I T IS IMPOSSIBLE TO identify a single locus of Kurdish policymaking within the Turkish state, although the National Security Council is the single most important institution. The policy grows out of a long-time elite circle of Turkish politicians and statesmen imbued with the conviction that this is a unitary state with a uniform national identity: It has had a hard time admitting the presence of alternative national identities. This Kemalist consensus is strengthened by an ever-vigilant army that, in the past, has not shied away from expressing its preferences or intervening.
These policies continue to be fostered by the silence or noninvolvement of most of the press, intellectuals, civil society, and political parties. This is not to say that the Kemalist consensus is immutable: During his presi-dency, O¨ zal managed to challenge it and introduce new ideas and open new realms of inquiry and thinking. He did this almost single-handedly,and often with members of his own party opposing him.
Policy in the southeast has relied almost exclusively on the military op-tion. As we note below, with massive infusions of manpower in tandem with better tactics and weaponry and sheer brute force, the state has man-aged to reclaim some if not most of the areas once under#PKK# control (especially at night, when the PKK would roam unimpeded)...[1]

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