Ibrahim Sadiq Malazada
Iraq, as a Middle Eastern nation-state, emerged following the First World War, similarly to Turkey, Iran and Syria. However, it has struggled to establish its foundations based on democratic principles and human rights, as well as a political system that promotes inclusive citizenship. Instead, these states have been characterized by ethnic identities from their inception, leading to discrimination among their citizens. Iraq, under King Faysal, was no exception as it was built on two principles, Arabism and Sunnism, resulting in significant discrimination based on religious and ethnic criteria.
Iraq, as a Middle Eastern nation-state, emerged following the First World War, similarly to Turkey, Iran and Syria. However, it has struggled to establish its foundations based on democratic principles and human rights, as well as a political system that promotes inclusive citizenship. Instead, these states have been characterized by ethnic identities from their inception, leading to discrimination among their citizens. Iraq, under King Faysal, was no exception as it was built on two principles, Arabism and Sunnism, resulting in significant discrimination based on religious and ethnic criteria.

Arab nationalism, like many nationalist movements in the Middle East including Turkish and Persian nationalisms, has unfortunately been tainted by a phenomenon known as Kurdophobia, leading to ethnic discrimination. Even a century after the Treaty of Lausanne, Iraq, just as well as Turkey, Iran and Syria, have failed to establish citizenship based states founded on universal principles such as freedom, human rights and the right to education in one’s mother tongue.

In the case of Iraq, after the Baathists came to power in 1963, representing an extreme form of Arab nationalism, three genocides were perpetrated in Baghdad against various Kurdish groups. The first targeted the Feyli Kurds, the second affected the Barzanis, and the third was directed against the rural Kurdish areas. Each of these genocidal operations was executed systematically, with the final one becoming widely recognized as the Anfal campaigns.. Even the Ezidi genocide in 2014 had a Baathist/Sunni dimension. This article aims to explore the century-long denial and its correlation with the Kurdish genocide in Iraq.

Introduction

After the division of the Kurdish territory during the battle of Chaldiran in 1514, the Safavid Empire took hold of Eastern Kurdistan, while the biggest part of this territory remained under the domination of the Ottoman Empire 1 . Throughout the conflict between these two empires, the Kurds remained in both parts and they did not get the opportunity to establish a state like the other components dominated by the Ottoman authorities, especially the Turkish and Arab people, for many reasons that cannot be mentioned here.

When the Middle East got divided by the victorious countries of the First World War, such as Great Britain and France, and especially after the Treaty of Lausanne, three countries were formed in the Middle East, containing parts of Kurdistan, such as Turkey, Iraq and Syria. The other part, Eastern Kurdistan, has stayed under the domination of Iran. All these countries became nation-states and have adopted policies aiming to develop a nation building model in accordance with the Western model, particularly the French one. This model required a civilizing process conforming to their agenda and ideology. The German sociologist Norbert Elias presented the concept of “civilizing process”, implying a progression towards the legitimation of the state and the creation of harmonious relations between the multiple components of society, involving the least amount of violence 2 . According to Elias, this procedure could go both ways, forward or backward: the civilizing process coexists with the process of de-civilisation 3 . It all depends on the construction of a state on solid grounds, such as democracy, human rights and dignity, without giving the state any racial identity.

Nation building in the Middle East, and particularly in Turkey, Iraq and Syria, has begun with the de-civilizing process because of two factors. First, the failure to build a citizenship state where humanity is at its centre, and not the demographic majority or minority, tribes or families. Furthermore, these states have adopted a biased nationalist ideological orientation, imposing its nationalist ideology to communities living on their territory. This policy resulted in the failure of policies of complementarity or integration. These countries have consistently denied the Kurdish people's fundamental rights to exercise their political and cultural freedoms in Kurdistan regions. Additionally, they have suppressed the cultural rights of minorities residing both within and outside Kurdistan regions, prohibiting the use of their mother tongue and other cultural rights. Consequently, they have resorted to violence and ethnic and sectarian solutions at different levels. The recourse to security solutions remains the preference of some of these states.

Thus, the development of the nation-building model with violent means requires specific policies and bureaucratic methods to overcome the dominant ideology and achieve the desired goals. One of these means could be a long-term bureaucratic one, such as the genocide of a group of people when this group is considered to be an obstacle to this goal. This is why, according to the Arab nationalist’s strategies and particularly Baathists, Kurds are perceived as the main obstacle to the Arabization of Iraq to become a fully Arab country because they possess their own region and having a demographic weight. To understand the characteristics of the genocide in Iraq, specialists have identified the main characteristics of the genocide’s author, corresponding perfectly to the model described by Raul Hilberg in his book “The Destruction of European Jews” 4 . In this book, Hilberg has identified multiple steps through which all genocides go through in their modern societies to achieve their goals.

According to Hilberg himself:'' The destruction process was a step-by-step operation, and the administrator could seldom see more than one step ahead. The steps were introduced in the following order: At first the concept of Jew was defined; then the expropriator operations were inaugurated; third, the Jews were concentrated in ghettos; finally, the decision was made to annihilate European Jewry”

«There might have been other steps depending on the execution mode. There could be multiple examples where a targeted separation of population followed the first step, meaning that after their identification, two other steps were put in place:

1- Separation of population or their isolation

2- Confiscation of their possessions” 5 .

This is precisely what has happened during the Anfal campaign, in the context of the purification process in Iraq and the genocide of the Feyli Kurds. 6

By examining the model of nation-building, it is evident that the Turkish state primarily practiced a negation policy in order to complete its policy of “Turkification” which has become primordial for the latter 7 . It refuses the recognition of the Kurdish people or any other group on its territory. Turkey continues to negate the specificities of these people, forbidding Kurdish children to study in their mother tongue, resolving discriminatory juridical measures, and violating the principles of human rights and democracy. In most cases, it invokes the security challenges to repress Kurdish claims. The genocide against the Kurdish people has been a documented historical continuity for the past 100 years, with significant events such as the Dersim uprising of 1938 marking its tragic timeline. 8 . Similarly, Iran has also adopted a nation-building model relying on similar principles, although the means used have been different during modern history. The Iranian state has denied the cultural rights of minorities residing on its territory, such as the Baloch people, the Kurds, the Arabs as well as the religious minorities like the followers of Baha’ism and Sunnis under the domination of the Islamic Republic. Education in their native tongue is also forbidden. Furthermore, detention camps for Kurds have been established in Iran where personalities such as Teacher Zara Mohammadi 9 and Teacher and writer Souleyman Abda 10 have been arrested just because they taught the Kurdish language to Kurdish children. In Syria, the national identity has been put forward since the country’s first Constitution, which was presented like the Arab Kingdom of Syria, under the direction of King Faysal ibn Hussein 11 which will later become the king of Iraq. After Syria’s independence, a new Constitution was written under the French mandate in 1930, in which Kurds were often marginalized and were trying to find their place.

However, in the context of this research, we will be focusing on the process of negation and violence in Iraq, as well as the security argument used, particularly after 1963 and the rise to power of the Baath party. From the beginning, the Baath party has put in place a policy of devastation, of displacement and Arabisation, to the extent of perpetrating a genocide. Furthermore, discriminatory policies based on race have been applied against the Kurdish people in Iraq, the “Kurdish threat” being the main raison evoked” 12 .

The importance of this study lies in the understanding of the historical context, in the policy of negation and Arabization of the Iraqi territory in order to become aware of the stakes of this conflict, even if they remain marginal at the moment. In this perspective, we have adopted a descriptive methodology and carried out investigations that we have identified using the available sources.
From marginalization to genocide

The birth of the Iraqi state took place in 1920, after the fall of the Ottoman empire, and was followed by the involvement of the League of Nations who decided to annex the city of Mosul on December, 16th 2925. This decision was in line with the treaties concluded during the last two decades, first with the Royal Government, and then with the Iraqi state. In accordance with article 16 of the law regarding the British mandate in Iraq” nothing in this mandate forbids the British to establish an administratively independent government in the Kurdish regions” 13 . Thus, during the announcement on December 24th, 1922, it was agreed that there would be a Kurdish region in Mosul under a Kurdish government. However, the Constitution “does not refer to the rights of the Kurdish people”. According to this declaration, Iraqi and British governments have affirmed recognition of the Kurdish people to form a government inside the Iraqi territory 14 .

However, after the withdrawal of the British troops, all declarations and agreements concluded have been ignored and no dispositions were put in place regarding Mosul 15 . This situation was confirmed when Faysal Ibn Husein, coming from the Arab Peninsula, became King of Iraq. Many reasons explain this situation:

Under the British mandate of 1920 16 , Iraq has been divided into two regions, Mosul and Basra. Faysal Ibn Husein took power in Iraq in 1921 17 . The first Iraqi Constitution was written in 1925 18 . Although Kurds represented the majority in the region of Mosul, which was in reality annexed by Iraq before the decision of the League of Nations, the Arab language has been recognized as the official language in the first Constitution 19 of 1925. This shows how the Arab identity was attributed to the country. Article 2 states that “Iraq is free, independent, sovereign and indivisible 20 ». According to Professor Sherko Kirmanj, Kurds were considered to be a threat 21 , although they did not claim their independence. Thus, Iraq took an Arab turn with the constitutional monarchy under the British mandate. According to historian Hanna Batatu, the period from 1921 to 1939 was the “example of an integrated society (Iraqi people, and an Arab nation) 22 ”.

Secondly, the core of the Iraqi army “was constituted of 600 officers reformed from the previous army, all of them coming from Arab Sunni families 23 ». These officers have all served in the Ottoman army where they were trained. Most of them were heavily influenced by the Arab nationalist ideology, and some even tried to stage a coup and caused instabilities in the country 24 25 .

Third, King Faisal also brought a non-Iraqi Arab intellectual elite, among whom an Arab nationalist philosopher, Sati al Husri, of Turanian descent, during the Ottoman period 26 . He was an advocate for Turkisation, and after the fall of the Ottoman empire, he developed the idea of Arab Nationalism. Sati al Husri was appointed Minister of Education in Damascus when King Faysal was in Syria in 1919. Then, he went to Iraq and was appointed by King Faysal as “General director at the minister of Education where he dedicated 20 years to studying and directing educational and cultural aspects of Iraq 27 ».

Generally, for the Baathists and Arab nationalists, the national link is the only link existing in Arab countries that can guarantee harmony and cohesion between citizens 28 . This Arab nationalism doctrine enables us to understand the words of the Baath party’s founder, Michel Aflaq, affirming that “Kurds have been living with Arabs for centuries, they fight, are ready to die to defend their Arab land». He also stated that the oppressed people were not the ethnic or religious minorities, but rather the Arab majority, oppressed by colonialism 29 . According to Michel Aflaq, Kurds were accused of rallying with the colonizers against Arabs, which justified their persecution. This vision is confirmed by another source close to Michel Aflaq, which deemed that the Kurds of Iraq and Syria, as well as the Berbers, were an obstacle to the Arab unity and had to be exiled 30 .

Thus, the Iraqi political elite was not built on the respect of human rights and democracy. This has led researchers to qualify the Iraqi state as fragile 31 and has provoked a series of unresolved conflicts 32 during the monarchy 33 , the Republic 34 35 and the Shia era after 2003 36 . In this study, our attention will be focused on the excessive authority used by the different regimes, with a particular interest for those claiming to adhere to Arab nationalism, especially during the rise to power of Sunnis following the Baath party in 1963, thus marking the start of systematic Arabization.

The Iraqi government, led by the Ba'ath party, implemented a series of discriminatory procedures such as displacement, elimination and genocide. These practices became systematic and were overseen by the entire Iraqi bureaucracy, dividing up tasks according to individual skills. For example, the Arabization policy in the fields of education and culture started under King Faisal and was conducted for over 20 years by Sati al-Husri.
The Arab State and the Arabization Policy

Giving Iraq a racial identity or imposing the Arabic language on non-Arab citizens is seen as a catalyst for ethnic and ideological conflict. Thus, it was after King Faisal came to power in Iraq that the clashes and conflicts over identity in Iraq began 37 ”. This marked the beginning of the nationalization process, which took the form of Arabization policies. Iraq has consequently witnessed the Arabization of its state, institutions, educational programs, media, culture, non-Arab peoples, land, monuments and natural landscapes. According to Abbas Ali Suleiman's study entitled The place of Arabization in Arab states: Iraqi Kurdistan as a model, the Arabization process began under the reign of Midhat Pasha (1829-1853), who settled Arab clans on lands proclaimed by the state, among which the clans of Shammar, Anza, al-Dalim and Kaab. After the establishment of the Iraqi state in 1931, the government undertook projects to settle nomadic Bedouin tribes from the Arabian Peninsula in the Kurdish regions. These projects, such as Latifiya, Dejla and Houija 38 , expanded considerably throughout the 20th century.

Arabization policies regarding culture began with the Arabization school curricula and, more generally, modern education. This initiative began with the arrival of Sati al-Husri, in agreement with King Faisal himself 39 . For twenty years, from 1921 to 1941, he held a number of high-profile teaching positions, including Director-General of Education, Professor at the Institute of Advanced Study, Supervisor of Public Instruction, President of the University of Law, Director of Historical Heritage and Advisor to the King on educational matters 40 . In addition to the Arabization of culture and education, the Arabization of Iraqi Kurdistan took place, which started during the monarchic times with the settlement of Bedouin Arabs in regions such as Garmian, Hawija, Makhmur, Rabia, Sinjar and Zamar 41 . Although Arabization during this period was not systematic, it nevertheless had a considerable impact and changed Kurdish demographics.

The Baath Party's rise to power began unofficially, but they managed to exploit the laws to their advantage 42 . They began taking advantage of legislation relative to the fragile security situation and seized power in a coup d'état on February 8, 1963 43 . At that point, they formed a militia called the National Guard, using the legal framework, and then promulgated National Guard Law number 35 on May 18, 1963, making it the official militia in charge of implementing the Arab nationalization plan. In this respect, Fayiz Al-Khafaji, in his book entitled “The National Guard and its bloody role in Iraq”, mentions that the National Guard is the most dangerous and bloody paramilitary militia in the history of contemporary Iraq 44

One of the first rules of this militia is to protect Arab identity, i.e. the Arabization of Iraq, as stated in the first article, which stipulates its duty to protect the Arab movement in Iraq and pave the way for revolutionary practices 45 , an essential characteristic of this militia is willpower, as mentioned in the third article. However, it is not simply a matter of being an Iraqi volunteer, but an Arab volunteer from Arab countries, under the approval of the Chief of Staff 46 . Subsequently, the armed combat campaign was launched, with the National Guard militia violating the borders of Iraqi Kurdistan, making use of state force and its capabilities. Kurds, not being Arabs, were targeted and subsequently expelled from targeted areas. There are no precise figures for the number of Kurdish victims of this operation. Dozens of Kurdish villages in the Kirkuk region, the Erbil plain and the Mosul area were taken by storm.

In this regard, Ibrahim Jalal's book, “South Kurdistan and the July Revolution”, mentions that Alongside the Iraqi army and Syrian Yarmouk forces, thousands of Arab mercenaries (from the National Guard) took part in the military campaign in Kurdistan. The conflict was described to them as the Kurds' war against the Arabs, and that if they didn't annihilate them, the Kurds would attack to occupy Arab villages and towns and wipe them out. Furthermore, they were promised that if they succeeded in taking a Kurdish region, they would have the right to plunder everything. In conclusion, this attack was extremely violent. The press in certain socialist countries even described it as genocide (1999). 47 ”

The systematic attack on Iraq's Kurdish borders caused great concern among the great powers of the time. The Soviet Union persuaded Mongolia, its ally, to table a motion at the next session of the UN General Assembly condemning the Iraqi government for waging a genocidal war against the Kurds. Mongolia, through its Foreign Minister, sent a message during the 18th session of the UN General Assembly on June 20, 1963 regarding the genocide against the Kurdish people. This led to a diplomatic campaign by the Soviet Union against Iraq and became a threat in July 1963. However, under pressure from other countries, in particular Arab countries, the draft resolution was withdrawn 48 .

The Baathists, in their party’s constitution, considered Iraq and present-day Syria to be an integral part of the Arab nation. Consequently, Iraqi and Syrian Kurdistan are considered parts of the Arab nation. This vision implies that Kurdish citizens living in these territories are foreigners or guests, and must therefore abide by the rules established in this respect. This gave the Baathists carte blanche to Arabize these territories.

​​The Arabization process in Syria has led to the division of Kurdish regions into isolated islands, with Arab settlements between Kurdish towns and villages 49 . This isolation also extended between Iraqi Kurdistan, Turkish Kurdistan and Syrian Kurdistan, due to Arab settlements along the borders 50 . In Iraq, the Arabization of land was mainly imposed in the regions of Diyala, Kirkuk and Mosul. Laws no. 30 of 1958, no.117 of 1970 and no.90 of 1975 allowed assimilated Arabs to own agricultural land, with the aim of Arabizing these regions 51 52 .

As a result, the process of Arabization and displacement was extended to the policy of colonization. Ismaël Bichkouji highlighted this approach, pointing out the divide-and-conquer strategy, while adding the notion of destroying Kurdish civilization 53 54 .

After 2003, with the rise of the new regime in Baghdad led by the Shiite political elite, the non-Arab population hoped for the end of exclusion, Arabization and displacement policies. However, this hope was confronted by the internalized mentality of exclusion as well as the problems and violence accumulated in Arab regions added to the ignorance and non-application of the Constitution, which included principles for restoring the rights of excluded populations in the concerned areas 55 56 .

This was confirmed by the launching of the Arabization process, mainly in Kirkuk and Khanaqin 57 . It is no longer a secret that families and individuals from Baghdad and southern Iraq are being registered to transfer their files to Kirkuk and Khanaqin 58 . As I write these lines, a vast Arabization campaign is being carried out in the targeted areas to protect the army and Arab militias in the village of Palkana, neighbouring villages and near Kirkuk. In this respect, Mariwan Qarani, member of the Iraqi parliament's security and defence committee, declared: The persecution of the Kurds in Palkana of the Sargaran district in Kirkuk Governorate, as well as in all Kurdish territory outside the Kurdistan Regional Administration, must come to an end. Likewise, the attacks by incoming Arabs should be halted. 59 ».
They were told that they are without a homeland

Based on the Arab colonial policy, according to Ismail Beşikçi 60 , the Baathists decided to remove the Feyli Kurds from their native regions and relocate them beyond the country's borders. It is estimated that the number of Feyli Kurds exceeds 800,000, the majority of whom live in the regions of Diyala, Baghdad, Wasit and Kirkuk 61 .

The story began when the Iraqi government promulgated the Iraqi Nationality Law in 1924, in which the government classified Iraqi society into two categories: Ottoman dependence and Iranian dependence. It was easy for the first category to obtain Iraqi nationality, however, for the second category, citizens had to face many difficulties to do so 62 . Thus, the Feylis were deprived of Iraqi nationality or were considered Iranian, as they had not completed their military service for religious beliefs. Their situation is very similar to that of the Shiite Arabs, however, the latter obtained Iraqi nationality because they were considered Arabs, whereas the Feyli Kurds did not because they weren’t.

The displacement and genocide of the Feyli Kurds didn't stop after they were considered dependent on Iran, the pressure resumed a year after the Baath party came back to power in 1968. For example, it was not until 1970 that 40,000 Feyli Kurds were moved to Iran, and since then the displacements and arrests have not stopped 63 64 . The authorities have always adopted an aggressive and violent attitude towards the Feylis, focusing particularly on refusing to grant them Iraqi nationality. The second major campaign against them began in 1980, starting with telegram no. 2884 of April 10, 1980, sent to security institutions in Iraq. This document revealed the true intentions and plans of the authorities.

Telegram text:

We have noticed some confusion and errors from your services regarding the identification of those who are to be deported and those who are not. To clarify previous instructions, you will find below the checks and instructions to be followed:

1- All Iranians present in the country, as well as those who do not have Iraqi nationality, those who are applying for naturalization and those whose status has not yet been decided, will be deported (note: By Iranians we mean Kurdish Feylis).

2 - Regarding families, some of them have a certificate of nationality and are therefore not affected by the controls, but if other members are normally subject to these measures in the name of family unity, their papers and, if applicable, their nationality must be withdrawn. You must then send the Ministry the lists of people affected by our measures, so that we can revoke their nationality.

3 - Some families are deported through the police stations, but if they fail to show up, they will be deported through the usual border regions.

Exceptions:

1°: Military personnel, regardless of their rank, will be turned into Baghdad officers, who will then act according to the orders given.

2°: Young people to be deported will not be deported if they reside in the country, but they must be identified in a register listing their identity and job, which will then be sent to the Ministry.

3°: Iranian women married to Iraqis must be identified and the list sent to the Ministry.

4°: Young people aged between 18 and 28 should not be expelled, but kept in the governorate until further notice.

5°: Iranian Armenians who reside in the country are not subject to deportation, but their identity and employment must be registered and sent to the Ministry.

6°: Iranian political refugees are not subject to deportation.

7°: Khuzestan Arabs who reside in the country are excluded from deportation.

8°: If you come across a case that is not mentioned above, please call us before making a decision.

We reaffirm our order to open fire on those attempting to return to Iraqi soil, please act accordingly. (Kazeem 2007:12) 65

Signed the Minister of the Interior

This telegram is considered the starting point for planning, organizing and classifying the victims into three categories.

The first category is deported in all cases, and under no circumstances must they return, otherwise they will be shot. When they were pushed outside the borders, at the time of the Iran/Iraq war, the victims remained for days on the front line between the two camps, exposed to bullets and the winter cold. Many lost their lives on this deadly journey. The second category: those who were excluded from the deportation, such as soldiers regardless of their rank, young people residing in the country, Iranian women married to Iraqis, and young people between the ages of 18 and 28. There was no mercy for them; their names were listed, arrested directly, and transferred to mass graves. The third category: Iranian Armenians, Iranian political refugees and Khuzestan Arabs were spared deportation because they were considered foreign residents of Iraq.

Kurdish Feylis faced numerous discriminatory measures throughout Iraqi history until 2003. After 2003, the pressure on the Kurds was lifted, but their civil status remained that of foreigners, and around 100,000 Feyli Kurds are still deprived of Iraqi nationality 66 .They have never been compensated and their rights have never been restored. For example, they have never retrieved the property stolen before their deportation 67 . Also, the graves of thousands of those who were exterminated under mysterious circumstances, known as the absents and estimated at 25,000 people, have not been identified. The legend says that they were used for chemical experiments 68 .
Scorched Earth Policy

Following the Algiers agreements between the Iraqi and Iranian regimes, and the collapse of the armed Kurdish movement in 1974, the way was paved for the Iraqi government to continue the Arabization and ethnic cleansing plans that were originally part of the Baath Party ideology and had been going on since the 1960s in the Kirkuk, Diyala and Mosul regions. These policies have led to the displacement of at least 70,000 Kurds from the completely Sunni Arab eastern region of Mosul» 69 . In addition, as the Arabization process continued in areas occupied by Kurds, the Iraqi government launched a massive campaign against the Kurds along the border from Khanaqin on the Iranian side to Sinjar on the Syrian-Turkish side » 70 . The operation extended from 15 to 30 kilometres around the border, in line with the Algiers agreements 71 72 73 , arguing the need to clear border areas that could be dangerous for the Iraqi government due to the activity of Kurdish fighting movements in these areas. However, despite the arguments used to justify the deportation and the policy of evacuating the borders, they targeted remote Kurdish villages, particularly those in the Garmiyan region. They carried out expulsions, eventually destroying 4,500 Kurdish towns and villages and sending their inhabitants to forced labour camps. This gave rise to a scorched earth policy, destroying villages and the entire ecosystem (wells, rivers, domestic and wild animals). People were sent to militarized locations surrounded by Iraqi armed forces, intelligence services and militias. It is important to know that at the time, the inhabitants of this region were mainly peasants or farmers, but suddenly, due to these destructive measures, they became unemployed. According to the Human Rights Watch research centre, more than 250,000 people 74 were deported and stripped of their land, their history and their memories.

By emptying these regions of their inhabitants and destroying them, the Baghdad government has achieved at least five security and strategic objectives:

The first: total control over Kurdish areas by driving out its population as a security measure. The Kurds are now under control, living in difficult conditions and lacking the bare minimum.

Second: the successful fragmentation and even destruction of the Kurdish cultural structure, urban planning and historical heritage. The village and rural life were the cradle and main source of the Kurdish people's values and traditions. A guarded treasure that foreigners had so far been unable to damage.

Third: the Baath Party was unable to set up party headquarters in these isolated villages, most of which were located in mountainous and rugged regions. But as soon as the residents were sent to the detention centres, they were given televisions, food and the necessities to live.

The Fourth: Once the Kurdish population had been deprived of their lands and sources of income, thousands of people were recruited into armed militias and enrolled in Iraqi military and intelligence activities. This was done in exchange for a monthly salary. In so doing, the government hopes to divide Kurdish society by making them fight against each other. Once again, they are applying the policy of divide and conquer in order to destroy everything.

The fifth: The areas that have been emptied are off-limits, and it is totally forbidden to move around in them. This makes it easier for the Iraqi government to control and monitor the region.
Annihilation of the population

As part of the deportation campaign mentioned above, the entire Barzan region was emptied. The Barzanis were deported from their native regions to certain areas of southern Iraq, especially to the Diwaniyah and Nasiriyah regions, in extremely precarious living conditions 75 76 . After years of living in southern Iraq, the Barzanis were sent to four detention centres in Iraqi Kurdistan: Qushtapa, Bahrka, Harir and Diana 77 ». The Barzanis began to have a more decent life in these centers as the rest of Kurdish society was forced to be here too. These centres were often located close to towns or at least next to the main roads. This geographical location was consciously chosen, as it was essential for controlling the Kurds on a security, intellectual and social level. As with all genocides, the rulers only need an excuse to act and justify their crimes and failures. For example, in the midst of the Iran-Iraq war, Iranian forces attacked Haj Imran on July 22, 1983, with the participation of Kurdistan Democratic Party forces led by Masoud Barzani. The latter took control of Shorsh, Alan, Azadi and Rayat 78 . These attacks were extremely deadly for both countries. In response to these attacks and the damage caused to Iraqi forces, the Baath regime led by Barzan and Watban Ibrahil al-Tikriti decided to besiege the silk camp on the night of August 8, 1983, then the Bahraka and Qushtapa camps were attacked on the night of August 10, 1983. During these attacks, all Barzani men aged between 12 and 65 were arrested. According to Kurdish sources, 8,000 Barzanis were abducted during the military operations, while human rights observers estimate the number to be over 5,000. In a speech delivered in the Erbil governorate on September 12, 1983, President Saddam Hussein made it clear that the Barzanis have been sent to hell. These abductions of 5,000 to 8,000 men did not go smoothly, as they all had families or children. Not only were these men abducted, but they also left behind women and children full of grief.
Extermination

Halbaja became the symbol of chemical weapon attacks. This city was bombed on March 16, 1983, killing 5,000 people, including many women and children 79 . According to a report by Middle East Watch, this caused an international scandal which was replaced by a new one when the international community learned that the first use of toxic gas against the Kurds was already eleven months old» 80 . The case was brought to international attention, and on December 23, 2005, the Dutch court sentenced Frans Van Anraat, the businessman who bought the chemicals on the international market and then sold them to Saddam Hussein's regime, to 15 years in jail. As for Saddam Hussein, the court ruled that he had committed genocide against the inhabitants of Halabja. This was a significant event, as it was the first time the word genocide had been used to refer to Iraqi actions 81 .

According to the survivors of the chemical gas attack and their testimonies, it was a real extermination process, but instead of the rooms designed for this purpose during the Second World War, in the Halabja attack the whole town became a crematorium. It was impossible to escape the bombings, which affected all civilians. Their only crime was to be Kurdish and to live on the land where their parents, grandparents and ancestors had always lived. In this regard, Adalat Omar, a well-known activist for the recognition of the Kurdish genocide, tells the story of a woman from the Balisan people who told him what had happened to their village during the bombardment:

The village suddenly turned into a dark zone, we couldn't see anything, couldn't recognize anyone. A thick cloud fell over the village and everyone lost their sight. Some of them were vomiting, their faces and eyes turned black. Most people began to bloat under their shoulder blades or, in the case of women, under their breasts. They were highly suffering. Then a yellow substance came out of their noses and eyes.

The inhabitants of the town of Ranya came to help them. However, in the morning, the intelligence services went to the hospital to transfer all the wounded to Erbil hospital. They were told that Iran had used this chemical weapon against them, and that 346 people had been killed, including 103 adults. Among the injured, 70 to 75 young men were killed by Erbil security forces, including 22 from Balisan, 50 from Sheikh Wasan and the rest from four other surrounding villages. (Adalat Omar, 2022 interview).

The chemical attacks went on for over a year. Middle East Watch recorded forty attacks targeting Kurds, some of which included airstrikes lasting several days between April 1987 and August 1988. All these events were war crimes, committed with completely prohibited weapons 82 .

Unlike Middle East Watch, which considered the attack on the town of Halbaja a war crime, Iraq's Supreme Court declared on February 20, 2010 that the bombing of the town of Halbaja constituted a genocide. Likewise, on March 16, 2010, the Iraqi Council of Elected Officials recognized that the attack was an act of genocide 83 .
Anfal Campaigns

Anfal is a religious term, and because of its origin it has led to contradictory thinking among Kurdish Muslims. It's the name of a Sura in the Qur'an, in which the battle of Khaybar is mentioned, and more precisely the first confrontation between the Muslim Arabs and the polytheist ones. The Muslim Arabs won, taking great spoils which led to quarrels over their management. The Qur'anic verses described how to manage it. By using this term, the Ba'ath regime assimilates the Kurds to apostates, foreigners to the central authority, who therefore deserve to be exterminated, dispossessed of everything they own, and have their goods considered as spoils of war and distributed to the soldiers and mercenaries who collaborate with them 84 .

On the other hand, the extermination campaign has begun to empty Kurdistan of its inhabitants. It destroyed thousands of villages and concentrated its inhabitants in the places mentioned above. However, the Iran-Iraq war disrupted the extermination plan and it was postponed. When Iraq felt that the war was coming to an end, the regime resumed its annihilation plan to implement the ideology of the Ba'ath party and remove the so-called Kurdish obstacle to Arab unity. They prepared a final solution plan they called the security solution. This new stage came at a time when the policy of Arabization was in full swing, through institutionalized marginalization, assimilation policies and the hunting down of Kurdish inhabitants 85 . In short, it was a policy of destruction, mobilizing all the capacities of the Iraqi state.

The Battle of Anfal began with the nomination of Hussein Majid, Saddam Hussein's cousin, as Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Region on March 29, 1987. This was approved in decree n°160 and signed by President Saddam Hussein himself. He was granted absolute powers and the ability to mobilize all military capabilities, as well as intelligence for the northern region. It's clear that all this was orchestrated. When the new head of the northern region, Ali Hassan al-Majid, came to Kirkuk, he issued his first decision, which can be considered a major first act and inaugurated what was planned. Here is the decision:

Northern Organization Office Command

Secretary

Decision 4408

N°28/4408

June 20, 1987

Northern Organization Bureau Command

Command of the 1st Corps, 2nd Corps and Army Corps

Dealing with the security threat in the villages

Considering that the time limit for action in the villages is due to expire on June 21, 1987, we have decided to proceed as follows from June 22, 1987:

1-All villages that have not been treated by our services, nor removed, are considered terrorist zones, where Iranian agents are present, traitors among Iraqi traitors.

2-Any human or animal must be eliminated from these zones, which are considered forbidden areas. It is authorized to open fire without any restrictions unless we mention it.

3-It is forbidden to go there, to make any investments (agricultural, industrial or breeding). All competent agents will closely monitor this measure and will be intransigent.

4-Air strikes are planned to kill as many people as possible at any time of the day or night.

5-Anybody in these zones will be arrested, investigated and sentenced to death if aged between 15 and 70, depending on the information gathered.

6-The competent authorities will investigate those who voluntarily turn themselves in to the government or a branch of the party for a period of three days. If necessary, this period can be extended to ten days, in which case we must be informed. If this period is still not sufficient, to continue it is necessary to have our approval by telephone or telegram through comrade Taher al Ani.

7-All items obtained by members of national defense regiments will be considered theirs, with the exception of heavy and medium weapons. Small arms can remain in their possession. They will just need to declare their numbers. Legion leaders will have to be reactive and quickly inform commanders and inform us in detail of their activity within the regiment.

Signature:

Comrade Ali Hussein al-Majid, member of the national leadership and head of the northern organization office 86 87 »

This decision, issued seven months before the operations, was a guideline in preparation for the Anfal campaign, which began on February 22 and ended on March 9, 1988. Ali Hussein al-Majid's violence provoked astonishment among senior Iraqi army officials and commanders. In a 1991 recording, experts formally identified his voice. He expresses his vision of the Kurds:

Next summer there must be no villages left, except for the centres, the Kurds must be rounded up like a hen puts her chicks under her wing, and strictly so » 88 .

After the deadline had passed, the target areas were attacked by land and air, using gas and weapons of mass destruction such as cyanide and mustard gas. Firstly, the remaining villages in Iraqi Kurdistan were destroyed, along with the ecosystem. Secondly, the operations resulted in the death and disappearance of some 180,000 people, most of them women and children, whose bodies were then dumped in mass graves. Thirdly, the operations destroyed all infrastructure, from wells to roads, buildings and anything else that might have stood in their way.

Fourthly, hundreds of thousands of hectares of agricultural land were destroyed and burned, resulting in high unemployment and lasting damage. Fifthly, the entire popular heritage of the region was completely destroyed. Sixthly, the confinement and stigmatization of the Kurds led to violence and the emergence of militias in Iraq.

In the context of what happened during the Anfal campaign, we come across the theory of Raul Hilberg's phased program. In the beginning, Ali Hussein Al Majid determined the group of people to be exterminated, and the target locations were determined with the utmost precision. Thousands of red zone citizens were arrested by the Iraqi army, special forces and Baath Party militias. In the second stage, these areas were bombarded with lethal weapons, including chemical and heavy weapons, after which the survivors were arrested and rounded up in detention camps such as Tobzawa. Once gathered, they were classified and isolated from each other, and then exterminated. To this end, they were transported by bus along large pits, where they were shot and then dumped.

Most observers and experts on the Kurdish genocide agree that the Anfal campaign was part of a longer series of events following the genocide of the Feyli Kurds and the extermination of Barzanis. If the regime hadn't collapsed and the uprisings hadn't taken place, Arabization would have taken another turn. The regime was ready to transfer hundreds of thousands of Arabs to the cities of Kurdistan.
Historical continuity

The city of Mosul began to be occupied on June 9, 2014, by the Islamic State (ISIS), however this was perceived as a liberation for some Sunnis particularly those of the revolutionaries of the army of Naqshbandi men. This statement reflected the current tensions between Shiites and Sunnis 89 . Less than a month later, the conflict took on another dimension and shifted to the Sinjar where the genocide against the Kurdish Ezidis began on August 3, 2014. To date, more than 2,800 women and children are still being held by ISIS or are missing 90 . Many experts see this as a new episode in the Kurdish genocide, for several reasons. Firstly, because the ISIS structure is made up of former Baath Party members and their senior officers. As mentioned in Mosul: Mosul's board of directors includes former officers and representatives of the Islamic fighting factions 91 .” According to Atheel al-Nujaifi, the governor of Mosul There are a number of fighting factions involved with the Islamic State and the local population is organizing protection committees in coordination with the armed factions 92 ».

Secondly, Sunni Arabs living in villages adjacent to the Ezidis played an important role in the genocide. Indeed, some of them participated directly in the massacres and looting. Christine Van den Toorn, Director of the Institute for Regional and International Studies, confirms that ISIS assault on Kurdish villages was carried out with the sometimes-enthusiastic support of the Sunnis, in order to expel them from their farms and homes. Hundreds of men were killed, and Ezidi girls and women were abducted, jailed and sold on the slave market 93 .”

Thirdly, the religious factor is another dimension of the Ezidi genocide. Indeed, if we look at the procedures, we can see that the issue of the captivity and enslavement of Ezidi Kurds were carried out in the name of a verse of the Quran and concerning the measures relating to the captivity of Ezidi girls as sexual slaves, it can be traced back to certain Islamic jurisprudence 94 95 .
Conclusion

The genocide in Iraq is multidimensional and cannot be summed up in a single event. It refers to a multitude of factors, some of which date back to the beginning of Iraqi history, such as the marginalization of the Kurds, the Arabization policy and the deportation. After the Baath party came to power, Iraq became the scene of the Kurdish genocide, beginning with a campaign of hatred and culminating in extermination. Achieving total annihilation was a multi-stage process, starting with a divide and-conquer policy, then moving on to the next stage of total destruction. Initially, the Iraqi state was founded on an Arab identity, so all means were mobilized to achieve the total Arabization of the country. Hundreds of thousands of hectares of farmland were seized from the non-Arab populations. After the Baath Party came to power in a violent, bloody coup, the Feyli Kurds living in the capital Baghdad and neighbouring towns were told they were stateless and had to leave Iraq. Most of them emigrated to Iran, and over 20,000 young people were eliminated. They were soldiers in the regular army, shopkeepers, students...

The scorched earth policy was adopted in the late 70's, after the suppression of the Kurdish armed movement with the Algiers Agreement between Iran and Iraq. As a result, the targeted regions and villages were destroyed, the inhabitants deported to camps, homes and water sources destroyed, and pets left to their fate. Many were deported to southern Iraq, including many Barzanis, but it wasn't long before they were sent back north. One morning they were all killed under unknown circumstances. This was followed by the massacre of the town of Halabja. These towns were destroyed by chemical weapons and heavy artillery. Immediately afterwards, the Final Solution and Anfal campaign were implemented. The goal was the total extermination of the Kurdish population and the permanent transformation of the region into Arab territory. The operations lasted more than eight months. Less than 35 years later, after the republican era of the Ba'ath party and the centenary of the Armenian genocide at the beginning of the 20th century, history repeated itself with a process of killing, captivity and enslavement, during which the Ezidis were exterminated on purely religious motives.
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