

Reintegrating the Faili Kurds into Iraqi Society: seeking their voice in politics

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Abstract

During the Iraqi Baath Party regime, the Faili Kurds faced an act of genocide; and their identity, as both Kurd and Shia, was terrorized. After the regime change in 2003, the discriminated decrees and laws were nulled. This paved the way to their return from Iran where they had been expelled, and re-acquire the citizenship that they were stripped from. Nevertheless, the community is still recovering from the genocide and facing the challenges of being both Kurds and Shi'a. That is because, as individuals, their wounds have not properly been healed yet; and they act as citizens in a country where political participation is mostly based on ethno-sectarianism, but not citizenship. While there are Faili individuals who play role in political arenas, their participation is not to represent their community. Other high-ranking politicians and lawmakers are there to represent non-Faili political parties and tendencies. Faili's pure participation is through a reserved minority seat in Wasit. This paper is to discuss the process of reactivating their real role in Iraqi politics through reintegrating them into Iraqi society. The question is how this might happen. The research uses qualitative methodology to collect and analyze data within the framework of political science.

Keywords: Faili Kurds; Iraq; Political Participation; Ethno-Sectarianism; Genocide.

Introduction and Methodology

Nowadays, the term Faili Kurds is given to any Iraqi Kurd who follows the Shi'a faith of Islam. However, originally, it had been given to those Kurdish nomads who immigrated from Western Iran to Iraq during the last centuries. After the establishment of the modern Iraqi state in 1921, and based on the Iraqi 1924 Nationality Law, Faili Kurds became Iraqi citizens. Since then, the Faili Kurds have been an important component of the country. They have been playing an active role in the country's development. Nonetheless, during the Baath party regime, and mostly in the decades of 1970s and 1980s, they faced an act of genocide. The act of genocide against Faili Kurds was a multi-dimension crime; as they had been denaturalized, their properties were seized, forced to be displaced, and expelled to Iran, and thousands of them had been disappeared and killed. All of this had been done because of the identity that they hold, the political role they played, and the economic position they occupied in Iraq. The Faili Kurds, as Iranian originated people from the Kurdish nation who follows the Shi'a faith of Islam, were not welcomed by a regime that was established based on the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein the dictator, the socialism of the Baath party, and the pan-Arab ideology of a group of Sunni Arabs of Iraq. Since the 2003 regime change in Iraq, the country is experiencing a more open political environment. A large number of the expelled Faili Kurds have been back to Iraq and rejoined their community. They, nevertheless, are struggling to reintegrate into the country where they had an important role in it.

The problematique, here, is that the Faili Kurds are trying to reintegrate as citizens into a country that is not a citizen state yet. The contemporary politics in Iraq is shaped by ethno-sectarianism and the actors mostly are those who represent a nation and/or a faith. For the Faili Kurds that their identity is a mixture of being Kurd as a nation and Shi'a as a faith, playing a role as a Shi'a Kurd is challenging. The fact is that the Faili Kurds, since 2003, could become almost anyone, but themselves. That is because they are playing a role whether as Kurds or Shi'a, but not Shi'a Kurds. They work within Kurdish or Shiite political parties and are active in politics as individuals, but not as a sect, or a group of people. Besides, the Faili Kurds, have become a scattered sect in Iraq, as they are not gathered together, politically and geographically too. This made them have no specific identified geography – while there are towns considered to

belong to them, such as Khanaqin, Jalawla, Mandali, Badra, etc.; and these areas are Administratively divided between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the federal government of Iraq. This too, alongside other factors, has become another vulnerability for playing role in Iraqi politics.

The significance of this study is that it pays attention to the question of the Faili Kurds, an important component of both Kurdish and Iraqi societies. Here, compensating victims of the genocide, reactivating their role in socio-cultural and political fields, and reintegrating them with society is not just a matter of national interest, but justice too. Therefore, it is significant to find a method or more to understand what happened to the Faili Kurds, what they are now suffering from, and who they can be helped. Such studies, alongside playing role in developing the related literature, can help raise awareness and prevent repeating such an act of genocide in Iraq and everywhere, too. That is because, it is believed, that crimes against humanity are always had more aspects than those which are limited to a person or a regime but extended to political ideologies and philosophies of governance too.

The present study is an attempt to find a method or more to reactivate the role that the Faili Kurds have lost in Iraq because of the genocide that they faced. It is, therefore, to address a specific question which is *how the Faili Kurds can be reintegrated into Iraqi society?* Addressing such a question requires analyzing the Faili Kurds' identity, discussing their role in modern and contemporary Iraq, and evaluating their vulnerabilities and potential. The research follows a qualitative methodology and uses a historical analysis approach within the framework of political science. It is to collect data from mainly secondary sources, provide a historical background to the topic and analyze the collected data to address the question and add some new insights to the related literature.

Faili Kurds: history and identity

The history of Faili Kurds, as an ethnoreligious group of people, is not ambiguous as their identity is. The term Faili has been interpreted in many ways; mostly it is understood as an Arabic version of the Persian term Pahlavi or the Kurdish term Peli (See: Akhavan-Kazemi & Azizi, 2018). It has been given to those Kurds who inhabited border areas between Iran and Iraq, along both sides of the Zagros Mountain range. They, historically, they have been a cross-border population (EUAA, 2022). Their

roots, geographically, are going back to Iran. In terms of ethnicity, they are Kurds; their religion is Islam. Differing from the Majority of Kurds in Iran, Iraq, and other countries too, their faith in Islam is Shi'a (IDMC, 2007). Faili Kurds have been migrating from Iran to Iraq. They had mostly settled down in Baghdad "where they took on key commercial, social, and cultural roles" (Ibid, p27).

The Faili Kurds of Iraq are descendants of tribes of Kermanshah, and Lorestan provinces of Iran. They either settled on the other side of Iran's borders during the Safavid era - and as a result of the Chaldiran War, or migrated to Iraq during the Qajar and Pahlavi eras for various reasons. Nowadays, Iraqi Faili Kurds mostly live in the urban areas of Iraq, mainly in the provinces of Baghdad, Diyala, Wasit, and Misan. They either acquired Iraqi and/or Iranian citizenship or live as stateless people (Moradi-Moghadam & Basiratmanesh, 2020).

Since the Safavid era, because of the rule of Faili or Peli governors over Lorestan and Ilam, the tribes and the nomads of those regions were called Faili (See: Akhavan-Kazemi & Azizi, 2018; also: Al-Faili Al-Alawee, 2009). These people were divided into three different categories of language which were known by some scholars as Lor, Lak, and Kurd - however, this categorization is not welcomed by Kurdish nationalists. Part of the Faili Kurds who live in eastern areas of Iraq is those who are located there after defining the borders between Iran and Ottoman Empire in the Safavid era. Some others, moreover, are the descent of nomads and tribes of provinces of Ilam, Kermanshah, and Lorestan who migrated to Iraq in the eras of Qajars and Pahlavis (Moradi-Moghadam & Basiratmanesh, 2020; also see: van Bruinessen, 2018).

Most of the Faili Kurds migrated from the deprived area of Pashtkooh of Lorestan and Ilam provinces to the Iraqi cities due to poverty and unemployment. Then, in Iraq, they could find a job and relative prosperity. Then, as they did not see a clear prospect of their future in their return to Iran, and to keep their jobs and properties in Iraq, they accepted Iraqi citizenship or they were attempting to get it and become Iraqi citizens (Ibid).

The Faili Kurds of Iraq consider themselves historically Iranian. They are Shiite Kurds of Iranian descent who have been based in the Western regions of Iran throughout history. They have been immigrating from Iran to Iraq in three main different eras. First, the Safavid era. In the Chaldiran War, of 1514, the Safavids, who controlled most parts of Kurdish populated areas, were defeated by the Ottoman Empire. Then, based on the peace treaty, a part of Iran and its inhabitants were annexed to the Ottoman

Empire. Second, in the Qajar era, in the 1860s, many residents of Pashtkooh immigrated to Iraq due to famine, increased taxes and unemployment, and then became residents of Iraq. Third, in 1925 and later, Pahlavis were suppressing Faili Kurds, in many ways - including economically; and, they had no more option but to migrate to Iraq, seeking a better life (Zargar & Molaei, 2022).

Nowadays, In Iraq, the Faili Kurds of Iraq are becoming a sect, if not an independent ethnic group. The term "Faili Kurd" was first applied to the immigrants of Pashtkooh, most of whom were Kurds. Then, it has gradually been used to call all Shi'a Kurds of Iraq, whether those who lived in the eastern regions of Iraq or those who immigrated from Iran. Currently, in Iraq, all Shia Kurds, wherever they came from, are called Faili Kurds. Nowadays, in Iraq, the title of Faili has been equalized to the Shi'a Kurd. Thus, there is a conceptual unity and these two terms are used interchangeably (Moradi-Moghadam & Basiratmanesh, 2020).

Today, based on estimations, there are approximately 1.5 to 2.5 million Faili Kurds who live in Iraq. They mainly live in Baghdad the capital, Diyala, Wasit, Misan, Basra provinces and as well as in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq too (EUAA, 2022). The identity of Faili Kurds can be known as a mixture of Iranian origin, Kurdish ethnicity and Shia Islam faith. In the era of the Baath regime, all of these three elements were not welcomed. They faced an act of genocide, a systematic state terror – terrorizing both their identity and character too / their moral and material existences. From the 1970s to 2003, approximately, 300,000 Faili Kurds had been stripped of their national identity documents, and citizenship, and expelled to Iran, where they had been accused of being agents. In the era of Baath, Faili Kurds were those who had a negative impact on the national security and political stability of the country. This is because of their being Iranian-originated, Kurd and Shia. Besides, they could have their hegemony on the country's economy and trade sector, especially the bazaar of Baghdad the capital. Moreover, they were supporting both Kurdish and Shi'a opposition movements politically and financially.

After 2003, the Faili Kurds could find themselves in a more politically open, and more secure and safe, society. Thus, many of them have returned to Iraq, from Iran. They tried to get back what they lost and were deprived of, such as their citizenship and property. They could achieve some legal guarantee as the previous laws which were again have been nullified (Omer, 2022). Some of them, to some extent, have got compensation. They also could guarantee a legal and political status of representation in the Iraqi political system, parliament, as they guaranteed a reserved seat of Wasit. In

2014, they have been targeted by the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham/Levant (ISIS/ISIL) for being Shi'a and Kurd. They reacted to this by playing a military role in the Shiite Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) (Jameel & Ameen, 2020). In 2017, when the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) held a vote in a referendum on the independence of the Kurdish era of Iraq, those of them who live outside Kurdistan areas, announced their rejection of the step, identified themselves as Iraqis and called for the territorial integrity of Iraq. Recently, they have had more support from KRI and there are plans to help them to organize themselves within an organization. All of these ups and downs can demonstrate the ambiguity of the political identity of the Faili Kurds. The fact is that different sects deal with them differently and they have not established a concrete political identity for themselves as they have not become a solid sect as others are there; and there is not any specific geography known as their land within Iraq. The problematique here is that the Faili Kurds are to act as individuals/citizens within a state which is not a citizen-state, and its political system is not working based on citizenship, but ethno-sectarianism.

The Act of Genocide against Faili Kurds

The Baath regime's crimes against Faili Kurds have been recognized as an act of genocide by the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Court and the Iraqi House of Representatives – Parliament. This genocide refers to a series of crimes conducted by the Baath regime against the Faili Kurds. It includes stripping from their nationality, seizing their properties, forced displacement, expelling from the country, disappearing and killing (See: Abbas-Tabar, et al., 2017). The fact is that the sufferings of the Faili Kurds began with the establishment of the Iraqi state, in 1921. Because of establishing a new state out of the Ottoman legacy, and border-defining, many Faili Kurds have been located within the Iraqi border. However, according to the Treaty of Lausanne, signed on 24 July 1923, in the newly established states, citizenship will be given to former Ottoman citizens. Based on Article 30 of the treaty, new states should automatically grant the right of citizenship to former Ottoman citizens who lived in their territory. This treaty did not provide a solution for the situation of individuals such as many of the Faili Kurds who lived in the newly established states, but did not acquire Ottoman citizenship (Moradi-Moghadam & Basiratmanesh, 2020). Thus, the fact is that, the sufferings of the Faili Kurds are twins of Iraqi statehood.

During the Baath regime, at the end of the 1960s, then during the 1970s and 1980s, the discrimination and crimes against the Faili Kurds increased. In 1969, when Iran abrogated the 1937 border agreement with Iraq, Iraq expelled approximately 30,000 Iranian-originated people mostly Faili Kurds. Then, in 1971, when Iran militarily seized Abu Musa and the Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb, Iraq again expelled more than 60,000 people, mostly Faili Kurds (Ibid). The regime was alleging that those expelled were not Iraqis, but Iranian nationals (Campbell, 2010). In the 1980s, the Iraqi army went into the Faili Kurds' villages, enforced them to displace, and seized their properties. Then they separated men and boys from women and girls and brought males to 'the places that had never found any news of them' (Saeed-Zadeh, & Shafiee, 2017, p217). The genocide reached its peak when Decree No. 666 of May 1980 was issued. It ordered to denaturalize those who are not originally Iraqi, arresting and deporting them to their country of origin, Iran (Stateless Journeys, 2019). This was a reaction to an assassination attempt targeting Iraq's vice-president Tariq Aziz in April 1980, which was carried out by a Faili member of the Da'wa Party in Baghdad the capital. Based on this, the regime expelled a large number of Faili Kurds from Iraq and deported them to Iran. There are different estimations for the number of casualties and those who were expelled; nevertheless, there are some data that can illustrate the brutality of the crimes.

In one instance, in the autumn of 1971, up to 40,000 Failis were expelled. In April 1980, shortly after Saddam Hussein seized full powers and just before he invaded Iran, the 480 wealthiest Baghdadis were summoned to the Chamber of Commerce building. One third of them, found to be Faili Kurds, were swiftly arrested and deported to Iran, with their families following shortly after. Further deportations continued, and the numbers of Faili Kurd refugees estimated to have gone to Iran range from 100,000 up to 300,000. It is not clear how many Faili Kurds remain in Iraq, but according to one account, as of 1997, the expulsions continued (IDMC, 2007, p27).

It is estimated that 22,000 Faili Kurds were killed during the Baath regime (Saeed-Zadeh, & Shafiee, 2017). Besides, the situation of those who could survive the killings and arrived in Iran was not ideal at all. They suffered much there too. Campbell states that:

Many of the families that were deported to Iran were highly educated, economically successful and held ranking positions in the government. While in Iran, many of these families lived in camps and were denied access to work, education and travel documents. They were even unable to register births, deaths and marriages. Some Faili Kurds report that if they sought to return to Iraq, many would receive a stamp from the Iranian authorities that read, "departure with no return (2020, Online).

The genocide against Faili Kurds had different aspects and dimensions. Moradi-Moghadam and Basiratmanesh (2020) argue that being of Iranian origin, Shi'a, border dwellers and immigrants as elements of the identity of Faili Kurds on the one hand, and on the other hand the Iraqi citizenship law and the growth of pan-Arab nationalist thoughts have been among the most important factors that affect the status of citizenship of them. They add that the Baath's fear of the alignment of Faili Kurds with Iran, as well as their favorable economic situation and political cooperation with the Kurdish and Shi'a opposition parties, were also among the factors in stripping from their nationality and expelling them. On the same issue, Darab and AbdulAlmonem (2021) believe that these factors can be as follows:

1) National Factor: Baath regime mentioned Faili Kurds as Iranians and Iranian agents. [...] Thus, the regime started a psychological war on Faili Kurds and described them as Trojan Horse. 2) Political Factor: It was in order to change the demographic structure, Arabization and changing the rate of Kurdish population. That was partly because after Mars Agreement of 1970, some Faili Kurds became senior members of Kurdish liberalization movement. It was also in order to put pressure on Iran by expelling them and forcing them to flee to Iran. Besides, it was also, partly, because some Faili Kurds were loyal to those Islamic Parties that were considered as opposition to Baath regime. 3) Religious-Sectarian Factor: Faili Kurds were mostly followers of Shia Islam, Jaafari faith. They were mentioned by the regime as those who have extremist ideas and enemies of government. 4) Economy Factor: Faili Kurds were well-known for success in business and trade. [...] and the regime was not happy with that (p510-511).

There were sociocultural, political, economic, security-related and ideological factors that had a role in the act of genocide against Faili Kurds in Iraq. Nonetheless, understanding it requires a deeper analysis of the nature of Baath as a regime and the character of Saddam Hussein as a dictator. This, of course, requires analyzing the issues from different views and using different methods. The fact is that the genocide against Faili Kurds is not only related to the presence of a regime and the rule of a dictator, but to the hegemony of an ideology of a philosophy of governance.

Faili Kurds' Role in Contemporary Iraq

Since the establishment of modern Iraq, in 1921, Faili Kurds have played a significant role in the country's development processes, from education to economy, politics and army too. In terms of trade and economy, because of the links they had between Iran

and Baghdad, they could make great successes and become influencers in the commercial life of Baghdad. Then, in 1948 and forward, Faili Kurd merchants could fill the gap made because of the departure of Jewish traders who left Iraq to join the newly established state of Israel. This helped them to rise their rank to the middle and upper classes of Iraqi society and control important bazaars of Baghdad, such as Shorja and Jamila (Minority Rights, 2017).

In terms of politics, Faili Kurds were also playing an active in Iraq, especially after the events of 1958, when the country's political system radically changed from a monarchy to a republican one – as an aftermath of the revolution. In the 1960s, Faili Kurds had oppositional political activities against the Baath regime. They supported the Kurdish movement against the central government, playing a direct role, and providing moral and material support. They were backing other oppositional political activities led by Shi'i and communist parties too - that they were opponents to the regime (See: Ibid). The question of the Faili Kurds, furthermore, was always a topic among others in the negotiation between the Kurdish political parties and the Baath regime. For instance, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in 1984, and the Kurdistan Front in 1991, demanded the Iraqi government give the Faili Kurds their nationality back and let the expelled ones be back to the country (Moradi-Moghadam & Basiratmanesh, 2020).

The active role that the Faili Kurds had made the Baath regime feel threatened. The Baath Party/Regime considers their activities as a real threat to its existence. It, therefore, interpreted them as something unlawful and against national security. In the Baath era, supporting a party other than the Baath party was punishable by deprivation of citizenship and expulsion from Iraq; and those who were members of the Da'wa party faced the death penalty. Nevertheless, the Faili Kurds were continuing in their political activities by supporting Shi'a groups and the Kurdish movement. The Faili Kurds were backing the Kurdish political parties, in terms of both financial support and providing manpower. Two of the four founding members of the PUK were Failis - Adel Murad and Abd al-Razzaq Mirza. There were also high-ranking members within the Kurdistan Democratic Party (PDK) - among them, Habib Mohammad Karim who was elected as the Secretary General of the party for several years. Faili Kurds were mostly living in the Arab-inhabited cities and areas of central and southern Iraq. For this reason, as Al-Faili Al-Alawee (2009) argues, they always had an active role in Shi'a movements and political parties against the Baath regime. Among Iraqi Shiite parties and organizations, the Faili Kurds had the largest presence within the Da'wa Party, the Islamic Action Organization, and the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution.

In the post-Saddam era, since 2003, Iraq has been more open to its sects. The country is not under the absolute rule of the Baath Party – the one that usually accounted for Pan-Arab ideology, an Iraqi version of Socialism and Sunni hegemony. Contemporary Iraq is meant to be ruled by all of its components, based on consociationalism. For Farsi Kurds, the regime change was a huge opportunity to return to the country, get their nationality back and reactivate their role in society, especially in the fields of economy and politics. The fact is that they could achieve some of their goals, relatively. However, they faced new waves of discrimination and suffering – such as proving that they are Farsi Kurds to get back their Iraqi nationality, get back their property and receive compensation.

In 2006, the Iraqi Nationality Law has been issued to replace Decree No. 666. Based on the law, all of those who were denaturalized by the Baath regime have the right to should re-acquire their Iraqi citizenship back (Omer, 2022). This is, however, a long, slow and tiring process. There are lots of requirements, including “travel to Baghdad, provide significant documentary evidence, pay high fees to make an application, and prove that Iraqi nationality was held prior to 1980” (Stateless Journeys, 2019, p2). Besides, even in the post-2003 era, just like the Baath Party era, there are signs on the national identity cards of Farsi Kurds indicating that they are originally non-Iraqis. This has been understood as continuous discrimination against Farsi Kurds.

In contemporary Iraq, the Farsi Kurds, as individuals, have been playing an active political role. They participate in elections; and there are a number of them who have become members of the Iraqi parliament and occupy high-ranking governmental positions. Here, the fact is that they represent a specific sect or political party, but not themselves as Farsi Kurds. The only Farsi Kurds' representative, however, is through a reserved seat in the Iraqi Parliament from Wasit province - which they feel ‘expelled’ and think that their quota seat had to be dedicated in Baghdad, instead of Wasit (Rudaw, 2018, Online).

Farsi Kurds’ participation in Iraqi political life is not, indeed, pure participation to represent their community. They are neither kings nor king-makers. For this, there are different reasons, such as they are not organized within the framework of one or more political organizations. They are not, in the majority, belong to a specific political tendency or coalition. They do not have defined geography within Iraq. They, as a population, are not inhabited in some specific areas. There is a division of the Farsi Kurds’ population between KRI and Baghdad-ruled areas. Their identity has not been formed as a solid political one. Their vision is not independent, but is depended on and

divided between Kurdish ethnicity and Shiite faith. They have not got their economic role back yet. Their intellectual and media-related activity is still a growing one. They do not possess a militia. They are not supported by a regional state – while they have been considered an element of Iran's soft power in Iraq (See: Afshardi & Babli, 2017; and also: Zargar & Molaei, 2022). They are still healing from the genocide, both psychologically and socially too. Thus, the Faili Kurds can be classified as a vulnerable community its today's performance is still in the shadow of its past.

Conclusion; or Reintegrating Faili Kurds into Iraqi Society

Today, Iraq has surpassed the era of civil war, sectarian violence and terror attacks. While the political circumstances are still unstable, there is a good level of security and economic growth. That is, mainly, because of the end of ISIS and the increase in oil prices. Besides, the decrees issued by the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Court, and the laws issued by the Iraqi House of Representatives paved the way to flourish the role that the Faili Kurds might play. Indeed, the decisions and decrees that are made by the Iraqi judiciary and legislative authorities are significant; and there are still more to be made. Now, the Faili Kurds are having more expectations of the Iraqi executive authorities, mainly the federal government. They are still seeking financial and moral compensation, as tools to empower their community aiming to play a more active role in the country's different sectors.

For the Faili Kurds, the future is not looking that much promising and bright if they do nothing to increase their potential and decrease their vulnerability. That is, as mentioned before, not only because of their power and potential, but the economic and socio-political mosaic of the country that they live in, too. Sectarianism in politics and corruption in the economy can be considered the main challenges to reintegrating Faili Kurds into Iraqi society and re-appearing as an economic and socio-political power in the country. To achieve such a goal, there are different tasks that should be carried out by the Faili Kurds community themselves and also some by the Iraqi society – that is all alongside the duties that the law has put on the shoulders of the governmental institutions.

Related to the Faili Kurds, they need having an inclusive intra-Faili talk process. This can be aiming to bring Faili Kurds together, enhance cooperation among them and establish an organization/coalition that can represent, if not embody, their demands and

dreams. This might be argued as a precondition to empower the community, activate their participation and strengthen their role in Iraq. In terms of their reintegration into Iraqi society, the Faili community has lots of potential. It can use almost of elements of its identity as sources of power. Being Kurd is a very interesting and attractive element to be reintegrated within Kurdish society in KRI and other parts of Iraq too. Being Shi'a is also another strong factor to play role in contemporary Iraq, which would be through their integration into the Shi'a community. However, in the absence of an exclusive Faili organization, these elements might play a contrary role – such as what has been felt by some Failis arguing that in the KRI they have been dealt with as Shi'a, and in Iraq they have been dealt with as Kurds.

To sum up, it can be argued that the role that Faili Kurds played in modern Iraq was an important and effective one. Their participation in building Iraq as a state and their sacrifice for liberty cannot be neglected – neither by the Kurds nor by Shi'a. Today, it is Iraq's moral, legal, and political duty to ease reintegrating of the Faili Kurds into society. Contemporary Iraq, indeed, is in need of the potential that the Faili Kurds community has. This potential would be used to rebuild the country economically, flourish it socially, and most importantly bring another example of politics into its political life which is sicked by sectarianism.

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إعادة اندماج الأكراد الفيليين في المجتمع العراقي: البحث عن صوتهم في السياسة

الملخص

خلال نظام حزب البعث العراقي، واجه الأكراد الفيليون الإبادة الجماعية؛ وتم اغتيال هويتهم الكردية والشيعية على حد سواء. بعد تغيير النظام في عام ٢٠٠٣، ألغيت القرارات والقوانين التمييزية، ومهد ذلك الطريق لعودتهم من إيران التي طردوا إليها، ولاستعادة الجنسية التي جردوا منها. ومع ذلك، لم يتعافى المجتمع الفيلي من الإبادة الجماعية، بل واجه تحديات جديدة، وذلك لأن الفرد الفيلي لم ينجو تمامًا من تأثيرات الإبادة الجماعية بعد. ولأنهم يريدون العمل في الساحة السياسية كمواطنين، في بلد تقوم فيه المشاركة السياسية في الغالب على الطائفية العرقية، وليست على المواطنة. هناك أفراد فيليون يلعبون دورًا في الساحات السياسية، لكن مشاركتهم ليست لتمثيل مجتمعهم الفيلي. هناك سياسيون وممثلون في البرلمان وآخرون رفيعو المستوى يمثلون الأحزاب والتوجهات السياسية غير الفيلية. المشاركة الفيلية الخالصة تأتي من خلال مقعد واحد في واسط ضمن المقاعد المخصصة للأقليات. تناقش هذه الورقة عملية إعادة تفعيل دور الفيليين الحقيقي في السياسة العراقية من خلال إعادة اندماجهم في المجتمع العراقي. السؤال المطروح هو كيف يمكن أن يحدث هذا؟ يستخدم البحث المنهج النوعي لجمع وتحليل البيانات في إطار العلوم السياسية.

كلمات مفتاحية: الأكراد الفيليون؛ العراق؛ المشاركة السياسية؛ الطائفية-العرقية؛ الإبادة الجماعية

ئاوئته كوردنه وهى كوردانى فهىلى به كۆمه ئىگای عىراقى: گهران به دواى دهنگيان له سياسه تدا

پوخته

له سه رده مى رژىمى به عسى عىراقدا، كوردانى فهىلى رووبه رووى جىنۆسايد بوونه وه؛ شوناسه كهيان، هم وهك كورد وه هميش وهك شيعه، تيرۆر كرا. دواى گۆرىنى رژىم له سالى ٢٠٠٣، برىار و ياسا جىكارىيه كان پووچه ئى كرانه وه. نه مهش رىگه خۆش كرد بۆ گهرانه وهيان له ئىران كه پىشتى به زۆر بۆى دهركرابوون وه ههروه ها بۆ دووباره به دهسته ئىنه وهى نه وه ره گه زنامه هيه كه پىشتى به زۆر لىيان سه ندرابوويه وه. سه ره راى نه وهش، هىشتا برىنى جىنۆسايدى كۆمه ئى كوردانى فهىلى به تهواوى سارىژ نه بووه، بگه ره رووبه رووى ناستهنگى نوئىش بوونه ته وه. نه وهش له بهر نه وهيه كه نه وان وهك تاكه كهس هىشتا به تهواوى له ژىر كارىگه رىيه كانى جىنۆسايد رزگارىان نه بووه؛ هاوكات له ولائىكدا كه به شدارىى سياسى زياتر له سه ر بنه ماى ئىتنۆتايه گه رىيه، نهك هاو لا ئىبوون، نه وان دهيانه وى وهك هاو لا ئى، نهك پىكهاته، رۆل بگىرن. له كاتىكدا ژماره يه كه سى فهىلى له گۆره پانه سياسىيه كاندا رۆل دهگىرن، به لام به شدارى كوردنى پارت و تهوژمه سياسىيه غه يره فهىلىيه كان له گۆره پانه كه دان. ياسادانه ره پله بالاكانى ترى فهىلىش بۆ نوئىنه رايه تى كوردنى پارت و تهوژمه سياسىيه غه يره فهىلىيه كان له گۆره پانه كه دان. هاوكات، به شدارى كوردنى په تىي فهىلىيه كان له رىگه كورسىيه كى كه مینه كۆتا وهيه له واست. نه م توئىژىنه وهيه بۆ تاوتوئى كوردنى پرۆسه كاركردنه وهى رۆلى راسته قىنه فهىلىيه كانه له ژبانى سياسه تى عىراقدا، له رىگه ئاوتى كوردنه وهيان به كۆمه ئىگای عىراقى. پرسىاره كهش نه وهيه كه نه مه چۆن ده توانىت روو بدات. توئىژىنه وهكه مینۆدى چۆنايه تى به كارد هه ئىتت بۆ كۆكردنه وه و شىكردنه وهى داتاكان، له چوارچىوه زانستى سياسىدا.

وشه سه ره كىيه كان: كوردانى فهىلى؛ عىراق؛ به شدارىى سياسى؛ ئىتنۆتايه گه رى؛ جىنۆسايد.