

CONFLICT IN KIRKUK

Understanding Ethnicity



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Kirkuk is a city and governorate in northern Iraq that holds significant importance to three different ethnic groups (see Appendix I). Kurds, Turkmen, and Arabs each view themselves as the rightful heirs to the land and use history to legitimize their claims. Kurds assert they have inhabited the area for hundreds of years, while Turkmen feel their Ottoman past guarantees them rights to the land, and Arabs allege Kirkuk has been a fundamental part of the Iraqi state since its inception in 1921.

Running parallel to ethnic disagreements, and complicating an already sensitive subject, is the fact that Kirkuk holds around 12 per cent of Iraq's proven oil reserves—totaling 13.5 billion barrels.¹ As a result, an Iraqi election law, hydrocarbons (oil) law, constitution, and national census have all been obstructed by debate over the future of Kirkuk. The ever-present political impasse has also caused heightened tensions in northern Iraq and an increase in violence has ignited fears of civil war. Consequently, the importance of this issue cannot be underestimated and an agreeable, feasible solution is necessary. Getting to that ideal point, however, is where the predicament lays, with so many contradictory viewpoints and factors to take into account.

Accordingly, this paper will attempt to tell the narratives of each ethnic group and explain the significance of ethnicity in Iraq in order to understand the conflict that persists today over Kirkuk. The first section of this paper is devoted to the concept of ethnicity and addresses the following questions: *Where did ethnic divides in Kirkuk come from? Why is ethnicity so important to Kirkukis?* The second section is dedicated to looking at all three sides of the conflict to acquire a holistic awareness of what resides deep within the hearts and minds of each group. The narratives describe each communal group's particular view of Kirkuk's history and demonstrate the wide variations that abound in claims to Kirkuk. The concluding section of this

paper will deal with future prospects for peace, and will incorporate what was discovered in the first two sections. Ultimately, what is argued is that a government based on majority rule (effectively Kurdish control) that is under the overarching rule of the Iraqi central government, yet given special status for greater autonomy, is the ideal political solution in which all three ethnic groups may find peace.

ETHNICITY IN IRAQ

Where did ethnic divides in Kirkuk come from?

At the center of debate around Kirkuk lies ethnicity. Turkmen, Arabs, and Kurds are the main communal groups that reside in the province and each of them holds a strong ethnic identity with corresponding ties to the land. However, it was not always this way. Before the creation of the state of Iraq by the British in 1921, Kirkuk had been part of the Ottoman Empire and flourished as a multi-ethnic region living in peace. Tribal Sunni Arabs were well-established and accepted. Turkmen held high bureaucratic posts and were considered part of the elite. Kurds were the majority and largely peasants, but there were also powerful Kurdish emirs who assisted Istanbul with maintaining security in the region.²

However, life as the people of Kirkuk knew it dramatically changed upon the discovery of oil at Baba Gurgur in Kirkuk. Before the realization that oil would be a major player in the 20th century and before the revelation that the Persian and Mesopotamian areas contained this precious resource, Britain had planned to completely hand over Mosul province³ to the French as part of the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement. Nevertheless, Britain soon realized the extent of the region's oil potential and decided to take a different course of action. The 1920 Treaty of Sevres granted British mandate over the Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul—the three of which form present-day Iraq.⁴

Also included in the Treaty of Sevres was mention of an autonomous region for the Kurds that would include southeastern Anatolia and Mosul. Article 62 of the treaty stated, “Britain, France and Italy...shall draft...a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas...”⁵ Winston Churchill, who was heading the Colonial Office at this time, rightly predicted that if an Arab leader were to rule over the Kurds, he would “ignore the Kurdish sentiment and oppress the Kurdish minority.”⁶ A year later, however, Churchill caved in and agreed that the Kurdish areas of Iraq should be annexed to Iraq, although given local autonomy.

Furthering this sentiment, in 1922 the British issued a Joint Declaration to the League of Nations with the Iraqi government, reiterating their assertion that Kurds had the right to form a local government in Iraq. However, following the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne that spared recognition of Kurdistan and split the region between Turkey, Iran and Iraq, the British performed a complete about-face and started to repress Kurdish movements for autonomy in Iraq, urging them to accept the new Arab government. With the 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty of Alliance, Britain ended its mandate of Iraq and made no mention of the Kurds or their right to local governance. When Iraq formally attained independence from Britain in 1932, oil was flowing from Baba Gurgur and Kirkuk was highly divided.⁷

Having lost the chance for autonomy, the Kurds of newly-formed Iraq disputed the state’s legitimacy from the start, as they never felt they belonged to such an entity. Their language was different from Arabic, their mountainous culture was not like that of the Arabs, and their devotion was hardly to an Arab King from present-day Saudi Arabia who was granted jurisdiction by a foreign entity. Turkmen, likewise, held no affection for the Arab government in Baghdad but rather desired Kirkuk to be a part of the newly-formed Republic of Turkey. They logically found it in their interest to be a part of an entity that would retain their power, not one

that would diminish it. In effect, Kirkuk became divided between the Arabs, Turkmen, and Kurds, with each having their own idea about who should control the region.

In the end, jurisdiction was dealt to who had the most power, money, and influence, and the Arab government in Baghdad, supported by Britain and the League of Nations, unquestionably was the victor. However, the aspirations of the Kurds and Turks remained and this greatly concerned Britain and the newly-formed Kingdom of Iraq because of Kirkuk's oil potential. It is difficult to cite exactly the ethnic composition of the Kirkuk governorate at this time due to skewed censuses taken by the Ottomans, British and Iraqi government; however, it is generally accepted that Kurds made up the majority of the population (possibly around 60%), and Arab and Turkmen each comprised anywhere from 5-25% of the population, depending on the source.⁸ Therefore, a process of "Arabization" took place, with the government displacing Kurds and Turks through a variety of means, while at the same time moving and settling Arabs into Kirkuk.

During the first few decades of the new Kingdom of Iraq, the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) hired many Arabs from outside Kirkuk to work for the burgeoning company, and widespread social change ultimately followed. Turkmen maintained their positions on the whole, and many mercantilists benefited from the new population influx. However, an outbreak erupted in 1924 that killed up to two hundred Turkmen, who did not support the newly-formed monarchy. Kurds also became demoralized at this time, as they saw their wealth, power, and authority flowing to the Turkmen and Arabs, but not to themselves.⁹

When the Iraqi government under Qassim united with the Iraqi Communist Party in 1958—that was largely composed of Kurds in the north—Qassim allowed Mulla Mustafa Barzani, the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), to return from exile. However, this

caused great fear amongst the Turkmen, who worried Kirkuk would fall to the Kurds and their status would diminish. Tensions between the two rose when a Kurd was elected Mayor of Kirkuk, and conflict eventually broke out for three days after an “accidental collapse into fighting.” Between 31 and 79 Turkmen died as a result, around 130 were injured, and 120 houses were destroyed. This event, which Turkmen refer to as a massacre, became a watershed in the relationship between Kurds and Turkmen.¹⁰

The sixties witnessed drastic measures taken against the Kurds as fear of a Kurdish rebellion along with the importance of oil grew. Around a hundred Kurdish villages were destroyed in the governorate, Kurds were forcibly moved away from oil pipelines and Arabs were moved in. Kurdish neighborhoods in Kirkuk were razed, Kurds were fired from their jobs in the IPC, names of buildings and streets were changed to Arabic, and the province became largely militarized. For the Kurds, these actions taken by the government in Baghdad signaled a turning point and heightened their sense of ethnic identity. Turkmen were also discriminated against at this time, as educated Turkmen—such as doctors, scientists, and engineers—were not allowed to work in Kirkuk but were sent to other regions of Iraq. Additionally, Turkmen on the whole were forced to adopt Arabic in schools and change Turkish names of neighborhoods, buildings, and villages.¹¹

The seventies presented Kurds with more of the same, but they also were banned from purchasing property, from selling property to non-Arabs, and from renovating decaying property. Turkmen leaders were executed and Turkmen officials were directly targeted by official orders that called to deport and disperse them. Arabs on the other hand were paid to move to Kirkuk and even given housing and employment.¹² After 1975 when Iran withdrew its support from the Kurds, a policy of repression coupled with cultural and demographic Arabization took place on a

scale never before seen. However, this too was to be surpassed in brutality by Saddam Hussein's Anfal Campaign in the late eighties that saw the use of chemical weapons, massive forced deportation, and destruction. The ultimate tragedy came in 1988 when a systematic gassing of the Kurdish village Halabja left thousands dead.¹³

After the Gulf War, between 1991 and 2000, the US and UK protected Kurdish-populated areas north of the thirty-sixth parallel. However, Kirkuk, which had a significant Kurdish population, was not protected, as it was beneath the thirty-sixth parallel. Therefore, Saddam made sure that oil-rich Kirkuk was firmly under his grip and not susceptible to further Kurdish uprisings. He displaced an estimated 120,000 people from Kirkuk and those who remained either faced destruction, or "ethnic identity correction" forms.¹⁴

The rift between Kurds and Turkmen also widened at this time, as Turkmen living above the thirty-sixth parallel in the newly-formed Kurdish Region feared the new leadership. Turkmen assert that a policy of Kurdification took place in these years and that they became marginalized under Kurdish rule, at times losing positions of authority. Therefore, random skirmishes and constant tension defined Kurd-Turkmen relations, not only above the thirty-sixth parallel, but also in Kirkuk.¹⁵

Since the days of Saddam's brutality, ethnic disagreements have not dissipated. In 2003, when the US invaded Iraq, Kurds took back Kirkuk militarily and started returning in large numbers. Hundreds of thousands have already returned, yet Turkmen and Arabs say that more have come back than were forced out and many are not even from Kirkuk.¹⁶ Moreover, Kurds have forcefully taken back homes, pressured Arabs to leave, and at the first provincial council meeting after the 2005 elections, in which Kurds attained a majority, the entire session was held in Kurdish without interpretation for the minority members. Kurds have also proceeded to

dominate the army, police, and security forces, as well as the civil service sector, and have established their own intelligence and security services—all to the chagrin of Turkmen and Arabs.¹⁷

What is evident from this brief history of ethnicity in Kirkuk, is that each group has experienced persecution, trauma, and discrimination. Ethnicity initially became an issue when the Iraqi central government feared that ethnic diversity in the areas surrounding Kirkuk's oil well had the ability to interfere with production, and ethnic divides widened as preference and privilege were handed to certain groups.

Why is ethnicity so important to Kirkukis?

Ted Robert Gurr, a renowned expert in the field of political conflict, sought to discover why minorities mobilized—either in the form of protest or rebellion. He published his research in 1993 and statistically demonstrated that lost autonomy and grievances were the primary motivators for communal mobilization.¹⁸ Using Gurr's findings as a guide for analyzing the Kurds and Turkmen in Kirkuk, this paper ultimately argues that Kurdish identity is shaped by the two primary factors Gurr discovered in his research: *lost autonomy* and *past grievances*. Turkish identity, on the other hand, is shaped by *unacknowledged identity* and *past grievances*. In the context of this paper, lost autonomy refers to the concept of relative deprivation¹⁹ due to a denial of statehood, and unacknowledged identity refers to a basic human need²⁰ for recognition of past achievements and current presence. Past grievances encapsulate a number of ideas that are fundamentally intertwined for the special case of Kurds and Turkmen in Kirkuk: subordination by a dominant group, threats to identity, collective violence, and collective disadvantage or discrimination (economic and political)—all of which will be discussed further in this section.²¹

Lost Autonomy

Relative deprivation is the discrepancy between what a group feels it “ought” to have, meaning value expectations, and what “is,” or value capabilities.²² The initial promise by the British to create a homeland for the Kurds created an expectation for autonomy, and the eventual denial of a Kurdish state left them feeling betrayed. Furthermore, repeated efforts to achieve their aspirations were consistently repressed by dominant governments in Baghdad. The capabilities of the Kurds never quite matched their expectations, making them feel as though their “basic needs for liberty and security” were being unjustifiably thwarted.²³ Kurds saw themselves in relation to other ethnic groups who had a state—such as Turkey for the Turks, Iran for the Persians, Iraq for the Arabs—but who were not allowing the Kurds to form a state of their own. Large movements formed and impassioned leaders gathered in Iraq calling for Kurdish autonomy; the importance of declaring ones ethnic identity thus grew amongst the Kurds. They believe they have been repressed as a group for almost one hundred years, and they see obtaining a state as a natural and legitimate right and need. Hence, retaining their ethnic identity is crucial if they ever hope to ever achieve autonomy.

Unacknowledged Identity

Turkmen view their ethnicity with pride in Iraq. They credit themselves with the establishment of great cities in the north and point to their achievements that are still visible in Kirkuk. Furthermore, they despair over efforts taken by the Arabs on the one hand and Kurds on the other to diminish their influence and rid them of the city. What makes them come together as an ethnic group is their shared sense of being overlooked. According to John Burton, recognition of ones identity is an inherent human need, and because of this, ethnic groups come together to achieve acknowledgment.²⁴ Turkmen oftentimes feel as though the Kurds take all of the

limelight away from them, making their suffering go unnoticed. They also feel like Kirkuk's present prosperity is largely due to their past efforts, but that their contribution to the province has been ignored, forgotten, and covered over by the sheer number of Arabs and Kurds. In effect, Turkmen place great emphasis on their distinct identity, trying to showcase what others neglect.

Past Grievances

As previously discussed, Arabization in the twentieth century had sweeping effects on the Kurdish and Turkmen populations. Hundreds of thousands of people were either displaced or killed, property was destroyed, and culture stifled. Economic opportunities were denied to both groups, and positions of authority were saved for Arabs. Physically weak compared to the Iraqi security forces, Kurds and Turkmen were continually subjugated by a domineering government that left no room for protest. Effectively, the more brutal steps the government in Baghdad took to change the demographics of Kirkuk in favor of the Arabs, the more ethnic identity soared amongst Kurds and Turkmen.²⁵

Arabs

The Arabs of Kirkuk hold different reasons than Kurds and Turkmen as to what explains their strong sense of ethnic identity. When the Kingdom of Iraq was created, constituents whom we would classify as "Arabs" today actually were barely familiar with the term. Instead, people were Ottomans or known by their tribal or familial affiliation. All of this changed, however, when modern nation-states were forced upon the region. The three provinces of Iraq were expected to unite as a sovereign nation and show allegiance to a foreign King, even though their diversity overpowered their similarities.

As it happened to be, those in power at the time were Sunni Arab (even though the majority of Iraqis were and still are Shi'a) and therefore the identity of the state was to reflect its

leaders. Occurring in parallel, other states of the Middle East were trying to control their diverse populations as well by enforcing a unifying identity. Ultimately, pan-Arabism took hold of the region and a sense of shared language, religion, and culture flourished. This is not to say that the movement was organic, which was hardly the case. Rather, the education system, military, national anthem, media, and leaders all carried the same message that declared Arabs were one entity with a shared history and culture that should be glorified and promoted.

CLAIMS TO KIRKUK – ETHNIC NARRATIVES

Kurds

For the Kurds of Iraq, Kirkuk has always been an integral part of what they would call Kurdistan (see Appendix IV). They legitimize their assertion by referring to the Ottoman province Shahrazour, later named Mosul, which the Kurds allege was widely known to be a Kurdish province. Additionally, according to most censuses and historical accounts, Kurds have been the majority in Kirkuk province for at least hundreds of years. Therefore, they denigrate Turkmen claims to Kirkuk by dismissing their presence as recent and a product of the Ottoman Empire. They also disregard the Arab claim to Kirkuk because they say they were merely wandering tribes that never really settled in the region until modern times. Even though the Kurds belittle other ethnic groups' primordial claims to Kirkuk, they still recognize the multiethnic nature of the region and respect those residents who were present before Arabization. However, for the Arabs who settled in the region thereafter, the Kurds have promoted a policy of return to their original land. By the same token, Kurds believe in the Kurdish right as a displaced population to return to Kirkuk and this process is already underway.²⁶

In addition to their sense of being the original and authentic inhabitants of Kirkuk, Kurds also retain a notion that Kirkuk embodies their past suffering under Arabization and therefore

underscores the Kurds' ethical right to the land. As Nechirvan Barzani, Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government, explained, "For us Kirkuk is the symbol of oppression, the denial of rights and injustices that have been committed against our people there."²⁷ Never before have the Kurds held Kirkuk for more than a few days, making it the only major Kurdish-populated region that has not yet fallen to their authority. By obtaining Kirkuk, which many Kurds refer to as the "heart" or "Jerusalem" of Kurdistan, the Kurds would have proof of their status as an ethnic group, separate from the identity of Iraq, and worthy of autonomy. In effect, Kirkuk would become a symbol of Kurdish steadfastness, achievement, and authenticity.²⁸

Although it is easy to find historical accounts that barely mention Kurdish existence in Kirkuk, and although there are arguments to be made that Kurdish identity, as well as a Kurdistan, never even existed until the fall of the Ottoman Empire, this is the Kurdish narrative and it is what millions of people believe. Effectively, it is futile to ponder and quarrel over its accuracy; a more sensible strategy is to become familiar with it and gain an awareness of how Kurds sincerely perceive their history and identity in relation to the conflict over Kirkuk.

Turkmen

The Turkmen have a completely different narrative than that of the Kurds. Much like the Kurds criticize the Turkmen's claims to Kirkuk, so do the Turkmen dispute the Kurdish claims. Turkmen credit themselves with the founding of major city centers in the north of Iraq, including Kirkuk, and view Kurds as merely being unindustrious, nomadic peoples who only recently settled in Kirkuk in the 1920s for socioeconomic reasons. Mosul province to them was never a Kurdish or Arab territory, but rather always Turkmen in nature, which they legitimize by pointing to Ottoman architecture and culture that can be seen throughout Kirkuk city.²⁹ They also legitimize their ancestry by referring to "Turkmeneli," or land of the Turks, that was indicated in

a map published in 1785 by William Guthrie (see Appendix V). The term, however, never appeared again until 1994 when the Iraqi Turkmen National Party rejuvenated the concept. The map of Turkmeneli and the map of Kurdistan depict obvious discrepancies with great overlaps. Sometimes for instance, depending on the map, Turkmeneli is completely incorporated into Kurdistan. Both ethnic groups see parts of northern Iraq as unmistakably and unquestionably their own. Who is right does not matter as much as the fact that both the Kurds and Turkmen truly believe that they are the primordial inhabitants of Kirkuk and neither have any intention of changing their firmly-held convictions anytime soon.³⁰

The other two factors that play into Turkmen claims of Kirkuk are past suffering and feelings of injustice. Suffering inflicted upon the Turkmen not only includes actions taken by the central government in Baghdad to Arabize Kirkuk, but also actions taken by the Kurds to Kurdify Kirkuk. Turkmen believe both the Kurds and Arabs have taken systematic steps to rid them of their homeland and memories of past abuses still run very deep among society. Kurds are viewed as an expanding population that first ruined the social order of the city and now want to dominate the entire population. Even though these accusations could be made against the Arabs, and it is true that abuses by the Ba'ath party are far greater than abuses afflicted upon them by the Kurds, Turkmen base their focal point around their relationship with the Kurds.³¹

One reason for this is because Turkmen often compare their situation to that of the Kurds. Turkmen feel as though they have suffered as much, if not more, than them, yet their plight has not been recognized by the international community on a scale like that of the Kurds. These feelings of injustice have led them to crave recognition that Kirkuk is genuinely theirs, and that they are the true victims. They assert that not only have the Arabs tried to take their land and power, but the Kurds are also trying to do the same today.³² In effect, Turkmen desire a special

status for Kirkuk as a federal region to show its uniqueness as a multiethnic governorate.³³ To them, if Kirkuk were to be part of Iraqi Kurdistan, as the Kurds desire, this would be seen as “ethnic one-upmanship,”³⁴ a disregard to past and future suffering of the Turkmen, and the ultimate catastrophe. For Kirkuk to be registered as a normal province of Iraq administered by the central government would mean the history, past suffering, and injustice inflicted upon Turkmen in Kirkuk would go completely unrecognized. Only a special status that would be sure to recognize Turkish contributions and provide inclusion of Turkish leaders into positions of authority would satisfy ethnic needs.

Arabs

The Arab narrative must be subdivided into Sunni and Shi’a, because most Sunni Arabs in Kirkuk have been there for generations, while most Shi’a Arabs have resided in Kirkuk only since the late 1900s. Tribal Sunni Arabs descended primarily from three nomadic tribes: the Obeid, Jbour, and Hadid. It is unknown when they first settled in the region, but the predominant Takriti family is assumed to go back to the seventeenth century. On the other hand, many Shi’a Arabs were forced to move to the region by Saddam Hussein during the 1980s. Some had been displaced by the Iran-Iraq War and others were living in substandard conditions in southern Iraq. Instead of referring to themselves as agents of Arabization, they contend that they either migrated because of pure economic opportunity or because they too suffered under the Ba’ath regime, as they were forced out of their homeland.^{35 36}

To the Arabs, any migration that occurred within the country was natural, legitimate, and a citizen’s right. They dismiss as exaggerations Kurdish and Turkmen claims of Arabization and refute numbers that show Kurdish displacement in the hundreds of thousands. Much like the Turkmen, Arabs see the Kurds as running a “propaganda machine” that paints themselves as

orphans without a home and the only victims of ethnic cleansing—but purposefully leaves out the suffering of all other Iraqis under the Ba’ath regime.³⁷

Furthermore, the Arabs deem the economic, social, and political transformation of Kirkuk in the twentieth century as an integral part of the transformation of Iraq as a whole. The city’s multiethnic nature, to them, is secondary to the unifying force of Iraqi nationalism. In the words of one ethnically Arab Kirkuki: “There are many cross-communal relationships and friendships. Look at me: I am a Sunni Arab because my father is a Sunni Arab. But my mother is a Shiite Arab, my wife is Turkoman and I was breastfed by a Kurdish woman. I’m an Iraqi first...This is Kirkuk.”³⁸ Opposing stances that do not conform to the notion that Kirkuk is, and always has been, an Iraqi province are seen by most Arabs as abominable and detrimental to national interests. For instance, they regard Kurdish aspirations for autonomy as unimaginable and completely unjustifiable—similar to how Americans would view autonomy for any state of the U.S.³⁹

FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

Considering the various narratives present in Kirkuk as well as the enormous weight placed on ethnicity, what does the future hold for such a conflicted province? Kurds, Turks, and Arabs all have understandable, sincere claims to the land that they legitimize using history, calamity, and nationality. Regardless of how many counterclaims or disagreements appear over who is right and wrong, all three groups wholeheartedly believe in their ethnic narratives. Thus, any solution that hopes to achieve peace and stability must take into account the aspirations and trepidations of each faction. For instance, the concept of an Iraqi province for all Iraqis will not hold, as Kurds and Turkmen both hold impassioned ethnic identities that likely will persevere. In

the same respect, a Kurdish province, feared by Turkmen and Arabs who have reason to believe their ethnic makeup will disadvantage them under such a system, is also not feasible.

Accordingly, two options remain after ruling out the highly-divisive possibilities of Kirkuk becoming a part of Iraqi Kurdistan with no special status, and Kirkuk remaining under rule of the central government with no special status. They are: Kirkuk being placed under the rule of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) with special status, or staying under the rule of the central government but with special status. Kurds favor Kurdish rule and Arabs favor Iraqi rule. The Turkmen position is more complicated, with Turkmen living outside of Kirkuk desiring Kurdish rule, but Turkmen living inside of Kirkuk preferring Iraqi rule.⁴⁰

The other decision that has to be made alongside territorial and administrative issues is governance. The two primary forms of rule currently being entertained are majority rule and proportional representation.⁴¹ Kurds favor majority rule because they would inevitably control government—unless the Kurdish population one day decides to not vote along ethnic lines. On the other hand, Turkmen and Arabs who are the minority favor a power sharing arrangement, as this would allow their voices to be heard. However, proportional representation usually leads to client-patron relationships that only further cement ethnic divides, which is hardly what Iraq now needs; therefore, this option will be ruled out.


Consequently, for compromise to take full effect and for all ethnic groups to feel like they have participated in an agreement of mutual give and take, the ideal arrangement would be for Kirkuk to remain under overarching rule of the Iraqi central government, to be given special status that translates into meaningful autonomy, and for Kirkukis to be governed by majority rule. Kurds would have to give up their dream of annexing Kirkuk and Turkmen and Arabs would have to forfeit greater power. However, Kurds would achieve their desired command over

Kirkuk, Turkmen would acquire their preferred special status for the province, and Arabs would secure the Iraqi identity of Kirkuk. Although not all demands are satisfied under this arrangement and details would have to be painstakingly sorted out, this agreement does recognize the plight of all ethnicities and affirms their right to exist within the limits of a stable society, which, according to Gurr, are the essential ingredients for peace.


APPENDIX

Appendix 1

Map 1: Kirkuk Province




Map 2: Mosul Province under the Ottoman Empire




Source: 1897 Rand McNally Atlas

Map 3: Iraq by ethnic/religious group (2003)



Source: US Central Intelligence Agency

Map 4: Iraqi Kurdistan



Source: Columbia University

Map 5: Turkmeneli – “The Land of the Turkmen”
(Indicated in blue)



NOTES

- ¹ International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: The brewing battle over Kirkuk,” *Middle East Report*, N°56, (18 July 2006): 2.
- ² Anderson, Liam and Stansfield, Gareth: 17.
- ³ Mosul province consisted of the northern region of Iraq that includes present-day Iraqi Kurdistan as well as areas to the south and west (see maps in Appendix II).
- ⁴ Anderson, Liam and Stansfield, Gareth: 21-23.
- ⁵ Henry D Astarjian, *The Struggle for Kirkuk*, (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007), 71.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*
- ⁷ Kerim Yildiz, *Kurds in Iraq*, (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 11-13.
- ⁸ Anderson, Liam and Stansfield, Gareth: 25.
- ⁹ *Ibid.*: 30, 63.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*: 30-34.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*: 35, 36, 66.
- ¹² *Ibid.*: 38, 64, 65.
- ¹³ Andreas Wimmer, “Democracy and Ethno-Religious Conflict in Iraq,” Paper presented at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford University (5 May 2003): 12, 13.
- ¹⁴ Anderson, Liam and Stansfield, Gareth: 40, 42, 68, 69.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁶ Timothy Williams, “Turkmens in Contested Oil-Rich Province Vow to Boycott Iraq’s National Census,” *The New York Times*, July 23, 2009.
- ¹⁷ International Crisis Group: 8, 9.
- ¹⁸ Ted Robert Gurr, “Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945,” *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (April 1993): 179.
- ¹⁹ Ted Robert Gurr, “Relative Deprivation and the Impetus to Violence,” *Why Men Rebel*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970): 22-58.
- ²⁰ John Burton, “Needs Theory,” *Violence Explained*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997): 33-40.
- ²¹ Gurr, Ted Robert (1993): 161-201.
- ²² Gurr, Ted Robert (1970): 23, 24.
- ²³ *Ibid.*: 38, 46.
- ²⁴ Burton, John: 37.
- ²⁵ Wimmer, Andreas: 8.
- ²⁶ International Crisis Group: 3.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*: 3.
- ²⁸ Anderson, Liam and Stansfield, Gareth: 25.
- ²⁹ International Crisis Group: 5, 6.
- ³⁰ Anderson, Liam and Stansfield, Gareth: 56-57, 59.
- ³¹ *Ibid.*: 60-67.
- ³² *Ibid.*: 60, 61.
- ³³ International Crisis Group: 5.
- ³⁴ Anderson, Liam and Stansfield, Gareth: 65.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*: 79-81.
- ³⁶ International Crisis Group: 5, 6.
- ³⁷ Anderson, Liam and Stansfield, Gareth: 80-83.
- ³⁸ International Crisis Group: 6.
- ³⁹ Anderson, Liam and Stansfield, Gareth: 83, 84.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*: 190-203.
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*: 204-213.

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