end of the myth of protection

The most remarkable aspect brought by Kurdish female involvement in the Syrian conflict is clearly the one of “self defense”: a concept that Abdullah Öcalan defined as the “rose theory” (a rose, in fact, develops the thorns in order to protect itself). As many scholars sustained recently (Seifert 1996; Enloe 2000; Hansen 2001), “in times of war women commonly experience rape and

²⁵ R. Serhat et al., *Rewriting Women's History in Rojava*, 2015

²⁶ D. Nurhak, *The Kurdistan Women’s liberation movement*, accessed March, 19, 2015

²⁷ Ö. Gündem, “Interview With YPJ Commander In Kobanê.” *The Rojava Report*. Accessed March 19, 2016 <https://rojavareport.wordpress.com/2014/08/01/interview-with-ypj-commander-in-kobane/>.

sexual torture and the perpetration of these kinds of action is distinctly gendered. Rape and sexual violence perpetrated in war and military context is intrinsic to militarized contexts”²⁸.

Hence, in a war against the ISIL, for the women who are living in the Middle East, (this is a matter that does not regard only the Kurdish women fighters, but also, for instance, the Yazidi women of Shengal or the YJA Star, the female army of the PKK) the self defense is rather a matter of life or death: in the words of Dilar Dirik “self-defense must thus not only fight against, but also for something, especially in the Middle East, where all forms of violence are performed on an unbearable scale. Thus, self-defense is the radical attempt at dissociating power from the patriarchal militarist system and women must be the avant-garde militant self-defense of a self-determining, more beautiful, just, free life. Self-defense, accompanied by revolutionary thought, has the potential to bring about radical social change. The Rojava Revolution with its model of democratic confederalism, as proposed by Öcalan, is a shining example of the power of the people”²⁹.

Once the Kurdish Army has been able to take under control the territory of Rojava, they tried to demonstrate how self-defense can work without hierarchy, control, and domination: in the midst of war, the Kurdish People's Defense Units (YPG), and its women's brigade the YPJ, as well as the internal security units, the *Asayish*, focus on ideological education, half of which is based on gender equality. This principle has also consequences at a political level: all the Kurdish political organizations (the PYD in Syria and the PKK in Turkey, but also the Turkish and Kurdish oriented Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP) compulsory require co-chairs, where a women and a man lead the parties together.

Conclusions

The aim of this essay was intentioned to prove that the analysis of the Kurdish question under a marxist and feminist perspective was not something forced and they are highly connected to each others. To understand this point, we need to move back once again to Abdullah Öcalan's ideology. In his most relevant book “Prison Writings: The Roots of Civilisation”, the alternative paradigm he opposes to the classical one is based on “women's liberation, ecology and grassroots

²⁸ R. Baksh, W. Harcourt, *ibidem*

²⁹ D. Dirik Published by TeleSur English, July 7, 2015

democracy”³⁰. Hence, the female question together with an attempt to build a different state model is the goal to be achieved by the KCK.

Still, there are some issues left on the ground. Şener Aktürk, criticizes the PYD for the establishment of “a one-party dictatorship in the territories where it had gained control in Northern Syria” and denounces that “the PYD and PKK have intimidated those Christian minorities under their rule, as evidenced by a joint statement of 16 Armenian and Assyrian organizations in the Hasakah province, condemning the PYD's confiscation of their property, forceful conscription of Christians, and even interference in their church curricula”³¹. Mansureh Shojai, an Iranian Kurdish women's rights activist and writer, is wondering whether Kurdish women will concretely ever be recognized as equals to men by Kurdish society³².

At the moment, we are not able to predict the path the Kurdish region will follow and still the outcomes of the Syrian war are not certain at all. However, as someone already noticed³³, it is remarkable to underline how the birth of a de facto Kurdish State brought together the birth of a little democratic state, allied with Western democracies and not casually with Israel which is one of the most combatant actor against the ISIL. “Detailed reports in the New Yorker”, The Guardian said, had previously claimed “Israel had become heavily involved with the Kurds from 2003”, as a “strategic counterweight to Sunni and Shia groups in Iraq” and an opportunity to get “better access to intelligence from Syria and Iran”. Meanwhile, the Zionist State had also “supported Kurdish rebels against the Ba'ath regime in Baghdad until 1975”, because they were considered not to be “as anti- Israeli as many Muslims in other countries”³⁴. At the same time, the Kurds’ resentment over “Yasser Arafat’s support for Saddam Hussein” meant that Israel felt it had a strategic ally in Iraq’s Kurdish nationalists. And this, in a tortured region such as the Middle East, is not irrelevant.

³⁰ D. Dirik, *ibidem* 2016

³¹ Ş. Aktürk, *ibidem*, 2016

³² F. Afary, *ibidem*, 2014

³³ C. Panella, *Il libro nero del califfato*, BUR, Milano, 2015

³⁴ The Guardian, December 5, 2005 in <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/dec/02/iraq.israel> visited on July, 13th 2016

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Suggested readings:

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- O. Sabio "Rojava. An Alternative to Imperialism, Nationalism and Islamism in the Middle East". In Roar Magazine, March 2015