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The Kurdish Struggle for Recognition in Turkey

Towards an Expanded Model of Recognition

Abstract

Kurdish communities have struggled for recognition from the Turkish state and national mainstream since the founding of the Republic of Turkey in 1922. Struggles of this type are often analyzed using theories of or related to the Hegelian concept of recognition. There are, however, two different conceptions of recognition: the original Hegelian conception and the contemporary one. Axel Honneth's model is one of the best-known attempts to bridge these two conceptions of recognition. Honneth's account, however, is lacking in many respects. The author uses the example of the Kurdish struggle for recognition in Turkey to demonstrate how the two conceptions of recognition may be reconciled and how Honneth's model may be expanded to be more comprehensive and descriptively powerful.

At the time of this writing (late May, 2010) one of the Middle East's oldest ongoing ethnic conflicts—the struggle between Kurds and the Turkish state in southeast Turkey—appears ready to flare up. After a period of relative calm, tensions have risen between the two parties since last October: clashes between Kurdish groups and the army have increased and the Turkish state recently arrested 1500 officials and elected politicians active in the main Kurdish political party, the BDP, on the accusation that they were trying to establish a “parallel state” in southeast Turkey.¹ If the conflict does reignite it will likely have profound and far-

reaching consequences for Turkish politics, the development of contemporary understandings of Turkish citizenship and identity, and the political fortunes of Kurdish populations in Iraq and Iran.

The more than eighty-year struggle of the Kurdish populations of Turkey, like many ethnic conflicts, stems partially from a struggle for recognition: though the Kurds have maintained (at least for many periods in the history of the Republic of Turkey) a distinct identity, the Turkish state and national mainstream refused, at least until the last decade, to recognize their existence. The denial was so

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strong that, for many years, Kurds were denied access to education or media in their own language or were even banned from speaking Kurdish in public. Kurdish social movements and organizations struggled not only for the right to express their identity in the public sphere, but also for constitutional recognition of their community and even, amongst more radical sectors of the Kurdish community, political autonomy up to or including statehood.

Over two hundred years ago, Hegel created one of the most important theories through which social science attempts to understand such struggles: that of “recognition.” The theory and philosophy of recognition lie at the root of a number of concepts crucial to many strands of contemporary political theory, such as “multiculturalism,” “identity politics,” and “cultural imperialism.” These concepts are of obvious utility in describing and explaining the experience of not only the Kurds in Turkey, but minority populations across the globe. Thus applying the Hegelian concept of recognition to understanding the Kurds’ struggle for recognition would seem to be straightforward. However, contemporary concepts such as “multiculturalism” and “the politics of difference” rely on a different understanding of recognition from that originally outlined by Hegel: In its original formulation, recognition was seen as a function of psychological crisis experienced by two fully formed subjects upon encountering one another. Contemporary theorists, on the other hand, treat recognition as an intersubjective, group-based phenomenon whereby subjects are formed.

In this article, I attempt to reconcile these two conceptions of recognition and, in the process, form a more comprehensive and descriptively powerful model of contemporary

recognitive processes than what is currently available. I attempt to do so using the empirical example of the Kurdish populations in Turkey as a guide: the experience of the Kurds demonstrates the shortcomings of available theoretical frameworks for studying recognition and helps suggest ways of addressing these shortcomings.

I begin by describing the Kurdish struggle for recognition in more detail, followed by a description of the contemporary and Hegelian conceptions of recognition. I then outline and assess the framework proposed by Axel Honneth, who elaborates on Hegel’s conception of recognition using his concept of “spheres of recognition.” Honneth argues that there are three major spheres within which recognition struggles occur, each governed by a different recognitive principle: The legal sphere, governed by the principle of equality, the sphere of achievement, governed by merit, and the private sphere, governed by modern conceptions of love. However, as I demonstrate using the example of the Kurds in Turkey, Honneth’s model fails on several counts to accurately explain and describe many recognition struggles as they occur on the ground: First, the experience of the Kurds demonstrates that most fundamental recognition struggles (those concerning identity-formative types of recognition) occur across spheres of recognition; the Kurds’ struggle for national recognition includes efforts that span every sphere identified by Honneth among others. I term these overarching recognitive processes which transcend recognition in any single sphere “modes” of recognition. Second, the situation of the Kurds in Turkey demonstrates the importance of states and nations as recognitive agencies; while Honneth accepts the importance of the state, I argue that

both the state and the nation must be analyzed as recognitive agents separately. Finally, the situation of the Kurds in Turkey demonstrates that there are more recognitive spheres than the three which Honneth outlines. The Kurds, for example, experience racism from Turks in their everyday interactions in public space. I argue that this amounts to misrecognition in what I term the “civil sphere,” which is governed by the principle of treating unfamiliar individuals encountered in public according to contextually-appropriate codes of politeness and respect.

After outlining these failings, I address them by proposing and outlining a set of changes and elaborations to Honneth’s model. First, I elaborate on the importance of states and nations as recognitive agencies and how to integrate them into the model. I argue that two must be taken into consideration separately without being subsumed under the concept of the “nation-state,” as is often done. While many states are dominated by a single nation and, ideally (according to nationalist ideology), each nation is governed under its own state, this is not always the case and recognition by one does not necessarily entail recognition by the other. This is demonstrated by the experience of the Kurds, who, while having received equal treatment as citizens of the Republic of Turkey, have not attained recognition of their separate national identity.² More importantly, understanding the state and the nation as recognitive agents helps reconcile the original and contemporary conceptions of recognition: The nation and state solve the crisis of identity that Hegel describes before it even begins by providing a developing subject impersonal recognition without the need for a psychological crisis. However, recognition between different national groups and states—between intersubjective recognitive agencies—

may, and often does, occur in the manner originally described by Hegel. In the case of Turkey, the violent assertion of the Turkish identity as a “master” which experiences an “existential threatened” from the recalcitrant Kurds is at the root of the Turkish nation-state’s unwillingness to recognize the Kurds.³

I continue by arguing that theorists must pay attention to the processes of recognition of belonging to states and nations, which I call “modes of recognition.” The two main modes I identify and describe below are recognition of nationality and citizenship. Recognition along these modes occurs simultaneously in every sphere and is most important for the formation of identity: nearly every single modern subject both is identified and identifies along these two axes of recognition. Using my understanding of these modes of recognition and the importance of state and national recognition I outline a typology of recognition struggles which compares struggles for recognition of meaningful similarity (such as the struggle by Turkish Islamists who emphasize the compatibility of Turkish and Islamic identities) with struggles for recognition of meaningful difference (such as the Kurdish struggle for recognition). I finish this section by outlining a third mode of recognition which is less important for identity formation than citizenship and nationality: recognition of humanity. I argue that struggles for recognition of humanity are less common than in previous eras of human history, though misrecognition of a subject’s humanity is at the root of many of modernity’s greatest evils, such as genocide and ethnic cleansing.

I conclude the article by identifying and outlining three new spheres of recognition in addition to those outlined by Honneth. In addition to the “civil sphere,” outlined above,

I include the “public sphere” wherein groups (including cultural groups) and individuals are provided the opportunity to publicly express their views, desires, and senses of identity, and the sphere of “international recognition,” wherein different national groups and states (mis)recognize each other and thus form the basis of the international state system and of the politics of multiculturalism.

It should be noted that Honneth claims only to describe recognition as it occurs in modern bourgeois capitalist societies. I claim that the expanded model I offer here explains recognition as it occurs in those societies and within the contemporary international-state system—that is to say, recognition between national groups and states. As I explain below, it also provides insight as to how recognition occurred in other epochs of human history, though a number of specific features of the model—such as the relevant spheres and modes of recognition—would be anachronistic. Regardless, this expanded model serves as a powerful analytical tool for understanding recognition and struggles for recognition in the contemporary world, including that of the Kurds in Republican Turkey.

The Kurdish Struggle for Recognition in Turkey

The Kurds are an ethnic national group which has largely lived, at least for several centuries, in an area off the northeastern coast of the Mediterranean, currently divided by the borders of the contemporary states of Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Turkey.⁴ Residents who self-identify as Kurdish comprise between 9% and 13% of the state’s population, though this

is somewhat lower than the estimated total number of ethnic Kurds in Turkey.⁵ The Kurdish population in Turkey has fought a number of struggles for recognition since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1922, culminating in the extremely violent secessionist-terrorist campaign undertaken by the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) in the 1980s and 1990s. The impetus for this struggle for recognition was the Turkish state, ruling parties, media, and national culture’s refusal to recognize the Kurds as a separate, non-Turkish people until approximately 2002, when the Islamist AK Party entered government and, in the interest of pursuing European Union membership, officially recognized the Kurds and liberalized its policies towards the Kurdish community.⁶ Before this, Turkish Kurds were denied access to education or media broadcasts in their native language and, for a time after the 1980 Turkish military coup, were banned from even speaking Kurdish in public.⁷ The general sentiments at the root of this refusal were the sense that non-Turkish identity was a threat to the security of the perceivedly unstable Turkish state and, furthermore, the sentiment amongst the Turkish mainstream that belonging to the Turkish nation equated with modernity. Kurds have been referred to, for most of the Republican era, as “future Turks,” or “Mountain Turks”—that is to say, they were thought of as only Kurdish to the extent that they continued to cling to pre-modern religious, cultural, and economic ways of being.⁸

Furthermore, the recognition struggle is evolving in new ways. As Cenk Saracoğlu has found, an anti-Kurdish discourse has emerged amongst urban Turks which portrays Kurds as rude, conniving, “culturally backward, intrinsically incapable of adapting to ‘modern city life’, naturally criminal, violent, and separatist.”⁹

This discourse emerged in the 1990s as Kurds migrated to urban centers in increasing numbers; while the Kurdish Workers' Party had been highly vilified amongst the Turkish mainstream since the 1980s, it was not until extensive migration that this discourse began to emerge.¹⁰ At the same time as this ethnicist discourse has emerged, a similar discourse has developed in the Turkish media since the mid-1990s that portrays Kurds as irredeemably alien. In editorials, Kurds are associated with historical non-Muslim others of the Turkish nation-state, described as “crypto-Jews,” and “native-Greeks.”¹¹ This change in Turkish conceptions of Kurdish national difference have led to the usage of the term “pseudo-citizens” to describe Kurdish protestors by several Turkish public agencies, such as the General Staff of the military; this has led Mesut Yeğen to predict that the Kurds will begin experiencing discriminatory citizenship practices of the type many non-Muslim citizen groups have experienced throughout the history of the Republic.¹² Though legal access to Kurdish-language education and media has increased since 2002, many Kurds and the PKK still struggle for official constitutional recognition.¹³

Two Centuries, Two Conceptions of Recognition

As stated above, the experience of the Kurds in Turkey is a classic example of a struggle for recognition. However, if one were to attempt to analyze it as a struggle for recognition, one would have to choose between two conceptions of recognition: In

its original conception as outlined by Hegel, recognition refers to the process of a subjective consciousness experiencing a psychological crisis of self-understanding upon encountering another subject for the first time.¹⁴ This crisis arises as each subject objectifies the other in an attempt to force the other to recognize its own subjective self-awareness—or, in Kojève's words, seeks validation of its own “autonomous value.”¹⁵ This objectification is repugnant to the consciousness that seeks its own recognition as subject, not object, and thus triggers a struggle wherein each consciousness risks its life to gain recognition as a subject from the other. In the end, one consciousness emerges as the “master” who exploits and receives non-reciprocal recognition from the other consciousness, the “slave.” This relationship of mastership and slaveship will only be overcome if the master realizes the falsity of the recognition he receives from a being that he does not in turn recognize as a subject. Ideally, the two parties reject the struggle for mastership and “recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.”¹⁶ In this understanding of recognition it may be said that “misrecognition” entails any recognitive scenario besides this ideal where the two consciousnesses mutually recognize each other's subjectivity and, in turn, confirm their own subjectivity. Here misrecognition is, at least in the most literal reading, a subjective psychological phenomenon.

The Hegelian account of recognition describes the experience of the Kurds in that the Turkish majority has arguably asserted itself as a modern “master” identity which supersedes the “backward” identity of the Kurds.¹⁷ The Turkish mainstream has demanded recognition from Kurdish communities—by demanding they become or seek to become Turks—without

in turn recognizing the value, authenticity, or even existence of Kurdish identity.¹⁸ The Hegelian conception of recognition does not, however, appear to describe the experience of the Kurds in Turkey if we strictly follow Hegel in considering recognition a subjective phenomenon; it describes only the relationship between two intersubjective national groups.

Let us compare this to more contemporary discussions of the concept of recognition in political theory and multiculturalism literature, which discusses recognition as a process that operates on an intersubjective level. Nancy Fraser provides a good example of the contemporary understanding of recognition in her essay “Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics.”¹⁹ In it she reinterprets Hegel’s thesis—though she claims to represent his original thesis—by arguing that “[recognition] is constitutive for subjectivity; one becomes an individual subject only in virtue of recognizing, and being recognized by, another subject,” and that Hegel’s theory of recognition hinges upon the idea that “intersubjectivity is prior to subjectivity.”²⁰ Thus, according to the interpretation adopted by Fraser, recognition is an intersubjective process whereby the subject is constituted and given meaning. Instead of the struggle for recognition emerging out of the encounter between two subjective consciousnesses, the subject does not exist until constituted in the process of recognition. Iris Marion Young, adopting a similar conception of recognition, thus outlines misrecognition as the recognition (constitution) of a subject as belonging to a culture or group to which she does not authentically belong or recognizing (constituting) a subject in terms which are demeaning to a group or groups to which she belongs.²¹ This is the conception of

misrecognition that I will adopt for the purposes of this article.

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Kurds in that Kurds feel authentically different from Turks because they are intersubjectively recognized in this way; as subjects their identity is constituted as Kurdish by the Kurdish national-cultural context in which they gain self-awareness. They feel misrecognized by the Turkish mainstream because it refuses to acknowledge their feelings of authentic belonging to the Kurdish nation or because many Turks recognize Kurds in demeaning terms.

These two accounts of the process of recognition are at odds. They posit a different relationship between the process of the constitution of the subject and recognition, and they focus on recognition which takes place at different levels—the intersubjective and the

subjective.

The first question this difference, once revealed, likely elicits is, “why have contemporary theorists altered Hegel’s original conception of recognition in this way?” To answer this question would require an in-depth survey of the literature, and that would be beyond the scope of this current essay. The question I propose to answer, however, is a more practical one: In which ways is each of the two more correct, and how may they be integrated or expanded upon? To answer this question I will begin with the framework offered by an author who attempts to “bring it all back to Hegel,” Axel Honneth, and proceed to modify and expand that framework—adding significant “spheres of recognition” and formally integrating the nation-state into the model—to dramatically increase its power and scope.

Axel Honneth

According to Axel Honneth in his essay “Redistribution as Recognition,” Hegel’s model is inaccurate in that, in reality, the subject does not precede the intersubjective context. He is, in an obvious sense, correct: fully-formed subjects never encounter one another in the manner Hegel described. I propose to call Hegel’s formulation a “state of nature” approach to modeling recognition, in that it presents an abstract theoretical encounter between two fully-formed subjects in a pre-social “state of nature.”²² In reality, this state of nature likely never existed, and a human always enters the world pre-embedded in a complex matrix of recognitive relations that operates on multiple levels at once.

For Honneth, at least in contemporary

liberal capitalist societies, the different levels on which these recognitive relationships operate are “spheres of recognition,” each of which operates according to a different recognitive principle. The three Honneth outlines are as follows: First, the sphere of love, where the principle is that of mutual “loving care for the other’s well-being in light of his or her individual needs.” Second is the legal sphere governed by the principle of equal treatment under a regime of laws. Third, there exists the sphere of achievement that is governed by the principle of equal recognition for work and accomplishments of value to society.²³ These spheres of recognition emerged in tandem with the “breakthrough to bourgeois-capitalist society” that began in some parts of the world in the 17th century: The sphere of love emerged out of changing understandings of childhood and love, the sphere of legal equality emerged from new understandings of the role of the state and its relationship with its citizens (former subjects), and the realm of achievement emerged through the developments of the capitalist economy.²⁴ Honneth adds, but then dismisses, the possibility for one further sphere of recognition, one which we will see later is highly important: that of recognition of cultural belonging. Honneth argues that this does not qualify as a separate sphere in that all arguments for recognition of cultural groups use the moral grammar of legal equality. As I will explain below, Honneth is correct in that it does not qualify as a sphere of recognition, but is wrong on two counts. First, the legal sphere is not the only sphere in which equality is the operative principle. Second, cultural recognition operates in a number of spheres—the legal sphere far from being the most important—in what I call a major transcendental “mode of recognition” in modern society. I explain both of these points in

greater depth below.

Axel Honneth, according to Nancy Fraser, qualifies as one of the contemporary theorists of recognition whose conception of recognition contradicts Hegel's original definition. This is largely true, though Honneth includes important elements of Hegel's original analysis. First, Honneth emphatically focuses on recognition not as something that can be "given," as some multiculturalist theorists like Charles Taylor do, but as a relation between two subjects that must be mutually enacted.²⁵ The key is the concept of mutuality, which is at work in all recognitive relationships in some capacity. Second, Honneth emphasizes the importance of studying recognition and misrecognition as they are experienced by subjects on the ground—even while he sees recognition as an intersubjective process, he focuses on the subject as understood in Hegel's original formulation.

In this understanding Honneth "brings it back to Hegel" by reemphasizing the process of mutual recognition between individual subjects and the individual psychological nature of recognition. At the same time Honneth's employment of the concept of different spheres of recognition describes the reality of intersubjective identity formation far more aptly than Hegel's "state of nature" description. Is this framework useful for describing the process of recognition on the ground? To answer this question let us apply it to the experience of the Kurds in Turkey.

The Limits of Honneth's Model

There are several ways in which Honneth's framework apparently fails to describe

the Kurdish struggle for recognition. First, it fails to adequately account for the recognitive power of both the nation and the state. For example, as Asa Lundgren wrote of her experience studying the "Kurdish Question," most Turkish officials were willing, when speaking personally or off-the-record, to recognize the Kurds' existence before 2002.²⁶ However, what was desired before, and received in, 2002 was recognition of the Kurdish people on the part of government officials speaking not as individuals, but as officials vested with the authority to articulate and enact the impersonal collective will of the state. As a further example, since 2002 many Kurds have pushed for an amendment to the constitution of the Turkish republic which formally recognizes their existence; they do not simply seek recognition from politicians and officials vested with authority to articulate the state's will, but rather to directly encode recognition into the impersonal legal framework of the Turkish state. In the case of constitutional recognition, the agent of recognition cannot possibly be an individual subject; it is the institution of the state unmediated by the agency of an individual. Therefore, if our framework for understanding recognition is to reflect how the process of recognition is experienced on the ground, we must emphasize the primacy of state-based and national recognition.

Second, the Kurds have been struggling and continue to struggle for recognition of their meaningful cultural difference from Turkish society. Thus they seek not only legal equality (i.e. recognition in the legal sphere), but a recognition of the cultural differences between them and the Turkish mainstream. This not only affects the types of legal treatment—such as access to education in the Kurdish language—that they feel they require in order to be treated "equally"

before the law, but also their desired treatment in other spheres. For example, the Kurds also seek equal recognition for their merit in the realm of achievement and the end of discrimination against Kurds in employment. However, the Kurds are not simply making simultaneous unrelated claims for recognition in separate spheres; in truth they are seeking recognition of perceived national difference across spheres. This struggle for recognition by the Turkish state and Turkish nation that transcends action in any single sphere must be addressed by our model of recognition. I propose to call these overarching cognitive processes “modes of recognition.”

Third, the experience of the Kurds demonstrates that there are obviously several spheres of recognition besides those which Honneth outlines. In which sphere would one place, for instance, the increasing instance of racism in encounters between Turks and Kurds in urban public spaces, as outlined by Saracoğlu? Recall that Saracoğlu described the increasing incidence of ethnic prejudice towards Kurds on the part of Turks living in cities to which Kurds have migrated in large numbers. This type of prejudice is distinct from both the newer liberal state discourse, and the older assimilationist discourse of ethnicity operative in Turkey with respect to Kurds; it lies outside the bounds of the legal sphere. Nor does it misrecognize the Kurds within the context of the private sphere or according to the principle of love. Nor, finally, does it occur in the sphere of achievement. The Kurds are, in this way, misrecognized by Turks in their non-competitive everyday interactions in public urban spaces. Thus we must add at least one important sphere to our list of spheres of recognition: what I term the “civil sphere.” In total I identify three spheres beyond those

identified by Honneth, which, when taken together, account for essentially all relevant cognitive interactions in contemporary late modern societies. I will describe these spheres in greater depth below, but first I shall integrate national and state cognitive agency into Honneth’s model.

The Cognitive Agency of the Nation and the State

As described above, in order to accurately understand processes of recognition as they occur on the ground in the contemporary world, it is crucial to consider group cognitive agency. I identify two collective agencies as the most crucial for contemporary cognitive processes: the nation and the state. I recognize that even scholars who have dedicated their lives to studying these two collective agencies have been unable to come to a consensus as to how to define and understand them. I will address this by defining exactly what I mean by “the state” and “the nation” specifically in terms of my expanded framework of recognition.

The most innovative definition I offer is that of the nation. I adopt the definition of the nation offered by scholar Étienne Balibar, though I re-frame his definition in terms of the theory of recognition.²⁷ Walker Connor and Étienne Balibar argue that nationalism operates on the level of psychology, the level of what Anthony Giddens called the individual’s “basic security system.”²⁸ In Iris Marion Young’s words this is the “basic level of identity security and sense of autonomy required for any coherent action in social contexts.”²⁹ One could say that in Hegel’s model the psychological trauma experienced by one subject upon first encountering another

subject is caused by the threat it experiences to its basic security system.

It is the nation, according to Balibar, which solves this psychological-identity crisis.³⁰ The nation, constructed in such a manner as to appear to exist objectively beyond time, or for all time, solves the crisis of identity outlined by Hegel before it even begins—it is the cultural foundation of the intersubjective reality into which the subject is born. The nation provides the subject a sense of identity and belonging, sets of life scripts and meanings with which to understand his world, and a profound sense of recognition. The principle which governs this process is that of acceptance of perceivedly authentic national belonging. The subject accepts and recognizes the national group to which he “naturally” or “authentically” belongs, and is in turn recognized intersubjectively as belonging to this nation and gains the esteem and acceptance this entails from his conationals.

What distinguishes and defines national identity from other identities is its hegemony. In Balibar’s words, “a ‘national identity’...will win out over all others and arrive at a point where national belonging intersects with and integrates all other forms of belonging.”³¹ While this might be a slight exaggeration, it is the ideal type of national identity; in Aleida Assman’s terms national identity constructs itself as the “primary” identity in reference to which all other “secondary identities” emerge.³² It is precisely through this hegemony that the nation solves the crisis of identity at the root of recognition struggles in the “state of nature” as outlined by Hegel. The subject does not need to rely on any other particular subject for recognition because he is recognized by and recognizes himself as belonging to the nation. Because the nation is an apparently objective entity that exists beyond

time, the subject does not doubt the value of the recognition it grants. The nation prevents the “state of nature” scenario that Hegel describes from occurring within a national context, but not necessarily between national contexts; the

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process of recognition is intersubjective and identity-formative within a national context, but sometimes traumatic between national groups. Thus both the contemporary and original conceptions of recognition are valid in different recognitive contexts.

This recognition permeates every sphere and is enacted by group and individual recognitive agents alike, such as the family, schools, and broadcast media. However, just as in the case of the official who personifies the impersonal will of the state, national recognition is enacted by individuals and institutions that act as members of a perceived—or, as Benedict Anderson would say, “imagined”—overarching national community, which possesses its own recognitive agency.³³

While this is a claim that could never be tested, it seems to me that, as a function of human psychology, every normally socialized subject acquires self-awareness already feeling a sense of belonging to some hegemonic identity group like a nation, and this belonging is crucial to achieving the baseline identity security discussed by Giddens. I acknowledge

that nations are not the only potential source of identity security; I only address the nation in this framework because the ideology of nationalism has gained such hegemony that, at least in contemporary bourgeois capitalist societies, there are very few or no hegemonic identity groups besides nations. What distinguishes the nation from other identity groups is that, ideally, a nation seeks to govern itself under its own state. Why this is the case has been the subject of a great deal of scholarship and is beyond the scope of this current article—it is sufficient to say, for now, that the nation has not always been, and perhaps will not always be, a hegemonic source of identity-formative recognition. I take it as a point of evidence for the centrality of the nation to the process of recognition for modern subjects, however, that so many famous analyses of recognitive processes written after the age of nationalism began address recognition in terms of national identity. For example, when Charles Taylor speaks of Quebec as a “culture” he is really discussing Quebec’s status as a minority national identity.³⁴ That is to say, an alternative basis of hegemonic identity in Canadian society.³⁵ As Quebec and the Kurds in Turkey demonstrate, however, the ideal of national hegemony is only an ideal; no nation experiences total hegemony in practice. It is precisely deviation from the ideal that causes many instances of the “politics of recognition” which those theories of multiculturalism attempt to address.

(Somewhat) beyond the nation, the most important collective recognitive agency is that of the state. Integrating the state into a comprehensive theory of recognition demonstrates an element of Hegel’s model of recognition that Honneth fails to properly emphasize: the hierarchical relation between master and slave. A perfect example is the

sphere of law, as described by Honneth. The principle of legal equality is not based on a respect for legal rights exercised between two subjects who recognize each other on the basis of legal equality, but the sorting of each subject by the state into legal categories—male or female citizen, noncitizen, criminal and so forth—and the state’s compulsion (in the ideal-typical case) of equal respect for the regime of rights which corresponds to each legal category for all subjects under its sovereign control. In this case, it is the impersonal agency of the state that defines the categories of legal recognition and recognizes each subject as being within one category or another. The state thus solves the crisis of recognition by serving as an impersonal and ultimate “master” able to mediate many of the relationships between those subjects under its control. I thus take after Max Weber and define the state as the political-institutional entity which establishes a sufficient monopoly over the powers of coercion with regards to a territory and its population to serve as a master recognitive agency.³⁶

The operation of the nation as a master identity works similarly to the state in this sense. Though both are hierarchical, the principle of mutuality is still operative in the ideal: the subject recognizes the authenticity of the nation and the legitimacy of the state just as the nation and state recognize him or her. In the ideal-typical case, the state is recognized as the legitimate authority by consensus within society, just as the state recognizes and categorizes each individual under its sovereign control.

The Nation-State, Citizenship, and Nationality

The Kurdish Struggle for Recognition in Turkey

As the experience of the Kurds in Turkey, along with a plethora of other empirical examples, demonstrates, the most fundamental struggles for recognition occur in the modes of citizenship, nationality, and humanity. The theoretical distinction between recognition in the two modes of citizenship and nationality is muddled by the fact that the two are closely related because of the conjunction of nations and states in the form of the nation-state. Many states, such as Turkey, have based or continue to base access to citizenship and granting of legal rights upon recognition of authentic belonging to the national community that dominates the nation-state. Despite being related, the two modes must be distinguished and analyzed separately, for it is precisely the tension between the two which forms the heart of many struggles for recognition and instances of what Charles Taylor calls the “politics of difference.”³⁷

One of the distinguishing features of the state is that, in the almost universally accepted ideal, the state represents and is integrated with a hegemonic national community, and they together form a nation-state. The reasons for this are multiplex and lie beyond the scope of this essay, though it may be said that perhaps the most important reason is that the state is instrumental in (and has historically had incentives for) using its resources to construct or perpetuate national identity through means such as standardizing language, organizing schools and curricula, and regulating broadcast and print media. For most or all nations that have arisen thus far, even if they arose out of pre-existing identity groups, the nation required the power of a state to exist in the first place.

The emergence of the nation-state as the hegemonic basis of recognition occurred, like the spheres outlined by Honneth, as a result

of the breakdown of traditional hierarchies and the emergence of modern bourgeois capitalism. The model of the nation-state arguably originated in the 17th century, though it was the French Revolution and the subsequent growth of French military and cultural influence in the late 18th century that demonstrated the power of the nation-state model and impelled its spread across the globe.³⁸ The nation-state is thus intricately linked with the rise of liberalism, and with it were founded two new types of belonging, at once exclusive and radically inclusive: citizenship and nationality.³⁹

The former, citizenship, is granted by the state. Citizenship is the primary axis of legal recognition; there are a number of secondary axes, such as criminality, legally-recognized minority status, and sex, which serve as the basis for granting additional rights or revoking some of the rights otherwise equally enjoyed by citizens. For example, throughout the history of the Republic of Turkey non-Muslims have experienced lower barriers to gaining Turkish citizenship and have experienced higher levels of taxation than non-Muslims.⁴⁰ Citizenship is at once exclusive and radically inclusive: everyone who is recognized by the state and who, ideally, in turn recognizes the legitimacy of the state in some basic capacity, is granted the equal legal rights entitled to them as a citizen. Everyone who is not is excluded from the full benefits of citizenship. This has not always been executed according to the ideal. A perfect example is the inferior regime of legal rights applied de facto to blacks in post-bellum America despite their status as American citizens, as outlined by W.E.B. DuBois in *The Souls of Black Folk*.⁴¹ When this occurs, however, it serves as the basis for perceivedly legitimate claims for recognition, such as the claims made by DuBois in the same

volume.

National belonging is also at once radically inclusive and exclusive. All who belong to the nation and recognize the nation as the authentic wellspring of their identity receive the esteem entailed in belonging; those who lie outside the bounds of authentic belonging are, at least to some extent, aliens, outsiders, or even “others.” While some national identities are more inclusive of “others”—for example, the national identity of the United States is arguably amongst the most inclusive in existence—exclusion is always a fundamental element of national identity. This latter point may be evidenced by the historical and ongoing cycles of demonization and acceptance of various ethnic groups as they entered, and eventually gained acceptance within, American national culture. Latin American groups are the current victims of this process, with debates over building a wall across the Mexican-American border and books like Samuel Huntington’s *Who Are We?*, which poses Latin American migration as a fundamental threat to American identity, a prominent part of the public discourse.⁴² This is equally true for Turkish national identity. While it frames itself as an identity based solely on civic and republican values, minority ethnic groups, particularly non-Muslim groups, have historically been barred from full national belonging in a number of ways. Non-Muslim minorities have been characterized in demeaning terms, experienced discrimination, and been subject to (occasionally state-organized) ethnic violence.⁴³

This is not to say that recognizing a nation as one’s authentic basis of identity entails accepting a national culture uncritically. Oftentimes minorities conceive of themselves as authentically belonging to a national group

despite demeaning and exclusive ideas held by the mainstream national culture which preclude them from full belonging. These groups attempt to alter conceptions of national belonging to be more inclusive, sometimes integrating new hybrid identities under the hegemonic umbrella of national belonging, such as African- or Japanese-American. For example, the aim of W.E.B. DuBois’ *The Souls of Black Folk* was “to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American.”⁴⁴ The same was true for Frantz Fanon who, though he attempted to understand racism writ large, struggled with racism specifically in the context of the French national culture which replaced the original culture of his native Martinique.⁴⁵ Neither author desired to be nationally black, but to reconcile blackness with the national group to which they and their communities felt belonging. It is in this sense that Fanon wrote that “there is but one destiny for the black man. And it is white.”⁴⁶ The main group which falls into this category in Turkey is the Islamists, who have attempted to reconcile public expressions of faith in Islam with the fiercely secular mainstream national culture.⁴⁷ For such groups, misrecognition is a failure to recognize meaningful similarity and they ask for commensurately equal treatment in a variety of spheres.

On the other hand, it is possible for a group to struggle for recognition because it does not accept the majority national culture as the authentic basis of its own identity. This is the case for the Kurdish population of Turkey, which has fiercely maintained a separate national identity in the face of severe oppression from the Turkish-identifying community. These groups experience misrecognition as a failure on the part of the cultural mainstream and/or the state to recognize meaningful national

difference, and ask for differential treatment in a number of spheres.⁴⁸ Claims for recognition of meaningful difference and similarity are two responses to what Iris Marion Young called “cultural imperialism,” the exposure to an

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inauthentic or demeaning hegemonic culture for a group or individual.⁴⁹

This typology corresponds roughly to Murat Somer’s distinction between the construction of Kurdish identity as either “rival” (exclusive and requiring recognition of difference) or “compatible” (able to be combined and requiring recognition of similarity) with Turkish identity; while Somer argues that a compatible conception of Kurdish identity should be fostered, Kurdish identity is currently framed as rival with Turkish identity.⁵⁰ One of the first questions this typology raises is what conditions cause one response instead of another. While a full treatment of this topic is once again beyond the scope of this article, I may offer some guidelines for analysis. It seems that there are three general factors which promote claims for recognition of meaningful

national difference instead of similarity. First, the existence of greater and more obvious differences between the dominant and minority group will make claims for recognition of difference more likely. A group is more likely to have a separate national identity if it has a pre-existing ethnic identity, a common language, a common religion, a different skin color, or other obvious and immutable “racial” traits which distinguish it from the main national group. This is the case for the Kurds, which speak their own language and clearly form a distinct demographic group in Turkey. In a 2006 study Koc, Hangioglu, and Cavlin found that Kurdish- and Turkish-language groups in Turkey experience clearly separate demographic and health trends which, “despite intensive internal migration movements in the last 50 years,” are not converging.⁵¹ Second, political conditions may be more or less conducive to claims for recognition of difference. For example, if another segment of the group has attained autonomy outside of the state where the group seeking recognition exists, then claims for meaningful national difference are more likely to be prevalent. This is the case for the Kurds in Turkey who have been inspired (and, in the case of the PKK, sheltered) by the relatively autonomous Kurdish communities of northern Iraq.⁵² Furthermore, as many scholars have noted, Kurdish claims for recognition of difference are at least partly a function of ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ and political elites’ actions to foment a rival conception of Kurdish identity for their own ends; this is a crucial component in nearly all separatist nationalist movements.⁵³ Finally, if a group’s intention to separate from the mainstream, either culturally or physically, is practical—as is the case for the Kurds, who are heavily concentrated in the southeastern region of Turkey—then a group is more likely to make

a claim for recognition of meaningful difference instead of similarity.

What distinguishes state and national recognition from recognitive processes that play out within individual spheres is that, while each is important, they are essential political and identity-forming processes which transcend any single sphere of recognition. In the end, every modern individual, regardless of their standing in any specific sphere of recognition, is ideally—and, to a remarkable extent, is in practice—identified and identifies along the axes of both citizenship and nationality. Usually an individual is recognized as belonging in one national and one citizenship category, or, in rare cases, two. Recognition along these axes is fundamental for modern processes of identity formation and the granting and enjoyment of legal rights. As such they are far more crucial to understanding and establishing justice than recognition in any single sphere. Because of their importance and transcendentalism with respect to the spheres of recognition I call state and national recognition, “modes of recognition.”

There is, finally, a third important mode: recognition of authentic humanity. This is the mode of recognition described by Tzvetan Todorov in *The Conquest of America*, where he demonstrates that the failure on the part of Spanish colonizers in the New World to recognize native populations as authentically human resulted in Spanish attempts to enslave or exterminate natives altogether rather than converting them.⁵⁴ The mode of recognition of humanity developed out of Enlightenment ideas concerning the equality of humans and the concept of human rights; the principle governing recognition in this sphere is the equal ethical treatment of every individual recognized as authentically human. While currently the

legal sphere is the most important in terms of this mode of recognition, it is operative in a number of other spheres, such as the civic sphere described below. This mode of recognition has become less relevant in the 21st century as universal recognition of outside groups as authentically human has become an almost universally accepted norm—even more so, perhaps, than that of national belonging. However, the ideal of universal recognition is far from realized, and the specific ethical obligations humans have to others who they recognize as authentically human are under constant debate within the philosophy and law of human rights. Situations where recognition of humanity fails to occur can result in extreme violence. Indeed, misrecognition in this mode is often required for some of modernity’s greatest crimes, including genocide and ethnic cleansing. The struggle for recognition between different national groups (or, before the hegemony of nationalism as an ideology, one could say “cultural groups” or “ethnies”) in this mode of recognition most closely matches the “state of nature” recognitive scenario outlined by Hegel.⁵⁵ It is the struggle between different intersubjectively constituted identity groups, and not subjects, that seems to result in the violent assertion of mastership and enslavement and non-reciprocal recognition.

Misrecognition in this mode is not always so dire, however; all or most non-national claims for recognition of meaningful similarity—such as the existentialist feminist argument made by Simone de Beauvoir in *The Second Sex*, or claims for recognition made by many other gender and sexual identity groups—operate in this mode of recognition, justifying equal treatment based on what Iris Marion Young called “universal humanisms.”⁵⁶

Including Other Spheres of Recognition

As described above, modes of recognition play out in a variety of spheres, including ones beyond those originally outlined by Honneth. One of the most important of these in both cases is the public sphere. What might be termed the “public sphere” colloquially, however, has two distinct components, each of which constitutes a separate recognitive sphere: the “public sphere” in the formal sense outlined by Habermas, and the “public sphere” of interactions between people with non-intimate relationships in public space.⁵⁷ I henceforth call the former the “public sphere,” and the latter the “civil sphere.”

Both of these spheres evolved, once again, out of the transition to contemporary bourgeois capitalism. In *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, Habermas outlines this process with regard to the public sphere, noting that as bourgeois capitalist European society began to develop, a new distinction between the private and the public also developed. For the first time homes were constructed to provide individuals with private rooms, journaling and other literary forms that sought to publicly express the private internal life of the individual subject came into being, and public spaces such as coffee shops and salons arose where individuals of different social status met in public, exchanged views, and engaged in rational debate. What developed was a recognitive sphere where each party was presented a roughly equal chance to present and debate its views in a public communicative setting. In contemporary modern societies the public sphere is vast, and meaningful

participation within it often requires group action and mediation through communications technology (“the media”). The principle which governs this sphere is the granting of a basic respect for the views and right to speak of each group or individual who seeks to participate, even when one is in disagreement.

While the principle that governs recognition within this sphere is related to recognition in the legal sphere—laws governing freedom and restriction of speech are an important element of state recognition in this sphere, for example—it is decidedly different. First, recognition in this sphere is not simply based on equality, but also respect, for each party and its views. Second, unlike the legal sphere, recognition in this sphere is fundamental for the recognition of cultural identity in multinational communities. As authors like Yael Tamir and Iris Marion Young have argued, it is precisely the public sphere where national culture is most meaningfully expressed and experienced, leading Tamir to argue that qualifying as a national minority is not a matter of representation in population, but of representation specifically in the public sphere.⁵⁸

The Turkish state has barred Kurds from expressing their identity as Kurds in the public sphere for most of the history of the Republic; Kurds in Turkey have thus only been able to legally express their identity in the private sphere. Suppression of public sphere expression of Kurdish identity was so complete that “from the mid-1950s to 1978 Kurdish nationalism ceased in the public sphere.” In this way, for much of the history of the Republic, the Kurds qualify as a supremely marginalized national minority according to Tamir’s definition.

The civil sphere, as outlined by Charles Taylor (though he does not describe it in these

terms), emerged out of the rise of liberal and Enlightenment-influenced thought and the replacement of the traditional concept of social esteem, “honor,” with that of “dignity.”⁶⁰ Honor was an exclusive and competitive form of esteem achievable by only a few at the top of the medieval social hierarchy, whereas dignity is a form of esteem warranted by an individual simply by virtue of being a human, citizen, or member of the national community. Mutual recognition of this dignity entails the treatment of unfamiliar individuals encountered in public according to informal codes of politeness and respect. This sphere has grown particularly important with the modern process of urbanization, and much urban sociology is concerned with detailing the codes of politeness which govern behavior in different urban settings.⁶¹ Claims for recognition in this sphere focus on the reformulation of these codes to respect the values of groups, or seek to argue that codes which do not equally apply to different groups should. Unequal application of these codes of respect can be an extremely common and painful form of misrecognition. Take, for example, Frantz Fanon’s description of the psychic pain caused by being called a “nigger” by a small child on a public train.⁶² As Saracoğlu discovered, Kurds who interact with Turks in urban public space are increasingly subject to this type of misrecognition.⁶³ At university, a Kurdish student may find her Turkish peers avoiding and ignoring her; a man who speaks Kurdish on public transit in Istanbul risks drawing the ire of, and being aggressively berated by, Turkish passengers.⁶⁴

Once again, this sphere of recognition is not accounted for in Honneth’s model, though it is one experienced by each individual in everyday life. Like the public sphere, the civil sphere is governed by a cognitive principle

similar to, but different from, the legal principle of equality. First, interactions in the civil sphere often do not entail legal recognition; one should treat strangers with dignity in public regardless of whether he is recognized as possessing

“Unequal application of these codes of respect can be an extremely common and painful form of misrecognition.”

legal status equal to oneself. Misrecognition of individuals in public space in this manner cannot be accounted for as a violation of the principle of mutual love in the private sphere or of the principle of achievement; therefore it should be included as a separate sphere in an expanded model of recognition.

Finally, there is the sphere of “international recognition.” This sphere stems from the development of what scholar Heather Rae calls “international society though a more apt title would be the “international society of nation-states.”⁶⁵ As the global order came to be dominated by nation-states, an international sphere of recognition between nation-states and stateless nations emerged. This sphere is governed by two principles. First, the principle that each nation, where possible, is entitled to self-government under a state. The qualification of the “where possible” clause in this principle has changed several times since the rise of nationalism: Woodrow Wilson, for example, helped change conceptions about the appropriate minimum size of a national group by advocating for national self-determination for all national groups in Europe after World

War I.⁶⁶ Second, each nation-state warrants mutual respect of its equal sovereignty from all other nation-states except in the expression of severe political disagreement or within the circumstances outlined in the established body of international law.

One of the key points of conflict in this sphere has been over whether a national identity is seen as authentically different and thus warrants recognition of equal and separate status by a nation-state that otherwise resists limitations to its cultural hegemony and coercive power. This is the basis upon which the Kurds in Turkey were denied recognition a number of times: nationalist Kurdish revolts were often disregarded by the Turkish mainstream as inauthentically nationalist, created by Communist or western powers to destabilize the state under the guise of a false nationalist movement.⁶⁷ Turkish officials attempted to deny Kurdish nationalists legitimacy by claiming that the Kurdish nation was not authentically different from the Turkish nation (recall, for example, that Kurds were often referred to as “Mountain Turks”) and Kurdish “nationalist” movements were nationalist only in name.⁶⁸

Even when recognition of authenticity has been gained, the interests of existing nation-states and stateless nations have come into conflict to greater degrees over the 20th and 21st centuries, and there are now very few situations in which nations are recognized as having the right to violate the stability of the international border regime in order to establish a new nation-state; it is this conflict between existing nation-states and the stateless nations under their sovereignty that is the source of much of the “politics of difference” in late modernity.⁶⁹ In addition, as noted above, it is within the sphere of international recognition

that the Hegelian model of recognition most often holds. However, because of the nearly universal acceptance of the principles of mutual recognition between nations and the subsequent development of an international society of nation-states, recognition in the international sphere has come to resemble the contemporary understanding of recognition as an intersubjective (in this case inter-national), identity-formative (in this case, nation-state-formative) process. However, the development of this international society has come at the expense of a great deal of what Heather Rae terms “pathological homogenization”: the violent and forced homogenization of diverse populations to more closely match the image of a unified nation.⁷⁰ The emergence of the Turkish nation-state out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, for example, was associated with the forced migration of millions of Greeks and other non-Muslim populations from Anatolia and the experience of ethnic violence and unequal legal treatment on the part of those who remained.⁷¹ The emergence of national consciousness and the subsequent pathological homogenization it created in many areas of the world could likely be analyzed as a Hegelian recognitive scenario. The Kurdish struggle for recognition has also been Hegelian in the sense that, for fear that acknowledging ethnic-national disunity would threaten its very existence, the Turkish nation-state has attempted to assert the primacy of Turkish identity over Kurdish identity, refusing to recognize Kurdish communities as authentically different while demanding that Kurds recognize the Turkish nation as their authentic source of identity. Furthermore, the reversion to violent international recognitive processes that result in the attempt by one national group to assert its mastership over another remains a possibility, as

the breakouts of ethnic violence in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda demonstrated at the end of the 20th century.

Conclusion

As I have outlined in this essay, the process of recognition—as demonstrated by the example of the Kurds—is quite complex. I built from the “spheres” model of Axel Honneth, adding the possibility of multilateral recognitive processes between group-based recognitive agencies, three more important spheres, and overarching identity-forming processes which operate across spheres, which I call “modes of recognition.” The three modes of recognition I outlined were those of recognition of belonging to states, nations, and humanity, the first two being more important than the last in most contemporary contexts. In addition to Honneth’s original three spheres of recognition I added the public sphere of public discourse, the civic sphere of everyday public interaction, and the international sphere of recognition between nation-states and nations.

This expanded framework aids us in re-integrating the contemporary and original conceptions of recognition by explaining how the process of recognition solves the subjective crisis of identity outlined by Hegel, while accounting for the intersubjectivity of processes of recognition in a realistic manner. Furthermore, it reintegrated Hegel’s conception of the dialectic of master and slave into the analysis, and included group-based recognitive agency. The most important implication of this expanded framework for understanding recognition is that, while recognition processes play out in roughly discrete “spheres,” the

overarching modes of recognition in the categories of national belonging, citizenship, and humanity, which are most important for the enactment of justice and identity formation, play out in a plethora of spheres. To focus one’s analysis solely upon spheres of recognition will miss the point that, in the struggle for proper national or state recognition, or even recognition of authentic humanity, the battle will be hard-fought and wide-reaching across a number of spheres. Progress in one sphere or mode may often lead to setbacks in another. For example, in the Kurdish case, it has only been after recognition by the state in the public and legal spheres of a separate Kurdish culture and language group that Kurds have confronted an increasingly exclusive and demeaning discourse of national belonging in the public, civic, and international spheres. Progress towards recognition in all three modes can thus be halting and slow.

However, this model also makes it easier to understand which tactics are likely to succeed in which spheres and modes of recognition. While fully exploring this would entail another essay in itself, some preliminary conclusions for the Kurdish case are apparent. First, it would seem that the Kurds will potentially face increased misrecognition in the modes of citizenship and possibly even humanity if the struggle for national recognition continues in the same (often violent and deeply antagonistic) manner; groups that contribute to the Kurdish struggle for national recognition should consider whether these tradeoffs will be worth making and whether equally effective means of continuing the struggle for national recognition that are less harmful to recognition of the Kurds in the other modes exist.⁷² Somer has argued to this end that parties to the conflict

should promote a compatible rather than rival conception of Kurdish identity; however, this raises the question of whether a non-rival identity is amenable to Kurds who feel as though they belong to an authentically different identity group.⁷³ In the author's opinion it would be more productive to think of the relationship between Turkish and Kurdish communities as following a Hegelian model of recognition and asking the question of how to facilitate the movement from a struggle between the groups to assert mastership (a struggle between rival and antagonistic identity groups) to a process of mutual and reciprocal recognition between the two (rival but non-antagonistic identity groups) without destabilizing the international border regime. This would require a change in attitude on the part of both Turks and Kurds concerning the meaning of their own and each other's national identity and a change in recognitive practices in all spheres. It would be my hope that the expanded framework for understanding recognition I present in this essay can aid both parties in making this transition. ♦

Turkey, Kurds, and the Emerging Iraq," *Security Dialogue* 36, no. 1 (2005): 109-128. 115.

- ⁶ C. Saracoğlu, "Exclusive Recognition?: The New Dimensions of the Question of Ethnicity and Nationalism in Turkey," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 32 no. 4 (2009): 664. And F. Moustakis and R. Chaudhuri, "Turkish-Kurdish Relations and the European Union: An Unprecedented Shift in the Kemalist Paradigm?," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 16 no. 4 (2005): 77-89.
- ⁷ Saracoğlu, 668.
- ⁸ Mesut Yeğen, "Turkish Nationalism and the Kurdish Question." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 30, no. 1 (2007): 119-151.
- ⁹ Saracoğlu, 640.
- ¹⁰ Saracoğlu, 640-641.
- ¹¹ Yeğen 2007, 135-136.
- ¹² Yeğen 2009, 599.
- ¹³ Agence France-Presse. 2009. PKK separatists skeptical of initiative. Hurriyet Daily News, November 4. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=kurdish-rebels-sceptical-of-turkeys-olive-branch-2009-11-04>.
- ¹⁴ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Arnold V. Miller, and J. N. Findlay, "Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage." In *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 111-119.
- ¹⁵ Alexandre Kojève and Raymond Queneau, "In Place of an Introduction." *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel; Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit* (New York: Basic Books, 1969), 3-30
- ¹⁶ Hegel, 111.
- ¹⁷ Reşat Kasaba, "Kemalist certainties and Modern Ambiguities," in *Rethinking modernity and national identity in Turkey*, ed. Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba (University of Washington Press, 1997), 15-36.
- ¹⁸ Yeğen 2007.
- ¹⁹ Nancy Fraser, "Social Justice in the Age of

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- ¹ "Turkey and the PKK: A never-ending fight," *The Economist*, May 20, 2010, http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=16167846.
 - ² Mesut Yeğen, "'Prospective-Turks' or 'Pseudo-Citizens': Kurds in Turkey," *Science*, Vol. 7 No. 1 (2009).
 - ³ Asa Lundgren, *The unwelcome neighbour*. (I.B.Tauris, 2007), 15.
 - ⁴ "Turkey and the PKK: A never-ending fight," *The Economist*, May 20, 2010, http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=16167846.
 - ⁵ M. Somer, "Failures of the Discourse of Ethnicity:

Identity Politics.” *Redistribution or Recognition?: A Political-Philosophical Exchange* (London: Verso, 2003).

²⁰ Ibid. 10.

²¹ Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), 58-61.

²² Axel Honneth, “Redistribution as Recognition: A Response to Nancy Fraser.” *Redistribution or Recognition?: A Political-Philosophical Exchange* (London: Verso, 2003), 110-197.

²³ Ibid. 139.

²⁴ Ibid. 138.

²⁵ Charles Taylor and Amy Gutmann. *Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition”: An Essay* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), 25-74.

²⁶ Lundgren, 10.

²⁷ Etienne Balibar, “Homo Nationalism: An Anthropological Sketch of the Nation-Form.” In *We, the People of Europe?: Reflections on Transnational Citizenship* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), 11-30.

²⁸ Walker Connor, “Beyond Reason: The Nature of Ethnonational Bond,” In *Ethnicity*, Ed. J. Hutchinson & A.D.Smith, (Oxford Univ. Press,) 69-75. Giddens cited in Young, page 131-32.

²⁹ Young 131.

³⁰ Balibar 25-27.

³¹ Ibid. 23.

³² Assman cited in Balibar 24-25.

³³ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991).

³⁴ Taylor, 60-61.

³⁵ It seems that the reliance on specifically the nation as the source of identity stems, like the development of the recognitive spheres outlined by Honneth, from the advent of modern bourgeois society. As Anderson (1991) argued, nationalism resulted from the breakdown of traditional religiously-based hierarchies, which had

before provided every individual a sense of identity security and belonging in a cosmic order (12-19). According to Bernard Yak (2003), the nation-form became the chief means through which individuals came to understand boundaries of belonging at approximately the same point in time in human history, when the concept of popular sovereignty first raised the question of “who exactly are ‘the people?’” and the concept of the nation offered a convenient and meaningful response.

³⁶ Gianfranco Poggi, *Weber: a short introduction* (Polity, 2006), 110.

³⁷ Taylor.

³⁸ Eric Hobsbawm, “The nation as novelty: from revolution to liberalism,” *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press), 1990 14-45.

³⁹ While the conceptual distinction between citizenship and national belonging is commonly made in the literatures on nationalism and ethnicity, I owe my initial awareness of the distinction to Professor Joel Migdal in the Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington – Seattle.

⁴⁰ A. Icduygu, S. Toktas, and B.A. Soner, “The Politics of Population in a Nation-Building Process: Emigration of Non-Muslims from Turkey,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 31 no. 2 (2008): 358-389. And Soner Çağaptay, “Citizenship Policies in Interwar Turkey,” *Nations and Nationalism* 9 no. 4 (2003): 601-619.

⁴¹ W.E.B. DuBois, Bartleby.com, *The Souls of Black Folk* (Bartleby.com, 1999; Chicago: A.C. McClurg, 1993) Web. 1 Dec. 2009. <<http://www.bartleby.com/114/>>.

⁴² Samuel Huntington, *Who Are We?: The Challenges to America’s National Identity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004).

⁴³ Icduygu, Toktas and Soner. And Kuyucu, Ali

Tuna, 2005, "Ethno-religious 'unmixing' of 'Turkey': 6-7 September riots as a case in 'Turkish nationalism,'" *Nations and Nationalism* 11 no. 3: 361-380. And A. Göl, "Imagining the Turkish nation through 'othering' Armenians," *Nations and Nationalism* 11, no. 1 (2005): 121-139.

⁴⁴ DuBois.

⁴⁵ Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (New York: Grove Press, 2008).

⁴⁶ Fanon, 202.

⁴⁷ F. Ahmad, "Politics and Islam in modern Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 27, no. 1 (1991): 3-21.

⁴⁸ This is the source of the "politics of difference" described by Charles Taylor (1994) in his classic essay "The Politics of Recognition."

⁴⁹ Young 58.

⁵⁰ Somer 118.

⁵¹ I. Koc, A. Hancioglu, and A. Cavlin, "Demographic differentials and demographic integration of Turkish and Kurdish populations in Turkey," *Population Research and Policy Review* 27, no. 4 (2008): 447-457. 447.

⁵² Lundgren 104.

⁵³ Somer. And M. H Yavuz, "Five stages of the construction of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 7, no. 3 (2001): 1-24. 2.

⁵⁴ Tzvetan Todorov, *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other* (New York: Harper & Row, 1984). 175-177.

⁵⁵ Anthony D. Smith, *Ethno-symbolism and nationalism* (Taylor & Francis, 2009).

⁵⁶ Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex* (New York: Knopf, 1953). And Young 158.

⁵⁷ Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Mass: MIT Press, 1989).

⁵⁸ Yael Tamir, "Ch. 3: The Rights to National Self-Determination," In *Liberal Nationalism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993) 57-75. And Young, page 168-190.

⁵⁹ Denise Natali, *The Kurds and the state* (Syracuse

University Press, 2005). 134.

⁶⁰ Taylor, 38-45.

⁶¹ See, for example, Lyn Lofland's *The Public Realm: Exploring the City's Quintessential Social Territory* (1998), or Elijah Anderson's *Code of the Street* (2000).

⁶² Fanon, 92.

⁶³ Saracoglu 2009.

⁶⁴ These examples are events the author personally witnessed while living in Istanbul and do not have an academic source

⁶⁵ Heather Rae, "Ch. 1: State Formation and Pathological Homogenisation," In *State Identities and the Homogenisation of Peoples* (Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 2002) 14-55. 23.

⁶⁶ Hobsbawm, 192.

⁶⁷ Yeğen, 2007, 121-126.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Hobsbawm. And Taylor.

⁷⁰ Rae.

⁷¹ R. Hirschon, *Crossing the Aegean: an appraisal of the 1923 compulsory population exchange between Greece and Turkey* (Berghahn Books, 2003). And Icduygu, Toktas, and Soner. And Kuyucu.

⁷² Yeğen, 2009.

⁷³ Somer.

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