Badrkhan Ali

The sparring about the Kurdish issue in Syria seems like it just opened. The Kurdish topic did not take an important place in national deliberations and panel discussions, since there is no noticeable history of the Kurdish issue at the level of the public political panel in the country, such as in Iraq, where the Kurdish issue has a history of wars and conflicts with Baghdad and At the core of political issues. Rather, it is a real problem in the formation and structure of the Iraqi state and society since the beginning of the establishment of the Iraqi state, an objective fact that is not ignored and denied, for at least Iraqis, if not for Arabs in general, only those who insist on derivating Reality is of ideology, and they are not few.
In Syria, as we mentioned, the Kurdish issue did not take much space in the political platforms of forces and currents, nationalism and non-nationalism. We read, every now and then, positions and opinions of individuals and organizations, close to power or in opposite locations, reflect this concern, obscurity and complaining about the growing talk about Kurdish affairs, rights and political, by non-Kurds, especially When talking exceeds a narrow roof of a fenced citizen with red conditions, lines and circles... It is closer to a forced son-in-law, prove its failure in our region and the reality of nationalism in it.
It is not necessary to create a different concept of citizenship more inclusive, broad and able to contain a constructive and productive identity of historically active identities, including national identities of the peoples of the region, and the work of consideration and the examining historical mind to create renewed models For citizenship in multinational and multinational countries, based on the experience of all mankind. We are talking about problems of a historic and extended nature in time and space that affect many peoples and countries in the region, major nations and international agreements.
First, it takes to stop looking at the Kurdish issue as a resurrection of sectarian formations, which were going to extinction, demise and integration (the kind expression of national and ethnic son-in-law, in this context) without imperial manipulation and colonial penetration of the Arab world I'm not going to be
It will be difficult to accept what disturbs the Arab nationalist rhetoric. Damascus is the beating heart of Arabs and the capital of Umayyad, and Syria is the cradle of Arabs, as all Arab political and intellectual literature gathers, not just the speech of the authority and its media, providing everyone with national slogans and mixing them with Islamic slogans when necessary, or Anti imperialism sometimes, or all, according to circumstances and its requirements.
However, the talk of Kurdish privacy in Syria is not an emerging invention, as many claim, but it has been present since the beginning of the Syrian state's emergence, i.e. even before the political expression organized in the 1991 s, which in turn precedes 1991 Much (History considered by a senior Syrian Arab thinker as the beginning of what Kurds called ′′ discovery ′′ of their Kurds, in Iraq?!) or the American occupation of Iraq!, or the simplified vision going to consider expatriation in 1962 The beginning of the history of the Kurdish problem, so that citizenship will be returned to the abstracts, including the closure of the Kurdish file permanently? Or more simplified: it is overreacted, called for by faulty power policies towards everyone, more and less.
It is necessary, at the outset, to refer to objective factors that are beyond the control of political and social actors, Kurdish or others, for the remarkable absence of Kurdish affairs in public political life for decades, and what seems to many now and has been lurking in Sue In Syria and Arabs seek ′′ blessing a Kurdish problem (or a Kurdish issue) in Syria . The first of these factors, in our opinion, which limit the Kurdish issue to take effect on the politics of the center, such as in Iraq, Iran and Turkey, As well as the early and essential role we mentioned in the Arab national advocacy and the absence of a Kurdish province with clear borders, but three areas with a relative majority in the island and appointed Arabs, for example, or an absolute majority in Afrin - (Mount Kurds) northwest Aleppo, a region that has joined modern Syria emerging with its current borders after agreements between major countries where none of the region has been consulted nor political elite.
The three Kurdish regions - an expression rejected by many today in Syria - were not in the accounts of Arab nationalists at the beginning of the last century, and Dre Aouni, the Egyptian Kurdish writer, points out in her book ′′ Arabs and Kurds, opponent or harmony ′′ ?, You see that the Kurdish island region was not one of the demands of Arab nationalists, not in Hussein-McMahon's correspondence, not during the Faisal era in Syria, not even by Arab nationalists under French assignment. The island region was joined in Syria in 1921. And for the Turkish-Syrian border, it was determined by the French-Turkish treaty concluded in London on March 9, 1921, which was amended twice: the first by the treaty of Ankara in October First (October) in the same year, then in the treaty of Jovial in 1926, where Turkey was given areas with a majority of Arab population, while three Kurdish areas were given to Syria haunted Kurdish majority. Dre Aouni transmits from Danish writer Karsten Newpur through a map published about a trip he took in this area in 1764 confirming the presence of Kurdish clans at that time in their current places on the island, known by the same name to date I'm sorry. Aouni moves itself from the French Traveler Folni who spoke lengthy about the Kurds and the Mountain of Kurds in his 1870 book, to conclude that they have been living in their current areas for centuries and have not yet come to them as refugees Drawing the Syrian border with Turkey as some nationalist communities claim in Syria.
Many authors point out that the Seafer treaty concluded on 10 August 1920 and across three articles (62-63-64) concerning Kurdistan included those Kurdish regions (later in Syria) with Ottoman Kurdistan. It is known that the Cever agreement remained ink on paper until it was terminally cancelled under the Lausanne Convention in 1923.
However, those regions are far from the center, marginal, ineffective, pressure on successive governments, as well as their fragility with subsequent Syrian economic, political and social centers, and population dependence on a simple primitive lifestyle of wheat cultivation and breeding Livestocks by primitive means, especially before the concentration of power in Damascus, the entry of agricultural machinery and modern irrigation systems later, the establishment of the Syrian-Egyptian state of unity, as well as the fragility of state building in Syria itself, which made those areas completely outside the Syrian life cycle , which was the sole eye of major cities, Damascus, Aleppo, and their commercial bourgeoisie. At the same time, the city relations were very weak in Kurdish regions of a tribal and rural nature, which were missed by cities. The largest city with a majority of Kurdish is Qamishli, only eight decades old (like Afrin).
The Kurdish-Syrian relationship (if to be spoken) is due to the petition submitted by five Kurds deputies in the Syrian Parliament (Syrian Constituent Assembly) in June 1928., as well as the demand of Kurdish leaders and Local Christians, 1932, French institutions establish a separate administration of the island and then the island general conference held in September 1938 under the chairmanship of Haju Agha, who appealed to France to give full autonomy. Pierre Rondo (one of the Kurdish mentors during the French assignment) says that prominent Kurds ′′ literature and tribal leaders ′′ demanded that they be allowed to establish a regime for their citizens within the Syrian ocean, and they were the most complete of their submissions made, as well It was mentioned earlier, on June 23, 1928 in Damascus, on the occasion of the meeting of the ′′ Syrian Constituent Assembly . this document was seeking the Kurds ′′ means of liberation within the framework of their national culture to become beneficial members of the Syrian people group . It was The petition includes the following orders:
The use of Kurdish language in the Kurdish regions, like other official languages.
Teaching Kurdish language in schools in those regions.
Replacing the staff of these regions with Kurdish employees.
The same document was also hoping for the creation of a Kurdish ′′ Legion ′′ army within a French border protection framework. Finally, it demanded facilities for the agricultural situation of Kurdish migrants on the upper island. (1)
If Kurds demands included in 1928, in an advanced form of self-administration of Kurdish regions and the adoption of the Kurdish language, what is strange that they demand today, eighty years later, recognition of national privacy within the framework of unity of the country Constitutional recognition of their existence as a non-Arab nationalist in the Syrian national fabric, under a modern democratic state and ensuring their political representation, and lifting discriminatory injustices and policies exercised for decades just because they were Kurds? Where is the surprise? And where is the conspiracy?![1]