

homogenization. Untroubled by restraints of any kind, it now continued behind the tightly closed curtains of national sovereignty.¹⁰³

The continuity of discourse and practice of the Kemalist regime in relation to the CUP regime did not take long to manifest itself. Well before Kemalist population politics became well articulated and programmatic, ad hoc and pre-emptive deportations were used to serve the purpose of preventing trouble. Mustafa Kemal, a skilled and opportunist orator who tuned his words to his audience, held speeches and harboured opinions that were often mutually incompatible. In his declarations for foreign consumption, he reiterated time and again that his regime would respect the rights of the minorities, whereas behind closed doors he actively pursued a policy that was manifestly different. His reassuring principle articulated to Kurdish elites that the new Turkey would be a state of Turks and Kurds was disingenuous as well.¹⁰⁴ Already in early 1921, amidst bitter warfare, Mustafa Kemal personally signed a decree ordering 'the deportation of the Milli and Karakeçi tribes from Diyarbakir province to Thrace and their homes given to refugees for settlement'.¹⁰⁵ These policies were harbingers of the future. After his official appropriation of power in 1923, Mustafa Kemal would continue the CUP's policies of persecution and deportation with equal vigour and focus.

—Şeyh Said (1823-79)

1925: PHASE TWO

One aspect of the 1923 establishment of the Turkish Republic was the naturalization of the 'geo-body' of the Turkish nation state: the rectangular shape of the state relocated Diyarbakir province, formerly a centre of economic, political, and cultural activity, to a nation state's periphery. Territoriality and ethnicity were two closely related phenomena in the Young Turk mind and needed to be prioritized in Young Turk population policies and ethnic homogenization. Spatial planning therefore was not only an aspect of 'modernity' but, in the Young Turks' words, had to 'dismember Kurdish territorial unity' (*Kürt arazi vahdetini parçalamak*).¹⁰⁶ The deportation of Kurds away from the eastern provinces and settlement of Turks into the eastern provinces was a prime component of these policies.

The Kemalist abolitions of the sultanate and caliphate in 1923 triggered many different responses throughout Turkey.¹⁰⁷ For Kurdish elites the frontal attack on

¹⁰³ Donald Bloxham, 'Changing Perceptions of State Violence: Turkey's "Westward" Development through Anglo-Saxon Eyes', in: Richard Littlejohns and Sara Soncini (eds.), *Myths of Europe* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007), 223-34.

¹⁰⁴ Andrew Mango, 'Atatürk and the Kurds', in: Sylvia Kedourie (ed.), *Seventy-Five Years of the Turkish Republic* (London: Routledge, 2000), 1-25; Robert Olson, 'Kurds and Turks: Two Documents Concerning Kurdish Autonomy in 1923 and 1923', in: *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 15, no. 2 (1991), 20-31.

¹⁰⁵ BCA, 30.18.1.1/2.29.7, decree dated 17 January 1921.

¹⁰⁶ Faik Bulut, *Kürt Sorununa Çözüm Arayışları* (Istanbul: Ozan, 1998), 185-9.

¹⁰⁷ Gavin D. Brockett, 'Collective Action and the Turkish Revolution: Towards a Framework for the Social History of the Atatürk Era, 1923-1938', in: Sylvia Kedourie (ed.), *Turkey Before and After Atatürk: Internal and External Affairs* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), 44-66.

Islam was perceived as an eschatological intrusion into the collective identity of the Kurds, the state, and the fraternity between Muslim groups.¹⁰⁸ A group of Kurdish elites united in a 1924 conference of a clandestine organization called 'Freedom' (*Azadî*) to discuss the Kurdish issue. During the congress, consensus was reached on organizing a widespread, coordinated campaign of resistance in the eastern provinces starting from May 1925.¹⁰⁹ Now, preparations were undertaken for a large-scale resistance movement that would transcend the local and engulf the entire eastern provinces. The ambitious plan was in its planning phase when, remembering Mustafa Kemal's promises to the Kurds, on 1 August 1924 a Kurdish delegation petitioned government officials in Diyarbakir for moderate claims of Kurdish local autonomy.¹¹⁰ The government ignored their demands, and distrust simmered on for several months until the Kurds ran out of patience. A local grab for power in the small town of Beytüşşebab, east of Diyarbakir, was organized under auspices of Colonel Xalid Beg Cibrani (1882-1925).¹¹¹ The initiative failed and its leaders were arrested. Although at that time the movement was being planned by the Freedom group, the arrest of Colonel Xalid Beg was the last straw for many. This Kurdish resistance to Young Turk policies was based on a broad spectrum of Kurdish elites: tribesmen, pious clergy, atheist intellectuals, village elders, Hamidiye military, but also ordinary peasants and tribesmen.¹¹² The leaders of the resistance capitalized on aggravating grievances as Kurdish discontent with twelve years of Young Turk rule now translated into openly violent resistance.

The general revolt erupted prematurely in the Piran district, north of Diyarbakir, on 13 February 1925. During a routine search gendarmes were engaged in a gunbattle with a group loyal to Sheikh Mehmed Said (1865-1925), member of a Zaza family originally from Piran and revered sheikh of the Naqshbandi Sufi order.¹¹³ The gendarmes were fired on and a local outburst quickly spread in the region as Sheikh Said skillfully organized the resistance with the assistance of experienced Kurdish military officers who had served in the Ottoman army during the First World War, as well as powerful chieftains of large tribes. His declaration of war against the regime reveals a complex mix of motives for the resistance:

¹⁰⁸ Hamit Bozarslan, 'Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey: From Tacit Contract to Rebellion (1919-1925)', in: Abbas Vali (ed.), *Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism* (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2003), 163-90.

¹⁰⁹ Martin van Bruinessen, *Agha, Sheikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan* (London: Zed, 1992), 280.


¹¹⁰ Osman Aydın, *Kürt Ulus Hareketi 1925* (n.p: Weşanên Weqfa Şêx Seid, 1994), 50. NAUK, FO 424/261, 44, no. 63, Henderson to MacDonald, 16 September 1924.

¹¹¹ Xalid Beg was a chieftain of the large Cibran tribe and a graduate of the Military Academy in Istanbul. He had served in the Hamidiye regiments under Sultan Abdulhamid II, served on two fronts in the First World War earning decorations and promotions, and after the First World War spearheaded a Kurdish-nationalist group of officers called *Azadî* (Freedom). Most significantly, he was Sheikh Said's brother-in-law. Cemil Gündoğan, *1924 Beytüşşebab İsyanı ve Şeyh Said Ayaklanmasına Etkileri* (Istanbul: Komal, 1994).

¹¹² Robert Olson, *The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1989).

¹¹³ See his biographies: Adem Karataş, *Ve Alim ve Mücahid ve Şehid ve Şeyh Said* (Konya: Sena, 1993); İlhami Aras, *Adım Şeyh Said* (Istanbul: İlike, 1992).

1994



Cemil GÜNDOĞAN

**1924 BEYTÜŞŞEBAP İSYANI
VE
ŞEYH SAİT AYAKLANMASINA ETKİLERİ**

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi Kütüphanesi	
Depozitasyon No	29149
Tasnif No	956.0812 GÜN.B

YAZARIN DİĞER ESERLERİ :

Vâdim o kadar yeşildi ki.. (Tercüme - Tükenmiştir)

Bir diktatörün iktidar yolu (Hitler)

İsmet Paşayla 10 yıl (Cilt I : 1954 - 1957)

İsmet Paşayla 10 yıl (Cilt II : 1957 - 1960)

İsmet Paşayla 10 yıl (Cilt III : 1960 - 1961)

Rus geldi aşka - Rusun aşkı başka (Gezi izlenimleri)

26 SUBAT 1995

METİN TOKER

**ŞEYH SAİT
ve İSYANI**

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı
İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi
Kütüphanesi

Demirbaş No: 17346

Tasnif No: 956.0812
SEY.S.

Kapak Kompozisyonu : Cemil Ünlütürk

Ankara 1968

AKİS YAYINLARI



İLKE YAYINLARI

1

Kitabın Adı
ADIM ŞEYH SAİD

Yazarı

İLHAMİ ARAS

Kapak

RAMAZAN ERKUT

Dizgi

İLKE DİZGİ

Baskı

KEREM MATBAACILIK

Birinci Baskı

OCAK 1992/İSTANBUL

İkinci Baskı

OCAK 1994/İSTANBUL

02 MAYIS 1995

ADIM ŞEYH SAİD

İLHAMİ ARAS

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi Kütüphanesi	
Demirbaş No:	31356
Tasnif No:	956.0812 ARA.A

İLKE YAYINLARI

Selman-ı Pak Cd. 162/4 (81130) Üsküdar-İst. Tel: 341 15 88

Yazışma Adresi: P.K. 117 (81130) Üsküdar-İst.

Dr. Hayit bu eseri ile kolonial halklar hayatında benzeri olmayan, fakat Türkistan'da devam eden büyük mücadele tarihi için bir temel kurmuştur. Müellifin ve bizim de arzumuz, gelecekte 16 yıllık mücadelenin çok miktarda ciltleri dolduran tarihini yazmaktır.

Eserin Türkçe, İngilizce, Fransızca, Arapça, Rusça ve Türk şivelerinde yayınlanması için ihtiyaç büyüktür. Bu şekilde Türkistan istiklâli için can veren 3.7 milyondan fazla Türk-Müslüman şehihidinin ruhunu yaşatabileceğiz ve aynı zamanda Sovyet Rusya ve komünizm rejiminin vahşiliklerini daha fazlasıyla öğrenebileceğiz. Şunu da kaydetmek gerekiyor ki, Türkistan'daki 17 yıllık (1917-1934 yıllarındaki) millî hürriyet savaşları, komünizmin Afganistan, İran, Hindistan ve Doğu Türkistan'a silahlar ve propagandalar yoluyla girmesine imkân vermemiştir.

Dr. Hayit eserinin sonunda, "Eylül-Ekim ayları 1991'de Türkistan'daki Sovyet Cumhuriyetleri-Kazakistan, Kırgızistan, Özbekistan, Tacikistan ve Türkmenistan'ın bağımsız devletler olarak ilân edilişi, Türkistanlılar'ın geçmişteki millî mücadelesinin neticesidir" diye yazmıştır (S. 422). Bağımsız devletlerin siyasî ve ilmî hâdimleri, "Basmaçılık" gibi, büyük millî mücadele tarihini, eski devirde olduğu gibi boyamadan, tarihî hüccetler esasında yazmaları ve yayınlamaları için kendi halkları karşısında görevleridir. Bağımsızlık, "Gökten tesadüfen indi" denilen hayal olamaz. Millî istiklal için can verenlerin ve onlardan kalan ruhi mirası bu günkü bağımsızlığı ortaya çıkarmıştır.

20 ARALIK 1993

Doğu / Kıbrıs
Kütüphane de Mevcuttur

Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları, sayı: 84,

D 130

s. 233 - Haziran - 1993. 1

İstanbul.

KİTAP TANITMA

Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı

ŞEYH SAİT KONUSUNDA YENİ BİR YAYIN YAPILDI

Türk Kültürü Araştırma Enstitüsü yazarlarından Dr. Yaşar KALAFAT'ın "Şark Meselesi Şeyh Sait Olayı, Karakteri Dönemindeki İç ve Dış Olaylar" ismi ile yeni bir eseri yayınlandı.

Eser; Önsöz, Giriş (Olay Bölgesinin Etnik Tarihi, olay Bölgesinin etnik kimliği, Muhalefetin ortaya çıkışı, Terâkki Perver Cumhuriyet Fırkası'nın kurulması, Halit Paşa Olayı) Şeyh Sait Ayaklanması (Şeyh Sait ve Kişiliği, Şeyh Sait Ayaklanmasında rol oynayan bölücü organizasyonlar, Şeyh Sait Ayaklanmasında rol oynayan Gizli Örgüt Azadi, Azadi-Hoybun ilişkileri, İhsan Nuri olayı, Şeyh Sait Ayaklanmasının Başlaması, Hükümetin aldığı tedbirler, İnönü Hükümeti'nin Kurulması, Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu, Tenkil Harekâtı ve asilerin sonu) Şeyh Sait Ayaklanmasının Karakteri (İsyanda İngiltere Faktörü ve Musul Meselesi, isyanda rol oynayan Sosyal, İdeolojik, Kültürel ve Dini faktörler, olaya konulan teşhisler, olaya Dini çevrelerin bakış açısı olaya Marksist çevrelerin bakış açısı, Said-i Nursi, Kürtçülük ve Şeyh Sait olayı, Atatürk, Kürtçü Hareket ve Şeyh Sait Olayı) ve sonuç bölümlerinden meydana gelmiştir. Ayrıca eserde, 220 kadar yararlanılan kaynağın künyesi verilmektedir. Eserde ismi geçen 400 kadar şahıs hakkında tanıtıcı bilgi veren bir bölüm eklenmiş ve indeksten sonra tanıtımı yapılan şahıslardan 35 şahsın resmi verilmiştir.

l'année 1769, barré) qu'il venait de remplir. Le travail de cet ambassadeur semblerait dispenser son successeur de la même tâche mais (comme, barré) les instructions remises au Chevalier de Saint Priest lui prescrivent d'envoyer à Sa Majesté des relations exactes qui fassent connaître l'état actuel de l'Empire ottoman tant intérieur qu'extérieur, il (juge nécessaire, barré) croit devoir former un mémoire préliminaire de ses observations à cet égard, réservant à un second mémoire le récit des faits et le compte de sa conduite depuis son arrivée» (f° 28 r°).

En conclusion, le Chevalier de Saint Priest écrit:

«Le Chevalier de Saint Priest sent combien ce court exposé laisse de choses à désirer mais il n'a pas prétendu former un corps complet d'observations sur le gouvernement turc. Il prend la liberté de représenter de nouveau au Roi qu'il s'est réduit à saisir dans ce mémoire préliminaire la situation actuelle (du gouvernement et des peuples sur les points où, barré) de l'empire ottoman, les objets qui lui ont paru changé de nature ou n'avoir pas été remarqués jusqu'à présent. Dans ce travail fait à la hâte, il a moins consulté ses forces que son obéissance aux ordres de Sa Majesté» (f° 48 r°).

Le texte est par ailleurs quasi identique à la version publiée par M. Landau. Il convient simplement de relever les divergences suivantes:

Landau, p. 136, l. 2, «ces princes chefs des hordes softes»

Mss. «hordes scythes».

Landau, p. 138, l. 5, «à l'âge de 5 ans»

Mss. «55 ans».

Landau, p. 139, l. 12, «conformément»

Mss. «conséquemment».

Landau, p. 139, l. 30, «alternations»

Mss. «altérations».

Landau, p. 139, l. 38, «premier juge de l'empire signifie»

MSS. «premier juge de l'empire ayant séance au divan du Grand Seigneur signifie».

Landau, p. 140, l. 5, «dans la capitale»

Mss. «dans Constantinople».

Landau, p. 141, l. 32, «dans la Capitulation de la ville de Jérusalem»

Mss. un copiste a écrit en marge le texte de la capitulation, f° 37 r°.

Landau, p. 144, l. 28, «il n'en est guère qui puissent soutenir un long siège»

Mss. «il n'en est pas une qui pût soutenir trois jours de tranchée ouverte»

Landau, p. 146, l. 29, «les nations chrétiennes»

Mss. «les traités des nations chrétiennes».

J.-F. L.

Robert OLSON

THE SHEIKH SAID REBELLION IN TURKEY IN 1925: ESTIMATES OF TROOPS EMPLOYED

In spite of the fact that the Sheikh Said rebellion was one of the most important developments for twentieth-century Kurdish and Turkish history¹, there are no estimates of troop strength employed in the rebellion based on archival statistics or documents. In this article I proffer estimates made by British Air Intelligence officers in Bagdad and Mosul². These estimates were then sent to the War, Colonial and

¹ The fullest account of the rebellion are: Behçet Cemal, *Şeyh Said İsyanı* (Istanbul, Sel Yayınları, 1955); M. Nuri Dersimi, *Kürdistan Tarihinde Dersim* (Aleppo, Ani Matbaası, 1952); M. Şerif Fırat, *Doğu İlleri ve Varto Tarihi* (Istanbul, Saka Matbaası, 1948); Metin Toker, *Şeyh Said ve İsyanı* (Ankara, Rüzgarlı Matbaası, 1968). There is also an account of the rebellion (chapter five) in Maarten M. van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State: On the Social and Political Organization of Kurdistan* (Published Ph.D. Dissertation, Utrecht, Rijksuniversiteit, 1978), pp. 253-406. A more up-dated account of the rebellion is in the same author's «Popular Islam, Kurdish Nationalism and Rural Revolt: The Rebellion of Shaikh Said in Turkey (1925)», in *Religion and Rural Revolt*, Janos M. Bok and Gerhard Benecke, eds. (Manchester University Press, 1984), pp. 281-95. There is a more detailed version of the above article entitled «Vom Osmanismus Zum Separatismus: Religiöse und Ethnische Hintergründe der Rebellion des Scheich Said», in *Jahrbuch Zur Geschichte und Gesellschaft des Vorderen und Mittleren Orients*, Martin van Bruinessen and Jochen Blaschke, eds. (Berlin, Express Edition, 1985), pp. 109-65; also see Robert W. Olson and William F. Tucker, «The Sheikh Said Rebellion in Turkey (1925): A Study in the Consolidation of a Developed Uninstitutionalized Nationalism and the Rise of Incipient (Kurdish) Nationalism», *Die Welt des Islams*, XVIII, 1978, pp. 195-211, for an account of the rebellion prior to the publication of Maarten van Bruinessen's *Agha, Shaikh and State*.

² The Air Ministry files add immensely to our knowledge of the rebellion. They are the only contemporary records of the rebellion. They were kept systematically and chronologically by Air Intelligence which took great interest in the rebellion because of its potential influence in and on Iraq. For example, there are four fat dossiers in the Air Ministry files that are entitled «Kurdish Rising in Anatolia». These four files are divided as follows. Part I Air 23/236 has 66 enclosures dealing with the period 26 February 1925 to 6 June 1924. Part II Air 23/237 contains 54 enclosures and deals with the period 18 June 1925 to 9 September 1925. Part III 23/238 has 101 enclosures and deals with the period 15 September 1925 to 15 April 1926. Part IV Air 23/239 has 83 enclosures and covers the period 15 April 1926 to 3 January 1927. All of the documents in these files are virtual goldmines in terms of the Turkish military operations against Sheikh Said. Air 23/333;

Şeyh Sait Ayaklanması Üzerine

Cengiz Duygulu

1 925 yılında başlayan ve aynı yıl içerisinde bastırılan Şeyh Sait Ayaklanması, Türk siyasi yaşamında sıkça tartışılan, değişik kesimler için farklı anlama ve öneme sahip tarihi bir olay olmuştur. Ayaklanmanın tanımlanmasında ve yorumlanmasında farklı görüşlerin olduğu bilinmektedir. Bu görüşlerin tek ortak noktası, her kesimin olayı kendi bakış açısı ile görmek istemesi ve sunmasından kaynaklanan taraflılık ve eksiklik olmuştur. Ayaklanma, laikler ve Kemalistler tarafından Nakşibendilik, gericilik, ve İngiliz kışkırtması, Kürt milliyetçileri tarafından ulusal kurtuluş hareketi, islami kesim tarafından ise şeriat savaşı ve Hilafeti geri getirme şeklinde tanımlanmakta ve bu itibarla da 'geçmiş', günümüzün siyasal mücadele perspektifinden yeniden kurgulanmış olmaktadır.

Şeyh Sait ayaklanmasının boyutunu ve muhtevasını anlamak için, dönemin içinde bulunduğu siyasi ortam, Kürt lider ve aydın profiline² ve daha da önemlisi Kürtlerin eski merkez Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile olan eklemlenme ilişkisinin yeni merkez Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile nasıl yeniden kurulduğuna bakmak gerekir. İmparatorluğun son yıllarında yaşanan dönüşüm sırasında gelişen milliyetçilik hareketlerinden etkilenen Kürt milli-yetçiliği, Kürt toplumunda yankı bulamamış, fakat medreseler ve Nakşibendi tarikatı gibi geleneksel ve dini örgütlenmeler ile ittifak yapınca örgütlenme ve taban bulmakta güçlük çekmemiştir. Dini örgütlenme için yapılması gereken en önemli tesbit, 1850'lerden sonra başlayan ve imparatorluğun dağılma sürecinde olgunluk dönemini yaşayan Kürt medrese geleneğinde gerçekleşen reform sonucunda, Nakşibendi tarikatının Kürdistan'daki toplumsal örgütlenmede oldukça etkin olan Kadiri tarikatını zayıflatması ve Kürtler arasında aşiretler-üstü bir birlik-teliği sağlayarak siyasal yaşamda etkinliğini artırmasıdır.

Nakşibendi Tarikatının Kürdistan'da Gelişimi:

Nakşibendilik, Şeyh Sait Ayaklanmasına kadar olan dönem içinde, Kürdistan'ın toplumsal yaşamında merkezi idarenin yanbaşıda ikinci bir güç haline geldi ve hatta bazı durumlarda merkezin etkinliğinin üstünde bir güce ulaştı. Nakşibendiliğin toplumsal örgüt-

lenmedeki öneminin bunca artmasını mümkün kılan, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Kürt beyliklerinin özerkliğini ortadan kaldırmak amacını da içeren merkezileşme siyaseti olmuştur. İmparatorluğun idari ve siyasi yapısının merkezileştirilmesi çerçevesinde tasfiye edilen Kürt beyliklerinin boşalttığı yerel iktidar alanı Nakşibendi yayılması için uygun bir ortamı oluşturdu. Bilindiği üzere, bölgedeki özerk Kürt beyliklerinin tasfiyesini hedefleyen ilk kapsamlı adım II. Mahmut döneminde atılmıştı. Yüksel'in de işaret ettiği gibi (Yüksel, 1993), uygulamaya konan merkezileşme siyaseti vasıtasıyla Osmanlı merkezi hükümeti emir ve beylerin otoritelerine son vererek Kürt illerini valilikler aracılığıyla merkeze bağlamayı başardı. Ancak bu başarının neticesi, yukarıda değinildiği üzere, bir otorite boşluğunun doğması oldu. Ortaya çıkan bu otorite boşluğu, Nakşibendiliğin yayılmasına hız kattı ve boşalan iktidar alanı bu tarikat tarafından dolduruldu. Bu süreç içerisinde, Nakşibendi şeyhleri ve molaları halkın siyasi, sosyal, ticari, münasebetler vs. bütün islami sorunları ile ilgilenen kimseler haline geldiler... Bütün medrese ve tekkelerin (Diwan) Nakşibendilerin elinde bulunması, Nakşibendiliğe daha da güç katıyordu. Medrese ve tekke aynı yerde bulunuyordu, Şeyhlerin tümü aynı zamanda mol-laydı. Bu da onları diğer yerel otoriteler karşısında güçlü kılmaktaydı (a.g.e., s.55.).

Nakşibendiliğin güçlenmesiyle birlikte Osmanlı merkezileşmesine karşı gelişen Kürt direnişinin önderliği de bu tarikatın eline geçti. Nakşibendiliğin önderliğinde gelişen Kürt direnişi zaman zaman büyük ölçekli ayaklanmalara dönüştü. Bu ayaklanmaların en önemlilerinden birisi de, bir nakşibendi şeyhi olan Şeyh Ubeydullah'ın önderlik ettiği ayaklanma oldu. Bu tür ayaklanmaların Osmanlı yönetimine karşı etkili ve uzun süreli olmaya başlaması, Nakşibendi tarikatının artık bütünlüklü bir toplumsal ve siyasal örgütlenmeye ulaştığını ve çok geniş halk kesiminden destek bulunduğunu göstermektedir. Bütün bu süreç içerisinde, Kürdistan'da öncesinde görülemeyecek şekilde en geniş çaplı sivil örgütlenmeyi gerçekleştiren Nakşibendi egemenliği, medrese ve tekkeyi siyasi toplumsal yaşamın merkezleri haline getirdi (a.g.e., s.106).

Azadi Örgütü: Nakşibendiliğin önderliğinde gelişen

12 TEM 2009
MADDE FİLELİNDİKTEN
SONRA OKUL DOKÜMAN

Sait Molla

(Tolu)

SAİT MOLLA'NIN NİCE'TE YAYIMLADIĞI RİSALE VE TAHLİLİ

Doç. Dr. Mehmet DEMİRYÜREK*

ÖZET

Bu çalışmanın amacı Sait Molla'nın 1923 yılı sonunda yayımlamış olduğu risaleyi ortaya çıkarmak ve tahlil etmektir. Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı sırasında bu harekete etkin muhâlefetiyle tanınan Sait Molla, Mudanya Mütarekesi öncesinde Türkiye'den kaçmış ve Romanya'ya gitmiştir. Romanya'dan sınırdışı edilince Fransa'ya gitmiş ve orada "Muhâliflere Hitabım" adlı bir risale yazmıştır. Risalede Sait Molla İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası ile ittihatçılığa ve ittihatçılara karşı oluşunun nedenlerini; Ankara Hükûmetini, bu hükûmetin yaptıklarını, Lozan Antlaşması ve İngiltere ile Fransa hakkındaki düşüncelerini açıklamakta ve Tevhid-i Efkâr gazetesinde aleyhinde yazılanlara cevap vermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sait Molla, Ankara Hükûmeti, İttihat ve Terakki, Tevhid-i Efkâr gazetesi, Muhâlifler

THE PAMPHLET WHICH WAS WRITTEN SAİT MOLLA IN 1923 AND ITS ANALYSE

ABSTRACT

The aim of this study is to reveal and analyse a pamphlet which was written and distributed by Sait Molla in 1923, in Nice. Sait Molla was an opponent of the Turkish War of Independence. Therefore when the Turkish War of Independence ended with Turkish victory, he went to Romania. There were another opponents of the war like him, in Romania. One of them was Mehmet Ali Bey, the former Interior Minister of the Ottoman State. They argued and Said Molla was deported by Romanian Government. Later, he went to Nice, in France and wrote a pamphlet about the other opponents of the war, Tevhid-i Efkâr newspaper and Ankara Government.

Key Words: Said Molla, The opponents of Turkish War of Independence, Tevhid-i Efkâr newspaper, Ankara Government, İttihat ve Terakki (Union and Progressive Party)

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produced a worthy translation as his part in a worthwhile project. The translation is generously annotated. Himself an outstanding scholar of this period, the bibliography he supplies will satisfy the most demanding reader. Will scholarship reflect this new-found access to Tabari? Will the blanket reference to slave soldiers be revised to convey the true complexity of the social structure? Finally, will peasant rebellions, such as that of Babak, Mazyar and al-Mubarak be integrated in the social history of the 'Abbasids? That remains to be seen and that indeed is the true measure of the value of this translation of Tabari.

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, MAHMOOD IBRAHIM
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THE AWAKENING OF PERSIA: THE REIGN OF NASR AL-DIN SHAH 1848-1896. By A.J. ABRAHAM. USA, Vande Vere Publishing, 1992. 64pp. \$18.95.

This book grew out of a series of lectures on the problems of race, ethnicity and religion confronting Westernizing rulers in non-Western countries, and has been written with a view to providing some historical background to the Iranian Revolution of 1979. It is based mainly on source material derived from the accounts of European travellers in the nineteenth century, with some secondary bibliography. The lack of primary material and of Persian-language sources works to its detriment from the point of view of the scholar, but it provides some reasonable background for the general reader. Attention to American missionary works brings out some interesting points, particularly Nasr al-Din Shah's encouragement of the missionaries' medical enterprises. In addition, Abraham suggests that the '*ulama*' may have been activated partly out of religious rivalry with newly awakened Christian communities stirred by the Shah's liberal policies, although he fails to mention the added encouragement of the Great Powers.

Perhaps because of the type of sources used, a principal weakness of the book is the failure to see the '*ulama*' as occupying a variety of positions, or to link their opposition to state policies with the discontent of other groups. In fact 'church' and 'state' were not locked in bitter conflict, but were to some extent mutually supportive. The strength of the book lies in its focus on Nasr al-Din Shah, and the attempt made to perceive the problems of modernization from his viewpoint. The accounts of Europeans who took advantage of the good order maintained by the Qajar Shahs to penetrate the further corners of their realm, but who nevertheless censured an impecunious government for its inefficiency and corruption, have colluded with the historiographers of the Pahlavi era in underestimating the Qajar struggle for reform. To some extent the imbalance is being rectified by current research in Persian. This work is thus welcome for stressing the perspective of an exceptionally able and intelligent ruler, though one who inevitably was less dedicated to modernizing his own position than those of his subjects and subordinates.

Abraham stresses the duration and tenacity of Nasr al-Din Shah's reform programme, pointing out the internal opposition he faced, though perhaps over-emphasizing the success of some of his endeavours. He covers the Shah's efforts at town planning, as well as the movement to translate text-books to secure the knowledge needed to regenerate Iran and to establish the beginnings of secular education. He brings out in particular the problems of attracting financial capital to Iran, and of securing surplus cash to invest in the economy. He reminds us on the subject of the Tobacco Concession that Nasr al-Din Shah lived at a time when monopolies were a part of economic life in the West and suggests that he regarded them as providing

opportunities for the employment of Iranians. He notes the significance of the telegraph in increasing the authority of the central government, but over-stresses the degree of control it gave. The book is indeed to some degree marred by misconceptions and inaccuracies: al-Afghani, for example, is said to come from Afghanistan; the lives of religious minorities under Qajar rule are somewhat idealized; Fath 'Ali Shah, not Nasr al-Din, was the first ruler to undertake a major reorganization of the army; the Cossack Brigade served one master, the Shah, not two; the Shahs of Iran were never unlimited despots, they were always bound by the *shari'a* and by many other conventions as well. This brief book is nevertheless to be commended for its fresh perspective, and it is to be hoped that other works emphasizing Qajar achievements rather than their failures may follow.

ROYAL HOLLOWAY COLLEGE, LONDON

VANESSA MARTIN

THE EMERGENCE OF KURDISH NATIONALISM AND THE SHAIKH SAID REBELLION, 1880-1925. By ROBERT OLSON. Austin, University of Texas Press, 1992.

Olson's book centres around one of the most obscure and fascinating events of contemporary Turkish and Kurdish history, the uprising of the Kurdish Naqshabandi religious leader, Shaikh Said of Palu (1865-1925). In 1925 he guided the largest and most spectacular Kurdish armed revolt of the twentieth century against the Kemalist Government in the Eastern provinces of the Turkish Republic. As is vividly portrayed and documented by the author, the revolt represented a very significant moment in the development of Kurdish and Turkish nationalism. Despite the religious and tribal character of the revolt, the insurgents claimed to be fighting for the creation of an independent Kurdish national homeland, thus contributing to the circulation of nationalist ideas in the rural areas of Kurdistan. In a very convincing way Olson also stresses the impact the revolt had on the Turkish government's national policy of attempting to hasten the process of secularization and 'Turkisation' of the country which the Kemalist government had started to implement in Turkey after the Second World War.

The most outstanding feature of this book undoubtedly lies in the originality and freshness of thought with which Olson approaches his primary sources, mainly British archive records from Foreign Office and Royal Air Force files. Besides filling the gap caused by the unavailability of official Turkish records, this quite exceptional contemporary source material offers the author an opportunity to open new and interesting avenues of enquiry. The Kurdish question in Turkey, as widely affected by the repercussions of Said's rebellion, is analysed and discussed in the context of contemporary Anglo-Turkish relations, which from 1924-25 were mainly influenced by the standing dispute over the Mosul *vilayet*. Stimulating political views about the wider international implications are also suggested, although they are not fully developed. Furthermore, Olson's careful perusal of British documents enables him to draw a fascinating and detailed picture of the different policies advocated toward the Kurds, both by a number of British officials based in Iraq, and in the central government in London in the crucial years between the armistice of Mudros and the Lausanne Treaty (1918-1923). This is especially relevant in estimating the impact that Britain's Kurdish policy in northern Iraq had on the development of the Kurdish question in the neighbouring Eastern provinces of Turkey.

Although Shaikh Said's battle for an independent Kurdistan and its political implications represent the central core of Olson's illuminating enquiry, significant

1125 OLSON, Robert, 'The Sheikh Said Rebellion in Turkey in 1925: Estimates of Troops Employed'. *Turcica* (Paris), Vol.24, 1992, pp.263-75

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Uğur Mumcu'ya cevap

Uğur Mumcu, Cumhuriyet gazetesinde (2-22 Haziran 1991 tarihleri arasında, 21 sayı) "Öncesi ve Sonrasıyla Şeyh Sait Ayaklanması" araştırmasını tefrika etti; sonra da kitap halinde bastırdı. 18. tefrikasının (19 Haziran) 266. dipnotunda beni eleştiriyor:

Araştırmacı Prof.Dr. Mete Tunçay Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması adlı kitabında (s.127-142) Şeyh Sait ayaklanmasını inceliyor, ancak ne Bilal Şimşir'in 1975 basımı İngiliz Belgeleriyle Kürt Sorunu kitabını incelemiş, ne Erol Ulubelen'in İngiliz Belgelerinde Türkiye kitabındaki Kürt-İngiliz ilişkilerinin belgelerini!

Prof. Tunçay, TBMM arşivindeki Şeyh Sait dosyasını incelememiş gibi davanın savcısı Ahmet Süreyya Örgüven ve 1957 yılında Dünya gazetesinde yayımlanan anılar ile bu anılarda yer alan tutanakları görmüş ve okumuş değildir. Tunçay'ın kaynakçaları arasında İstanbul Emniyet Müdürü Ekrem Baydar'ın 1971 yılında Cumhuriyet gazetesinde 10

Ağustos-9 Eylül 1971 tarihleri arasında yayımlanan "Mustafa Kemal'in İstanbul Emniyet Müdürüydüm" adlı anıları da yoktur.

Tunçay gereken araştırmaları yapmıyor, her kitaplıkta rahatça bulunacak türden kaynakları okumuyor. Ancak incelememiş olaylarla ilgili yetersiz kaynaklarla kesin yargılarda bulunmaktan da geri kalmıyor.

Prof. Tunçay'ın Bastırma hareketi boyutları hakkında yukarıda değindiğim Ayaklanmalar 1923-1938 adlı yapıtı iyice inceleyemediğim için kesin bir bilgim yok yolundaki itirafı (Tunçay, s.136) da bu bağlamda herhalde ilginçtir.

Araştırmacı bilim adamlarımız bunu yaparlarsa, olaylar hakkında yüzeysel bilgilerle yetinip bu yetersiz bilgiler üzerine kuramlar oluşturan delikanlıları da anlayışla karşılamak gerekir.

Önce Uğur Mumcu'ya beni profesörlüğe terfi ettirdiği için çok teşekkür ederim. Ama ben bundan tam çeyrek yüzyıl önce (1966'da) doçent olduğum halde, profesörlük payesini alamadan (1983'te) Sıkıyönetim ve YÖK tarafından 1402

sayılı yasaya dayanılarak üniversiteden atıldım. 1990'da mahkeme kararıyla üniversiteye dönüş hakkını kazanınca da, emekliliğimi istedim. Mumcu'nun lütfettiği ünvanın üstüne yatıp, kendime profesör süsü verdiğim sanılmasın diye bu açıklamayı yapıyorum.

Ben Şeyh Sait hakkında bir kitap yazmadım. Kitabımda, Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu'nun vesilesi olarak birkaç sayfa içinde (Uğur Mumcu'nun dediginden daha kısa: s.127-136), bu ayaklanmaya değindim. Olaya ilişkin bütün kaynakları incelemiş olmak iddiasında değildim; böyle yapmaya ihtiyacım da yoktu. İtirafıma gelince, bunun ayıbı bana ait değildir. Genelkurmay Harb Tarihi Başkanlığı'na yayımlanan (Mumcu'nun rahat rahat kullandığı) T.C.'nde Ayaklanmalar kitabı, aynı makamca yasaklanmış ve toplatılmış olduğu için, bir asker dostumdan bir saatliğine ödünç alabildim.

Asıl mesele nedir? Ben, Şeyh Sait Ayaklanmasının İngilizlerce düzenlendiği yolundaki resmî görüşe karşı çıktım. 12. tefrika, 193. dipnotunda belirtildiği gibi, "... Tunçay... kitabında 'Hemen belirtiyim

TDV İslâm Araştırmaları Merkezi Kütüphanesi
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ISBN 975-550-107-X

to have become at the least the spokesman for the 'ulamā', though he continued to consult widely before delivering his opinion: cf. I. Mouradgēa d'Ohssoon, *Tableau général de l'Empire ottoman*, 7 vols., Paris 1788-1824, iv, 511-13, 528. On the difficult question of the status of the *Muftīs*' *fatwās*, see Repp, *op. cit.*, 113-15, 212-21, 279-90. If not actually instituted before his death, the *Muftīs*' close involvement in appointments to the higher offices in the learned profession, a function which they took over from the *kādī* 'askers, was certainly mooted in Abu 'l-Su'ūd's time, with the intent that he should take on this fundamentally important duty (Repp, *op. cit.*, 293-5). Abu 'l-Su'ūd's achievements were recognised by substantial rewards, notably a greatly enhanced salary which, at least from 973/1566, came to surpass that of the *kādī* 'askers.

Further systematic work needs to be done on the nature of the office in the 17th and 18th centuries, during which time (and indeed until the end of the empire) the *Muftī* was recognisably a state official, having gradually been absorbed into the hierarchy, at its head, from the previous position of having stood entirely outside it. He was now frequently, if not invariably, drawn into the decision-making process, in which he played an important part, on matters of state policy such as the making of war and peace or the deposition of a sultan, not in the forum of the *diwān-i humāyūn*, of which, as mentioned earlier, he was not a member, but through the medium of "consultations" (*mīshāwure*, *meshwure*). The very much greater involvement in affairs of state and the consequent demands on his time meant that the function of the preparation of *fatwās*, and particularly "private" *fatwās*, a function of such importance in the early years of the office, passed largely into the hands of a deputy, the *fatwā emīni*, who became with the passage of time a highly influential figure in his own right (on this post, and the organisation of the *Muftī*'s deputies generally, see Uzunçarşılı, *op. cit.*, 195 ff.; U. Heyd, *Some aspects of the Ottoman fetwā*, in *BSOAS*, xxxii [1969], 35-56). It might be speculated that this absorption into the learned hierarchy, at its head, of an office which had originally stood outside it, and much of whose *raison d'être* lay in its independence from the secular government, had its cost. Certainly in purely material terms, though the *Muftīs* gained greatly in terms of salary, perquisites and defined powers, they lost the tenure of the office for life which the early *Muftīs* had almost without exception enjoyed; removal from the office was by now a common occurrence.

In 1241/1826, following the destruction of the Janissaries, Maḥmūd II [*q.v.*] gave the residence of the Agha of the Janissaries near the Süleymaniye mosque to provide an office for the *Shaykh al-Islām* and his department. The *Shaykhs* now for the first time had a permanent location for their work, having previously carried out their functions in their own residences or in rented accommodation [see BĀB-I MESHĪKHAT]. The diminution of the powers and influence of the 'ulamā' generally in the 19th century affected the position of the *Shaykh al-Islām* as well: they gradually lost their influence, more particularly after the revolution of 1908. The last holder of the office, the 131st, resigned on 4 November 1922 in the wake of the abolition of the sultanate a few days earlier. The office came formally to an end following the abolition of the caliphate on 3 March 1924.

Bibliography: Given in the article.

(R.C. REPP)

SHAYKH MŪSĀ NATHRĪ, modern Persian writer dealing in historical novels. The details con-

cerning his life are at the best sketchy. By profession, he was involved in educational activities, serving as principal of the government college *Nusrat* in Hamadān and as Director of Education in Kirmānshāhān (for his latter designation, see *Armaghān* [March-April 1930], 73). He edited the periodical *Ittiḥād* which was published from Hamadān in 1293/1914 (Ṣadr Ḥashimī, *Tārīkh-i dīārīyid u maḡjallāt-i Irān*, i, Iṣfahān 1343/1964-5, 46). An article from him, entitled *Shā'ir kist* "Who is a poet?", appeared after his death in the July-August 1968 issue of *Armaghān*, suggesting that he died not later than that year.

Shaykh Mūsā Nathrī was among the pioneers of the modern historical novel in Persian. His first work in that genre, entitled *Ṭīh u saltanat* "Love and kingship", was published at Hamadān in 1337/1919 (repr. Bombay 1342/1924), and deals with the exploits of Cyrus the Great, founder of the Achaemenid dynasty. The material for the narrative was borrowed by the author from the French translation of Herodotus's account and historical works in French, as well as from the Avesta. The author claimed that his work was the first historical novel in Persian composed after Western literary models, but Buzurg Alavī has pointed out that Muḥammad Bākīr Mīrzā Khushrawī's *Shams u tuhrā* is earlier (1328/1910). However, as a piece of fiction, it hardly stands up to artistic scrutiny. According to the criticism of E.G. Browne (*LHP*, iv, 465), the book "is overloaded with dates, archaeological and mythological notes and prolix historical dissertations." It was the first of a trilogy; the others, which appeared later, are *Sūtāra-yi Lidī* "The Lydian star" (Bombay 1344/1925-6) and *Sargudhash-t-i shahzāda khānum-i Bābīlī* "The story of a Babylonian princess" (Kirmānshāhān 1311/1932). These show only a slight advance upon their predecessor, and not surprisingly have received little attention from Persian critics. The only aspect of Shaykh Mūsā Nathrī's literary exercises finding approval concerns his language, which tends towards a simplified form. His works, therefore, must be judged not so much for their artistic merit as for their place in the overall historical evolution of modern Persian fiction.

Bibliography: Mentioned in the text, but see also F. Machalski, *Historyczna powieść Perska*, Kraków 1952; R. Gelpke, *Die Iranische prosaliteratur im 20. Jahrhundert*, Wiesbaden 1962; Buzurg Alavī, *Geschichte und Entwicklung der modernen persischen Literatur*, Berlin 1964, 119; H. Kamshad, *Modern Persian prose literature*, Cambridge 1966; J. Rypka et alii, *History of Iranian literature*, Dordrecht 1968; Muḥammad Isti'lāmī, *Shinākht-i adabiyāt-i imrūz*, Tehran 1349/1970; Yahyā Āryanpūr, *Az Ṣabā tā Nīmā*, ii, Tehran 1350/1971-2; 'Abd al-Ḥusayn Zarrīnkūb, *Naksh bar āb*, Tehran 1368/1989-90; Rādiyya Akbar, *Irān menī dīadīd Fārsī adab ke pa'ās sāl (1900-1950)*, Haydarābād (Deccan) n.d.; B. Nikitine, *Le roman historique dans la littérature persane actuelle*, in *JA* (October-December 1933), 297-336. (MUNIBUR RAHMAN)

SHAYKH SA'ĪD [see SA'Ī AL-DĪN ARDABĪLĪ].
AL-SHAYKH SA'ĪD, a monsoon harbour on the straits of Bāb al-Mandab [*q.v.*], lying just north of the so-called Small Strait on a cape whose high cliffs dominate the island of Mayyūn [*q.v.*]. This Strait is also called Bāb Iskandar because Alexander the Great is said to have built a town here. The harbour, named after Shaykh Sa'īd whose tomb is found on the northern side of the cape, has been identified by Sprenger and Glaser with ancient Ocelis or Acila, which is mentioned by Pliny, Ptolemy and in the *Periplus Maris Erythraei*, and conceals perhaps some

net werden können wie solche in europäischen, liegt dagegen in der Natur der Materie und der Archive und kann dem Autor nicht zum Vorwurf gemacht werden. Der Umstand führt dennoch dazu, daß die Bemühungen des Autors, den arabischen Akteuren in seiner Darstellung ihren Stellenwert zu geben, unvollständig bleiben. Was, drittens, die Darstellung der Willensbildungs- und Entscheidungsprozesse in Großbritannien und den USA betrifft, so ist hier gelegentlich nicht erkennbar, aufgrund welcher Kriterien einzelne Abläufe – etwa die britisch-amerikanischen Erdölverhandlungen und die gleichzeitig in den USA geführte Debatte – sehr ausführlich dargestellt werden, während es an anderer Stelle bei einem flüchtigen Hinweis auf wichtige Vorgänge bleibt: Der Rezensent hätte beispielsweise gern mehr über die nur nebensächlich erwähnten britisch-iranischen Verhandlungen über eine Entschädigung für die nationalisierte APOC erfahren.

Der Autor ist, viertens und zuletzt, seinen Lesern kein leichter Partner. Obgleich er gelegentlich Namen und Daten einstreut, die für Darstellung und Argumentation allenfalls von nebensächlicher Bedeutung sind, verzichtet er an anderen Stellen auf notwendige Erläuterungen. So wird zum Beispiel Lesern des vorliegenden Bandes daraus nicht klar, um was es sich bei dem häufig zitierten „Red-Line-Abkommen“ oder dem „Achnacarry-Kartell“ eigentlich handelt. Zum Red-Line-Abkommen zumindest findet der Leser im ersten Band Hinweise (S. 38).² Zum Inhalt des Achnacarry-Marktkartells europäischer und amerikanischer Ölkonzerne fehlen aber auch dort nähere Erläuterungen.

Volker Perthes, Moers

Robert Olson: The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880 – 1925. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989. XIX, 229 p. \$ 35, – .

There can be no doubt that the most important problem facing both population and policy makers in the Republic of Turkey is the position of the Kurdish minority. One fifth to one quarter of the population of Turkey is Kurdish in origin and of this population of between twelve and fifteen million, a large part, possibly the majority, no longer lives in the mountains and valleys of South-Eastern Anatolia, but in the fast-growing cities of the West. Ever since the nineteen twenties this part of the population has been denied cultural and political expression of its identity.

These last few years there have been increasing signs that more and more Turks are prepared to face the issue of nationality and recognize that Turkey is a state consisting of (mainly) Turks and Kurds. Doğu Perinçek's periodical *İkibine doğru* (which has been closed down several times) and the publications of İsmail Beşikçi have drawn attention to the way the Kurds have been treated within the Turkish nation state and to the suppression of Kurdish national identity, and in the Turkish National Assembly a party has been formed (the *HEP*), whose programme consists almost exclusively of putting the Kurdish question on the political agenda in Turkey. While the great majority of public opinion in Turkey rejects the violent means

² Vgl. etwas ausführlicher auch: Helmut Meijer: *Imperial Quest for Oil. Iraq 1910–1928*, London 1976, S. 162 ff.

employed by the Kurdish PKK in their guerilla warfare, more and more people have come to realize that some kind of accommodation will have to be reached, involving free expression of Kurdish culture or even some form of autonomy for the South Eastern provinces.

Clearly, the growing public discussion of the Kurdish question in Turkey increases the need for scholarly publications on the history of the Kurds and, especially, on the history of Kurdish-Turkish relations. Censorship and inaccessibility of source materials have seen to it that the number of publications on this subject which are more than partizan pamphlets is minimal (Martin van Bruinessen's *Agha, Shaikh and State* [Utrecht, 1978] still being the most important landmark in this field). These considerations lead one to take Olson's new book to hand with interest and even a certain excitement. The expectations of the reader who has laid down his thirty five dollars are certainly not diminished by the notes on the dust cover, which state: „This is the first work in any Western language dealing with the development of Kurdish nationalism during this period and is supported with documentation not previously utilized . . . In addition, the author provides much new material on Turkish, Armenian, Iranian and Arab history“. The author of the introduction to the book, William Tucker of the University of Arkansas, proclaims: “Having done considerable research into the background, nature and results of the Sheikh Said rebellion myself, I can assure you that Professor Olson's conclusions are new, grounded in the evidence, and very important!“ No wonder the author himself, who greets us on the back cover, is looking pleased as punch.

Olson's study consists of six chapters, a conclusion and a number of appendices. Chapters one and two, largely based on secondary sources, give the historical background. They describe the development of Kurdish nationalism and the various nationalist organizations up to the Sheikh Said rebellion of February, 1925. Chapter three looks into the background of the revolt from another angle, describing British policy towards the Kurds after the First World War. Chapters three and four deal with the rebellion itself, while the last chapter goes into the international implications of the rebellion, especially with regard to Turkish-British relations, which at the time were strained almost to breaking point over the issue of the inclusion of the Ottoman province of Mosul in British occupied Iraq.

While Olson gives us a useful blow by blow account of the Sheikh Said rebellion itself and a thorough analysis of British policy towards the Kurds (both in Turkey and Iraq), it has to be said that his grasp of Turkish history is rather weak. It is not clear why this should be so, since his bibliography contains most of the relevant publications on the Turkish history of this period.

The one source one feels he might have, but has not, used with profit is the *Zabıt Ceridesi*, the minutes of the meetings of the Turkish National Assembly, which have been published by the assembly itself. Nevertheless, the author's lack of familiarity with the period is shown in a number of places. I shall limit myself to quoting only those major mistakes which can really mislead the reader as to the place of the rebellion in the history of modern Turkey.

In some cases, the chronology is at fault: The final victory of the Turks over the Armenians was in 1920, not 1918–19 (p. 27); the armistice of Mudanya (between the British and the Turkish nationalists) was concluded in 1922, not 1921 (p. 82); the resignation of İsmet Pasha as Prime Minister took place in 1924, not 1922 (p. 86) and his later recall to Ankara by Mustafa Kemal Pasha in February 1925, not 1921 (p. 88). On 17 February 1925 the Hormek tribes learn of a decision taken by the Cibran chiefs on the 19th (p. 113); Ali Saip became president of the Diyarbakır

23. In 1897 (excluding Mangishlavskii uezd), there were 5,015,008 indigens and 197,420 Russians and other Slavs in Turkestan; in 1910 there were respectively 6,008,636 and 406,607 (cf. *Aziatskaia Rossiia*, 194, p. 87, 92).
24. The natural growth rate that we have applied is that obtained from 1909 and 1910 (cf. *Aziatskaia Rossiia*, 1914, Vol. 1, p. 77).
25. Cf. S. Becker, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1895–1924*, Cambridge (MA): 1968, pp. 6, 7, 10, 346, 347; E. Allworth (ed.), *Central Asia, a Century of Russian Rule*, New York: 1967, pp. 93–94; N. A. Kisliakov, *Patriarkhal'no-feodalnye otnosheniia sredi osedlogo naseleniia Bukharskogo khanstva v kontse XIX – nachale XX v.*, Moscow–Leningrad: 1962, pp. 18–19; B. I. Iskandorov *Bukhara (1918–1920) gg.*, Dushanbe: 1970, p. 16; *Aziatskaia Rossiia* (1914), Vol. 1, p. 178; *Sredne-Aziatskii ekonomicheskii raion, Ocherki po ekonomike Srednei Azii*, Tashkent: 1922, p. 17; *Kommissiia po raionirovaniu Srednei Azii*, Tashkent: 1926, kn. 1, *Bukhara*, pp. 149–150, 252, 274, 284 and kn. 2, *Khorezma*, pp. 63, 74; I. Vereikis and I. Zelenskii, *Natsional'no-gosudarstvennoe razmezhevanie Srednei Azii*, Tashkent: 1924, p. 72 and others.
26. CSU, *Statisticheskii ezhegodnik 1918–1920 gg.*, Moscow: 1921, pp. 2–3.
27. Volkov (1930), p. 233.

Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union toward the Turkoman Rebellion in Eastern Iran in 1924–1925 and the Kurdish Rebellion of Shaykh Said in Eastern Turkey in 1925: A Comparison

ROBERT OLSON

The Turkoman rebellion began in the autumn of 1924 and continued until 1926, although it had been largely quelled by the autumn of 1925. The most intense fighting between Turkoman rebels and Iranian government forces occurred in 1925. In spite of the intensity of the fighting and despite the fact that the quashing of the Turkoman rebellion was important to the consolidation of Reza Khan's power, there is little mention of the rebellion in general histories or in monographic literature dealing with Iran.¹ There is, however, quite extensive coverage of the revolt in the Public Record Office both in the Foreign Office records and in the Air Ministry records.² British Air Intelligence, headquartered in Baghdad, was responsible for most intelligence operations in Iraq by the autumn of 1922. Most of the information and analysis which later appeared in the Foreign Office records originated in the Air Ministry, specially in Air Intelligence. The major reporters of the Turkoman rebellion were Major W. A. K. Fraser, British military attaché in Tehran and Major D. Thompson, British military attaché, Mashhad.

The government of Iran under the leadership of Reza Khan was attempting to consolidate its control over various tribal groups in the country in 1924. Military operations had commenced against the Kurds, Lurs, Bakhtiyars, and most importantly against Shaykh Khaz'al of Muhammerah (now Khorramshahr), the Arab leader of Khuzistan, frequently referred to as Arabistan.

I have no intention here of relating the battles fought between the Turkomans and the government forces.³ The nearly one and a half years duration of the rebellion should, however, indicate the tenacity with which the Turkomans fought and/or the inability of the Iranian

Şeyh Said.

1978 (LEIDEN)

THE SHEIKH SAIT REBELLION IN TURKEY (1925)

*A Study in the Consolidation of a Developed Uninstitutionalized Nationalism and the Rise of Incipient (Kurdish) Nationalism**

BY

ROBERT W. OLSON and WILLIAM F. TUCKER

On February 13, 1925 a rebellion broke out in the Kurdish districts of southeastern Turkey. Thousands of Kurds, under the leadership of a Naqshbandi dervish and tribal leader known as Sheikh Sait, took arms against the recently established Ankara government of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk). The outbreak soon enveloped almost the entire area occupied by Kurds in Turkey.¹ This article attempts to elucidate the causes of the rebellion and its consequences with special emphasis on its role in further consolidating Turkish nationalism, Mustafa Kemal's bases of power, and the development of the new Republic

* Modern Turkish orthography will be used in the text with the exception of the familiar English *sheikh*.

¹ *The Times* of London, March 3, 1925 records the date of the outbreak of the rebellion as February 13. Kemal Karpas, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System* (Princeton, 1959), 46 states February 11 as the date of the rebellion. Because of the contemporaneity of *The Times'* account it will be accepted. The best concise survey of the Naqshbandi Brotherhood (*Tarikat*) is Hamid Algar, "The Naqshbandi Order: A Preliminary Survey of its History and Significance", *Studia Islamica*, XLIV (1977), 124-152. The Naqshbandi order began to expand in Kurdistan under the guidance of Maulana Khalid Baghdadi (d. 1827) who was born in the Shahizur district of Kurdistan in 1776 and taught in a *medrese* or religious school in Sulaymaniya until 1805 returning to that city in 1811 after travel, study and teaching in Mecca, Iran and India. Algar states Kurdish adherents of the order have displayed great militancy and cites the revolt of Sheikh Sait as being an example, but with the caveat that Kurdish nationalist motivations should not be attributed to the Sheikh Sait rebellion or similar rebellions; Algar, 151. The authors, in disagreement with Algar, will attempt to demonstrate that Kurdish nationalist motivations were a factor in the rebellions of 1929, 1930 and especially in the 1938-1939 uprisings. For example see, İsmail Beşikçi, *Doğu Anadolu'nun Düzeni: Sosyo-Ekonomik ve Etnik Temeller: The Social Structure of Eastern Anatolia: Socio-economic and Ethnic Foundations* (Ankara: E. Yayınları, 1969), 313 states that Naqshbandi sheikhs were leaders of the Kurdish Rebellion in Şemdinli during 1928-1930. Beşikçi is of the opinion that, unlike Sheikh Sait's rebellion, the Şemdinli rebellions had nationalist motivations.

While the British had maintained extensive intelligence operations in Eastern Anatolia ever since the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 and had several agents active in the area during and immediately after World War I, there is no evidence that the British instigated the Sheikh Sait rebellion. This argument seems to have originated with Mustafa Kemal. Kemal maintained that the British, seeking the oil deposits of Mosul, had roused anti-Turkish feeling among the Kurds, hoping to use this as a means of pressuring Turkey into relinquishing Mosul.⁵ Sait cooperated with the British, according to a similar argument, because he hoped they would gain control of all the Kurdish districts. If the British were to become the masters of the area, Sait apparently felt they would be less oppressive than Ankara. Sait believed the privileges of the Kurdish chiefs and religious sheikhs, not least his own, would be retained.⁶

These arguments leave something to be desired. In view of the dispute over Mosul, it is natural that Kemal blamed Britain for any trouble in an area so near the contested province. Denouncing Britain also was good public relations which could help solidify support for some of Kemal's reforms, especially in view of the great reservoir of hostility for the British because of their activities in the so-called partition of Turkey and their support of the Greek invasion of Anatolia. Kemal was reluctant to admit that the main causes of the rebellion stemmed, in fact, from Ankara's Turkification and westernization measures. *The abolition of the religious schools with the stipulation that henceforward the language of instruction would be Turkish was especially resented.* There is little evidence to support the claims that Sait encouraged British rule in the region. The British never advanced a claim to the land above Diyarbakir, the area where Sait resided and held sway. Taking advantage of their dispute over Mosul, Sait may have sought to play the British off against Turkey, and may have had contact with the British, but there is no *proof* of such

⁵ Harold Armstrong, *Grey Wolf* (New York: Minton & Balch, Co., 1933), 225. There is a vast bibliography on the Mosul question. Two good recent surveys are Paul Helmreich, *From Paris to Sèvres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920* (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1974), Briton Cooper Busch, *Mudros to Lausanne*, 376-392.

⁶ Kurt Ziemke, *Die Neue Türkei* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1930), 291.

⁷ At least nothing has appeared in published accounts and the authors have not had an opportunity to investigate relevant files in the British Public Record Office.

25 ARALIK 1992

Dergi / Kitap
Kütüphane / Mecmua

NAQSHBANDIS

Cheminements et situation actuelle d'un ordre
mystique musulman

Historical Developments and Present Situation
of a Muslim Mystical Order

Actes de la Table Ronde de Sèvres
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Robert W. OLSON

THE INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE SHEIK SAIT REBELLION

The Sheik Sait rebellion played an important role in the evolution of Middle Eastern politics and history after 1925, especially in Turkey and Iraq. The rebellion had profound repercussions on the domestic affairs of these two countries¹ and the foreign policies of several European countries. In order to evaluate the international consequences of the Sheik Sait rebellion it is first necessary to discuss relations between Turkey and Great Britain, the two main protagonists in the Sheik Sait rebellion, as they evolved after the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres on 10 August 1920 which in articles 62, 63 and 64 had allowed for the creation of an independent Kurdish state and the international recognition of Kurdish nationalism. These articles were challenged by the stated objectives of the National Pact proclaimed by the nationalist forces in Turkey, especially those clauses of the National Pact which demanded national sovereignty and territorial integrity over Anatolia, Western Thrace and Istanbul². This meant Greece and British evacuation of these areas and Turkish sovereignty over areas assigned to a Kurdish state by the Treaty of Sèvres. The year 1921 marked victories of the Turkish forces over the Greeks and important and crucial nationalist agreements with France, Italy, the Soviet Union, the Ukraine and Afghanistan. The most important of these agreements was the Franklin-Bouillon Treaty of 20 October

¹The impact of the Sheik Sait rebellion in Turkey was the subject of William F. Tucker and my "The Sheikh Sait Rebellion in Turkey (1925) : A Study in the Consolidation of a Developed Uninstitutionalized Nationalism and the Rise of Incipient (Kurdish) National, " *Die Welt des Islams*, XVIII, 3-4 (1978), pp. 195-211 in which we stress the rebellion was primarily an expression of Kurdish nationalism as well as religious feeling. Since the publication of our article, several publications, articles and books, have appeared which address the Sheik Sait rebellion. The best among these are : Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, *Türk İngiliz İlişkileri* (1919-1926), (Ankara : Ankara Üniversitesi Bilgi Fakültesi Yayınları n°411, 1978), pp. 253-334 ; Mahmut Goloğlu, *Devrimler ve Tepkileri* (1924-1930), (Ankara : Turhan Kitabevi, 1972), pp. 101-135 and M.M. van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State : On the Social Organization of Kurdistan* (Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Utrecht, Holland 1978), pp. 353-406. Because of the variety of different renderings of the word Sheik in Turkish, Arabic and Farsi, I have used the English version.

² Kürkçüoğlu, *Türk-İngiliz*, pp. 137-250.

s. 379-406