

UNITED STATES AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN IRAQ

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Abstract: This study examined United States and democratization in Iraq. The study was anchored on the democratic peace theory as propounded by Immanuel Kant in 1795. The study adopted ex-post research design while data was gotten from secondary source such as textbooks, journal articles, newspapers, magazines and internet and the data generated was analyzed through content analysis. The findings of the study showed that The United States efforts to adoptive democracy was widely implemented by a range of governmental and non-governmental actors in Iraq, but it has yielded far less than what was promised and United States interest has had negative effects on democratization in Iraq as the dissolution of the Iraqi army has resulted to security vacuum in Iraq. Based on the findings the study recommended among others; Democracy should not be seen as a United States import but rather an indigenous adaptation of general principles by Iraqi people.

Keywords: Government, system, elections, human rights, constitution.

1. INTRODUCTION

The United States (US) has worked to promote its own worldview, which is based on a mix of liberal democratic political norms and free market economic principles. The US has taken its leadership role seriously and assertively, and has not shied away from declaring the Middle East's significance as a national security priority. The fundamental aspects of US ideology were steadily developed and employed in defense of the country's interests around the world. On the eve of the US entry into the First World War in 1917, President Woodrow Wilson issued a call for the world to be made safe for democracy. The promotion of 'democracy' supplied the conceptual grounds for the US opposition to foes such as imperialism, fascism, and finally communism. It has also shaped the outlines of the modern international system to a large extent, as evidenced by the different democratic 'waves' that have happened around the world during the last century. The Middle East found American political ideals, ideas, and principles appealing during and after World War I. Despite the fact that the Middle East region was heavily influenced by Europe after World War I, according to Pratt (1972), American ties with the region, particularly petroleum firms, developed gradually. Between the two World Wars, the US remained only tangentially involved in Middle Eastern events from a political standpoint, but it created a slew of economic ties with the region. The US government began to pay more attention to the region's significant oil reserves and reassess its importance to US and allied security interests, but "it was not until the end of WWII that the area came to assume real significance in US foreign policy" and her political presence in the region increased (Ismael, 1986).

This shift can be attributed to a number of events in the region, including the use of Iran as a transit route for sending Lend-Lease supplies to the Soviet Union from 1941 to 1945, the establishment of the Arabian-American Oil Company (Aramco) in Saudi Arabia in 1938, and the Arab nationalist movement in the early 1920s, which she influenced through her domestic ideals." Furthermore, the US remained the preeminent superpower in the post-Cold War era as a result of the Cold War. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the US foreign policy was distinguished by hegemony, leadership, primacy, and military might. Iraq's strategic location and vast oil reserves made it a key player in the area for US interests. The promotion of 'democracy' overseas, on the other hand, has been a cornerstone of US foreign policy since the early twentieth century, coinciding with the country's ascent as a global player. The year 1979 was a turning point in US-Iraq relations. Saddam Hussein had formally seized the presidency of Iraq during this time by pushing Ahmad Hassan

al-Bakr into retirement on July 16, 1979. With Saddam's rise to power, however, the US aimed to achieve its goal of re-establishing a stable hegemonic position in the region by limiting Iran's spread and Ayatollah Khomeini's growing influence. The US connection with Iraq was thus vital to its efforts to undercut Ayatollah Khomeini's revolutionary power. According to Allawi, a former minister of trade and defense in the Iraqi Governing Council's Cabinet, US policy toward Iraq became more affected by a new strategic variable in the 1970s: the development of the Shah's Iran as a crucial partner in the region. When the US was seen engaging in Iraq's affairs, it was to boost Iran's relative influence in the Gulf's war for domination. Iraq was pushed to the back of the list of US interests in the region. With the fall of the Shah's regime and the formation of the virulently anti-American Islamic Republic of Iran, all of this altered.

The perceived lack of democracy in Iraq, on the other hand, was cited as one of the key arguments for the US-led coalition's invasion of the country in 2003. One of the motivations for launching the war in Iraq, according to Bush, was to bring democracy to the country. The US-led Coalition Provisional Authority named an interim Coalition Governing Council of Iraqis in mid-2003, with the sole purpose of facilitating the next stage of government formation. Insurgent and terrorist actions, mainly in Sunni-dominated central Iraq, hampered the normalization of administration and services from 2003 until early 2005. A nationwide election was held in January 2005 to elect members of an interim parliament tasked with electing an interim president and drafting a constitution. However, the efficiency of the new coalition administration remained under question, and economic and civil society rehabilitation remained slow. The level of violence progressively grew as US forces assumed control of the country, dwarfing the brutality during Saddam's final years in power and tripling the average yearly death rates for his entire quarter-century in office. Kidnapping, rape, and armed robbery have all reached new highs in recent years. Small guns have proliferated dramatically, and private militias have been swiftly expanding. In 2004, Amnesty International and other human rights organizations condemned US forces for committing extensive violations of international humanitarian law, including torture and other forms of ill-treatment of detainees. Despite the Bush administration's mainly successful efforts to conceal the scope of US torture of Iraqi detainees, the Abu Ghraib revelations were only the top of the iceberg. The Iraqi government, which is backed by the US, is ruled by inept Shi'ite Islamist fanatics who are closely aligned with hardline Iranian clergy. Human rights violations are becoming more common, largely at the hands of the government's only security agency. "Not only has the Iraqi government failed to provide minimal safety for its residents, but it has also adopted a strategy of rounding up and torturing innocent citizens," according to Amnesty International.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

This paper addressed several objectives which includes to; (1) ascertain whether United States has contributed to democratization in Iraq, and; (2) examine the impact of the pursuit of United States interest on democratization in Iraq.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Democratic Peace Theory, proposed by Immanuel Kant in 1795, was employed for this study. In his essay Perpetual Peace, he predicted that if the world were exclusively populated by constitutional republics, conflict would be a thing of the past (Kant, 1917). Kant's idea of constitutional republic would accomplish this by obtaining the agreement of the governed before declaring war. Because the residents would bear the financial, physical, and emotional costs of a fight, Kant saw no reason for them to declare war other than to defend themselves from outside anger (Kant, 1917). He then went on to illustrate the specific contrasts between majority rule government, which he compares to oppression, oppression, and republicanism, which has a constitution and an arrangement of detachment of abilities inside the public authority (Kant, 1917). Kant's depiction of the conservative government is consistent with the advanced meaning of a liberal vote-based system, which is used to explain the rationale for democratic peace theory, the most widely accepted theory in international relations (Russett, 2001). The democratic peace theory is based on the notion that a negative system can be limited in some way. War is unquestionably the most significant of these factors. This is based on the idea that global connections between states aren't basically a zero-sum game in which one state's benefits equal the other's costs, but that they can be represented by the formation of forms of cooperation and mutual benefit. Again, if it is not understood that states behave differently in the international system, and that the current domestic political regime influences such behavior in a significant way, this theory loses its validity. Those who rely on democratic peace theory to promote global democracy must recall that Kant's philosophy is infused with the idea of not using conflict to effect historical change. The significance of this theory to this study is evident, given the United States' desire for every country in the world to be a democratic nation, as democratic states do not go to war.

2. METHODOLOGY

Given the paper's dilemma, the Ex Post Facto (After the Fact) research design was used. Secondary data was used to compile this work, which included textbooks, journal articles, newspapers, magazines, official government records, and internet materials, among other things. The data generated was analyzed using content analysis. This is done in order to find a logical data sequence as well as trends.

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Tables and data were supplied at this time to help address the two objectives outlined. In other words, the purpose of this section is to establish an empirical link between the United States and Iraqi democratization.

Table 1: United States contribution to democratization in Iraq

United States democratic blue print in Iraq	Progress made by US in Iraq
Free and autonomous civil society group	International non-governmental organizations and donors have inspired the formation of a slew of new civil society organizations in Iraq.
Free and fair elections	In Iraq, a free election battle would result in the formation of a representative government.
Drafting the Iraqi constitution	There was a distinct absence of strategic cooperation between Washington and Bremer's CPA during the Iraqi constitution-writing process.
Investigative journalism and free media	The elimination of restrictions on free expression was a critical component of the Coalition Provisional Authority's political strategy in Iraq.
Respect for human rights	The approval of the TAL document, which specifically condemned torture and other cruel, inhuman, or humiliating treatment or punishment.

Source: Computed by the researcher based on data from <https://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/6257/>

Table 1 showing, international non-governmental organizations and donors have inspired the formation of a slew of new civil society organizations in Iraq, in Iraq, a free election battle would result in the formation of a representative government, there was a distinct absence of strategic cooperation between Washington and Bremer's CPA during the Iraqi constitution-writing process, the elimination of restrictions on free expression was a critical component of the Coalition Provisional Authority's political strategy in Iraq and the approval of the TAL document, which specifically condemned torture and other cruel, inhuman, or humiliating treatment or punishment.

Free and autonomous civil society group

The US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, which began in March 2003, marked a watershed moment in Iraqi civil society. The collapse of the Ba'athist regime, the sudden absence of political control, the onset of a humanitarian catastrophe, and the entry of INGOs and donors were all reasons that drove the establishment of numerous new Civil Society Organizations in Iraq. It is estimated that between 8,000 and 12,000 of these organizations were formed in the years following the invasion. In an effort to institutionalize governmental backing for these new entities, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) quickly constituted a Committee for Civil Society Organizations. The formation of civil society as an active participant in Iraq's recovery and development became a hot topic among major players. While the appearance of a large civil society is typically regarded as a positive step forward in development. Iraq's civic society since 2003, has become an extremely sensitive and divisive subject. Many NGOs were founded as a reaction to the past dictatorship, as proxy for political parties in power, or as opportunistic businesses aimed at gaining access to the large amount of humanitarian help that was flowing into the nation.

Free and fair elections

The US touted efforts to improve the democratic process in Iraq as evidence that US foreign policy toward Iraq after 9/11 and the 2003 Iraq war was motivated by a genuine desire to foster democracy in that country. According to the US Department of State's February 2006 report, 'Rebuilding Iraq, US Achievements through the Iraq Relief & Reconstruction Fund,' there is some considerable indication that Iraq has begun advanced measures toward becoming a democratic government. In the aftermath of the 2003 war, the report recognizes the December 2005 elections to elect a four-year administration as an important step toward democratic growth. Although there were allegations of rebellion and violence, these elections were said to have gone off without a hitch. Furthermore, the International Mission for Iraqi Elections (IMIE), an international non-governmental body established in 2004 (composed of independent electoral management bodies as well as the League of Arab States as an observer), assessed the 2005 Iraqi elections and concluded in its final report in 2006 that the design of the legal framework, institutions, and procedures governing the December 2005 elections conformed to international standards. The December 2005 elections broadened the spectrum of participation, according to the IMIE Report, and voter turnout was high. According to the report, despite continued armed violence and poor security conditions, the Iraqi people voted in numbers that would make democracies in more settled regions of the world proud (IMIE, 2006). Despite these advances in electoral participation, and despite being certified as free and fair by international monitors (Freedom House, 2007), the International Crisis Group (ICG) reported that the Sunni and Shiite 'urban – slum underclass' populations boycotted the January 2005 elections on the orders of their political leaders (ICG, 2009). As a result of 'important constituencies' declining to vote, there were substantial imbalances in parliament and regional councils (Hill, 2011).

Drafting the Iraqi constitution

During the process of drafting the Iraqi constitution, there was also a distinct lack of strategic cooperation between Washington and Bremer's CPA. The main issue here was the schedule for the constitution process devised by the CPA and the Iraqi leadership. The Transitional Administration Law for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (TAL) called for elections for a Provisional Assembly to elect a Provisional Government on January 30, 2005. Much more crucially, the Provisional Assembly was to draft a constitution within six months. The draft constitution was to be completed by the 15th of August of that year, followed by a popular referendum on the constitution on the 15th of October, and then new elections for a permanent Assembly on the 15th of December. If the Provisional Assembly did not request an extension and did not finish drafting the constitution by August 15th, TAL called for its dissolution and a "start-over" from the beginning.

While Bremer was the CPA Administrator, he was unwavering in his belief that meeting the mandated dates was critical in order to "keep the momentum of the political process" in Iraq, he notes in his memoir that important members of the Bush Administration did not share his viewpoint (Bremer, 2006). "Some important Washington actors went wobbly on our 'carved in stone' deadlines," Bremer says (Bremer, 2006). Bremer cites a chat he had with Condoleezza Rice in which the then-National Security Adviser told him that "some individuals here" are still moving toward giving over sovereignty to an appointed government with no constitution in April" (Bremer, 2006). Bremer remarked that it sounded to him like the people being referred to be in the Pentagon's policy office. In his memoir, he added that he told Rice that he strongly advised against the Pentagon staff's planned strategy because it did not serve the President's or America's interests in Iraq (Bremer, 2006). Bremer recalls that during a National Security Council meeting on February 13th, Donald Rumsfeld suggested that because the US now has so much leverage in Iraq, it could consider divesting sovereignty "in parts" or "sliding" the date. Bremer asserted that during the same discussion, Colin Powell stated that it would not be a failure if the United States relinquished sovereignty on the 1st of August rather than the 30th of June in order to ensure the security of the region since Iraq's temporary government was prepared to take control.

According to Bremer, President Bush himself stated that, while the date slip would be a defeat, the US might maybe "calibrate sovereignty" in some way (Bremer, 2006). Bremer believed that a lack of strategic cooperation originating from the corridors of power in Washington posed a serious threat to the complex political structure that he and other like-minded persons were attempting to construct in Iraq. Indeed, Bremer found it difficult to hold the Iraqis to the 15th November Agreement if Washington was 'wobbly' or not tough on the matter. He believed that it was critical for the United States to maintain firm public pronouncements about the June 30th handover. Bremer also believed that any delay in completing the deadline would raise questions about the US's ultimate goals in Iraq, potentially costing American lives (Bremer, 2006). Bremer appeared to be committed to meeting the specified timeframes, even if each milestone just reflected a hollow achievement.

Investigative journalism and free media

The removal of press restrictions was a major component of the CPA's political strategy in Iraq. According to Bridoux, the CPA identified the establishment of a free press as crucial to the transmission of ideas and values congruent with the wider US goal of re-formatting Iraqi society along democratic lines. Indeed, the establishment of a free press, according to Bridoux, was a vital component of the CPA's effort to garner the favor of the Iraqi people (Bridoux, 2011). The virtues of an open and tolerant society could be easily demonstrated by maintaining a free and uncensored press, which was expected to endear Iraqis to the ways of a liberal democratic society (Allawi, 2007). In the aftermath of the war, more than 100 newspapers sprouted up in Baghdad to meet this challenge, and in addition to Az-Zaman, two other newspapers, the Iraqi National Congress's al-Moutamar and the Kurdish Al-Ittihad, came out of exile to print in Baghdad (cited in Fisk, 2003). Shawqat explains in the aftermath of the US conquest of Iraq that it's nice to finally feel like a true journalist. We have a circulation of 50,000 in Baghdad and 15,000 in Basra, with each edition containing 12 pages of international and Arab news and eight pages of local news (cited in Fisk, 2003). According to the Freedom House Country Report on Iraq 2007, over a dozen private television stations operated in the aftermath of the US liberation of Iraq, major Arab satellite stations were easily accessible because roughly one-third of Iraqi families owned a satellite dish, and internet access was not restricted by the authorities (Freedom House, 2007).

Respect for Human Rights

Many thousands of Iraqis were murdered, tortured, or disappeared as a result of Saddam Hussein's regime's involvement in opposition politics and a range of other activities. Following the toppling of the Ba'athist administration, the CPA advocated the incorporation of human rights principles during Iraq's constitutional and legal rebuilding, which resulted in the adoption of the TAL. Torture and other cruel, inhumane, or humiliating treatment or punishment were clearly outlawed in the document. Article 37 of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution incorporated the TAL's human rights safeguards, which state that:

- 1) the liberty and dignity of man shall be protected;
- 2) no one shall be detained or investigated except on the basis of a judicial decision; and
- 3) all forms of psychological and physical torture and inhuman treatment are prohibited.

Any confession obtained via coercion, threat, or torture shall not be accepted, and the victim shall have the right to seek restitution for material and moral harm in line with the law (Iraqi Constitution 2005).

Human rights education and awareness were also regarded as a cross-cutting theme that ran across USAID's Civil Society Programme. Human rights awareness and education in civil society, civic education, women's advocacy, anti-corruption, and media components were all included in ADF. ADF established an ICSP management unit for human rights in the latter half of its contract. Many Iraqis, especially public officials, were unaware of human rights safeguards, and the quantity and ferocity of human rights breaches grew in the aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq. As a result, ICSP strengthened human rights CSOs through training, technical support, and forums for institutional building, skill enhancement, extending understanding of human rights as a concept, enhancing knowledge of specific themes, and establishing increased levels of cooperative action. CSOs extended their activities under the ICSP, such as huge public education campaigns to teach the Iraqi public and government institutions about human rights and to advocate for human rights, including the rights of children and detainees. Workshops, mobile theater, posters, banners, art displays, and festivals were all part of these public education programs. More specific advocacy operations targeted the Iraqi security sector, including police and jail personnel, as well as workers of the Ministries of Interior and Defense. ICSP Human Rights personnel and CSO implementing partners were successful in raising police understanding of human rights in many regions, forming collaborations with police departments in Basra, Mosul, Kirkuk, Hilla, Karbala, Diwaniyah, and elsewhere. ICSP also developed good working relationships with the Ministry of State for Human Rights and Parliament's Human Rights Committee. ICSP offered technical help and guidance to these institutions, including assisting the Ministry of Human Rights in developing a draft statute establishing an independent Human Rights Commission in accordance with the Paris Principles for national human rights institutions (USAID, 2007).

Despite the US's efforts to expand and clarify human rights protections, the situation of human rights in Iraq is one of the most contentious problems that critics of the Bush administration have used to reject the US's quest for democratic progress in that country. Following the release in late 2004 of the first photographs showing US military personnel

humiliating, torturing, and otherwise mistreating detainees at the infamous Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, the evidence supporting the contradictions between the Bush administration's rhetoric claims of promoting human rights in Iraq and its practices in that country became irrefutable. Dick Cheney recalls the fateful day on May 10, 2004, when he went to the Pentagon with President Bush to view images of American soldiers torturing Iraqi inmates at Abu Ghraib jail that had already been made public, as well as ones that had not been disclosed. In his memoir, Cheney recalls the photographs as very distressing. He goes on to say that the behavior was brutal and terrible, and it was surely not representative of US policy (Cheney, 2011).




Figure 1: Impact of United States pursuit for democratization in Iraq

Source: Computer by the researcher based on data from [https://pfiffner.gmu.edu/files/pdfs/Articles/CPA Orders, Iraq PDF.pdf](https://pfiffner.gmu.edu/files/pdfs/Articles/CPA%20Orders,%20Iraq%20PDF.pdf)

Figure 1 shows the impact of US pursuit on democratization in Iraq. The Coalition Provisional Authority Order 1 de-Baathification of the Iraqi Society. The CPA Order 1 also ensured that there was not sufficient security to carry on normal life in Iraq. Coalition Provisional Authority Order 2, disbanding the Iraqi Army. The CPA 2 also brought about fueling of insurgency in Iraq and undermine the normal infrastructure necessary for social and economic activity.

Dissolution of Iraqi State

The first of the two blunders occurred as a result of Bush's choice to fully entrust Bremer with command. Bremer's de-Baathification order (Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1 on 16 May 2003) barred all senior Baath Party members from serving in government, and the top three levels of all government ministries' officials were removed, even if they were not Baath Party members. Up to 85,000 persons were counted as 'genuine believers' and supporters of Saddam Hussein's administration, according to Bremer (Paul, 2007). Bremer's method was more far-reaching and severe than Garner's incremental approach to de-Baathification (Charles, 2008). President Bush, according to Bremer, made the decision to bar Baathists from participating in a new Iraqi administration. In some ways, he was right. Douglas Feith provided Bush with de-Baathification proposals during the NSC meeting on March 10, 2003. (Douglas, 2008). There was widespread agreement that top-level Saddam sympathizers in the party needed to be purged to demonstrate Iraqis that Saddam's influence had faded. Douglas Feith's Office of Special Plans collaborated on the plans with Ahmed Chalabi and advocated for a complete de-Baathification of the Iraqi government (Rajiv, 2006). On May 9, Feith showed Bremer a draft of an order for the 'De-Baathification of Iraqi Society,' and later that day, he received his 'marching instructions' in a final note from Rumsfeld, according to Bremer. The decision had been 'examined and rewritten in interagency meetings, and it obtained interagency clearance by early May,' according to Feith. 'The White House, the Department of Defense, and the State Department all approved off on this,' Bremer declared after arriving in Iraq. Despite Feith's claim that the decision was reached through an inter-agency process, the military had a different take on the strategy, and the CIA was

not contacted. The purge, according to the military, would apply to the Baath party's top two tiers, or those who were definitely leaders, which amounted to about 6,000 people. Bremer, on the other hand, interpreted the de-Baathification strategy to exclude the Baath Party's top four levels, as well as the top three levels of each government ministry. Universities, hospitals, transportation, electricity, and communications all lost leadership and top technical expertise as a result of this decision. In the Health Ministry, for example, a third of the employees was fired, and eight of the organization's top twelve officers were removed. Despite Bremer's claim that the order would touch only 20,000 persons, the overall number of people affected was estimated to be between 85,000 and 100,000.

Disbanding the Iraqi Army

The disbanding or destruction of the Iraqi army created a security vacuum, resulting in substantial loss of life and making Iraq significantly more unstable internally as a result of the development of rebel groups following the US invasion in 2003. The "bad effects" of the regime change in Iraq outweighed the "good effects." It altered the political structure, but it wreaked havoc in Iraq" (Zyad, 2016). Following the 2003 invasion, Iraq's State Administration Law enacted a variety of measures, two of which, de-Baathification and the breakup of the Iraqi army and security forces, have had the most far-reaching consequences on Iraqi politics and society. Under the Ba'ath government, the state was the major employer and promoted Ba'athists. In post-2003 Iraq, this official account rendered de-Ba'athification synonymous with de-Sunnification. As a result, the Sunni community rose against the entire governmental system, believing it was not representative or reflective of their society (Zyad, 2016). Later, this sense of exclusion showed itself in deeper schisms and the emergence of militant violent organizations. De-Sunnification also resulted in targeted assassinations and violence; "when one of these professionals or academics was slain, the attackers accused them of being a 'Ba'athist'" (Jawad, 2016). "Over 400 assassinations of academics were carried out under American occupation and under sectarian administrations," Jawad continues, "and not a single crime was probed, and nobody notified us who perpetrated these or other crimes" (Jawad, 2016). The unrepresentative nature of the US democracy promotion model can also be linked to the loss of human capacity and technical competence. Excluding Iraqi specialists from the re-building of Iraq under the pretense of de-Baathification was a big setback for democracy promotion and nation-building. According to Dawisha (2016), if the Ba'athists had been "used in partnership with US civilians to create or rebuild these institutions, whatever institutions they were, and whatever government they were in, we might have arrived at results palpable enough for Iraqis to believe this thing is working" (Dawisha, 2016). Basic services, for example, are one of the outcomes Dawisha is alluding to, and their absence has fueled even more hatred among Iraqis. The politicization of ethnic-religious identity occurred not just in the political arena or through violence, but also in the execution of other programs such as de-Baathification. Similarly, disbanding the Iraqi army was a policy that backfired miserably. This program was the most hazardous since it resulted in the unemployment of millions of Iraqis who were highly adept in fighting and violence. Furthermore, the security vacuum left in Iraq not only allowed militant groups like al Qaeda-Iraq and later ISIS to flourish, but it also produced an atmosphere of complete disorder, making US democratic goals hard to achieve. Leaving aside the problem of sectarian rivalry or animosity, Al-Ali (2016) claims that after 2003, the absence of the rule of law and security institutions was the primary contributor to violence. People simply assumed there would be no consequences" (Al-Ali, 2016).

Because of the high unemployment rate, committing crime became "a good way to make a living, to get some money, and that was the primary source of violence" (Al-Ali, 2016). Furthermore, the perpetrators of these crimes, primarily militias that entered Iraq after the war and accompanied the exiles, were doing so for "purely criminal reasons, for financial reasons" in a huge number of cases. The collapse of the Iraqi army was further aided by the already troubled notion of sectarianism, which held that Iraqi society was divided into groups incapable of coexistence. Bremer's decision to dissolve the Iraqi army was justified in "pure ethno-sectarian" terms, according to Al-Ali, because "the previous army had been dominated by Sunni Arabs," which meant that "Shi'a soldiers would never gladly accept their instructions" (Al-Ali, 2016). "Under the conditions, it would have been safe to anticipate that many former soldiers would have welcomed the opportunity to resume service, if only to provide a monthly salary," Al-Ali claims (Al-Ali, 2016). Furthermore, the CPA relied solely on information provided by former exiles, which was incorrect: "very many of the top officers in Iraq's new army were officers in the old army, and since there is now greater transparency on sect and race issues, we know that the majority of those officers were actually Shi'a" (Al-Ali, 2016).

3. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

1. The findings revealed that, while the Bush administration's attempts to promote democracy in Iraq were broadly implemented by a variety of governmental and non-governmental organizations, the initiatives yielded far less than the promised "democratic revolution."
2. The findings also revealed that the pursuit of US interests has harmed democratization in Iraq, as the disbanding or dissolution of the Iraqi army resulted in a security vacuum, resulting in significant loss of life and making Iraq far more unstable internally due to the proliferation of insurgent groups.

4. CONCLUSION

The study concluded that the United States' attempts to bring about democracy in Iraq were carried out through governmental and non-governmental entities, but did not result in the democratic revolution that the US had promised. The study also concluded that the collapse of Iraq's army had a detrimental influence, as this loophole allowed the security situation to worsen.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1) Democracy should not be viewed as a product of the United States, but rather as an Iraqi adaption of basic ideas.
- 2) Instead of disbanding the Iraqi army, it should be enhanced by providing advanced training and equipment to meet modern security concerns.

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