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Editors' Introduction: Palimpsestic Genocide in Kurdistan

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The Kurdish-inhabited lands of the Middle East—spanning territories in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey as well as the Caucasus—have hosted a complex ethno-religious mosaic of civilizations since ancient times. The region's fertile soils bear witness to centuries of social cohesion and intercommunal harmony, punctuated by persecution, war, genocide, and atrocity committed against its peoples by internal and external historical agents. In the modern era, genocidal strategies have been employed against ethnic Kurds as well as Armenians, Assyrians, and Ezidis,[1] among other groups, as part of the rise of nationalism and nation-states within a larger global context characterized by regional competition and Russian, European, and North American imperial interests.

At times, Kurds have found themselves caught up in genocidal processes as perpetrators, bystanders, and rescuers, as was the case with the Ottoman Empire's genocide against its Christian (and Ezidi) populations during and after World War I. At other times, and more frequently, Kurds have found themselves targeted by genocidal violence, to the extent that they have been referred as "a nation of genocides."[2] The enduring trauma of genocide and of the historical processes of erasure, as well as the trauma associated with the unfinished project of creating a sovereign homeland in which Kurds can find protection, is palpable to anyone who visits the region.

This special issue of *Genocide Studies International* engages with the question of genocide in the variously defined territory known as "Kurdistan" and in the Kurdish diaspora. We have focused on "Genocide and the Kurds" rather than "in Kurdistan" to emphasize the shifting nature of claims to the land as well as the diversity of peoples that have inhabited it historically, whose presence is still so definitive of the region and its politics. The articles published here help to give shape to the overlapping experiences and discourses of genocide for different Kurdish communities and their neighbors in the unique landscape of palimpsestic genocide. They do so with a view to better understanding genocide's impact on the spatial and temporal dynamics of identity construction and the long-standing question of Kurdish self-determination in the Middle East, and at times touch upon the complex politics of genocide memory and genocide recognition in the region.

In planning this issue, we were very much influenced by the contemporary, and in some cases ongoing, genocides committed by the Islamic State (also known as ISIS/ISIL/Daesh) against various minority communities in northern Iraq and Syria. These actions have placed multilayered pressures on communal relations, as well as the capacity of local authorities to respond to the needs of the survivors and displaced population. Most notably, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has accepted close to 1.5 million internally displaced people, including Ezidis, Christians, Shabak-Shia, Turkomen, Mandean, and

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Sunni Arabs since 2014, which has placed an immense burden on an already contracting economy.[3] Nevertheless, the stories of persecution and displacement told by these traumatized communities are very familiar to the host society, which experienced genocide most recently from 1986–1991, and have been incorporated, in some instances, into Kurdish articulations of their own need for and right to self-determination, and sometimes to an independent state.

Nowhere is this trauma more clear than in what is often referred to as the 74th Ezidi *firman* (literally "edict" or "royal decree" in Persian and Turkish, but generally translated in the Ezidi case as "genocide"), which began in August 2014, when ISIS overran the Sinjar/Shengal region and the Nineveh Plain.[4] The Ezidi count between 73 and 74 firman against them, with the ISIS genocide of 2014 to the present being the most recent. The ISIS attack on the Ezidi was preceded by the fatal, and seemingly planned, withdrawal of Kurdish Peshmerga troops from the Ezidi homeland of Sinjar on the Iraqi border with Syria. This left the Ezidis completely unprotected when ISIS arrived some hours later. The withdrawal has been experienced by many Ezidis as an abandonment and a betrayal, leading to tensions between Ezidi IDPs and the Kurdish authorities, often expressed through disputed identity claims. While Ezidis have long been characterized as the "guardians of the original Kurdish faith," the 2014 ISIS attack on Sinjar intensified the tendency for Ezidis to identify as a distinct ethno-national group rather than as Kurds.[5]

The argument that Ezidis are ethnically Kurdish is in some measure used to ground the KRG's territorial ambitions to the Sinjar (and Nineveh) region. This is evident in the slogan used at the 2017 anniversary of the Sinjar genocide, one month before KRG's independence referendum: "Yesterday was genocide, today is referendum and tomorrow will be an independent Kurdistan."[6] The incorporation of Ezidi identity into Kurdish ethno-nationalist identity has raised fears of a further erasure of Ezidi identity and culture in the post-genocide KRG, while simultaneously supporting Kurdish hopes for greater territorial control and ultimately independence. The tension (and sometimes the contradiction) between the fears of destruction and the consequent security demands of two traumatized communities, both victims of genocide, highlights an enduring feature of genocidal processes in the region.

Palimpsestic Genocide

Since 2014, genocidal attacks by the Islamic State against various communities in Iraq and Syria have added new layers to the already historically complex notion of genocide in the territories broadly defined as "Kurdistan" today. This recent (and arguably ongoing)[7] persecution, recognized by the United Nations as "genocide" in the case of the Ezidis from Sinjar,[8] underscores the palimpsestic nature of victimization in the region. At issue today is the ultimate meaning of genocides to the borders of group identities, and how these meanings should inform future peace and justice processes as well as articulations of good governance and institutions of group security.

The concept of the "palimpsest," drawn from literary and cultural theory, can helpfully frame the history and politics of genocide in Kurdistan by pointing out the shifting nature of power and the way it has coalesced with episodes of great violence and cultural erasure as well as cultural renewal. The term palimpsest draws our attention to two important and interrelated aspects of genocide: (1) the distinctness of each case and (2) the "contamination" of one by the other, so that "even though the process of layering which creates a palimpsest [in the history of literary texts] was born out of a need to

erase and destroy previous texts, the reemergence of those destroyed texts renders a structure that privileges heterogeneity and diversity."[9]

ISIS genocides have laid bare the fragility of long-term efforts by religious and national minority communities in the region to find security within competing imperial, religious, and nationalist ideologies. They have also called attention to the complex historical dynamics that have moved groups around within power matrices that have often resulted in catastrophe for some and relative gain for others. The spatiotemporal geography of genocide in Kurdistan does not involve total erasure of past events as much as their supersession and transmutation by events that come after, so that intercommunal tensions have a high chance of developing existential characteristics. Prior destructive events and processes exist in discourses and experiences of people in the present day, even when they are no longer actively remembered, creating an affective landscape deeply scarred by trauma that is shared by people within groups as well as between them. There is substantial cross-cultural fertilization as well as tension between the memory of genocidal events in one group and memories in another. Therefore, in addition to shifting the discourse around "genocide in Kurdistan" to address a multiplicity of minority communities targeted alongside Kurds,[10] the recent ISIS genocides highlight the parallels, recurrent practices, and continuity of survivor experiences within the various overlapping cases of genocide implicating Kurds and Kurdistan.

With the above in mind, this special issue considers "Genocide and the Kurds" through a long-term historical lens across a rich and varied geographic, demographic, and affective landscape. Indeed, our contributors have emphasized the long-term historical depth of genocide in the region, pointing out that the dynamics of community destruction in Mesopotamia have taken surprisingly similar forms over time, a central feature of which has been the deprivation of homelands through expulsion, dislocation, cultural destruction, sexualized violence, and the denial of memory and identity. Genocidal processes have often coexisted in the region, unfolding at different tempos and at different levels of local, national, and international organization and frequently affecting several different groups at once, though in different ways. Viewed over the longue durée, the history of genocide in Kurdistan challenges and offers correctives to approaches that focus exclusively on genocide as a process linked to modern nation-building.

Throughout this special issue on "Genocide and the Kurds," the contributors highlight the importance of understanding the complex dynamics that exist between victimization and perpetration. While there is a growing literature on victims becoming killers,[11] several essays in this volume consider the opposite process: Kurdish perpetrators and bystanders becoming victims. As one Kurdish saying has it, "the Armenians were breakfast; the Kurds were lunch."[12] The sentiment that there is a connection between the suffering of Armenians during World War I and the suffering of Kurds thereafter is part of Kurdish oral history and appears often in Kurdish novels. Oral tradition identifies the Armenians as the first people to use the phrase: they supposedly said it to their Kurdish neighbors (and sometimes persecutors) as they were being massacred and disappeared from Anatolia: "em şîv in, hûn jî paşîv in" (if we are dinner, you are supper). The widespread presence of this phrase in Kurdish cultural production has contributed "to the establishment of a continuity between the devastations that have befallen the two peoples at the hands of a common agent, the Ottoman state and its successor, the new Turkish nation state" thereby creating an "association of victimhood" between Kurds and Armenians.[13]

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By calling attention to memory's multiple layers, the palimpsest can challenge sectarian and competitive approaches to the past.[14] This introduction recognizes the importance of growing momentum to conceive of "genocide in Kurdistan" through an inclusive concept applying to multiple affected communities, underscoring the possibility of building effective coalitions across communities working for genocide recognition and prevention.[15] Scholarship testifies to the increased interest among Kurds around the Kurdish role in the Armenian Genocide in recent years.[16] Political figures within the Kurdish movement have also issued a series of powerful statements recognizing the Armenian Genocide. Notably, in 2008, a senior Kurdish politician from Turkey (Northern Kurdistan), Ahmet Türk, issued a public apology to the victims of genocide during World War I, acknowledging that "Kurds contributed to the loss of this [cultural] richness."[17] Nonetheless, further research is certainly needed into the complexities of genocide recognition politics, and models for future prevention, across and within the palimpsestic landscape that is "genocide in Kurdistan."

Revisiting Anfal and Halabja

Arguably, Saddam Hussein's Anfal campaign against Kurds in Iraq (1986–1991) represents the most widely known and recognized case of genocide in Kurdistan. Indeed, the terms "Anfal"—literally meaning "spoils of war"—and "Halabja"—the site of the notorious chemical attack on civilians in 1988—have themselves become metonyms for Kurdish genocide. While much of the early work on Anfal emerged out of the important need to record and document the factual details of the tragedy,[18] academic scholarship has more recently expanded to consider "life after Anfal": coming to terms with the social and psychological consequences of the genocide. For example, Choman Hardi's work on women's experiences of Anfal and its aftermath has helped to re-inscribe a gendered dimension to the violence that was often absent in earlier narratives.[19] Nicole Watts' work on the popular violence against the Halabja monument in 2006 speaks further to the importance of sensitively engaging the survivor community in the processes of genocide memorialization and memory production.[20]

The contributions dealing with Anfal within this special issue concentrate on how the genocide, and its legacy, have subsequently been (re-)experienced at a more reflective distance. Bahar Baser and Mari Toivanen, in their contribution "Remembering the Past in Diasporic Spaces: Kurdish Reflections on Genocide Memorialization for Anfal," employ psychiatrist Vamik Volkan's concept of "chosen trauma" to consider how the memory of Anfal and Halabja is reconstructed in the contemporary Kurdish diaspora of Europe—a diaspora largely formed as a result of the genocide itself. Building on the authors' previous work on genocide recognition politics (GRP) within the Kurdish diaspora context,[21] their current work explores the unique spatial and temporal/generational dynamics implicit within diaspora memorialization and commemoration of the genocide. They argue that diasporic articulations within Anfal commemoration practices differ from those in the homeland context and serve the special function of contributing to collective identity construction, and a sense of belonging, for the "exiled" and diaspora community.

Rebeen Hamarafiq, in his *Notes from the Field* contribution, "Cultural Responses to the Anfal and Halabja Massacres," presents a critical reflection on the dominant artistic responses to the Anfal genocide, mostly in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). He traces the changing forms of the genocide's representation across the phases of Pre-Image (unaccompanied audio), Image (both still and video footage), and Monuments.

The ubiquitous reproduction of iconic Anfal motifs in Kurdish society has arguably led to a saturation of the cultural sphere, ultimately trivializing the legacy of the genocide. Further, Hamarafiq's analysis suggests that artistic production around the theme of Anfal does not always sensitively reflect the lived experiences and individual memories of the population, but rather is generating "a new, homogenized public memory" that can be alienating (or even re-traumatizing) for survivors of the genocide.[22] Neglecting authentic voices and perspectives may well undermine individual psychological recovery since it is necessary to come to terms with the representation of the genocide as well as the genocide itself. More broadly, the sometimes crude political manipulations of the Anfal narrative have created "a culture of horror and trauma that affected everyone," argues Hamarafiq. Both he and Baser/Toivanen (this volume) highlight the variation in genocide experience and memory—be it between the real and its representation, or between the homeland and diaspora—urging the reader to question the neat homogeneity of hegemonic narratives of "genocide in Kurdistan."

In contrast with these two contributions, Hannibal Travis, in "The Long Genocide in Upper Mesopotamia: Justice Lost amidst Nation-Building and Peacebuilding," considers Anfal within the context of enduring genocides in the region. He points out that the recent Kurdish genocides have received a great deal more attention, especially legally, than other genocides in Kurdistan in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, arguing that Anfal must be understood in relation to genocides experienced by other populations, specifically Christians. Kurdish nationalist claims to the territory referred to as "Kurdistan" were strengthened by Ottoman genocides, he argues, which turned Christians into a minority population in Upper Mesopotamia whose very survival is now challenged. In making this argument, Travis examines not only the better-known Christian genocides of World War I, but also genocidal processes from the more distant past that affected the viability of non-Muslim populations in the long term. The excavation of "hidden" and "lost" genocides is of immense value to the field of genocide studies, as it expands our concept of the crime and urges us to question some of the dominant narratives that have emerged since 1945. In particular, the Mesopotamian cases add significant ballast to arguments that "cultural genocide" be accepted as "genocide" next to the physical elements outlined in the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

While Hamarafiq and Baser/Toivanen explore memory and memorialization around the Anfal genocide, the other contributors to this special issue consider genocide in Kurdistan within the broader historical context. They challenge the established understanding of genocide as mass murder alone, calling attention to the centrality of displacement, cultural destruction, the undermining of reproductive and biological power, and the subversion of group historical power in genocidal processes in the region. These were factors that Raphael Lemkin, the Polish Jewish jurist and scholar who coined the term genocide, believed were core parts of the crime. Both Majid Hassan Ali, in his contribution, "Genocidal Campaigns during the Ottoman Era: The Firmān of Mīr-i-Kura against the Yazidi Religious Minority, 1832–1834," and Hannibal Travis point out that Lemkin learned from historical cases of mass atrocity in the region (especially the Armenian genocide in Ottoman Turkey) in developing his sociological and legal notion of genocide. Lemkin himself credits the Armenian case for his youthful realization that, unlike homicide and slavery, a state's murder of its own inhabitants was not—yet—considered a crime.[23] Travis argues that "Upper Mesopotamia should return to the core of scholars' attention

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rather than remaining a marginalized topic of study." Certainly the models of genocide drawn from this history challenge dominant assumptions about the shape and nature of genocide in law and in practice.

In a similar vein, Kaziwa Salih, in "Kurdish Linguicide in the 'Saddamist' State," examines Lemkin's ideas about "linguicide" and its role in the perpetration of genocide—ideas that were incorporated into a draft of the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. She argues not only that Iraq's modern education policy was linguicidal towards the Kurdish language before 1991, but also that linguicide formed an important element in the genocidal techniques of domination practiced by the state that culminated in the mass murder of Kurds during the Anfal massacres and the Halabja gas attack. Her work challenges longstanding scholarly opinion that Kurds in northern Iraq (Southern Kurdistan) did not experience linguicide as did their co-nationals in modern Turkey,[24] but rather suffered "linguistic suppression," a state policy that was aimed not at exterminating a language but rather at disempowering it through discrimination. Drawing on the concepts of cultural and linguistic capital, Salih demonstrates how apparent efforts to discriminate against the Kurdish language were tied to genocidal ideologies of Arab supremacism and genocidal polices of Arabization, as well as violent and coercive implementation of strategies that for the Kurds culminated in, but did not start with, the genocides of Anfal and Halabja.

Precursors to Genocide Under the Islamic State

Dominant models of genocide are also engaged critically by Maria Six-Hohenbalken ("Genocide of the Yezidis in the Ottoman Empire, 1915–1917") and Hassan Ali ("Genocidal Campaigns during the Ottoman Era"), who bring together the 1948 legal definition of genocide and the Ezidi concept of firman (which the Ezidis use to describe the process of destruction of Ezidi communities throughout the Ottoman period). To make their cases, these authors look at enduring genocidal patterns that exist beyond moments of massacre and seek to incorporate them into nuanced considerations of the history and definition of the crime. The increased academic interest in the Ezidis following the ISIS genocide has presented an opportunity to return to the "hidden" or insufficiently studied antecedents to the events of 2014, which can help clarify the abiding institutions and conditions that can lead to cycles of genocide. The contributions by Six-Hohenbalken and Hassan Ali each present compelling narratives of earlier examples of firman against the Ezidi people, which have largely been neglected in scholarship due to the limited availability of historical records. While Six-Hohenbalken draws on original data in the form of family narratives transmitted through oral history to subsequent generations of survivors in the Armenian diaspora, Hassan Ali supplements local historical sources with the books written by eighteenth and nineteenth century Western travelers to the affected region. Both contributors view the Ezidi tragedy through the prism of historic identity-based persecution.

Six-Hohenbalken takes a sociological-anthropological approach to genocide, considering Ottoman destruction of the Ezidi community during World War I in terms of Ezidi concepts of firman, the 1948 Genocide Convention, and the political history of Ezidi identity in the diaspora and in Iraq. Using long-form interviews with the Ezidi diaspora in Armenia as well as archival documents, she argues that the pattern of destruction of the Ottoman Ezidi community during World War I (the 72nd firman) fits the legal definition of genocide determined by the UN in 1948, and that the importance of international recognition of this 72nd firman has grown since the 73rd/74th

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were committed by ISIS and Ezidi ethnonational identity has amplified.[25] This has, in recent years, led to a breaking of the relative "silence" in Armenia about the suffering experienced by ancestors of the Ezidi diaspora there—confirming arguments presented by Baser/Toivanen (this volume) that unique genocide recognition processes take place in diaspora settings. Six-Hohenbalken thus calls our attention to the role of genocide in long-term processes of identity formation and the problematics this creates for inter-communal relationships between groups with interwoven identities and histories.

For his part, Hassan Ali traces the history of the firman issued against the Ezidis by Islamic governors and semi-independent (Sunni) Kurdish princes through the Abbasid and Ottoman eras. His contribution focuses particularly on the military campaign of 1832–1834 led by Muḥammad Pāshā Rawwānduzī, known as Mīr-i-Kura (the one-eyed prince), against the Ezidis of Kallak, Sheikhan, and Sinjar. This, he argues, was the "largest and most influential [firman] in terms of destruction, murder, and enslavement in the nineteenth century, and quickly rose to the level of genocide." Mīr-i-Kura took revenge on Ezidi communities after Ezidi prince ʿAlī Beg Dāsinī was recruited to assassinate a chieftain from the Kurdish Mizūry tribe in the context of an internal Kurdish struggle. The resultant killing of thousands of Ezidi men and boys and the abduction of women and children, who were later sold in slave markets, established strong precedents in Ezidi collective memory for the later understanding of their persecution at ISIS's hands, "thrust[ing] the term genocide into the pre-modern era thereby marking the long continuity of [the Ezidi's] suffering."

Conclusion

As our contributors make clear, the architecture of present-day genocides in the region has been built over centuries with the rise and fall of empires across this diverse region. In particular, the genocides against Christian populations, the Ezidi, and other minorities of the late Ottoman period, as well as the ongoing Turkish and Iraqi policies towards the Kurds, which alternate between co-optation and persecution, have informed the political landscape, and the intercommunal tensions, in the region up to the present day. Indeed, the Anfal and Halabja genocides, as well as the 2014 Sinjar genocide against the Ezidi, show the relevance of earlier genocides in that they echo ideologies and practices that have deep roots in the region. It is a small wonder that the Sinjar genocide against the Ezidi has also given rise not only to new scholarship on earlier cases of genocide against the community that had received limited academic attention, but also to a renewed interest in Anfal and Halabja among Kurds, for whom the Yezidi genocide has evoked painful traumatic memories of recent genocidal destruction and loss. Likewise, the Christian communities across Kurdistan continue to carry the powerful memory of genocidal destruction and survival, shaping their present experiences as minority groups in the region.

Due to the expansive scope of the subject, naturally we have left out many cases and approaches in this volume. Significantly, we were unable to include a contribution on Kurds and other minority populations in northern Syria. This is a particularly glaring absence, given the genocidal aspects of Turkish incursions and occupation there, as well as the relevance of Syria to many of the genocidal patterns that played out in northern Iraq after 2014. Likewise, no consideration has been made of the relevance of the "Rojava" and the associated "Syrian Democratic" projects developed in northern Syria as potential models for genocide prevention. Other regions and events that have not been explored here are the (recent) Turkish state attacks on Kurdish villages and towns

in eastern Turkey and the situation of Kurds in southwestern Iran. The historical fate of the sizable Jewish community in northern Iraq has also not been addressed. Additionally, there is no contribution from the growing field of gender and genocide studies, and no treatment of the experiences of the LGBTQIA+ community in the region. We hope that subsequent issues of *Genocide Studies International* will be able to advance our understandings of these and other topics.

Notes

1. In view of the complex arguments underlying preferences for use of several orthographical variants (primarily Yezidi/Yazidi/Ezidi), the editors have opted not to standardize the community name across the contributions in this special issue.
2. Kristiina Koivunen, *The Kurds: A Nation of Genocides* (Spånga: Apec Förlag, 2013).
3. In October 2016, the KRG Ministry of Interior's Joint Crisis Coordination Centre (JCC) reported that 1,411,313 IDPs were officially registered. See JCC, Registered ICPs and Refugees in Kurdistan Region-Iraq (October 2016), http://jcc.gov.krd/contents/reports/10-12-2017/1512888961.Registered_IDPs_and_refugees_in_KRI-6_October_2016.pdf.
4. Irene Dulz, "The Displacement of the Yezidis After the Rise of ISIS in Northern Iraq," *Kurdish Studies* 4,2 (2016): 131–47.
5. Eszter Spät, "Yezidi Identity Politics and Political Ambitions in the Wake of the ISIS Attack," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 20,5 (2018): 420–38. See also: Majid Hassan Ali, "The Identity Controversy of Religious Minorities in Iraq: The Crystallization of the Yazidi Identity after 2003," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 46,2 (2019).
6. Arzu Yilmaz and Bayar Mustafa Sevdeen, "The Yazidi Quest for Protection in Sinjar in the Post-ISIS Iraq," in *Beyond ISIS: History and Future of Religious Minorities in Iraq*, ed. Bayar Mustafa Sevdeen and Thomas Schmidinger (London: Transnational Press, 2019), 187.
7. Yale Macmillan Center, Genocide Studies Program, *Before It's Too Late: A Report Concerning the Ongoing Genocide and Persecution Endured by the Yazidis in Iraq, and Their Need for Immediate Protection* (June 2019).
8. Human Rights Council, Office of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights, *"They Came to Destroy": ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis*. 32nd session, Agenda item 4, A/HRC/32/CRP.2 (15 June 2016), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A_HRC_32_CRP.2_en.pdf (accessed 12 Aug 2019).
9. "Palimpsest," *Chicago School of Media Theory* (2019), https://lucian.uchicago.edu/blogs/mediatheory/keywords/palimpsest/ (accessed 27 Aug 2019).
10. See also the recent publication: Bayar Mustafa Sevdeen and Thomas Schmidinger eds., *Beyond ISIS: History and Future of Religious Minorities in Iraq* (London: Transnational Press, 2019).
11. Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2002).
12. One will hear this concept articulated in several different ways, including "They had you for breakfast and will have us for dinner." See Ronald Grigor Suny, "The Cost of Turkey's Genocide Denial," *The New York Times*, 23 April 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/opinion/the-cost-of-turkeys-genocide-denial.html (accessed 2 Sept 2019).
13. Adnan Çelik and Ergin Öpengin, "The Armenian Genocide in the Kurdish Novel: Restructuring Identity through Collective Memory," *European Journal of Turkish Studies* (2016), 8.
14. This is the central argument made by Max Silverman in *Palimpsestic Memory: The Holocaust and Colonialism in French and Francophone Fiction and Film* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2015).
15. Maria Koinova, "Diaspora Coalition-building for Genocide Recognition: Armenians, Assyrians and Kurds," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 42,11 (2019): 1890–1910.
16. Çelik and Öpengin, "The Armenian Genocide in the Kurdish Novel"; Özlem Belçim Galip, "The Politics of Remembering: Representation of the Armenian Genocide in Kurdish Novels," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 30,3 (2016): 458–87.
17. Galip, 466–7.
18. Human Rights Watch, *Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds* (1993).
19. Choman Hardi, *Gendered Experiences of Genocide: Anfal Survivors in Kurdistan-Iraq* (New York: Routledge, 2011). See also: Karin Mlodoch, *The Limits of Trauma Discourse: Women Anfal Survivors in Kurdistan-Iraq* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2015).

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20. Nicole Watts, "The Role of Symbolic Capital in Protest: State-Society Relations and the Destruction of the Halabja Martyrs Monument in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 32,1 (2012): 70–85.
21. Bahar Baser and Mari Toivanen, "The Politics of Genocide Recognition: Kurdish Nation-building and Commemoration in the Post-Saddam Era," *Journal of Genocide Research* 19,3 (2017): 404–26.
22. It has similarly been argued that hegemonic (Western) media representation of Ezidi survivors following the 2014 Sinjar genocide has silenced the survivors' own narratives in favor of sensational presentations of their victimhood: Veronica Buffon and Christine Allison, "The Gendering of Victimhood: Western Media and the Sinjar Genocide," *Kurdish Studies* 4,2 (2016): 176–95.
23. Raphael Lemkin, *Totally Unofficial: The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin*, ed. Donna Lee-Frieze (New Haven: Yale UP, 2013), 20.
24. See, for example: Tove Skutnabb-Kangas "Kurds in Turkey and in (Iraqi) Kurdistan: A Comparison of Kurdish Educational Language Policy in Two Situations of Occupation," *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 3,1 (2008): 43–73.
25. Within Ezidi oral culture, 72 represents the mythical number of firman said to have been carried out against the community up until recent times.

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