The Kurdish Quasi-State: Leveraging Political Limbo
Denise Natali
2015

Prior to the takeover of Mosul by the Islamic State of Iraq and alSham (ISIS) in June 2014, political pundits, the media, and some Kurds were predicting imminent Kurdish statehood. They argued that Kurds do not feel attached to Iraq but to their own distinct territory, language, peshmerga (militia) forces, resources, and political institutions. A variety of factors fuelled these predictions including the dysfunctional Iraqi state, Syrian crisis, shifts in Turkish policy toward Iraqi Kurds, and a ‘booming’ Kurdish economy powered by hydrocarbons development. Yet instead of secession, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has reaffirmed its commitment to a federal Iraq. Not only have KRG leaders agreed, once again, to sell Kurdish crude via the Iraqi State Oil Marketing Company (SOMO) even in part, but they are coordinating with the U.S.-led Coalition, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and Shi’a militias to counter ISIS. What explains this political shift, and what does it imply about Baghdad– Erbil relations and the Kurdistan Region’s strategic role in Iraq and the region? Dramatic swings in the Kurdistan Region’s behavior underline its condition as a quasi-state, a political entity with no external sovereignty but large internal sovereignty. Like other quasi-states of its kind, it thrives off a weak central government, nationalist sentiment, external patronage, and international recognition. 1 The particularities of its geopolitical context also shape Kurdish. [1]
=KTML_Link_External_Begin=https://www.kurdipedia.org/docviewer.aspx?id=413233&document=0001.PDF=KTML_Link_External_Between=Click to read The Kurdish Quasi-State: Leveraging Political Limbo=KTML_Link_External_End=