

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The Kurdish image in statist historiography: the case of Simko

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> I think…as history, nationalism's autobiography is fundamentally flawed.
>
> - Partha Chatterjee[1]

> 'Getting history wrong' is the precondition of nationalist history.
>
> - David McCrone[2]

This article aims to analyse the treatment of undesirable ethno-nationalist politics in Persian nationalist historiography by way of focusing on the revolt of Ismail Agha of Shikak, better known as 'Simko' and on his attempts to create an autonomous region in northwestern Iran. It must be stated that both the official account and Iran's state-sanctioned historiography are considered the same in this article. The article consists of segments through which I put forward my approach to nationalism. This article also attempts to shed some light on the historical context of Kurdish political activities under Simko's leadership as well as their relations with non-Kurdish communities in the Lake Urmia region. Furthermore, I venture to explain how *Shi'î* and *Sunni-ness* figured in the ethno-nationalist discourse of various communities. At the end, by way of analysing the dominant narrative, I attempt to elucidate the place of Simko and Kurdish politics in the Persian historiography. It should be noted that my portrayal of any given group as nationalist does not amount to a moral evaluation of the group. Rather it is to highlight the dominant narrative's denial of the existing ethno-nationalist tendencies in early twentieth-century Iran. The case in point is Simko's uprising, examined below.

Despite the general tendency to dismiss his impact on Iranian Kurdish history, Simko led a movement that co-founded the first Kurdish school in Iranian Kurdistan, published the first Kurdish–Persian language newspaper, and made Kurdish the official medium of his rule. The period of his revolt laid the foundation for the opposition between the official and semi-official state narratives and Kurdish nationalist narrative in Iran. This was followed by a second period in which the states strove to make territorial and political boundaries coterminous, a process which Kurds resisted, albeit without a coherent ideology or project. While the Iranian state marshalled its military, economic, institutional and cultural/educational might, the Kurdish side could only demonstrate its intermittent reactions. Kurdish politics lacked the ability to utilize its full internal potential or external support.

The absence of strong indigenous Kurdish intelligentsia might count as one of the major deficiencies in the Kurds' reactions to the state nation-building project. Such a

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process in Iran began in earnest following the inauguration of Iran's Pahlavi dynasty in 1925. Subsequently, the state undertook the project of homogenizing its polities by making the political space extremely narrow and exclusionary in the hope of eliminating all cultural and ethnic differences as possible grounds for political demands. The nation-state took up the task of singularizing its people, and this in practice resulted in creating unwanted, despised other(s) within the state's own territorial boundaries. In the Iranian context, this resulted in the continual displacement of populations in the periphery, in accordance with the state's security measures, which was referred to as the politics of *tahta kapu* (the wooden door).[3] As such, state discourse defined ethno-nationalistic discontents as tribalism[4] in an attempt to obscure anti-centrist political tendencies. The treatment of Simko's resistance in Persian state historiography exemplifies one such case.

Nationalism and Simko

There is no universal scholarly agreement on the most important issues and concepts of nationalism. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith declare that perhaps 'the central difficulty in the study of nations and nationalism has been the problem of finding adequate and agreed definitions of the key concepts, nation and nationalism'.[5] The overall application of grand frameworks often creates further problems relating to the ahistoricity of such frameworks, which unavoidably overlook the particularity of some nationalist movements and claims. Benedict Anderson points to the complexity of nationalism as something that exists everywhere but everywhere retains its local traits.[6] Smith argues, due to enormous discrepancies across time periods and space, that a general theory of nationalism cannot be attained.[7] Also, 'different non-Western nationalisms would later produce local versions of the same narrative, replacing "Europe" by some locally constructed center'.[8]

When it comes to the debate over the emergence of Kurdish nationalism or the determination of *which* modern Kurdish political activities and uprisings were nationalist, the subject becomes particularly complicated.[9] However, here, as elsewhere, I define nationalism as a modern convention according to which an 'imagined community' claims the right to make 'the national and the political congruent' (to use Ernest Gellner's famous dictum).[10] 'Based on such a convention, communal self-referentiality *ipso facto* constitutes legitimate ground for communal political demands and claims to self-rule.'[11] Hence, any statement or 'utterance, religious or otherwise, that ties collective rights to the communal self-referentiality is modern and nationalistic and locatable within the paradigm of nationalist politics'.[12]

Similarly, this article locates Simko within the confines of Kurdish ethno-nationalism. As indicated earlier, ascribing nationalism to any group or figure should not be seen as an ethical assessment of them. It is rather to shed a greater light on this particular era of Iranian Kurds and to elucidate the socio-political context that gave rise to the Kurdish-state conflict. The article argues that Simko's politics was informed by and founded upon the communal distinctions deemed to legitimize varying degrees of self-rule. Over the 16 years of Simko's political involvement, many changes can be seen in his politics. Yet he introduced a number of firsts in Iranian Kurdish political history and these innovations have generally been overlooked. Simko was born to a region fraught with ethnic and

religious conflicts. The existing documents evidence that he was well aware of the politics of his time and of the determinative political trends.

Painting Simko as another Kurdish rebellious chief who lacked any nationalist aspiration whatsoever – as has been done very often – leaves some important questions unanswered.[13] For instance, why did Simko establish the first Kurdish school in Eastern Kurdistan? Why did he open the school in the Kurdish language rather than in Persian? Why did a regular 'tribal chief' even bother to publish a Kurdish newspaper? Considering that Kurdish was not standardized and the level of Kurdish literacy was worse than that of Persian, why did Simko venture to publish a newspaper in his own mother tongue rather than in Persian? What motivated him to use the Kurdish language as an official medium in the region he controlled? To address some of these, let us take a look at Simko's life story and his political vision.

Life story and politics

Simko was chosen as the head of the Shikak tribe after his elder brother Ja'far Agha was assassinated in 1905 by the governor of Tabriz, Nizam al-Saltana, on the orders of the crown prince.[14] Ja'far Agha was known for maintaining connections with the Hamidiye Cavalry, an Ottoman militia raised from amongst the tribes of Ottoman Kurdistan.[15] Considering the Hamidiye's involvement in Kurdish political activities in the following decade, such connections may have had historical significance for Kurdish ethno-national awareness.[16] At the time of his brother's death, Simko would still have been in his 20s when he was chosen to lead the Shikak, the second largest Kurdish tribe in Iran.[17] In 1912, seven years after his selection as chief, Simko was invited to Russia. He was received by a cavalry parade organized in his honour by the governor of Tiflis.[18] In the next year, with the help and guidance of 'Abdurrezaq Bedirxan, a well-known Kurdish politician, Simko established the first Kurdish school in Maku, Iran. The following year, Bedirxan and Simko strove to open another Kurdish school in the neighbouring city of Khoy. However, they faced the opposition of Iranian state officials.[19]

These years would have been critical for Simko's future ethnic politics while he was still overwhelmed by the desire to avenge his brother's death. At the time he was working with one of the most literate Kurdish notables, 'Abdurrezaq Bedirxan, who possessed greater breadth of experience than any other Kurdish nationalist leaders of the time. In 1912–1913, along with Simko, Bedirxan sought and received the support of the Russian Vice-Consul Chirkov in Urmia to open a Kurdish school in Maku. Simko gathered 29 children between the ages of 8 and 10, then assigned 40 of his men to guard the school.[20] Simko personally sent a letter of gratitude to the Russian Czar.[21] Apparently, Bedirxan like many other contemporary nationalist intellectuals in the Ottoman and Qajar contexts had developed a great affinity for Russian culture. Indeed, he even supported the idea of writing Kurdish in the Cyrillic script. This indicates Bedirxan's awareness of the nationalist and intellectual currents among the Turks and Persians. These intellectuals were also advocating alphabetic and linguistic reforms as a means of promoting literacy and eliminating the influence of their perceived 'Other' in their respective national languages and cultures.

Bedirxan seems to have considered adapting to Russian culture preferable to the continuing influence of Arabic, Ottoman Turkish and Persian. Hence, he sought help from

Russian scholars to publish a Kurdish–Russian dictionary and to Cyrillicize the Kurdish alphabet.[22] In a similar vein, he requested that a Kurdish newspaper be established and that a school of Kurdish studies be opened in Saint Petersburg.[23] Eden Naby, in her article, 'The First Kurdish Periodical in Iran', without referring to Simko's role, states that Bedirxan published a newspaper in 1912.[24] No traces of a 1912 Kurdish newspaper can be found. Even when she discusses Turjani or Turjanizedeh, Naby does not mention Simko while Turjani worked for Simko and he clearly signed two of his columns as a Simko-appointed judge. Mohammad Tammadun, a journalist from Urmia who was Simko's contemporary, offers a detailed account of the newspaper. The journalist states that Simko had confiscated the Tammadun publishing house to use it for the publication of his own newspaper, *Kurd*.[25]

It should also be noted that Bedirxan was a peculiarly irredentist politician. None of his contemporaries emphasized the issue of Kurdish territorial unification to the degree he did in his agenda. One of the pillars of Bedirxan's political strategy was to 'free and to reclaim all Kurdish lands without any encroachment on the Iranian or Turkish lands'.[26] Of course, there is not much information available on 'the precise borders' of his imagined homeland. Nor was there any definite criterion by which people could demarcate vast geographic regions as exclusively, partially or non-Kurdish. As such, this issue of territorial infringement was left to Kurds on their own to address the matter of delineating the imagined geographical boundaries.

Simko was amenable to Bedirxan's ambitious plan for Kurdish independence. Indeed, Simko was an enthusiastic supporter of Bedirxan's activities until their differences over Russian policy divided them. Their short-lived political unity ended when Bedirxan tried to turn the newly established Cultural Society (Gehandni) into an anti-Ottoman political party, friendly to the Czar.[27] Kurdish historian Muhamad Rasul Hawar asserts that while Simko was collecting zakāt (religious tax) for the school, Bedirxan tried to arm the Kurds against the Ottoman Turks. At this juncture Simko dissented, arguing that the money should be spent on the school and educational activities rather than on killing a few Ottoman soldiers. Such armed activities, Simko argued, would not serve Kurdish interests well.[28] This story not only highlights Simko's political farsightedness but also illustrates the value he attached to cultural and educational activities. However, the biggest challenge to these cultural activities was that of 'protecting [them] from the intrigues of Persian officials who considered Kurds only slightly better than Russians. Religious leaders, including Persians and pro-Ottoman partisans, had started to agitate against the school, spreading rumors that Simko planned to use the school to convert the students to Christianity'.[29]

Simko was noted for his astuteness by friend and foe alike.[30] Muhammad Tamaddun, an Azeri Turk who had been a member of the Urmia War Commission, organized to bring Simko to heel, writes that the independent-minded chief was 'the most enlightened person' among all the Kurds and Assyrians of the region.[31] It is said that, in addition to various Kurdish dialects, Simko knew Azeri Turkish, Persian and Russian.[32] Indeed, he paid special attention to the Kurdish language and made it the official medium of his fiefdom.[33] Simko's activities were the cause of particular concern to Qajar officialdom. Therefore, the head of the tariff and tax bureau in Tabriz warned that any paperwork in Kurdish was illegal and those who used it would incur severe consequences.[34] Simko was also interested in music. For example, he kept a piano in his house;[35] apparently, he had learned to play it

during his exile in Russia.[36] Tamaddun recounts that Simko had enjoyed his time in foreign countries and appreciated theatre and cinema.[37] Yet Ahmad Kasravi, a prominent pro-Reza Shah historian, mocks the 'uneducated' Simko for seeking Kurdish independence.[38] Yet, neither Kasravi nor even his enemies question the nationalism of Reza Shah, despite the fact that he, too – according to historian Amin Banani – lacked 'adequate formal education and his spelling was the subject of many [derisive] anecdotes'.[39]

Simko and communal conflicts

During the First World War, Simko and his followers were careful to avoid any involvement in the confrontation. Still, ethnic-religious hostilities were escalating to such a degree that according to historian Michael Zirinsky, 'under pressure of wartime hysteria, all Christians in Urmia perceived the war as conflict between Ottoman-led Islam and Russian-led Christendom'.[40] These new developments added fuel to a raging fire. Zirinsky notes that 'During the war… Russia carried a genocidal war into Eastern Anatolia, killing as many as eighty percent[41] of the Kurdish population.'[42] Hostility among the states and Great Powers took an enormous toll on the region's communities merely for being in the vicinity, regardless of whether or not they were involved in the war. During the war and its aftermath, a very large number of Christians were forced out of their homes to places where the local populations were both unwilling and unable to help or accommodate them. As many as '50,000 armed Assyrians from Hakkari (Jilus, led by Mar Shimoun) and Armenians from Van descended on the Urmia plains as refugees. Because of their wartime experiences they were wretchedly poor and anti-Muslim'.[43] The absence of state power left the region at the mercy of communal rivalries and the emergence of new alliances formed on religious lines.[44]

Both Simko and the Qajar states considered Armenians to be a threat; at the same time, the Kurds and Assyrians also competed over control of Urmia.[45] Reports in British records state that 'Urmia and its fertile plain attracted the covetous eyes of both Simko and the moving spirits of the embryonic Armenian state'.[46] The Qajar state had but a nominal presence in the region. It is possible that the state promised some type of autonomy to convince Simko to take action against the Christians.[47] While the nature of such a deal is unknown, there is enough evidence to prove that the Qajar state was prodding Simko to attack the Christians. When 'the castle of Simko… was captured many incriminating documents were found. Letters from prominent Persian officials…had been sent [all] inciting Simko to rise against the Christians'.[48] With such encouragements, Simko treacherously trapped and assassinated Mar Shimoun, the Assyrian leader. In one of his rare interviews with a Kurdish notable, Simko tried to justify his act by claiming that the Christians, with European support, were seeking an independent state and cleansing of the Kurds from the region.[49]

It seems that Mar Shimoun had high hopes about allying his Assyrians with the Kurds. According to Kasravi, in 1918, when Mar Shimoun met Simko, unaware of the latter's plot, he told Simko that:

> this land which is called Kurdistan was the land of us all. Nevertheless, religious differences have brought upon us the current calamity and separated us from one another.[50] Now, we must unite, reclaim our land, and [once more start] living together.[51]

This account, if correct, reveals the genuine belief of Mar Shimoun in the unity of Kurdish–Assyrian ethnic roots, and his ethno-nationalist sentiments must have been an overriding factor in seeking alliances. Mar Shimoun must have also been aware of Simko's desire for an independent Kurdistan; otherwise he would not have invoked the idea or seized upon it as a basis for unity. However, Simko's brutal act along with the subsequent massacres brought communal conflicts to a record-high level, precluding such an 'ethnic coalition'.

After the Assyrians' harrowing escape, following the Russians troops' pulling out of Urmia, Simko became the strongest man in the region. In 1918, the vice governor of Urmia plotted to kill Simko by sending a poisoned gift in a sweet box. This instead claimed the life of one of his brothers,[52] which further alienated Simko from the state and led him to forge local and anti-central government alliances. He believed that 'Urmia was absolutely necessary to the Kurds'.[53] By the end of 1918, working to force the new governor in Urmia out of the city, Simko began to propagate a regionalist agenda. According to Tamaddun, the methods he used and the nature of his propaganda were becoming so sophisticated that they amazed the population of Urmia. Simko and his followers were particularly successful in convincing Urmians that their affairs had to be run only by people from the region.[54] 'Such sophistication' in Simko's organizational skills is partly attributable to the increasing numbers of former Kurdish–Ottoman officers in his group. Again, Tamaddun records the presence of 100[55] – or according to British records, 200 – Ottoman military deserters among Simko's forces.[56] Othman Ali, a Kurdish historian, claims that their number amounted to as many as 3000 people.[57]

In his personal eyewitness account, Rahmatullah Khan Mo'tamed al-Vozarâ, an Azari resident of Urmia, portrays a complex and nuanced picture of Simko's relations with the non-Kurdish population of Urmia.[58] A close reading of Mo'tamed al-Vozarâ's memoir reveals that he had written it over an extended period. (One also notices a change in his tone at the end of the book, especially when he witnesses the frequent defeat of the state forces at the hands of Simko. However, Mo'tamed al-Vozarâ's bias towards the state does not stop him from reporting on the complex relationship that existed between Simko and the non-Kurdish population in the city.) The general picture he draws shows that not all Urmians saw Simko as their blood enemy, a fact that was even validated by Major-General Derakhshani, the commander of the government forces in the region. The General also attests that the majority of the elite, mostly from a Qajar military background, preferred the rule of Simko over that of their own fellow *Shi'î* Azeri leaders. He states that 'the well-known [*sar-shenās*] residents of Urmia, mostly ranking Qajar army officers, were obedient to Simko'.[59] Evidently, Simko was on good terms with many of the community leaders and officials. He appointed a follower of Khiyabani, an Azeri constitutionalist leader, as the governor of Urmia.[60]

Knowing the significance of having local support, Simko strove to win the hearts and minds of non-Kurdish elements of Urmia's population. He was ready to help residents with basic supplies as they were overwhelmed by hunger. For instance, Mo'tamed al-Vozarā recounts a story according to which Simko sent a shipment of wheat to the people of Urmia.[61] In contrast, the central government either stayed aloof or remained incapable of helping the people. This was at a time when people had been devastated by the war in which 'perhaps one-quarter of the population [had] died from starvation [and disease]'.[62]

Indeed, the grip of starvation had become so strong that there were occasional stories of cannibalism.[63]

In these turbulent times, intercommunal relations were affected by various factors and accordingly took different directions. Himself belonging to the opposite camp, Mo'tamed al-Vozarā recounts that a portion of the Urmia population advocated alliance with the Kurds.[64] Also, he reports that it was not just common people who favoured unity with the Kurds, even some members of the Democratic Party (*firqah*) entertained the idea of joining the Kurds against the government. However, Mo'tamed al-Vozarā himself contends that it 'was not in the provinces' interest'.[65] Nonetheless, despite degrees of success, Simko was not able to further or sustain the support of non-Kurdish communities. The conflation of ethnicity with religious identity, as expressed in the Kurd-*ʿAjam* binary, constituted a fundamental element in their group formation. This binary, which has generally been overlooked, was an important ground for Kurdish self-differentiation, particularly in the Lake Urmia region.

Sunni vs. Shiʿi

Simko's activities drastically increased ethnic and religious divisions. At the cost of significant human suffering, his rebellion spurred the rise of Kurdish nationalistic sentiment, which just over a decade later resulted in the creation of a Kurdish political party and, in the late 1940s, the short-lived Kurdish Republic of Mahabad. The conflation of Kurdish ethnicity with *Sunni* religion has not received any significant attention in the writing on this subject. The paucity of documents resulting from this neglect makes it harder to properly construe how Kurdishness was fused with *Sunni*-ness or vice versa. Additionally, later Marxist influences on Kurdish historiography have often served to promote disregard of this subject.[66] All that said, there is still some sporadic evidence in personal memoirs and accounts that, if put together, may shed some light on the fusion of religious and ethnonational tendencies at the time. In that region and in Simko's time, those who were called *ʿAjam* (Arabic plural *Aʿjām*) were generally understood to be non-Kurdish Shiʿa. The overwhelming majority of Kurds in the region were *Sunni*. *Sunni*ness and Kurdish-ness were nearly synonymous.

It is noteworthy that the uniformed army unit of Simko carried a flag decorated with the Quranic verse (61:13), which reads 'the help is from God and victory is near'.[67] The unit of militia bearing this flag had been dispatched to fight the state forces.[68] Also, the title of Simko's newspaper was *Kurd*, and in the top-right corner of its front page it stated that 'any article written in the Kurdish interest will be published'.[69] The chief editor of the newspaper was a clergyman by the name of Mullah Muhammad Torjani.[70] The logo of the paper was the Quranic verse (3:103), which commands Muslims to unite and avoid discord among themselves.[71] In one of its columns, for instance, Simko's paper claims that 'newspapers of the *Aʿjām* have been falsely trying to paint what is taking place [in Kurdistan,] in the last four years as but *shaqāvat*[72] (brigandry)'.[73] Although there had been instances of unity between the Kurds and the *Aʿjām*, especially against the Assyrians,[74] there are many indications that Kurds and *Aʿjām* did not always perceive of each other as true Muslims.

Kurd, the newspaper published by Simko

A binary of *Sunni* Kurds vs. Iranians and non-Kurdish *Shi'a* was the operative dichotomy employed by both Kurds and non-Kurds. Thus, occasionally, for both sides, Kurdishness connoted non-Iranian-ness, with the crucial difference being the *Sunni-Shi'i* divide. Tamaddun recounts a story according to which a prominent figure from Urmia advised Zafar al-Saltana, the governor, to refrain from attacking the Kurds since, he believed, 'all the Kurds are well-armed and they are stationed in the most strategic position in the city, while the Muslims [non-Kurdish *Shi'i*] are defenceless and, therefore, we better tolerate those evil-doers (*ashrār*) to prevent bloodshed'.[75] Apparently, using Islam against the Kurds was not that uncommon since it was used by groups that must have been politically savvier than the common people. Kasravi refers to a telegram from the Urmia *Anjuman* (the Association of Democrats, connected to the Constitutionalist Movement) that clearly explains the religiously antagonistic ways in which the different parties perceived one another. The telegram reads, 'all the villages around the city [of Maku] and the military depots have been looted [by the Kurds] and 350 [*Shi'i*] Muslims are killed [and] all the [*Shi'i*] Muslims there are awaiting their death'.[76] It is clear that the *Anjuman* did not consider the attackers, the Kurds and the Ottomans, to be true Muslims.

In another instance, al-Vozarā refers to a certain Mulla ʿAli, characterizing him in terms of his pro-Kurdish stance, as someone who lacked any regard for his own kind (*nav'iyat*) – for his Iranian-ness (*Irāniyat*) – meaning *Shi'i* Muslims, including Azeris.[77] The above example illustrates that the Kurds were not regarded as of the Iranian kind or race (*nav'iyat*). Also, *Shi'i* solidarity against the *Sunni* Kurds was sometimes expressed by evoking symbols that conflated *'Ajam*-ness with Iranian-ness. For instance, when Zayia ad-Dawleh attacked the Kurds, the non-Kurdish *Shi'i* Muslims joined him as they chanted in Azeri Turkish: 'Those who refuse to join our onslaught are disgraced by God… . May God give our lives to the king of Iran and Islam deserves our blood.'[78] Similarly, al-Vozarā, himself a state official, sees no problem using *Shi'i*-ness as a concept inimical to Kurdishness and to Kurdish self-rule when he states that 'without eliminating all the *Shi'a* in the province, it would be impossible for the Kurds to have their self-rule'.[79]

Simko's statement, which was issued after defeating the governor of Urmia, also distinguishes the Kurds from other Iranians, and reads, 'the central forces of Kurdistan launched an attack on… *the Iranian* government's army, which in three hours of hard

struggle, [Kurdistan forces] defeated them… and *the Iranian* forces were devastated'.[80] Simko's newspaper, *Kurd*, also provides us with valuable information about those dichotomous references. The paper continuously refers to Kurds as a nation (*millet*) and differentiates them from *the rest of Iranians*. For instance, we are told that 'the Kurds were like brothers to their Armenian and Assyrian neighbors until four years earlier *the Iranians* resorted to every possible trick to deceive both nations and made [their neighbors] destroy the poor Kurdish nation'.[81] Furthermore, it alleges that *the Iranians* used 'deceptive schemes' to pit the Kurds against the Christians and now the Iranians side with [the Armenians and Assyrians]. The Kurdish nation, recounts the newspaper, had no choice but to take up arms 'to protect its honor and fight against the Iranians and kick them out from a number of provinces of Kurdistan. However, the Iranians deceptively call it brigandry (*shaqāwat*).'[82] These examples clearly indicate that at least politically active Kurds perceived themselves as non-Iranians. Whether or not all of the above references by each group to distinguish 'us' from 'them' had a universal application or varied at different times and settings may be a secondary issue. The upshot is the fact that every group made such self-differentiations based on religio-ethnic divides. This shows that the people at the time made use of religious and ethnic concepts interchangeably, to delineate their religio-ethnic boundaries from that of the other in their respective imagined communities.

Toward independence

The above examples illustrate Simko's efforts to build a relationship with non-Kurds, efforts which did not produce any tangible results. Inter-community divides could not be overcome. By 1919, Simko was well aware of the Iranian state's military weakness and therefore took a bolder step in his plans. In February 1919, he assembled Kurdish community leaders to discuss the prospect of declaring a Kurdish state. However, the declaration was postponed since Sayyed Taha Nehri, his most prominent advisor, warned against such a move, knowing possible reactions of the Western powers. Nehri believed such a move could unite the Turks and the Qajar states against the nascent Kurdish political entity.[83]

Nehri was commissioned to seek British support for a possible state in the Kurdish provinces of Turkey and Iran in addition to British financial support and military training. They were of the opinion that at least Britain would not put any obstacles in the way of the envisioned Kurdish state.[84] However, Nehri's meeting with British officials was a total disappointment. Simko tried to reach British officials personally, but to no avail.[85] This was mostly because British officials believed the presence of Simko made it 'impossible [for the] Christians to return to those districts as long as he remained unpunished'.[86] Of course, a few years later when they witnessed Simko's increasing power, British officials reopened their doors to talks with him. Nevertheless, Simko's subsequent defeat by 'the Persians [removed] the pressure, [leading her majesty's government] to immediately postpone the proposed interview between Sayyid Taha and the Assistant Political Officer [in Iraqi Kurdistan]'.[87]

After failing to obtain British support, Simko attacked many Iranian cities, which resulted in Russian and British support for the Iranian State. Simko's military had scored many victories and gained control over major cities in Iranian Kurdistan, from Urmia to Baneh. Simko continued his rule until June 1922, when he was attacked by 8000 army

troops under General Jahanbani upon Reza Khan's direct orders.[88] During the wars, the Kurds displayed tremendous zeal. According to Hasan Arfaʿ, a former chief of military intelligence, 'Ismail Aqa at the time had 10,000 armed men'. Arfaʿ attests to the incredible loyalty and devotion of Simko's forces and the fact that their warfare was not a typical tribal fight.[89] For instance, he explains that on their last day of clashes:

> The Kurds attacked us four times in one morning… . Shockingly, they were not using guns but their swords and daggers. This type of fighting was extraordinary for the tribes… . The war with Simko's forces was not analogous with the state's previous wars with the Kurds.[90]

The reason was that the forces of Simko 'fought for their autonomy'.[91] In this battle, Simko's men sustained an irrecoverable defeat. Hence, Simko was never able to recoup his might and prestige. 'Simko's defeat in the summer of 1922, the army's victory in Loristan the following year and the suppression of Khazʿal [in Arab regions,] in 1924 were all celebrated widely in the major Iranian towns at the time.'[92] After years of exile and intermittent skirmishes with the state, roaming on the Iranian, Iraqi and Turkish borders, Simko was finally trapped and killed in 1930.

Statist narration, 'denial and resistance'

As Abbas Vali, a scholar of Kurdish and Iranian Studies notes, Kurdish–State relations can be characterized as a 'dialectic of denial and resistance'.[93] The statist historiography approach to Simko should be seen within this dialectic. By imagining 'the state as sole initiator and agent of change',[94] the dominant historiographical discourse dismisses political demands from non-dominant ethnicities as tribal discontent.[95] In doing so, this historiography has become the manifestation of the dialectic of denial and resistance. Accordingly, the identitarian nature of Kurdish uprisings is often reduced to a mere remnant of tribalism, and the state's military campaign is justified as its obligation to preserve law and order. The dominant historiographical explanation of Kurdish resistance in general and Simko's activities in particular can be summed up in terms of denial, domination and defence. First, it denies that Kurds aspired to self-determination before the end of Reza Khan's era. It does so by reproducing and reaffirming official claims of the cultural, racial and even linguistic homogeneity of the Iranian polity. In some later texts, Reza Shah's arbitrary rule is shown to be the primary cause for the emergence of non-Persian nationalism.[96] Second, peripheral resistance is framed as dubious and as the result of foreign incitements and meddling, and is thus delegitimized. Finally, this historiography defends the legitimacy of the centre in the face of any ethnicity-based challenges from the periphery, in part by explicitly or implicitly defining the peripheral Other as *ashrār*[97] (evildoers), tribalists, looters and the like.

As stated earlier, statist historiography describes Kurdish opposition to the state as the persistence of tribalism. This is not because the dominant historiography perceives nationalism as inherently tribal. Rather, it represents Kurdish ethno-nationalist resistance simply as a phenomenon lacking genuine political demands. From the statist perspective, acknowledging the presence of a Kurdish resistance *qua* Kurdish (and therefore possibly national) resistance would have meant the admission of the non-singularity of the nation. The term 'tribalism' was used to define anti-centralist and ethno-national movements in the early twentieth century in those Middle Eastern countries that have a sizable Kurdish

population. In state discourse, tribes are posited to have universally known dispositions, common characteristics and identical patterns of behaviour regardless of where or when they exist.[98] This projection of tribalism into the past gained much currency and was propagated as a justification for colonial powers in the face of native challenges.[99] The ascription of tribalism has also had the more practical aim of justifying the exertion of state violence. As Iranian studies scholar Kaveh Bayat asserts, the politics of 'sedentarization, which was carried out in Luristan, Fars, Azerbaijan and Khurasan during the years 1933 to 1937, took a very brutal and, in some cases, a genocidal, form'.[100]

Persian nationalist historiography has been uncritical in adopting the state's discourse of tribalism. This historiography is the product of an elite for whom 'the restoration of the central government's authority over the country was of the utmost importance, the first priority being to put an end to the semiindependence and autonomous state of the country's tribes and local powers'.[101] Permitting the recognition of multiple identities within the writing of history was thus seen as a threat to the homogeneity of the polity. In the nationalist imagination, tribalism was applied indiscriminately as a pejorative label to any behaviour or attitude even faintly associated with undesired identities. Communities that claimed multiple sources of identity were to be interdicted from playing any constructive role in the nation-state. According to Bayat:

> In an era when war provided the means for states to assert their supremacy over society through monopolizing not only the means of coercion, but also through asserting their legitimacy as the sole agent capable of preserving the unity of the country, Riza Shah's tribal campaigns assumed an essential and indispensable role in his state-building endeavors.[102]

As stated at the outset, my aim here is not to hierarchize different forms of nationalism morally in order to categorize them as either good or bad. I am merely attempting to explain how the socio-political context of nationalist rivalries has shaped history writing in Iran. Moreover, I argue that the Simko uprising cannot be explained either as a security problem or as sheer tribal resistance against the state's modernizing policies. Perceiving the conflict between Kurds and the state as a conflict between the forces of modernity and pre-modernity places statist modernity outside of the discourse of power. It is important to note that 'the detribalizing discourse' also recapitulates the mechanisms used by supporters of colonialism when they drew on the discourses of the European Enlightenment to justify their *missions civilisatrices*.

It should be reiterated that statist historiography exhibits a uniform approach towards any ethnicity-based opposition to the state, characterizing it as (tribal) unruliness. For instance, Iranian historian Mortaza Barazuyi states that 'all Persian historians without exception do not consider Simko as a Kurdish nationalist leader but rather as the cruel head of the Shikak tribe, who were all robbers and looters'. His characterization is not limited to Simko alone. Barazuyi portrays the Shikak community in its entirety as 'robbers and looters'.[103] He goes on to say that no 'accurate assessment of the record of Simko and his followers proves [his aforementioned] claim incontestable'.[104] Barazuyi nevertheless avoided including a single Kurdish work on the subject. This understanding of peripheral resistance to the state is apparent in the works of the majority of Persian intellectuals and distinguished historians who, as historian Mehrzad Boroujerdi describes, were in effect, 'intellectual statesmen'.[105] The Persian intelligentsia usually stayed in close proximity to state power, defended the state against anti-central political movements, and

therefore 'at one time or another approved of Sayyid Ziya and Reza Khan's [Persian] nationalist platform and the need for a strong central government'.[106]

The Persian intelligentsia either actively participated in the state's *mission auto-civilisatrice*, especially between 1920 and 1941, or remained obdurately supportive of this mission. What Stephanie Cronin, an historian of Iran, describes as 'the imbalance in much older scholarship resulting from too great an emphasis on the high politics of the urban elite [of the center]'[107] is one manifestation of pro-state tendencies among the Persian elite. The dominant ethnicity perceiving the state as the agent of change has led to the conflation of *étatisme* with progress and developed its moral system, with its own idealized and despised images.[108] The pro-state and the dominant nationalist entities were 'good' or idealized by default, while the remainder were undesirable, portrayed as relics belonging to the past and hindrances to the country's progress. Christopher Houston, a scholar of Kurdish studies, is right to claim that nationalism (be it dominant or dominated) invents 'a new virtue. [The] discourses on Kurdish identity too brings with it an ethical dimension, constructed partially around the virtues of indignity and authenticity'.[109] Yet, there is a difference between the two: dominant nationalism 'is able to legislate virtues'.[110] While dominated nationalism is portrayed as inherently evil, dominant nationalism – through laws and state institutions – creates its national subjects within the framework of the ruling culture and language.

In many respected works of Persian history, such as that of renowned historian Ahmad Kasravi, the word Kurd is often qualified by terms like looters, belligerents (*ātash-afrūz*) and evildoers (*ashrār*, an Arabic term with a strong religious overtone).[111] Challengers to the central state were generally identified as *ashrār*. In the eyes of Reza Khan and the Persian elite, local leaders and 'traditional elements' such as the Bakhtiyari khans and Shaykh Khazʿal of Muhammarah were not only beyond the control of the centre, but also 'impediments to the achievement of modernity and national unity… they constituted a permanent fifth column, and were a perennial danger to the integrity and political independence of the Iranian state'.[112] The pro-state intelligentsia often perceived regional political opposition as a security threat to national unity.[113] A cursory glimpse at the press reveals that the Persian elite was even advocating the denial of show trials to those who challenged the state and despite some reservations, Riza Khan was generally portrayed as 'Iran's last chance to preserve its unity and independence'.[114]

The activities of Simko and similar actors are always discussed negatively and in terms of national security. These challengers are depicted as unruly and dangerous, conducive to foreign exploitation, and conspirators against the country's territorial integrity. The following passage from Muhammad T. Bahar, a renowned Persian historian, poet and lexicologist, exemplifies how the aforementioned elements are conflated. He states that:

> the Kurdish *ashrār* (evildoers) such as Sheikh ʿUbeydullah, Hamza Agha of Shikak and all the members of that family like Ismaʿil Agha himself are known for their long history (*ʿahd-i ʿatiq*) of rebellion but of course the enormity of the state forces has been instrumental in their defeat and destruction. It is obvious that in every country, state forces are able to defeat rebel groups be they from the [non-tribal] people or from tribes.

After berating the above-mentioned persons, irrespective of the disparity between their times and socio-political contexts, Bahar introduces the third cause for their revolts: foreign conspiracy and foreign incitement. The implicit logic of dominant historiographical

texts is this: if it were not for their unruly nature or foreign incitement, why would people from the periphery rebel against 'their own state'? Rather than providing motivation, ethnic self-identification betrays the deviant nature of tribalism. Bahar dismisses any possible political motivations behind Simko's movement or its appeal. In his view:

> Ismail Agha was one of these rebels who were perhaps incited by the neighboring states. [It] is not an exaggeration to say that some of the army officers delayed killing him for their foreign ties or used him as a bargaining-chip for their personal politics.[115]

Persian nationalists who ascended from the military to the intelligentsia generally painted Simko's uprising as one that lacked any serious political dimensions. Instead, they attributed his actions to the unruly tribal nature of the region's population. It is striking that such views about peripheral resistance are so prevalent that they continue to inform histories of Iran today. Historian of Iran Ervand Abrahamian ridicules Seyyed Jaʿfar Pishevari for founding and leading the Azerbaijan Democratic Party in 1945. Abrahamian states that 'Pishevari *suddenly rediscovered* his [ethnic] Azari "*roots*"[116] and realized that his native Azerbaijan had *long been deprived of its "national rights."* A parallel "uprising" took place in neighboring Kurdistan.'[117] This characterization discounts the sense of betrayal felt by Azeri Turks. Azeris played a unique role in the success of the Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1907. Nonetheless, they were the first to be subjected to discrimination and a language ban after Reza Shah's consolidation of power. Yet Abrahamian overlooks this history and insinuates that Pishevari either abused Azeri-ness for his personal interest or was spurred to action by foreign powers, i.e. by the Russians, regardless of the existence of popular support for the Azeri cause. In a similar vein, the tribal social structure blamed for Simko's uprising supposedly remains conducive to producing banditry even to this day. For instance, we are told that even current 'Kurdish liberation movements […] are deeply rooted in the Kurdish *alienating mode of behavior*. *The traditional political culture of seize-and-loot has largely been abandoned*, but *still plays a critical role* in the politics of factionalism and alienation.'[118]

Conclusion

In summation, statist motives have determined the writing of history. Reza Shah's campaign against 'tribes' and his nationalist agenda, according to Banani were 'inspired, encouraged, and supported by an articulated majority of intelligentsia, and his actions were approved and applauded by a majority of the urban middle class, government officials, army officers, professional men, and students'.[119] Like most statist historiographies, Persian historiography has thus been written to serve a nationalist project and the ruling community's interests. Such histories deny the political legitimacy of Others by rewriting rival nationalists as groups of bandits or foreign mercenaries who warrant elimination and have no valid political claims. The erasure of Kurdish nationalist sentiments matters not simply because of the significance of the nationalism of dominated groups. It also deserves scholarly attention since such an erasure serves state silencing of some aspects of the past and the continuation of state practice against dominated groups.[120]

Statist historiography in the portrayal of Simko is thus, at best, distorted. Simko is presented as someone who lacked any political aspirations. Simko's life story and his devotion to Kurdish cultural and educational activities, including the spread of Kurdish literacy,

reveal that his uprising was not resistance to modernity and law and order. But to acknowledge his political objectives would throw the state discourse of cultural and linguistic national homogeneity into question. Hence, in the official account, Simko and Kurds are portrayed as 'bloodthirsty looters'[121] without any goal beyond looting and plunder. In this mode of writing history, complex ethnic and religious relationships as possible causes for peripheral dissent have been effaced.

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Notes

1. P. Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), p.6.
2. D. McCrone, *The Sociology of Nationalism: Tomorrow's Ancestors*, International Library of Sociology (London; New York: Routledge, 1998), p.44.
3. Cf. K. Bayat, 'Riza Shah and the Tribes: An Overview' in Stephanie Cronin (ed.), *The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under Riza Shah 1921–1941* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003).
4. For an interesting paper on the Turkish case and the way the state refers to Kurdish identity as synonymous with tribalism, see M. Yeğen, 'The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of Kurdish Identity', *Middle Eastern Studies* Vol.32, no.2 (April 1996), pp.216–29.
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6. Cf. B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (Rev. and extended ed, London; New York: Verso, 1991).
7. Cf. McCrone, pp.11–7.
8. D. Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), p.7.
9. Cf. A. Vali, *Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism*, Kurdish Studies Series (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2003).
10. For more on this issue, see K. Soleimani, *Islam and Competing Nationalisms in the Middle East, 1876–1926* (New York: Palgrave, 2016), p.284.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Cf. M. Barazuyi, *Barrasiy-e Awzaʿ-e Siyasiy-e Kordestan*, az sal-e 1258–1325 [*The Political Situation in Kurdistan, Between 1869 and1936*] (Tehran: Fekr-e No, 1999); M.-T. Bahar, *Tarīkh-e Mukhtaṣar-e Aḥzab-e Siyasī-e Iran* [*A Concise History of Political Parties in Iran*] (Tehran: Sherkat-e Sohamiy-e Ketabha-ye Jībī, 1979); A. Kasravi, *Tarīkh-e Hijdeh Saleh-ye Aẕarbayjan* [*18 Years in the History of Azerbaijan*] (Vol.1–2, Tehran: Matbaʿah-ye Ṭoluʿ, 1934).
14. For a more detailed story, see M. Tamaddun, *Awzaʿ-e Iran dar Jang-e Avval ya Tarīkh-e Rezaʾiyeh* [*Iran During the First World War or the History of Urmia*] (Reżaʾiyeh: Moʾasseseh-ye Matbuʿati, 1971), pp.334–35.
15. Foreign ministry records quoted in M. Barazuyi, p.150.

16. Cf. R. Olson, *The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880–1925* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989).
17. M.R. Hawar, *Simko; Ismail Aghay Shikak u Bzutnewey Netewayeti Kurd* [*Ismail Agha Simko and the Kurdish National Movement*] (Stockholm: Chapxaney APEC, 1995), pp.259–64.
18. Ibid., p.150.
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20. For more details, see C. Celil, *Nahḍatu al-Akrad al-Thaqafiyyah wa al-Qawmiyyah fi Nihayati al-Qarn al-Tasi'a wa Bidayat al-'Ishirin* [*Kurdish Cultural and Political Movements in the late 19th and early 20th Century*], Naazi Fard (trans.) (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab, 1986), pp.178–81.
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23. For more details, see Hawar, pp.163–68, and H. Madani, *Kurd u Statiji Dewletan* (Vol. 2, Stockholm: Spartryck, 2001), pp.55–6.
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25. Tamaddun, pp.370–71.
26. Madani, p.52.
27. O. Ali, *Dirāsat f ī al-Ḥarakah al-Kurdiya al-Mu'āṣirah* [*A Study of Contemporary Kurdish Movements (1833–1946)*] (Arbil: Maktab al-Tafṣīr, 2003), p.343.
28. Hawar, p.168.
29. Reynolds, pp.120–22.
30. Cf. M.T. Sorgun (ed.), *Ittihat ve Terakki'den Cumhuriyet'e: Bitmeyen Savaş, Kutulamare Kahramanı Halil Paşa'nın Anıları* [*From the Committee of Union and Progress to the Emergence of the Republic*] (Istanbul: 7 Gün Yayınları, 1972), p.60.
31. Tamaddun, p.322.
32. F. Hasangoli, 'Simko' (Unpublished MA thesis, 2011), p.14.
33. Cf. Tamaddun, p.371.
34. Cf. Iranian National Archives Records. File: 240003905, No. 2864. 1960.
35. Chris Kochera, *Kurdish National Movement*, trans. Ebrahim Younesi (Tehran: Nigah Press, 1994), p.64.
36. Hasangoli, *Simko*, p.37.
37. Tamaddun, p.322.
38. Kasravi, Vol.2, p.830.
39. Banani, p.39.
40. Zirinsky, p.5.
41. Many others report similar figures. See W. Jwaideh, *The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006); K.M. Ahmad, *Kurdistan During the First World War* (London: Saqi Books, 1994); M.T. O'Shea, *Trapped Between the Map and Reality: Geography and Perceptions of Kurdistan* (New York: Routledge, 2004), p.100.
42. Zirinsky, p.8.
43. Ibid., pp.8–9.
44. Barazuyi, pp.162–63.
45. Zirinsky, p.10.
46. The National Archives. Eastern Reports. Catalogue Reference: CAB/24/145. No. CXXVIII. July 10, 1919, p.4.
47. See a letter by T.E. Allen to the Secretary of State. Project. Tehran Persia. No. 402. Jun 12, 1918. Gomidas Institute Armenian Genocide Documentation.
48. Ibid.
49. See Ali, pp.362–71.
50. (*Mara beh īn hal andakhteh*)
51. Kasravi, Vol.2., p.727.
52. *The National Archives*. Eastern Reports. Catalogue Reference: CAB/24/145. No. CXXY. June 19, 1919, p.245.
53. Ibid., No. CXXVIII. July 10, 1919, p.4.

54. Tamaddun, p.322.
55. Ibid, p.337.
56. The National Archives. Eastern Reports. Catalogue Reference: CAB/24/129. Not 4 5. November 2, 1921, p.574.
57. Ali, p.344.
58. See R.K. Mo'tamed al-Vozarâ, *Urumiyeh dar Jang-e 'Alamsuz; Az Moqaddemeh-ye Nasara ta Bolva-ye Esma'il Aqa* [*Urmia During the First World War, from the Christian Rebellion to that of Ismail Aqha* (*1290–1300*)] (Tehran: Nashr-e Shirazeh, 1990). Al-Vozarâ's memoir constitutes one of the primary sources for Kasravi's *Tarikh-e Hijdeh Saleh-ye Azarbayjan* [*18 Years in the History of Azerbaijan*].
59. Derakhshani, p.153.
60. Al-Vozarâ, p.339.
61. Ibid., pp.340–41.
62. Zirinsky, p.2.
63. Al-Vozarâ, pp.340–41.
64. Ibid., p.334.
65. Ibid., p.244.
66. To my knowledge, Ghassemlou is the only author to attend to this issue, though in passing. See A. al-Rahman Ghassemlou, *Kurdistan u Kurd: Lêkolineweyki Siyasi u Aburi* [*Kurdistan and Kurds: A Political and Economic Investigation*] (Sweden: Çapxaney Erzan, 2000).
67. Al-Vozarâ, p.502.
68. Ibid., p.502.
69. Cf. *Kurd*. No. 3. (23 July 1922).
70. Tamaddun, p.371.
71. Ibid.
72. *Shaqāwat* (literally: deeply in the wrong) is a religious term that both the Persian and the Turkish states have labelled Kurdish opposition as such. For instance, a Quranic verse (41:52) reads: 'Who could be more astray than one who places himself [so] deeply in the wrong (*shiqaq*)?'
73. *Kurd*. No. 3, 23 July 1922.
74. Tamaddun, v.
75. Ibid., p.324.
76. Kasravi. Vol.I, p.425.
77. Al-Vozarâ, p.495.
78. Kavianpour, p.161.
79. Al-Vozarâ, p.512.
80. Ibid, p.440.
81. *Kurd*. No. 3. (23 July 1922).
82. Ibid.
83. Ali, p.346.
84. Ibid, p.346.
85. Ibid, p.347.
86. The National Archives. Eastern Reports. Catalogue Reference: CAB /24/145. No. CV. January 30, 1919, p.182.
87. Ibid., CAB/24/157. No. 78. September 13, 1922, p.164.
88. Arfa', p.81.
89. Ibid, pp.81–9.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. K. Bayat, 'Riza Shah and the Tribes: An Overview' in Stephanie Cronin (ed.), *The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under Riza Shah, 1921–1941* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p.228.
93. A. Vali, 'The Kurds and Their "Others": Fragmented Identity and Fragmented Politics,' *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, Fall Vol.18, no.2 (1998), pp.82–95.
94. Cronin, p.3.
95. Cf. Barazuyi, Bahar, Kasravi.

96. Cf. Barazuyi, p.216. Even though Kasravi considers Simko to be too brutish and too primitive to demand independence, he nevertheless accuses him of separatism. *18 Years History of Azerbayjan*, Vol.2, p.830.
97. *Ashrar* (pl., 'evildoers', singular *sharr*, is an Arabic word used in the Quran as the opposite of *khair (*good or goodness). This word is frequently used, even after 1979, in the official discourse on Kurdish opposition. It is worth remembering that Ayatollah Khomeini's first declaration of Jihad against the Kurdish political movement in Eastern Kurdistan ordered 'cleansing the Kurdistan region of those *ashrar*'. *Sahifay-e Nur: Majmuay-e Rahnumudhay-e Imam Khomeini*/ Tehhiy-e va Jam'avariy-e Markaz-e Madarek-e Farhangiy-e Inghlab-e Islami, Jald-e 12 (Tehran: vazarat-e Irashad-e Islami, 1364), p.292.
98. Of course, up to now the state has tolerated the existence of some 'tribal' elements and used them against nationalist movements. The same policy can be observed in Iran and in Iraq from the pre-mandate era up to the end of Saddam Hussein's rule. Talal Asad's work on tribes is informative here. Asad shows that anthropologists have at least three different definitions for tribes. He shows how the Kababish tribe in Sudan undergoes a great deal of transformation over a relatively short time span, making a strong case for how the tribe turns from a somewhat independent entity into a collaborator with the colonial power, and later with the state, then serves as an extension of the state's administrative body. Cf. T. Asad, *Political Inequality in the Kababish Tribe* in Evans-Pritchard et al. (eds.), *Essays in Sudan Ethnography* (London: C. Hurst, 1972).
99. It is worth remembering that one of the most detailed contemporaneous studies of the Kurdish, Turkmen and other tribes of the region was done by one of the authors of *Sykes-Picot,* Mark Sykes.
100. Bayat in Cronin, p.229.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid, p.228.
103. Barazuyi, p.216.
104. Ibid.
105. M. Boroujerdi, 'Triumphs and Travails of Authoritarian Modernisation in Iran' in Stephanie Cronin (ed.), *The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under Riza Shah 1921–1941* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p.150.
106. S. Cronin (ed.), *The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under Riza Shah, 1921–1941* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p.3.
107. Ibid.
108. The expressions 'idealized image' and 'despised image' are taken from the theory of K. Horney, *Our Inner Conflicts* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, INC, 1945).
109. C. Houston, *Kurdistan: Crafting of National Selves* (Bloomington; Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008), p.31.
110. Ibid.
111. Satan is known be the source or the absolute manifestation of *shar*, evil deed, for its diabolical and unruly nature moves in direct opposition to the absolute *khair,* good and goodness.
112. Cronin, p.260.
113. See Vali, 'The Kurds and Their "Others"' (1998), pp.82–95.
114. Bayat in Cronin, p.228.
115. M.T. Bahar, *Tarikh-e Mukhtasar-e Aḥzab-e Siyasiy-e Iran* [*A Concise History of Political Parties in Iran*] (Tehran: Sherkat-e Sohamiy-e Ketabha-ye Jībī, 1979), p.266.
116. Emphasis added.
117. E. Abrahamian, *Modern History of Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p.111. Emphasis added.
118. A. Manafi, *The Kurdish Political Struggles in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey: A Critical Analysis* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2005), p.44. Emphasis added.
119. Banani, p.47.
120. See M.-R. Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1995).
121. See Kasravi, *Tarīkh-e Hījdeh Saleh-ye Āẕarbayjān*, Vol.1–2.