

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Resistance to centralisation in the Ottoman periphery: the Kurdish Baban and Bohtan emirates

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The drive for centralisation affected the Kurdish *mîrs* (Kurdish for emir) between 1834 and 1847. Although bringing the Kurdish *mîrs* under state control was accomplished in Kurdistan later than the other parts of the Ottoman Empire, the empire-wide campaign of the policies of suppressing the provincial *ayans* and *derebeys* (nobility and lords of the valley) started during the reign of Mahmud II (1808–1839). The sultan not only wiped out the entire corps of Janissaries (1826) but suppressed all the notables in the Balkans and Anatolia. Before the Kurdish *mîr*s were expelled from Kurdistan, the Porte removed many Arab noble families from power such as the Azms of Damascus (1807), the powerful Mamluk pashas of Baghdad (1831), the Jalilis of Mosul (1834) and the Karamanids of Tripoli (1835).[1]

The Tanzimat (restructure, reforms, reorganisation) period officially stretched from 1839 to 1876, but its antecedents lie in the reign of Abdülhamid I (1774–1789) as well as of Selim III (1789–1807) and Mahmud II.[2] The legislation and reforms aimed at modernising the Ottoman state and society. Reform-minded bureaucrats who had been educated in Europe intended to reorganise and change the empire from its loosely connected semi-autonomous regions to a more centralised administrative system. To realise such a broad project, the sultan decided to eliminate the power of the notables and to bring the frontiers under his control.

Before moving onto the Kurdish *mîrs*, Mahmud II had to deal with İbrahim Pasha, and his father Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt. In 1831–32, İbrahim Pasha seized Syria and moved across Anatolia, reaching Kütahya. He was persuaded to withdraw by the European powers. Witnessing how a strong local notable could devastate the Ottoman army, as in the case of Mehmed Ali Pasha and İbrahim Pasha, the Porte had become determined to remove the local powers in Kurdistan.[3]

Soon afterward, the Porte prepared to launch a campaign against most of the Kurdish emirates in the region, especially those around Lake Van and further south of it. Istanbul first decided to send off new provincial and district governors (*vali* and *kaymakam*) to these regions with new rules. However, many *mîrs* did not accept either these rules or the governors who were sent to implement them. The result was that the conflict emerged between the Ottoman government attempting to spread the new order to Kurdistan and local armies trying to uphold their autonomous status. In the end, the Kurdish *mîrs* were suppressed one by one and sent into exile with their family members to as far away as Albania, Crete, Mecca, Tunisia and Egypt. Soran, Bohtan, Bahdinan, Müküs and Hakkari emirates all resisted, but it was the Babans who were the last to be crushed.

Historians who have examined Kurdish movements resistant to centralisation in Ottoman Kurdistan have for the most part focused on the Bohtan emirate and its leader Bedir Khan's

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revolt in the 1840s while ignoring the Baban emirate. The Bohtan, through the charismatic personality of Bedir Khan Beg, has dominated much Kurdish historiography.[4] Not only the Beg but also his children and grandchildren, including Celadet Ali Bedirkhan and Kamuran Bedirkhan, had perpetuated his fame within the Kurdish national movement. Many popular works on the family were written with nationalist sentiments eager to show the members of the family as the vanguard of Kurdish national movement.[5] To some extent, this is a legitimate approach, since several members of the Bedir Khani family pioneered Kurdish nationalism. However, overemphasising the family's role in the national movement not only marginalises its long past in the Ottoman Empire but also pushes aside the story of other Kurdish emirates like the Babans and their contribution to the political and cultural life of the Kurds. Thus, a comparative study of both emirates will not only help to place the role the Baban played in Kurdish history but will also show the complexity of the centralisation and modernisation efforts by the Sublime Porte from a broader perspective. Before presenting the story of the Baban and Bohtan emirates, it is necessary to give a short overview of the Tanzimat and the effects of these centralisation policies towards the Kurdish regions of the empire.

Tanzimat and the attempts to centralise the periphery: an overview

Although in the early nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran had to deal with a changing international balance of power, they had strategic concerns relating to their mutual border and the borderland people in between. The Ottomans already intended to reduce the number of Kurdish emirs when they were terminating the rule of Georgian slaves (Mamluks) of Baghdad with the expulsion of Davud Pasha in 1831.[6] However, their capacity to work independently, or in collaboration with one another or with Iranian forces made it more difficult to expel the Kurdish emirs once and for all. The Porte adopted a long-term plan to accomplish the centralisation process. Thus, the demarcation of the border with Iran would help the Ottomans both to limit Iran's collaboration with the Kurds and facilitate the elimination of these local notables.[7]

With the announcement of the rescript of *Gülhane* in November 1839, the provincial administration was reorganised, although this was not a total revision. The Provincial Administration Law of 1864 reorganised the provincial units into three hierarchical levels: *vilayet* (province), *sancak/liva* (county or sub-governorate) and *kaza* (sub-district). Accordingly, each of these administrative units would have a sharia court with a judge appointed by the centre. But in practice many towns escaped the attention of the Porte, and were not included within the centralised judicial system. The Ottomans simply could not overcome geographical challenges such as the mountains in the east and south of the Kurdish regions, which did not allow the development of effective transportation or communication systems. While the Ottoman *kadıs* and *müftü*s had jurisdiction in most western and central provinces, they had no power over many urban and rural areas in Kurdistan.[8] In his research into the *naib* (deputy judge) registers of Rumeli and Anadolu in the *Meşihat* archives (Islamic Law archives) which covered all of the cities and towns during the period from 1855 to the early 1870s, Jun Akiba pointed out that as an administrative centre of a *sancak*, Sulaimaniya in Northern Iraq, along with some other cities such as Mardin and Nablus, were not included in the list.[9] Thus one can surmise that even though the Porte introduced reforms to reorganise and centralise the border regions, little accomplishment was made on the ground. Somehow these centres remained outside the control of the *Şeyhülislam*'s office, while the *naib*s for places like Sulaimaniya 'were appointed by the judges or central kazas to which they were attached as nahiyes'.[10] The Kurds mostly followed the *Shafi'i* school of Sunni Islam and their *ulema* were educated in *Shafi'i* madrasas in Kurdistan. Due to the fact that Ottoman laws were grounded in the *Hanafi* school, the Kurdish *mîrs* were able to appoint their *kadıs* from among the Kurdish *ulema*. They, however, needed to be approved with a *berat* (an authorisation document) issued by the Porte.[11]

While the pace of judicial reform and centralisation in Kurdistan proceeded at a relatively slow speed, the economic and social life changed much faster due to Western political and economic penetration into the region. Locals had already met with the transformation and changes before the new regulations were announced in the *Gülhane* edict. European merchants started in earlier periods to introduce industrial products to the local markets in some urban centres like Damascus, Basra, Baghdad and Mosul. Beyond European mercantilism, Syria witnessed a rapid political change during the expeditions of Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt and similar changes in neighbouring territories had forced the Kurdish *mîrs* to adopt new political strategies. Finally, because of the Western missionaries, travellers, diplomats, tradesmen, archaeologists, and many others who had been through Kurdish regions, the local notables and the ordinary people were exposed to European culture and modern political ideas.

The eastern provinces of the empire were also going through substantial economic changes. The regional economy was influenced by new land laws, a taxation system and administrative divisions. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the *timar* system (a fief granted to cavalrymen as nonhereditary prebends) had already been abolished but Mosul was still using the *miri* system (a system of state land ownership) while areas like Baghdad and Basra were being farmed out to tax farmers, who were selected by the sultan from among the eligible applicants to collect the taxes instead of his servants collecting taxes directly.[12] With the Tanzimat, the Porte envisioned centralising the taxation system in the periphery and so ending these practices. The lifetime tax system (*malikhane*) had already been replaced with short-term (e.g. one to three years) tax-farming methods in Baghdad after the establishment of direct rule in the province in 1831. In Kurdistan, the *sancak*, *yurtluk* and *ocaklık* systems were replaced with *liva, kasaba* and *kazas*.[13] The titles such as *mîr*, pasha and *mütesellim*, which were related to the previous administrative system, were abolished in the Kurdish principalities and instead *kaymakam, müdür* and *vali* were put to use. The Provincial Law further emphasised the control of the centre on the periphery. One of the people behind the drafting of the law was Midhat Pasha and after a successful implementation of the law in the Danube, he was appointed to Baghdad and one of his first achievements was to realise the same law there.[14] Despite the change in the structure of the provincial administration in the empire, Baghdad was still considered to be a *sancak*.[15]

The Ottoman Land Code of 1858 was also another means of centralisation and modernisation in the periphery intended to 'de-tribalize' the empire. Although Haim Gerber claims that the law was 'no more and no less than a re-enactment of classical fifteenth and sixteenth-century Ottoman *kanun*s relating to agrarian matters', it still brought important changes, such as registering the *miri* land in his/her name for a title deed (*tapu senedi*).[16] When considering that 82 per cent of the land (including the waqf land) in Iraq was owned by the state and only 12 per cent was private land (*mülk*), one could see how the nature of land ownership changed by permitting the registration of state land in the name of individuals and private parties.[17] A peasant could register land in his name without payment, which he occupied for ten years.

The Tanzimat initially created a central bureaucratic elite class that included almost no Kurdish or Arab bureaucrats. But this changed after the 1850s when large numbers of Kurdish notables entered the Ottoman bureaucracy. One wonders if this was due to the late arrival of the Tanzimat to the Arab and Kurdish provinces, as the measures of centralisation did not have much impact on them until after the second half of the nineteenth century. However, these ethnic groups, especially the Kurds, were more prominent in the judicial administration of the empire because of the abundance of the *ulema* among the total number of religious scholars in the Ottoman Empire. Nonetheless, the upper echelons of the *ulema* were filled by those trained in Istanbul. Moreover, the implementation of Tanzimat's new secular laws reduced the power of the Kurdish *ulema*.[18]

The new changes mentioned above did not go unnoticed among the local people. People in different parts of the empire had mixed feelings towards these new regulations. The reaction to the Tanzimat was undoubtedly more negative in the provinces and the periphery of the empire,

especially because some new laws were introduced explicitly to transform rural life. Two cases will suffice to show how locals perceived the new changes in their environs. First, there is the case of a man who had been cheated by a Persian *hakim* (physician) who offered to cure his blind eye with a powder – a treatment which did nothing except cause the other eye to go blind. He complained to Austin Layard, a British archaeologist in Kurdistan in 1843, that Tanzimat were to blame for the *hakim*'s duplicity and all other issues in his country, adding, 'But what can one do in these days of accursed Tanzimat?'[19] Second, a letter from the Porte to the *vali* of Erzurum demanded that he take care of rebellions among the people of Van, which were caused by false news spread by certain individuals about Tanzimat.[20] It seems that the Muslim Kurds there were afraid of losing their superiority to non-Muslim subjects and some members of the Kurdish *ulema* were speaking out against the idea of being equal with the Armenians, Nestorians and the Jews.

Attitudes towards reforms were mixed among the Kurdish population of Muş in the early years of the Tanzimat. Layard met a tribal chief there and asked his opinion of them. Not surprisingly, the chief was very hostile to the reforms, which he declared 'had destroyed all Mussulman spirit, had turned true believers into infidels, and had brought his own tribe to ruin'. On the other hand, the son of the chief 'praised the present state of things, spoke less unfavourably of reforms'.[21] Although the reaction to the changes differed from person to person, it seems that the reforms appealed more to the younger generations in Kurdistan, who were more open to European products and a life style that was different than their traditional modes of life. Thanks to Tanzimat reforms, the state opened new military schools in places like Sulaimaniya and introduced the progeny of ousted notables to a new world. Such new ideas transferred into these notable families through the younger generation and made the older one accept these new changes more easily than if the Ottomans had forcefully imposed them. In other words, transformation in the social and political life of Kurdish society came more from within and from the notable class. Desire for a reorganised system with new rules imposed on corrupt officials also made the Tanzimat appealing to the notables of the older generation. Süleyman Agha, a Turkish tribal chief who encamped with the Çiçi and Milli Kurds at the foot of the mountains of Mardin in the 1840s, was more supportive of changes brought about by the Tanzimat because they put an 'end to bribes, treachery and irregular taxation'.[22]

While the aging generation of the Kurdish notables yearned for a less corrupt system, the younger generation, especially those who led the society, looked for new political strategies to deal with their overload. Two of these Kurdish *mîr*s, who were young and energetic in the political life of Kurdistan, were Ahmed Pasha of the Baban and Bedir Khan Beg of the Bohtan emirates. In the following sections, we will witness how both leaders tried to adopt new military technologies and rules of engagement with Ottoman officials in order to survive.

Bedir Khan and the Emirate of Bohtan

Bedir Khan Beg was probably one of the most celebrated personalities in mid-nineteenth century Kurdistan because of the widespread rebellions he led. Descended from the Azizan and tracing his family roots back to the thirteenth century in the *Sharafnama*, Bedir Khan came to power around 1821 when he was probably 18 years old.[23] From the beginning, his success was resented by other family members but he held fast and quickly began to consolidate his power. Mîr Sevdin (Seyfeddin) was a distant relative and predecessor of Bedir Khan. In the early 1820s, Bedir Khan deposed him from power and reached for the political leadership of Bohtan emirate.[24] He avoided the widespread punitive actions of the Ottoman army against the Kurdish *mîrs* between 1834 and 1836. After coming to power, he immediately set out to strengthen his power over the Bohtan emirate, which had been divided into 'sister emirates' and been a scene of quarrel for the rival tribal confederations.[25] He grew increasingly independent from Ottoman rule

and ignored many duties of a *mîr* to the Porte – eventually refusing to send the requisite armed forces when the sultan called them up during the Ottoman-Russian war of 1828–29.[26] He went even further by minting his own coins and having the Friday prayers recited in his name, both of which are representative of a Muslim ruler's independence.[27] In 1838, he was subdued and a year later in addition to his title of *mütesellim* (tax collector), which he had been granted before, he was given the title of the Ottoman military rank of *miralay* (colonel).[28] However, following the defeat of the Ottoman army in 24 June 1839 at the battle of Nizip, close to his capital in Cizre, Bedir Khan began to expand his authority over the surrounding regions. As the *mîr* of Bohtan his rule extended over the territories beyond Rawanduz in its southeast corner, beyond Urumiya in the eastern, to the southern shores of Lake Van in the north, to Diyarbekir in the west, and up to the northern fringes of Mosul in the south.[29] During his territorial gains, he was probably helped – or at least his actions were ignored – by the Ottomans, because they needed him in the battle of Nizip against the forces of İbrahim Pasha of Egypt. Wadie Jwaideh, quoting two American Missionaries, Austin Wright and Edward Breath, states that Bedir Khan Beg made a secret agreement with the Ottomans.[30] Although there is no information about the nature of the accord between the two sides, one suspects that the Ottomans tried to centralise Kurdistan under one strong name since it was much easier to deal with one *mîr* instead of many.

Despite Bedir Khan Beg's despotic ruling, reports from Western travellers claim that among his Muslim subjects he was known as 'a man of inflexible integrity, and had never been known to receive bribe to pervert the ends of justice'. On the other hand, because of his mistreatment of the Nestorian and Christian population many 'cursed the memory of the tyrant [Bedir Khan Beg] in execrations long and deep'.[31] Such a view was the result of his suppression of the Nestorians in 1840s. As Jwaideh puts it, this not only caused much carnage, as I will examine below in more detail, but also led to his demise.[32]

Like the other Kurdish *mîrs*, Bedir Khan was inspired by Mehmed Ali Pasha. He modernised his army through centralisation, creating elite units from all the tribes and putting them under his direct command instead of dealing through tribal chiefs.[33] He created regiments from some of the best men of all tribes which were more loyal to the *mîr* than to their own *aghas* (tribal chief). Such men of these regiments were called *ghulam*, which literally means 'slave' or 'servant'.[34] This new system, although good for the *mîrs*, meant that the *aghas* lost their independence since they had sacrificed their best men. As with Mîrê Kor of Rawanduz and Baban Ahmed Pasha, Bedir Khan produced his own arms and ammunition in Cizre and he financed it through the income he collected from his subjects.[35]

In the early 1840s, Bedir Khan was in a very advantageous position to consolidate his power. The Emirate of Soran had been shattered after Mîrê Kor's defeat at the end of 1836. Meanwhile, the Babans had been weakened and Hakkari under the leadership of Nurullah Beg did not have much power. Taking advantage of this situation, Bedir Khan made an easy alliance with the latter followed up with the joining of Khan Mahmud of Müküs, a strong *mîr* around Van.[36] In addition to these *mîrs*, he brought a number of minor chieftains of the immediate vicinity under his rule and he gained influence with tribes as far as Muş and Kars.[37] In the words of Reverend George Badger, Bedir Khan formed a 'confederate Coordish Emeers' by uniting all these local, impotent Kurdish *mîrs*.[38] He brought all the local magnates under his control by eroding their power and created a relatively central system by de-tribalizing the territories under his rule.[39] One cannot rule out the ancient tribal structure in Kurdish society but Bedir Khan was relatively able to diminish the patron-client relationship between the Kurdish *aghas* and their subjects.

The power grip by Bedir Khan in Kurdistan created a place of security under his control, though this was accomplished through the harsh punishment of offenders. Accounts of travellers to the emirate of Bohtan showed that the travellers felt safer in the domains of Bedir Khan Beg. The missionaries Wright and Breath, for instance, when returning from Urumiya to the *mîr*'s territories, rested in a village of former robbers who told them they would have robbed their guests if it were not for Bedir Khan. After meeting with the *mîr*, the missionaries stated 'the guilty under

his government found no escape. Bribery, favouritism, &c.[etc.], which too often, in these countries, pervert the course of justice and nullify the force of law, are unknown here.'[40] A writer such as Ditil went so far as to praise the security and public order in Bohtan by suggesting that 'a kid can go all around the country of Bedir Khan Beg' without worry. Therefore, he continues, 'inhabitants, who live in the other regions, want to migrate here and people do not wish to leave this land'.[41]

Some might have wanted to move into the lands under the realm of Bedir Khan, but the Nestorians and others would certainly have preferred to be elsewhere. Bedir Khan Beg's massacre of Nestorians was probably the most well-known incident in the Western travelogues and memoirs about nineteenth-century Kurdistan. The tragic story of this small Christian community who inhabited the valley of Zap and mountains of Hakkari for centuries was witnessed and recorded by Austin Henry Layard, Reverend George Percy Badger and Dr. Asahel Grant.[42] There have been many attempts to explain the causes behind the massacres of the Nestorians by Bedir Khan Beg. Some have given the Beg's religious bigotry as the reason of the atrocity – a bigotry that was inflated by Nurullah Beg's sense that his authority was threatened by the Nestorian leader Mar Shimun's support for his rival, Süleyman Beg. Nurullah Beg's suspicion developed into the idea that Mar Shimun was the second most powerful man in Hakkari. One should know that whenever the *mîr* of Hakkari was absent in the principality, it was Mar Shimun who acted as a locum.[43] Both the fear for his rival, Süleyman Beg, and Mar Shimun's desire to become more independent left no choice for Nurullah Beg but to ask for assistance from Bedir Khan, who took this as a great opportunity to become the patron of the ancient emirate of Hakkari. The attacks over the Nestorians also gave Bedir Khan the opportunity to seize the riches of this community, which he used to reward the growing number of those loyal to him and prove his religious fervour. Jwaideh states that both of these matters were crucial to his reputation and plans.[44]

Mar Shimun, who was extremely jealous and wary of any external threat to his position, not only wanted to be free from the Kurdish *mîr* but was also anxious to keep his authority over the Nestorians in Hakkari. Some of his contenders were the leaders in his community. The American and English missionaries, who took sides in this struggle, also tried to undermine his authority since Mar Shimun was seen as an obstacle to proselytising the Nestorian community. However, the missionaries were divided in this episode of bloodshed. While Anglicans supported Mar Shimun, the American Protestants opposed his patriarchal authority.[45] Additionally, the reality of the missionaries, who grew from day-to-day in Hakkari, was causing more suspicion and discomfort among the Muslim Kurds and their leaders. That the ominous implications already existed among the Kurds becomes clear when one considers the reaction of a Kurdish Beg in Hakkari to the arrival of William Ainsworth, who travelled through Hakkari on behalf of the Church of England in the early 1830s. Upon the arrival of the British traveller to the village of Leyhun, the Beg immediately started to question him about his travel into his land. Without welcoming him, the Beg said 'You are the fore-runners of those who come to take this country; therefore it is best that we should take the first what you have, as you will afterwards take our property.'[46] The Beg was right about the colonisation of the surrounding landscape since in 1842 the American missionaries built a hilltop house for their activities, which sparked rumours of its being a fortress against the Muslims or an alternative market to draw business away from Culemêrg (modern day Hakkari), the seat of Nurullah Beg.[47]

The Kurdish chieftains were afraid that the missionaries, as well as the other European travellers, were in contact with the Porte and had the power to draw Ottoman forces into their lands.[48] Even though the missionaries did not invite the Ottomans, they were already involved, if not directly, in this massacre. The Porte had long hoped for a clash between the two unruly subjects, the Kurds and the Nestorians. A conflict between two sides would weaken both, eliminate the Nestorians and provide a pretext while preparing the ground for the Ottomans to remove the Kurdish notables from Kurdistan. Reverend George Percy Badger, an English missionary and delegate appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury to the Christian Church of the East in

Kurdistan, witnessed the massacres and suggested that the Ottomans intended to use this for their own interest:

> The Turks, sensible of their own weakness, had all along abstained from seriously remonstrating against the proceedings of Bedr Khan Beg, and that being anxious to extend their rule throughout central Coordistan, they regarded with secret complacency, the late dissensions among the Coords and Nestorians, – dissensions which their own policy had fomented, – foreseeing that these would lead eventually to the weakening of the mountain tribes, and pave the way to the establishment of the Sultan's authority where as yet it was recognized only in name.[49]

Going through many documents on this issue in the Ottoman archives, one can easily see that from the very beginning the Porte was aware of Bedir Khan Beg's intention to massacre this Christian community.[50] When Bedir Khan's forces attacked the mountain Nestorians of Hakkari, the Ottoman *valis* of Mosul and Erzurum did not discourage the Beg from his well-publicised plan, even though they had the military personnel to stop him. Furthermore, the Porte knew that once the *mîr* was done, the European powers would demand punishment of the culprits and this would create a convenient pretext for the Porte to finish the Kurdish emirates.[51]

The first attack took place in July 1843, when Bedir Khan assembled a force of 70,000 men, made of tribes from Van to Rawanduz and from the Tigris to the frontiers of Iran, which were sent to suppress the Tiyari and Diz clans of the Nestorian community.[52] The *vali* of Erzurum seemed to approve of Bedir Khan's invasion of the Hakkari region. Austin Henry Layard, who witnessed the massacres, recounted them in his works in detail. With some exaggeration, he stated that Bedir Khan, during his attacks in 1843, massacred nearly ten thousand people and carried away a large number of women and children as slaves.[53] The second attack took place in 1846 on the Nestorians of Tkhuma, who had allied themselves with the invading forces during the first massacres. Although the deaths numbered in the hundreds for the second attack, the killings committed were not less than before.[54] Nevertheless, this time the Ottoman forces moved against Bedir Khan Beg with the intention of removing him from the Bohtan region.

Upon Bedir Khan's second round of massacres the European powers, especially Britain and France, exercised pressure on the Porte to punish the *mîr* and thwart further killings of the Nestorians.[55] But this was not a simple task for Bedir Khan, who had been expanding his confederation for years and had formed an alliance with the Kurdish notables in Hakkari, Van, Müks and Bitlis. A large Ottoman army under the command of Marshal Osman Pasha, assisted by Generals Ömer Pasha and Sabri Pasha, was prepared to clash with Bedir Khan's forces. The *mîr* was able to defeat the first expedition of the Ottoman forces against him and declared himself independent.[56] When one of the family members of Bedir Khan and a leading army commander of his forces, Ardeşir (Ezdin Şir) decided to cooperate with the *vali* of Mosul, this led the Ottoman army to occupy the Beg's capital, Cizre. After the defeat of Bedir Khan's army, many of his followers surrendered to the Ottoman forces and the Beg was forced to make peace. By the end of July 1847, he finally accepted to surrender with the condition of honourable treatment; he was expelled to Istanbul and later exiled to Crete. Meanwhile, allies of Bedir Khan in Van, Khan Mahmud of Müküs and his two brothers, were defeated near Tilleh with the help of Yezidi Kurds, thus they decided to give up their struggle. Khan Mahmud was put to death after many tortures and humiliations.[57] At the same time, the signing of the Erzurum Treaty was approaching and the *mîr* of Hakkari, Nurullah Beg, had been convinced to abandon his cause and alliance with Bedir Khan Beg. Soon afterwards, the news arrived about Nurullah Beg's attempt to bring together the district of Hakkari under his rule. But his effort produced no results with the attacks of the Ottoman troops and after a short period of flight to Iran he returned and surrendered.[58] Likewise, many other Kurdish *mîrs* were subdued by the Porte. By the beginning of August 1847, almost all major Kurdish chiefs surrendered to the Ottoman forces and each one was later exiled to different corners of the empire.[59]

Once the emirate of Bohtan fell apart, a power vacuum developed in Kurdistan. Although the Porte appointed governors from the centre, they were not considered legitimate rulers by the

local people and thus had very little power to impose law and order.[60] The security that had once reigned in the region suddenly vanished. Once the highway robbers and the criminals reappeared, travelling became extremely dangerous. Feuds and conflicts broke out between the tribes again. With the absence of Bedir Khan Beg, the confederate system collapsed and his trans-tribal forces disintegrated. New sub-tribes that did not exist before the arrival of the *mîr* emerged and members of his army re-established ties with their old tribes. Although no one could fill the *mîr*'s position, a few *aghas* succeeded in increasing their sphere of influence in the politics and economy of the region. Since there were many rivals among the tribal chieftains, need for an inter-tribal leader led the way for religious dignitaries, such as Sheikh Ubeydullah of Nehri, to become new power brokers.[61]

Babans in their last phase

Among all the Kurdish emirates, the Babans were the last Kurdish notables who were defeated and expelled from power a few years after Bedir Khan Beg's exile. During the 1840s it was Ahmed Pasha, the son of Sulaiman Pasha and a nephew of Mahmud Pasha, who ruled the emirate and the town of Sulaimaniya until the *vali* of Baghdad, Necib Pasha, defeated him and his modernised army in 1847. Although the Babans were not as powerful as in the 1820s, Ahmed Pasha was still able to continue ruling over these territories until the end of the mid-nineteenth century.[62]

Ahmed Pasha, like his predecessors, kept strong contact with the Iranians and other foreign dignitaries. Two British officers, Commander J.F. Jones and Major Rawlinson, visited with Ahmed Pasha in Sulaimaniya in late September of 1844.[63] They made some important observations on the town and the state of the last standing member of the Baban dynasty. Ahmed Pasha's appearance was

> … not prepossessing; and an impediment in his speech renders it at times painful to listen to him. When excited, however, an energy is observable in his eye which accords with his actions; and he bears the character of a persevering man of business. In manner he is mild and gentlemanly, and, like all Kurds, frank and hospitable. Accustomed to but little sleep, he devotes most part of the night to financial and political correspondence, whilst his days are occupied in general affairs, in the superintendence of his little army, and in agricultural improvements.[64]

Ahmed Pasha had a 'liberal education' and a taste for the 'new order of things'. He witnessed the advantages of a regular force and in few months succeeded in persuading the tribal forces to dress in the garb of the regular troops and equip themselves with modern arms. In a year 'he had raised and disciplined, according to European tactics, a respectable force, which at the present time amounts to about 800 men'.[65] Ahmed Pasha tried to revive the old days of the Baban dynasty and thus prepared for a major rebellion when he realised that it was his turn to be taken out of Kurdistan as the last standing Kurdish emirate.[66] The border commission, which will be discussed below, also became more visible in the region and started to produce more concrete results from surveys on the borderlines. Because they neglected the local powers and the tribes, the surveys of the commission had caused further suspicion and disturbance among the people of the region.

The capital of the Baban house, Sulaimaniya, was already in ruins because of the wars and unstable leadership in the ruling family. Compared to its earlier period, Sulaimaniya in the 1840s was less populated and more devastated than before. When Jones and Rawlinson visited Sulaimaniya in the early fall of 1844 they found less than half of people that C.J. Rich had recorded in 1820. The town was made of 'a collection of small and ruinous houses'.[67] Sulaimaniya and the court of the Baban dynasty were already in decay when Rich visited the town, but it was still better than it had been during Ahmed Pasha's period. The age of Ahmed Pasha had its ups and downs but in general the dynasty was in decline. Still the Pasha tried

hard to revitalise this centuries-old dynasty by reforming his armed forces. Necib Pasha, *vali* of Baghdad, suspected Ahmed Pasha's progressive improvements and in response the former decided to lay heavy taxes on the Baban emirate. While trying to keep the Iranians at bay, the Baban leader also had to bribe the *vali* and various authorities in Baghdad in order to prevent them from listening to the tempting offers of his brother Abdullah Pasha, who wanted to take his place.[68]

Necib Pasha was not content with Ahmed Pasha's actions, so he decided to prepare a military campaign against him, but had to cut it short as the British representatives in the region were annoyed since they did not want there to be any disturbances while the delegates in Erzurum tackled the question of the Ottoman–Iranian borders, which also included the status of Sulaimaniya.[69] Rawlinson worried about further interference by Necib Pasha in Sulaimaniya before the ratification of the Erzurum treaty and stated that Sulaimaniya 'may perhaps at no distant period be subject to some disturbance, as I think an attempt will be made to break in upon the almost independent government of the Kurdish Pasha'. Upon receiving this information, the British Commissioner for frontier negotiations, Williams, urged the British Consul in Baghdad 'to allow affairs remain in status quo, in that province especially until the new treaty shall have been ratified, and the frontier-line practically defined'.[70]

The British officers were able to restrain Necib Pasha only for a short period as he gathered his troops in the spring of 1845 to crush the Baban, Bothan and Soran principalities. With the intention of taking out the *mîr* of Soran first, he secretly invited Ahmed Pasha of Baban to join him in his campaign. Considering the good relations and the arms deal he had made with the British, Ahmed Pasha was reluctant to join the pasha and declined his offer. Annoyed and provoked, Necib Pasha changed his plans and moved on to the Babans instead of establishing an alliance. Necib Pasha proceeded toward the province of Koy Sanjaq (a district of Baban territories) with the avowed purpose of inspecting it and adopting measures for agricultural developments. Necib Pasha's move was received with suspicion by the Kurds since they were aware of the position of their pasha and regarded this move as a hostile invasion of their lands. Therefore, the locals resisted the Baghdad officers when they arrived in the town and deprived them of their arms while Ahmed Pasha was sixty miles away from the incident. The Baban governor of the district had the officers released and informed Necib Pasha in a letter that 'pending instructions from Ahmed Pasha Baban the Ottoman troops could not be permitted to occupy the place'.[71]

Disappointed with Ahmed Pasha's response to his officers, Necib Pasha offered him a chance to withdraw his army from Koy, admit surrendering his lands with the troops in five days, and afterwards pay a personal homage to the latter. After all these conditions were met, then the town would be given back to him. Necib Pasha deposed Ahmad Pasha after receiving no response from him and appointed his brother Abdullah Pasha to the leadership of Sulaimaniya. Necib Pasha requested all troops from Mosul and Baghdad to march on Ahmed Pasha. These forces were made up of '20 pieces of artillery, more than 4000 regular infantry, and a body of irregulars numbering at 6000 horse and foot'.[72] While the command of the army was given to Ferik Kurd Mehmet Pasha, an officer with the skills in mountain combat, Abdullah Pasha Baban was appointed as the pasha of Baban territories one more time. Ahmed Pasha tried to reconcile with his brother and Necib Pasha but his efforts produced no result. Upon this Ahmed Pasha formed an alliance, consisting of the chief of Khusnaw and Koy Sanjaq and the *mîr* of Rawanduz. The women, children and valuable goods were conveyed to secure places or crossed over the border to the Iranian side. The passes were secured and two separate Kurdish forces were put together in Koy and Bazian, the only places where the Ottoman troops could pass through towards the mountain chain.

The state, eager for centralisation, required all the independent entities and local dynasties in and around the border to be removed. Ahmed Pasha was one of these last elements to be taken care of. It was not going to be easy for the Ottoman officials to finish the Baban leader's job as

he kept changing tactics. Although Ahmed Pasha's forces were ready to attack Necib Pasha's forces, he decided to go entirely on the defensive.[73]

Rawlinson doubted that the attack on Sulaimaniya had been authorised by the Porte, but he felt 'assured that Necib Pasha has good grounds for believing the substitution of Turkish for Kurdish power in that Pashalic [Baban] to be agreeable to the Porte'. Rawlinson continues:

> … if his Excellency [Necib Pasha] should be called to account by the government at Constantinople, for having thrown the frontier into disorder, he will justify his adaptation of hostilities by the original outrage of Koie, and he will further argue from the extensive preparations which the Kurds are making for resistance, that the fault of negligence, rather than of precipitancy should be imputed to him in having so long delayed the chastisement of a rebellious race. That Ahmed Pasha will be goaded into actual rebellion, there is now, I confess, almost a certainty, his present position indeed is that of rebellion, but your Excellency will perceive from what I have already said that this rebellion is against Nejib Pasha not against the Porte, and that it is the effect and not the cause of the Kurdish Prince being attacked … [74]

The end of Ahmed Pasha's leadership in Baban territories, however, did not come directly from Necib Pasha's offensive move. While Necib Pasha was on the move to advance to Koy Sanjaq with four battalions and a number of Kurdish cavalrymen and foot soldiers, totalling 12,000 armed men with fourteen guns, Ahmed Pasha was proceeding to surround his camp.[75] Necib Pasha's position was in a critical situation and he dispatched two Tatars to Baghdad for help. Upon their interception, Necib Pasha chose to send a sheikh much venerated by the Kurds to Ahmed Pasha. While discussing the terms of peace and surrender, Ahmed Pasha murdered the sheikh with a pistol.[76] Many Kurds were aggravated by the killing of a holy man and changed their allegiance to Abdullah Pasha Baban. After that, a sharp conflict broke out and Ahmed Pasha 'received a ball in his head and another in his arm, [and] fled to powerful tribe of Jaf'.[77] His army then retreated and his guns were confiscated by Necib Pasha.

Russian and British representatives were also involved in the elimination of Ahmed Pasha. After his failure Ahmed Pasha fled to Senna, the capital of the rival Ardalani dynasty on the Iranian side. Meanwhile, Count Modem, the Russian Minister in Tehran, and Colonel Sheil, the British Minister, immediately instructed Hajji Mirza Aghasi, the Iranian Prime Minister, to remove Ahmed Pasha from the border. They promised to place him far away from Sulaimaniya and in a more remote area than Senna, where he then resided. However, they could not remove him and Ahmed Pasha stayed active in the frontier region. A year later Ahmed Pasha tried to oust his brother in Sulaimaniya though with no success.[78] After his attempt, the Porte asked Baghdad and the frontier authorities to watch the borders more closely and one last time the sultan demanded that the Shah order the *vali* of Senna to send Ahmed Pasha further away from the frontiers. This was the heaviest strike to the Baban rule but the Ottomans still had more work to do in order to bring an end to the dynasty.[79]

The Porte finally decided to replace Ahmed Pasha, who was the son of Süleyman Pasha and became the leader of Baban territories based on the hereditary practices, with his brother, Abdullah Pasha.[80] Some Baban people, who accompanied Ahmed Pasha in his struggle against Abdullah Pasha, later broke their loyalty and escaped from the battlefield when they did not receive the support that they sought from the prominent people of the town. After such a devastating defeat Ahmed Pasha

> … with fifty cavalrymen left the field of Karzar. Without the luggage and boxes, which were left open, he hurried to the lands of Kermanshah and from there he fled to the frontiers of Kurdistan. And he also went through the territory of Grus, Afshar and the castle of Sain until he traversed the region of Mukri. He also resided for five months in the province of Shamdinan, which is the first land of Salman, where the tomb of Sheikh Taha of Naqshibandi is located. Since he could not find a place of refuge to save himself, he sought protection in the Ottoman state as a last resort. In the end he moved towards Mosul with his entourage.
>
> Tahir Pasha, vali of Mosul, who had agreed with him previously, was informed of his coming and he prepared with his staff to receive him. The day His Honour [Ahmed Pasha] arrived in the town, Tahir Pasha unexpectedly and suddenly passed away. The British consul proceeded to receive him and wrote a report to

the Court about the situation. After that, the new vali issued a summons dismissed the people who accompanied him and gave him permission to move to Istanbul with two aides.[81]

Ahmed Pasha was first moved to Istanbul and given only a small monthly payment for his expenses. Once the Babans were banished from Sulaimaniya and surrounding areas and Kurdistan was put under the control of the central government, the Porte decided to appoint Ahmed Pasha to some important posts in other parts of the Ottoman Empire. Like many other Kurdish Pashas, he was also incorporated into the Ottoman bureaucracy. A year after he arrived in Istanbul, he was sent to Paris with an imperial envoy and stayed there for two and a half years.[82] He later became the governor of Yemen (1855 and 1865), *mutasarrıf* (district governor) of Van (1865), governor of Erzurum (1867) and Adana (1875), respectively. Following him, his sons and his brothers also took important positions in the Ottoman state[83] While Sulaimaniya was not under the influence of the Babans any more, during the occupation of Sulaimaniya by the British in 1918, there were still some descendants of the family living in the city. Some of these men, such as Jamal Beg, Azmi Beg and Faik Beg, later became involved in the Kurdish nationalist movements in modern Iraq. Other family members, who resided in different centres of the empire such as Baghdad and Istanbul also remained active in politics. For instance, Ismail Hakkı Babanzade became the Minister of Education during the government of the Committee of Union and Progress. Relatives of the Babans, who were able to stay in Iraq, held the power to a certain degree as local leaders: Adela Khanum of Halabja (female chief of Jaf tribe) was a very influential leader in Sulaimaniya and Kirkuk during the British mandate and Muhammad Salih Beg was deputy of Sulaimaniya in the Iraqi Parliament.[84]

Survey of the border commission and Erzurum Treaty of 1847

The Porte with centralisation policies in Kurdistan not only caused changes in the life of the local population but by means of the signing of the treaty of Erzurum in 1847 and the preceding border survey, it also redrew the map of the lands they had inhabited for centuries. A quadripartite border commission (*Tahdîd-i Hudûd Komisyonu*), which was made of delegates from Iran and the British, Russian, and Ottoman Empires, was assigned to decide and demarcate a line for the border between the Ottoman and Iranian states.[85] The first commission had already started to survey the frontiers in 1843 before the Ottomans eliminated the Kurdish *mîr*s, and the treaty of Erzurum was not signed until 1847, when the last emirate, the Babans, were defeated. The first commission was responsible for assessing the problems on the border, whereas the second commission, which was going to be formed in 1848 from the same countries but with different delegates, focused more on the determination of a borderline. Thus, one could say that the process of delimitation was made up of two stages. The theoretical stage, where the commission was going to determine the disputed areas and points, took place between 1843 and 1848. The second stage stretched from 1849 until 1852, during which period the border was drawn and the borderline was placed precisely on a map.[86] During the first stage, several conferences were held so that each side could communicate their territorial claims and discuss the issues of fugitives, Iranian pilgrims and merchants travelling through the Ottoman territories, and the question of tribes located on the frontier.[87]

I do not intend to go into the details of the work done by the Border Commission and the implementation of the Erzurum Treaty since the subject has been well treated due to the abundance of archival documents in the repositories of all four countries, including Iran, Turkey as the successor of the Ottomans, Russia and Britain.[88] Instead I aim to give a short story of the survey commission and the implementations of the Erzurum treaty for the Babans and Sulaimaniya. One needs to keep in mind that the status of Sulaimaniya was one of the major issues between the two parties before the treaty was signed.

With this commission, Britain and Russia hoped to help their host states (Iran and the Ottomans) toward a more 'definitive and binding settlement of their territorial dispute and to narrow the frontier zone into a mappable line'.[89] Both Iranians and Ottomans used old *fermans*, maps and travel accounts such as Katib Çelebi's *Cihannüma* in order to prove their claim to certain territories.[90] When they found no data to verify their assertion, the commissioners turned to the local inhabitants (tribes, *aghas*, notables) and geographic landmarks (mountains, rivers, plains) to adjudicate disputes between the Ottomans and Iranians who were concerned about the strategic points for their military and trade expeditions. Through the negotiations until the signing of the treaty in 1847, the most disputed areas were Muhammarah (today's Khorramshahr), Zohab and Sulaimaniya. Iranian delegates took every opportunity to claim some of the lands on the Ottoman side of the border. By showing Katib's account, *Cihannüma*, which bore the seal of the sultan, and the details in it about the Iranian lands during the Safavid period as evidence, Iran claimed the districts of Ahiska, Van, Kars and Bayezid as well as the district of Sulaimaniya. Nonetheless, in return for giving up their claims on Sulaimaniya, they asked for the right to jointly appoint a member of the Baban family as governor of the town and to receive from that governor an annual payment of 30,000 Iranian *tomans* (15,000 Ottoman liras) for the summer camps of the Baban tribes on the Iranian side.[91] Discussions between two states on the status of Sulaimaniya continued longer than the delegates expected since the Ottoman claims to these territories marshalled many documents, treaties, chronicles and accounts of court historians, which the Iranians considered illegitimate.[92]

After four years of negotiations on different issues a final draft of the treaty, which was made of nine articles, was prepared and signed on 4 January 1847 (16 Muharrem 1263). With the treaty, many neglected issues (Iranian pilgrims, taxation and customs duties applied to Iranian merchants, the status of tribes on the border, Iranian fugitives in the Ottoman Empire, the status of Muhammarah) were resolved and with that the first treaty of Erzurum signed in 1823 was reaffirmed. The status of the town of Sulaimaniya and its province, which was more or less defined by the historical Baban lands, was precisely stated as territories of the Ottoman Empire. The second article of the treaty stated '… the State of Persia firmly undertakes to give up all manners of claim in regard to the town and province of Souleimanieh, and not at any time to meddle or interfere in any way with the right of sovereignty which the State of Turkey possesses in the said province …'.[93] With this article, Sulaimaniya was accepted as part of the Ottoman Empire. Although the status of Muhammarah and Zohab was a topic of continued debate after both sides signed the treaty, the article on Sulaimaniya was never disputed by Iran. One of the most important reasons for this was that a short period after the treaty was signed the Porte removed the last members of the Baban family from the region and appointed *kaymakams* from the centre. Once the Babans were detached from their historical lands Iran lost its last hope of a successful claim to Sulaimaniya.

Despite the official signing of the treaty of Erzurum in 1847, disputed issues were not fully settled. The Kurdish tribes, which settled on the borders, had never been effectively controlled by a political elite for any extended period of time. Although the tribes defined the borders between each other, they did not specify which national jurisdiction they recognised. In other words, 'the only borders the tribesmen respected were those drawn by them – not by a ruling power'.[94] The other reason for the negligence of issues was the continuing claims on each other's land from both sides. Beyond these, the commission had not specified the precise spots where the Turkish border ended and the Iranian one began. Therefore, in 1849 a new boundary commission was assembled in Baghdad to regulate the frontiers.[95] Regardless of the new surveys and meetings between both sides, there had always been dubious issues and as Mohammad Reza Nasiri has noted, the disputed topics remained almost the same until the beginning of the twentieth century, as renewed incidents caused new clashes.[96]

Among all the issues coming between these two states, the status of the Kurdish population with its emirates, tribes and villages on and around the frontiers was the most volatile and

explosive issue. Walter Harris, who visited the region by the end of the nineteenth century, summarised the problem well:

> … in spite of the fact that the question was settled upon paper at that date [1847], the greatest ill-feeling still exists upon the subject, and the two countries are always ready to fly at one another's throats. Probably they would scarcely ever reach one another, as the wild Kurds, released for a time from their present state of an appearance of law and order, would merely loot on their own account. The Kurds of Persia, on account of their being Sunnis, would join the Turks, for even in Persian Kurdistan they recognise the Sultan Abdul Hamid as their Caliph. Anyhow, there would be such an upset that no good could possibly accrue to either side, and so matters have been allowed to remain as they are – that is to say, a vague frontier not in the least recognised by the Kurds who dwell near it, and who are to all intents and purposes not only robbers, but absolutely independent of either Sultan or Shah, and who would escape, were punishment for violence threatened by either ruler, by asserting that they were the subjects of the rival.[97]

The last period of the Kurdish *mîr*s – implicated as they were with the Porte, foreign powers, missionaries and modernised armies – turned into the bloodiest decade of Kurdish history in the nineteenth century. The Kurdish *mîr*s were overwhelmed while trying to catch up with rapid change brought about by modernisation. Alienation and breaking ties between the patron and the subject in the centuries-old Kurdish principalities was the objective, and the humiliation of Kurdish notables by the Ottoman and Iranian armies was the means. Such an attitude was going to help dissolve the political authority of the Kurdish *mîr*s. All possible political instruments were put to use to eliminate the autonomous parties in Kurdistan. The *mîr*s tried to adopt modern means with the establishment of new defence forces and modern arms factories in order to compete with this new state apparatus. Although they were partially successful, in the end all were defeated and separated from their subjects.

The Kurdish *mîr*s were not only targeted by external enemies but also subject to internal enmity. Each *mîr* was concerned only to protect his own territories and to keep power in his own hands. Although there were some alliances between the *mîr*s, such as the coalition between Nurullah Beg and Bedir Khan Beg, they were realised only in the short term during times of external threat. Alliances and rivalries between the same Kurdish *mîr*s became a norm during the 1840s. The emirates of this period relied on charismatic personalities (Ahmed Pasha, Bedir Khan Beg, Nurullah Beg, Mîrê Kor of Rawanduz) who were practically irreplaceable. Each one tried to look more vicious than the other in order to show off his power. With this each one aimed to be taken as the sole leader of Kurdistan by the Porte and the local *vali*s.

Contrary to common belief, modernisation efforts started not after 1839 but at the dawn of the eighteenth century in the Ottoman Empire. The declaration of Tanzimat was not a starting point of centralisation, but rather the official acceptance of this process. As such, centralisation in the eastern periphery of the empire was not the result of the declaration of Tanzimat, but its affirmation. Therefore, we might note that such policies were intended – and indeed declared themselves – as part of an ongoing project that required much more time to reach fruition. As Sabri Ateş puts it, this was an 'Ottoman citizenship project' which included 'the making of the boundaries, the forceful replacement of local notables and interest groups with salaried appointees, the reorganisation of regional administrative divisions, the reform of landholding patterns, the forced settlement of itinerant populations, the introduction of new taxes, and the conscription of hitherto unconscripted locals'.[98] These new standards, which were introduced by the centre to regulate the periphery, meant in practice the introduction of such innovations in governance as travel documents, passports, customs houses and border patrols.

As a part of modernisation, centralisation of the state was also implemented first in the provincial centres like Baghdad, Mosul, Damascus Tripoli and later included more peripheral regions such as Kurdistan and Trans-Jordan. Centralisation efforts took decades, since the Ottomans could accomplish this only gradually as they were at war with Russia and Iran at the beginning of the century and had to deal with the Greek revolt and Mehmed Ali Pasha's occupation of Syria. The Iranian authorities followed the example of the Ottomans by introducing new reforms

a decade after their adversary. The imitation of the Ottomans by the Qajars did not stop there as they centralised their territories and put an end to the centuries-old Ardalan family in Iranian Kurdistan in 1867, two decades after their contender.

Before moving into Kurdistan the Ottomans learned from their experience of dealing with urban notables and later moved to deal with centuries-old rural Kurdish notables. Meanwhile, the Kurdish *mîr*s also experienced the effects of modernisation long before they were removed from their territories and tried to adapt to the new rules of engagement while dealing with modernised imperial armies. As in the case of the Bedir Khan Beg of Bohtan, Ahmed Pasha of Baban and Mîrê Kor of Rawanduz, they also learned from their peers like Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt. They thought that it was necessary to establish modern armies and they imagined themselves one day becoming like him. Besides, the Kurdish *mîr*s felt it was necessary to establish central towns that would become the political, social, economic, cultural and religious hubs of their territories, and would help to keep their power over their subjects and their modernised armies supplied.

For three and a half centuries the Baban maintained a relatively consistent strategy for engaging Iranian and Ottoman powers: to use one imperial power against the other in order to stay in power, however with different tactics in different periods. However, this policy did not work when both powers decided to move conjointly against the local *mîr*s. Once the two imperial powers realised that it was the end of regional politics for the sake of centralisation in the mid-nineteenth century both reached an agreement in order to remove the Kurdish *mîr*s. Such collaboration meant the end of the Kurdish *mîr*s, as they possessed no political tools to overcome such a decision. As the two overlords changed their politics of engagement with the Kurdish *mîr*s, so the latter repositioned themselves with new changes in their politics.

Despite such a long history of the Baban emirate with an established political, social and cultural background, historians paid more attention to the Bohtan emirate and its well-publicised leader Bedir Khan Beg. For some, he was the first among all the *mîr*s who gave a national spirit to the feudal struggle against the Ottomans. Therefore, Chris Kutschera states, he was named as 'the father of Kurdish nationalism' in Kurdish history.[99] Such claims are certainly exaggerated by Western travellers and missionaries who visited the Beg. On the other hand, despite the little attention the Babans received from Kurdish historians and intellectuals, one witnesses a much longer period of leadership with many important contributions to the legacy of the Kurds and Kurdistan. The Ottomans realised the role the Babans played in the regional politics and rewarded them with the title of *mîr-i mîrân* (provincial governor) and Pasha long before other Kurdish *mîr*s. It was the Babans who erected a new Kurdish town, Sulaimaniya, instead of building over an Arab or Turkoman one. Besides, the Babans patronised the poets and the Sufis, who wrote in Soranî Kurdish, and through them this newly emerging dialect of Kurdish was standardised. During the nineteenth century and after, more and more works were produced in Soranî rather than in Kurmancî.[100] During the last period of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Sulaimaniya became the hub for the many Kurdish national movements.

In the last decade of the Kurdish *mîr*s, towns like Rawanduz, Sulaimaniya, Amediye and Cizre became less popular centres for trading, religious studies and nascent Kurdish literature, though these towns were still promising urban hubs. The forced exodus of the *mîr*s caused a rapid decline of the cities, which 'strangled the growth of the urban merchant stratum, which represented the bourgeoisie, and nipped the Kurdish literature and 'high' language in the bud'.[101] Many poets, Sufis and intellectuals in these centres also left for major Ottoman cities like Baghdad, Damascus, Mecca, and Istanbul, in hopes of finding audiences and patrons among the prominent Kurdish families, who were exiled there by the authorities. The progeny of these families were brought up and educated by these intellectuals. Later, some of these notables themselves became prominent Kurdish scholars, poets, and writers as in the cases of Kamuran Bedir Khan and Ahmed Naim Babazade while others, such as Ismail Hakkı Babanzade, were incorporated into the Ottoman bureaucracy. In the end the Tanzimat project was successful in

transforming the life of the society, and more specifically the notables in Kurdistan. Although relocation of the Kurdish leaders created a power vacuum, this gap was later filled with newly emerging leaders, tribal chiefs and the sufi sheikhs of Naqshibandiyya and Qadiriyya orders. By the end of the century, most Kurdish notables, including these sheikhs and tribal leaders, were forced out of their native lands by the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran.

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Notes

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2. Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p.55.
3. The struggle with the Egyptian Khedive and his son İbrahim Pasha was taking all the efforts and energy of the Porte. Though the threat by the Albanian dynasty in Egypt did not mean a lack of awareness of the growing danger of Kurdish *mîrs*. A letter from Ali Rıza Pasha, the governor of Baghdad, dated 27 August 1832, stated that Mehmed Ali Pasha had already occupied Acre and Damascus and it appeared that he also advanced to capture Aleppo. The reason for the weakness of the Ottoman army before the Egyptian army, argued Ali Rıza Pasha, was that *serdar-ı ekrem* (the commander-in-chief) was in Iraq with his army to deal with the 'enemies' in Hille and Rawanduz. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Osmanlı Arşivi (Ottoman Archives of Presidency of Turkey, hereafter COA) HAT. 19734-A, 1 Rebiülahir 1248 (27 August 1832); See also James Henry Skene, *The Three Eras of Ottoman History* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1851), p.49.
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9. Jun Akiba, 'From Kadı to Naib: Reorganisation of the Otoman Sharia Judiciary in the Tanzimat Period' in Colin Imber and Keiko Kiyotaki (eds), *Frontiers of Ottoman Studies: State, Province, and the West* (Vol. 1, London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), pp.43–60.
10. Ibid., pp. 43–60.
11. Since there are still no major works on where the Kurdish *Shafi'i* population stands in the *Hanafi* dominant Ottoman law system it would still be difficult to make concrete statements on the role of the school in the slow rate of centralisation/reform. Yavuz Aykan offers some details on the difference between the *Hanafi* and *Shafi'i* schools through Diyarbekir court records in the eighteenth century. Yavuz Aykan, *Rendre la justice à Amid: Procédures, acteurs et doctrines dans le contexte ottoman du XVIIIème siècle* (Leiden: Brill, 2016); also see Ateş, *Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands*, pp.41–2.
12. Ceylan, *Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq*, p.15.
13. For a thorough discussion on the transformation of *yurtluk-ocaklık* and *hükûmet* land regime in Diyarbekir see Uğur Bayraktar, 'Yurtluk-Ocaklıks: Land, Politics of Notables and Society in Ottoman Kurdistan, 1820–1890' (PhD diss., Boğaziçi University and EHESS, 2015).
14. Midhat Pasha had the province of Baghdad divided into ten sub-divisions. Sulaimaniya was one of these ten sub-divisions and besides the centre of the *sancak* there was Karadagh, Bazian, Markah, Gulanbar, and Shahr-i Bazar. COA. İ. MMAH. 1664, 19 Zilhicce 1287 (12 March 1871) in Ceylan, *Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq*, p.126.
15. Ceylan, 'Ottoman Centralisation and Modernisation in the Province of Baghdad, 1831–1872' (PhD diss., Boğaziçi University, 2006), p.29. In an Ottoman document that Ceylan refers to, Sulaimaniya was also considered a *sancak* in 1860. The document states '… Şehrizor ve Musul ve Süleymaniye sancaklarına dahi Bağdad'ın merkez ittihaz olunması cihetiyle …' [Baghdad is accepted as the centre of Shahrizor, Mosul and Sulaimaniya], COA. İ. MVL. 19487, dahiliye lef 1, gurre-i Cemaziyel-evvel 1277 (15 November 1860) in Ceylan, 'Ottoman Centralisation', footnote 359, p.116.
16. Haim Gerber, *The Social Origins of the Modern Middle East* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987), p.68.
17. Keiko Kiyotaki, 'Ottoman Land Policies in the Province of Baghdad, 1831–1881' (PhD diss., The University of Wisconsin, 1997), pp.137–8.
18. Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), p.20.
19. Austen Henry Layard, *Discoveries in the Ruins of Nineveh and Babylon with Travels in Armenia, Kurdistan and the Desert, Part 1* (London: John Murray, 1856), pp.19–20.
20. COA. C.DH. 1878/ 38, 11 Receb 1861 (16 July 1845).
21. Layard, *Discoveries in the Ruins of Nineveh*, p.20.
22. Ibid., p.311.
23. David McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), p.45. *Sicill-i Osmani* recorded that 'Bedirhan Pasha' was 'Hâlid b. Velid sülalesinden ve Kürdistan'ın seçkin beylerinden Abdülhan'ın oğludur. 1217 tarihinde Cezire-i İbn-i Ömer'de doğup babası yerine yurtluk suretiyle bey oldu' [He is a descendent of Halid bin Velid and one of sons of Kurdistan's distinguished beys Abdülhan. He was born in 1802 in Cezire-i İbn-i Ömer and became the bey of the family estate in place of his father]. Mehmed Süreyya Bey, *Sicill-i Osmani* [*Records of the Ottomans*] vol. 2 (Istanbul, 1308), p.13.
24. Lokman Turgut, *Mündliche Literatur der Kurden in den Regionen Botan und Hekarî* [*Oral Literature of the Kurds in the Regions of Bohtan and Hakkari*] (Berlin: Logos Verlag, 2010), p.164.
25. Janet Klein, *The Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), p.57; Martin van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State* (London: Zed Books, 1992), p.177.
26. Klein, *The Margins of Empire*, p.58; van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State*, p.179.
27. Klein, *The Margins of Empire*, p.58.
28. Sabri Ateş, 'Empire at the Margins: Towards a History of the Ottoman-Iranian Borderland and the Borderland Peoples' (PhD diss., New York University, 2006), p.85; Jwaideh states that Bedir Khan Beg was appointed as the head of a contingent of Bohtan troops in the battle of Nizip against İbrahim Pasha of Egypt. So, most likely because of his participation in the war on the Ottoman side he was appointed as *miralay*. Wadie Jwaideh, *The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2006), p.63; An Ottoman archival document refers to Bedir Khan's reception of the title of *miralay* in 1839. COA. C. AS. 46027/1047, 09 Muharrem 1255 (25 March 1839); In some Ottoman documents he is called '*kaymakam*'. See, for instance, COA. C. NF. 959/20, 8 Cemaziyel-evvel 1259 (7 June 1843), where it says 'Diyarbekir ve Musul arasının eşkıya taarruzundan muhafazası için Cizre Kaymakamı Bedirhan Bey'e emir yazılması' [An order to be sent to Kaymakam of Cizre Bedirhan Bey in order for him to protect Diyarbekir and Mosul from the attacks of bandits].

29. Ateş, *Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands*, p.76. Van Bruinessen substantiates this with a map, which shows the eastern border of the Bohtan emirate reaching to the Iranian border on the west of Urumiya Lake: van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State*, p.178. Considering that the *mîr* of Hakkari, Nurullah Beg, was an ally of Bedir Khan Beg, one could claim that the latter's rule extended to the frontier of Iran, though Hakkari was still under the leadership of the former.
30. According to the report that Wright and Breath prepared after their visit to Bedir Khan, 'He prides himself upon being a man of "one word," a rare thing in these countries. In confirmation of this, he told us that eight years ago, when he was weak and Turkey strong, he entered into an engagement with the latter; and now, though the power had changed hands, he did not violate his word. "Upon this you may rely," he said, "that when I give you my word as a friend, I am so indeed." He is an uncommon man. Eight years ago he was poor, without power, and little known. The Turkish government then took him by the hand; and now his wealth is incalculable,' *The Missionary Herald* Vol.42, No.11 (1846), p.381. Also cited by Jwaideh, he adds that it is interesting to see that this agreement was made during the Ottoman government's effort to pacify the Kurdish emirates, which no doubt helped the former to have one less enemy. Jwaideh, *The Kurdish National Movement*, p.64.
31. George Percy Badger, *The Nestorians and Their Rituals: with the Narrative of a Mission to Mesopotamia and Coordistan in 1842–1844, and of a Later Visit to Those Countries in 1850* Vol. 1 (London: Joseph Masters, 1852), p.305.
32. Jwaideh, *The Kurdish National Movement*, p.64.
33. The leadership of Kurdish tribes in Bohtan emirate was weakened during the reign of Bedir Khan Beg but did not totally cease to exist as they re-emerged after the Kurdish emirates were destroyed by the Ottomans. See more on the rise of the tribes after the destruction of the Kurdish emirates in Klein, *The Margins of Empire*, pp.58–62.
34. van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State*, p.179.
35. Kaws Kaftan, *Baban, Botan ve Soran: 19. yüzyıl Bölgesel Kısa Kürt Tarihi* [*Baban, Bohtan and Soran: A Short Nineteenth Century Regional History of the Kurds*], trans. Alihan Zerşati and Fuat Cemil (Istanbul: Nujen, 1996), p.66; Mihemed Emîn Zekî, *Dîroka Kurd û Kurdistanê* [*History of the Kurds and Kurdistan*], trans. Ziya Avcı (Istanbul: Avesta, 2002), p.163.
36. Halfin, *XIX. Yüzyılda Kürdistan Üzerine Mücadeleler* [*Scramble over Kurdistan during the Nineteenth Century*] (Istanbul: Komal, 1992), p.50; Kaftan claims that the *mîr* of Ardalan also joined the band of Bedir Khan Beg, though I suspect this is not true since I have come across no information or indication about this. Kaftan, *Baban, Botan ve Soran*, p.67. Nikitin also briefly states that the *mîr* of Ardalan was part of the unity created by Bedir Khan, but he does not provide any source for this information. Basil Nikitin, *Kürtler* [*The Kurds*], trans. Hüseyin Demirhan and Cemal Süreyya (Istanbul: Deng, 2002), p.333.
37. van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State*, p.179; One also wonders why the Babans did not establish any coalition with Bedir Khan Beg. The geography was, probably, one of the reasons in addition to the traditional independent status of the Babans. Through the nineteenth century the Babans made no alliance with any Kurdish emirate, though they made temporary commitments to the Iranian governors or to the pashas of Baghdad when it suited their interest.
38. Badger, *The Nestorians and Their Rituals*, p.372.
39. Ateş names the process of unification by Bedir Khan as 'de-clanization' of Kurdistan in reference to the erosion of the power of the tribal chiefs. He claims that such a process 'was the beginning of a new form of identity and allegiance formation and so posed a challenge to the Ottoman project of creating citizenship based on rights provided by *tanzimat* reforms'. Ateş, *Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands*, p.77.
40. *The Missionary Herald* Vol.42, No.11 (1846), p.381.
41. Ditil, *1824'ten 1845'e Kadar Şark Gezileri Günlükleri İnceleme Kütüphanesi* [*Survey Library on Diaries of Eastern Travels from 1824 until 1845*], 1:95 (1849), pp.5–6 cited in Halfin, *XIX. Yüzyılda Kürdistan*, p.51.
42. For more information on the massacres of the Nestorians and its background see Jwaideh, *The Kurdish National Movement*, pp.65–72 and van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State*, pp.177–181. For primary accounts see also George Percy Badger, *The Nestorians and Their Rituals, Layard, Discoveries in the Ruins of Nineveh, and Lütfi* [Liceli Ahmed Ramiz]*, Emir Bedirhan* (Cairo: Matbaa-yı İctihad, ca. 1907), pp.17–21.
43. McDowall, *The Kurds*, p.45.
44. Jwaideh, *The Kurdish National Movement*, p.67.
45. Jwaideh, *The Kurdish National Movement*, p.67; McDowall, *The Kurds*, p.46. It was clear that the American missionaries wanted to maintain good relations with Bedir Khan Beg since they thought that taking a stance with the *mîr* would help them to convert more mountain Nestorians. *The Missionary Herald*, Vol.43, No.1 (1847), p.6.
46. William Ainsworth, *Travels and Researches in Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Chaldea, and Armenia* Vol. 1 (London: John W. Parker, 1842), p.242.
47. McDowall, *The Kurds*, p.46; Jwaideh, *The Kurdish National Movement*, p.70.
48. Jwaideh, *The Kurdish National Movement*, p.70.

49. Badger, *The Nestorians and Their Rituals*, pp.368–69.
50. A document refers to the release of the Nestorian captives by Bedir Khan. See COA. HR. MKT. 29/2, 09 Safer 1960 (28 February 1844). Another document indicates that Bedir Khan's army was still financed by the *vali* of Mosul: 'Cizre Mütesellimi Bedirhan Bey'in maiyyetinde müstahdem asker ve başıbozukların maaş ve tayinatı için Musul Valisi Mahmud Paşa'nın hazinesinden karzen para aldığı' [The leader of Cizre Bedir Khan Beg has borrowed money from the governor of Mosul, Mahmud Pasha's budget for salaries and expenses of soldiers and irregulars employed under his leadership], COA. A. MKT. 86/9, 19 Safer 1260 (9 March 1844). There was even a demand by the commander of the army in Anatolia asking to keep Bedir Khan in place for the time being: COA. A. MKT. 69/28, 3 Şevval 1261 (5 October 1845).
51. McDowall, *The Kurds*, pp.46–37.
52. Dated 12 August, 1843, Dr. Grant stated in his letter that the Kurdish forces were made up of seventy thousand men. *The Missionary Herald* Vol.39, No.12 (1843), p.454. Others suggested that there were a hundred thousand men. Both figures are cited in Jwaideh, *The Kurdish National Movement*, p.72.
53. Austin Layard, *Ninevah and Its Remains* Vol. 1 (New York: George P. Putnam, 1849), p.153; idem, *Discoveries in the Ruins of Nineveh*, part 2, pp.424, 428, 435. Dated 27 July 1846 the American missionary Edward Breath reports in his letter 'the number killed in two campaigns was said to be about seven thousand; but this estimate may be too high'. *The Missionary Herald* Vol.42, No.12 (1846), p.407.
54. Layard does not provide a precise number, but he states that around three hundred women and children were killed in the Tiyari region of Hakkari. Layard, *Ninevah and its Remains*, p.201. The news coming from the American missionaries was also conflicting. A letter from Dr. Wright dated 22 December 1846 states 'probably not less than five hundred Tahomeans [a Nestorian tribe in Hakkari region] fell by the sword; and perhaps the number may rise a good deal above that amount'. *The Missionary Herald* Vol.43, No.4 (1847), p.138.
55. van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State*, p.180.
56. McDowall, *The Kurds*, p.47.
57. McDowall, *The Kurds*, p.47.
58. On 21 December 1848, Rev. Joseph Gallup Cochran, an American missionary, reported that the Ottoman army was fast subjugating the rugged mountains of Hakkari. He also noted that Nurullah Beg fled to the borders of Iran, and he was soon to be caught and exiled with Bedir Khan Beg. *The Missionary Herald* Vol.45, No.5 (1849), p.161.
59. Several British documents, such as The National Archives of UK (hereafter TNA), FO 78/702, 9 August 1847, From Brant to Palmerson; TNA, FO 78/702, 3 July 1847, From Brant to Lord Cowley; TNA, FO 78/702, 26 June 1847, From Brant to Lord Cowley and the Ottoman document COA. A. MKT. 112/50, 17 Şaban 1264 (29 July 1848) mention the defeat and removal of the Kurdish notables from Kurdistan. Among those Kurdish leaders exiled were Nurullah Beg of Hakkari, Baban Ahmed Pasha, Şerif Beg of Bitlis, and Bedir Khan Beg of Bohtan. Also see McDowall, *The Kurds*, p.47 and Jwaideh, *The Kurdish National Movement*, p.74.
60. Müşir Esad Pasha became the governor of newly created Eyalet-i Kürdistan (1847–1867), which was made up of several *elviyes* (sub-provinces), including Van, Muş, Mardin, Diyarbekir, Hakkari, and Dersim. Some governors of these sub-provinces, like Ahmed İzzet Pasha of Hakkari, had the rank of vizier, which was one of the highest in the Ottoman bureaucracy. Hakan Özoğlu, *Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2004), pp.62–3.
61. van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State*, p.181.
62. The name of the Babans occurs variously in different Western sources as Babeh, Bebbeh, and Bebe. Modern Kurdish and Persian sources refer to them as 'Baban' or 'Al-e Baban', while they are called 'Babanlar' or 'Babanzadeler' in modern Turkish historiography. W. Behn, 'Baban', *Encyclopaedia Iranica*. Scholars speculate on the origin of the name 'Baban'. Some say the shah of Iran gave this name to Faqih Ahmed because of his service to the Iranian king and the courage he showed in a war. The shah patted him on the back and praised him by saying 'baba, baba!'. After that, everyone started to use 'Baban' as an epithet for him. Yamülkizade Aziz, 'Kürd Tarihinden: Baban Hanedanı [From the Kurdish History: Dynasty of Baban]', *Jin* Vol.9 (1335/1917), pp.1–6. The Babans are mentioned in the classical work of Sharaf Khan Bidlisi's Sharafnama (1597), in which he allocates ten pages to the Babans and traces their history back to 1500 CE. Sharaf Khan bin Shams al-din Bidlisi, *Ketab-ê Sharafnamah*, prepared by Vladimir Vladimirovich Veliaminov-Zernov (St. Petersburg: Académie Impériale des Sciences, 1860), pp.279–88. The first Ottoman source to mention the Babans is a Mühimme Defteri [the register of important affairs] for the hijri years of 951-52/1544-46. Halil Sahillioğlu (ed.), *Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi H.951–952 Tarihli ve E-12321 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri* (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2002), pp.106–8, 56. There is also one *Tapu Tahrir Defteri* [land registry book] for Baban Sancağı recorded by the Ottomans almost thirty years after the capture of the region from the Safavids. COA. ML. T. 352 (h. 972/1564–5).
63. As Zekî states, there is not much information on Ahmed Pasha compared to his predecessors. For more information on Baban Ahmad Pasha see Mihemed Emîn Zekî, *Tarîxî Slêmanî we welatî le dewreyê zor Qadîmewe ta ewwelê ehtilal (1918 m.)* [*History of Sulaimaniya and the Region from the Ancient Period until the*

First World War (1918)] (Baghdad: Al-Najah, 1939); Abd al-Qadir bin Rostam Babani, *Siyar al-Akrad dar Tarikh wa Jografya-ye Kordestan* [*A Survey of the Kurds in the History and Geography of Kurdistan*] (Tehran: Chapkhane-i Golbang, 1288/1871; republished in 1377/1998). So far Rostam Babani has covered more information on the last phase of the Babans than any other sources. Although there is not much information about the author he seems to be a witness to the demise of the Baban dynasty as he states in his account.

64. 'Art. XI. – Narrative of a Journey through parts of Persia and Kurdistan, undertaken by Commander J. F. Jones, I. N., of the Honourable Company's Steam Vessel "Nitocris", in company with Major Rawlinson, Political Agent in Turkish Arabia. – Dated Baghdad, 31st December, 1847' *Transactions of the Bombay Geographical Society*, Vol. 8 (1847–49), pp.249–335. Emîn Zekî also focuses on Ahmed Pasha's character and states that he was very 'industrious, shrewd, and mature'. Emîn Zekî, *Tarîxî Slêmanî*, p.114.
65. 'Narrative of a Journey through parts of Persia and Kurdistan', p.329; Emîn Zekî, *Tarîxî Slêmanî*, p.114.
66. Major Soane states that Ahmed Pasha's fight against the Ottoman army was one of the major attempts with 'national spirit' in nineteenth-century Kurdistan. The other three such attempts were, Soane notes, Baban Abdurrahman Pasha's rebellion against the *valis* of Baghdad in 1806, the bid for independence by the Mîrê Kor of Rawanduz in 1836–8 and Bedir Khan Beg's famous 'revolution' in 1847. Soane was right when he stated that Ahmed Pasha's rebellion was among some of the major Kurdish movements of the nineteenth century but approaching these events as 'nationalist' and 'secessionist' seems to be a misreading of the period. Ely Banister Soane, *To Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in Disguise* (Boston: Small, Maynard and Company, 1913), pp.371–72; Four decades before Soane, Millingen made similar comments on Ahmed Pasha's resistance against the Ottomans. Millingen supported his 'nationalist' view with the first-hand accounts of the Kurdish notables. He noted: 'It seems as if the revolutionary fever had inflamed the brains of the whole mass of the Koordish nation. From my personal experience, having been thrown into contact with many of the chiefs of the Koordish national movements, as Ahmed Pasha of Suleimanieh and Resul Pasha, with all their brothers and sons, I can affirm, without fear of exaggerating, that the sentiment of nationality and the love of independence are as deeply rooted in the heart of the Koords as in that of any other nation.' Frederick Millingen, *Wild life among the Koords* (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1870), p.213. Although Soane did not cite him or any other sources for his analysis of Kurdish nationalism, one suspects that he made such comments under the influence of Millingen.
67. 'Narrative of a Journey through parts of Persia and Kurdistan', p.329.
68. 'Narrative of a Journey through parts of Persia and Kurdistan', p.330.
69. Ateş, *Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands*, pp.71–2.
70. From Williams to Canning, Erzurum, 12 February 1844. Richard Schofield (ed.), *The Iran-Iraq Border, 1840–1958* (Vol. 1, London: Archive Editions, 1989), p.213.
71. TNA, FO 78/2713, 9 July 1845, From Rawlinson to Canning, Suleimanieh and British Consulate in Baghdad.
72. TNA, FO 78/2713, From Rawlinson to Canning.
73. TNA, FO 78/2713, From Rawlinson to Canning.
74. TNA, FO 78/2713, From Rawlinson to Canning.
75. Rostam Babani notes that Ahmed Pasha had upheld Koy Sanjaq with 10,000 cavalrymen at the time of Necib Pasha's advance. bin Rostam Babani, *Siyar al-Akrad*, p.160.
76. Rostam Babani named the sheikh as Mullah Ali Kahyai. bin Rostam Babani, *Siyar al-Akrad*, p.161.
77. TNA, FO 78/2713, 12 July 1845, From Rawlinson to Canning.
78. When, one night, Ahmed Pasha came close to the outskirts of Sulaimaniya with a few loyalists he waited until dawn so people of the town could join him. Around a thousand men, mostly the elderly and dignitaries, decided to join him, while most of the people held out for Abdullah Pasha in Sulaimaniya. bin Rostam Babani, *Siyar al-Akrad*, p.163.
79. Ateş, *Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands*, pp.74–5; See also Canning to Lord Aberdeen, Constantinople, 20 July 1846 in Schofield, *The Iran-Iraq Border*, Vol.1, pp.576–77.
80. Abdullah Pasha remained as *kaymakam* of Sulaimaniya for four years. However, his leadership was symbolic as he did not have the capacity of his predecessors. In 1851, together with his brother Ahmed Pasha, he was summoned by Namık Pasha, the *vali* of Baghdad, and both were exiled to Istanbul. After the departure of the last member of the Baban dynasty, the Porte appointed a certain İsmail Pasha from the centre as the *kaymakam* of Sulaimaniya. Mehmed Emin Zeki Bey (Mihemed Emîn Zekî), *Kürd ve Kürdistan Ünlüleri* [*Notables of Kurds and Kurdistan*] (Ankara: Öz-Ge Yayınları, 2005), pp.59–60; 'Narrative of a Journey through parts of Persia and Kurdistan', p.330.
81. bin Rostam Babani, *Siyar al-Akrad*, pp.166–67.
82. bin Rostam Babani, *Siyar al-Akrad*, p.167. In Paris, Ahmed Pasha met Aleksander Chodzko, a Russian Iranologist who worked for the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1853 Chodzko visited Ahmed Pasha frequently and worked with him on the Kurdish dialect of Sulaimani. Calling Ahmed Pasha the 'hereditary chief of Kurdish tribe of Bébé' and 'the fourth pasha of the dominant family in that part of Kurdish Bébé tribe' Chodzko produced a work on the Kurdish language as a result of their meetings. A. Chodzko, 'Etudes philologiques sur la langue kurde (dialecte de Suléimanié)', *Journal Asiatique* (April–May 1857), pp.297–356.

83. *Sicill-i Osmani*. Vol. 1, p.302. Mehmed Süreyya records in *Sicill-i Osmani* that Ahmed Pasha's son Halid Bey was once the Ottoman ambassador to Tehran and his other son, Mustafa İzzet Pasha, was a mirliva (major general). His brother Mehmed Pasha was the governor of Basra and the other brother lived in Istanbul.
84. Jordi Tejel Gorgas, 'Urban Mobilisation in Iraqi Kurdistan during the British Mandate: Sulaimaniya 1918–30', *Middle Eastern Studies* Vol.44, No.4 (2008), pp.537–552.
85. Abdulla, *İmparatorluk, Sınır ve Aşiret*, p.222; The members of the first commission were Enveri Efendi of the Ottoman Empire, Mirza Taki Khan of Iran, Col. Denish of Russian Empire and Robert Curzon, Col. Williams and Major Perrant of the British Empire. The second commission members were Mushir al-Dawla Mirza Jaafar Khan, a British-educated engineer from Iran, Derviş Pasha from the Ottoman Empire, Col. Williams, his assistant Captain Glasscotte and Fenwick William Kenneth Loftus from the British side and Col. Y.I. Tchirikof from the Russian Empire.
86. Abdulla, *İmparatorluk, Sınır ve Aşiret*, p.222; Ateş, following M. Harari's periodisation, presents three phases in the Erzurum negotiations: in the first phase, which lasted from January 1843 to mid 1844, the Ottoman and Iranian negotiators conveyed their claims and grievances to each other's governments. The second phase was about the possible compromises by the negotiators, the presentation of the Anglo-Russian compromise plan to Iranian and Ottoman delegates, and the signing of the treaty of Erzurum in 1847. The third phase focused more on the endorsement of the Treaty of Erzurum. Ateş, *Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands*, p.88; see also Maurice Harari, 'The Turco-Persian Boundary Question: A Case Study in the Politics of Boundary Making in the Near and Middle East' (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1958), p.43.
87. After the first treaty of Erzurum was signed in 1823, the commerce between Iran and the Ottomans grew substantially. Joseph Wolff, a British officer who visited Erzurum in 1843, states 'the commerce between Turkey and Persia has been most considerably increased and facilitated', especially thanks to 'the activity and exertions' of James Brant, Esq., the British consul in Erzurum. Of course, the more the inhabitants of two countries interacted the more the diplomatic issues (diplomatic representation, territorial claims, citizenship of border people, etc.) and legal questions (tax, custom duties, lawsuits between Iranian and Turkish merchants) came into existence. For the letter from Wolff to Grover (Erzurum, 21 December 1843) see Joseph Wolff, *Narrative of a Mission to Bokhara, in the Years 1843–1845, to Ascertain the Fate of Colonel Stoddart and Captain Conolly* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1845), pp.107–08.
88. Several works have problematised the Ottoman-Iranian border. Ateş in his work offers a wide perspective of the borderlands and border people in the second half of the nineteenth century. Ateş, *Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands*. Abdulla presents a similar picture of the border, but with a broader period and less analytical approach. Abdulla, *İmparatorluk, Sınır ve Aşiret*. On the other hand, Aykun in his work, which is mostly based on the Ottoman sources, is focused more on the Erzurum Treaty of 1847 and the border. İbrahim Aykun, 'Erzurum Konferansı (1843–1847) ve Osmanlı-İran Hudut Antlaşması' (PhD diss., Atatürk University, 1995). Besides the modern sources some of the members of the border commission also produced some works on the Ottoman-Iranian frontiers. Two such works were written by the Ottoman delegates and one was written by the Iranian delegate: Mehmed Hurşid Paşa, *Seyahatname-i Hudud* [*Travelogue of the Border*] trans. Alaaddin Eser (Istanbul, circa 1850, reprinted in Istanbul: Simurg, 1997); Derviş Pasha (Mehmed Emin), *Tahdid-i Hudud-u İraniye* [*Demarcation of the Iranian Border*] (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1326/1910); Mirza Sayyid Ja'fer Khan (Mosher-al Dawlah), *Resale-ye Tahqeqat-e Sarhadiyyah* [*Treatise of Frontier Investigation*] (Tehran, 1348).
89. R. Schofield, 'Narrowing the frontier: mid-nineteenth century efforts to delimit and map the Perso-Ottoman border', in Roxane Farmanfarmaian (ed.), *War and Peace in Qajar Persia: Implications Past and Present* (New York: Routledge, 2008), p.152.
90. Besides Katib Çelebi's account, the Ottoman delegate Enveri Efendi presented *Düstur'ul İnşa [Principals of Writing]*, which was made up of many documents from the correspondence and treaties with Iran and collected by Reisü'l-Küttab in 1643, and Mustafa Naima Efendi's *Tarih-i Naima [Naima's History]* as well as Feraizi-zade's *Gülşen-i Maarif [Rose Garden of Wisdom]* to the delegates as evidence showing that Sulaimaniya was part of the Ottoman Empire throughout of centuries. Aykun, 'Erzurum Konferansı', pp.117–18.
91. Ateş, *Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands*, p.92; Iran had already asked the Ottomans to appoint Baban Mahmud Pasha to the leadership of Sulaimaniya in 1841. Sultan Abdülmecid agreed to dismiss Baban Ahmed Pasha and appoint Mahmud Pasha instead. While waiting for Mahmud Pasha to arrive in the town, the Ottomans appointed Baban Abdullah Pasha as deputy governor of Sulaimaniya. Iran immediately sent Mahmud Pasha with 2000 soldiers to cross the border and take over the governorship. Abdullah Pasha resisted this request with his forces and he defeated Mahmud Pasha and the Iranian soldiers. Although Iran tried to make another attempt to defeat Abdullah Pasha, he warned them that he would resist as he did before. The Iranians then left the question of Sulaimaniya unresolved until they raised the issue again during the negotiations of the Erzurum Treaty. Aykun, 'Erzurum Konferansı', pp.39–41.

92. The minutes of the discussions on the status of Sulaimaniya were well documented. A copy of them is available in the Ottoman archives in COA. İMM. 1073/4, 15 Şevval 1259 (8 November 1843). Aykun discusses these minutes in details in his work on the treaty of Erzurum. Aykun, 'Erzurum Konferansı', pp.105–120.
93. Richard Schofield (ed.), *Arabian Boundary Disputes* Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Archive Editions, 1992), pp.167–69. For more information on the text of the Erzurum Treaty see also: COA. HR. SYS. 2920/83 (12 April 1847); *Name-i Humayun Defteri* [*Register of Imperial Correspondence*]. Vol. 12, p.17; *Muahedat Mecmuası* [*Corpus of Treaties*]. Vol. 3, pp.5–8; Gabriel Effendi Noradounghian, *Recueil d'Actes internationaux de l'empire ottoman: 1789–1856* (Vol. 2, Paris: Cotillon, 1900), pp.383–385; Aykun, 'Erzurum Konferansı', pp.242–44; Reza Qoli Khan Hedayat, *Rawzat al-Safa-ye Naseri* [*Naser's Garden of Purity*] (Vol. 10, Tehran, 1339), pp.302–306; Fereydun Adamiyat, *Amir Kabir va Iran* [*Amir Kabir and Iran*] (Tehran: Chap-i Piruz, 1334/1955), p.51; *British and Foreign State Papers* (Vol. 45, London: William Ridgway, 1865), pp.874–876.
94. Kamal Abdal-Rahman Salman, 'The Ottoman and British Policies Toward Iraqi Tribes: 1831 to 1920' (PhD diss., the University of Utah, 1992), p.86.
95. Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, *Frontier fictions: Shaping the Iranian Nation, 1804–1946* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p.26.
96. Mohammad Reza Nasiri, *Nasıreddin Şah Zamanında Osmanlı-İran Münasebetleri, 1848–1896* [*Ottoman-Iranian Relations during the Period of Nasir Al-Din Shah, 1848–1896*] (Tokyo: ILCAA, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, 1991), p.8.
97. Walter B. Harris, *Batum to Baghdad: Via Tiflis, Tabriz and Persian Kurdistan* (London: W. Blackwood, 1896), pp.285–287.
98. Ateş, *Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands*, p.34.
99. Kutschera, *Kürt Ulusal Hareketi*, p.23.
100. J. Blau, *Written Kurdish Literature* in Philip G. Kreyenbroek and Ulrich Marzolph (eds), *Oral Literature of Iranian Languages: Kurdish, Pashto, Balochi, Ossetic, Persian and Tajik* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), pp.33–69.
101. Michael Eppel, 'The Demise of the Kurdish Emirates: The Impact of Ottoman Reforms and International Relations on Kurdistan during the First Half of the Nineteenth Century', *Middle Eastern Studies* Vol. 44, No.2 (2008), pp.237–258.