David Siddhartha Patel
On September 10,-09- 2014, President Barack Obama outlined the inchoate U.S. strategy to “degrade and ultimately destroy the terrorist group known as ISIL [the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, also known as #ISIS# or the Islamic State].”1 At the core of that strategy, in both Iraq and Syria, is a systematic campaign of air strikes against ISIS, coupled with support for local “partner forces” fighting ISIS on the ground.
Subsequent analysis and policy attention have focused largely on the campaign in Syria. This is partly due to the challenge of identifying effective local partner forces in the midst of the complex Syrian civil war. But it is also because U.S. policy makers tend to believe that they understand Iraq, after having occupied the country for more than eight years.[1]

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